



R

NOT ISSUABLE

GREAT²BOOKS
OF THE WESTERN WORLD
ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS EDITOR IN CHIEF

LOCKE
BERKELEY
HUME

MORTIMER J. ADLER, *Associate Editor*

Members of the Advisory Board STRINGFELLOW BARR, SCOTT BUCHANAN, JOHN ERSKINE,
CLARENCE H. FAUST, ALEXANDER MEISELJOHN, JOSEPH J. SCHWAB, MARK VAN DOREN

Editorial Council—A. F. B. CLARK, F. L. LUCAS, WALTER MURDOCH

WALLACE BROCKWAY, *Executive Editor*

A Letter Concerning Toleration
Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

BY JOHN LOCKE

The Principles of Human Knowledge

BY GEORGE BERKELEY

An Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding

BY DAVID HUME



WILLIAM BENTON *Publisher*

ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA INC

CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO GENEVA SYDNEY TOKYO

A Letter Concerning Toleration by John Locke edited by Charles L. Sherman
is reprinted by arrangement with D. APPLETON CENTURY COMPANY INC
Copyright 1937 by D. APPLETON CENTURY COMPANY INC

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding by John Locke is reprinted from
the edition collated and annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser and published
by OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding by David Hume edited by
L. A. Selby Bigge is reprinted by arrangement with OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Great Books

is published with the editorial advice of the faculties
of The University of Chicago

○

1952

BY ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA INC

COPYRIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT UNION

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED UNDER PAN AMERICAN AND UNIVERSAL COPYRIGHT
CONVENTIONS BY ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA INC

GENERAL CONTENTS

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION Page 1
CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT
SECOND ESSAY Page 73

AN ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING Page 85
By JOHN LOCKE

THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, Page 403
By GEORGE BERKELEY

AN ENQUIRY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING Page 451
By DAVID HUME

JOHN LOCKE

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

Translated by WILLIAM POPPLE

CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT

SECOND ESSAY

AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN

UNDERSTANDING

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

JOHN LOCKE 163-1704

LOCKE was born August 29, 1632 the eldest child of a respectable Somersetshire family of Puritan sympathies. His father was a lawyer, small landowner and captain of volunteer regiment in the parliamentary army. Lock's education was carefully tended by his father at the rural home of Belton, near Bicester, and it was probably through the influence of the elder Locke's parliamentary patrons that he obtained a place at Westminster School, where he remained from his father's death to his twentieth year. In 1652 he won a scholarship at Christ Church College Oxford.

At this time Lock entered Oxford. Cromwell was chancellor and the Puritans were in control. The curriculum, however, was still the traditional one of grammar, rhetoric, logic, geometry and moral philosophy. Lock later declared that he had lost great deal of time at the commencement of his studies, because the only philosophy then known at Oxford was the Peripatetic, and his friend Lady Masham, reported that he often told her that he had so small satisfaction there from his studies that this discouragement kept him from being any very hard student. Nevertheless, after taking his bachelor's degree in 1656 he remained at Oxford, but his master's degree and then became successively lecturer in Greek, rhetoric, and finally in 1664 censor of moral

the founding of Oxford of the Royal Society led him to begin experiments in chemistry and meteorology. Soon afterwards he began the study of medicine, and by 1666 he was gaged in occasional practice although he never took a doctor's degree.

The common-place books kept between his twenty-eighth and thirty-fourth years show that was also Oxford that Lock became interested in political questions. His citations are concerned with such topics as the constitution of society, the relation of church and state and the importance of religious toleration. In 1665 he interrupted his medical studies to serve

diplomat mission to Brandenburg. On his return

This action came about largely as a result of an

liberty of perverting an impostment in the breast, prescribed for the servants helped to arrange the marriage of the eldest son, and drew up the Fundamental Constitution of the Government of Carolina, a colony of which Ashley was a lord protector. When Ashley was made first Earl of Shaftesbury and Lord Chancellor in 1671 Lock became secretary of presentation and secretary of the council of trade.

Lock's many practical duties in London did not prevent him from pursuing his scientific and philosophical interests. His medical studies provided the basis for close friendship with Sydenham, and Lock sometimes accompanied him on his professional calls. He kept up his early interest in chemistry with his friend Robert Boyle and upon the latter's death, edited his *General History*. He and H. frequently held informal gatherings for the discussion of questions in science and theology. On one such occasion when he met with his friends, a question

as connected by the typically witty but coherent parcels, after long intervals of neglect resumed again as humour and occasions permitted" and published after almost twenty years as *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*.

Lock's fortunes were closely linked with those of Shaftesbury, and when the Earl fell from power in 1685 Lock withdrew from public

life He went to France where he remained four years during which he sought to restore his health which had never been good and to work upon his *Essay* At Montpellier he was the neighbor of the Earl of Pembroke later also the patron of Berkeley to whom he dedicated his work When Shaftesbury again arose to power in 1679 Locke returned to England and resumed his former activities Although he seems to have played little part in Shaftesbury's plotting with Monmouth against the King which led to the Earl's exile and death he fell under royal suspicion and in 1683 he found it safer to seek refuge in Holland Fearing arrest at the insistence of the English Government he lived at first in Amsterdam under the assumed name of Dr Van der Linden He rapidly formed congenial associations especially among the Remonstrants with whom Spinoza had also lived and settled down to complete the *Essay* In 1687 he made his first appearance as an author by publishing an abstract of it in the *Bibliothèque Universelle* of his friend Le Clerc It seems likely that he was involved to some extent in planning the Revolution of 1688 He had friends among the English refugees he was known to William of Orange and he returned to England in 1689 in the same ship which carried William's wife Princess Mary

Although Locke was offered several responsible positions in the new regime he preferred to devote himself to his writings and accepted only the comparatively light task of commissioner of appeals Within four years he completed his most important works The *Letter Concerning Toleration* which had been written and published in Latin in Holland appeared in

English the year of his return In 1690 the *Two Treatises on Civil Government* and the *Essay* appeared and three years later the *Thoughts on Education*

Prompted by ill health and dissatisfaction with the course of public affairs Locke retired in 1691 to Oates Manor in Essex the home of Lady Masham daughter of Ralph Cudworth

brought out during his life time The *Essay* and *Letter Concerning Toleration* involved him in a long series of controversies regarding the religious implications of his teaching The *Second* and *Third Letter Concerning Toleration* the pamphlets interchanged with Bishop Stillingfleet of Worcester and the *Reasonableness of Christianity* belong to these years as does the series of letters to Isaac Newton He continued to be occupied with political problems and expressed his views on currency reform in his *Observations on Silver Money* and *Further Considerations on Raising the Value of Money* Upon the establishment of a commission on trade and plantations Locke reluctantly accepted a post as one of the commissioners This office absorbed all the time his health permitted him to spend in London from 1696 to 1700 when constant illness compelled his resignation

Locke's last years were spent quietly in retirement at Oates He occupied himself with biblical studies and wrote a commentary on St Paul's Epistles He was in the midst of writing a *Fourth Letter on Toleration* when he died on October 28 1704 He was buried near Oates by the parish church of High Laver

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

HONOURED SIR,

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion I must needs answer you freely that I esteem that to be the chief characteristic mark of the true Church. For whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of places and times, or of the pomp of their outward worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline all of them or the majority of their faith—so everyone is orthodox to himself—these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men striving for power and empire rather than of the Church of Christ. Let anyone have never so true a claim to all these things, yet if he be destitute of charity meekness, and good will in general towards all mankind even to those that are not Christians he is certainly yet far from being true Christian himself. The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, said our Saviour to his disciples, but ye shall be so. The business of true religion is quite another than its outward order, the external pomp, or the brilliant apparatus of ecclesiastical dominion, or the mere exercise of compulsion by force but the revivifying of men in love, according to the rules of virtue and piety. Whoever will lift himself under the banner of Christ, must, in the first place and before all things, make his own lusts descend. It is impossible for any man to usurp the name of Christian with out holiness, filial purity, firmness, benignity and meekness of spirit. Let everyone then name the name of Christ, depart from iniquity. "Thou, who thou art converted to the good things brethren, said our Lord to Peter. It would indeed be very hard for that appears careless about his own salvation to persuade me that he were extremely concerned for mine. For it is impossible that those should sincerely and heartily

apply themselves to make other people Christians, who have not really embraced the Christian religion in their own hearts. If the Gospel and

commit against the precepts of the Gospel which I shall see them persecute with fire and sword the members of their own communion that are tainted with various vices and with ungodly manners and an error of eternal perdition and which I shall see them thus press their lives and dearest of the salvation of the souls by the infliction of various and exercise of all manner of cruelties. For if it be the principle of charity as they pretend and I to men's souls that they do prize them for their estates, maintain them with corporal punishments, torture and torment them in iron prisons, and in the end to entreat way that their lives—I say, if all this be done merely to make men Christians and procure their salvation why then do they suffer who are in fraud make and such like norms, which (according to the apostle) manifestly relish of the iniquity corrupt to predestinate so much and bound amongst their flocks and people? These and such like things, are certainly more contrary to the glory of God to the purity of the Church, to the salvation of souls, than any consent us dissent from ecclesiastical decisions, or separation from public worship whilst accompanied with inordinate filial. Why then does this burning calf God, the Church, and for the salvation of souls—burning I say let
Rom.

Luk 5.
11 Tim. 9.
Luk 32.

erally with fire and faggot—pass by those moral vices and wickednesses without any chastise

of opinions which for the most part are about nice and intricate matters that exceed the capacity of ordinary understandings? Which of the parties contending about these things is in the right which of them is guilty of schism or heresy whether those that domineer or those that suffer will then at last be manifest when the causes of their separation comes to be judged of He certainly that follows Christ embraces His doctrine and bears His yoke though he forsake both father and mother separate from the public assemblies and ceremonies of his country or whomsoever or whatsoever else he relinquishes will not then be judged a heretic

Now though the divisions that are amongst sects should be allowed to be never so obstructive of the salvation of souls yet nevertheless adultery fornication uncleanness lasciviousness idolatry and such like things cannot be

the kingdom of God and thinks it his duty to endeavour the enlargement of it amongst men ought to apply himself with no less care and industry to the rooting out of these immoralities

he be indulgent to such iniquities and immoral

another kingdom he aims at and not the advancement of the kingdom of God

That any man should think fit to cause another man—whose salvation he heartily desires—to expire in torments and that even in an unconverted state would I confess seem very strange to me and I think to any other also But nobody surely will ever believe that such a carriage can proceed from charity love or good will If anyone maintains that men ought to be compelled by fire and sword to profess certain doctrines and conform to this or that exterior worship without any regard had unto their morals if anyone endeavour to convert those that are erroneous unto the faith by forcing them to

profess things that they do not believe and allowing them to practise things that the Gospel does not permit it cannot be doubted indeed but such a one is desirous to have a numerous assembly joined in the same profession with himself but that he principally intends by those means to compose a truly Christian Church is altogether incredible It is not therefore to be wondered at if those who do not really contend for the advancement of the true religion and of the Church of Christ make use of arms that do not belong to the Christian warfare If like the Captain of our salvation they sincerely desired the good of souls they would tread in the steps and follow the perfect example of that Prince of Peace who sent out His soldiers to the subduing of nations and gathering them into His Church not armed

with arms by armed soldiers we know very well that it was much more easy for Him to do it with armies of heavenly legions than for any son of the Church how potentsoever with all his dragoons

The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion is so agreeable to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and to the genuine reason of mankind that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it in so clear a light I will not here tax the pride and ambition of some the passion and uncharitable zeal of others These are faults from which human affairs can perhaps scarce ever be perfectly freed but yet such as nobody will bear the plain imputation of without covering them with some specious colour and so pretend to commendation whilst they are carried away by their own irregular passions But however that some may not colour their spirit of persecution and unchristian cruelty with a pretence of care of the public weal and observation of the laws and that others under pretence of

pretences of loyalty and obedience to the prince or of tenderness and sincerity in the worship of God I esteem it above all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the other If it is to be not done there can be no end put to the controversies that will be always arising be

tween those that have or at least pretend to have
th one de, a co cernme t f the terest
of m s souls, d, o th ther s d a care f
th commo ealth

The commonwealth seems to m to be a so-
ci ty of me constituted nly for th procuring
preserving and ad a ing th ir own ci il in-
terests.

Ci il interests I call li berty health and i-
d lency of body d th possess n f outward
things, such as m e y lands, h uses furniture,
and the lik

It is th d ty f the ci il magistr e by th an-
parial ex cution f qual laws, to secure u t
all th peopl ing eral d t ery ne f his

fully satisfied in our own mind that the o is
tru and the ell pleas gunt God such
profess on d such practice f from be gany
furtherance are indeed great bstacl s t our

we dd u to the numbe of our ther sins those
also f hypocrisy a d contempt of His D ine
Majesty

I th seco d place the care of so ls cann t
belon to th ci il magistrate because his power
consists nly outward fore but tru and sav-
grel gi consists in the in ard persuas o of
th mund w thout which nothing ca be accept

punishm t, consist of th d privation di-
min u f those ci vil terests, or goods, which
therwise h might d ght t enjoy B t see
ing o ma does willingly suffer himself to be
p nished by th d pri at n f any part f his
goods, and m h less f his liberty or life th
f re is th magistra armed with th f ree and
str gth f all his subjects in order to th pun-
ishm t of those that lat y other man
rights.

Now that th wh l jurisdict f th magis-
trate reaches nly t these ci il co cernm ts
d that all vl powe right nd d minon, is
bo ded and onfi d t th nly care of pro-
mou these things and that t n ther ca nor
ou ht in y man er t be e t nded to the sal-
u f souls, these f llowing consid rati ns
seem t m bund ly t dem trat

First, because th care f souls is t com-
mi ed t th ci vil magistr t any more than to
othe m n. I m t comm tted unt him, I say
by God because t ppears th t God has
eve gi y ch uth rity t man er
another ast compel y to his el gion Nor
ca any ch power be m d th magistrate
by th conse t f th pe pl because man
can so far band n th ca f his own sal ation
as blindly to l t th ch f y th
th ther prince or subject, p escribe t him
what faith he worship he shall embrac For no

mak m n change th inward j dgement that
they ha framed f th gs.

It may deed be allowd that th magistrate
may mak use of argum ts, d thereby draw
the h t rodo unt the vay f truth d procure
th ursal at m f grant t but th is mmon to
him w th ther men. I t ching nstructi g
and redressing the erro eous by reaso he may
certainly d what becomes any good man t do
M ostracy does t oblige him to put ffe ther
humanity o Christua ty but it is thi g to
persuad another t comma d o th g to

th ferror d by r aso g to dra him
to truth but to gi la z, ecc e obed e ce
a d c mpel w th th sw d bel gyt b t
th magi tr t A d upo this gro nd I affirm

light can in no manner proceed from corporal sufferings or any other outward penalties

In the third place the care of the salvation of

the salvation of their souls For there being but one truth one way to heaven what hope is there that more men would be led into it if they had no rule but the religion of the court and were put under the necessity to quit the light of their own reason and oppose the dictates of their own consciences and blindly to resign themselves up to the will of their governors and to the religion which either ignorance ambition or superstition had chanced to establish in the countries where they were born? In the variety and contradiction of opinions in religion wherein the princes of the world are as much divided as in their secular interests the narrow way would be much straitened one country alone would be in the right and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following their princes in the ways that lead to destruction and that which heightens the absurdity and very ill suits the notion of a Deity men would owe their eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity

These considerations to omit many others that might have been urged to the same purpose seem unto me sufficient to conclude that all the power of civil government relates only to men's civil interests is confined to the care of the things of this world and hath nothing to do with the world to come

Let us now consider what a church is A church then I take to be a voluntary society of men joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him and effectual to the salvation of their souls

I say it is a free and voluntary society No body is born a member of any church otherwise the religion of parents would descend unto children by the same right of inheritance as their temporal estates and everyone would hold his faith by the same tenure he does his lands than which nothing can be imagined more absurd Thus therefore that matter stands No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect but everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God The hope of salvation as it was the only cause of his entrance into that communion so it can be the only reason of his stay there.

For if afterwards he discover anything either erroneous in the doctrine or incongruous in the worship of that society to which he has joined himself why should it not be as free for him to go out as it was to enter? No member of a religious society can be tied with any other bonds but what proceed from the certain expectation of eternal life A church then is a society of members voluntarily uniting to that end

It follows now that we consider what is the power of this church and unto what laws it is subject

Forasmuch as no society how free soever or upon whatsoever slight occasion instituted whether of philosophers for learning of merchants for commerce or of men of leisure for mutual conversation and discourse no church or company I say can in the least subsist and hold together but will presently dissolve and break in pieces unless it be regulated by some laws and the members all consent to observe some order Place and time of meeting must be agreed on rules for admitting and excluding members must be established distinction of officers and putting things into a regular course and such like cannot be omitted But since the joining together of several members into this church society as has already been demonstrated is ab-

is the same thing) to those whom the society by common consent has authorised thereunto

Some perhaps may object that no such society can be said to be a true church unless it have in it a bishop or presbyter with ruling authority derived from the very apostles and continued down to the present times by an uninterrupted succession

To these I answer In the first place let them show me the edict by which Christ has imposed that law upon His Church And let not any man think me impertinent if in a thing of this consequence

Whether such an assembly want anything necessary to a true church pray do you consider Certain I am that nothing can be there wanting unto the salvation of souls which is sufficient to our purpose

Next pray observe how great have always been the divisions amongst men those who lay

Matt 18 20

so much stress upon the Divine institution and continued succession of a certain order of rulers in the Church. Now their very dissent is undoubtedly put upon necessity of liberty and, consequently allows liberty of conscience. At which upon consideration we prefer

And, in the last place I consent that these men have ruler in their church, established by the long series of success in as they judge necessary provided I may have liberty at the same time to join myself to that society in which I am persuaded those things are to be found which are necessary to the salvation of my soul. In this manner ecclesiastical liberty will be preserved all sides, and no man will be a legislator imposed upon him but what himself has chosen.

But since men are so solicitous about the true church, I would only ask them by the way if it be a more agreeable to the Church of Christ to make the conditions of her communion consist in such things, and such things only as the Holy Spirit has in the Holy Scriptures declared, in express words, to be necessary to salvation I ask, I say whether there be not more agreeable to the Church of Christ than for men to impose their own inventions and interpretations upon others as if they were of Divine authority and to establish by ecclesiastical laws, as absolutely necessary to the profession of Christianity such things as the Holy Scriptures declare not to be, or at least not expressly command? Whosoever requires those things in order to ecclesiastical communion, which Christ does not require in order that eternal life may perhaps, indeed constitute society accommodated to his own opinion and his own doctrine but how that can be called the Church of Christ which is established upon laws that are such, and which excludes such persons from its communion as I will one day receive in the kingdom of Heaven, I understand not. But this being the

proper place to inquire into the marks of the true church, I will not mind those that consent to assent to the decrees of their own society and they cry out so usual. The Church the Church with as much noise and perhaps upon the same principle as the Ephesian elders did for their Diana thus, I say I desire to mind them of, that the Gospel frequently declares that the true disciples of Christ must suffer persecution but that the Church of Christ should persecute others, and force others by fire and sword to embrace her faith and doctrine. I could never yet find any of the books of the New Testament.

The end of religious society (as has already been said) is the public worship of God and, by

means thereof the acquisition of eternal life. All discipline on him, therefore is tend to that end, and all ecclesiastical laws to be thereunto confined. Nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods. No force is here to be made use of upon any occasion whatsoever. For force belongs wholly to the civil magistrate and the possession of all outward goods is subject to his jurisdiction.

But, it may be asked, by what means then shall ecclesiastical laws be established if they must be thus destitute of all compulsive power? I answer. They must be established by means suitable to the nature of such things, whereof the external profession and observation—if it proceed from a thorough conviction and approbation of the mind—is altogether useless and unprofitable. The arms by which the members of this society are to be kept within their duty are exhortations, admonitions, and disciplines. If by these means the offenders will not be reclaimed, and their erroneous opinions increased there remains nothing further to be done but that such stubborn and obstinate persons, who give no ground to hope for their reformation, should be cast out and separated from the society. This is the last and utmost force of ecclesiastical authority.

Other punishment can thereby be inflicted than that, the relation ceasing between the body and the member which is cut off. The person so condemned ceases to be part of that church.

These things being thus determined, I thus inquire in the next place. How far the duty of toleration extends, and what is required from everyone by it.

And, first, I hold that no church is bound, by the duty of toleration, to retain any such person in her bosom as, after admonition, continues obstinately to stand against the law of the society. For these being the essential of communion and the bond of the society if it be breach if men were persecuted with out any animadversion the society would immediately be thereby dissolved. But, nevertheless, in all such cases care is to be taken that the sentence of excommunication, and the execution thereof carry with it no rough usage of word or action whereby the persecuted person may any wise be damaged in body or estate. For all force (as has been said) belongs only to the magistrate nor ought any private persons at any time to use force, unless it be in self-defence against unjust violence. Excommunication neither does, nor can, deprive the excommunicated person of any of those civil goods that he formerly possessed. All those things be

long to the civil government and are under the magistrate's protection. The whole force of excommunication consists only in this: that the resolution of the society in that respect being declared, the union that was between the body and some member comes thereby to be dissolved and that relation ceasing, the participation of some certain things which the society communicated to its members and unto which no man has any civil right comes also to cease. For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church minister's refusing him that bread and wine in the celebration of the Lord's Supper which was not bought with his but other men's money.

Secondly, no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion. All the rights and franchises that belong to him as a man or as a denizen are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him whether he be Christian or Pagan. Nay we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice; charity, bounty, and liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins; this reason directs and this that natural fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right way, it is his own misfortune; no injury to thee; nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this life, because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one another in religion, I understand also of particular churches which stand as it were in the same relation to each other as private persons among themselves; nor is as any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over any other, no, not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no new right to the church, nor the church to the civil government. So that whether the magistrate join himself to any church or separate from it, the church remains always as it was before—a free and voluntary society. It neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate's coming to it, nor does it lose the right of instructing and excommunication by his going from it. This is the fundamental and immutable right of a spontaneous society—that it has power to remove any of its members who transgress the rules of its institution, but it cannot by the accession of any new members acquire any right of jurisdiction over

those that are not joined with it. And therefore peace, equity, and friendship are always mutually to be observed by particular churches in the same manner as by private persons without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another.

That the thing may be made clearer by an example, let us suppose two churches—the one of Armenians, the other of Calvinists—residing in the city of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as we see practised else where) because of their differing from it in some doctrines and ceremonies whilst the Turks in the mean while silently stand by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating the other ill, I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs, and by what right? It will be answered undoubtedly that it is the orthodox church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is in great and specious words to say just nothing at all. For every church is orthodox to itself, to others erroneous or heretical. For what soever any church believes, it believes to be true, and the contrary unto those things it pronounces to be error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal; nor is there any judge either at Constantinople or elsewhere upon earth by whose sentence it can be determined. The decision of that question belongs only to the Supreme Judge of all men, to whom also alone belongs the punishment of the erroneous. In the mean while let those men consider how vehemently they sin, how adding injustice, if not to their error, yet certainly to their pride, do rashly and arrogantly take upon them to misuse the servants of another master who are not at all accountable to them.

Nay further, if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches is in the right, there could not accrue the evil unto the orthodox any right of destroying the other. For churches have neither any jurisdiction on worldly matters nor are free and sword a proper instruments wherewith to convince men's minds of error, or to inform them of the truth. Let us suppose nevertheless that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of them and to put his sword into their hands that (by his consent) they might chastise the dissenters as they pleased. Will any man say that any right can be derived

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

7

I th thrd place l tussee hat the d ty of
c m ~ h a c d t

place No ca l y a y greate a tho ty cles ast cal t ou ht t be w u mann r
anf a y greate a tho ty cles ast cal t ou ht t be w u mann r
ho ch
ist ct

ues h e h a e th u r o g
a d nev y th g p e sectly dnt ct d n f t

co rtf ou has g en th
f th tall d they beg to f l th msel esth
tr ger th p eac tly pea d hanty are
t bel d as d Otherw th y r l gously
t be tserv d Where they ha t th power
to ca ry persecut a d to bec me masters
th th y des to l p f t rms d
p ch pt l uon Wh they ar tstr gih
e ed w th th d pow th th y ca bear
nost p u dly d m dly the co tagio
of d l try supersu nd h esy in th
ghbou hood f wh h th ccas the
t est f l g m kes l m to be tr mely
pp hens Theyd t forwardly tta k those
errors wh har in fash t t or ar ou
tena d by th gov m t. H e th y ca be
co t to sp th gum m wh h y t
(th he l) is th ly ght m thod f
p p g t g tru h, wh h has h w y f
pr l g as wh tr g gum m d good
easo ar j ed w th th sof ess f ca l ty a d
good usag

that d ffer ce between th m n rel g
whatsoe e t l f l t th whol Chu ch
ca t by ny ocles astual right becom la v

provoca to dless h r ds rap es d
al gh ers th y th by f ish t ma ki d

rel g is to be p op g ed by f ce f arms

f cry c l for l n s c to th aft f thers
has ki d d g mst d sse t I w l l t u d r
tak t ep es t how happy d h g m
would be th fru t, both Ch h a d Stat f
th p lp is ev ry wher so ded with th doc
tr f p e c d toler m n lest l sho ld seem
to m t too sev rely upon those men whose d g
n ty l des t to d tr ctf m, or w ld h m
std m shed th by ther o themsel m B t
thus l s y th t thus t ght to be A d f y
one that p fesses himself to be munister f th

long to the civil government and are under the magistrate's protection. The whole force of excommunication consists only in this that the resolution of the society in that respect being declared the union that was between the body and some member comes thereby to be dissolved and that relation ceasing the participation of some certain things which the society communicated to its members and unto which no man has any civil right comes also to cease. For there is no civil injury done unto the excommunicated person by the church minister's refusing him that bread and wine in the celebration of the Lord's Supper which was not bought with his but other men's money.

Secondly no private person has any right in any manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion. All the rights and franchises that be long to him as a man or as a denizen are inviolably to be preserved to him. These are not the business of religion. No violence nor injury is to be offered him whether he be Christian or Pagan. Nay we must not content ourselves with the narrow measures of bare justice charity bounty and liberality must be added to it. This the Gospel enjoins this reason directs and this that natural fellowship we are born into requires of us. If any man err from the right way it is his own misfortune no injury to thee nor therefore art thou to punish him in the things of this life because thou supposest he will be miserable in that which is to come.

What I say concerning the mutual toleration of private persons differing from one another in religion I understand also of particular churches which stand as it were in the same relation to each other as private persons among themselves nor has any one of them any manner of jurisdiction over any other no not even when the civil magistrate (as it sometimes happens) comes to be of this or the other communion. For the civil government can give no new right to the church nor the church to the civil government. So that whether the magistrate join himself to any church or separate from it the church remains always as it was before—a free and voluntary society. It neither requires the power of the sword by the magistrate's coming to it nor does it lose the right of instruction and excommunication by his going from it. This is the funda-

those that are not joined with it. And therefore peace equity and friendship are always mutually to be observed by particular churches in the same manner as by private persons without any pretence of superiority or jurisdiction over one another.

That the thing may be made clearer by an example let us suppose two churches—the one of Arminians the other of Calvinists—residing in the city of Constantinople. Will anyone say that either of these churches has right to deprive the members of the other of their estates and liberty (as we see practised else where) because of their differing from it in some doctrines and ceremonies whilst the Turks in the mean while silently stand by and laugh to see with what inhuman cruelty Christians thus rage against Christians? But if one of these churches hath this power of treating the other ill I ask which of them it is to whom that power belongs and by what right? It will be answered undoubtedly that it is the orthodox church which has the right of authority over the erroneous or heretical. This is in great and specious words to say just nothing at all. For every church is orthodox to itself to others erroneous or heretical. For whatsoever any church believes it believes to be true and the contrary unto those things it pronounces to be error. So that the controversy between these churches about the truth of their doctrines and the purity of their worship is on both sides equal nor is there any judge either at Constantinople or else where upon earth by whose sentence it can be determined. The decision of that question belongs only to the Supreme Judge of all men to whom also alone belongs the punishment of the erroneous. In the meanwhile let those men consider how vehemently they men who adding injustice if not to the error yet certainty to their pride do rashly and arrogantly take upon them to misuse the servants of another master who are not at all accountable to them.

Nay further if it could be manifest which of these two dissenting churches were in the right there would not accrue the obeyance unto the orthodox any right of destroying the other. For churches have neither any jurisdiction in worldly matters nor are fire and sword any proper instruments where with to convince men's minds of error and reform them of the truth. Let us suppose nevertheless that the civil magistrate inclined to favour one of them and to put his sword into the hands that (by his consent) they might chastise the dissenters as they pleased. Will any man say that any right can be derived

tion but it cannot by the accession of any new members acquire any right of jurisdiction over

my hair is not of the right cut because perhaps, I have not been dipp'd in the right fashion because I eat flesh upon the road or some other food which agrees with my stomach because I do not certain by way, which seem unto me to be the several paths that are in the same road, I choose that to walk in which seems to be the straightest and clearest because I avoid to keep company with some travellers that are less grave and others that are more sour than they ought to be or in fine, because I follow good that either is, or is not, clothed white or crowned with a mitre Certainly if we consider aught, we shall find that, for the most part, they are such for whom things as these that (without) prejudice

ter known by price than by his subjects or at least that in this certainty of things the safest and most commodious way for private persons is to follow the law. You will say What

such like things as these
blended among Christian brethren, who are all agreed in the substantial and truly fundamental part of religion.

But let us grant unto these cases, who condemn all things that are not of their mode that from these circumstances are different kinds. What shall we conclude from thence? There is

divine of Heaven

Perhaps some will say that they do not suppose this infallible judgment, that all men are bound to follow in the affairs of religion, to be in the civil magistrat but in the Church. What the Church has determined that the civil magistrate orders to be observed which provides by his authority that nobody shall thereto or believe in the business of religion otherwise than

way that leads to heaven more certainly to the magistrate than every private man search and study discovers to himself I have weak body sunk under languishing disease, for which (I suppose) there is only remedy but that unknown. Does it then behoove the magistrate to prescribe me remedy because there is but one, and because it is unknown? Because there is but one way for me to escape death, will it therefore be safe for me to do whatsoever the magistrate ordains. Those things that every man ought sincerely to inquire into himself and by meditation, study search, and his own endeavours, attain the knowledge of cannot be looked upon as the peculiar possession of any sort of men. Princes, indeed, are born superior unto other men in power but in nature equal. Neither the right nor the artificial good does necessarily carry along with it certain knowledge of other things, and least of all of true religion. For if there were so, how could come to pass that the lords of the earth should differ so vastly as they do in religious matters? Let us grant that it is probable the way to eternal life may be bet

sees not how frequently the name of the Church, which was never blotted in time of the apostles has been made use of to throw dust in the people's eyes in the following ages. But, however in the present case it helps us not. The one only narrow way which leads to heaven is not better known to the magistrate than to private persons, and therefore I cannot safely take him for my guide, who may probably be as ignorant of the way as myself, and who certainly is less concerned for my salvation than I myself am. Amongst so many kinds of the Jews, how many of them were there whom any Israelite, thus blind by following had not fallen into idolatry and therewithal destructive. Yet, nevertheless, you find me be of good courage and tell me that all is now safe and secure, because the magistrate does not now enjoin the observance of his own decrees in matters of religion, but only the decrees of the Church. Of what Church, I beseech you of that, certainly which likes him best. As if he that compels me by laws and penalties to enter into this or the other Church, did not in-

Word of God a preacher of the gospel of peace teach otherwise he either understands not or neglects the business of his calling and shall one day give account thereof unto the Prince of Peace. If Christians are to be admonished that they abstain from all manner of revenge even after repeated provocations and multiplied injuries how much more ought they who suffer nothing who have had no harm done them forbear violence and abstain from all manner of ill usage towards those from whom they have received none! Thus caution and temper they ought certainly to use towards those who mind only their own business and are solicitous for nothing but that (what ever men think of them) they may worship God in that manner which they are persuaded is acceptable to Him and in which they have the strongest hopes of eternal salvation. In private domestic affairs in the management of estates in the conservation of bodily health every man may consider what suits his own convenience and follow what course he likes best. No man complains of the ill management of his neighbour's affairs. No man is angry with another for an error committed in sowing his land or in marrying his daughter. Nobody corrects a spendthrift for consuming his substance in taverns. Let any man pull down or build or make what soever expenses he pleases nobody murmurs nobody controls him he has his liberty. But if any man do not frequent the church if he do not there conform his behaviour exactly to the accustomed ceremonies or if he brings not his children to be initiated in the sacred mysteries of this or the other congregation this immediately causes an uproar. The neighbourhood is filled with noise and clamour. Everyone is ready to be the avenger of so great a crime and the zealots hardly have the patience to refrain from violence and rapine so long till the cause be heard and the poor man be according to form condemned to the loss of liberty goods or life. Oh that our ecclesiastical orators of every sect would apply themselves with all the strength of arguments that they are able to the confounding of men's errors! But let them spare their persons

suade men of sense that he who with dry eyes and satisfaction of mind can deliver his brother to the executioner to be burnt alive does sincerely and heartily concern himself to save that brother from the flames of hell in the world to come.

In the last place let us now consider what is the magistrate's duty in the business of toleration which certainly is very considerable.

We have already proved that the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate. Not a magisterial care I mean (if I may so call it) which consists in prescribing by laws and compelling by punishments. But a charitable care which consists in teaching admonishing and persuading cannot be denied unto any man. The care therefore of every man's soul belongs unto himself and is to be left unto himself. But what if he neglect the care of his soul? I answer What if he neglect the care of his health or of his estate which things are nearer related to the government of the magistrate than the other? Will the magistrate provide by an express law that such a one shall not become poor or sick? Laws provide as much as is possible that the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud and violence of others they do not guard them from the negligence or ill husbandry of the possessors themselves. No man can be forced to be rich or healthful whether he will or no. Nay God Himself will not save men against their wills. Let us suppose however that some prince were desirous to force his subjects to accumulate riches or to preserve the health and strength of their bodies. Shall it be provided by law that they must consult none but Roman physicians and shall everyone be bound to live according to their prescriptions? What shall no potion no broth be taken but what is prepared either in the Vat can suppose or in a Geneva shop? Or to make these subjects rich shall they all be obliged by law to become merchants or musicians? Or shall everyone turn victualler or smith because there are some that maintain their families plentifully and grow rich in those professions? But it may be said there are a thousand

For if there were several ways that led thither

tion and show that what they desire is temporal dominion. For it will be very difficult to per-

to the sacred geography leads straight to Jerusalem which my Amen beaten and ill used by others because perhaps, I wear not buskins because

ship they may draw thers unto the love of the true religion, and perform such other things in religion as cannot be done by each private man apart.

These religious societies I call *Churches* and these I say the magistrate ought to tolerate for the business of these assemblies of the people is nothing but what is lawful every man particular to take care for—I mean the salvation of their souls not in this case is there any difference between the National Church and other separated congregations.

But as every Church there are two things especially to be considered—the outward form and rites of worship, and the doctrines and articles of faith—these things must be handled each distinctly that so the right matter of religion may the more clearly be understood.

Concerning outward worship I say in the first place that the magistrate has no power to enforce by law either in his own Church, or much less in another the use of any rites or ceremonies whatsoever in the worship of God. And this, not only because these Churches are free societies, but because whatsoever is practised in the worship of God is not so far justifiable as it is believed by those that practise it to be acceptable unto Him. It is however a religion with conscience of faith is not their well in itself

is the salvation of souls, and it no way concerns the commonwealth, or any member of it, that thus or otherwise ceremony be there made use of whether they use nor the omission of any ceremonies in those religious assemblies does either advantage or prejudice the life liberty or estate of any man. For example it is to be granted that the washing of an infant with water is in itself an indifferent thing it is to be granted also that the magistrate to understand such washing to be profitable to the curing or preventing of any disease in children is subject unto and esteems the matter weighty enough to be taken care of by a law. In that case he may order it to be done. But will any one therefore say that a magistrate has the same right to order by law that all children shall be baptised by priests in the sacred font in order to the purification of their souls. This stream difference of these two cases is visible to every one at first sight. Or let us apply the last case to the child of a Jew and the thing speaks itself. For what hinders but a Christian magistrate may have subjects that are Jews. Now if we knowledgeth such an injury may not be done unto a Jew as to compel him, against his own persuasion to practise in his religion a thing that is in its nature indifferent how can we maintain that any thing of this kind may be done to a Christian.

Again, things in their own nature indifferent cannot, by any human authority be made any part of the worship of God—for this very reason because they are indifferent. For since indifferent things are not capable by any virtue of their own, to propose to the Deity no human power or authority can confer in them so much dignity and excellency as to enable them to do it. In the common affairs of life that we find indifferent things which God has not forbidden are free and lawful, and therefore in those things

making is taken away. I say easy to find indifferent things, and perhaps not but such, are subjected to legislative power. It does not therefore follow that the magistrate may ordain whatsoever he pleases concerning anything that is indifferent. The public good is the rule and measure of all law making. If a thing be not useful to the commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it may not presently be established by law.

And further things never so indifferent in their own nature, when they are brought into the Church and worship of God, are removed out of the reach of the magistrate's jurisdiction, because in that use they have no connection at all with civil affairs. The only business of the Church

men. Now when increased Deity shall ask us, Who has equated these or such like things to your hands, will it be enough to answer Him that the magistrate commanded them. If civil jurisdiction extend thus far what might not lawfully be introduced into religion. What hedge of ceremonies, what superstitious inventions, built upon the magistrate's authority might not (against conscience) be imposed upon

not

is as

H

—

wealth receive no prejudice and that there be no injury done to any man, either in life or estate. And thus what may be spent in a feast may be spent on a sacrifice. But if per adventure such were the state of things that the interest of the commonwealth required all laughter of beasts should be forbore for some while in order to the increasing of the stock of cattle that had been destroyed by some extraordinary misraus, who sees not that the magistrate in such a case may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever. Only it is to be observed that, in this case, the law is not made about a religious, but political matter nor is the sacrifice, but the slaughter of calves, therein prohibited.

¶ Thus we see what difference there is between the Church and the Commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the Commonwealth cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the Church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary use neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sort of people for their religious uses. If any man may lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling in his own house the law ought not to hinder him of the same liberty in his religious worship though in the Church the use of bread and wine be very different and be there applied to the mysteries of faith and rites of Divine worship. But those laws that are prejudicial to the commonwealth of people in their ordinary use and are, therefore, forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be permitted to Churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse his authority to the oppression of any Church, under pretence of public good.

It may be said What if Church be idolatrous, is that also to be tolerated by the magistrate? I answer What power can be given to the magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous Church, which exists in time and place be made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one. For I must be remembered that the civil power is the same everywhere and the religion of every prince is orthodox to himself. If, therefore, such power be granted unto the civil magistrate in spirituals as the Geneva, for example, he may extirpate, by violence and blood, the religion which is there reputed idolatrous, by the same rule another magistrate, in some neighbouring country may oppress the reformed religion and, in India, the Christian. The civil power can either change everything in religion, according to the prince's pleasure or teach change nothing. If it be once permitted to introduce any

thing into religion by the means of laws and penalties, there can be no bounds put to it but it will in the same manner be lawful to alter everything according to that rule of truth which the magistrate has framed unto himself. No man whatsoever ought, therefore, to be deprived of his terrestrial enjoyments upon account of his religion. ¶ Even Americans, subjected unto a Christian prince, are to be punished either in body or goods for not embracing our faith and worship. If they are persuaded that they please God in observing the rites of their own country and that they shall obtain happiness by that means, they are to be left to God and themselves. Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is An inconsiderable and weak number of Christians despoiled of everything arrive in a Pagan country: these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity that they would procure them with the necessaries of life those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they all join together and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by this means takes root in that country and spreads itself but does not suddenly grow the strongest. What thus are in this condition peace and friendship, faith, and equal justice are preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated that of liberty may be extirpated and unless these innocent Pagans, strict observers of

of their forefathers and perhaps deprived of themselves. Then, I trust, it appears what call for the Church, joined with the desired religion, is capable to produce, and how easily the pretence of religion, and of the care of souls, serves for a cloak to covetousness, pride and ambition.

Now whosoever maintains that idolatry is to

any dissenting Christians here, can, with any right, be deprived of their worldly goods by the prevailing faction of a court-church nor are any civil rights to be either changed or violated upon account of religion in one place more than another.

the worshippers of God? For the greatest part of these ceremonies and superstitions consists in the religious use of such things as are in their own nature indifferent nor are they sinful upon any other account than because God is not the author of them. The sprinkling of water and the use of bread and wine are both in their own nature and in the ordinary occasions of life altogether indifferent. Will any man therefore say that these things could have been introduced in to religion and made a part of divine worship if not by divine institution? If any human authority or civil power could have done this why might it not also enjoin the eating of fish and drinking of ale in the holy banquet as a part of divine worship? Why not the sprinkling of the blood of beasts in churches and expiations by water or fire and abundance more of this kind? But these things how indifferent soever they be in common uses when they come to be annexed unto divine worship without divine authority they are as abominable to God as the sacrifice of a dog. And why is a dog so abominable? What difference is there between a dog and a goat in respect of the divine nature equally and infinitely distant from all affinity with matter unless it be that God required the use of one in His worship and not of the other? We see therefore that indifferent things how much soever they be under the power of the civil magistrate yet cannot upon that pretence be introduced into religion and imposed upon religious assemblies because in the worship of God they wholly cease to be indifferent. He that worships God does it with design to please Him and procure His favour. But that cannot be done by him who upon the command of another offers unto God that which he knows will be displeasing to Him because not commanded by Himself. That is not to please God or appease his wrath but willfully and knowingly to provoke Him by a manifest contempt which is a thing absolutely repugnant to the nature and end of worship.

But it will be here asked If nothing belonging in to divine worship be left to human discretion how is it then that Churches themselves have the power of ordering anything about the time and place of worship and the like? To this I answer that in religious worship we must dis-

tinct instances or modifications of them are not determined and therefore they are indifferent. Of this sort are the time and place of worship habit and posture of him that worships. These are circumstances and perfectly indifferent where God has not given any express command about them. For example amongst the Jews the time and place of their worship and the habits of those that officiated in it were not mere circumstances but a part of the worship itself in which if anything were defective or different from the institution they could not hope that it would be accepted by God. But these to Christians under the liberty of the Gospel are mere circumstances of worship which the prudence of every Church may bring into such use as shall be judged most subservient to the end of order decency and edification. But even under the Gospel those who believe the first or the seventh day to be set apart by God and consecrated still to His worship to them that portion of time is not a simple circumstance but a real part of Divine worship which can neither be changed nor neglected.

In the next place As the magistrate has no power to impose by his laws the use of any rites and ceremonies in any Church so neither has he any power to forbid the use of such rites and ceremonies as are already received approved and practised by any Church because if he did so he would destroy the Church itself the end of whose institution is only to worship God with freedom after its own manner.

You will say by this rule if some congregations should have a mind to sacrifice infants or (as the primitive Christians were falsely accused) lustfully pollute themselves in promiscuous uncleanness or practise any other such heinous enormities is the magistrate obliged to tolerate them because they are committed in a religious assembly? I answer No. These things are not lawful in the ordinary course of life nor in any private house and therefore neither are they so in the worship of God or in any religious meet-

ing by a law. Melchior whose calf he may lawfully kill his calf at home and burn any part of it that he thinks fit. For no injury is thereby done to any one no prejudice to another man's goods. And for the same reason he may kill his calf also in a religious meeting. Whether the doing so be well pleasing to God or no it is their part to consider that do it. The part of the magistrate is only to take care that the common

cannot be separated from worship yet the par-

idolatry was thus rooted out of the land of Canaan & every idolater was not brought to cut on. The whole family of Rahab that whil

Yoshu
may
lives.

David and Solomon subdued many nations who then came from the Land of Promise as far as Euphrates Amongst so many captives taken so many thousands were brought to Jerusalem and the worship of the true God and published I try though all of them were certainly guilty of it if any were indeed become apostate I desired to be made known to their commonwealth he was obliged to submit to the law that is, to embrace their religion But thus did

prophets And as soon as he was admitted he became subject to the laws of the commonwealth by which all that try was forbidden within the borders of the land of Canaan But that law (as I have said) did not extend to those regions, & we are subjected to the Jews that were situated within those bounds

Thus far concerns toward worship Let us now consider articles of faith.

The articles of religion are some of them peculiar to some particular nations with which both sorts consist in the knowledge of truth & these terminat imply no understanding those in which no such will and manner. Speculative opinions therefore and articles of faith (as they are called) which have required to be believed, can be imposed by Church by the law of the land For it is bound that the law should be obeyed by laws which are not men power perform. Ad to believe thus that to be true does not depend on our will. But if this ought has been said already But, will some say I am I last page saw that they believe. A sweet religion and ed that big men to dissemble & dilles both God and man, for the sake of their souls If the magistrate thinks to see in them he seems to understand little of the way of salvation. And if he does it order to see them, why is he so solicitous about articles of faith that concern them by law

Further the magistrate ought to consider the private or public safety of any particular religion by Church because they have a manner of relation to the civil rights of the sub-

jects If a Roman Catholic believe that to be really the body of Christ such another man does an injury thereby to his

Test
e c
hea
ere

power of the magistrate and that of the people may be equally secure whether any man believes these things or no I readily grant that these principles are false and absurd But the business of the magistrate is not to provide for the truth of opinions but for the safety and security of the commonwealth and of every particular man's goods and persons And so thought to be For the truth certainly would well enough if she were not left to hurt herself She seldom has received and if a man will receive much assistance from the power of government whom she is but rarely known and more rarely will come She is not taught by laws no has she any need of force to procure her entrance into the minds of men Errors indeed prevail by the assistance of government do however concern But if Truth makes not her way to the understanding by her own light, how will be but the weaker for any borrowed force of ecclesiastical her Thus much for peculiar opinions Let us now proceed to practical cases

A good life in which consists the last part of religion and true piety concerns also the civil government and it lies the safety both of men's souls and of the commonwealth. Malicious beliefs therefore both just and unjust both civil and outward and inward court both civil and merciful or I mean both of the magistrate and commonwealth Here, therefore, is great danger lest of these jurisdictions intrude upon the other and discord arise between the keeper of the public peace and the officers of the law But I think that has been already said concerning the limits of both these governments to be easily considered and will easily remove all difficulty in this matter

Every man has a immortal soul, capable of eternal happiness or misery whose happiness depends upon his believing and doing those things in this life which are necessary to the obtaining of God's favour and are prescribed by God that is If I live in this manner first, that I observe these things is the highest blessing that I can possess and that the utmost care of piety should be directed ought to be directed to the search and performance of them because that is the thing in this world that

But idolatry say some is a sin and therefore not to be tolerated. If they said it were therefore to be avoided the inference were good. But it does not follow that because it is a sin it ought therefore to be punished by the magistrate. For it does not belong unto the magistrate to make use of his sword in punishing everything indifferently that he takes to be a sin against God. Covetousness uncharitableness idleness and many other things are sins by the consent of men which yet no man ever said were to be punished by the magistrate. The reason is because they are not prejudicial to other men's rights nor do they break the public peace of societies. Nay even the sins of lying and perjury are nowhere punishable by laws unless in certain cases in which the real turpitude of the thing and the offence against God are not considered but only the injury done unto men's neighbours and to the commonwealth. And what is in another country to a Mahometan or a Pagan prince the Christian religion seem false and offensive to God may not the Christians for the same reason and after the same manner be extirpated there?

But it may be urged farther that by the law of Moses idolaters were to be rooted out. True indeed by the law of Moses but that is not obliga-

Moses only to that people. And this consideration alone is answer enough unto those that urge the authority of the law of Moses for the inflicting of capital punishment upon idolaters. But however I will examine this argument a little more particularly

the Mosaical rites and made citizens of that commonwealth did afterwards apostatise from the worship of the God of Israel. These were proceeded against as traitors and rebels guilty of no less than high treason. For the commonwealth of the Jews different in that from all others was an absolute theocracy nor was there or could there be any difference between that commonwealth and the Church. The laws established there concerning the worship of One

Invisible Deity were the civil laws of that people and a part of their political government in which God Himself was the legislator. Now if any one can shew me where there is a commonwealth at this time constituted upon that foundation I will acknowledge that the ecclesiastical laws do there unavoidably become a part of the civil and that the subjects of that government both may and ought to be kept in strict conformity with that Church by the civil power. But there is absolutely no such thing under the Gospel as a Christian commonwealth. There are indeed many cities and kingdoms that have embraced the faith of Christ but they have retained their ancient form of government with which the law of Christ hath not at all meddled. He indeed hath taught men how by faith and good works they may obtain eternal life but He instituted no commonwealth. He prescribed unto His followers no new and peculiar form of government nor put He the sword into any magistrate's hand with commission to make use of it in forcing men to forsake their former religion and receive His.

Secondly foreigners and such as were strangers to the commonwealth of Israel were not compelled by force to observe the rites of the Mosaical law but on the contrary in the very same place where it is ordered that an Israelite that was an idolater should be put to death there it is provided that strangers should not be vexed nor oppressed. I confess that the seven nations that possessed the land which was promised to the Israelites were utterly to be cut off but this was not singly because they were idolaters. For if that had been the reason why were the Moabites and other nations to be spared? No the reason is this God being in a peculiar manner the King of the Jews He could not suffer the adoration of any other deity (which was properly an act of high treason against Him

reason the Emims and the Horims were driven out of the countries by the children of Esau and Lot and their lands upon the same grounds given by God to the invaders. But though all

Exod 22 20 21
Deut 19

which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be bettered; it is left entirely to every man's self. Thus the safeguard from slaves and of all things that belong unto himself is the business of the commonwealth and the preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate. And therefore that magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this man or party and give them to that nor change property amongst fellow subjects (no not even by law) for cause that has no relation to the end of civil government, I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or false does no prejudice to these worldly concerns of their fellow subjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe that a law as this to be for the public good? I answer: As the private judgment of an particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law so the private judgment (as I may call it) of the magistrate does not give him as new right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant, much less if he make his business to enrich and advance his followers and fellow sectaries with the spoils of the church. But what if the magistrate believe that he has right to make such law and that they are for the public good, and his subjects believe the contrary? What shall be judge between them? I answer: God alone. For there is no judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people. God, I say, is the only judge this case, who will retribute every one to his day according to his deserts that is, according to his sincerity and uprightness in endeavouring to promote piety and the public weal and peace of mankind. But what shall be done in the meanwhile? I answer: The principal and chief care of every one ought to be of his own soul first, and, in the next place, of the public peace though yet there are very few will think it is peace there where they see all kind wars.

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, one maintained by law the other by force and these are of that nature that whilst the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of the magistrate in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise without judge to determine them. You will say then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and carry his point without doubt; but the question is no here concerning

the doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say first, no opinions contrary to human society or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these indeed, examples in

thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative considered over with specious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil right of the community. For example, we cannot find any sect that teaches, expressly and openly that men are not obliged to keep their promise that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in religion or that the dominion of all things belong only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate and wake in all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an evil. But, nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other words. What is denied them mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with heretics. Their meaning forsooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves for they declare all that are not of their communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whenever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their assertion that kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms. It is evident that they thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace as also an assertion by which those that maintain it plainly lay claim to the possession of all things. For they are not so wanting to themselves as not to believe or to last as not to profess themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These therefore, and the like who trouble unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals, in civil concerns or who upon pretence of religion chal-

is of any consideration in comparison with eternity Secondly that seeing one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of worship nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs therefore the care of each man's salvation belongs only to himself But I could not have this understood as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours to reduce men from errors which are indeed the greatest duty of a Christian Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases towards the promoting of another man's salvation But all force and compulsion are to be forborne Nothing is to be done imperiously Nobody is obliged in that matter to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another further than he himself is persuaded Every man in that has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself And the reason is because nobody else is concerned in it nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein

But besides their souls which are immortal men have also their temporal lives here upon earth the state whereof being frail and fleeting and the duration uncertain they have need of several outward conveniences to the support thereof which are to be procured or preserved by pains and industry For those things that are necessary to the comfortable support of our lives are not the spontaneous products of nature nor do offer themselves fit and prepared for our use This part therefore draws on another care and necessarily gives another employment But the pravity of mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men's labours than take pains to provide for themselves the necessity of preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already acquired and also of preserving their liberty and strength whereby they may acquire what they farther want obliges men to enter into society with one another that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each other their properties in the things that contribute to the comfort and happiness of this life leaving in the meanwhile to every man the care of his own eternal happiness the attain-

forced from him by any external violence But forasmuch as men thus entering into societies grounded upon their mutual compacts of assistance for the defence of their temporal goods

may nevertheless be deprived of them either by the rapine and fraud of their fellow citizens or by the hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of this evil consists in arms riches and multitude of citizens the remedy of the other in laws and the care of all things relating both to one and the other is committed by the society to the civil magistrate This is the original this is the use and these are the bounds of the legislative (which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth I mean that provision may be made for the security of each man's private possessions for the peace riches and public commodities of the whole people and as much as possible for the increase of their inward strength against foreign invasions

These things being thus explained it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed and by what measures regulated and that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society which is the sole reason of men's entering into society and the only thing they seek and aim at in it And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation and that is that every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends the eternal happiness For obedience is due in the first place to God and afterwards to the laws

But some may ask What if the magistrate should enjoy anything by his authority that appears unlawful to the conscience of a private person? I answer that if government be faithfully administered and the counsels of the magistrates be indeed directed to the public good this will seldom happen But if perhaps it do so fall out I say that such a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear For the private judgement of any person concerning the law enacted in political matters for the public good does not take away the obligation of that law nor deserve a dispensation But if the law indeed be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate's authority (as for example that the people or any party amongst them should be compelled to embrace a strange religion and join in the worship and ceremonies of another Church) men are not in these cases obliged by that law against their consciences For the political society is instituted for no other end but only to secure every man's possession of the things of this life The care of each man's soul and of the things of heaven

which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to, unless entred to every man self. Thus the safeguard of men's lives and of the laws that belong unto this life is the business of the commonwealth and the preservation of these things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate. And therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this man or party and give them to that nor change property amongst different subjects (no not even by law) for a cause that has no relation to the end of civil government, I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or false does no prejudice to the worldly concerns of their fellow subjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe such law as this to be for the public good? I answer As the private judgement of an particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law so the private judgement (as I may call it) of the magistrate does not exempt him as new right of imposing laws upon his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant, much less if he make it his business to enquire and dance his followers and fellow-sectaries with the swills of errors. But what if the magistrate believe that he has right to make such laws and that they are for the public good and his subjects believe the contrary. What shall be judged between them. I answer God alone. For there is no judgement upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people's God, I say is the final Judge in this case how will retribut unto every one at the last day

every one ought to be of his own soul first, and in the next place of the public peace though if there are very few will think it is peace there are they see all laid was

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, Let our magistrate by law the other by force and these are of that nature that where the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of the magistrat in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise without judgement determine them. You will say then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and carry his point. Without doubt but the question is not here concerning

the doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say first, no opinion is so contrary to human society or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these indeed, examples in an Church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive to such degree of madness as that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion such

the
own
it be

thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative covered over

light or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly would soon draw upon them the eye and hand of the magistrate and waken all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the preadings of so dangerous an evil. But, nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other words. What else do they mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with heretics. Their meaning forsooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves for they declare all that are not of their communion to be heretics, or at least may declare them so whensoever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their asserting that kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms. It is evident that they thereby arrogate unto themselves the power of deposing kings, because they challenge the power of excommunication, as the peculiar right of their hierarchy. That dominion is founded in grace is also an assertion by which those that maintain'd plain liberty claim to the possession of all things. For they are not so wanting to themselves as not to believe or at least as not to profess themselves to be true, true pious and faithful. These therefore and the like who tribut unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, in plain terms, unto themselves, an peculiar privilege or power above their mortals, in civil concerns or who upon pretence of religion do chal-

is of any consideration in comparison with eternity. Secondly that seeing one man does not violate the right of another by his erroneous opinions and undue manner of worship nor is his perdition any prejudice to another man's affairs therefore the care of each man's salvation belongs only to himself. But I would not have this understood as if I meant hereby to condemn all charitable admonitions and affectionate endeavours to reduce men from errors which are indeed the greatest duty of a Christian. Any one may employ as many exhortations and arguments as he pleases towards the promoting of another man's salvation. But all force and compulsion are to be forborne. Nothing is to be done imperiously. Nobody is obliged in that matter to yield obedience unto the admonitions or injunctions of another further than he himself is persuaded. Every man in that has the supreme and absolute authority of judging for himself. And the reason is because nobody else is concerned in it nor can receive any prejudice from his conduct therein.

But besides their souls which are immortal men have also their temporal lives here upon earth the state whereof being frail and fleeting and the duration uncertain they have need of several outward conveniences to the support thereof which are to be procured or preserved by pains and industry. For those things that are necessary to the comfortable support of our lives are not the spontaneous products of nature nor do offer themselves fit and prepared for our use. This part therefore draws on another care and necessarily gives another employment. But the pravty of mankind being such that they had rather injuriously prey upon the fruits of other men's labours than take pains to provide for themselves the necessity of preserving men in the possession of what honest industry has already acquired and also of preserving their liberty and strength whereby they may acquire what they farther want obliges men to enter in to society with one another that by mutual assistance and joint force they may secure unto each other their properties in the things that contribute to the comfort and happiness of this life leaving in the meanwhile to every man the care of his own eternal happiness the attainment whereof can neither be facilitated by another man's industry nor can the loss of it turn to another man's prejudice nor the hope of it be forced from him by any external violence. But forasmuch as men thus entering into societies are grounded upon their mutual compacts of assistance for the defence of their temporal goods

may nevertheless be deprived of them either by the rapine and fraud of their fellow citizens or by the hostile violence of foreigners, the remedy of this evil consists in arms riches and multitude of citizens the remedy of the other in laws and the care of all things relating both in one and the other is committed by the society to the civil magistrate. This is the original this is the use and these are the bounds of the legislative (which is the supreme) power in every commonwealth. I mean that provision may be made for the security of each man's private possessions for the peace riches and public commodities of the whole people and as much as possible for the increase of their inward strength against foreign invasions.

These things being thus explained it is easy to understand to what end the legislative power ought to be directed and by what measures regulated and that is the temporal good and outward prosperity of the society which is the sole reason of men's entering into society and the only thing they seek and aim at in it. And it is also evident what liberty remains to men in reference to their eternal salvation and that is that every one should do what he in his conscience is persuaded to be acceptable to the Almighty on whose good pleasure and acceptance depends their eternal happiness. For obedience is due in the first place to God and afterwards to the laws.

But some may ask What if the magistrate should enjoin anything by his authority that appears unlawful to the conscience of a private person? I answer that if government be faithfully administered and the counsels of the magistrates be indeed directed to the public good this will seldom happen. But if perhaps it do so fall out I say that such a private person is to abstain from the action that he judges unlawful and he is to undergo the punishment which it is not unlawful for him to bear. For the private judgement of any person concerning a law enacted in political matters for the public good does not take away the obligation of that law nor deserve a dispensation. But if the law indeed be concerning things that lie not within the verge of the magistrate's authority (as for example that the people or any party amongst them should be compelled to embrace a strange religion and join in the worship and ceremonies of another Church) men are not in these cases obliged by that law against their consciences. For the political society is instituted for no other end but only to secure every man's possession of the things of this life. The care of each man's soul and of the things of heaven

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

which neither does belong to the commonwealth nor can be objected to, is left entirely to every man self. Thus the safeguard of men's lives and of the things that belong unto the life is the business of the commonwealth, and the preserving of those things unto their owners is the duty of the magistrate. And therefore the magistrate cannot take away these worldly things from this man or party and give them to that nor change property amongst fellow subjects (so not even by law) for cause that has no relation to the end of civil government. I mean for their religion, which whether it be true or false does no prejudice to the world, concerns of their fellow subjects, which are the things that only belong unto the care of the commonwealth.

But what if the magistrate believe such law as this to be for the public good. I answer As the private judgement of any particular person, if erroneous, does not exempt him from the obligation of law so the private judgement (as I may call it) of the magistrate does not give him any new right of imposing law upon his subjects, which neither was in the constitution of the government granted him, nor ever was in the power of the people to grant, or which less if he make his business to enrich and advance his followers and fellow-sectaries with the spoils of others. But what if the magistrate believe that he has right to make such laws and that they are for the public good, and his subjects believe the contrary. Who shall be judge between them. I answer God alone. For there is no judge upon earth between the supreme magistrate and the people. God, I say is the only Judge in this case, who will retribute unto every one the law due according to his deserts. This is, according to his clemency and uprightness in ending vowing to promote piety and the public weal, and peace.

th doubtfulness of the event, but the rule of right.

But to come to particulars. I say first, no opinions contrary to human society or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of these and of examples in any Church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive at such degree of madness as that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society and are therefore condemned by the judgement of all mankind because their own interest, peace, reputation, everything would be thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative covered over with specious show of devout words, but in effect opposing to the civil right of the community. For example we cannot find a sect that teaches, expressly and openly that men are not obliged to keep their promise that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in religion or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly would soon draw upon them the eye and hand of the magistrate and awaken all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an evil. But nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in their words. What he do they mean who teach that faith is not to be kept with heretics. Their meaning, I smooth, is that the privilege of breaking faith belongs unto themselves for they declare all that are not of their communion to be heretics, or at least to make declare them so whenever they think fit. What can be the meaning of their asserting that kings excommunicated forfeit their crowns and kingdoms. It is evident that they thereby arrogate

— as the prerogative of deposing kings,

where they see all laid waste.

There are two sorts of contests amongst men, the one managed by law the other by force and these are of the nature that where the one ends, the other always begins. But it is not my business to inquire into the power of the magistrate in the different constitutions of nations. I only know what usually happens where controversies arise without judge to determine them. You will see then, the magistrate being the stronger will have his will and carry his point. Without doubt, but the question is not here concerning

believe, or at least as not to prefer themselves to be the truly pious and faithful. These therefore, and the like, who stir up unto the faithful, religious, and orthodox, that is, plain terms, unto themselves, any peculiar privilege or power above other mortals, in civil concerns or who upon pretence of eliged chal

lenge any manner of authority over such as are not associated with them in their ecclesiastical communion I say these have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate as neither those that will not own and teach the duty of tolerating all men in matters of mere religion For what do all these and the like doctrines signify but that they may and are ready upon any occasion to seize the Government and possess themselves of the estates and fortunes of their fellow subjects and that they only ask leave to be tolerated by the magistrate so long until they find themselves strong enough to effect it?

Again That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby *ipso facto* deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince For by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country and suffer his own people to be listed as it were for soldiers against his own Government Nor does the frivolous and fallacious distinction between the Court and the Church afford any remedy to this inconvenience especially when both the one and the other are equally subject to the absolute authority of the same person who has not only power to persuade the members of his Church to whatsoever he lists either as purely religious or in order thereunto but can also enjoin it them on pain of eternal fire It is ridiculous for any one to profess himself to be a Mahometan only in his religion but in everything else a faithful subject to a Christian magistrate whilst at the same time he acknowledges himself bound to yield blind obedience to the Mufti of Constant nople who himself is entirely obedient to the Ottoman Emperor and frames the feigned oracles of that religion according to his pleasure But this Mahometan living amongst Christians would yet more apparently renounce their government if he acknowledged the same person to be head of his Church who is the supreme magistrate in the state

Lastly those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God Promises covenants and oaths which are the bonds of human society can have no hold upon an atheist The taking away of God though but in thought dissolves all besides also those that by the atheism undermine and destroy all religion can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration As for other practical opinions though not absolutely free from all error if they do not tend to establish

domination over others or civil impunity in the Church in which they are taught there can be no reason why they should not be tolerated

It remains that I say something concerning those assemblies which being vulgarly called and perhaps having sometimes been conventicles and nurseries of factions and seditions are thought to afford the strongest matter of objection against this doctrine of toleration But this has not happened by anything peculiar unto the genius of such assemblies but by the unhappy circumstances of an oppressed or ill settled liberty These accusations would soon cease if the law of toleration were once so settled that all Churches were obliged to lay down toleration as the foundation of their own liberty and teach that liberty of conscience is every man's natural right equally belonging to dissenters as to themselves and that nobody ought to be compelled in matters of religion either by law or force The establishment of this one thing would take away all ground of complaints and tumults upon account of conscience and these causes of discontent and animosities being once removed there would remain nothing in these assemblies that were not more peaceable and less apt to produce disturbance of state than in any other meetings whatsoever But let us examine particularly the heads of these accusations

You will say that assemblies and meetings endanger the public peace and threaten the commonwealth I answer If this be so why are there daily such numerous meetings in markets and Courts of Judicature? Why are crowds upon the Exchange and a concourse of people in cities suffered? You will reply Those are civil assemblies but these we object against are ecclesiastical I answer It is a likely thing indeed that such assemblies as are altogether remote from civil affairs should be most apt to embroil them. Oh but civil assemblies are composed of men that differ from one another in matters of religion but these ecclesiastical meetings are of persons that are all of one opinion As if an agreement in matters of religion were in effect a conspiracy against the commonwealth or as if men would not be so much the more warmly unanimous in religion on the less liberty they had of assembling But I will be urged still that civil assemblies are open and free for any one to enter into whereas religious conventicles are more private and thereby give opportunity to clandestine machinations I answer that this is not strictly true for many civil assemblies are not open to everyone And if some religious meetings be private who are they (I beseech you) that are to be

blamed for it, those that desire or those that for-
bid their being public. Again, you will say, that re-
ligious communion does exceedingly unite men's
minds and affections, and on the other side there-
fore the more dangerous. It is true, but so why
is not the magistrate afraid of his own Church
and why does he not forbid their assemblies as

gether by a common persecution, would be
as dangerous to the magistrat as any others
that had associated themselves merely upon the
account of religion. Some enter into company
for trade and profit, others for want of busi-
ness have their clubs for claret. Neighbourhood joins
some and religion others. But there is only one
thing which gathers people into seditions com-
motions, and that is oppression.

You will say, What, will you have people to
meet at the service against the magistrat? I
will answer, Why I pray against his will.
Is it not both lawful and necessary that they
should meet? Against his will do you say? That
is what I complain of, that is the very root of all
the mischief. Why are assemblies less sufferable
in a church than in a theatre or market. Those
that meet there are not either more riotous or
more turbulent than those that meet elsewhere.
The business is that is that they are ill used and
therefore they are not to be suffered. Take away
the partiality that is used towards them in mat-
ters of common right change the laws, take away
the penalties unto which they are subjected and
all things will immediately become safe and
peaceable; nay those that are verse to the reli-
gion of the magistrat will think themselves so
much the more bound to maintain the peace of
the commonwealth as their condition is better
in that place than elsewhere and all the several
separate congregations, like so many guardians
of the public peace, will watch another that
nothing may be innovated or changed in the form
of the government, because they can hope for

lessly soever to defend themselves. I mean
penalties than by galleys, prisons,
confiscations, and death. These he cherishes
and defends those he cruelly scourges and
oppresses. Let him turn the tables. O let those
discontents enjoy but the same privileges in civil
as his other subjects, and he will quickly find that
these seditious meetings will be no longer dan-
gerous. For if men enter into seditious conspira-
cies, it is religion inspires them to it in their
meetings, but their sufferings and oppressions
that make them willing to ease themselves. Just
and moderate government is everywhere
quiet, everywhere safe but oppression raises fer-
ments and makes men struggle to cast off an un-
easy and tyrannical yoke. I know that seditions
are very frequently raised upon pretence of reli-
gion, but it is as true that for religious subjects are
frequently ill treated and miserable. Believe
me the tyrants that are made proceed more from
any peculiar temper of this or that Church or
religious society but from the common dispo-
sition of all mankind who when they grow un-
der a heavy burden do naturally shake
shake off the yoke that galls their necks. I pro-
pose this business of religion were it alone and
that there were some distinction made be-
tween men and men upon account of the dif-
ferent complexions, shapes and features, so that
those who have black hair (for example) or grey
eyes should enjoy the same privileges as their
citizens that they should not be permitted either
to buy or sell, or liberty in their callings that pa-
rents should not have their government and educa-
tion of their own children that all should there
be excluded from the benefit of the laws,
meet with partial judgements can be desired but
those persons, thus distinguished from others by
the colour of their hair and eyes, and united to-

government, and that for no other reason (as
has already been shown) than because the prince
is kind and the laws are favourable to it, how
much greater will be the security of government
where all good subjects, of whatsoever Church
they be without any distinction upon account
of religion, enjoying the same liberty and pri-
vilege and the same benefit of the laws, shall become
the common support and guard of it, and where
no man will have any occasion to fear the severity
of the laws but those that do injuries to their
neighbours and offend against the civil peace.

That we may draw towards conclusion. The
sum of all we drive is that every man may en-
joy the same rights that are granted to others. Is
it permitted to worship God in the Roman man-
ner? Let it be permitted to do it in the Geneva

form also Is it permitted to speak Latin in the market place? Let those that have a mind to it be permitted to do it also in the Church Is it lawful for any man in his own house to kneel stand sit or use any other posture and to clothe himself in white or black in short or in long garments? Let it not be made unlawful to eat bread drink wine or wash with water in the church In a word whatsoever things are left free by law in the common occasions of life let them remain free unto every Church in divine worship Let no mans life or body or house or estate suffer any manner of prejudice upon these accounts Can you allow of the Presbyterian discipline? Why should not the Episcopal also have what they like? Ecclesiastical authority whether it be administered by the hands of a single person or

do with riches and revenues

Ecclesiastical assemblies and sermons are justified by daily experience and public allowance *These are allowed to people of some one persuasion why not to all?* If anything pass in a religious meeting seditiously and contrary to the public peace it is to be punished in the same manner and no otherwise than as if it had happened in a fair or market *These meetings ought not to be sanctuaries for factious and flagit ous fellows* Nor ought it to be less lawful for men to meet in churches than in halls nor are one part of the subjects to be esteemed more blamable for their meeting together than others Every one is to be accountable for his own actions and no man is to be laid under a suspension or odium for the fault of another Those that are seditious murderers thieves robbers adulterers slanderers etc *if whatsoever Church whether national or not ought to be punished and suppressed* But those whose doctrine is peaceable and whose manners are pure and blameless ought to be up on equal terms with the r fellow subjects Thus if solemn assemblies observations of festivals public worship be permitted to any one sort of professors all these things ought to be permitted to the Presbyterians Independents Anabaptists Arminians Quakers and others *with the same liberty* Nay if we may openly speak the truth and as becomes one man to another

ew ought
the com
he Gospel

commands no such thing, i.e. such which
judgeth not those that are without wants it

not. And the commonwealth which embraces indifferently all men that are honest peaceable, and industrious requires it not Shall we suffer a Pagan to deal and trade with us and shall we not suffer him to pray unto and worship God? If we allow the Jews to have private houses and dwellings amongst us why should we not allow them to have synagogues? Is their doctrine more false their worship more abominable or is the civil peace more endangered by their meeting in public than in their private houses? But if these things may be granted to Jews and Pagans surely the condition of any Christians ought not to be worse than theirs in a Christian commonwealth

You will say perhaps Yes it ought to be because they are more inclinable to factions tumults and civil wars I answer Is this the fault of the Christian religion? If it be so truly the Christian religion is the worst of all religions and ought neither to be embraced by any particular person nor tolerated by any common ealth For if this be the genius this the nature of the Christian religion to be turbulent and destructive to the civil peace that Church itself which the magistrate indulges will not always be innocent But far be it from us to say any such thing of that religion which carries the greatest opposition to covetousness ambition discord contention and all manner of inordinate desires and is the most modest and peaceable religion that ever was We must therefore seek another cause of those evils that are charged upon religion And if we consider right we shall find it to consist wholly in the subject that I am treating of It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided) but the refusal of toleration to those that are of different opinions (which might have been granted) that has produced all the bustles and wars that have been in the Christian world upon account of religion The heads and leaders of the Church moved by avarice and insatiable desire of dominion making use of the immoderate ambition of magistrates and the credulous superstition of the giddy multitude have incensed and animated them against those that dissent from themselves by preaching unto them contrary to the law of the Gospel and to the precepts of charity that

commands no such thing, i.e. which which
judgeth not those that are without wants it
1Co 5 12 13

A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION

1

their honest industry and contrary to all the law of equity both human and divine to be delivered up for prey to their malignance and rapine especially when they are otherwise altogether blameless and that the occasion which they are thus treated does not at all belong to the jurisdiction of the magistrate but entirely to the conscience of every particular man for the conduct of which he is accountable to God only what else can be expected but that these men, growing weary of the evils under which their labour should in the end think it lawful for them to resist force with force and to defend their natural rights (which are not for sale upon account of religion) with arms as well as they can That this has been hitherto the ordinary course of things is abundantly evident in his story and that it will continue to be so hereafter is but too apparent. It cannot indeed be otherwise so long as the principle of persecution for religion shall prevail as it has done hitherto, with magistrates and people, and so long as those that ought to be the preachers of peace and concord shall continue with all their art and strength to excite men to arms and

to children except only of such as are arrogant ungovernable and jurious to their brethren and the tall ecclesiastical men who boast themselves to be the successors of the Apostles, walking peaceably and modestly in the Apostles steps, without meddling with State Affairs, may apply themselves wholly to promote the salvation of souls.

FAREY TILL.

— — — add few

and an answer was made
by this it appears that men of different religions cannot be heretics or schismatics to one another

We are to enquire therefore what men are of the same religion Concerning which it is manifest that those who have one and the same rule of faith and worship are of the same religion and those who have not the same rule of faith and worship are of different religions. For since all things that belong to that religion are contained in the true rule it follows necessarily that those who agree in one rule are of one and the same religion and vice versa. Thus Turks and Christians are of different religions, because these take the Holy Scriptures to be the rule of their religion, and those the Alcoran. And for the same reason there may be different religions also even amongst Christians. The Protestants and Lutherans, though both of them profess faith in Christ and are therefore called Christians, yet are not both of the same religion because these acknowledge as thing but the Holy Scriptures to be the rule and foundation of their religion, those take in also traditions and the decrees of Popes and of these together make the rule of their religion and thus the Christians of St. John (as they are called) and the Christians of Geneva are of different religions, because these also take only the Scriptures, and those I know not what tradition, for the rule of their religion.

This being settled it follows, first, that heresy is separation made ecclesiastical communion between men of the same religion for some persons who are contained in the rule itself and secondly that amongst those who acknowledge as thing but the Holy Scriptures to be their rule of faith heresy is a separation made in the Christian communion for persons not contained in the express words of Scripture. Now

desired to find it appears that they have been incited by the must participate in the spoil and have thereof thought fit to make use of their overtness and power as means whereby to increase their own power For what does not see that these good men are indeed most ministers of the government than ministers of the Gospel and that, by flattery in the manner and favouring the dominion of popes and men in authority they endeavour with all their might to promote that tyranny in the commonwealth which otherwise they should not be able to establish

that we lately witness of the manner with which, the other the salvation of souls — it is impossible that any discord should ever have happened between them. *Scripturae hanc probris* to God Almighty grant, I beseech Him, that the Gospel of peace may to length be preached and that the magistrates, growing more careful to conform their own consciences to the law of God and less solicitous about the binding of their consciences by human laws may likewise their country direct all their counsels and efforts to promote universally the civil welfare of all

this separation may be made in a twofold manner

1 When the greater part or by the magistrate's patronage the stronger part of the Church separates itself from others by excluding them out of her communion because they will not profess their belief of certain opinions which are not the express words of the Scripture. For it is not the paucity of those that are separated nor the authority of the magistrate that can make

it make a separation because of such opinions

When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because that Church does not publicly profess some certain opinions which the Holy Scriptures do not expressly teach

Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals and they err obstinately against knowledge for when they have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith they nevertheless lay down certain propositions as fundamental which are not in the Scripture and because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of theirs nor build upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental they therefore make a separation in the Church either by withdrawing themselves from others or expelling the others from them. Nor does it signify anything for them to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture and to the analogy of faith for if they be conceived in the express words of Scripture there can be no question about them because those things are acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore fundamental. But if they say that the articles which they require to be professed are consequences deduced from the Scripture it is undoubtedly well done of them who believe and profess such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture and to make a separation for such things as these which neither are nor can be fundamental is to become heretics for I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he dare give out his consequences and interpretations of Scripture as divine inspirations and compare the articles of faith that he has framed according to his own fancy with the authority of Scripture. I know there are some propositions so evidently agree-

able to Scripture that nobody can deny them to be drawn from thence but about those there fore there can be no difference. This only I say—that however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture we ought not therefore to impose it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith unless we would be content also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner and that we should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans Calvinists Remonstrants Anabaptists and other sects which the contrivers of

cannot but wonder at the extravagant arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost the eternal and infinite wisdom of God

Thus much concerning heresy which is in common use is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion. Let us now consider schism which is a crime near akin to it for both these words seem unto me to signify an ill grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion made about things not necessary. But since use is such is the

Schism then for the same reasons that I have already been alleged is nothing else but a separation

what Christ our legislator or the Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit have commanded in express words

In a word he that denies not anything that the Holy Scriptures teach in express words nor makes a separation upon occasion of anything that is not manifestly contained in the sacred text—however he may be nicknamed by any sect of Christians and declared by some or all of

These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously but it is enough to have hinted at them thus briefly to a person of your parts.

CONTENTS

CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT

SECOND ESSAY

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	ix
I OF POLITICAL POWER	25
II OF THE STRENGTH OF NATURE	5
III OF THE STATE OF WAR	8
IV OF SLAVERY	29
V OF PROPERTY	30
VI OF PERSONAL POWER	36
VII OF POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY	42
VIII OF THE BEGINNING OF POLITICAL SOCIETIES	46
IX OF THE ENDS OF POLITICAL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT	53
X OF THE FORMS OF A CONSTITUTION	55
XI OF THE EXTENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.	55
XII THE LEGISLATIVE EXECUTIVE AND JUDICATIVE POWERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH	58
XIII OF THE SUBORDINATION OF THE POWERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH	59
XIV OF PREROGATIVE	62
XV OF PERSONAL, POLITICAL AND DOMESTIC CIVIL POWER COMBINED TOGETHER	64
XVI OF CONQUEST	65
XVII OF UPRISINGS	70
XVIII OF TYRANNY	71
XIX OF THE DISSOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT	73

this separation may be made in a twofold manner

1 When the greater part or by the magistrate patronage the stronger part of the Church separates itself from others by excluding them out of her communion because they will not profess their belief of certain opinions which are not the express words of the Scripture. For it is not the paucity of those that are separated nor the authority of the magistrate that can make any man guilty of heresy but he only is a heretic who divides the Church into parts introduces names and marks of distinction and voluntarily makes a separation because of such opinions

2 When any one separates himself from the communion of a Church because that Church does not publicly profess some certain opinions which the Holy Scriptures do not expressly teach

Both these are heretics because they err in fundamentals and they err obstinately against knowledge for when they have determined the Holy Scriptures to be the only foundation of faith they nevertheless lay down certain propositions as fundamental which are not in the Scripture and because others will not acknowledge these additional opinions of theirs nor build upon them as if they were necessary and fundamental they therefore make a separation in the Church either by withdrawing themselves from others or expelling the others from them. Nor does it signify anything for them to say that their confessions and symbols are agreeable to Scripture and to the analogy of faith for if they be conceived in the express words of Scripture there can be no question about them because those things are acknowledged by all Christians to be of divine inspiration and therefore fundamental. But if they say that the articles which they require to be professed are consequences deduced from the Scripture it is undoubtedly well done of them who believe and profess such things as seem unto them so agreeable to the rule of faith. But it would be very ill done to obtrude those things upon others unto whom they do not seem to be the indubitable doctrines of the Scripture and to make a separation for such things as these which neither are nor can be fundamental is to become heretics for I do not think there is any man arrived to that degree of madness as that he dare give out his consequences and interpretations of Scripture as

able to Scripture that nobody can deny them nor be drawn from thence but about those therefore there can be no difference. This only I say—that however clearly we may think this or the other doctrine to be deduced from Scripture, we ought not therefore to impose it upon others as a necessary article of faith because we believe it to be agreeable to the rule of faith unless it would be content also that other doctrines should be imposed upon us in the same manner and that we should be compelled to receive and profess all the different and contradictory opinions of Lutherans Calvinists Remonstrants Anabaptists and other sects which the contrivers of symbols systems and confessions are accustomed to deliver to their followers as genuine and necessary deductions from the Holy Scripture. I cannot but wonder at the extravagant arrogance of those men who think that they themselves can explain things necessary to salvation more clearly than the Holy Ghost the eternal and infinite wisdom of God.

Thus much concern heresy which word in common use is applied only to the doctrinal part of religion. Let us now consider schism which is a crime near akin to it for both these words seem unto me to signify an ill grounded separation in ecclesiastical communion made about things not necessary. But since use which is the supreme law in matter of language has determined that heresy relates to errors in faith and schism to those in worship or discipline we must consider them under that distinction.

Schism then for the same reasons that have already been alleged is nothing else but a separation made in the communion of the Church upon account of something in divine worship or ecclesiastical discipline that is not any necessary part of it. Now nothing in worship or discipline can be necessary to Christian communion but what Christ our legislator or the Apostles by inspiration of the Holy Spirit have commanded in express words.

In a word he that denies not anything that the Holy Scriptures teach in express words nor makes a separation upon occasion of anything that is not manifestly contained in the sacred text—however he may be nicknamed by any sect of Christians and declared by some or all of them to be utterly void of true Christianity—yet in deed and in truth this man cannot be either a heretic or schismatic.

These things might have been explained more largely and more advantageously but it is enough to have hinted at them thus briefly to a person of your parts.

AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT

Chap I Of Political Power

It has been shown in the foregoing discourse

First That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood or by positive institution from God, any such authority over his children, nor dominion over the world, as is pretended.

Secondly That if he had, his heirs yet had no right to it.

Thirdly That if his heirs had, there bears no law of Nature nor positive law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could not have been certainly determined.

Fourthly That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which is the eldest line of Adam posterity being so long since utterly lost, that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains no more above another the least pretence to be the eldest house, and have the right of inheritance.

All these promises hanging as I think, been clearly made out, is impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or derive any the least shadow of authority from that which is held to be the fountain of all power. Adam private dominion and paternal jurisdiction so that he will not give just occasion to think that all government in the world is the product only of force and violence, and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where the strongest carries it, and so lay the foundation for perpetual disorder and mischief, tumult, sedition, and rebellion (which that the followers of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must if necessary find out another rise of government, another original of political power and another way of designing and knowing the persons that

A Essay Concerning Certain False Principles

have it than what Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.

2 To this purpose, I think I may not be misstaken to set down what I take to be political power. That the power of a magistrate over a subject may be distinguished from that of a father over his children, a master over his servant, a husband over his wife and a lord over his estate. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the same man, if he be considered under these different relations, I may help us to distinguish these powers one from another and show the difference betwixt ruler of a commonwealth, father of family and a captain of a galley.

3 Political power then I take to be a right of making laws, with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties for the regulation and preserving of property and of employing the force of the community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury and all this only for the public good.

Chap II Of the State of Nature

4 To understand political power aright, and derive it from its original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of Nature without asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.

As that also of equality wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another there being nothing more evident than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by

every man upon this score by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general may restrain or here is necessary destroy them as noxious to them, and so may bring in evil on an one who hath transgressed that law as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others from doing the like mischief. And in this case and upon this ground every man has a right to punish the offender and be executioner of the law of nature.

I doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men but before they condemn it let them consider the time by which the first hit any prince or state can put to the punishment of any crime he commits in their country. It is certain that laws by virtue of an oath which they receive from the promulgation of the laws are not to be disobeyed. They speak not to him, nor if they did, is he bound to hear them. The laws are not to be disobeyed by whom they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth. But no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws. En la d France or Holland are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world—men without them. And therefore if by the law of nature every man hath not power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require I see not how the magistrates of an community can punish an alien of another country since in reference to him, they can have no more power than what every man natural may have over another.

Besides the crime which consists in disobeying the laws, and arising from this is the right of reason, whereby man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself against the principles of human nature and be noxious creature to the common good. And no one person or the some other man, receive damage by his transgression which case he who hath received any damage has (besides the right of punishment common to him with other men) a particular right to seek reparation from him that hath done it. And another person who finds it just may also join with him who is injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the harm he hath suffered.

From these two distinct rights (the one for punishing the crime for restraint and preventing the like offence which is of punishment is in everybody the other of taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party) comes to pass that the magistrate who by being magistrature hath the common right of punishment put into his hands, can of necessity where the public good

demands it the execution of the law remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority but yet cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That he who hath suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name and behalf the satisfaction. The damaged person has thus power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender by right of self preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime to prevent a benefit committed gain, by the right he has of preserving all mankind and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end. And thus it is that every man in the state of nature has power to kill a murderer both to deter others from doing the like injury (which no reparation can compensate) by the example of the punishment that it does to from everybody and also to secure men from the attempers of criminal who, having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust offence he hath committed upon one declared war against all mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tiger one of those wild savage beasts with whom men can have no society nor security. And upon this is grounded that great law of nature. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced that every one had right to destroy such a criminal that at the murder of his brother he cries out. Every one that findeth me shall slay me, so plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.

But the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser breaches of that law as well, perhaps, be demanded with death I answer. Each transgression may be punished to that degree and with that measure as will suffice to make an ill bargain to the offender give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the like. Every offence that can be committed in the state of nature may in the state of nature, be also punished equally and as far forth, as may in common we think. For though it would be hard my present purpose to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature or its measures of punishment, yet it is certain there is such law and that too as is intelligible and plain to rational creature and a student of that law as the positive laws of commonwealths, no possible plainer as much as reason is able to be understood than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men, flowing contrary and hidden interests put in words for truly so are great part of the municipal laws of countries, which

any manifest declaration of his will set one above another and confer on him by an evident and clear appointment an undoubted right to dominion and so sovereignty

5 This equality of men by Nature the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself and beyond all question that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they owe one another and from whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are

The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty to love others than themselves for seeing those things which are equal must needs all have one measure if I cannot but wish to receive good even as much at every man's hands as any man can wish unto his own soul how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire which is undoubtedly in other men weak being of one and the same nature to have anything offered them repugnant to this desire must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me so that if I do harm I must look to suffer there being no reason that others should show greater measure of love to me than they have by me showed unto them my desire therefore to be loved of my equals in Nature as much as possible may be imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to them and fully the like affection From which relation of equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn for direction of life no man is ignorant (*Ecclesiastical Philosophy*)¹

6 But though this be a state of liberty yet it is not a state of licence though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions yet he has not liberty to destroy himself or so much as any creature in nature may use than that which the law of Nature teacheth which

to harm another in his life health liberty or possessions for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker all the servants of one sovereign Master sent into the world by His order and about His business they are His property whose workmanship they are made to last during His not one another's

pleasure And being furnished with like faculties sharing all in one community of Nature there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy one another as if we were made for one another's uses as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours Every one as he is bound to preserve himself and not to quit his station wilfully so by the like reason when his own preservation comes not in competition ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind and not unless it be to do justice on an offender take away or impair the life or what tends to the preservation of the life the liberty health limbs or goods of another

7 And that all men may be restrained from invading others' rights and from doing hurt to one another and the law of Nature be observed which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind the execution of the law of Nature is in that state put into every man's hands where by every one has a right to punish the transgressor

vain if there were nobody that in the state of Nature had a power to execute that law and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders and if any one in the state of Nature may punish another for any evil he has done every one may do so For in that state of perfect equality where naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another what any may do in prosecution of that law every one must needs have a right to do

8 And thus in the state of Nature one man comes by a power over another but yet no absolute

calm reason and conscience dictate what is proportionate to his transgression which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint. For these three are the only reasons why one man may lawfully do harm to another which is that we call punishment In transgressing the law of Nature the offender declares himself to live by an

¹Richard Hooker *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*

thereby put himself into a state of war with him
 that he cannot be understood as a declaration of a
 design upon his life. For I have reason to con-
 clude that he who would get me into his power
 without my consent would use me as he pleased
 which he had got me there and destroy me too
 when he had a fancy that my body can endure
 that he may in his absolute power unless I be to
 compel me by force that which is against the
 nature of my freedom — I make me slave to

be in society and a fellow subject. Thus, a thief
 whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law
 for hanging shall kill all that I am worth, I may kill
 whom he sets against me to rob me but of my horse or
 coat, because the law which was made for my
 preservation where I cannot interpose to secure
 my life from present force which if lost cap-
 tivity of no reparation permits me my own de-
 fence and the right of war a liberty to kill the
 aggressor because the aggressor allows I turn
 I appeal to our common judge nor the decision
 of the law for remedy in a case where the mis-
 chief may be irreparable. Want of a common
 judge with authority put all men in a state of
 nature force without right upon a man's per-
 son makes a state of war both where there is, and
 is not, a common judge

necessarily be supposed that nature has
 any thing in itself that freed men be the
 foundation of all the rest as that in the state
 of society would take away the freedom belong-
 ing to those of the society or commonwealth
 must be supposed to design to take away from
 them everything else and so be looked on as in
 a state of war

8 This makes lawful for man to kill a thief
 who has in the last hurt him, nor declared
 an design upon his life farther than by the
 use of force to get him in his power as to take
 away his money or what he pleases, from him
 because using force where he has no right get
 me into his power I suppose he would take
 I have no reason to suppose that he would
 take away my liberty would not, when he had
 me in his power take away everything else. And
 ———— he may as

of war ceases between those that are in society
 and are equally both subject to the judge
 and therefore in such controversies, where the
 question is put, Who shall be judge? I cannot
 be meant who shall decide the controversy, ev-
 ery one knows what Jephthah here tells us, that
 the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there
 is no judge in earth the appeal lies to God in
 Heaven. That question then cannot mean who
 shall judge whether another hath put himself in
 a state of war with me and whether I may as
 Jephthah did appeal to Heaven in it. Of that I
 myself cannot judge in my own conscience as
 I will answer to that great day the Supreme
 Judge of all men.

Chap. IV. Of Slavery

1 The natural liberty of man is to be free from
 any superior power on earth and not to be un-
 der the will or legislative authority of man, but
 to have only the law of nature for his rule. The
 liberty of man in society is to be under no other
 legislative power but that established by consent
 in the commonwealth nor under the dominion
 of any will, or restraint of any law but what that
 legal power shall enact according to the trust put
 in it. Freedom, then, is not what Sir Robert Fil-
 mer tells us. A liberty for every one to do what
 he lists, to live as he pleases, and not to be tied
 by any laws but freed men of men under gov-
 ernment is to have standing rule to live by
 common to every one of that society and made
 by the legislative power erected in it. A liberty
 to follow my own will in all things where that
 rule prescribes to, to be subject to the
 constant, uncertain, unknown, arbitrary will
 of another man, as freedom in nature is to be un-
 der no other restraint but the law of Nature

state of war and is aggression.
 9. And here we have the plain difference be-
 tween the state of nature and the state of war
 which however some men have confounded as
 as far distant as the state of peace goodwill mu-
 tual assistance and preservation and that of
 mutual malice violence and mutual destruction
 are not from another man living together con-
 cording reason without common superior on earth
 with authority to judge between them, is
 properly the state of nature. But force or de-
 clared design of force upon the person of an-
 other where there is no common superior on earth
 to appeal to for relief is the state of war and it
 is the want of such an appeal gives man the
 right of war even against an aggressor though

are only so far right as they are founded on the law of Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted

13 To this strange doctrine—viz That in the state of Nature every one has the executive power of the law of Nature—I doubt not but it will be objected that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases that self love will make men partial to themselves and their friends and on the other side ill nature passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others and hence nothing but confusion and disorder will

ment is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of Nature which must certainly be great where men may be judges in their own

remember that absolute monarchs are but men

■ therefore not to be endured I desire to know what kind of government that is and how much better it is than the state of Nature where one man commanding a multitude has the liberty to be judge in his own case and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases without the least question or control of those who execute his pleasure? and in whatsoe he doth whether led by reason mistake or passion must be submitted to? which men in the state of Nature are not bound to do one to another And if he that judges judges amiss in his own or any other case he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind

14 It is often asked as a mighty object on where are or ever were there any men in such a state of Nature? To which it may suffice as an

they are or are not in league with others for it

munity and make one body politic. once upon uses and compacts men may make one with another and yet still be in the state of Nature The promises and bargains for truck, etc between

the two men in Soldania in or between a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America are binding to them though they are perfectly in a state of Nature in reference to one another for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men as men and not as members of society

erto mentioned — i.e. the laws of Nature— do bind men absolutely even as they are men although they have never any settled fellowship never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do or not to do but for as much as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our Nature doth desire a life fit for the

duced to seek communion and fellowship with others this was the cause of men uniting themselves as first in politic societies But I more over affirm that all men are naturally in that state and remain so till by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society and I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse to make it very clear

Chap III Of the State of War

16 The state of war is a state of enmity and de

a state of war with him against whom he has de

I should have a right to destroy that which threatens me with destruction for by the fundamental law of Nature man being to be preserved as much as possible when all cannot be preserved the safety of the innocent is to be preferred and one may destroy a man who makes war upon him or has discovered an enmity to his being for the same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion because they are not under the ties of the common law of reason have no other rule but that of force and violence and so may be treated as a beast of prey though so dangerous and noxious creatures that will be sure to destroy him whenever he falls into their power

17 And hence it is that he who attempts to get another man into his absolute power does

■ This freedom from absolute arbitrary power is so necessary to and closely joined with a man's preservation that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his preservation and life together. For a man not having the power of his own life cannot by compact or his own consent enslave himself to any one nor put himself under the absolute arbitrary power of another to

other power over it. Indeed having by his fault forfeited his own life by some act that deserves death he to whom he has forfeited it may when he has him in his power delay to take it and make use of him to his own service and he does him no injury by it. For whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his

which is nothing else but the state of war continued between a lawful conqueror and a captive for if once compact enter between them and make an agreement for a limited power on the one side and obedience on the other the state of war and slavery ceases as long as the compact endures for as has been said no man can by agreement pass over to another that which he hath not in himself—a power over his own life.

I confess we find among the Jews as well as other nations that men did sell themselves but it is plain this was only to drudgery not to slavery for it is evident the person sold was not under an absolute arbitrary despotical power for the master could not have power to kill him at any time & him at a certain time he was obliged to let go free out of his service and the master of such a servant as so far from having an arbitrary power over his life that he could not at pleasure so much as maim him but the loss of an eye or tooth set him free (Exod. 21.)

Chap. V. Of Property

24 Whether we consider natural reason which tells us that men being once born have a right to their preservation and consequently to meat and drink and such other things as Nature affords for their subsistence or revelation which gives us an account of those grants God made of the world to Adam and to Noah and his sons it is very clear that God as King David says (Psalm 115. 16) has given the earth to the children of men given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have a

property in anything. I will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to make out property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his posterity in common it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch should have any property upon a God—how he could to Adam
all the rest
to show

how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common and that without any express compact of all the commoners.

25 God who hath given the world to men in

to men for the support and comfort of their being. And though all the fruits it naturally produces and beasts it feeds belong to mankind in common as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of Nature and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive of the rest of mankind in any of them as they are thus in their natural state yet being given for the use of men there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other before they can be of any use or at all beneficial to any particular men. The fruit or venison which nourishes the wild Indian who knows no enclosure and is still a tenant in common must be his and so his—the part of him that another can no longer have any right to it before it can do him any good for the support of his life.

26 Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men yet every man has a property in his own person. This nobody

can take from him. If therefore his labour is joined to it, then it is his. Whatsoever he hath laid out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in he hath mixed his labour with it and joined to it something that is his own and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others.

7 He that is nourished by the acorns he picked

se-1) larger possessions and a right to them
 which how it has done I shall by and by show
 more large

3 This is certain, that in the beginning be-
 fore the decree of having more than men needed
 and a-tered the intrinsic value of things, which
 depends on their usefulness to the life of
 man, or had agreed that it is the piece of yellow
 metal which would keep without wasting or de-
 cay should be worth great price of flesh or a
 bushel of corn, though men had a right to
 possess by their labour as much as they could
 use it was could not be much, nor the pre-
 judice of others, where the same plenty was still
 left those who would use the same industry

Before the appropriation of land he who gather-
 ed as much of the wild fruit, killed caught, or
 tamed as many of the beasts as he could—he that
 so employed his pains about any of the spo-
 rous products of nature as an was to alter them
 from the state in which we put them in, by placing
 any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire
 property in them but if they perished in his
 possession without their due use—if the fruits
 rotted or the venison putrefied before he could
 vend—he offended against the common law of
 nature and was liable to be punished he in-
 vaded his neighbours share for he had no right
 farther than his use called for any of them, and
 let him serve himself with the conveniences of
 life

30. The same measures governed the posses-
 sion of land, on whatsoever he sowed and re-
 had up and made use of before it spoiled, that
 was his property, on whatsoever he enclosed,
 and could feed and make use of, the cattle and
 product was also his. But if either the grass of his
 enclosure rotted, or the fruit of his
 planting perished without gathering and har-
 vesting

31. This part of the earth, now standing in his
 enclosure was still to be looked on as waste and
 much to be the possession of an other Thus,
 in beginning Cain must take as much ground
 as he could till and make his own land and
 make it known by Abel sheep to feed
 few acres would serve for both their possession
 But as families increased and industry enlarged
 their stocks, their possessions enlarged with the
 need of them but it was common without
 fixed property the ground they made use
 of till they incorporated, settled themselves to-
 gether and built cities, and then, by consent,
 they came in time to set out the bounds of their
 distinct territories and agree on limits between
 them and their neighbours, and by law to limit

themselves to the properties of those of the
 same society For we see that in that part of the
 world which was first inhabited, and therefore
 like to be best peopled, even as low down as Ab-
 raham time they wandered with their flocks
 and their herds, which was their substance free-
 ly up and down—and thus Abraham did in a
 country where he was a stranger whence it is
 plain that, at last, a great part of the land lay
 in common, that the inhabitants valued it in
 no claimed property in more than they made
 use of but when there was not room enough in
 the same place for their herds to feed together
 they by consent, as Abraham and Lot did (Gen.
 xiii. 5) separated and enlarged their pasture
 where it best liked them. And for the same rea-
 son, Esau went from his father and his brother
 and planted in Mount Seir (Gen. 36. 6)

32. And thus, without supposing any pri-
 ority of dominion and property in Adam over all the
 world, exclusiveness of all other men, which can no
 way be proved, nor any property be made

quarrel.

4 Nor is it so strange as, perhaps, before con-
 sidering that the property of

sown with wheat or barley and an acre of the
 same land lying in common without any hus-
 bandry upon it, and he will find that the im-
 provement of labour makes the far greater part
 of the value I think will be but very modest
 computation to say that of the products of the
 earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are
 the effects of labour if we will roughly esti-
 mate things as they come to our use, and cast up
 the several expenses about them—what in them
 is purely owing to nature and what to labour—we
 shall find that in most of them more than nine
 hundredths are wholly to be put on the account
 of labour

4 There cannot be a clearer demonstration
 of anything than several nations of the Ameri-
 cans are of this, who are rich in land and poor in
 all the comforts of life whom nature has ing
 furnished as liberally as any other people with
 the materials of plenty—the fruitful soil, fit
 to produce in abundance what might serve for

property which another had no title to nor could without injury, take from him

32 Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of land by improving it any prejudice to any other man since there was still enough and as good left, and more than the yet unprovided could use. So that in effect there was never the less left for others because of his enclosure for himself. For he that leaves as much as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all. Nobody could be so prodigal as to waste his drinking of an draught, who

ter left him to quench his thirst. And the case of land and water where there is enough of both is perfectly the same

33 God gave the world to men in common but since He gave it them for their benefit and the greatest conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it it cannot be supposed He meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as good left for his improvement as was already taken up needed not complain. ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labour if he did it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to and not the ground which God had given him in common with others to labour on and whereof there was as good left as that already possessed and more than he knew what to do with or his industry could reach to

34 It is true in land that is common in England or any other country where there are plenty of people under government who have money and commerce no one can enclose or appropriate any part without the consent of all his fellow commoners because this is left common by compact—first by the law of the land which is not to be violated. And though it be common in respect of some men it is not so to all mankind but is the joint property of this country or this parish. Besides the remainder after such enclosure would not be as good to the rest of the commoners as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole whereas in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world it was quite otherwise. The law man was under was rather for appropriating God commanded and his wants forced him to labour. The

mimon we see are joined together. The one gave title to the other. So that God by commanding to subdue gave authority so far to appropriate. And the condition of human life which requires labour and materials to work on necessarily introduces private possessions

35 The measure of property Nature will set, by the extent of man's labour and the convenience of life. No man's labour could subdue or appropriate all nor could his enjoyment consume more than a small part so that it was impossible for a man to

the right of a property to the present still have room for as good and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was appropriated. Which measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion and such as he might appropriate to himself without injury to anybody in the first ages of the world when men were more in danger to be lost by wandering from their company in the then vast wilderness of the earth than to be straitened for want of room to plant in

36 The same measure may be allowed still without prejudice to anybody full as the world seems. For supposing a man or family in the state they were at first peopling of the world by the children of Adam or Noah let him plant in some inland vacant places of America. We shall find that the possessions he could make himself upon the measures we have given would not be very large nor even to this day prejudice the rest of mankind or give them reason to complain or think themselves injured by this man's encroachment though the race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world and do infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay the extent of ground is of so little value without labour that I have heard it affirmed that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough so far and reap what he sows without disturbing upon land he has no other title to but only his making use of it. But on the contrary the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him who by his industry on neglected and consequently waste land has increased the stock of corn which they wanted. But be this as it will which I lay no stress on this I dares boldly affirm that the same rule of property—viz that every man should have as much as he could make use of—could hold still in the world without straitening anybody since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants had not the invention of money and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it introduced (by con-

can make use of, and so till he is common though this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind that have consented to the use of money.

45. The greatest part of this is really useful to the life of man, and such as the necessity of sustenance makes the first commoners of the world look after—as it doth the Americans now—are generally things of short duration, such as—if they are not consumed by use—will decay and perish of themselves. Gold, silver and diamonds are things that last long, or at leastment hath put the value on, more than real use and the necessary support of life. Now of those good things which nature hath provided in common, every one hath right (as hath been said) to as much as he could use and had property in all he could get with his labour, all that his industry could send to, till it from the state of nature had put in, was his. He that gathered hundred bushels of corn or apples had therein property in them, they were his goods as soon as gathered. He was only to look that he used them before they spoiled, else he took more than his share

part to another, but he so that it perished not uselessly in his possession, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered was plums that would have perished in waste, for nuts that would last good for his use, in whole year he could not part he wanted no the common stock destroyed no part of the portion of goods that belonged to him, so long as nothing perished uselessly in his hands. Again if he would give his wife for a piece of metal, pleased with the colour or excellence of his sheep for bells, or wool for a sparkling pebble or diamond and kept those by him all his life, he had done no the right of others, he might he put up as much of these durable things as he pleased to, according to the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his possession, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it.

47. And thus came in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might keep without spoiling, and that, by mutual consent, men would take in exchange for the truly useful but perishable supports of life.

48. And as different degrees of industry were put to the possession in different proportions, so this in the use of money gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge their possessions, and an island separates from all possible commerce with the rest of the world, wherein

there were but a hundred families, but there were sheep, horses, and cows, with other useful animals, wholesome fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as many, but nothing in this island either because of its commonness or perishable nature, fit to supply the place of money. What reason could any man have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his fatal and plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable useful commodities with others. Where there is not something both lasting and scarce, and so valuable to be hoarded up, there men will not be permitted to enlarge their possessions of land, were they never so rich, never so free for them to take. For I ask, what would a man value ten thousand or an hundred thousand acres of excellent land ready cultivated and well stocked, with cattle in the middle of the inland parts of America, where he had no hopes of commerce with other parts of the world, to draw money to him by the sale of the product. It would not be worth the colour of, and we should see him run up against the wild common of nature whatever was more than would support the conveniences of life to be had there for him and his family.

49. Thus, in the beginning of all the world, as America and more so than that is now for such things as money was a where known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money, amongst his neighbours, you shall see the same man will begin presently to enlarge his possessions.

50. But as the gold and silver being little useful to the life of man, in proportion to food, raiment

and unequal possession of the earth—I mean out of the bounds of society and compact for in government is the law regulate the habit by consent, found out and agreed in a way how a man may rightfully and without injury possess more than he himself can make use of by receiving gold and silver which may continue in man's possession without decaying for the overplus, and a restraint those mortals should have.

51. And thus, I think, it is very easy to conceive without any difficulty how labour could first begin the title of property in the common things of nature, and how the depending upon our uses bounded so that there could then be

food raiment and delight yet for want of improving it by labour have not one hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy and a king of a large and fruitful territory there feeds lodges and is clad worse than a day labourer in England

42 To make this a little clearer let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life through their several progresses before they come to our use and see how much they receive of their value from human industry Bread wine and cloth are things of daily use and great plenty yet notwithstanding acorns water and leaves or skins must be our bread drink and clothing did not labour furnish us with these more useful commodities For whatever bread is more worth than acorns wine than water and cloth or silk than leaves skins or moss that is wholly owing to labour and industry The one of these being the food and raiment which unassisted Nature furnishes us with the other provisions which our industry and pains prepare for us which how much they exceed the other in value when any one hath computed he will then see how much labour makes the far greatest part of the value of things we enjoy in this world and the ground which produces the materials is scarce to be reckoned in as any or at most but a very small part of it so little that even amongst us land that is left wholly to nature that hath no improvement of pasturage tillage or planting is called as indeed it is waste and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing

43 An acre of land that bears here twenty bushels of wheat and another in America which with the same husbandry would do the like are without doubt of the same natural intrinsic value But yet the benefit mankind receives from one in a year is worth fifty pounds and the other possibly not worth a penny if all the profit an Indian received from it were to be valued and sold here at least I may truly say not one thousandth It is labour then which puts the

other utensils which are a vast number requisite to this corn from its sowing to its being made bread must all be charged on the account of labour and received as an effect of that Nature and the earth furnished only the almost worthless materials as in themselves It would be a strange catalogue of things that industry provided and made use of about every loaf of bread before it came to our use if we could trace them iron wood leather bark timber stone bricks coal lime cloth dyeing drugs pitch tar masts ropes and all the materials made use of in the ship that brought any of the commodities made use of by any of the workmen to any part of the work all which it would be almost impossible at least too long to reckon up

his own person and the actions or labour of it) had still in himself the great foundation of property and that which made up the great part of his being when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life was perfectly his own and did not belong in common to others

45 Thus labour in the beginning gave a right of property wherever any one as pleased

first for the most part contented themselves with what unassisted Nature offered to their necessities and though afterwards in some parts of the world where the increase of people and stock with the use of money had made land scarce and so of some value the several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories and by laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their society and so by compact and agreement settled the property which labour and industry be

ducts for all that the straw bran bread of that acre of wheat is more worth than the product of an acre of as good land which lies waste is all the effect of labour For it is not barely the ploughman's pains the reaper's and thresher's

to the land in the other's possession have by common consent given up the pretences to the natural common right which originally they had to those countries and so have by positive agreement settled a property amongst themselves in distinct parts of the world yet there are still great tracts of ground to be found

employed about the plough mill oven or any more than the people who dwell on it, do or

can mak use f d m till e in comm
though this can scarce happen am gat th t
part of ma kind that ha c ns nted t the use
f mo y

46 Th ore test part f things ally usel t to
th lif f man, and such as th e ss ty of sub-
ting mad the first onamo rs f the wo ld
look after— s t d th th Am ca s n —are
g n ally th g f ho t du ti n su h as—if
they are t consumed by use—w ll decay d
pe h f th msel es G ld l er a d d iamo ds
ar th th t fa cy agre m th th put the
al mor than l use d the cessary
support f l f Non f those good th g which
Nur hath p ded om n, ery e
hath right (h th bee sa d) t as much as he
could se a d had p pe t all h e ld
fect u th h l bo all that he du try could
ste d to t l f m the ta N n h d p t
t was h u H th t g th ed hu dred b sh
la fa orn r pples h d th by pr perty n
them th y w lu good as soon s g th ed
H was ly t look th t h used th m bef re
they spo led lse h took m e than hu hare
d robbed th rs A d deed t was foolish
th g as w ll dish est t l and p mor
than b could mak use f l f b g e ay
part y body lse so th t perished t use
lessly hus possess th se h bom d se f
And if h also bart ed y pl ms that would
ha rotted week f us that o ld l t
good f hu t g wh l y ar h d d n
jury h wasted t th mm ock destroyed
part f th po t f goods tha bel get t
no had useless

lung pe
h m all his life, h d d t th ght of
others h m ght h p pas m h f these d
abl th g as h pl ased th d g f th
bou d f hus just p perty t l g the
larg ess f hu possess but th perish g f
t hu g useless

47 A d thus cam th use f m y some
baot g th g tha m m ch keep w thout p d
g d th t, by m tual ns t, m could
tak in excha g f th truly sel l but perish
bl supports f l f

48 And as d f f t d gr es f dustry w
ap t g m possess ns d f f r t p po
u na, so th t f m y g th m th
ppo ty co t d larg th m F
suppos gan f d sep c f m all poss
commerce w th th est f th wo ld wh m

th re were but a hundred f mil es but there
w re heep h res a d cows w th th r use
f la mals wh lesome frusts d l a d no gh
f re n f a hund ed thousand t mcs as many
but noth g in the sla d ithe because of it
commo ess r pe usabl ness fit to supply the
pla e f mo y What ason could any one
ll th re to enlarg h possess ns beyond the
w f h f m ly and a plentiful supply t m
— d r v

ther is not som th g bot as b
and so valu ble t be h ded up th r men
will not be pt to enl g th possess ns of
la d were tn verso h n erso f eel th m
t tak For l ask what would man val e ten
th usand o an hu d ed th sa d cres of ex
cell t l d r dy culti ated and well tocked
too with e t l n the middle of the l d
parts of Am ca wh r he had no h pe of
ommerce with oth r p rs f the wo ld t dr w
m y t h m by the sale of th p od t It
would ot be v th th enclos g nd w should
see hum g up gain t th wld comm n f
hatur e whatev as m e tha would supply
th e ces f l f t be had ther f r hum
a d h f m ly

49 Thu in the beg n ng all th wo ld was
Am ca and mo so th th t is n w f n
su h th g as m ey was y where known f nd
t som th g th t hath th use a d val of
m y mo t h m ghbours, you hall see
th sam ma will begn pres ntly t enlarge
hus possess ns

5 B t s ceg ld d l ber gl t l use
ful t l f f ma p po u nt food ra
m t a d carriag has t l only from the
e nse t f m n—wh f l bo yet makes n

out of th bou d f soci ty and comp ct for n
gov rnm nts th l w s egul te t they hav g

a also

5 A d thus I tha k, t is ery asy to co
ce w thout any d fficulty l w labo co ld
t first begn t l f p pe ty n th m m
th a of N t d h w th spend g t upon
ur user bo ded t so that there could th p be

no reason of quarrelling about title nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave Right and conveniency went together For as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of This left no room for controversy about the title nor for encroachment on the right of others What portion a man carved to himself was easily seen and it was useless as well as dishonest to carve himself too much or take more than he needed

Chap VI Of Paternal Power

52 It may perhaps be censured an impertinent criticism in a discourse of this nature to find fault with words and names that have obtained in the world And yet possibly it may not be amiss to offer new ones when the old are apt to lead men into mistakes as this of paternal power probably has done which seems so to place the power of parents over their children wholly in the father as if the mother had no share in it which here as if we consult reason or revelation we shall find she has an equal title which may give one reason to ask whether this might not be more properly called parental power? For whatever obligation Nature and the right of generation lays on children it must certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent causes of it And accordingly we see the positive law of God every where joins them together without distinction when it commands the obedience of children

Honour thy father and thy mother (Exod 20 12) Whosoever curseth his father or his mother (Lev 20 9) Ye shall fear every man his mother and his father (Lev 19 3) Children obey your parents (Eph 6 1) etc as the style of the Old and New Testament

53 Had but this one thing been well considered without looking any deeper into the matter it might perhaps have kept men from running into those gross mistakes they have made about this power of parents which however it might without any great harshness bear the name of absolute dominion and regal authority when under the title of paternal power it seemed appropriated to the father which could yet have sounded but oddly and in the very name shown the absurdity if this supposed absolute power over children had been called parental and thereby discovered that it belonged to the mother too For it will but very ill serve the turn of those men who contend so much for the absolute power and authority of the fatherhood as they call it, that the mother should have any share in it. And it could have but ill supported

the monarchy they contend for when by the very name it appeared that that fundamental authority from whence they would derive their government of a single person only was not placed in one but two persons jointly But to let this of names pass

54 Though I have said above (2) That all men by nature are equal I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of equality Age or virtue may give men a just precedency Excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level Birth may subject some and alliance or benefits others to pay an observance to those to whom Nature gratitude or other respects may have made it due and yet all this consists with the equality which all men are in respect of jurisdiction or dominion one over another which as the equality I there spoke of as proper to the business in hand bein that equal right that every man hath to his natural freedom without being subjected to the will or authority of any other man

55 Children I confess are not born in this full state of equality though they are born to it Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into the world and for some time after but it is but a temporary one The bonds of this subjection are like the swaddling clothes they are wrapt up in and supported by in the weakness of their infancy Age and reason as they grow up loosen them till at length they drop quite off and leave a man at his own free disposal

56 Adam was created a perfect man his body and mind in full possession of their strength and reason and so was capable from the first in stance of his being to provide for his own support and preservation and govern his actions according to the dictates of the law of reason God had implanted in him From him the world is peopled with his descendants who are all born infants weak and helpless without knowledge or understanding But to supply the defects of this imperfect state till the improvement of growth and age had removed them Adam and Eve and after them all parents were by the law of Nature under an obligation to preserve nourish and educate the children they had begotten not as the rovers or workmen but the workmanship of their own Maker the Almighty to whom they were to be accountable for them

57 The law that was to govern Adam was the same that was to govern all his posterity the law of reason But his offspring having another way of entrance into the world different from him by a natural birth that produced them igno-

rant, and without the use of reason, they were not presently under that law. For nobody can be under a law that is not promulgated to him, and this law being promulgated made known by reason, it is that is not come to the use of his reason cannot be said to be under this law and Adam's children being presently as soon as born under this law of reason, were not present free. For law is true in us, as it is so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law. Could they be happy or without it, the law as useless that would of itself vanish and that ill deserves the name of constraint which hinders us only from evils and preempes. So that however it may be mistaken, the end of law is to bold or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge freedom. For if the states of created beings, capital laws, where there is no law there is no freedom. For liberty is to be free from restraint and less from others, which cannot be where there is no law and is not, as we are told, "liberty is every man to do what he lists." For who could be free when every other man humours him and dominates over him. But liberty is to dispose and order freely as he lists his person, his actions, possessions, and his whole property within the allowance of those laws under which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another, but freely to follow his own.

--

form the mind, and govern the actions of it, as yet ignorant nor till reason shall take its place and ease them of that trouble, as what the children want, and the parents are bound to. For God has given men an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him freedom of will and liberty of conscience as proper belonging thereunto more than the bounds of that law he is under. But whilst he is in a state where he has no understanding of his own so direct his will, he is not to have a will of his own to follow. He that understands for him must will for him too he must prescribe his will, and regulate his actions, but when it comes to the estate that made his father free man, the son is a free man too.

59. This holds in all the laws man is under whether natural or civil. Is man under the law of nature? What made him free of that law? what gave him free disposing of his property

according to his own will within the compass of that law. I answer an estate wherein he might be supposed capable to know that law that so he might keep his actions within the bounds of it. When he has acquired that estate, he is presumed to know how far that law is to be his guide and how far he may make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it till then, some body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the law allows a liberty. If such a state of reason, such an act of discretion made him free the same shall make his son free too. Is a man under the law of England? what made him free of that law—that is to have the liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his own will, without the permission of that law capital knowing that law? Which is supposed, by that law that the age of twenty-one in some cases sooner. If this made the father free the same shall make the son free too. Till then, we see the law allows that so to have no will but he is to be guided by the will of his father or guard as which is to understand for him. And if this

understanding the law takes care to do to some other must govern him and be will to him till he hath attained the state of freedom, and his understanding be fit to take the government of his will. But after that the father and son are equally free as much as tutor and pupil after non-age equally subjects of the same law together without any dominion left in the father over the son's liberty or estate of his son, whether they be only in the state and under the law of nature or under the positive laws of an established government.

60. But if thou hast defects that may happen out of the ordinary course of nature any one comes in it such degree of reason when in him he be supposed capable of knowing that law and so law within the rules of he is never capable of being free man, he is ever loose to the disposition of his own will because he knows no bounds to it, has not understanding to proper guide but is only used under the tutelage and government of others all the time his own understanding is incapable of that charge. And so lunatics and idiots are ever self-oom the government of their parents. Children who are not as yet come unto those years whereat they may be handled and innocents, which are excluded by natural defect from ever having. Thirdly Madmen, which for the present cannot possibly have the use of right reason to guide

themselves have for their guide the reason that guideth other men which are tutors over them to seek and procure their good for them says Hooker (*Eccle Pol lib 1 s 7*) All which seems no more than that duty which God and Nature has laid on man as well as other creatures to preserve their offspring till they can be able to shift for themselves and will scarce amount to an instance or proof of parents regal authority

61 Thus we are born free as we are born rational not that we have actually the exercise of either age that brings one brings with it the other too And thus we see how natural freedom and subjection to parents may consist together and are both founded on the same principle A child is free by his father's title by his father's understanding which is to govern him till he hath it of his own The freedom of a man at years of discretion and the subjection of a child to his parents which yet short of it are so consistent and so distinguishable that the most blinded contenders for monarchy by right of fatherhood cannot miss of it the most obstinate cannot but allow of it For were their doctrine all true were the right heir of Adam now known and by that title settled a monarch in his throne invested with all the absolute unlimited power Sir Robert Filmer talks of if he should die as soon as his heir were born must not the child notwithstanding he were never so free never so much sovereign be in subjection to his mother and nurse to tutors and governors till age and education brought him reason and ability to govern himself and others? The necessities of his life the health of his body and the information of his mind would require him to be directed by the will of others and not his own and yet will any one think that this restraint and subjection are inconsistent with or spoiled him of that liberty or sovereignty he had a right to or gave away his empire to those who had the government of his nonage? This government over him only prepared him the better and sooner for it If anybody should ask me when my son is of age to be free I shall answer just when his monarch is of age to govern

But at that time says the judicious Hooker (*Eccle Pol lib 1 s 6*) a man may be said to have attained so far forth the use of reason as sufficeth to make him capable of those laws

to begin to act like free men and therefore till that time require not oaths of fealty or allegiance or other public owning of or submission to the government of their countries

63 The freedom then of man and liberty of acting according to his own will is grounded on his having reason which is able to instruct him in that law he is to govern himself by and make him know how far he is left to the freedom of his own will To turn him loose to an unrestrained liberty before he has reason to guide him is not the allowing him the privilege of his nature to be free but to thrust him out amongst brutes and abandon him to a state as wretched and as much beneath that of a man as theirs This is that which puts the authority into the parents hands to govern the minority of their children God hath made it the business to employ this care on their offspring and hath placed in them suitable inclinations of tenderness and concern to temper this power to apply it as His wisdom designed it to the children's good as long as they should need to be under it

64 But what reason can hence advance this care of the parents due to their offspring into an absolute arbitrary dominion of the father whose power reaches no farther than by such a discipline as he finds most effectual to give such strength and health to the bodies such vigour and rectitude to their minds as may best fit his children to be most useful to themselves and others and if it be necessary to his condition to make them work when they are able for the their own subsistence but in this power the mother too has her share with the father

65 Nay this power so little belongs to the father by any peculiar right of Nature but only as he is guardian of his children that when he quits his care of them he loses his power over them which goes along with their nourishment and education to which it is inseparably annexed and belongs as much to the foster father of an exposed child as to the natural father of another So little power does the bare act of begetting give a man over his issue if all his care ends the same and this be all the title he hath to the name and authority of a father And what will become of this paternal power in that part of the world where one woman hath more than one husband at a time? or in those parts of America here when the husband and wife part which happens frequently the children are all left to the mother follow her and are wholly under her care and provision And if the father dies whilst the children are young do they not naturally cry here owe the same obed

mine

62 Commonwealths themselves take not care of and allow that there is a time when men are

once their mother during their minority as to their father were he alive. And will any man say that the mother hath the legislative power over her children that he can make statutes and rules which shall be of perpetual obligation by which they ought to regulate all their concerns of their property and bound their liberty all the course of their lives, and enforce the observation of them with capital punishment? If this is the proper power of the magistrate, of which the father hath not so much as the shadow. His command over his children is not but temporary and reaches not their life or property. It is but a help to the weakness and imperfection of their reason, discipline necessary to their education. And though the father may dispose of his own possessions as he pleases when his children are out of danger of perishing for want, yet his power extends not to their lives or goods which either the own industry or another's bounty has made theirs notwithstanding their liberty there when they are once arrived to their franchise.

mother and child to his wife

66 But though there be some who child comes to be as free from subjection to the will and command of his father as himself free from subjection to the will of God himself and they are both under no other restraint but that which is common to them both, that is to be the law of nature or municipal law of the country yet this freedom extends not to the son from that honour which he owes by the law of God and nature to his parents, God having made the parents instruments in His great design for the use of mankind and the occasion of his father's child. As He hath laid on the man blood to nourish his service and bring forth his progeny so He has laid on the child perpetual obligations of honouring their parents, which contains in it an earnest and ever to be known by all outward expressions, ties upon the child from anything that may injure or afflict, disturb or disorder his happiness or life of those from whom he receives his nourishment and all actions of defence relief assistance and comfort of those to whose means he is indebted to beget and has been made capable of any joysments of life. From this obligation no

in freedom, can absolve children. But this is very far from giving parents a power of command over their children, or an authority to make laws and dispose as they please of their lives or liberties. It is one thing to owe him our respect, gratitude and assistance another to require absolute obedience and submission.

more

67 The subject of this places the father a temporary government which terminates with the minority of the child and the removal from a child places in the parents.

powers which the father hath, in the minority of his son, during minority and the right of his own all his life may perhaps have caused great part of the mistakes about this matter. For to speak properly of them, the first of these is the father's privilege of children during parents.

from taking care of it. And though the power of command and having them go along with

cess is seldom on the sever side, the more good as

them as man hastens his son (Deut. 8:5) with tenderness and affection and in part to mind a severer discipline than what was absolutely best for them, and had been less kindness, to have slackened. This is that power to which children are commanded obedience that the pains of care of their parents may not be increased or ill rewarded.

68. On the other side, however and support all that which he is indebted to return for the benefit received by and from them is the indispensable duty of the child and the proper privilege of the parents. This is intended for the parents' advantage as the father is for the child's

though education the parents duty seems to have most power because the ignorance and infirmities of childhood stand in need of restraint and correction which is a visible exercise of rule and a kind of dominion And that duty which is comprehended in the word honour requires less obedience though the obligation be stronger on grown than younger children For who can think the command Children obey your parents requires in a man that has children of his own the same submission to his father as it does in his yet young children to him and that by this precept he were bound to obey all his father's commands if out of a

1. This education belongs so to the father that it terminates at a certain season When the business of education is over it ceases of itself and is also alienable before For a man may put the tuition of his son in other hands and he that has made his son an apprentice to another

of a great and to him the other part remains nevertheless entire to them
ble
can

can discharge his son from honouring her that bore him But both these are very far from a power to make laws and enforcing them with penalties that may reach estate liberty limbs and life The power of commanding ends with nonage and though after that honour and respect support and defence and whatsoever gratitude can oblige a man to for the highest benefits he is naturally capable of he always due from a son to his parents yet all this puts no sceptre into the father's hand no sovereign power of commanding He has no dominion over his son's property or actions no any right that his will should prescribe to his son's in all things however it may become his son in many things not very inconvenient to him and his family to pay a deference to it

70 A man may owe honour and respect to an ancient or wise man defence to his child or friend relief and support to the distressed and gratitude to a benefactor to such a degree that all he has all he can do cannot sufficiently pay it But all these give no authority no right of making laws to any one over him from whom they are owing And it is plain all this is due not to the bare title of father not only because

as has been said it is owing to the mother too but because these obligations to parents and the degrees of what is required of children may be varied by the different care and kindness trouble and expense is often employed upon one child more than another

71 This shows the reason how it comes to pass that parents in societies where they themselves are subjects retain a power over their children and have as much right to their subjection as those who are in the state of nature which could not possibly be if all political power were only paternal and that in truth they were one and the same thing for then all paternal power being in the prince the subject could naturally have none of it But these two powers political and paternal are so perfectly distinct and separate and built upon so different foundations and given to so different ends that every subject that is a father has as much a paternal power over his children as the prince has over his And every prince that has parents owes them as much filial duty and obedience as the meanest of his subjects do to theirs and can therefore command not any part or degree of that kind of dominion which a prince or magistrate has over his subject

72 Though the obligation on the parents to bring up their children and the obligation on children to honour their parents contain all the power on the one hand and submiss on the other which are proper to this relation yet there is another power ordinarily in the father whereby he has a tie on the obedience of his children which though it be common to him with other men yet the occasions of showing it almost constantly happening to fathers in the private families and in instances of it else here being rare and less taken notice of it passes in the world for a part of paternal jurisdiction And this is the power men generally have to bestow the estates on those who please them best The possession of the father being the expectation and inheritance of the children ordinarily in certain proportions according to the law and custom of each country yet it is commonly in the father's power to bestow it with a more sparing or liberal hand according as the behaviour of this or that child hath comported with his will and humour

73 This is no small tie to the obedience of children and therefore being always annexed to the enjoyment of land a submission to the government of the country of which that land is a part it has been commonly supposed that a father could oblige his posterity to that govern

ment of which he himself was subject, that his compact held them whereas, being only necessary conditions annexed to the land which under that government, reaches only those who will take to that condition and so no universal or engagement, but voluntary submission for every man's children being by Na-

ture. But if they will enjoy the advantage of their ancestors, they must take to the same terms their ancestors had to, and submit to all the conditions annexed to such a possession. By this power indeed fathers oblige their children, because to themselves even when they are past minority and most commonly too, subject them to this or that political power. But neither of these by an peculiar right of their blood, but by the reward they have in their hands to enforce and recompense such a compliance and is no more power than that Frenchman has over an Englishman, who, by the hopes of an estate will leave him, will certainly have strove to his bed and if he is left him, he will joy to, he must certainly take to the conditions annexed to the possession of land in that country where it lies, whether it be France or England.

4. I conclude then though the father's power of commanding extends farther than the minority of his children, and is decreed only fit for the discipline and government of that age and though that honour and respect, and all that which the Latins called piety, which they indispensable owe to their parents all their lifetime, and all estates with all that support and defence is due to them, gives the father no power of government — making laws and exacting penalties on his children though by this he has dominion over their property or actions of his son, yet it is by ought to create how any was, in the first ages of the world and in places still where the thinness of people gives families leave to separate in unpossessed quarters, and they have room to move and plant themselves in yet vacant habitations, for the father of the family become the prince of the household had been ruler from the beginning of

It is no improbable opinion, therefore which the arch-philosopher was of, That the first person in every household was always, as were kings so the members of households joined themselves in societies together kings were the first kind of governors among them, which is also as seemeth, the reason why the name of fathers con-

likeliest should by the express or tacit consent of the children, be in the father heretofore seemed without any change hardly to continue. And when, indeed a thing more was required than the permitting the father to exercise alone his family that executive power of the law of nature which every free man naturally hath, and by that permission resigning up to him a monarchial power whilst they remained in it. But that this was not by an paternal right, but only by the consent of his children, is evident from hence that nobody doubts but if a transgressor whom chance or business had brought to his family had there killed an of his children or committed any other crime he might condemn and put him to death — rather wise have punished him as well as an of his children, which was impossible he should do by virtue of an paternal authority over one who was not his child but by virtue of that executive power of the law of nature which as man, he had right to and he could punish him in his family here the respect of his children had laid by the exercise of such power to the way to the dignity and utility they were willing should remain in him above the rest of his family.

5. Thus it was easy and almost natural for children by tacit and almost natural consent, to make way for the father's authority and government. This had been accustomed their childhood to follow his direction, and to refer their little differences to him and when they were men, he was fitter to rule them. Their little perversities and less covetousness seldom afforded greater controversies and when any should arise where could they have fit umpire than he by whose care they had ever been sustained and brought up and who had a

inbred still in them, who if fathers were made rulers as also the ancient custom of governors

tenderness for them all? It is no wonder that they made no distinction betwixt minority and full age nor looked after one and twenty or any other age that might make them the free disposers of themselves and fortunes when they could have no desire to be out of their pupilage. The government they had been under during it continued still to be more their protection than restraint and they could nowhere find a greater security to their peace liberties and fortunes than in the rule of a father.

76 Thus the natural fathers of families by an insensible change became the politic monarchs of them too and as they chanced to live long and leave able and worthy heirs for several successions or otherwise so they laid the foundations of hereditary or elective kingdoms under several constitutions and manors according as chance contrivance or occasions happened to mould them. But if princes have their titles in the father's right and it be a sufficient proof of the natural right of fathers to political authority because they commonly were those in whose hands we find *de fact* the exercise of government I say if this argument be good it will as strongly prove that all princes nay princes only ought to be priests since it is as certain that in the beginning the father of the family was priest as that he was ruler in his own household.

Chap VII Of Political or Civil Society

77 God having made man such a creature that in His own judgment it was not good for him to be alone put him under strong obligations of necessity convenience and inclination to drive him into society as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was betwixt man and wife which gave beginning to that betwixt parents and children to which in time that between master and servant came to be added. And though all these might and commonly did meet together and make up but one family where in the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family each of these or all together came short of political society as we shall see if we consider the different ends ties and bounds of each of these.

78 Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact betwixt man and woman and though it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief end procreation yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance and a communion of interests too as necessary not only to unite

their care and affection but also necessary to their common offspring who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them till they are able to provide for themselves.

79 For the end of conjunction betwixt male and female being not barely procreation but the continuation of the species this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to last even after procreation so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones who are to be sustained by those that got them till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. This rule which the infinite wise Maker hath set to the works of His hands we find the inferior creatures steadily obey. In those vivacious animals which feed on grass the conjunction betwixt male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation because the teat of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young till it be able to feed on grass the male only begets but concerns not himself for the female or young to whose sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer because the dam not being able well to subsist herself and nourish her numerous offspring by her own prey alone (a more laborious as well as more dangerous way of living than by feeding on grass) the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family which can not subsist till they are able to prey for themselves but by the joint care of male and female. The same is observed in all birds (except some domestic ones) where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding and taking care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the nest the cock and hen continue mates till the young are able to use their wings and provide for themselves.

80 And herein I think lies the chief if not the only reason why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer conjunction than other creatures—viz because the female is capable of conceiving and *de fact* is common with child again and brings forth too a new

to himself on his parents and thereby the father who is bound to take care for those he hath begot is under an obligation to continue in conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures who young being able to subsist of

in every season summons them again and choose

new mates. Wherein cannot but admire the wisdom in this great Creator who, having given to man an ability to labour for the future as well as the present, has made it necessary that society of man and wife should be more lasting than of male and female alone, that they may be

and power of life and death naturally belong to the husband and were necessary to the society between male and wife there could be no matrimony. Any of these countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony require no such power: the husband it is not at all necessary that he should be sole proprietor of the society put in him but whatsoever may consist with justice and suppose that of the children till they could shift for themselves—mutual assistance

frequent solutions of conjugal society would be a disturbance.

8 But though these are uses upon mankind which make the conjugal bond more firm and human than the other species of animals, yet it would give reason to enquire why this contract, where procreant and cause are secured and inheritance taken care of may not be made terminable either by consent, or at certain times or upon certain conditions as well as by the voluntary compact, there being necessity in the nature of the thing or the ends of it, that it should always be for life—I mean, such as are under restraint of any positive law which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.

8 But the husband and wife though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too. It therefore being necessary that the law should terminate (as the rule) should be placed somewhere, it naturally falls to the man share as the bolder and the stronger. But thus, reason being but to the things of their common interest and property leaves them still in the full and true possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and at least gives the husband no more power over her than she has over his life: the power of the husband being so far from that absolute monarchy that the wife has, in many cases, liberty to separate from him where natural right or the contract allow it, whether that contract be made by themselves, the state, or the laws, customs or laws of the country they live in, and the children, upon such separation, fall to the father or to the mother as the contract does determine.

83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under political government, as well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate then takes the right or power of their naturally necessary to those ends—viz., procreation and mutual support and assistance whilst they are together but only decides any controversy that may arise between male and wife about them. If otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty

which it is made.

84. The society between parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers belonging to them, I have mentioned so largely in the foregoing chapter that I shall not here need to say anything of it and I think it is plain that it is far different from a political society.

85. Master and servant are names as old as history but given to those far different conditions for a free man makes himself servant to another by selling himself for a certain time the service he undertakes to do in exchange for wages he is to receive and though the commonly put him to the service of his master and under the

which being captives taken in a just war are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of the masters. These men have, as I say forfeited their lives and with it, their liberties, and lost their estates, and being in that state fall a prey not capable of any property can obtain that state be considered as any part of civil society the chief end whereof is the preservation of property.

86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate laws of wife, children servants, &c. united under the same rule of family with what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with little commonwealth yet is very far from both in its constitution, power and end if it must be the highest monarchy and the perfect monarchy the absolute monarchy will have but very shattered and short power when it is plain by what has been said before that the master of the family has very distinct and differently him

ited power both as to time and extent over those several persons that are in it for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family and his power as paterfamilias as great whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family who has but a very limited one over every individual in it But how a family or any other society of men differ from that which is properly political society we shall best see by considering wherein political society itself consists

87 Man being born as has been proved with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature equally with any other man or number of men in the world hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property—that is his life liberty and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offence deserves even with death itself in crimes where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it But because no political society can be nor subsist without having in itself the power to preserve the property and in order thereunto punish the offences of all those of that society there and there only is political society where every one of the mem-

tion to the law established by it And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded the community comes to be umpire and by understanding indifferent rules and men authorised by the community for their execution decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society with such penalties as the law has established hereby it is easy to discern

peal to with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders are in civil society one with another but those who have no

Nature

88 And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall be long to the several transgressions they think worthy of it committed amongst the members of that society (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by any one that is not of it (which is the power of war and peace) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society in far as is possible But though every man entered into society has quitted his power to punish of fences against the law of Nature in prosecution

the magistrate he has given up a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called in it which indeed are his own judgments they being made by himself or his representative And herein we have

committed within the commonwealth and also by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact how far injuries from without are to be indicated and in both these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need

89 Wherever therefore any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of Nature and to resign it to the public there and there only is a political or civil society And this is done where any number of men in the state of Nature enter into society to make one people one body politic under one supreme government or else when any one joins himself to and incorporates with any government already made For hereby he authorises the society or which is all one the legislative thereof to make laws for him as the public good of the society shall require to the execution of the laws in assistance (as to his own decrees) is due And thus puts men out of a state of Nature into that of a commonwealth by setting up a judge on earth with authority to determine all the controversies as to redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it And where there are any number of men however associated that have no such decisive power to appeal to there they are still in the state of Nature

90 And hence it is evident that absolute mon

which by some me is counted for th

such an th ty to ppeal to u
any differ n between th m th e those pe
sons are ull in th stat f N tur And so is
cry bsol te p once in respect f those who are
under hus d min n.

g1 For h be g supposed to ha all both
legislati and execut power himself also e,
there is n j dg to bef d ppealles open
to any wh may fa ly and indiff ly
dw th th ty decid d f om wh ce e
l f and edress may be expected f any injury
or cy that may be suff ed f mbum,
or by hus der So th t su h man however
uled Czar or G d S gn ho you
pl ase is as much th tat f N tur with
all der hus d m as h is w th th est of
mankind. F wherev y n m ar who
ha tanding l d m m j d t p
peal to earth f th d terminati f co
trovers es f ght betwixt th m, th they are
tull in th tate f N tur and under all th in
co eniences f t w th nly th woeful diff
ence to th subject, or ther al f an absol t
prince. That whereas th ordinary stat f

Th p blue power f ll soc ty m bo e every
soul co tained in th sam soci ty d h p in
pal use f that power is t g laws t l th t
ar under which laws in h cases we must
bey nless there be aso h w d wh h may
necessarily enforce h th law f aso f God
doth joun h co trary Hook Ec l P 6
T tak way all su h m ual gr eva es in
juries, d wro gs— has d m m h
u f N ure, there was way but nly by
growing in compos m d greeme t mo gst

flered theyough be d f nd rs f h msel es
They knew this however men may seek h r own

N tu e h has a l berty to j dge of his r ght, #
co ding to the best f his powe t mainta n it
but wh ever his pr pe ty s ded by the w ll
a d o der f his m arch he has ot o ly no
ppeal as th se soc ety ought to have but, as
if h r d graded f om the comm tat of
r tu al cr tures, s den ed a l berty to judge
of or def d h s ght d so s xposed to all
th misery d con e ctes th t a man can
f ar f m o e wh being in th unrestrai ed
tat f Natur t j t corrupted w th flattery
a d armed w th pow r

g Fo h that th ks absol t power pu fies
me blood a d co rects th base cas of hu
man nature eed r d but th h t ry of this, or
any ther age t be co vinced t th co trary
H that wo ld ha been insol nt and jur ous
in the woods f Amer ca would t p bably be

Fo wh t th p teet f absol t m narchy
is what k d ff ther of th ur cou tr m t makes
y incest be, and t wh t a d gree f happness
d secu ty t care es ci l soc ty whe e this
sort f gover ment is gr wnt perfect o he
that w ll look t t the late relati f Ceyl n
may eas ly se

g3 I be l t m na hes, deed s ell as
th rg nm us of th w ld th subject sha e
appe l s th law d j dges to dec d a y
co tr erses, and estrai y l cet hat may
happe betwixt the suby ts th msel es, n e
mon st a th Th cry th nks neces
ary a d believes h deser est be thought
declared emy t soc ty d manks d ho
h uld g bo t to tak t w y B t wh th r
th bef m tr l f manks d d soc ty
and such a har ty as w o e all t th
ther is aso t d bt. F this no mo tha
what e ryma wh l esh wn powe p f
t, gr tness may a d r th lly must d keep
those animal f m hurt g destr yung ne
ther wh l bour and dr dg nly f his
pl asur and d tag and so ar tak n care
f t out f y love th mast has f them,
but lov of himself d th p fit th y br g

d termin p oc d m main nance thereof in
as m h as every ma n t wards him lf d

ited power both as to time and extent over those several persons that are in it for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family and his power as paterfamilias as great whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of life and death over any of them and none too but what a mistress of a family may have as well as he And he certainly can have no absolute power over the whole family who has but a very limited one over every individual in it But how a family or any other society of men differ from that which is properly political society we shall best see by considering wherein political society itself consists

87 Man being born as has been proved with a title to perfect freedom and an uncontrolled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of Nature equally with any other man or number of men in the world hath by nature a power not only to preserve his property—that is his life liberty and estate against the injuries and attempts of other men but to judge of and punish the breaches of that law in others as he is persuaded the offence deserves even with death itself in crimes where the heinousness of the fact in his opinion requires it But because no political society can be nor subsist without having in itself the power to preserve the property and in order thereunto punish the offences of all those of that society there and there only is political society where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the law established by it And thus all private judgment of every particular member being excluded the community comes to be umpire and by understanding indifferent rules and men authorised by the community so their execution decides all the differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against the society with such penalty as the law has established whereby it is easy to discern who are and are not in political society together Those who are united into one body and have a common established law and judicature to appeal to with authority to decide controversies between them and punish offenders are in civil society one with another but those who have no such common appeal I mean on earth are still in the state of Nature each being his own judge for himself and executioner which is as I have before showed it the perfect state of Nature

88 And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions they think worthy of it committed amongst the members of that society (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by any one that is not of it (which is the power of war and peace) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society as far as is possible But though every man entered into society has quitted his power to punish of fences against the law of Nature in prosecution of his own private judgment yet with the judgment of offences which he has given up to the legislative in all cases yet here he can appeal to the magistrate he has given up a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to it which indeed are his own judgments they being made by himself or his representative And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society which is to judge by standing laws how far offences are to be punished when committed within the commonwealth and also by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact how far injuries from without are to be vindicated and in both these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need

89 Wherever therefore any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of Nature and to resign it to the public there and there only is a political or civil society And this is done wherever any number of men in the state of Nature enter into society to make one people one body politic under one supreme government or else

h - -
1
F
CALLS ON it hereof his own assistance (as to his
- - -

1 A title controversies addressed the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it And wherever there are any number of men however associated that have no such decision power to appeal to there they are still in the state of Nature

90 And hence it is evident that absolute mon

96 For when any number of men have, by the consent of every individual, made community, they have thereby made that community a body with power as a body which is only by the will and termination of the majority. For that which is any community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and the body must move that way which is necessary the body should move that way whether the greater force carries it, which the consent of the majority or less is impossible. It should not contain any body community which

shorter duration than the feeblest creatures and not let it outlast the day it was born in which cannot be supposed till we can think that rational creatures should desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved. For if the majority cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body and consequently will be

stood to give up all the power over itself which they give to society to the majority

the the the the

power of the whole

97 And thus every man by consenting with others to make a body politic under a government, puts himself under an obligation to every one of that society to submit to the determination of the majority and to be concluded by it or lose this original compact where by he then incorporates into society would signify nothing and be compacted himself free and under the less than he was in before

did so could give beginning to any law which government in the world

98 To this I find two objections made. That there are instances to be found in history of company time and spend time and equal among themselves that met together and in this way began and set up government. It is impossible for him that men should do so because all men, being born under government, they are to submit to that and are not liberty to begin a new

he must submit himself and use it any to of it if this is fit

99 For if the consent of the majority shall not in reason be received as the will of the whole, and concluded every individual though but the consent of every individual cannot make anything to be the will of the whole which, considering the infirmities of health and occasions of business, which in a number though much less than that of commonwealth will necessarily keep many from the public assembly and the variety of opinions and contrary interests which unavoidably happen in all collections of men, it is impossible ever to be had. And therefore, if coming in society be possible such terms, it will be only like Caesar's coming to the treacherous as in a Sicilian conspiracy as this would make the mighty Leviathan of

of society in sooner brought any number of them together but they presently united and incorporated themselves designed to continue together. And if we may not suppose men ever to have been in that state of nature because we hear not much of them such that we may as well suppose the armies of Salmandasser conquer ever children because he has killed them till they were men and embodied armies. Go meet is cry with antecedent records, and letters seldom come in armistice people till long continued in of civil society has, by the most necessary arts provided for their safety case, plenty. And then they begin to look after the history of the founders and search into their original when they have outlived the memory of it. For it is with commonwealths as

him For if it be asked what security what fence
 is there in such a state against the violence and
 oppression of this absolute Ruler the very ques-
 tion can scarce be borne They are ready to tell
 you that it deserves death only to ask after safe-
 ty Betwixt subject and subject they will grant
 there must be measures laws and judges for
 their mutual peace and security But as for the
 ruler he ought to be absolute and is above all
 such circumstances because he has a power to
 do more hurt and wrong it is right when he
 does it To ask how you may be guarded from
 or injury on that side where the strongest hand
 is to do it is presently the voice of faction and
 rebellion As if when men quitting the state of
 Nature entered into society they agreed that
 all of them but one should be under the restraint
 of laws but that he should still retain all the lib-
 erty of the state of Nature increased with pow-
 er and made licentious by impunity This is to
 think that men are so foolish that they take care
 to avoid what mischiefs may be done them by
 polecats or foxes but are content may think it
 safety to be devoured by lions

94 But whate'er flatterers may talk to amuse
 people's understandings it never hinders men
 from feeling and when they perceive that any
 man in what station soever is out of the bounds
 of the civil society they are of and that they
 have no appeal on earth against any harm they
 may receive from him they are apt to think
 themselves in the state of Nature in respect of
 him whom they find to be so and to take care as
 soon as they can to have that safety and secur-
 ity in civil society for which it is as first insti-
 tuted and for which only they entered into it
 And therefore though perhaps at first as shall
 be shew'd more at large hereafter in the fol-
 lowing part of this discourse some one good

their differences by a tacit consent devolved in
 to his hands without any other caution but the
 assurance they had of his uprightness and wis-
 dom yet when time giving authority and as
 some men could persuade us sacredness to cus-
 toms which the negligent and unforeseeing in-
 nocence of the first ages began had brought in
 successors of another stamp the people finding
 their properties not secure under the government
 as then it was (whereas government has no other

end but the preservation of property) could nev-
 er be safe nor at rest nor think themselves in
 civil society till the legislative as so placed in
 collective bodies of men call them senate par-
 liament or what you please by which means

ed nor could any one by his own authority
 avoid the force of the law when once made nor
 by any pretence of superiority plead exemption
 thereby to license his own or the mis-carriages
 of any of his dependants No man in civil society
 can be exempted from the laws of it For if any
 man may do what he thinks fit and there be no
 appeal on earth for redress or security against
 any harm he shall do I ask whether he be not
 perfectly still in the state of Nature and so can
 be no part or member of that civil society un-
 less any one will say the state of Nature and civil
 society are one and the same thing which I
 have never yet found any one so great a patron
 of anarchy as to affirm

Chap VIII Of the Beginning of Political Societies

95 MEN being as has been said by nature all
 free equal and independent no one can be put
 out of this estate and subjected to the political
 power of another without his own consent which
 is done by agreeing with other men to join and
 unite into a community for their comfortable
 safe and peaceable living one among another
 in a secure enjoyment of their properties and
 a greater security against any that are not of it
 This any number of men may do because it in-
 jures not the freedom of the rest they are left
 as they were in the liberty of the state of Na-
 ture When any number of men have so con-
 sented to make one community or government
 they are thereby presently incorporated and
 make one body politic where the majority
 have a right to act and conclude the rest

going on permitted until the wisdom
 and discretion which we are to rule till by ex-
 per-

Explain to
 C II be geth et of the wh bod
 polit d tl the f o errul e ch ver lp t f
 th sam body look r b d

tin together there t s not to be doubted
but they used th ir n tural freedom to set p
hum whom they j doed th blest and most l le-
l t rule well over th m. Conformabl her un-
to e find the peopl f Amer ca, who—h ing
out f the reach f th co qu g swords and
sreading dominat f the two great mpres
of Peru d Mexico—enj ed th ir own nat
ural freed m, thou h *tens parbas* they m
monly prefer th h r f th ir deceased lin
y t, f they find hum anyw y w ak incapabl
— h d set up th touter and

was apt t la claim to and bring upon th m it
was n t at all strange that th y should not much
trouble th msel es to think of methods of re-
str ni g any b tances of those to wh m th y
had g en the a th ty cr th m, and f bal
ancu th powe f go trum nt by placing se
— h d. Th y had ne

is ec
o id,
ly find

t

soci ty who wh they are us m m p
ted might set p what f rm f governme t
they thought fit. B t this ha g g occas n
to men to mistak and think that, by ture,
governm t was m narchical and bel ed to
— h m h y consider

plain that th easo that co tinue u m f
governme t in sm l perso was n t any
gard or expect t m ternal utho ty since all
petty monarchies—that is, almost all m narchies,
near their ori al ha been common ly t
least po occas lect e.

107 First, th th beginn g f things,
thet ther governm t f th huldhood f those
spru g from him ha ing cus med th m to
th rul of one man and ta ght th m that wher
t was exercised w th car and skill with affec-
tion and lov t those und t, was sufficient
to procure and preserv m (all th pol tical
happ m they sough f soci ty) was no
wonder that th y should p tel pon and natur-
ally ru into that form f gov rnm t which,
fr m their inf ncy they had bec all cust med
to, and which, by per ence th y had found
both asy and saf T which if we add that
monarch bet g m p l and most h y custom
whom ether xper ence had instru ted in forms
of government, or th ambitu or msl ce of
empire had taught t beware f th encroa li-
ments f prerog m or th mcon enu cies f
bsol te power which monarchy in success n,

fr dship tog ther d some u m
other they could not but ha greater appre-
hens ns of thers than f ne an th r and
therel th first ear and thought cann t but
be supposed to be, how to secure themsel es
aainst for gn f roe. It was natural for th m t
put themsel es under fr m of government
which might best serve to that e d and choose
th wisest and br est man to co d t th m in

pl and mo ey g m n temptat n t n
larg th ir possess ns f land co est for w d
er exte t of ground ar l t l more than g e
als f th ir armies and thou h th y command
bsolut ly in war y t t h me and in tim of
pe ce they exc ise very little d m m d

sol uth ry

og. And thus, in Isra l itself th ch f bus-
ness f th ir judges and first k n gs seems t ha e
been to be captains in war and lead m f th ir
armies, which (besides what is signified by go-

with particular persons they are commonly ignorant of their own births and infancies and if they know anything of it they are beholding for it to the accidental records that others have kept of it And those that we have of the beginning of

plain instances of such a beginning as I have mentioned or at least have manifest footsteps of it.

102 He must show a strange inclination to deny evident matter of fact when it agrees not with his hypotheses who will not allow that the beginning of Rome and Venice were by the uniting together of several men free and independent one of another amongst whom there was no natural superiority or subjection And if Josephus Acosta's word may be taken he tells us that in many parts of America there was no government at all There are great and apparent conjectures say he that these men [speaking of those of Peru] for a long time had neither kings nor commonwealths but lived in troops as they do this day in Florida—the Cheriuanas those of Brazil and many other nations which have no certain kings but as occasion is offered in peace or war they choose their captains as they please (lib. 2 cap. 25) If it be said that every man

or the freedom of thought has been already proved but be that as it will these men it is evident were actually free and without any superior or inferiority some politicians now would place in any of them they themselves claimed it not but by consent were all equal till by the same consent they set rulers over themselves So that their political societies all began from a voluntary union and the mutual agreement of men freely acting in the choice of their governors and forms of government

103 And I hope those who went away from Sparta with Palantus mentioned by Justin will be allowed to have been free men independent one of another and to have set up a government over themselves by their own consent Thus I have given several examples out of history of people free and in the state of Nature that being met together incorporated and began a commonwealth And if the want of such instances be an argument to prove that government were not nor could not be so begun I suppose the con tenders for paternal empire were better let it alone than urge it against natural liberty for if

they can give so many instances out of history of governments begun upon paternal right, I think (though at least an argument from what has been to what should of right be of no great force) one might without any great danger yield them the cause But if I might advise them in the case they would do well not to search too much into the original of governments as they have begun *de facto* lest they should find at the foundation of most of them something very little favourable to the design they promote and such a power as they contend for

104 But to conclude reason being plain on our side that men are naturally free and the examples of history showing that the governments of the world that were begun in peace had their beginning laid on that foundation and were made by the consent of the people there can be little room for doubt either where the right is or what has been the opinion or practice of mankind about the first erecting of governments

105 I will not deny that if we look back as far as history will direct us towards the original of commonwealths we shall generally find them under the government and administration of one man And I am also apt to believe that here a family was numerous enough to submit by itself and continued entire together without mixing with others as it often happens where there is much land and few people the government commonly began in the father For the father having by the law of Nature the same power

fit

pur

ver

verily likely to submit to his punishment and all join with him against the offender in their turns giving him thereby power to execute his sentence against any transgression and so in effect make him the law maker and governor over all that remain in conjunction with his family He was as fittest to be trusted paternal affection secured their property and interest under his care and the custom of obeying him in their childhood made it easy to submit to him rather than any other If therefore they must have one to rule them as government is hardly to be avoided amongst men that I am together who so likely to be the man as he that as their common father unless negligence cruelty or any other defect of mind or body made him unfit for it? But when either the father died and left his next heir—for want of age wisdom courage or any other qualities—less fit for rule or where several families met and consented to con

future ages, would retain and increase the power without doing the business for which it was given, and aided by flattery flattered princes to have distinct and separate interests from the people, men found it necessary to examine more carefully the original and rights of government, and to find out ways to restrain the abuses and prevent the abuses of that power which they have entrusted in their hands, only for their own good they found was made use of to hurt them.

12 Thus we may see how probable it is that people that were naturally free, and by their own consent, their submitted to the government of their fathers united together out of different families, to make government, should equally put their rule into other men's hands, and choose to be under the conduct of a single person, without so much, as by express consent, limitation or regulating his power which they thought themselves in his hands and prudence though they ever dreamed of monarchy being for Divine which we never heard of among mankind till it was revealed to us by the divinity of this last age, nor allowed political power to have right to dominion or to be the foundation of all government. And thus much may suffice to show that, as far as we have any light from history we have reason to conclude that all peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people I say peaceful, because I shall have occasion, in their place to speak of conquest, which is some estimate of the beginning of governments.

The by the by I find urged against the beginning of politics, in the way I have mentioned is this, viz.

13. That all men being born under government, some or the other is impossible any of them should ever be free and liberty united together and begin new, or be able to erect lawful government. If this argument be good I ask, How came so many lawful monarchs in the world? For if anybody upon this supposition can show me any one man, yet if he would free to begin lawful monarchy I will be bound to show him that he free me liberty at the same time to unite and begin new government under a regal or

reformed and indeed but increase the sore which it should have cured. They saw that free by name will become the cause of all misery. This constrained them to come upon laws wherein men might see their duty beforehand and know the penalties of transgressing them. Hooker
Ecl. Pol. l. 2.

any other form. It being demonstrated that if any man born under the dominion of another may be so free as to have a right to command others in new and distinct empire every one that is born under the dominion of another may be so free too and may become a ruler or subject of a distinct separate government. And so

law
old
ely to
ha
as ly

by union to show that I am in the same difficulties that doth those they use against, I shall need a tour to discover the weakness of this argument a little farther.

All men, say they are born under government, and the rest they can be at liberty to begin a new one. Every one is born a subject to his father his prince and is the fore and the perpetual subject to him and allegiance. It is plain mankind never owned nor could red any such natural subject in that they were born in, to one rather to the other that tied them, without their own consent, to subjection to them and their heirs.

15. For the as examples of equality in history both sacred and profane as those of men who dividing themselves and their obedience from the jurisdiction they were born under and the family or community they were bred up in, and setting up new governments in other places, from whence sprang all that number of petty commonwealths in the beginning of ages, and which always multiplied as long as there was room for them, till the strong more fortunate swallow

perpetual sovereignty and plainly prove that was not the natural right of the father descending to his heirs that made governments in the beginning since it was impossible, upon that ground that should have been so many little kingdoms but only universal monarchy if men had not been at liberty to separate themselves from their families and their government, be what it will that was set upon it, to divide and make distinct commonwealths and thereby to grow as they thought fit.

6 This has been the practice of the world from its first beginning to this day nor is it now any more hindrance to the freedom of mankind

ing out and in before the people which was to march forth to war and home again at the heads of their forces) appears plainly in the story of Jephtha. The Ammonites making war upon Israel the Gileadites in fear send to Jephtha a bastard of their family whom they had cast off and article with him if he will assist them against the Ammonites to make him their ruler which they do in these words And the people made him head and captain over them (Judges 11 11) which was as it seems all one as to be judge And he judged Israel (Judges 11 7)—that is as their captain general— six years

ered you out of the hands of Midian (Judges 9 17) Nothing mentioned of him but what he did as a general and indeed that is all is found in his history or in any of the rest of the Judges And Abimelech particularly is called king though at most he was but their general And when being weary of the ill conduct of Samuel's sons the children of Israel desired a king like all the nations to judge them and to go out before them and to fight their battles (1 Sam 8 20) God granting their desire says to Samuel I will send thee a man and thou shalt anoint him to be captain over my people Israel that he may save my people out of the hands of the Philistines (ch 9 16) As if the only business of a king had been to lead out their armies and fight in their defence and accordingly at his inauguration pouring a vial of oil upon him declares to Saul that the Lord had anointed him to be captain over his inheritance (ch 10 1) And therefore those who after Saul being solemnly chosen and saluted king by the tribes at Mizpah were unwilling to have him their king make no other objection but this How shall this man save us? (ch 10 27) as if they should have said This man is unfit to be our king not having skill and conduct enough in war to be able to defend us And when God re-

him as to their king that he was in effect, their king in Saul's time and therefore they had no reason but to receive him as their king no

Also say they in time past when Saul was king over us thou wast he that leddest out and broughtest in Israel and the Lord said unto thee Thou shalt feed my people Israel and thou shalt be a captain over Israel

110 Thus whether a family by degrees grew up into a commonwealth and the fatherly authority being continued on to the elder son every one in his turn growing up under it tacitly submitted to it and the easiness and equality of it not offending any one every one acquiesced till time seemed to have confirmed it and settled a right of succession by prescription or whether several families or the descendants of several families whom chance neighbourhood or business brought together united into society the need of a general whose conduct might defend them against their enemies in war and the great confidence the innocence and sincerity of that poor but virtuous age such as are almost all those which begin governments that ever come to last in the world gave men one of another made the first beginners of commonwealths generally put the rule into one man's hand without any other express limitation or restraint but what the nature of the thing and the end of government required It was given them for the public good and safety and to those ends in the infancies of commonwealths they commonly used it and unless they had done so young societies could not have subsisted Without such nursing fathers without this care of the governors all governments would have sunk under the weakness and infirmities of their infancy the prince and the people had soon perished together

111 But the golden age (though before vanity ambition and avarice's sinister bends evil concupiscence had corrupted men's minds into a mistake of true power and honour) had more virtue and consequently better governors as well as less vicious subjects and there as then no stretching prerogative on the one side to oppress the people nor consequently on the other any dispute about privilege to lessen or restrain the power of the magistrate and so no contest betwixt rulers and people about governors or government Yet when ambition and luxury in

His own heart and the Lord hath commanded him to be captain over His people (ch 13 14) As if the whole kingly authority were nothing else but to be their general and therefore the tribes who had stuck to Saul's family and opposed David's reign when they came to Hebron with terms of submission to him they tell him amongst other arguments they had to submit to

his own himself thereunto annexes also and
 & binds to the community those possessions which
 he has, or shall acquire, that do naturally be-
 long to any other government. For it would be
 a direct contradiction for any one to enter to
 war with others for the security and regu-
 lation of that government

and the property of the land is subject. By the
 same act, therefore, where by any man unites his
 person, which was before free to any common-
 wealth, by the same he unites his possessions,
 which were before free to himself and they be-
 come, both of them, person and possessions, sub-
 ject to the government and dominion of that
 commonwealth as long as that being who
 ever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance
 purchases permission or otherwise enjoy any
 part of the land so annexed to, and under the
 government of that commonwealth, must take
 with the condition it is under—that is, of sub-
 mitting to the government of the commonwealth,
 under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any
 subject is.

But since the government has direct
 power over all and each of these

men so that whenever they own a thing
 in nothing but such tacit consent to the go-
 vernment will by deduction, sale or otherwise
 quit the said possessions, he is liberty to go and
 incorporate himself in any other common-
 wealth, or agree with them to begin new co-
 munities in any part of the world they can
 find free and unpossessed whereas that has
 once by actual agreement and any express de-
 claration given his consent to be of a common-
 wealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged
 to be, and remain unalterably subject to it,
 and can never be as in the liberty of the
 state of nature, unless by any calamity the go-
 vernment be dissolved and comes to be dissolved.

By submitting the law of any coun-
 try to be quietly and joyfully obeyed and
 perfectly obeyed them, makes a man a mem-
 ber of that society as only local protection
 and homage to and from all those who, not
 being in state of war come within the territory
 belonging to any government, all parts
 whereof the force of its law extends. But this no

more makes a man a member of that society a
 perpetual subject of that commonwealth, than
 it would make a man subject to another
 whose family he is independent to be for
 some time, though, whilst he continued in it, he
 were obliged to comply with the laws and submit
 to the government thereof and there. And thus we
 see that foreigners, by living all their lives under
 another government, and enjoying the privileges
 and protection of it, though they are bound, even
 in conscience to submit to its administration as
 far as they can yet do not thereby come
 to be subjects members of that commonwealth.
 Nothing can make any man so but his actually
 entering into the positive engagement and ex-
 press promise and compact. This is that which
 I think, concern the beginning of political
 societies, and that consent which makes any one
 a member of any commonwealth.

Chap. IV. Of the Ends of Politic Society and Government

123. I man in the state of nature be so free as
 has been said if he be absolute lord of his own
 person and possessions, equal to the greatest and
 subject to nobody why will he part with his
 freedom, thus impair and subject himself to the
 dominion and control of any other power. To
 which it is no constant answer that though in the
 state of nature he hath such a right, yet the en-
 joyment of it is very uncertain and constantly
 exposed to the invasion of others for all being
 kings as much as he every man his equal and
 the greater part strict observers of equity and
 justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in
 this state is very unsafe very insecure. This makes
 him willing to quit this condition which, how-
 ever free is full of fears and continual dangers
 and it is without ease that he seeks to
 and is willing to join in society with others who
 are already united, have a mind to unit
 the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties
 and estates, which I call by the general name —
 property

124. The great end and chief end, therefore, of
 men uniting into commonwealths, and putting
 themselves under government, is the preserv-
 ing of their property which in the state of
 nature there are many things wanting

Firstly there wants an established, settled
 known law created and allowed by common
 consent to be the standard of right and wrong
 and the common measure to decide all con-
 troversies between them. Though the law of
 nature be plain and intelligible to all rational
 creatures, yet men, being biased by their inter-

that they are born under constituted and ancient polities that have established laws and set forms of government than if they were born in the woods amongst the unconfined inhabitants that run loose in them. For those who would persuade us that by being born under any government we are naturally subjects to it and have no more any title or pretence to the freedom of the state of Nature have no other reason (bating that of paternal power which we have already answered) to produce for it but only because our fathers or progenitors passed as by their natural liberty and thereby bound up themselves and their posterity to a perpetual subjection to the government which they themselves submitted to. It is true that whatever engagements or promises any one made for himself he is under the obligation of them but cannot by any compact whatsoever bind his children or posterity. For his son when a man being altogether as free as the father any act of the father can no more give away the liberty of the son than it can of anybody else. He may indeed annex such conditions to the

any common sessions which were his father's because that estate being his father's property he may dispose or settle it as he pleases.

117 And this has generally given the occasion to the mistake in this matter because commonwealths not permitting any part of their dominions to be dismembered nor to be enjoyed by any but those of their community the son cannot ordinarily enjoy the possessions of his father but under the same terms his father did by becoming a member of the society whereby he puts himself presently under the government he finds there established as much as any other subject of that commonwealth. And thus the consent of free men born under government which only makes them members of it being given separately in their turns as each comes to be of age and not in a multitude together people take no notice of it and thinking it not done at all or not necessary conclude they are naturally subjects as they are men.

118 But it is plain governments themselves understand it otherwise they claim no power over the son because of that they had in the father nor look on children as being their subjects by their fathers being so. If a subject of England have a child by an Englishwoman in France whose subject is he? Not the King of England's for he must have leave to be admitted to the privileges of it. Nor the King of France's

for how then has his father a liberty to bring him away and breed him as he pleases and however was judged as a traitor or deserter if he left or warred against a country for being barely born in it of parents that were aliens there? It is plain then by the practice of governments themselves as well as by the law of right reason that a child is born a subject of no country nor government. He is under his father's tuition and authority till he come to age of discretion and then he is a free man at liberty that no

119 It is evident there is no title upon him by his father being a subject of that kingdom nor is he bound up by any compact of his ancestors and why then hath not his son by the same reason the same liberty though he be born any where else? Since the power that a father hath naturally over his children is the same wherever they be born and the ties of natural obligations are not bounded by the positive limits of kingdoms and commonwealths.

119 Every man being as has been showed naturally free and nothing being able to put him into subjection to any earthly power but only his own consent it is to be considered that shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent to make him subject to the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. Nobody doubts but an express consent of any man entering into any society makes him a perfect member of that society a subject of that government. The difficulty is what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent and how far it binds—how far any one shall be looked on to have consented and thereby submitted to any government where he has made no express ones of it at all. And to this I say that every man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of any government doth hereby give his tacit consent and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government during such enjoyment as any one under it whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs forever or a lodging only for a week or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway and in effect it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.

120 To understand this the better it is fit to consider that every man when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth he by

Chapter V. *Of the Forms of a Commonwealt*

132. THE majority having as has been showed upon men's first uniting into society the while

society the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the

making law into the hands of one man, and their heirs or successors, and then it is an oligarchy or else into the hands of a few men, and then it is monarchy if to him and his heirs, it is hereditary monarchy if to him only for life but power his death power only in nominating successors to him, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislature power be first given by the majority to more persons only for the times, or any limited time and then the supreme power to revert to them again, while it is so reverted the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please and so constitute a new form of government for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power which is the legislature being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to superior or any but the supreme making laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth.

33 By commonwealth I must be understood all along to mean no democracy or any form of government, but any independent community which the Latins signified by the word *res*, to which the word which best answers in our language is commonwealth, and most properly expresses such society of men which community does not (for there may be subordinate communities government) and city much less. And therefore, to avoid ambiguity I care leave to use the word commonwealth in that sense, in which sense I find the word used by King James himself which I think to be the genuine signification, which, if anybody dislike, I consent with him to change it for better.

Chapter VI. *Of the Extent of the Legislative Power*

34. THE great end of men entering society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety and the great instrument of means of that being the laws established in that

every person in the laws regarding the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of anybody else in what formsoever concerned, by what power soever backed have the force and obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislature which the public has chosen and appointed for without this the law could not have that which is absolutely necessary to be a law the consent of the society of whom nobody can have power to make laws but by the own consent and by authority received from them and therefore all laws made by any other means are in the most solemn ties

any inferior power whatsoever or any misused subordinate power discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislature acting pursuant to their trust, nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted or farther than they do allow it being ridiculous to imagine can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society which is not the supreme.

133. Though the legislature, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being or only by intervals, though the supreme power in every commonwealth, yet, first, it is not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the

The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men belonging so properly unto the same entire societies, that for any prince potentate what kind soever power he exercise the same of himself, and no by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or by authority derived the first from their consent upon whose persons they impose laws it is no better than mere tyrannical Law they are not, therefore which probable hath no mad so Hooker *Ibid* 6.

Of this point, therefore we are not that such men naturally have no full and perfect power command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort be to no man commanded living. And because he commanded, we do consent

est as well as ignorant for want of study of it are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases

125 Secondly in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature men being partial to themselves passion and revenge are very apt to carry them too far and with too much heat in their own cases as well as negligence and unconcernedness make them too remiss in other men's

126 Thirdly in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous and frequently destructive to those who attempt it

127 Thus mankind notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniences that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them and by such rules as the community or those authorized by them to that purpose shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments and societies themselves

128 For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of Nature by which law common to them all he and all the rest of mankind are one community make up one society distinct from all other creatures and were it not for the corrupt and viciousness of degenerate men there would be no need of any other necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power to

punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up when he joins in a private if I may so call it or particular political society and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind

129 The first power—viz of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature

130 Secondly the power of punishing he wholly gives up and engages his natural force which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature by his own single authority as he thought fit to assist the executive power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new state wherein he is to enjoy many conveniences from the labour assistance and society of others in the same community as well as protection from its whole strength he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty in providing for himself as the good prosperity and safety of the society shall require which is not only necessary but just since the other members of the society do the like

131 But though men when they enter into society give up the equality liberty and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of the society to be so far disposed of by the legislature as the good of the society shall require yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society or legislature constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth

right judges who are to decide controversies by those laws and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws or abroad to prevent or redress foreign

of the people.

had a liberty to defend their right against the invasions of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, when they invaded by a single man or many in combination. Whereas by supposition, they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, and have disarmed themselves, and armed him to make prey of them when he pleases. He becomes in much worse condition than he was exposed to the arbitrary power of one man who has the command of a hundred thousand than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of a hundred thousand men, no body being so secure that his will which has such a command is better than that of a hundred thousand times stronger. And therefore, what ever form the commonwealth is under the ruling power or right to govern by declared and received laws, and not by arbitrary decrees.

when he pleases against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable whose members upon the dissolution of the assembly are subjects under the common laws of their country equally with the rest. But in governments where the legislative is in a lasting assembly always in being or in one man as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking what they think fit from the people. For a man's property is not so tall secure though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow subjects, if he who commands those subjects has power to take from any private man what part he pleases of his property and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

men with the joint power of multitudes to use them to buy pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden passions, or unrestrained and till that moment unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions. For all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society as it ought not to be arbitrary and to pleasure so ought it to be exercised by established and promulgated laws, that both the people may know their duty and be safe and secure within the limits of the law and the rulers, too kept within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to employ it to purposes, and by such measures as they would not have known, and own nor will.

38. Thirdly the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it is necessary to suppose and requires that the people should have property within which they must be supposed to lose that by entering into society which was the end for which they entered to too gross an abridgement for any man to own. Men, therefore, in society having property they have such a right in the goods, which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath right to take them, or any part of them, from them without their own consent without that they have no property at all. For I have true no property in that which another can by right take from me

39. But government, not whosesoever he is put, being as I have before shown, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men may have and secure their properties, the prince or senate however it may have power to make laws for the regulation of property between the subjects among themselves yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole or any

that reason and confined to those ends which required in some cases to be absolute we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline. For the preservation of the army and union of the whole commonwealth requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command a soldier to march upon the mouth of cannon, or stand a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods whom yet he can command

lives and fortunes of the people For it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is legislator it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature before they entered in to society and gave it up to the community For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself or over any other to destroy his own life or take away the life or property of another A man as has been proved cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another and having in the state of Nature no arbitrary power over the life liberty or possession of another but only so much as the law of Nature gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind this is all he doth or can give up to the commonwealth and by it to the legislative power so that the legislative can have no more than this Their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society It is a power that hath no other end but preservation and therefore can never have a right to destroy enslave or designedly to impoverish the subjects the obligations of the law of Nature cease not in society but only in many cases are drawn closer and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them to enforce their observation Thus the law of Nature stands as an eternal rule to all men legislators as well as others The rules that they make for other men's actions must as well as their own and other men's actions be conformable to the law of Nature—i.e. to the will of God of which that is a declaration and the fundamental law of Nature being the preservation of mankind no human sanction can be good or valid against it

Two found tions th e a which b up publ ocres th on a nt al in nt n whe by all men d sur oc: bl l d and f llow sh p the oth an der p essly m sec tly

136 Secondly the legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws and known authorised judges For the law of Nature being unwritten and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men they who through passion or interest shall miscite or misapply it cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge and so it serves not as it ought to determine the rights and fence the properties of those that live under it especially where every one is judge interpreter and a custodian of it too and that in his own case and he that has right on his side having ordinarily

disorder men's properties in the state of Nature men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties and may have standing rules to bound it by in which every one may know what is his To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society they enter into and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit with this trust that they shall be governed by declared laws or else their peace quiet and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of Nature

137 Absolute arbitrary power or governing without settled standing laws can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government which men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for and tie themselves up under were it not to preserve their lives liberties and fortunes and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet It cannot be supposed that they should intend had they a power so to do to give any one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them thus were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature where they

¹ To insist on men to anything upon consent doth seem unreasonable 16 d. l. 10

tion of it. So that und this cons d r t i n th
he community is one bod th sta f n
ture in respect f all other states or persons out
f is community

45 This, therefore contains the power of
war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all th
transactions w th al persons and communities
w thout the commo w alth, and may be called
federative if any one pleases. So th thing be
und stood, I am und fferent as to th name.

14 These two powers, executiv and federa
tive thou h they be really distinct in themsel ves,
yet ne comprehending the execution f th mu
nicipal laws f th society w th n If upon all
that are parts f t, th ther th man em t of
the security and terest f the publ w thout
th al those that tma rect be fit dam
age from, yet they ar always almost united.
And thou h this federative power in th well or
ul managem t f t be fgre t m ment t the
commonw alth, yet tis much less capabl t be
directed by an eccdent, standin pos tve laws
than the executiv, and so must necessaril be
left to th prud ce and wisdom f those whose
hands tis in, to be managed for th public good.
For the law th concern subjects on amonst
another being to direct th ir cuoms, ma well
enough precede them. Bu what is t be d in
reference to fore gners d pending much pon
their cuoms, and th variation of designs and
interests, must be l f t in gr t part t th pru
dence f those who ha ve this power committed
to them, to be mana ed by the best f th x skill
for th d antiag f th commo wealth.

46 Thou h, as I said, th executiv and fed
erativ power f every community be really dis
tinct in themselves, yet they ar hardly t be
sepa, ed and placed th sam tum in th
hands of distinct persons. For both f them re
quire th force f the soci ty for their exercise
n almost impr cuscabl place th force of
the commonw alth in disti ct and n subo d
na hands, or hat the executiv and federative
power should be placed in persons that mu hit
act separ ly whereby th force f th publi
would be nd diff en commands, which
would be pt some time or ther to cause dis
order and ruin.

Chap XIII Of the S hard f th
P xer f t Comm tte th

47. T OUCH in const ituted commonwealth
andir pon is own basis and can coord
to is own natur —tha is, acti g for the pre
servation f the community there can be but
one preme power which is the legislative, to

which all the rest are and must be subord nate
y t th legislat e be g only a fid ciary power
to ct for certain ends, th re remains still in the
peopl a supreme power to remove or alter the
legis tve when they find th l gislat e act con
trary to th trust posed them. For all power
m t n w th trust for the t tain g an end be ng
limited by that end, whenever that end is mani
festl n elected o opposed the trust must nec
essaril be foref ed, and the power d ol e

sequ d the means f t, to th auso t ul
and arbitrary dominion of another whenever
any one shall go bout t bring them into such a
slavish co dit n, they will always ha ve right
to preserve what they ha not a power to part
w th and to rid themsel ves of those who ad
thus fundame tal, sacred and unalt rabl law
of self-preservation for which they entered into
soci ty And thus th community may be said
in this respect t be alwa t th supreme power
but not as cons de d u der any form of govern
ment, because this power of th peopl can neve
tak place till th government be dissol ed

50. I all cases whilst the governme t sub
sists, th legislativ is the sup em power For
what can gve laws t an ther must needs be
superior to him, nd since the legislativ is no
therwise legislati of th soci ty but by the
ght t has to make laws for all th parts, nd
every member f the soci ty prescribing rules to
their cuoms, and givi g power f executi wher
they are transgressed, th legislativ must needs
be th supreme, and all other powers any
members or parts of the soci ty deriv d from
and subordinat to t.

15 I some commonwealths where th le
gislativ is not always being, and the executi
is es'ed in se el perso h has also a share n
the legislati there that single person, in ery
tolerab sense, may also be called suprem not
that h has himself all th supreme power
wh. h is that f law makin but because he has
in him th supreme execution from wh m all
inferior magistrats deriv all their several sub
ordina powers, or t least, the greatest part
of them ha n also no legislativ superior to

anything and hang for the least disobedience. Because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his power—viz the preservation of the rest but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it.

140 It is true governments cannot be supported without great charge and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent—i.e. the consent of the majority giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority and without such consent of the people he thereby invades the fundamental law of property and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself?

141 Fourthly The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands for it being but a delegated power from the people they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth which is by constituting the legislative and appointing in whose hands that shall be. And when the people have said We will submit and be governed by laws made by such men and in such forms; nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them nor can they be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorized to make laws for them.

142 These are the bounds which the law that is put in them by the society and the trust of God and Nature have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth in all forms of government. First They are to govern by promulgated established laws not to be varied in particular cases but to have one rule for rich and poor for the favourite at Court and the countryman at plough. Secondly These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people. Thirdly They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies to be from time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly Legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else or place it anywhere but where the people have

Chap. XII The Legislative Executive and Federative Power of the Commonwealth

143 THE legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. Because those laws which are constantly to be executed and whose force is always to continue may be made in a little time therefore there is no need that the legislative should be always in being notwithstanding always business to do. And because it may be too great temptation to human frailty apt to grasp at power for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them & hereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make and suit the law both in its making and execution to their own private advantage and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community contrary to the end of society and government. Therefore in well ordered commonwealths where the good of the whole is so considered as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons who duly assembled have by themselves, or jointly with others a power to make laws which when they have done being separated again they are themselves subject to the laws they have made which is a new and near tie upon them to take care that they make them for the public good.

144 But because the laws that are at once and in a short time made have a constant and lasting force and need a perpetual execution or an attendance thereunto therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being which should see to the execution of the laws that are made and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated.

145 There is another power in every commonwealth which one may call natural because it is that which an individual possesses every man naturally had before he entered into society. For though in a commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another and as such are governed by the laws of the society yet in reference to the rest of mankind they make one body which is, as every member of it before was still in the state of Nature with the rest of mankind so that the contract enters that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it are managed by the public, and an injury done to a member of the society engages the whole in the repara-

they should exercise the power of making laws, either at certain set times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from what is so necessary to the society, and wherein the safety and preservation of the people consists, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all states and conditions the true remedy of force without authority is to oppose force to it. The use of force without authority is always putting him that uses it into a state of war as the aggressor and renders him liable to be treated accordingly.

156. The power of assembling and dismissing the legislature placed in the executive, gives not the executive superiority over it, but is fiduciary trust placed in him for the safety of the people in a case where the uncertainty and uncertainty of human affairs could not bear any fixed rule. For it not being possible that the first framers of the government should by an foresight be so much masters of future events as to be able to prefix so just periods of return and duration to the assemblies of the legislature in all times to come that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the commonwealth, the best remedy could be found for this defect was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be present, and whose business it was to watch over the public good. Constant, frequent meetings of the legislature and frequent consultations of their assemblies, without necessary occasion, could not be burdensome to the people and must necessarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniences, and yet the quick turn of affairs may be sometimes such as to need their present help and delay of their convening might endanger the public and sometimes too, that it becomes may be so great that the limited time

trary power depending on his good pleasure but with this trust always to have it exercised only for the public good as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whether settled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convening the legislature or perhaps a mixture of both hath the last inconvenience attending it, it is not my business here to inquire but only to show that, though the executive power may have the prerogative of convening and dissolving such conventions of the legislature yet it is not thereby superior to it.

157. Things in this world are in so constant a flux that nothing remains long in the same state. Thus people, riches, trade, power change their state as flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in time neglected desolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow populous countries filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not always changing equally and per se in erect often keeping up customs and privileges when the reasons of them are ceased, if it comes to pass that in government where part of the legislature consists of representatives chosen by the people that in tract of time this representation becomes very unequal and disproportioned to the reasons it was first established upon. That gross absurdity the following of custom when reason has left it may lead, we may be satisfied when we see the bare name of a town, of which there remains not so much as the ruins, where scarce so much housing as sheepcote or more inhabitants than a shepherd is to be found send as many representatives to the grand assembly of law-makers as whole counties numerous people and powerful in riches. This strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy though most think it hard to find one because the constitution of the legislature being the original and supreme act of the society antecedent to all positive laws is, and depending wholly on the people, no inferior power can alter it. And therefore the people when the legislature

community from being exposed some time or other to imminent hazard on one side or the other by fixed intervals and periods set to the meeting and sitting of the legislature but to contrast to the prudence of some who, being present and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for the public good? And where he could thus be so well placed as in his hands who was entrusted with the execution of the laws for the same end? Thus, supposing the regulation of times for the assembling and sitting of the legislature not settled by the original constitution, it naturally fall to the hands of the executive not as an arbitrary

38. Some persons from this it is certainly so just and fundamental rule, that he who sincerely follows cannot danterous err. If therefore the executive who has the power of convening the legislature, observing rather the true proportion than fashion of representation, regulates not by old custom, but true reason, the number of

him there being no law to be made without his consent which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative he is properly enough in this sense supreme But

they find cause and to punish for any mal administration against the laws The same holds also in regard of the federative power that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative which as has been shown in a constituted commonwealth is the

utor of the law made by a joint power of him with others allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law which when he violates he has no right to obedience nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law and so is to be considered as the image phantom or representative of the commonwealth acted by the will of the society declared in its laws and thus he has no will no power but that of the law But when he quits this representation this public will and acts by his own private will he degrades himself and is but a single private person without power and without will the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society

152 The executive power placed anywhere but in a person that has also a share in the legislative is visibly subordinate and accountable to it and may be at pleasure changed and displaced so that it is not the supreme executive power that is exempt from subordination but the supreme executive power vested in one who having a share in the legislative has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and ac-

and so will as supreme naturally have the supreme executive power together with the legislative may assemble and exercise their legislative at the times that either their original constitution or their own adjournment appoints or when they please if neither of these hath appointed any time or there be no other way prescribed to convolve them For the supreme power being placed in them by the people it is always in them and they may exercise it when they please unless by their original constitution they are limited to certain seasons or by an act of their supreme power they have adjourned to a certain time and when that time comes they have a right to assemble and act again

154 If the legislative or any part of it be of representatives chosen for that time by the people which afterwards return into the ordinary

at certain appointed seasons or else when they

certainly conclude that the other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth need not speak they being different

necessary to our present purpose we may take notice of concerning them that they have no manner of authority any of them beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them and are all of them accountable to some other power in the commonwealth

153 It is not necessary—no nor so much as convenient—that the legislative should be always in being but absolutely necessary that the executive power should because there is not always need of new laws to be made but always need of execution of the laws that are made When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws they make into other hands they have a power still to resume it out of those hands when

limitations in respect of time—that either the original constitution requires their assembling and acting at certain intervals and then the executive power does nothing but ministerially is sued rectors for their electing and assembling according to due forms or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections when the occasions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old or making of new laws or the redress or prevention of any inconveniences that lie on or threaten the people

155 It may be demanded here what if the executive power being possessed of the force of the commonwealth shall make use of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative when the original constitution or the public exigencies require it? I say using force upon the people without authority and contrary to the trust put in him that does so is a state of war with the people who have a right to reinstate the legislative in the exercise of their power For having erected a legislative with an intent

rogative, to the good or hurt of the people, will
 and decid that questi
 I asy t to ce t that n the nancy

n ce rational creature ca not be

most all p rogau e. n c

mined in those po t s wh rein they t r u c u s d
 vanta e from t, and declared limitati ns f pre-
 rogau e in those cases whi h th y and th ir an-
 cestors had l f t h utmost laud t the wis-
 dom of those p nces who mad ther b t a
 ght use of t—that is, for the good of th ir
 peop e.

63 And therefore they ha a cry to g
 nobo of governm t wh say that th people
 ha e encroached upon th p rog u wh n
 they ha got any part f t to be d li ed by pou
 t ulled

hands, to be reused f th ir good, vas n t
 thing th y in ended him, when h used t ther
 wise For the d f governm t being the good
 f th community whatsoever alt u ns are
 made t nd gt tha nd cann t be an
 croachmen po anybody, so ce n body ngov
 ernm t ca ha ght nding t any ther
 nd nd those nly ar croachm nts which
 pr judice hu d th p bls good. Those who
 say therwise speak as if th pri ce had dis-
 tinct nd separat est from th good f the
 community and was t mad f t th oot
 and source from whi h spr almost all those
 evils and disord rs which happe n kingly gov-
 ernments. And ndeed, if tha be so the people
 nd his governme art t soci ty f rati on
 all creatures, tered community for their
 m tual good su h as ha e se rulers on th m-
 sel es, t guard d prout that good but are
 to be looked on as herd f infer or cre tures
 under the d muni o f master who keeps them
 and works them for his own pl asure or profit. If
 men were so vid f reason and brutish as t
 into soci ty upon such terms, prerogati e might
 indeed be, what some m would ha e t, an ar-
 bitrary power to d things hurtful to th people.

h ps, think t e ther necessary o u s — I
 p ees bounds to his power n all things) pr
 rogati e can be noth g but the people s permit-
 tin their rulers to do e v al th gs f their on n
 free cho ce h e the law was s l t, and some
 times too aga nst th d cct i t of the law for
 the public good and th ir acquiescing in it when
 so d For as good prince who mindful of
 th trust put into his ha ds and careful of the

ir m tha u p r b
 cas n to cl m th ir right and l mut that po r
 which, hilst t was exercised f th ir good
 they were co tent should be tacitly allow ed.

165. And th fo h th t will look t to th
 hist ry of En land will find that p rogati e was
 al ys larg st m th h ds four wise t and best
 p nces, because th peopl bservin th wh le
 t de cy f th ir cu ns to be the public good
 or if any human frailty o m take (fo princes
 are but m made as oth rs) ppeared some
 small declinati ns fr m that end yet t was vis-
 bl the main f th ir condu t t ned to noth g
 but th care of th p bl e. Th people therf
 finding reason t be satisfied w th these p ces

li good

66 S ch God lik pr ces, deed had some
 title to m b trary pow r by th t argum t that
 would prn bsol t m narchy the best g
 erame t, as th t which God Himself g rns th
 un erse by because such kings partak f His
 wisdom d good ess. Upon this is founded that
 saying That th ons f good princes ha e
 been alw ys most dangerous t the l bert f
 th ir peopl For wh n th ir success rs, man-
 agi g th governm at w th d f t thoughts,
 wo ld d w th s ns f those good rul rs into
 p eced t nd make th m th tandard f th ir
 prerogati e—as if what had been done only for

members in all places that have a right to be distinctly represented which no part of the people however incorporated can pretend to but in proportion to the assistance which it affords to the public it cannot be judged to have set up a new legislative but to have restored the old and true one and to have rectified the disorders which succession of time had insensibly as well as inevitably introduced for it being the interest as well as intention of the people to have a fair and equal representative whoever brings it nearest to that is an undoubted friend to and establisher of the government and cannot miss the consent and approbation of the community prerogative being nothing but a power in the hands of the prince to provide for the public good in such cases which depending upon unforeseen and uncertain occurrences certain and unalterable laws could not safely direct Whatsoever shall be done manifestly for the good of the people and establishing the government upon its true foundations is and always will be just prerogative The power of erecting new corporations and therewith new representatives carries with it a supposition that in time the measures of representation might vary and those have a just right to be represented which before had none and by the same reason those cease to have a right and be too inconsiderable for such a privilege which before had it It is not a change from the present state which perhaps corruption or decay has introduced that makes an inroad upon the government but the tendency of it to injure or oppress the people and to set up one part or party with a distinction from and an unequal subject on of the rest Whatsoever cannot but be acknowledged to be of advantage to the society and people in general upon just and lasting measures will always when done justify itself and whenever the people shall choose their representatives upon just and undeniably equal measures suitable to the original frame of the government it cannot be doubted to be the will and act of the society whatsoever permitted or proposed to them so to do

Chap XIV Of Prerogative

159 WHERE the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands as they are in all moderated monarchies and well framed governments there the good of the society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power For the legislators not being able to foresee and provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community the executor of the laws, having the power in his hands

has by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it for the good of the society in many cases where the municipal law has given no direction till the legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it nay many things there are which the law can by no means provide for and those must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require nay it is fit that the laws themselves should in some cases give way to the executive power or rather to this fundamental law of Nature and government—viz that as much as may be all the members of the society are to be preserved For since many accidents may happen wherein a strict and rigid observation of the laws may do harm as not to pull down an innocent man's house to stop the fire when the next to it is burning and a man may come sometimes within the reach of the law which makes no distinction of persons by an action that may deserve reward and pardon it is fit the ruler should have a power in many cases to mitigate the severity of the law and pardon some offenders since the end of government being the preservation of all as much as may be even the guilty are to be spared where it can prove no prejudice to the innocent

160 This power to act according to discretion for the public good without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against it is that which is called prerogative for since in some governments the law making power is not always being and is usually too numerous and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to execution and because also it is impossible to foresee and so by laws to provide for all accidents and necessities that may concern the public or make such laws as will do no harm if they are executed with an inflexible rigour on all occasions and upon all persons that may come in their way therefore there is latitude left to the executive power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe

161 This power whilst employed for the benefit of the community and suitably to the trust

in the point or question of prerogative whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant—that is the good of the people and not manifestly against it But if there comes to be a question between the executive power and the people about a thing claimed as a prerogative the tendency of the exercise of such pre

not reach to all the property of the child which is only in his own disposal.

Secondly, political power is that power which every man has in the state of nature has given up to the hands of the society and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over itself with this express or tacit trust, that

shall be employed for the good and the preservation of the property. Now this power which every man has in the state of nature and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society enjoineth him, is to use such means for the preserving his own property as he thinks good and to not allow harm and to punish the breach of the law of nature in things so as (according to the best of his reason) may meet reason due to the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind so that the end and measure of this power when in every man's hands, in the state of nature, being the preservation of all his own—that is, all mankind in general—it can have no other measure when in the hands of the magistrate but to preserve the members of the society in their lives, liberties, and possessions, and so cannot be an absolute arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which is as much as possible to be preserved but a power to make laws, and no such penalties therein as shall prevent to any of the whole by

power has no original right from the consent and the mutual consent of those who make the community.

Thirdly, despotical power is an absolute, arbitrary power which one man has over the whole to take away his life, whenever he pleases and thus is a power which the society gives to him, for it has made no such distinction between man and another or compact can contain. For man is not to have such an arbitrary power over his own life, as to give another man such power over him, but with effect of the law of nature which the magistrate makes his own law when he puts himself into the state of war with another. For having no other reason, which God hath given to be the rule between man and man, and the peace of which that charity and mild use of force compass has unjustly disposed him here he has no right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by his enemies who never be can, as an heretious and brutish creature this is destructive to his being. And thus captivities, taken just and lawful war and such only are subject to despotical power which, as

carries it from compact, so neither is it capable of an end but as the state of war continued. For what compact can be made with man that is not master of his own life? What condition can

— And if it be once allowed to be made

slavery ceases, and it is so in the power and puts an end to the state of war which is no condition with his captivity. The first of the second is that nature is the first of the second is that nature is for the benefit of the

derstood here as the property which men have in their persons as well as goods. Voluntary agreement gives the second is that political power is to govern, for it be fit for subjects, to secure them in their possessions and use of their properties. And if nature gives the third—despotical power is for the use of the fit over those who are stripped of all property.

4. He that shall consider the distinct rise and extent, and the different ends of these several powers, will plainly see that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrate as despotical exceeds it and that last is to be placed, is so far from being a kind of civil society, that it is as consistent with the slavery with property. Paternal power is not what men try makes the child incapable to manage his property in political but men have property in their own disposal and despotical over such as have no property at all.

Chapter III Of Conquest

1. That a government can or lawfully have no other use than that before mentioned, nor politics be founded on anything but the consent of the people yet such have been the disorders which have filled the world with, that in the use of war which makes so great a part of the history of mankind this consent is but taken in use of it and therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people and erect conquest as if the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting up any government as destroying houses is from building new in the place. I deem success makes way for a new frame of commonwealth by destroying the former but without the consent of the people, can never erect a new one.

the good of the people was a right in them to do for the harm of the people if they so pleased—it has often occasioned contest and sometimes public disorders before the people could recover their

not to

so sin

erty should have a right to do the people harm though it be very possible and reasonable that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings or rulers who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good For prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule

167 The power of calling parliaments in England as to precise time place and duration is certainly a prerogative of the king but still with this trust that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation as the exigencies of the times and v

ing in

be the

which the choice of these was left with the executive power as might be best subservient to the public good and best suit the ends of parliament.

168 The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of? I answer Between an executive power in being with such a prerogative and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening there can be no judge on earth As there can be none between the legislative and the people should either the executive or the legislative when they have got the power in their hands design or go about to enslave or destroy them the people have no other remedy in this as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth but to appeal to Heaven for the rulers in such attempts exercising a power the people never put into their hands, who can never be supposed to consent that anybody should rule over them for their harm do that which they have not a right to do And where the body of the people or any single man are deprived of their right or are under the exercise of a power without right having no appeal on earth they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment And therefore though the people cannot be judge so as to have by the constitution of that society any superior power to determine and make effective sentence in the case yet they have reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind

where there lies no appeal on earth by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men whether they have just cause to make it or appeal to Heaven And this judgment they can not part with it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another as to give him a liberty to destroy him God and Nature never allowing a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation And since he cannot take away his own life neither can he give another power to take it Nor let any one think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder for this operates not till the inconvenience is so great that the majority feel it and are weary of it and find a necessity to have it amended And thus the executive power or wise princes never need come in the danger of and it is the thing of all others they have most need to avoid as of all others, the most perilous

Chap. V. Of Paternal Political and Despotical Power Considered Together

169 Though I have had occasion to speak of these separately before yet the great mistakes of late about government having as I suppose arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another it may not perhaps be amiss to consider them here together

170 First then paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children to govern them for the children's good till they come to the use of reason or a state of knowledge wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule whether it be the law of Nature or the municipal law of their country they are to govern themselves by—capable I say to know it as well as several others who live as free men under that law The affection and tenderness God hath planted in the breasts of parents towards their children makes it evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government but only for the help instruction and preservation of the offspring

171 As to a young child keep the child in subjection to the will of his parents when grown to a man and the perfect use of reason any farther than as his grace ed life and education from his parents obliges him more perfect honour gratitude assent and

not reach at all to the property of the child which is only in his own disposal.

Second! political power is that power which every man has in the state of nature has given up into the hands of the society and therein to the governors whom the society hath set over them, which thus express or tacit trust that

shall be employed for their good and the preservation of their property. Now this power which every man has in the state of nature, and which he parts with to the society in all such cases where the society can secure him, is to use such means for the preserving of his own property as he thinks good and nature allows him, and to punish the breach of the law of nature in others so as (

according to the best of his reason) may most conduce to the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind so that the end and measure of this power which is in every man's hands, in the state of nature being the preservation of all of his society—that is, all mankind in general—it can have no other end or measure, while in the hands of the magistrate but to preserve the members of the society in their lives, liberties, and possessions, and so cannot be an absolute arbitrary power over their lives and fortunes, which as much as possible to be preserved but power to make laws, and annex such penalties to them as may tend to the preservation of them by virtue. Of those parts, and those of which are so corrupt that they were ten times sound and health without which no society is lawful. And this power has its original not from compact and agreement and the mutual consent of those who make up the community.

Third! despotic power is an absolute arbitrary power one man has over another to take away his life, wherever he pleases and thus is power which of the nature gives, for has made no such distinction between one man and another nor compact can convey. For man, not having such an arbitrary power over his own life, cannot give another man such power over it, but is the effect only of force, force which the aggressor makes of his own life, when he puts himself in the way of war with another. For his

qualified reason, which God hath given him to be the rule between man and man, and the period of which that it aches, and may use of force compass his unjust ends upon another where he has no right, he renders himself liable to be destroyed by his adversary whenever he can, as an other noxious and brutish creature this is destructive to his being. And thus expressions taken in just and lawful war and such only are subject to despotic power which, as

arises not from compact, so neither is it capable but is the state of war continued. For

power and puts an end to the state of nature into conditions with his captive.

3. Nature gives the first of these—paternal power to parents for the benefit of their

children—second—political power to governors, for the benefit of the subjects, to secure them in the possession and use of their properties. And for the nature gives the third—despotic power to lords for their own benefit over those who are stripped of all property.

4. If that shall consider the distinct use and extent, and the different ends of these several powers, will plainly see that paternal power comes as far short of that of the magistrat as despotic exceeds it and that absolute dominion, however placed, is so far from being the kind of civil society that it is as inconsistent with it as slavery is with property. Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his private political where men have property in their own disposal and despotic over such as have no property at all.

Chap. XVI Of Conquest

1. 3. THOUGH governments can originally have no other use than that before mentioned, nor polities be founded on anything but the consent of the people yet such has been the disorders ambition has filled the world with, that in the noise of war which makes so great a part of the history of mankind, this consent is little taken notice of and, therefore many have mistaken the force of arms for the consent of the people, and reckon conquest as one of the originals of government. But conquest is as far from setting up an original as demolishing a house is from building new one in the place. Indeed, it often makes way for new frame of a commonwealth by destroying the former but, without the consent of the people, can never erect new one

the good of the people was a right in them to do for the harm of the people if they so pleased—it has often occasioned contest and sometimes public disorders before the people could recover their original right and get that to be declared not to be prerogative which truly was never so since it is impossible anybody in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm though it be very possible and reasonable that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings or rulers who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good For prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule

167 The power of calling parliaments in England as to precise time place and duration is certainly a prerogative of the king but still with this trust, that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation as the exigencies of the times and variety of occasion shall require For it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in and what the best season the choice of these was left with the executive power as might be best subservient to the public good and best suit the ends of parliament.

168 The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative. But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of? I answer Between an executive power in being with such a prerogative and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convenience there can be no judge on earth As there can be none between the legislative and the people should either the executive or the legislative when they have got the power in their hands desist or go about to enslave or destroy them the people have no other remedy in this as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth but to appeal to Heaven for the rulers in such attempts exercising a power the people never put into their hands, who can never be supposed to consent that anybody should rule over them for the harm do that which they have not a right to do And where the body of the people or any single man are deprived of the right or are under the exercise of a power without right having no appeal on earth they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment. And therefore though the people cannot be judge so as to have by the constitution of that society any superior power to determine and give effect to the sentence in the case yet they have reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind

where there lies no appeal on earth by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men whether they have just cause to make their appeal to Heaven And this judgment they can not part with it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another as to give him liberty to destroy him God and Nature never allow a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation And since he cannot take away his own life neither can he give another power to take it Nor let any one think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder for this operates not till the inconvenience is so great that the majority feel it and are weary of it and find a necessity to have it amended And this the executive power or wise princes, never need come in the danger of and it is the thing of all others they have most need to avoid as of all others, the most perilous.

Chap. V. Of Paternal Political and Despotical Power Considered Together

169 THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before yet the great stakes of late about government hanging as I suppose arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another it may not perhaps be amiss to consider them here together

170 First then paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children to govern them for the children's good till they come to the use of reason or a state of knowledge wherein they may be supposed capable to understand that rule whether it be the law of Nature or the municipal law of their country

and tenderness God hath planted in the breasts of parents towards their children makes it evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government but only for the help instruction and preservation of their offspring But happen as it will there is as I have proved no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death at any time or over their children more than over any body else or keep the child in subjection to the will of his parents when grown to a man and the perfect use of reason any farther than as having received life and education from his parents obliges him to respect honour gratitude assistance and support all his life to both

of re ch at all t th property of th child
h ch is nly in his own disposing

17 Seco dly poltical pow r s that power
h h every man ha th stat of N ture
has g r p into the hands of the soc ty and
th in to th gov ors wh m th soc ty hath
s r on self w th this exp ess or tac t trust, that
t shall be mploy d for th good a d the p es-

tanses n t from compact mone ther is it capable
f any but s th state of war co unu d F r

p eserv g t so that as soo as comp t ente s
al ery ceases and he so far quits his abs lut
powe and p ts n d to the stat f war ho
t t co d to s w th hu capt e

73 N ture ga th first f these— pa
ternal pow r t par nts f th be efit of the

ording to th be t of h ason) may most con
d ce to the preservati f himself and th rest
of mankind so that th d d measur f this
power wh ev ry man s hand n th tat
of N ture, being the presers to fall f his so-
ci ty—that is, all mankind in g al—t can
ha the d measur whe the hands

m ch as poss bl to be preserv d b t power
to make laws, d ann ch penalt t th m
as may t d to th p s r t f th wh l by
eu ting f those parts and thos nly huch ar
so corrupt th t they thr tenth sound d h al
th thout wh b se ry l wful. And thus
power has is or m al nly f m comp t d
agrem t and th m tual conse t f those wh
mak p th mmy ty

74 Thirdly despotical pow m bsol t
arbitrary pow ma has th t
tak w y his l f wh m pl ases and thus
pow huch th Natur g es f th as
mad su h d u u berr ma d
anoth mp t ca ey F ma t
ha gsuch an arb trary pow h s own l f
canno gr ch man s h pow t,
b is th effect nly f f f t wh h th
rressor makes f th own l f wh h p us h m
self to th tat f war w th th F h
in quated aso wh h God hath ga t be
th rule betw t man d ma d th pe ce
d w huch that t hes, nd m d use f
force t compass his unjust ds po th
here h has no ght, h nd rs himself liabl
to be destr y d by his d rsars wh ev he
can, as any th vious and brutish cr ture
t at destr u to his be g And thus cap-
t ra, take just d lawful war and ch
only ar subject to despotical power which, as

ond—12 poltical po e to g er ors for th
be efit f th r subjects t secur th m in the
possess d use of their propertie And f
f cur m es the third—despotical pow tol ds
for th r own ben fit over those wh ar str pped
of all p erty

174. ¶ that shall cons d r th dista t se
and te t, and th diff r nt ends of th se se
e al powe will plainly se that p t rnal powe
com s as f h t f that f th magistr t as
d pot cal vce d t d that abs l t d m
hov pl ced is so far f m be g e k d
of c l ocity that tis as co ist nt w th tas
ala ry s w th p pe ty P te nal pow r is ly
wh m ty mak s th child cap bl t
manag h s p pe ty poltical he e m h
p pe ty th r own d sposal a d despotical
o such as ha m pe ty t all

Chap XVI Of C quest

175. Two n go nm m can o gnally h e
n th ue than that befor m nu d n r
politu bef und d n anyth g but th cons t
f th pe pl yet such ha be n th diso d s
mb t has fill d th ld w th, that the
ouse f war which make so gr at a part f the
m ry f mank d thus conse t is littl tak n
n uce of and th for ma y ha mistak n
th f ce of arms f th consent f the pe ple
and eck co q t as f th or ginals f
gov rnm t. But co qu t is as far fr m s tung
up any gov m t as d m lishing a h use
fr m building n w the place I d d t
ft mak way f n w fram f comm n
calth by destr y gth f rme but, w th ut th
conse t f th pe ple, can er erect new one

the good of the people was a right in them to do for the harm of the people if they so pleased—it has often occasioned contest and sometimes public disorders before the people could recover their original right and get that to be declared not to be prerogative which truly was never so since it is impossible anybody in the society should ever have a right to do the people harm though it be very possible and reasonable that the people should not go about to set any bounds to the prerogative of those kings or rulers who themselves transgressed not the bounds of the public good For prerogative is nothing but the power of doing public good without a rule

167 The power of calling parliaments in England as to precise time place and duration is certainly a prerogative of the king but still with this trust that it shall be made use of for the good of the nation as the exigencies of the times and variety of occasion shall require For it being impossible to foresee which should always be the fittest place for them to assemble in and what the best season the choice of these is left

168 The old question will be asked in this matter of prerogative But who shall be judge when this power is made a right use of? I answer Between an executive power being with such a prerogative and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening there can be no judge on earth As there can be none between the legislative and the people should either the executive or the legislative when they have got the power in their hands design or go about to enslave or destroy them the people have no other remedy in this as in all other cases where they have no judge on earth but to appeal to Heaven for the rulers in such attempts exercising a power the people never put into their hands who can never be supposed to consent that anybody should rule over them for the harm do that which they have not a right to do And here the body of the people or any single man are deprived of their right or are under the exercise of a power without right having no appeal on earth they have a liberty to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment And therefore though the people cannot be judge so as to have by the constitution of that society any superior power to determine and give effect to sentence in the case yet they have reserved that ultimate determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind

where there lies no appeal on earth by a law antecedent and paramount to all positive laws of men whether they have just cause to make their appeal to Heaven And this judgment they can not part with it being out of a man's power so to submit himself to another as to give him a liberty to destroy him God and Nature never allow a man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation And since he cannot take away his own life neither can he give another power to take it Nor let any one think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder for this operates not till the inconvenience is so great that the majority feel it and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended And this executive power or wise princes never need come in the danger of and it is the thing of all others they have most need to avoid as of all others, the most perilous

Chap. XV Of Paternal Political and Despotical Power Considered Together

169 THOUGH I have had occasion to speak of these separately before yet the great mistakes of late about government having as I suppose arisen from confounding these distinct powers one with another it may not perhaps be amiss to consider them here together

170 First then paternal or parental power is nothing but that which parents have over their children to govern them for the children's good till they come to the use of reason or a state of knowledge where they may be supposed capable to understand that rule whether it be the law of Nature or the municipal law of their country they are to govern themselves by—capable I say to know it as well as several others who live as free men under that law The affection and tenderness God hath planted in the breasts of parents towards their children makes it evident that this is not intended to be a severe arbitrary government but only for the help instruction and preservation of their offspring But happen as it will there is as I have proved no reason why it should be thought to extend to life and death at any time over the children more than over anybody else or keep the child in subjection to the will of his parents when grown to a man and the perfect use of reason any farther than as having received life and education from his parents obliges him to respect honour gratitude assistance and support all his life to both father and mother And thus it is true the paternal is a natural government but not at all extending itself to the ends and jurisdictions of that which is political The power of the father doth

given to their governors no power to do
 just such as is to make an unjust war
 or they never had such a power in themselves
 say you hit not to be charged as guilty of the
 force and injustice that is committed in an un-
 just war any further than they actually abet it,
 no more than they are to be held guilty of
 violence or oppression their governors should
 be upon the people themselves or any part of
 their fellow subjects, they having empowered
 them no more to this or than to the things
 of error. It is true, seldom in trouble themselves to
 make the distinction by it they wilfully permit
 to continue in a war to sweep all together but
 yet it is not the right for the conqueror's
 power over the lives of the conquered being only
 because they have used force to do or maintain
 an injustice he can have that power only over
 those who have concurred in that force, all the
 rest are innocent, and he has no more rule over
 the people of that country who have done him
 no injury and so have made no forfeiture of their
 lives, than he has over any the who, without
 any injuries or provocations have lived upon
 fair terms with him.

So. Thirdly the power conquerors have over
 those he overcomes in a just war is perfectly despo-
 sitional he has an absolute power over the lives
 of those who, by putting themselves in that
 war have forfeited them, but he has no thereby
 rule, and title to their possessions. Thus I doubt
 not but the first is his will seem strange doctrine,
 it being so quite contrary to the practice of the
 world there being nothing more familiar in
 speaking of the dominion of countries than say
 such an one conquered it, as if conquest, he
 out a more direct way to his possession
 is. But what we consider that the practice of
 the strong and powerful, how universal soever
 it may be, is seldom in the rule. For he, however it
 be or part of the subject of the conquered
 to argue against the conditions cut out to
 them by the conquering sword.

8. Though it is all that there be usually com-
 punction of force and damage, and the aggressor
 seldom fails to harm the estate when he uses force
 against the persons of those he makes war upon,
 yet is the use of force only that puts man into
 the state of war. For whether by force he begins
 to injure or lose his things quiet and by fraud
 done the injury he refuses to make reparations,
 and by force maintains it, which is the same thing
 as if first he had done by force is the un-
 just use of force that makes the war. For he that
 breaks open my house and violently turns me
 out of doors, or has me peaceably got in, by force

keeps me out, does, in effect, the same thing
 supposing we are in such a state that we have no
 common judge with whom I may appeal to,
 and that whom we are both obliged to submit, for
 such I am now speaking. It is the unjust use of
 force in the state of war.

liable to be destroyed by him he uses it as
 as any savage or ravenous beast that is dangerous
 to his being.

18. But because the miscarriages of the father
 are no faults of the children who may be ra-
 tional and peaceable notwithstanding the brut-
 alness and injustice of the father the father by

destruction, though he, perhaps, he may take some
 right to them to repair the damages he has sus-
 tained by the war and the defence of his own
 right, which however far it reaches to the possessions
 of the conquered we shall see by-and-by so that
 he that by conquest has right over man a pe-
 son, to destroy him if he pleases, has not thereby
 right over his estate to possess and enjoy it. For
 it is the brutal force the aggressor has used that
 gives his adversary a right to take away his life,
 and destroy him, if he pleases, as noxious crea-
 ture but it is damage sustained that alone gives
 him title to another man's goods for though I
 may kill a thief that sets on me in the highway
 yet I may not (which seems less) take away his
 money and let him go this would be robbery on
 my side. His force, and the state of war he put
 himself in, made him forfeit his life, but gave me
 no title to his goods. The right, then, of conquest
 extends only to the lives of those who joined in
 the war but not to their estates, but only in or-
 der to make reparation for the damages received
 and the charges of the war and that, too, the
 reservation of the right of the innocent wife and
 children.

83. Let the conqueror have as much justice
 on his side as could be supposed, he has no right

176 That the aggressor who puts himself into the state of war with another and unjustly invades another man's right can by such an unjust war never come to have a right over the conquered will be easily agreed by all men who will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts from them Should a robber break into my house and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him would this give him any title? Just such a title by his sword has an unjust conqueror who forces me into submission The injury and the crime is equal whether committed by the wearer of a crown or some petty villain The title of the offender and the number of his followers make no difference in the offence

— Th o l d i f f e n c e

warded with laurels and triumphs because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world and have the power in their own possession which should punish offenders What is my remedy against a robber that so broke into my

when able may seek the relief of the law which I am denied he or his son may renew his appeal till he recover his right But the conquered or the rich children have no court—no arbitrator on earth to appeal to Then they may appeal as Jephtha did to Heaven and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors which is as to have such a legislative

the court he appeals to And he that appeals to Heaven must be sure he is right on his side and a right too that is worth the trouble and cost of the appeal as he will answer at a tribunal that cannot be deceived and will be sure to retribute to every one according to the mischiefs he hath created to his fellow subjects—that is any part of mankind From whence it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered

177 But suppose no victory favours the right side let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war and see what power he gets and over whom.

First it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest but must at least be as much free men

other advantages that attend the conquering sword or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them And the conquering people are not I hope to be slaves by conquest and wear their laurels only to show they are sacrifices to their leader's triumph They that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword make their heroes who are the founders of such monarchies arrant draw cards and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won or assisted them in the subduing or shared in possessing the countries they mastered We are told by some that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman Conquest and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion which

could reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons that were then inhabitants of this country The Normans that came with him and helped to conquer and all descended from them are free men and no subjects by conquest let that give what dominion it will And if I or anybody else shall claim freedom as derived from them it will be very hard to prove the contrary and it is plain the law that has made no distinction between the one and the other intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges

178 But supposing which seldom happens that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people under the same laws and freedom let us see nevertheless what power a conqueror has over the subdued and that I say is purely despotic He has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them but not over their liberties or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war nor over the possessions even of those who were actually engaged in it

179 Secondly I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted concurred or consented to that unjust force that is used against him For the people

176 That the aggressor who puts himself into the state of war with another and unjustly invades another man's right can by such an unjust war never come to have a right over the conquered will be easily agreed by all men who will not think that robbers and pirates have a right of empire over whomsoever they have force enough to master or that men are bound by promises which unlawful force extorts from them. Should a robber break into my house and with a dagger at my throat make me seal deeds to convey my estate to him would this give him any title? Just such a title by his sword has an unjust conqueror who forces me into submission. The injury and the crime is equal whether committed by the wearer of a crown or some petty villain. The title of the offender and the number of his followers make no difference in the offence unless it be to aggravate it. The only difference is great robbers punish little ones to keep them in their obedient but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs because they are too big for the real hands of justice in this world and have the power in their own possession which should punish offenders. What is my remedy against a robber that so broke into my house? Appeal to the law for justice. But perhaps justice is denied or I am crippled and cannot stir robbed and have not the means to do it. If God has taken away all means of seeking remedy there is nothing left but patience. But my son when able may seek the relief of the law which I am denied he or his son may renew his appeal till he recover his right. But the conquered or the rich children have no court—no arbitrator on earth to appeal to. Then they may appeal as Jephtha did to Heaven and repeat their appeal till they have recovered the native right of their ancestors which was to have such a legislative over them as the majority should approve and freely acquiesce in. If it be objected this would cause endless trouble I answer no more than justice does where she lies open to all that appeal to her. He that troubles his neighbour without a cause is punished for it by the justice of the court he appeals to. And he that appeals to Heaven must be sure he has right on his side and a right too that is worth the trouble and

part of mankind. From hence it is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered.

177 But supposing victory favours the right side let us consider a conqueror in a lawful war and see what power he gets and over whom.

First it is plain he gets no power by his conquest over those that conquered with him. They that fought on his side cannot suffer by the conquest but must at least be as much free men as they were before. And most commonly they serve upon terms and on condition to share with their leader and enjoy a part of the spoil and other advantages that attend the conquering sword or at least have a part of the subdued country bestowed upon them. And the conquering people are not I hope to be slaves by conquest and wear the laurels only to show they are sacrifices to their leader's triumph. They that found absolute monarchy upon the title of the sword make their heroes who are the founders of such monarchies arrant draw can sirs and forget they had any officers and soldiers that fought on their side in the battles they won or assisted them in the subduing or shared in possessing the countries they mastered. We are told by some that the English monarchy is founded in the Norman Conquest and that our princes have thereby a title to absolute dominion which if it were true (as by the history it appears otherwise) that William had a right to make war on this island yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the Saxons and Britons that were then inhabitants of this country. The Normans that came with him and helped to conquer and all descended from them are free men and no subjects by conquest let that give what dominion it will. And if I or any body else shall claim freedom as descended from them it will be very hard to prove the contrary and it is plain the law that has made no distinct on betwixt the one and the other intends not there should be any difference in their freedom or privileges.

178 But supposing which seldom happens that the conquerors and conquered never incorporate into one people under the same laws and freedom let us see nevertheless what power a conqueror has over the subdued and that I say is purely despotic. He has an absolute power over the lives of those who by an unjust war have forfeited them but not over their liberties or fortunes of those who engaged not in the war nor over the possessions of those who were actually engaged in it.

179 Secondly I say then the conqueror gets no power but only over those who have actually assisted concurred or consented to that unjust force that is used against him. For the people

dyt estore t—i quit seu —
 of t or I may resume t myself— choose
 h th I will perf rm t. F r th l w f n ture
 la g an bl gation n m only by the rules
 sh preser bes, ca n t bl g m by th la
 u of h rules such as th ev t ung a yth
 from m by force n does t t all alt r th
 case t say I ga t may p rous n m than t
 ruses the force and pass s the right, wh n I
 put my hand my pock t n d d l my purse
 myself t a th f who demands t w th a p tol at
 my br ant.

187 From all which t f llows that th gov rn
 — h — th

poli c, may be tak n t ha j d th t u
 just war wh in they ar subd d a d so th ir
 l r s ar at the m cy f th co q

189. I as this co cerns t th r childr who
 ar in their man ry F ce f the hath
 t, himself pow n th h f l berty
 f his child, n ct f his can poss bly f f t t
 so that th childre what may ha hap
 pe ed to th f thers, ar free me and th b
 sol t power of th co q or ch m f ther
 tha th persons f th men that w subd ed
 — —

cest rs, if it were a gov nment made by th ir
 conse t.

19 By the seco d the nhabitants of any
 cou try wh are d sce ded a d de e a til to
 th e estates fr m those wh ar subdued a d
 had m r nment f reed upon them against
 th ir fr conse ts, eta r ght t the posses
 s on f their nce t rs though they cons t n t
 fre ly t th gov nment whose hard cond tions
 we e by force imposed on the possessors of that
 country F r th first co qu ror ne er ha r g
 had t d t the l d of that country th peo
 pl ho ar the descenda ts f o cl um und m
 thos wh er f reed t submit to the yoke of a
 governm nt by constr int, ha e always right
 to shake t off nd fre themsel s from the
 usurp ti n r tyranny the sword hath br ght n
 upon them till th ir rulers put them u d r uch
 frame of go e nm t as they w llingly d of
 — — wh h th cann be sup

body ca tak aw y any part of t w th ut th m
 own conse t, with t which, m n u d any
 — h f fre m but

so l g gr aned unde wh eve th y ha
 pon to d it.

93 B t granting that th conqu n a just

them but by th ir own conse t, wh tever h
 may dr them t say d d h has law
 ful th or ty whist force and n t ch ce com
 pels them to submit on

90 E ry man is born w th doubl right.
 First, ght f f edom t his perso which
 ther man has power ove but th fr dis
 posal f t lies in himself Seco dly, ght be
 fore y ther ma t h t, w th his br th
 has f th goods.

9 By th first f these man is naturally
 f ree om subjects to any gov nme t, though
 he be bor pl ce nd t jurisd ct n. But
 if he disclaim the lawful g vernme t f th coun
 try he was born, he must loo qu t the ght
 that belonged to him, by th law f t, nd th
 possessions there descend g t him from his an

will f llow from h ce m the continu nce of th
 g nm t. Because th descendants f these
 be gall f men f h grants th m tat nd
 possessions t h b t h s country w th t w hich
 t would be worth n thng whatsoe e h grants
 them th y ha e so far as t is grant d p pe ty
 n th n tur wh e f s, that, w thout man
 own conse t, t can ot be tak f om him.

94. Their persons are free by a n t e right
 and their properties, be they mor less, are
 th ir own, and e th ir own dispose and n t t
 his or lse t is o p p e ty B ppos g th con
 qu gies to on ma thousand cres t
 him and his h irs for ev to a other h l s
 thousand cre for his l f und th t f
 £50 or £500 per annum. Has n t th of these

to seize more than the vanquished could forfeit his life in at the victor's mercy and his service and goods he may appropriate to make himself reparation but he cannot take the goods of his wife and children they too had a title to the goods he enjoyed and their shares in the estate he possessed For example I in the state of Nature (and all commonwealths are in the same manner)

1
I am unjustly makes me the aggressor I am conquered my life it is true as forfeit is at mercy but not my wife's and children's They made not the war nor assisted in it. I could not forfeit their lives they were not mine to forfeit My wife had a share in my estate that neither could I forfeit And my children also being born of me had a right to be maintained out of my labour or substance Here then is the case The conqueror has a title to reparation for damages received and the children have a title to their father's estate for their subsistence For as to the wife's share whether her own labour or compact gave her a title to it it is plain her husband could not forfeit what was hers What must be done in the case? I answer The fund as much as possible to the laws that both—viz. to the conqueror's losses and children's rights

24 But supposing the charge and damages of the war are to be made up by the conqueror to the utmost farthing and that the children of the vanquished spoiled of all their father's goods are to be left

25 country he shall conquer For the damages of war can scarce amount to the value of any considerable tract of land in any part of the world where all the land is possessed and none lies waste And if I have not taken away the conqueror's land which being vanquished it is impossible I should scarce any other spoil I have done him can amount to the value of mine supposing it of an extent any way coming near what I had overrun of his, and equally cultivated too The destruction of a year's product or two (for it seldom reaches four or five) is the utmost spoil that usually can be done For as to money and such riches and treasure taken away these are

none of Nature's goods they have but a fantastical imaginary value Nature has put no such upon them They are of no more account by her standard than the Wampompeke of the Americans

26 In five years' product is not worth the perpetual inheritance of land and here all is possessed and none remains waste to be taken up by him that is dispossessed which will be easily granted if one do but take away the imaginary value of money the disproportion being more than between five and five thousand though at the same time half a year's product is more worth than the inheritance where there being more land than the inhabitants possess and make use of any one has liberty to make use of the waste But their conquerors take little care to possess themselves of the lands of the vanquished No damage therefore that men in the state of Nature (as all princes and governments are in reference to one another) suffer from one another can give a conqueror power to dispossess the posterity of the vanquished and turn them out of that inheritance which ought to be the possession of them and their descendants to all generations The conqueror indeed will be apt to think himself master and it is the very condition of the subdued not to be able to dispute their right But if that be all it gives no other title than what bare force gives to the stronger over the weaker and by this reason he that is strongest will have a right to whatever he pleases to seize on

185 Over those then that joined with him in the war and over those of the subdued country that opposed him not and the posterity even of those that did the conqueror even in a just manner hath by his conquest no right of dominion They are free from any subjection to him and if their former government be dissolved they are at liberty to begin and erect another among themselves

186 The conqueror it is true usually by the force he has over them compels them with a sword at their breasts to stoop to his conditions and submit to such a government as he pleases to afford them but the inquiry is what right he has to do so? If it be said they submit by their own consent then this allows their own consent to be necessary to give the conqueror a title to rule over them It remains only to be considered whether promises extorted by force without right can be thought consent, and how far they bind To which I shall say they bind not at all because whatsoever another gets from me by

are both liberty to consent, and he a tually h l a'es off to rule according to his la's. And
consented to all w a d confirm h with pow t f The ef re, all ka's that are not
er he hath till the usurped. h m h e y
h
h
h

Chap XVIII Of Tyranny

100. As usurpat is th case f power which hr
another hath ht t to tyr y is th
case f power beyo d ht, h h n body can
ha a ight t d this is mak g use of the
has in his hands, t f r th good

erum nt d oth r makes a lig u } w as
A nnet =

1

t

f

1

e

tion, en covetous ss, r y u g
lar pass n.
oo If = can doubt this to be truth or
son because t com from th becu hand fa
subject, I hope th uth ty f k g ll make

po've th t is put in a y hands u =
m : f th pe pl and the pr ervatu f the r
properties is appl d th r ends, and mad
use of to impove ll harass, subd = th m to
the arbitrary and rregular commands f those
th th a v t, th t p ese tly becomes tyranny
wh th those that thus use t are = many
Thu e ad f the thirty tyrants t Athens, as
w ll as on t Syrcuse and t ntol r bl do-
m n f the Decemvri t R m as nothing
bett

stus ns, t ; particular and p a w u
mune think e th wealth d w l f th
common wealth be my gr test w aland w ld
l f lerty = point wh l wful king d th
directly diff f m tyrant for l d know l
ed'e th th special d gr test po t f dif
ll r noe th is betw n a ghtful king and an

Wh e ll nds, tyran y be'ins, f
th la be transgressed t ther s harm and
hose a th ty e ceeds th power g
hum by th law and makes use of th f ce h
has u d th comma d to compass that upo
the ubj t wh ch th l w all s n t, ceases n
that t be mamstr t a d et w th ut n
th rity may be pposed as any other man wh
by force in ades th ght f oth Thu ac
know led ed in subo dinat mamstrates H that
hath th ty t seiz my person in the street

by doubl oath th be'v t f th f
dam tallaws fhus kind m-tacit as by be
g ki t and so bou d p ect, as w ll th
peopl as th law fhus edom nd presaly
by his oath hus co nat so as ry just
king in ed kun-d n, is bou d bserve
that p ct on mad hus peopl b hus laws,
framing hus gover m t = ee bl h t
cord: that p ction which God mad w th
Noah af the d l c ffer af seed time,
and harvest, and cold, nd h t, and sumn
and w t nd day and night, h ll cease
whil the arth remaineth. And ther for king
goveru g sented ki gd m, l est t be a
king and deg-ne' es to tyr t, as soo as

warrant d s u h l gal uthor ty as will em

tat h ld th eb ha h t t tak y
y fhus young b th rs po ti ns O that a
hman wh possessed whol cou try bould
f m th ce h e ght t se h n h pl as
ed th co tax and gard of hu poo n gh
bou Th be g ghtfully possessed of gre t
pove and riches, exceed gly bey d th =
est part f th sons of Adam, is so far f m being
an excuse, m ch less a ason f rap and op-

a right to his thousand acres for ever and the other during his life paying the said rent? And hath not the tenant for life a property in all that he gets over and above his rent by his labour

from the heirs of one or from the other during his life he paying the rent? Or can he take away from either the goods or money they have got upon the said land at his pleasure? If he can then all free and voluntary contracts cease and are void in the world there needs nothing but power enough to dissolve them at any time and all the grants and promises of men in power are but mockery and collusion For can there be any thing more ridiculous than to say I give you and yours this for ever and that in the surest and most solemn way of conveyance can be devised and yet it is to be understood that I have right if I please to take it away from you again to-morrow?

195 I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country but this I am sure they owe subjection to the laws of God and Nature Nobody no power can exempt them from the obligations of that eternal

that hold the Almighty whatever some flatterers say to princes of the world who all together with all their people joined to them are in comparison of the great God but as a drop of the bucket or a dust on the balance—inconsiderable nothing!

196 The short of the case in conquest is this The conqueror if he have a just cause has a despotical right over the persons of all that actu

Or the rest of the people is
or the possessions of either he has no power and so can have by virtue of conquest no lawful title himself to dominion over them or derive it to his posterity but as an aggressor and puts himself in a state of war against them and has no better right of principality he nor any of his successors than Hingar or Hubba the Danes had here in England or Spartacus had he conquered Italy which is to have their yoke cast off as soon as God shall give those under their sub-

jection courage and opportunity to do it. Thus notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah by the sword God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire And the Lord as with Hezekiah and he prospered and therefore he went forth and he rebelled against the king of Assyria and served him not (II Kings 18 7) Whence it is plain that shaking off a power is his choice

tenances though even promises and covenants when obtained by force have intervened For it is very probable to any one that reads the story of Ahaz and Hezekiah attentively that the Assyrians subdued Ahaz and deposed him and made Hezekiah king in his father's lifetime and that Hezekiah by agreement had done him homage and paid him tribute till this time

Chap XVII Of Usurpation

197 As conquest may be called a foreign usurpation but where one is got into the possession of what another has right to This so far as it is usurpation is a change only of persons but not of the forms and rules of the government for if the usurper extend his power beyond what of right belonged to the lawful princes or governors of the commonwealth it is tyranny added to usurpation

198 In all lawful governments the designation of the persons who are to bear rule be as natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself and that which had its establishment originally from the people—the anarchy being much alike to have no form of government at all or to agree that it shall be monarchical yet appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power and be the monarch—all commonwealths therefore with the form of government established have rules also of appointing and conveying the right to those

laws of the community have prescribed hath no right to be obeyed though the form of the commonwealth be still preserved since he is not the person the laws have appointed and consequently not the person the people have consented to Nor can such an usurper or any deriving from him ever have a title till the people

which threatened my life. I went
to appeal to the law to secure it and then it
was gone. I was too late to appeal. The law could
not restore life to my dead carcass. The loss was
irreparable which to prevent the law from
giving me right to destroy him who had put
himself to stat war with me and there it
ended my destructi. But in the other case my
life not being in danger I might have the ben-
efit of appealing to the law and have reparati-
on for my loss on that way.

208. Fourthly But if the unlawful a do
by the majority to be maintained (by the pow-
er has got) and the remedy which is due by
law be by the same power bestowed yet th-
ing it remaining even in such manifest case of
tyranny will not add all or slight occa-
sions, disturb the government. For if reach no
farther than some particular cases, though
they have right to defend themselves, and to
recover by force what by unlawful force is taken
from them, yet the right to do so will not easily
engage them in contest which ruin they are sure
to perish being as impossible for one or a few
oppressed men to disturb the government where
the body of the people do not think themselves
concerned in it, as for a madman heady
malcontent to overturn a well settled state the
people being as little prone to follow the
other.

209. But if these illegal acts have ex-
tended to the majority of the people or if the
multitude and oppress has light only on some
few but in such cases as the precedent and con-
sequences seem to threaten all, and they are per-
suaded in their consciences that their lives, and
with them, their estates, liberties, and lives are
in danger and perhaps their religion too, how
they will be hindered from resisting illegal force
used against them I cannot tell. This is an in-
consequence I confess, that attends all govern-
ment whatsoever when the governors have
brought to this pass, be generally suspected
of their people the most dangerous to they
can possibly put themselves in where they are
the less to be pitied, because it is so easy to be
seduced. It being as impossible for a governor
if he really means the good of his people and
the preservation of them and their laws too, ther-
fore no to make them see and feel it, as is for the
father of a family not to see his children see his
loves and takes care of them.

210. But if all the world shall observe pre-

tences of the kind and effects of another arts
used to lead the law and the trust of preroga-
tive (which has an arbitrary power in some things
left in the prince's hand) to do good not harm,
to the people employed contrary to the end for
which it was given if the people shall find the
ministers and subordinate magistracies chosen
suitable to such ends, and favoured or laid by
proportionably as they promote or oppose them
if they see several examples of arbitrary
power and that either in one hand favoured
though publicly proclaimed against, which is
easiest to introduce it, and the operators in it
supported as much as may be and when that
cannot be done, yet approved still and liked
the better and long train of actions shows the
councils all to doing that way how can man
any more refuse himself from being persuaded
in his own mind which way things are going or
from casting about how to save himself than he
could from believing the captain of a ship he
was was carrying him and the rest of the com-
pany to Algiers, when he found himself a witness
ing that course though cross winds, leaks in his
ship and want of men and provisions did often
force him to turn his course on the way some-
times which he still returned again as soon
as the wind weath and other circumstances
would let him.

Chap. IV. Of the Dissolution of Governments

211. He that will, with an end in view, speak of
the dissolution of government, ought in the first
place to distinguish between the dissolution of
the society and the dissolution of the govern-
ment. That which makes the community and
brings men out of the loose state of nature into
one political society is the agreement which every
one has with the rest to incorporate and act as
one body and so be one distinct commonwealth.
This usual, and almost only way whereby this
union is dissolved, is the invasion of foreign force
making a conquest upon them. For in that case

and as he thinks fit, in some other society.
When ever the society is dissolved it is certain
the government of that society cannot remain.
Thus conquests swords of men cut up govern-
ments by their roots, and mangled societies
of eccles, separation the subdued or scattered mul-

pression which the endamaging another with out authority is that it is a great aggravation of it For exceeding the bounds of authority is no more a right in a great than a petty officer no more justifiable in a king than a constable But so much the worse in him as that he has more trust put in him is supposed from the advantage of education and counsellors to have better knowledge and less reason to do it having already a greater share than the rest of his brethren

203 May the commands then of a prince be opposed? May he be resisted as often

sh

ha

ov

and instead of government and order leave nothing but anarchy and confusion

204 To this I answer That force is to be opposed to nothing but to unjust and unlawful force Whoever makes any opposition in any other case draws on himself a just condemnation both from God and man and so no such danger or confusion will follow as is often suggested For—

205 First As in some countries the person of the prince by the law is sacred and

h

of condemnation But yet opposition may be made to the illegal acts of any inferior officer or other commissioned by him unless he will by actually putting himself into a state of war with his people dissolve

re

l

can tell what the end will be?

And a neighbour kingdom has showed the world an odd example In all other cases the sacredness of the person exempts him from all inconveniences where by he is secure whilst the government stands from all violence and harm whatsoever than which there cannot be a wiser constitution For the harm he can do in his own person not being likely to happen often nor to extend itself far nor be possible by his single strength to subvert the laws nor oppress the body of the people should any prince have so much weakness and ill nature as to be willing to do it The inconveniency of some particular mischiefs that may happen sometimes when a heady prince comes to the throne are well recompensed by the peace of the public and security of the government in the person of the chief magistrate thus set out of the reach of danger it being safer for the body that some few private men should be sometimes in danger to suffer than that the

head of the republic should be easily and upon slight occasions exposed

of

only

may

use unjust force though they pretend a commission

as is p

it is

f

all which is a full commission

f

king upon certain days nor in certain places though this commission have no such exception in it but they are the limitations of the law which if any one transgresses

—

any one to act against the law or justify him by his commission in so doing The commission or command of any magistrature where he has

cant

betw

magistrate

as some authority so far and to such ends and the private man has none at all for it is not the commission but the authority that gives the right of acting and against the laws there can be no authority But notwithstanding such resistance the king's person and authority are still both secured and so no danger to government or government

07 Thirdly Supposing a government wherein the person of the chief magistrate is not thus sacred yet this doctrine of the lawfulness

ness of

er

him

injure may be relieved and his damages repaired by appeal to the law there can be no pretence for force which is only to be used where a man is intercepted from appealing in the law For nothing is to be accounted hostile force but where it leaves not the remedy of such an appeal and it is such force alone that puts him that uses it into a state of war and makes it lawful to resist him A man with a sword in his hand demands my purse on the highway when perhaps I have not it in my pocket This man I may lawfully kill To another I deliver £100 to hold only whilst I alight which he refuses to restore me when I am got up again but dares his sword to defend the possession of it by force I endeavour to retake it The mischief of this man does me a hundred or possibly a thousand times more than the other perhaps intended me (I hom I killed before he really did me any)

2. Fourthly the dissolution of the people into the subjection of one man power, either by the prince or by the legislature is certain. And so is the dissolution of the government. For the end which people entered into society being, to be preserved in estate, free and peace, to society to be governed by its own laws, this is lost whenever they are given up into the power of another.

3. Why in such constitution as this, the dissolution of the government in these cases is to be imputed to the prince is evident, because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the State to employ, and of encouraging himself or being flattered by others, that, as supreme magistrate he is incapable of control he alone is in condition to make great advances towards such changes under pretence of lawful authority and has it in his hands to terrify or suppress opposers as factious, seditious, and enemies to the government whereas no other part of the legislature, or people is capable by themselves to tempt any alteration of the legislative without open and visible rebellion, sufficient to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign conquest. Besides, the prince, in such a form of government, having the power of dissolving the other parts of the legislature, and thereby rendering them private persons, they can never in opposition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legislature by law his consent being necessary to give any of their decrees that sanction. But yet so far as the other parts of the legislature any way contribute to an attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not, has lies in them, hinder such designs, they are guilty and partake in this, which is certainly the greatest crime men can be guilty of one towards another.

4. There is one way more whereby such government may be dissolved, and that is When he who has the supreme executive power neglects and abandons this charge so that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution this is demonstrated to reduce all to anarchy and so effectively to dissolve the government. For laws not being made for themselves, but to be by their execution, the bonds of the society to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function. When this totally ceases, the government visibly ceases, and the people become confused and muddled without order or connection. Where there is no longer the administration of justice for the securing of men's rights, nor any remaining power within

the community to direct the force, or provide for the necessities of the public, there certainly is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed it is all one as if there were no laws, and government without laws is, I suppose a mystery in politics unconcernable to human capacity and inconsistent with human society.

5. In these and the like cases, when the government is dissolved the people are at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new legislature different from the other by the change of persons, or form, or both, as they shall find most for their safety and good. For the society can never by the fault of another lose the nature and original which it has to preserve itself which can only be done by a settled legislative and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the state of mankind is not so miserable that they are incapable of using this remedy till it be too late to look for any. To the people they may provide for themselves by erecting a new legislature, when, by oppression, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power their old one is gone, is only to tell them they may expect relief when it is too late and the evil is past cure. This is, in effect, no more than to bid them first be slaves, and then to take care of their liberty and when their chains are on, tell them they may expect like free men. Thus, if barely so, is rather mockery than relief, and men can never be secure from tyranny if there be no means to escape till they are perfectly

is, when the legislature or the prince either of them act contrary to their trust.

For the legislature acts against the trust imposed on them when they endeavour to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community masters or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people.

6. The reason why men enter into society is the preservation of their property and the end which they choose and authorise a legislative is that there may be laws made, and rules set, as guards and fences to the properties of all the society to limit the power and moderate the dominion of every part and member of the society. For since it can never be supposed to be the will of the society that the legislature should have power to destroy that which every one designs to secure by entering into society and for which the people submitted themselves to

titude from the protection of and dependence on that society which ought to have preserved them from violence. The world is too well instructed in and too forward to allow of this way of dissolving of governments to need any more to be said of it and there wants not much argument to prove that where the society is dissolved the government cannot remain that being as impossible as for the frame of a house to subsist when the materials of it are scattered and displaced by a whirlwind or jumbled into a confused heap by an earthquake.

212 Besides this overturning from without governments are dissolved from within

First When the legislative is altered civil society being a state of peace amongst those who are of it from whom the state of war is excluded by the umpirage which they have provided in their legislative for the ending all differences that may arise amongst any of them it is in their legislative that the members of a commonwealth are united and combined together into one coherent living body. This is the soul that gives form life and unity to the commonwealth from hence the several members have their mu-

essence and union of the society consisting in having one will the legislative when once established by the majority has the declaring and as it were keeping of that will. The constitution of the legislature is the first and fundamental act of society whereby provision is made for the continuation of their union under the direction of persons and bonds of laws made by persons authorised thereunto by the consent and appointment of the people without which no one man or number of men amongst them can have authority of making laws that shall be binding to the rest. When any one or more shall take upon them to make laws whom the people have not appointed so to do they make laws without authority which the people are not therefore bound to obey by which means they come again to be out of subjection and may constitute to themselves a new legislative as they think best being in full liberty to resist the force of those who without authority could impose anything upon them. Every one is at the disposal of his own will when those who had by the delegation of the society the declaring of the public will are excluded from it and others usurp the place who have no such authority or delegation.

213 This being usually brought about by such

in the commonwealth who misuse the power they have it is hard to consider it aright and know at whose door to lay it without knowing the form of government in which it happens. Let us suppose then the legislative placed in the concurrence of three distinct persons — First a single hereditary person having the constant, supreme executive power and with it the power of convoking and dissolving the other two within certain periods of time. Secondly an assembly of hereditary nobility. Thirdly an assembly of representatives chosen *pro tempore* by the people. Such a form of government supposed it is evident

14 First that when such a single person or prince sets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws which are the will of the society de-

required to be obeyed when other laws are set up and other rules pretended and enforced than what the legislative constituted by the society have enacted it is plain that the legislative is changed. Whoever introduces new laws not being thereunto authorised by the fundamental

14

15 Secondly when the prince hinders the legislative from assembling in its due time or from acting freely pursuant to those ends for which it was constituted the legislative is altered. For it is not a certain number of men — no nor their meeting unless they have also freedom of debating and leisure of perfecting what is for the good of the society wherein the legislative consists when these are taken away or altered so as to deprive the society of the due exercise of their power the legislative is truly altered. For it is not names that constitute governments but the use and exercise of those powers that are intended to accompany them so that he who takes away the freedom or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due seasons in effect takes away the legislative and puts an end to the government.

16 Thirdly when by the arbitrary power of the prince the electors or ways of electing are altered without the consent and contrary to the common interest of the people there also the legislative is altered. For if others than those whom the society hath authorised thereunto do choose or in another way than that the society hath prescribed those chosen are not the legislative appointed by the people.

long to offer self. He must have heard but a few while in the world, who has not seen examples of this in his time and he must have very little who cannot produce examples of it in all sorts of governments in the world.

23 Secondly I answer such revolutions happen not upon every little mismanagement in public affairs. Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and inconvenient laws, and all the evils human frailty will be borne by the people without mutiny or murmur. But if long train of abuses, prevarications, and artifices, all tending the same way make the design visible to the people, and they cannot but feel what they lie under and see whether they are grown or not to be wondered that they should then rise. Let me say, and endeavour to put the rule in such hands which may secure to them the ends for which government was first erected and without which, ancient names and specious forms are so far from being better that they are much worse than the state of Nature or pure anarchy the inconveniences being all as great and as far but the remedy farther off and more difficult.

236 Thirdly I answer that this power in the people of providing for their safety anew by new legislative when their legislators have acted contrary to their trust by invading their property is the best fence against rebellion, and the probable means to hinder it. For rebellion be-

comes by them made pursuant to their trust, he thereby takes away the umpirage which every one had consented to for peaceable decision of all their controversies, and a bar to the state of war among them. They do remove or change the legislative to take away this decision power which nobody can have but by the appointment and consent of the people and so destroy the authority which the people did and nobody else can, set up, and introduce a power which the people hath not authorised. Usually introduce state of war which is that of force without authorisation and thus by removing the legislative is established by the society in whose decisions the people acquiesced and united as to their own will, they unite the knot, and expose the people anew to the state of war. And those who by force take away the legislative are rebels, the legislators themselves, as has been shown, can be no less esteemed so, who they who were set up for the protection and preservation of the people their liberties and properties shall by force invade and endeavour to take them away and so they put the society into a state

of war with those who made them their protectors and guardians of their peace are properly and with the greatest ingratitude rebels.

238 But if they do say that a foundation for rebellion means that at many occasions civil wars or intestine broils with people they are absolved from obedience when illegal attempts are made upon their liberties or properties, and may oppose the unlawful use of those who were their magistrates when they invade their properties, contrary to the trust put in them, and that, therefore, the doctrine is not to be allowed being so destructive to the peace of the

the young as will say upon the same ground, that the best men may be proper robbers or put to death, because thus may occasion disorder and bloodshed. If any mischief come in such cases, it is not to be charged upon him who finds his way right but on him who takes his neighbourhood. If the innocent who are made must quarrel quarrel all he has for peace sake to him who will lay his hands upon it, I desire it may be considered what kind of peace there will be in the world which consists in civil order and rapine, and which is to be maintained only for the benefit of robbers and oppressors. Who would it think it desirable peace better with might and the mean when the lamb without resistance yielded his throat to be torn by the imperious wolf? Polyphus must deny Jesus perfect pattern of such peace. Such a government wherein Ulysses and his companions had the

who, by force break through, and, by force, justify the violation of them, are truly and properly rebels. For when men, by entering in society and civil government, have exchanged force, and introduced order for the preservation of property and unity amongst themselves, those whose power is set in opposition to the laws, do it for a purpose, that is, for gain, gain the state and not for property. But, which they who are powerful by the power of the state they have thereby emptied for they have no other hands, and the state is void of those about them be like these do, the proper way to prevent this evil is to show them the danger and injustice of it who are under the greatest temptation to ruin to it.

241 Both the former used cases, when either the legislative is changed, or the legislative contrary to the end for which they were constituted those who are guilty of guilty of rebellion. For if an one by force takes away the established legislative of a society and the

legislators of their own making whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power they put themselves into a state of war with the people who are thereupon absolved from any farther obedience and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence. Whosoever therefore the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society and either by ambition fear folly or corruption endeavour to grasp themselves or put into the hands of any other an absolute power over the lives liberties and estates of the people by this breach of trust they forfeit the power the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends and it devolves to the people who have a right to resume their original liberty and by the establishment of a new legislative (such as they shall think fit) provide for their own safety and security which is the end for which they are in society. What I have said here concerning the legislative in general holds true also concerning the supreme executor who having a double trust put in him both to have a part in the legislative and the supreme execution of the law.

The legislature and officers of the society to corrupt the representatives and gain them to his purposes when he openly engages the electors and prescribes to their choice such whom he has by solicitation threats promises or otherwise won to his designs and employs them to bring in such who have promised beforehand what to vote and what to enact. Thus to regulate candidates and elections and new model the ways of election what is it but to cut up the government by the roots and poison the very fountain of public security? For the people having reserved to themselves the choice of their representatives.

1. They act and advise as the necessity of the commonwealth and the public good should upon examination and mature debate be judged to require. Thus those who give the votes before they hear the debate and have weighed the reasons on all sides are not capable of doing. To prepare such an assembly as this and endeavour to set up the declared abettors of his own will for the true representatives of the people and the law makers of the society is certainly as great a breach of trust and as perfect a declara-

tion of a design to subvert the government as is possible to be met with. To which if one shall add rewards and punishments visibly employed to the same end and all the arts of perverted law made use of to take off and destroy all that stand in the way of such a design and will not comply and consent to betray the liberties of their country it will be past doubt what is doing. What power they ought to have in the society who thus employ it contrary to the trust that along with it in its first institution is easy to determine and one cannot but see that he who has once attempted any such thing as this can not any longer be trusted.

2. 3. To this perhaps it will be said that the people being ignorant and always discontented to lay the foundation of government in the unsteady opinion and uncertain humour of the people is to expose it to certain ruin and no government will be able long to subsist if the people may set up a new legislative whenever they take offence at the old one. To this I answer quite the contrary. People are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest. They are hardly to be prevailed with to amend the acknowledged faults in the frame they have been accustomed to. And if there be any original defects or adventitious ones introduced by time or corruption it is not an easy thing to get them changed even when all the world sees the ease an opportunity for it. This sloth and aersion in the people to quit their old constitutions has in the many revolutions [that] have been seen in this kingdom in this and for many ages still kept us to or after some interval of fruitless attempts still brought us back again to our old legislature of king lords and commons and whatever propositions have made the crown be taken from some of our princes heads they never carried the people so far as to place it in another line.

24. But it will be said this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion. To which I answer.

First no more than any other hypothesis. For when the people are made miserable and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power cry up their governors as much as you will for sons of Jupiter let them be sacred and divine descended or authorised from Heaven give them out for whom you please the same will happen. The people generally ill treated and contrary to right will be ready upon any occasion to ease themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them. They will wish and seek for the opportunity which in the change of weakness and accidents of human affairs, seldom de-

de deb ita erent d pr pter acc ptum juram Pra
niam denique impetum p pul nd rim p ateri
tern ul scendi jus hab t Horum nom alterum d natura
t ut et scil t orpusque tueam. Alterum er
e naturam ul feror d r per ora pphatum su
mat Quod t que populus malum t quam f tum
nt, ped pol t fit d p tquam f t m t
em autorem se leri r d ar p t t p pulus
ur hoc mpl us quam p tus q isp m h b t
Quod hac l pn ad er aris jud cabus c pto B
charno malum ut pol t em d um super t
Clem ill si nt ler b l tyr na t (modicum emm
Jor omnia d del) suster cum coerent d p rt —
Barcl y C tr W ar homach u 8

1 E glish thus
233 B tufany sh uld ask M tth peo-
ple, th alway layth msel e pe t th cru l
ty and f tyran v—m t th y th ur est
ies pull g d and laud in ash s, th ur and
chldr posed t th tyrant s lust d fury
d th m l d f m l ed d by th ur
kun t ruu and all th muse es f want and p-
press and y t t t till—must m al be
d barred th comm p ul f ppo gs
th force, which N tu allow so f ly t all
ther creatures for th ur p eserv is n fr manju
ry l ann e Self-d f ce is part f th law f
N tur or can t be d nced th commu ry
m against th kun himself but t evenge
th m

use; cru lly tyrannise th wh l
s d rabi part f th pe pl this case th peo-
pl ha ght es t d d f d th msel es
f or injury but t must be th th ca ti
that they nly d l d th msel but d t t
lack th pri ce. Th y m y parth damages
r d but m t t for any p ocati n,
reed th bounds f d ever d expect.
They may r pulse th

nos
to
houl
m. sch
d s gned th m th peopl ma
peri t befor be d but, wh it d
they m t eve ge t th k thou h u
thor f th illa y Thus, th for is th pri
lege f h peopl ge l bove what y
pri te person hath That part cular m ar
allowed by our d m ries themsel es (B cha
nan only xcepted) t ha ther med y b t
pa nce but th body f the peopl may w th

respect at nt l bl tyran y f when it is
but mod at th you ht to e dure it.

234 Thus far th t gr t d ocat f m nar
chical pov all s f es

35 It is tr h has an e. ed to olumtati ns
t t t n purpos

For t H says t must be w th rev
Se dl It must be th ut tr b tion r
p ushm t and th as h g es is betaus
an nf can t p nish as pe r

First Hov t exist f w th t strik g
gai t trike th e er will eed
som hall to mak t fl gible H that hall op
pose an assault nly th a shu ld t re th

l has is as d ul us w y f usi gas J al
th ught t f f i t g Lib t pul ar g pul
ta lam And th su ess f th comb t ll be
d bly th sam h th descr be t

Libertas pauperis hac it
Pul tus t t p gus ncurus ador t
Ut l t pauca cum d nt bus nd re t

Thus ll alw ys be th t f such an m gi
nary es tance wh m n may n t trike gai
ll th f wh may ist must be allowed t
strike And th l t ur uth anybody lse
j n k ock th h d cut n th f c w th
asm h ce and espe t as h thinks fit
H that can concil bl w d en e may
f ght I know d ef h pains l
spe tful cud ll g wh e h can m tw th t.
Seco dly As to his co d—An f or can
t po h a supe —that tru g rally
speak wh l

unus mains —th th h ppos th
unjust gressio has this supe ty er h m
th th has ght, h wh p t rads t pu ish
th ff d both for th b ll f th pe ce
d ll th ev l that f ll d upo t Bar l y
th f th nl ce m

ing to do but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured And no doubt Ulysses who as a prudent man preached up passive obedience and exhorted them to a quiet submission by repre

Polyphemus who had now the power over them

229 The end of government is the good of mankind and which is best for mankind that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power and employ it for the destruction and not the preservation of the properties of their people?

230 Nor let any one say that mischief can arise from hence as often as it shall please a busy head or turbulent spirit to describe the alteration of the government It is true such men may stir whenever they please but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition For till the mischief be grown general and the ill designs of the rulers become visible or their attempts sensible to the greater part the people who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance are not apt to stir The examples of particular in

evidence that designs are carrying on against their liberties and the general course and ten

they who might avoid it bring themselves into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed if they have the sense of rational creatures and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? And is it not rather their fault who put things in such a posture that they could not have them thought as they are? I grant

goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people and lays the foundation for overturn

ing the constitution and frame of any just government he is guilty of the greatest crime I think a man is capable of being to answer for all those mischiefs of blood rapine and desolation which the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country and he who does it is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind and is to be treated accordingly

231 That subjects or foreigners attempting by force on the properties of any people may be resisted with force is agreed on all hands but that magistrates doing the same thing may be resisted hath of late been denied as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law had thereby a power to break those laws by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren whereas their offence is thereby the greater both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law and breaking also that trust which is put into their hands by their brethren

32 Whosoever uses force without right—as every one does in society who does it without law—puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it and in that state all former ties are cancelled all other rights cease and every one has a right to defend himself and to resist the aggressor This is so evident that Barclay himself—that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings—is forced to confess that it is lawful for the people in so near cases to resist their king and that too in a chapter wherein he pretends to show that the Divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion Whereby it is evident even by his own doctrine

er del tati et furor iustum semper perhibet. Et quoniam
multi tunc civitates suas fame ferociter inflammant vastant
sequere eos iuges et libero fortuna ludibri et tyranni
libidinis expont inque omnia vitia pericula omnesque
miserias et molestias a se deduci patiuntur. Num illi
quod omnium in unum generi est à natura tribu-
denque debet ut se cum re pellant seseque ab i-
uria tuentur? Illic brevis responsio si periculum
verso generis infestationem quam ius naturalis est ne-
que ultionem quam per alterum natum est adversus recentem
concedere debere. Quapropter si rex noster singulari
et in personas aliquas privet modum exercere de-
bitus et in republicam ius ipse et potest est—et totum
periculum et insigne aliquam ejus partem immanem et
intolerabilem dedit sibi seu tyrannidem ex se populo qua-
dem hoc casu resistendi ac tuendi se ab iurisdictione
et impetu sed tunc de se tunc non enim in se confert
unum dedit et constituenda injuria illata non cedendi

ad b b d ver t d p o p t e r e p t u m j u r m p r a
s i d q p i m p o p u l s d m p t
t u l d j h h t i l l u m m l t m d t d
t t i l t o p q t m A l l e r u m e r
e n i t m t f e r d s p e r s s p l m s u
t Q d s t q u p p d u x m l u m t q m f t u m
s t p d p t t f t d p t q m f t m t
g t h m l e r d n p t t p p l s
g t h o e m p l d s q m p t s q p m l b l
Q o d h i p d x d b e p l B
h n a l l u m p t t e m d m p t
C m l l n t l b l t y s e t m d c u m m
f e r d b t t e r c u m e r t d p t —
B u r l y C t A f a r e h m h v B
I E b l h t h

33 P t f a n y e s i o l d a k M t t h e p e o
p l t h l y s a y t h e m l p e n t t h e r l
t y d g f t y r y — t t l e y a e t h e t
t p l l g d a d i d i n a h t h r w i s d
h t

re p e c t r e n t i n t o l e r a t e t y r y f o r w h n i t i s
l t m o d t t y o u g h t t e d r l i
34 T l s f t l t g t a d o c a t e o f m o
h l p o l l s f r e s t a n c
235 I t i s t r l e h a a n e d t o l i m i t a t o s
t l t m p r o s
F t l l e a y s i t m u s t b e w i t h r r e c e
S l l y I t m u s t b e w i t h t r i b u t i o n r

ag h o t o s t k e v l i t h r e v e w l l e e d
s o m s k l l t o m k t e l l b l e H t a t s l l p
p o s e s s a l t l y w t h a s h t l t t h e
h l v s t

I t i s a s r d e l o w y f r e s t g a s j u l
t l o g h t t t f g h u g U b t p u l g p u l
t t m v d t h e c c e s o f t h m l t l l b e
a d a b l y t h a m h e t h r d e s c r i b e s i t

L a b t p a u p h e t
P u l t g t t p g n e d o r t
U t l t p m d e b d o e t

N t h T h

t

u t c a r c l b l w d —

b l l y t y r a t h w h l a o
d a b l p t f t h p e p l t h c a s t h e p e o
p l e h h
f
t h
t a
r e

T h
t e v g p t v i l c e f t n t a l f
u t o d f d i f d i m b b u t t h a t f
h l d p h p g t i T h e
m h f w h h d g e d t h m t h p p l y
p t b f t b d o b u t w h t d o
t h y m t c e e g t t h k g t h g h
t h o f t h a l l y T h t h f t h p
l g o f t h p p l g l b o w w h t y
p t p s o h t h T h t p t c u l a r m a r
a l l w d b y a d t h e m l (B h
n a l y p t d) t t t h m d y b t
p t c e b t t h b o d y f t h p p l m a y w t h

a u t t b c h f t h p e c

ing to do but quietly to suffer themselves to be devoured And no doubt Ulysses who was a prudent man preached up passive obedience and exhorted them to a quiet submission by representing to them of what concernment peace was to mankind and by showing [what] inconveniences might happen if they should offer to resist Polyphemus who had now the power over them

■ 9 The end of government is the good of mankind and which is best for mankind that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny or that the rulers should be sometimes liable to be opposed when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power and employ it for the destruction and not the preservation of the properties of their people?

230 Nor let any one say that mischief can arise from hence as often as it shall please a busy head or turbulent spirit to desire the alteration of the government It is true such men may stir whenever they please but it will be only to their own just ruin and perdition For till the mischief be grown general and the ill designs of the rulers become visible or their attempts sensible to the greater part the people who are more disposed to suffer than right themselves by resistance are not apt to stir The examples of particular injustice or oppression of here and there an unfortunate man moves them not But if they universally have a persuasion grounded upon manifest evidence that designs are carrying on against their liberties and the general course and ten-

they who might avoid it bring themselves into this suspicion? Are the people to be blamed if they have the sense of rational creatures and can think of things no otherwise than as they find and feel them? And is it not rather the fault who put things in such a posture that they would not have them thought as they are? I grant that the pride ambition and turbulency of private men have sometimes caused great disorders in commonwealths and factions have been fatal to states and kingdoms But whether the mischief hath oftener begun in the people's ambition and a desire to cast off the lawful authority of the rulers or in the rule's insolence and endeavours to get and exercise an arbitrary power over the people whether oppression or disobedience gave the first rise to the disorder I leave it to impartial history to determine Thus I am sure whoever either ruler or subject by force goes about to invade the rights of either prince or people and lays the foundation for overturn

the breaking to pieces of governments bring on a country and he who does it is justly to be esteemed the common enemy and pest of mankind and is to be treated accordingly

231 That subjects or foreigners attempting by force on the properties of any people may be resisted with force is agreed on all hands but that magistrates do the same thing may be resisted hath of late been denied as if those who had the greatest privileges and advantages by the law had thereby a power to break those laws by which alone they were set in a better place than their brethren whereas their offence is thereby the greater both as being ungrateful for the greater share they have by the law and breaking also that trust which is put into their hands by their brethren

32 Whosoever uses force without right—as every one does in society who does it without law—puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it and in that state all former ties are cancelled all other rights cease and every one has a right to defend himself and to resist the aggressor This is so evident that Barclay himself—that great assertor of the power and sacredness of kings—is forced to confess that it is lawful for the people in some cases to resist their king and that too in a chapter wherein he pretends to show that the Divine law shuts up the people from all manner of rebellion Whereby it is evident even by his own doctrine that since they may in some cases resist all resistance of princes is not rebellion His words are these *Quod siq. is dicat Ergone populus tunc crudeliter et furor jugulum semper præbet? Ergone multitudo ciuitates suas fam. ferr. et si mmd. vultam seque eo jug. s. et liberos f. rituna ludibrio et tyranni libid. i. expo. i. s. que omnia vitæ peccula iniquis miseri s. et molesti s. d. g. d. dux p. tentur? Num illi s. quod omnia a. m. n. tium generi est ad naturam tributum denegari debet ut s. vim ei repell. i. sequeque b. j. tuum tuant? Hinc breuiter responsum sit p. pulo u. i. vers. gari def. natio em. quæ ju. is natur. l. s. est ne que ult. em. quæ præter naturam est ad eiusdem regem concedi debere Quap. opter s. rex no. in singulis res. tum pers. aliquot priv. i. modum e. erec. i. s. d. e. r. pus. i. am. res. publ. cæ. cuius ipse c. put. est—i. e. totum p. pulum s. l. i. sing. em. al. qu. m. ejus partem imm. : et intoler. dā. sacra. i. seu. ty. d. d. vexat populo. quia d. m. hoc casu r. s. stendi ac tue di. se. b. i. jurid. p. i. stas c. mpetit sed tuendi se la. tum non en. m. in principem unuadend. et restituendæ iniuriæ illatæ non recedendi*

potestati resistit Dei ordinationi resistit non alias &c. *tur in eum populo potestas est quam si id committat propter quod ipso jure rex esse desinat. Tunc enim se ipse principatus exuit atque in privatius constituit liber hoc modo populus et superior efficitur reuerso ad eum scilicet jure illo quod ante rege inuatum in inter reges habuit. At sunt paucorum generum commissa ejus modi quæ hunc effectum pariunt. At ego cum plurima animo perlustrem duo tantum inuenio duos inquam casus quibus rex ipso facto ex rege non regem se facit et omni honore et dignitate relictus atque in subditos potestate destituit quorum etiam meminit Winzerus. Horum unus est si regnum disperdat quemadmodum de Nerone fertur quod si nempè senatumque pulumque Romanum atque adeo urbem ipsam ferro flammamque sita et acutas sibi sedes querere decreuisset. Et de Caligula quod palam denunciari se neque citem neque principem senatus amplius fore ique animo habuerit interempto utriusque ordinis electissimo quoque flexandis in commissa et ac ut pulum in actu interemeret unam ei ceruicem optauit. Talia cum rex aliquis in ditatur et molitur seruo omnem regnum curam et animum sileo abijcit ac proinde imperium in subditos amittit ut dominus se ipso derelicto habuit dominium.*

36 Alter casus est si rex in alicujus clientelam se contulit ac regnum quodlibet eum in iure et populo traditum accepit licet aditus non recipiat. Nam tunc qui minus forte non eam te de populo plane ut in commoda tamen quod deipsum est regie dignitas sit in manu ut suum se licet in re non secum Deum sit et solo Deo iure atque populum etiam in tum gnora tem et in tum cuius libet tem sit etiam et lecti in consensu debuit in alterius gestione et potestatem deinde hanc velut quod in rem ab initio et esset ut nec quod ipse regis imperium habuit relictum nec in eum cui illi in voluntas quisquequam transferat atque ita eo facto libere in eis et potestatis pulum relictum cuius rei et implum unum anales Scotici præpeditant. —Barclay Cont. a. 150 narchom ch. 5. t. 11. § 16.

Which may be thus Englished

37 What then can there no cases happen wherein the people may of right and by their own authority help themselves take arms and set upon their king imperiously demanding over them? None at all whilst he remains a king.

Honour the king and he that resists the power resists the ordinance of God and the Divines that will never permit it. The people therefore can never come by a power over him unless he does something that makes him cease to be a king for then he divests himself of his crown and dignity and returns to the state of a private man and the people become free and superior the power which they had in the interregnum before they crowned him king devolving to them

again. But there are but few miscarriages which bring the matter to this state. After considering it well on all sides I can find but two or three cases there are I say whereby a king ipso facto becomes no king and loses all power and regal authority over his people which are also taken notice of by Winzerus. The first is if he endeavour to overturn the government—that is, if he have a purpose and design to ruin the kingdom and commonwealth as it is recorded of Nero that he resolved to cut off the senate and people of Rome lay the city waste with fire and sword and then remove to some other place and of Caligula that he openly declared that he would be no longer a head to the people or senate and that he had it in his thoughts to cut off the worthiest men of both ranks and then retire to Alexandria and he wished that the people had but one neck that he might dispatch them all at a blow. Such designs as these when any king harbours in his thoughts and seriously promotes he immediately gives up all care and thought of the commonwealth and consequently forfeits the power of governing his subjects as a master does the dominion over his slaves whom he hath abandoned.

238 The other case is when a king makes himself the dependent of another and subjects his kingdom which his ancestors left him and the people put free into his hands to the dominion of another. For however perhaps it may not be his intention to prejudice the people yet because he has hereby lost the principal part of regal dignity—viz. to be next and immediately under God supreme in his kingdom and also because he betrayed or forced his people whose liberty he ought to have carefully preserved in to the power and dominion of a foreign nation. By this as it were alienation of his kingdom he himself loses the power he had in it before without transferring any the least right to those on whom he would have bestowed it and so by this act sets the people free and leaves them at their own disposal. One example of this is to be found in the Scotch annals.

239 In these cases Barclay the great champion of absolute monarchy is forced to allow that a king may be restrained and cease to be a king. That is in short—not to multiply cases—in whatsoever he has no authority there he is no king and may be restrained for heresoe or the autocracy ceases the king ceases too and becomes like other men who have no authority. And these two cases that he instances differ little from those above mentioned to be destructive to governments only that he has omitted the principle

from which his doctrine flows, and that is the
breach of trust in not preserving the form of go-
vernment agreed on, and not tending and
of government itself which is the public good
and preservation of property. When king has
deduced himself and put himself at the
judge cannot mean that there is no judge at all.
If which there is judgment on earth to do

son, would do well to know
four Church, and great truth for the power
and prerogative of princes, does it mistake

dd

4 If a controversy arise between a people
and some of the people in a matter where the
law is into doubt if a duty the government of great
king or not umpire

pected to be granted four government name, or
comes to the British his Hook all might

their civil policy is so wonderful, and so
destructive to both rulers and people that for
measures could bear the burden of it,
so it may be hoped those considered
from the imposition of the Egyptian and
taskmaster, will be the memory of these
flatterers, who whilst seemed to serve the
turn, sold all government into absolute tyr-
anny down would have all men to what the
man souls fixed the manly

4 If it is like the common question will
be made. Who shall be judge when the people
or the king is contrary to the truth. Thus,
perhaps, I affirm that it is unmanly to do

concord to the trust posed in him by him who
depend on him and me, by his dependence on him
has till power to discard him who has faith
in his trust. If that be as the particular
cases of people by his lord to be the wise
the faith of government, which the will
far from null is considered and also which the
evil, if it is perceived, is great to the end of
very difficult, dear and dangerous

4 But, farther this question, Who shall be

the contrary to or beyond the truth will
perpetrate against the body of the people (who are
first lodged that trust in him) how far they may
it should be decided by the people or whoever
they be in the administration decide that way
if determined the appeal then lies now here
but to the Force between the persons
who have known usurpation or near there who have
permits to appeal against the government be-
cause he will

contrary to the general green to so also in
the society hath placed the legislature as
assembly from the constitution the manner of the
succession, which direct and a the type of pro-
vide the succession, the legislature an new

the people which the government lasts
because he proposed legislative power
to the people the people have the power
political power the legislature, and not
sum. But if they have time to the
the legislature the manner of this sup-
power type of person assembly by tempor-
ary laws by the miscarriages of those in
thority is fixed upon the people the
the rulers the the manner of the
set, the trust the society the people have
right to the supreme decision the legis-
lature the manner of the people the new form, the
new hand as they think good

CONTENTS

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

DEDICATIO	85	XXX. Of Real and Fictitious Ideas	238
EPISTOLE TO THE READER	87	XXXI. Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas	239
INTRODUCTIO	93	XXXII. Of True and False Ideas	243
		XXXIII. Of the Assent to an Idea	248
BOOK I. Whether Principles and Ideas are Innate		BOOK III. Of Words	
~ De Innatis		I. Of Words or Language General	251
	95	II. Of the Signification of Words	252
	103	III. Of General Terms	254
		IV. Of the Name of Simple Ideas	260
	12	V. Of the Name of Mixed Modes and Relations	263
BOOK II. Of Ideas		VI. Of the Names of Simple Things	268
I. Of Ideas general and their Original	21	VII. Of Particulars	283
II. Of Simple Ideas	27	VIII. Of Abstract and Concrete Terms	284
III. Of Simple Ideas of Sens	128	IX. Of the Imperfection of Words	285
IV. Of Solidity	9	X. Of the Abuse of Words	291
Of Simple Ideas of Duration and Sens	131	XI. Of the Remembrance of the former Imperfection	300
V. Of Simple Ideas of Reflection	3		
VI. Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection	31	BOOK IV. Of Knowledge and Probability	
VII. Some further considerations concerning our Simple Ideas of Sens	133	I. Of Knowledge General	317
VIII. Of Perception	38	II. Of the Degrees of our Knowledge	309
IX. Of Retention	41	III. Of the Extent of Human Knowledge	313
X. Of Discriminating and their partitions of the Mind	43	IV. Of the Reality of Knowledge	323
XI. Of Complex Ideas	47	Of Truth General	319
XII. Complex Ideas of Simple Modes — and First of the Simple Mode of the Idea of Space	48	V. Of Universal Propositions their Truth and Certainty	331
XIII. Idea of Duration and its Simple Mode	55	VI. Of Maxims	337
X. Idea as of Duration and Expansion considered together	16	VII. Of Trifling Propositions	345
XVI. Idea of Number	63	VIII. Of our Trifling Knowledge of Existence	349
XVII. Of Infinity	67	X. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of God	349
XVIII. Other Simple Modes	174	XI. Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things	354
XIX. Of the Mode of Thinking	175	XII. Of the Improvement of our Knowledge	358
XX. Of Mode of Pleasure and Pain	176	XIII. Some Further Considerations Concerning our Knowledge	363
XXI. Of Power	178	Of Ideas	364
XXII. Of Mixture of Modes	180	XIV. Of Judgment	365
XXIII. Of our Complex Idea as of Distance	204	XV. Of Probability	366
XXIV. Of Causal Ideas as of Simple Things	4	XVI. Of the Degree of Assent	371
X. Of Ideas of Relation	4	XVII. Of Reason	371
XXVI. Of Cause and Effect and their Relations	7	XVIII. Of Faith and Reason and their Distinction	380
XXVII. Of Identity and Diversity	8	Principle	384
X. Of Other Relations	8	XX. Of the Assent or Error	388
XXIX. Of Clear and Obscure, Distinct and Confused Ideas	33	XXI. Of the Design of the Sciences	394

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THOMAS EARL OF PEMBROKE AND MONTGOMERY

BARON HERBERT OF CARDIFF

LORD ROSS OF KENDAL, PAR FITZHUGH MARMIO ST QUINTIN AND SHURLAND
LORD PRESIDENT OF HIS MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL AND
LORD LIEUTENANT OF THE COUNTY OF WILTSHIRE, AND OF SOUTH WILTSHIRE

MY LORD

THIS Treasurie which is grown up under your lordship's eye and has ventured into the world by your order does now by natural kind of right, come to your lordship for that protection which you several years ago promised it. It is not that I think any name how glorious ever set at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it. Things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader's fancy. But there being in this more to be desired for truth than for fair unprejudiced

whenever you please to oblige the public with some of those large and comprehensive discourses you have made of truths hitherto unknown unless to some few from whom your lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a sufficient reason were there no other why I should dedicate this Essay to your lordship and is highly agreeable to the correspondence with some parts of the noble and vast system of the sciences your lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive. I think of it with glory enough, if your lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen in with some thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your

might otherwise perhaps be thought to deserve no consideration, for being somewhat of the common road. The imputation of Novelty is a terrible charge amongst those who do not men heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion, and can all well to be in hit but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet earned by its anywhere its first appearance. New opinions are always suspected, and usually proposed, without any other reason but because they are not already common. But truth, like gold, is the less so for being early brought out of the mine. It is trial of examination must give price and any antiquity and though be it yet current by the public stamp it may for all that, be as old as nature and is certainly not the less genuine. Your lordship can give great and convincing instances of this,

your lordship further and you will allow me to say that you herewith would an earnest of some of that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. Thus, my lord shows what present I herewith make to your lordship just such as the poor man does to his rich and

are made the offerings of respect, esteem, and gratitude these you have given me so mighty and peculiar reasons to have, in the best degree for your lordship that if they could do a price to what they give all growth, proportionable to their own greatness, I can with confidence brag I here make your lordship the richest present you ever received. Thus I am sure I am under the greatest obligation not to seek all occasions to acknowledge your favour. I have received from your lordship favours, though great and important in themselves, yet made much more so by the forwardness, concern, and kind

ness and other obliging circumstances that never failed to accompany them To all this you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem and allow me a place in your good thoughts I had almost said friendship This my lord your words and actions so constantly show on all occasions even to others when I am absent that it is not vanity in me to mention what everybody knows but it would be want of good manners not to

be so bold

I

gratitude as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship This I am sure I should write of the *Understanding* without having any if I were not extremely sensible of them and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world how much I am obliged to be and how much I am

My Lord

Your Lordship's most humble and most obedient servant

JOHN LOCKE

Dorset Court

4th of May 1689

EPISTLE TO THE READER

READER,

As which has been the

but some mea or considerati and it is not worth while to be co cerned what h says or thinks, who says or thinks n ly as h m d ected by an ther If thou j dgest for thyself I know thou wilt j dg cand dly and the I hall not be harmed sse ded whatever be thy en sur For though it be certa n that there is n th g thus T = use of the truth whereof I m n t fully persau ded yet I cons der myself as liabl

tak not this f comme d t n f my wo co cl d because I was pl ased w th th d ing of t, that th for I am f dly tak n w th t ow t is do H that hawks t larks nd parrow has n less sport, tho h much less cons der bl quarry, than h that flies t n bler gam and h is i t l equ int d w th the sub- ject f this tr use—th ~ AST DRG—who does t know that, as is th most elevated faculty f th soul so t mpl yed w th gr er nd more consta d lght th y f th other It searches af truth ar so t f hawking d hun g h in th ery pursuit makes gr t part f th pl asur E ry p th m d takes is p gress t ward h knowl dg mak s som disco ry which is t nly but th best too f th t m t last.

For he der tanding lik th y j dgi g f bjecta nly by m wn h can t but be pl ased th what disco rs, ha ing less regret for ha has escaped t, because s unknown Thus h who has aised himself bo th lms- bask t, d, not co t t t lazily nscr ps f begged opin ns, sets his own th ghts on work, to find and f llow truth, w l (whateve h lights on) must h h t satisf cu every moment f his pursu will w d has pains with som d lght d h will h as t th k has turn t l l pe ev wh li can t m ch boast f y gr t equi t

Thus, R ad is th rta m t f those wh l loose their wn th ghts, d f l w them w g h h thou ought t :: y th m, ce they ff d th an ppo tun ty f the l k d rs af th w lt mak use f thy ow thoughts d g l t th m, af th y are thy own th l f myself but af th y ar tak po trus f m h s, m gr t mat ha they ar th y ar t f llow g truth,

Of Pascal, *Pens* — "W ever look for the tru h f things b so th wa ty f knowledge

that had already mastered this subject, a d mad a thorough co q as tance w th their ow n u d tand = but for my own nf matio d th

ry de. Afte w had while puzzled our sel es w thout comi any n arer resolut on f thos doubts which pe plevied us, it cam nt my thou hts th tw took a wro geours and that before we set oursel m po quires of that n rur twas necessary t xamu e wn ab lites, and se what b y t our d rsta d s ge wer orw t, firt t d alw th Thus l p oposed t th company wh all adily assent d d th pon twas gr ed that thus should be our fir t inquiry Som hasty and und gest d th ghts, b j t l had eve before co d d which l set down against our n tme t g g th first entr ce into this Discourse wh h ha g been thus begu by chance was co n used by intreaty writt by coher tpar cels and aft l unt rvals f glect, resumed ain, as my h mou or occas na perm itted and tlast, tur m tw h re tle dance on my health m l sur twas b ought in t that ord th unow cest t.

This disco u ed w y fwr ung may ha oc cas ed bes des th rs tw co trary f lts, 12. Cf Bk IV ch xxx, §

ness and other obliging circumstances that never failed to accompany them To all this you are pleased to add that which gives yet more weight and relish to all the rest you vouchsafe to continue me in some degrees of your esteem and allow me a place in your good thoughts I had almost said friendship This my lord your words and actions so constantly show on all occasions even to others when I am absent that it is not vanity in me to mention what everybody knows but it would be want of good manners not to acknowledge what so many are witnesses of and every day tell me I am indebted to your lordship for I wish they could as easily assist my

gratitude as they convince me of the great and growing engagements it has to your lordship This I am sure I should write of the *Undersigned* without having any if I were not extremely sensible of them and did not lay hold on this opportunity to testify to the world how much I am obliged to be and how much I am

MY LORD

Your Lordship's most humble and most obedient servant

JOHN LOCKE

Dorset Court
24th of May 1689

I am not the least knowing and therefore
 I must say to be satisfied. If I have not

excuse for those who will not take care about the
 meaning of their own words, and will not suffer
 the efficacy of their expressions to be required
 into.

I ended for them. But yet
 be the trouble to be of that number. But yet
 one thinks fit to be answered and said to be

I have been told that a short Epitome of this
 Treatise which was printed 1683 was by some
 condemned thought because it was
 considered not that too hastily concluded
 that it finished were not supposed there
 would be little left there for the new or proof
 of spirit. If an one takes the like offence at the
 entrance of this Treatise I shall desire him to
 read through and then I hope he will be con-
 vinced that the tale was false found it is
 is not that prejudice but a care of truth,
 which is never injured or endangered so much
 as it is here built on, falsehood

ments to the admiration of posterity. I try
 we must not hope to be Borel or a S. d. nam
 and in an area that produces such masters as the
 great Henry VIII. and the comparison of Mr
 Newton, with some others of that strain is un-
 happy. You hit be implied as an und
 labourer in clearing the ground little and re-
 moving some of the rubbish that lies in the way

the man faults committed the former u-
 sures too, that it should be known that it has
 while now hither can give it to d
 modifications and modifications in the pla-
 ces. These I must inform the reader of all new
 matter but most of them the further confirma-
 tion of what I had said or explanations, to pre-
 vent them being mistaken the sense of what
 was formerly printed, and not any variation in
 me from it.

terms, introduced in the sciences, and there-
 fore an art, to that degree that Philosophy
 which is in this but the true knowledge of
 things, was the highest or capable to be
 brought into well bred company and polite con-
 versation. I give the name of forms of
 speech, and base language.

I must only except the alterations I have made
 in Book II. chap. xxi.

What I had there written concerning Liberty
 and the Will, I thought deserved a separate
 new as I am capable of those subjects hanging in
 all the confused and part of the world
 with questions and difficulties, that have not a
 little perplexed moral and divinity those parts
 I know that men are more concerned to be
 clear in. Upon close inspection into the work-
 ing of men's minds, and strict examination
 of those motives and laws they are turned by
 I have found something to it the
 thought has formed I had concerning that which
 gives the last term to the Will in all
 voluntary cases. Thus I cannot forbear to
 know that the world with as much freedom
 and adroitness as I first published what then
 seemed to me to be right think myself more
 concerned to quit and enounce any opinion
 of my own, than oppose that of another when
 truth appears against it. For is truth alone I

who speak of those who have art in, has they are
 but the covers of ignorance and hindrance of
 true knowledge. To break in upon the sanctuary
 of vanity and ignorance will be I suppose some
 service to human understanding though so few
 are apt to think they decrease or are decreased in
 the use of words or that the language of the sect
 they are of has any faults in which ought to be
 examined or corrected that I hope I shall be par-
 doned if I have in the Third Book dwelt long
 on this subject, and indeed could not make complaint,
 that neither the inveterateness of the mischief,
 nor the prevalence of the fashion shall be any

Of Berkeley Principles of Human Knowledge In-
 troduction. Sect.

Of Berkeley the abuse of words, Principles
 Introduction. Sect. 8-25.
 Bk. II. ch. xxvii.

that I should have gone further. If it seems too much to thee thou must blame the subject for when I put pen to paper I thought all I should have to say on this matter would have been contained in one sheet of paper but the further I went the larger prospect I had new discoveries led me still on and so it grew insensibly to the bulk it now appears in. I will not deny but possibly it might be reduced to a narrower compass than it is and that some parts of it might be contracted the
 and many I
 apt to cause
 truth I am now too lazy or too busy to make it shorter

I am not ignorant how little I herein consult my own reputation when I knowingly let it go with a fault so apt to disgust the most judicious who are always the nicest readers. But they who know sloth is apt to content itself with any excuse will pardon me if mine has prevailed on me where I think I have a very good one. I will not therefore allege in my defence that the same notion having different respects may be convenient or necessary to prove or illustrate several parts of the same discourse and that so it has happened in many parts of this but saying that I shall frankly avow that I have sometimes dwelt long upon the same argument and expressed it different ways with a quite different design. I pretend not to publish this *Essay* for the information of men of large thoughts and quick apprehensions to such masters of knowledge I profess myself a scholar and therefore learn them beforehand not to expect anything here but what being spun out of my own coarse thoughts is fitted to men of my own size to whom perhaps it will not be unacceptable that I have taken some pains to make plain and familiar to their thoughts some truths which established prejudice or the abstractedness of the ideas themselves might render difficult. Some objects had need be turned on every side and when the notion is new as I confess some of these are to me or out of the ordinary road as I suspect they will appear to others it is not one simple view of it that will gain it admittance into every understanding or fix it there with a clear and lasting impression. There are few I believe who have not observed in themselves or others that what in one way of proposing is as very obscure an other way of expressing it has made very clear and intelligible though afterwards the mind

found little difference in the phrases and wondered why one failed to be understood more than the other. But everything does not but alike upon every man's imagination. We have our understandings no less different than our palates and he that thinks the same truth shall be equally relished by every one in the same dress, may as well hope to feast every one with the same sort of cookery the meat may be the same and the nourishment good yet every one not be able to receive it with that seasoning and it must be dressed another way if you will have it go down with some even of strong constitutions. The truth is those who advised me to publish it, advised me for this reason to publish it as it is and since I have been brought to let it go abroad I desire it should be understood by whoever gives himself the pains to read it. I have so little affection to be in print that if I were not flattered this *Essay* might be of some use to others as I think it has been to me. I should have confined it to the view of some friends who gave the first occasion to it. My appearing therefore in print being on purpose to be as useful as I may I think it necessary to make what I have to say as easy and intelligible to all sorts of readers as I can. And I had much rather the speculative and quick sighted should complain of my being in some parts tedious than that any one not accustomed to abstract speculations or prepossessed with different notions should mistake or not comprehend my meaning.

It will possibly be censured as a great piece of vanity or insolence in me to pretend to instruct this our knowing age it amounting to little less, when I own that I publish this *Essay* with hopes it may be useful to others. But if it may be permitted to speak freely of those who with a feigned modesty condemn as useless what they themselves write methinks it savours much more of vanity or insolence to publish a book for any other

tends not they should meet with anything of use to themselves or others and should nothing else be found allowable in this Treatise yet my design will not cease to be so and the goodness of my intention ought to be some excuse for the orthlessness of my present. It is that chiefly which secures me from the fear of censure which I expect not to escape more than better writers. Men's principles not only and relishes are so different that it is hard to find a book which pleases or displeases all men. I acknowledge the age

Links in what he says hist. rd chapter 1 (p. 8)
concerning natural nscr pt. n and nat no-
tions. I shall not deny him the privilege he claims
(p. 5.) to say th q est on as h p laces, es-
pecially when he states t so as to l noth g
in t contrary to what I ha e said. For accord-
g to him, innat n t n s been co d t nal
th d pend upon the concurrence of sev-
eral her circums tances ord t th soul
extr t m, all that be a f n m
priv d expressed not n s (fo f nat h
so not in tall) amounts at l t h t th —
th there are ce t n pr posit ns which though
h soul from th beginnin ar when a m n s
born, does not know yet by as sance from the
outward senses, and th h l p f some prev ious
cul ation, t may st nward come certa l to
know th truth f wh h is no more than wh t
I ha e affirmed in my First Book. For I suppose
bv th soul s ering them, h me ns is be-
ginnin t k ow them or be the soul ex rt
in of notions will be t me a vry un il lible
expression nd I th nk t best is vry unfit ne
in this, t mal din m s th ights by in-
suation, as if these n t naws in the mind be
fore th soul exerts them, before they are
known — wh reas truly bef th y are know n
ther is th n f th m n th mind but ca-
p city to know them, h th co cur re ce of
those circumstances, wh h this g ous au-
thor thinks necessary rd t th soul
g th m, brings them t ur kn ledoe
Th m tural

cl de th t e ther my book is pl nly ough
wr it n to be w lth and rs ood by those ho
peruse t w th that attention nd nd crency
w ch evers one who l l e t m s l l th pa ns
to read ough t to empl n read e r l e that
I ha e wr it n n n e so t e u r e l t e r i s n n
to go bout to mend it. Whichever of these be
the truth, it is m self o ly am l l e c t e d t e r e b y
nd th r e f o r e I s a l l b e f a r f r o m t r o u b l g m y
d r t h w a t I t h k r h t b e s a d n a n
s w e t t h o s e s e v e r l b i c e n s I h a e m e t w t h
s w e t t h o s e s e v e r l b i c e n s I h a e m e t w t h

in my doctrine when I find my usefulness both to be well understood.

m d r stume n so dl or il nature d a
 ploym t smune astolessenth satisf ct on any
 ch a hums lf org es to thers, in so hasty
 a conutat n of what I ha e wr it n.

The book is preparing for the Fourth Edition. I am not sure if I should think it. When I think about it, I should think it. When I think about it, I should think it.

th m Wh h has pla ed t himself th
rs what he means b tl soul t i gunn t
t ns, or th ir er h msel es and what
tha p evous ur t u d circumstances' n
ord t th ir bein ed ar —h ill I sup-
pose find th issol til fco tr xrsv bet e n
hum and m th pos t bat that h alls
that ex tne fno ns wh h more ul
gar tyl all k in th t l h reas t
lunk h brou ht m name ths occa t
nly out f th pl asure h has t peak cally f
me wh h l m stgr t f ll kn l dg ll has
d everywhere h m t ns m tw thout
conf rrin m me as som th rs h e d a
ut l h e ght to.

Th ma y f h s, th t I
think justice to my re d and my lft con

Cl e r d d t r a c t l a s a r e t r m s w h i c h t h g h
 f m i l a r d f e q u i m n s m o u t h s I h
 r e a s o n t h i n k v e r y o w h y u s e s d o e s n o t p e r
 f e c t l y u d r i s t a d A n d p o s s i b l y u s b u t h r e a n d
 t h r e w h g a v e s h i m s e l f t h e t r o u b l e t o c o
 d t h m s o f a r a s t l o w h a t h h u m s l f
 t h r s p e c i e s l y m n b t h m I h a t e t h r e f o r e
 m o s p l c e s c h o s e t p u t d e r r e t o r d e r
 m e d t c d f l d e i n a c t a s m o r e l i k l y
 t d a r e t m n t h h u s t m y m e g i t h
 m t t e r B y t h o s d o m t i s l m n s o c
 b y t t h m d a d q u t l y d t
 m a e d s u h a s t s t h r e e n a n d p e r c e d
 t b e T h u s I t h i n k m y s i f l y b e c a l l d a d t e r
 m u t d t r m d d a w h n s u h a s t s t
 a n y t u m b y t e l t h m u n d d s o d t
 I m e d t h t e s n e d d w t h t e
 t n d t m e d t n a m a r t i c l e s o d

seek¹ and that will always be welcome to me when or from whencesoever it comes

But what forwardness soever I have to resign any opinion I have or to recede from anything I have writ upon the first evidence of any error in it yet this I must own that I have not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions I have met with in print against any part of my book nor have from anything that has been urged against it found reason to alter my sense in any of the points that have been questioned Whether the subject I have in hand requires often more thought and attention than cursory readers at least such as are prepossessed are willing to allow or whether any obscurity in my expressions casts a cloud over it and these notions are made difficult to others apprehensions in my way of treating them so it is that my meaning I find is often mistaken and I have not the good luck to be everywhere rightly understood

Of this the ingenious author of the *Discourse Concerning the Nature of Man* has given me a late instance to mention no other For the civility of his expressions and the candour that belongs to his order forbade me to think that he would have closed his Preface with an insinuation as if in what I had said Book II ch xxvii concerning the third rule which men refer their actions to I went about to make virtue vice and vice virtue unless he had mistaken my meaning which he could not have done if he had given himself the trouble to consider what the argument was as I was then upon and what was the chief design of that chapter plainly enough set down in the fourth section and those following For I was there not laying down moral rules but showing the original and nature of moral ideas and enumerating the rules men make use of in moral relations whether these rules were true or false and pursuant thereto I tell what is everywhere called virtue and vice which alters not the nature of things though men generally do judge of and denominate their actions according to the esteem and fashion of the place and sect they are of

If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I had said Bk I ch ii sect 18 and Bk II ch xxviii sects 13 14 15 and 20 he would have known what I think of the eternal and unalterable nature of right and wrong and what I call virtue and vice And if he had observed that in the place he quotes I only report as a matter of fact what others call virtue and vice he would not have found it liable to any great exception For I think I am not much out in saying that one of

¹ See Bk I ch iii § 23 Bk IV h v xi § 1

the rules made use of in the world for a ground or measure of a moral relation is—that esteem and reputation which several sorts of actions find variously in the several societies of men according to which they are there called virtues or vices And whatever authority the learned Mr Lowde places in his *Old English Dictionary* I dare say it nowhere tells him (if I should appeal to it) that the same action is not in credit called and counted a virtue in one place which being in disrepute passes for and under the name of vice in another The taking notice that men bestow the names of virtue and vice according to this rule of Reputation is all I have done or can be laid to my charge to have done towards the making vice virtue or virtue vice But the good man does well and as becomes his calling to be watchful in such points and to take the alarm even at expressions which standing alone by themselves might sound ill and be suspected

This to this zeal allowable in his function that I forgive him saying as he does these words of mine (ch xxviii sect 11) Even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not feared to appeal to common repute Philip iv 8 without taking notice of those immediately preceding which introduce them and run thus Whereby even in the corruption of manners the true boundaries of the law of nature which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice were pretty well preserved So that even the exhortations of inspired teachers &c By which words and the rest of that section it is plain that I brought that passage of St Paul not to prove that the general measure of what men called virtue and vice throughout the world was the reputation and fashion of each particular society with itself but to show that though it were so yet for reasons I there give men in that way of denominating their actions did not for the most part much stray from the Law of Nature which stands and unalterable rule by which they ought to judge of the moral rectitude and gravity of their actions and accordingly denominate them virtues or vices Had Mr Lowde considered this he would have found it little to his purpose to have quoted this passage in a sense I used it not as I could imagine have spared the application he subjects to it as not very necessary But I hope this Second Edition will give him satisfaction on the point and that this matter is now so expressed as to show him there was no cause for scruple

Though I am forced to differ from him in these apprehensions he has expressed in the latter end of his preface concerning what I had said about virtue and vice yet we are better agreed than he

which is to be steadily the sign of that very same object of the mind or determinate idea

To sum

determine

that is

it is in its view or perceives in itself when that idea is said to be in it by *determined* when applied to a complex idea I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas joined in such a proportion and situation as the mind has before its view and sees in itself when that idea is present in it or should be present in it when a man gives a name to it I say *should* be because it is not every one nor perhaps any one who is so careful of his language as to use no word till he views in his mind the precise determined idea which he resolves to make it the sign of The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses

I know there are not words enough in any language to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings But this hinders not but

he may have it

he makes it fit

keep it steadily annexed during that present discourse Where he does not or cannot do this he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas it is plain his are not so and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion

in his reasoning

that is in such distinct and where men have got

such determined ideas of all that they reason inquire or argue about they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end the greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words or (which is the same) indetermined ideas which they are made to stand for I have made choice of these terms to signify (1) Some immediate object of the mind which it perceives and has before it distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it (2) That this idea thus determined is which the mind has in itself and knows and sees there be determined without any change to that name and that name determined

men

ies an

far th

avoid

wranglings they have with others

Besides this the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new the one of the *Association of Ideas* the other of *Enthusiasm*. These with some other larger additions never before printed he has engaged to print by themselves after the same manner and for the same purpose as was done when this *Essay* had the second impression

In the Sixth Edition there is very little added or altered The greatest part of what is new is contained in the twenty first chapter of the second book which any one if he thinks it worth while may with a very little labour transcribe into the margin of the former edition

So in Beckley's *Preface* Introductory 18-23.

cause some things are not to be understood. It is of great use to the sailor to know the length of his line, though he cannot tell if it be all the depth of the ocean. It is well he knows that it is long enough to reach the bottom, in such places as are necessary to direct his voyage and caution him against running upon shoals that may ruin him. Our business here is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct. If we can find out those measures, hereby a rational creature, put in that station which man

der that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to confuse and increase their doubts, and to confirm them in a perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance of the one and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage in the other.

our knowledge.

7 *Observe of this Essay* This was that which gave the first rise to this Essay concerning the understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was to try to run into was, to take a survey of our own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in this sort of satisfaction is no quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of Being as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understandings, wherein there was nothing except from accidents, or that escaped to comprehension. Thus men, extending their inquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, this is no won-

8. *What the words for* Thus much I thought necessary to say concerning the occasion of this inquiry into human understanding. But, before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in this preface beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word *idea* which he will find in this following treatise. It being that term which, I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when man thinks, I have used it to express whatever is meant by *phenomenon*, *notion*, *form*, or whatever it is which the mind employs about its knowledge, and I could not avoid frequently using it.

— as it has easily created me, that

come into the mind.

BOOK I Neither Principles nor Ideas Are Innate

Chap I *An Idea of the Principles*

The way here to it is not made by any knowledge of it, for it is not made by an established opinion amongst some men, that there are the understanding certain *ideas* from some primary causes, and that these characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince a prejudiced reader of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I

hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how man, barely by the use of the natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions and may arrive at certainty about any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any man will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose that as if colours innate in creatures to whom God hath given sight, and power to see them by the eyes from external objects and no less unreasonable would it be to suppose that all truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, which we may observe in ourselves, are fitted to be taken as any and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because man is not permitted without cause to follow his own thoughts in the search

Cl. Lock *Philosophy* to Gulliver's Travels, p. 69 also Ed. N. Cl. 1711.

Cl. H. u. 1. 3. Descartes *Meditations on First Principles* of Philosophy, p. 43. below

ideas notions or whatever else you please to call them which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind and the ways where by the understanding comes to be furnished with them ¹

Secondly I shall endeavour to show what *known* the understanding hath by those ideas and the certainty evidence and extent of it ²

Thirdly I shall make some inquiry into the nature and grounds of *faith* or *opinion* whereby I mean that assent which we give to any proposition as true of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge And here we shall have occasion to examine the reasons and degrees of *assent* ³

4 *Useful to know the extent of our comprehension*
If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof how far they reach to what things they are in any degree proportionate and where they fail us I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities We should not then perhaps be so forward out of an affectation of an universal knowledge to raise questions and perplex ourselves and others with disputes about things to which our understandings are not suited and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions or where of (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view how far it has faculties to attain certainty and in what cases it can only judge and guess we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state

5 *Our capacity suited to our state and concerns* For though the comprehension of our understand-

to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them since he hath given them (as St. Peter says) πάντα πρὸς ζῶην κατεσκευασμένα *hath soever is necessary for the conveniences of life and information of virtue and has put within the reach of their discovery the comfortable provision for this life and the way that leads to a better* How short soever their knowledge may come of an universal or perfect comprehension of whatsoever is it yet secures their great concerns that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker and the sight of their own duties Men may find matter sufficient to busy their heads and employ their hands with variety delight and satisfaction if they will not boldly quarrel with their own constitution and throw away the blessings their hands are filled with because they are not big enough to grasp everything We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us for of that they are very capable And it will be an unpardonable as well as childish peevishness if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it It will be no excuse to an idle and untoward servant who could not attend his business by candle light to plead that he had not broad sunshine The Candle that is set up in us shines bright enough for all our purposes The discoveries we can make with this ought to satisfy us and we shall then use our understandings right when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to our faculties and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed to us and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration and demand certainty where probability only is to be had and which is sufficient to govern all our concerns If we will disbelieve everything because we cannot certainly know all things we shall do much what as wisely as he who could not use his legs but sit still and perish because he had no wings to fly

6 *Knowledge of our capacity a cure of scepticism and idleness* When we know our own strength we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of success and when we have well surveyed the powers of our own minds and made

¹ The subject of the Book II and negatively of the Ist

² The basis and boundary of human knowledge or absolute certainty is examined in the first thirteen chapters of the Book IV

Assent consists in degrees of probability from moral certainty down to the faintest presumption is considered in the fourteenth and following chapters of the Book IV

knowing anything nor on the other side questioning everything and disclaim all knowledge be

stood. So that to be understood and to be understood to be in the mind and ever to be perceived is all that I say a thing is and is that the mind understands. If therefore these two propositions, "Whosoever is, is, and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be" are by our impetuous children cannot be granted of them infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to them.

6 *That men know them when they come to the use of reason answer d* To do this, it is usually answered that all men know and assent to them when they come to the use of reason and thus is enough to prove them not. I answer

7 Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification for clear reasons to those who being prepossessed take of the present exam in even what they themselves say. For I reply this answer with any further belief sense to our present purpose it must only consist of these two things the that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed notions in their notions come to be known and observed by them or else that the use and rise of reason, assists them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly make them known to them.

8 *If reason discover them that would not prove them not* If they mean that by the use of reason men may discover these principles and that this is sufficient to prove them not, then it may be argued will stand thus, that they have

1 *discovered* it is discovered
usually
natural
notions
asson
minded

undiscovered, as I have said we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be natural. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason or that we raise the roof to make the understanding see that so generally granted and cannot be in the understanding before to be perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say that the use of reason discovers to man that he knew before and if men have those innate impressed truths originally and before the use of reason and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is needless to say that men know and know them not at the same time.

2 *It is made for a reason the discovery of them* It will here perhaps be said that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are true in themselves are as tested as soon as proposed while they are distinguished from the maxims and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposition more particularly by and by. I shall here only and therefore I will allow that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in the different that the other have need of reason so as to give proof to make them out and to gain our assent but the other as soon as understood are without any further reason granted and assented to. But I will that begin to observe that they open the weakness of this subterfuge which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths since it must be confessed that their discovery there is in us made for a reason. I tell And I think those who give the answer will not be far and to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim, That

is in the nature of things to be and to

being all discoveries made by the use of reason and truths that are natural or may certainly come to know if properly his thoughts rightly that way

~ ~ ~ P how

casting about and quires parts as a piece of it. And how can it be any further be supposed that what was imprinted by nature as it found in the mind of us should be the use of reason to discover it.

mind some truths, discovered in the nature, that is inserted into, or the use of reason but faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of

of truth when they lead him ever so little out of the common road I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion as an excuse for my mistake if I be in one which I leave to be considered by those who with me dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it

General assent the great argument There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain principles both speculative and practical (for they speak of both) universally agreed upon by all mankind which therefore they argue must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their beings and in them as necessary their inhere

3 *Universal consent proves nothing innate* This argument drawn from universal consent has this misfortune in it that if it were true in matter of fact that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed it would not prove them innate if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement in the things they do consent in which I presume may be done

4 *What is is and It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be not universal* But consequence principle demonstration that there are none such because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent I shall begin with the speculative and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration Whatsoever is is and It is impossible for the same thing to be

I think these have been universally received that it is all no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it But yet I take liberty to say that these propositions are so far from having an universal

assent or thought of them And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths it seeming to me near a contradiction to say that there are truths im

printed on the soul which it perceives or understands not imprinting if it signify anything being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it seems to me hardly intelligible If therefore child

there are no such impressions For if they are not notions naturally imprinted how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted how can they be unknown? To say a notion imprinted on the mind and yet at the same time to say that the mind is ignorant of it and never yet took notice of it is to make this impression nothing No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew which it is never yet conscious of For if any one may then by the same reason all propositions that are true and the mind is capable ever of assenting to may be said to be in the mind and to be imprinted since if any one can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew it must be only because it is capable of knowing it and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know Nay thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did nor ever shall know for a man may live long and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind is capable of knowing and that with certainty So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for all the truths a man ever comes to know will by this account be every one of them innate and this great point will amount to no more but only to a very improper way of speaking which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary says nothing different from those who deny innate principles For nobody I think ever denied that the mind is capable of knowing several truths The capacity they say is innate the knowledge acquired But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original they must all be innate or all accidental in what shall a man go about to distinguish them? He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived and is yet wholly ignorant of For if these words to be in the understanding have any propriety they signify to be under

¹ Cf. *The Letter to Stillingfleet* p. 264, 286

34 Cf. Bk. IV. ch. vii.

to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language the minds box, which to exercise is divine satisfaction. And the use of reason becomes daily more active as these materials that give it employment increase. But though the habit of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind, but in what they show them not to be innate. For we will observe we shall find it still to be about ideas, not words, but acquired, as being about those first which are imprinted by external causes, in which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. I ideas thus got, the mind discovers the some more and others different, probably as soon as it has an use of memory as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words or comes to that which we commonly call the use of reason. For a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (e. g. that sweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are no the same thing.

6. There is no need of words to be learned or known clear and distinct ideas, which are terms innate and not in any sense. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea frequently, and then, upon explanation, perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate or that ever was his assent, which will then because he was used the use of reason, but the truth appears him as soon as he has settled in his mind the ideas and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of this proposition upon the same grounds, and by the same means, that he knew before that rod and chert are not the same thing, and upon the same grounds also that by men come to know afterwards "That is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, as shall be more fully shown hereafter. So that the latter is before any one comes to have those general ideas, how which those maxims are, or to know the ratification of those general terms that stand

In Bk. IV. ch. ii. § and ch. vii. § 9.

for them, or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for, the latter also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims — whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more natural than those of a cat or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them, and then he will be in capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas as in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that man knows that eight and sixteen are equal to twenty-four, by the same self-evident that he knows one and two to be equal to three, yet a child knows this not so soon as the other, not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas of the words eight, sixteen, and twenty-four stand for are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one, two, and three.

Therefore, as soon as first and second words are joined, as soon as first and second words are joined, therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those surmises innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood, and being all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that never doubts again.

8. If any man assent to such a maxim as that one and two are equal to three, that seven times nine is sixty-three, and hundred and fifty is five times thirty, and demand whether read assent to any proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be certain mark of an innate principle. If he be not such general assent is in no way proved as a proof of them, if it be said that is mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate, which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the same ground, of assent at first hearing and understanding the

CL Bk. IV. ch. vii.

them as we shall see hereafter Reason therefore having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims if by saying that men know and assent to them when they come to the use of reason be meant that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims it is utterly false and were it true would prove them not to be innate

1 The coming to the use of reason not the time we come to know these maxims If by knowing and assenting to them when we come to the use of reason be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind and that as soon as children come to the use of reason they come also to know and assent to these maxims this also is false and frivolous First it is false because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery How many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be" And a great part of illiterate people

1 When they come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths which are thought innate till they come to the use of reason and I add nor then neither which is so because till after they come to the use of reason those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind about which those general maxims are which are mistaken for innate principles but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same way and discovered by the same steps as several other propositions which nobody is ever so extravagant as to suppose innate This I hope to make plain by the following discourse to the use of reason but deny that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery

13 By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths In the mean time it is observable that this saying that men know and assent to these maxims when they come to the use of reason amounts in reality of fact to no more but this—that they are never known nor taken notice of before the use of reason but may possibly be assented to some time after during a man's

life but when is uncertain And so may all other knowable truths as well as these which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from others by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason nor are thereby proved to be innate but quite the contrary

14 If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery it would not prove them innate But secondly were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were when men come to the use of reason neither could that prove them innate This way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false For by that kind of logic it will appear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution because it comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind which has quite a distinct province begins to exert itself And therefore the coming to the use of speech if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to which may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the use of reason would be as good a proof that they were innate as to say they are innate because men assent to them when they come to the use of reason I agree then with these men of innate principles that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind till it comes to the exercise of reason but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of and if that were the precise time I deny that it could prove them innate All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition that men assent to them when they come to the use of reason is no more but this—that the making of general abstract ideas and the understanding of general names being a concomitant of the rational faculty and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them till having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas they are by their ordinary discourses and actions with others acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation If assenting to these maxims when men come to the use of reason can be true in any other sense I desire it may be shown or at least shown in this or any other sense it proves them innate

15 The steps by which the mind attains to certain truths The senses at first let in particular ideas and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them they are lodged in the memory and names got

1 Cf Hum. L. qu. y p 457 fn bcl w

print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better as he has been thus taught than can be did before. Wherein it will follow that these printed letters be made more evident to us by letters than nature has made them by impression which will agree with the opinion of most philosophers, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, but men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed; but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know propositions which he knew no before and which from thenceforth he never questions no because was taught but because the consideration of the nature of the ideas contained in these words would not suffer him to think otherwise how or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first bearing, and understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into general rule must be innate. When yet it is certain that no all, but only savanious heads, felt at first on these matters to us, and reduce them into general propositions that innate but collected from preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These when observing men have made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them, cannot refuse their assent to.

22. For many years before printing, men used to be taught the first principles of geometry, and it was said that they understood them as if they had innate knowledge of these principles, but not so much before this first bearing (as we must observe) that they are in the understanding before they are known. It will be hard to conceive what is meant by principles implanted in the understanding, implicitly unless the understanding is the mind is capable of understanding and assenting from to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles must be received as native impressions on the mind which I fear they will scarce allow them to be who find it harder to demonstrate proposition than assent to when they are contrived. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe that all the diagrams they have drawn were by compasses (those last characters which are had engraved upon their minds.

3. The error of assenting on first bearing as

There
in the foregoing
there
which
assent
right, nor
ment or
under

standing of the terms. Under which it seems to me to lie this fallacy that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything & yet when in truth they are taught, and do learn something, they were ignorant of before. For first, then have learned the terms, is born know about

which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but not understood. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first bearing the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for being, neither of them innate. I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were the of them were by the got down as names, and from their appropriated connection one with another and then to propositions made in such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our dear when put together is expressed, we at first having assent though to their propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For though a child quickly assents to this proposition, "That an apple is not fire," when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted

for the same time, to be and not to be" because that though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more far-t, comprehensive and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with, is longer before he learns their precise meaning and requires more time plain to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done you will in vain endeavour to make an child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms but as soon

terms that men would have those maxims pass for innate they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate and thus that one and two are equal to three that two and two are equal to four and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms must have a place amongst these innate axioms Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone and propositions made about several of them but even natural philosophy and all the other sciences afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood That two bodies cannot be in the same place is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be that white is not black that a square is not a circle that bitterness is not sweetness These and a million of such other propositions as many at least as we have distinct ideas of every man in his wits at first hearing and knowing what the names stand for must necessarily assent to If these men will be true to their own rule and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to be a mark of innate they must allow not only as many innate propositions as men have distinct ideas but as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denoted one of another Since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be or that which is the foundation of it and is the easier understood of the two The same is not different by which account they all have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other But since no proposition can be innate unless the ideas about which it is be innate this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours sounds tastes figures &c. innate than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience ² Universal and ready

more particular self-evident propositions which are assented to at first hearing as that one and two are equal to three that green is not red &c. are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles since any one who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding will certainly find that these and the like less general propositions are certainly known and firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims and so being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing

o *One and one equal to Two &c. not general nor useful answered* If it be said that these propositions viz two and two are equal to four red is not blue &c. are not general maxims nor of any great use I answer that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing and understanding For if that be the certain mark of innate whatever proposition can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard and understood that must be admitted for an innate proposition as well as this maxim

That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be they being upon this ground equal And as to the difference of being more general that makes this maxim more remote from being innate those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing understanding And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered ⁴

21 *These maxims though known sometimes till proposed proves them not innate* But we have not yet done with assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms It is fit we first take notice that this instead of being a mark that they are innate is a proof of the contrary since it supposes that several who understand and know other things are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others For if they were innate what need they be proposed or deriving assent when by being in the understanding by a natural and original impression (if there were any such) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them

See Bk IV ch vii.

was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate

19 *Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims* Nor let it be said that those

Cf h u § 20

Cf Hum Engu y p 457 fn 1 bel w

Cf Bk IV ch ii § 1 &

CHAP II

MAXIMS we are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and great part of mankind, ^{heretics}

and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that sort of conversation or learning where disputes are frequent these maxims being led to artificial argumentation and useful for conversation, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth or advancement of knowledge. But of this small use for the improvement of knowledge I shall have occasion to speak more at large § 4. c. 7

§ 8 *Refrutal on.* I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration. And probably it will hardly go down with anybody that is hating I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice and forbearance I assure till I have been heard out in the sequel of this Discourse being every willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own notions which I confess we are all apt to be when application and study have warmed our heads with them.

Upon the whole matter I cannot see any ground to think these two speculative Maxims innate since they are not universally assented to and the use they so generally find is no other than what several propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake now with them and since the assent that is given them is produced another way and comes not from natural inscription, as I do but not but to make appear in the following Discourse And if these first principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other speculative maxims can (I suppose) with better suit pretend to be so.

Chap II *Of Innate Practical Principles*

§ 1 *Moral principles so called and so generally conceived as former ones speculative maxims* If those speculative Maxims, whereof we discoursed in the foregoing chapter have not an eternal universal assent from all mankind, as we there proved it is much more visible concerning practical Principles, that they come short of an universal reception and I think it will be hard to instance an moral rule which can pretend to so general and ready an assent as, What is, is or to be so manifest a truth as this, that "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be." Whereby it is evident that they are further removed from innate and the doubt of their being native impressions on the mind is stronger against those moral principles than the doubt that their truth shall in question. They are equally true, though not equally evident. Those speculative maxims carry their

nature thou hast into new moulds not yet producing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there one might reasonably imagine that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one's view as it is certain that those of children do. It might very well be expected that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals which be stamped immediately on the soul, (as these men suppose) can have no dependence on the constitution or organs of the body the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles, that all these native beams of light (were there any such) should, in those who have no reserves, in arts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and I value us no more doubt of their being there than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But alas, among children, idiots, savages, and the gross illiterate, what general maxims are to be found. What universal principles of knowledge. Their notions are few and narrow borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made powerful impressions the frequent and strong impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and best deserves

these abstract maxims and purified principles of science will, if he find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the histories of India in which less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools

as ever he has got those ideas and learned their names he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propositions and with both for the same reason viz because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind to such propositions how ever evidently true or false in themselves he affords neither assent nor dissent but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds any further than they are signs of our ideas we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we have but no further than that But the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds and the grounds of several degrees of assent being the business of the following Discourse it may suffice to have only touched on it here as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles

24 *Not innate because not universally assented to* To conclude this argument of universal consent I agree with these defenders of innate principles—that if they are innate they must needs have universal assent For that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time But then by these men's own confession they cannot be innate since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms nor by a great part of those who do understand them but have yet never

stroy universal assent and thereby show these propositions not to be innate if children alone were ignorant of them

5 *These maxims not the first known* But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants which are unknown to us and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before they express it I say next that these two general propositions are not the truths that first possess the minds of children nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions which if they were innate they must needs be Whether we can determine or no it matters not there is certainly a time when children begin to think and their words and actions do assure us that they do so When therefore they are capable of thought of knowledge of assent can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted were there any

such? Can it be imagined with any appearance of reason that they perceive the impressions from things without and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being and imprinted there in indelible characters to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose or at least to write very ill since its characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well and those

doubted knowledge of several other things may be had The child certainly knows that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with nor the blackmoor it is afraid of that the vorseed or mustard it refuses is not the apple or sugar it cries for this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of but will any one say it is by virtue of this principle That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age wherein yet it is plain it knows a great many other truths?

thou hast to have more passion and zeal for his opinion but less sincerity and truth than one of that age

6 *And so not innate* Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent as soon as proposed to men grown up who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas and names stand new for them yet they not being to be found in those of tender years I do nevertheless know other things they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons and so by no means can be supposed innate—it being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there ever any such) should be unknown at least to any one who knows anything else Since if they are innate truths they must be innate thoughts there being nothing a truth in itself and that it has never thought on Whence it is evident if there be any innate truths they must necessarily be

impos. bl f r the s m thing to be and not t
be It carr esu on al hta die d nec th t
and eeds ooth p oof h that u d r stands
" t t t fo u on n tak or is

h sees m n n the dark, has in his hand re
ards nd pun shu nes a d pow ough to
call t count the proudest off der For God
ha g byan ns parabl conuio jo ned r
th a d made the

soo s a h ard and u d r s oouy u.

ase red to as an u q t n bl truth which
ma ca by m ns d bi f So th t th
truth f all these mo ai rules pl nly d pe ds
po som th t ed t t th m d from
h h they mus be d duc d h ch ould n t be
d th they m so much as self-e
d t.

3. *Interloc.* k p n omp t That m n h uld
keep th ir comp is is tainly a gr t d
d m bl rul um al ty B t y t fa Chris an
wh has th v w shapp ss d mus rv in an
other lif be asked why man must k p his
ord h w ll gr this as aso —Because
God, wh has th power f rnal lif a d d th,
equu m t sus. B f H bost be asked why

natur d th ruse

6. I sue g r r lly pp d not b ans i
but b ans pr flact li naturally flow a th
gr t ar n f p ns on certun m al rules
wh char t be fous d m gm eco d t
th d f so as sh pp ess they ha p os-
pect f p pose th ms l which could
no be f pr cal p pl e d
imp ed vrms d muned t ly by th ha d
f God lgr th us f God many
wa manif t d th bed e e hms
so ongruous t th light f as that gr t
part f mank d gr t um ye th f f
tu bu y t i th k t must be allowed that se
al mo al rul may ecc f m mank d
er g f ppr hatu w thou h ll ow
g dnu ing th tru gr und f mo al ty
which can nly be th w ll d l w f God

be sale n
f om th m l nd et n l bl gst on wh ch
these rules de dy ha yet t shows th t th
outward ck wledom n me p y to th m in
th words p n t that they re nate pr n
h as that m n

prof as o s d pp hatu n o l t e w use
n ns suffc dv prove that th y ry i tle c
d t th Lawg er th t p escr bed thes rules
n e th h l l that h has dai d f r the pu h
me t f those that tr nser as th m.

7. *M* act as concave us that th rule f r t
is not then ntern l principl F f w will n t in
ca l ty allow too much cer ty t th p les
s na f most n but think th ur cu ns to be
the t p t f th ir thoughts we sh ll fi d
that they ha e n ch t al e t on f
these rules so full persuas of th ur ce
tainty and bl gau n. Th gr t p eple f
m rality To d as w uld be d e to as
m comm ded than p used But the bre ch
f this rul ca t be gr t r ce than to
t ch the s, th t t no moral rule n r bl ga
t cy uld be th he mad ex, and co trary
t that nt um n ce fi et h n th yb r h
t th anel x. F hap nse ne w ll be urged as
check us f r such be ches d so the t r
nal bl cat and tablishme t f the rul be
pres r d

8. *E* nce no p f f y t m al rul T
which I w e th t i d be t b t th ut
be wr n n th ur h arts many m n may
by th sam w y that th com t th kn w
ledg f th th ex, com to assent t m e al
m ral rul s, and be co ced f th bl g
tu n. Oth also may e m to be f th sam
me d from th d cat company and cus-
t ms f th ur country which persuas how

own evidence with them but moral principles require reasoning and discourse and some exercise of the mind to discover the certainty of their truth They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind which if any such were they must needs be visible by themselves and by their own light be certain and known to everybody But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones because it is not so evident as the whole is bigger than a part nor so apt to be assented to at first hearing It may suffice that these moral rules are capable of demonstration and therefore are our own faults if we come not to a certain knowledge of them But the ignorance wherein many men are of them and the slowness of assent where with others receive them are manifest proofs that they are not innate and such as offer themselves to their view without searching

2 *Faith and justice not owned as principles by all men* Whether there be any such moral principles wherein all men do agree I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys Where is that practical truth that is universally received without doubt or question as it must be if innate? Justice and keeping of contracts is that which most men seem to agree in This is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves and the confederacies of the greatest villains and they who have gone furthest towards the putting off of humanity itself keep faith and rules of justice one with another I

of convenience with in the same communities but it is impossible to conceive that he embraces justice as his practical principle who acts fairly with his fellow highwayman and at the same time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with Justice and truth are the common ties of society and therefore even outlaws and robbers who break with all the world besides must keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves or else they cannot hold together But will any one say that those that live by fraud or rapine have innate principles of truth and justice which they allow and assent to?

their minds agrees to what their practice con-

tradicts I answer first I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts But since it is certain that most men's practices and some men's open professions have either questioned or denied these principles it is impossible to establish an universal consent

reasonable to suppose innate practical principles that terminate only in contemplation Practical principles derived from nature are therefore operative and must produce conformity of action not barely speculative assent to their truth or else they are in vain distinguished from speculative maxims Nature I confess has put into man a desire of happiness and an aversion to misery these indeed are innate practical principles which (as practical principles ought) do continue constantly to operate and influence all our actions without ceasing these may be observed in all persons and all ages steady and universal but these are inclinations of the appetite to good not impressions of truth on the understanding I deny not that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men and that from the very first instances of sense and perception there are some things that are grateful and others unelusive to them some things that they incline to and others that they fly but this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind which are to be the principles of knowledge regulating our practice Such natural impressions on the understanding are so far from being confirmed hereby that this is an argument against them since if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding as the principles of knowledge we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us and influence our knowledge as we do those others on the will and appetite which never cease to be the constant springs and motives of all our actions to which we perpetually feel them strongly impelling us

4 *Moral rules need a proof not innate* Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is that I think there is no of any eternal rule before proof of which man may not justly demand reasons which would be perfectly ridiculous and absurd if they were innate or so much as self-evident which every innate principle must needs be and not need any proof to ascertain its truth nor want any reason to gain its approbation He would be thought odd of common sense is asked on the one side or on the other side to give a reason why it is

CHAP II

ment that the rule is not known, because it is broken. I grant the objection good where men though they transgress, yet discern not the law where fear of shame, censure or punishment carries the mark of some awe it has upon them. But it is impossible to conceive that a whole nation of men should all publicly reject and re-

which in their private lives they are not able to be true only to keep themselves in esteem among those who are

know to be such and the one of them apprehend from others all the contempt and abhorrence due to one who professes himself void of humanity and one who, confounding known and natural measures of right and wrong cannot but be looked upon as the professed enemy of their peace and happiness. Whatever practical principle is innate cannot but be known to every one to be just and good. It is therefore less than contradiction to suppose that whole nations of men should both in their professions and practice unanimously and universally give the lie to that, by the most inviolable evidence every one of them know to be true, right, and good. This is enough to satisfy us that no practical rule which is anywhere universally and with public approbation allowed, transgressed, can be supposed innate. But I have something further to add in answer to this objection.

2. The generally acknowledged rule of proof that it is not innate. The breaking of the rule, say you, is no argument that is unknown. I grant it but the general evidence that I anywhere say is proof that it is not innate. For example let us take any of these rules, which, being the most obvious deductions of human reason, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greatest part of men, few people have had the impudence to deny or inconsiderately doubt of. If an can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none I think, can have a surer pretence to be innate than this. Parents, preserve and cherish your children. When, therefore you say this is an innate rule what do you mean. Either that it is an innate principle which upon

all occasions excites and directs the actions fall in or else that it is a truth which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which therefore they know and assent to. But in neither of these senses is it innate. For that it is not a principle which influences all men's actions, has I have proved by the examples before cited nor need we seek so far as Mingrelia or Peru to find instances of such as neglect, abuse and destroy their children or look on them as but more than brutality of some savage and barbarous nations, when we remember that it is a familiar and uncondemned practice among the Greeks and Romans to expose their infants or remove their infants from the world. For Parents preserve your children, is so far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all it being a command, and not proposition and so not capable of truth or falsehood. To make it must be it is a law.

But what if it is, cannot we without a law not law be known or supposed without a lawmaker or without reward and punishment or a reward or a punishment or a punishment of, of a law as usually supposed, of that punishment follows not in this life the breach of this rule and consequently that it has not the force of a law in countries where the general allowed practice runs counter to it, is in itself

ous or think man, much less very one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and distinct and that one of them, which fall there seems most likely to be innate, is not so, (I mean the rule of God) I think, in the next chapter will appear very evident to any sensible man.

13. If we can be shown, first, that it is not innate by itself from the fact that has been said I think we may safely conclude that whatever practical rule is in any place generally and with allowance broken cannot be supposed innate it being impossible that men

if it were innate, to a degree to make it a very Ch. II § 8-7

ever got, will serve to set conscience on work which is nothing else but our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions and if conscience be a proof of innate principles contraries may be innate principles since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid

9 *Instances of enormities practised without remorse*
But I cannot see how any men should ever transgress those moral rules with confidence and serenity were they innate and stamped upon their minds View but an army at the sacking of a town and see what observation or sense of moral principles or what touch of conscience for all the outrages they do Robberies murders rapes are the sports of men set at liberty from punishment and censure Have there not been whole nations and those of the most civilized people amongst whom the exposing their children and leaving them in the fields to perish by want or wild beasts has been the practice as little condemned or scrupled as the begetting them? Do they not still in some countries put them into the same graves with their mothers if they die in childhood or despatch them if a pretended astrologer declares them to have unhappy stars? And are there not places where at a certain age they kill or expose their parents without any remorse at all? In a part of Asia the sick when their case comes to be thought desperate are carried out and laid on the earth before they are dead and left there exposed to wind and weather to perish without assistance or pity¹ It is famous among the Mingrelians a people professing Christianity to bury their children alive without scruple There are places where they eat their own children The Caribbees were wont to geld their children on purpose to fat and eat them And Garcilasso de la Vega tells us of a people in Peru which were wont to fat and eat the children they got on their female

believed they merited paradise and were revenge and eating abundance of the enemies They have

cannot with modesty relate A remarkable passage

Gruber apud Theophrastus part iv p 13

Lambert pud Th ven t p 38

Vossius *Dial. O gene* c 18 19.

P Mart Dec 1

¹ Hist d s Incas l 2 c 11

¹ Lery c. 16 216 231

sage to this purpose out of the voyage of Baumgarten which is a book not every day to be met with I shall set down at large in the language it is published in *Ibi* (scilicet prope Belbes in Ægypto) *vidimus sanctum unum Saracenum inter armarum cumulos ita ut ex utero matris prodiret nudum sedentem Moser ut didicimus Mahometistis ut eos qui a matre et sine ratione sunt pro sanctis colant et venerentur Insuper et eos qui cum d u vitam egerint iniquitissimam voluntariam demum penitenti in et pauperum in sa ciuitate venerandos deputant Ejusmodi vero genus hominum libertatem quandam effrenam habent domos*

vunt ma nos exhibent honores mortuis vero cel templea vel monumenta extruunt amplissima eosque eo li gere ac sepeli e maxima fortuna ducunt loco Aud virum hæc dicta et d cenda per interpretem à Mucro nostro Insuper sanctum illum quem eo loco vidimus p b a tus apprime commendari eum esse hominem sanctum d uum ac i legiti præcipuum eo quod nec fami n rum ungu m esset nec puerorum sed tantummodo asellarum concubitor atque mularum (Pere r Baumgarten l u c i p 73) More of the same kind concerning these precious saints amongst the Turks may be seen in Pietro della Valle in his letter of the 5th of January 1616

Where then are those innate principles of justice piety gratitude equity chastity? Or where is that universal consent that assures us there are such inbred rules? Murders in duels when fashion has made them honourable are committed without remorse of conscience nay in many places innocence in this case is the greatest ignominy And if we look abroad to take a view of men as they are we shall find that they have remorse in one place for doing or omitting that which others in another place think they merit by

10 *Men have no arbitrary principles* He that will carefully peruse the history of mankind and look abroad into the several tribes of men and with indifference survey their actions will be able to satisfy himself that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named or rule of vir

tincts or rules which is not some where or other blighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others

11 *Whole nations reject several moral rules* Here perhaps it will be objected that it is no argu

all bargain to the transgressor Without such a knowledge as this a man can never be certain that anything is his duty Ignorance or doubt of the law hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law maker or the like may make men give way to a present appetite but let any one see the fault and the rod by it and with the transgression a fire ready to burn it.

Case where any duty is imprinted on the mind) and then tell me whether it be possible for people with such a prospect, such a certain knowledge as this wantonly and without scruple to offend against a law which they carry about them in indelible characters and that stares them in the face whilst they are breaking it? Whether men at the same time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an Omnipotent Law maker can with assurance and gaiety slight and trample underfoot his most sacred injunctions? And lastly whether it be possible that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law and supreme Lawgiver all the bystanders yea even the governors and rulers of the people full of the same sense both of the law and Law maker should silently connive without testifying their dislike or laying the least blame on it? Principles of actions indeed there are lodged in men's appetites but these are so far from being innate moral principles that if they were left to their full swing they would carry men to the overturning of all morality Moral laws are set as a curb and restraint to these exorbitant desires which they cannot be but by reward and punishments that will overbalance the satisfaction any one shall propose to himself in the breach of the law If there fore anything be imprinted on the minds of all men as a law all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it For if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate innate principles are insisted on and urged to no purpose truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all secured by them but men are in the same uncertain floating estate with as without them An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment great enough to make the transgression very uneligible must accompany an innate law unless with an innate law they can suppose an innate Gospel too I would not here be mistaken as if because I deny an innate law I thought there were none but positive laws There is a great deal of difference between an innate law

and a law of nature between something imprinted on our minds in their very original and something that we being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of by the use and due application of our natural faculties And I think they equally forsake the truth who run in to contrary extremes either affirm an innate law or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature i.e. without the help of positive revelation.

14 Those who maintain innate practical principles tell us not what they are The difference there is amongst men in their practical principles is so evident that I think I need say no more to evince that it will be impossible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general assent and it is enough to make one suspect that the supposition of such innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure since those who talk so confidently of them are so sparing to tell us which they are This might with justice be expected from those men who lay stress upon this opinion and it gives occasion to distrust either their knowledge or charity who declaring that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge and the rules of living are yet so little favourable to the information of their neighbours or the quiet of mankind as not to point out to them which they are in the variety men are distracted with But in truth there are no such innate principles there would be no need to teach them Did men find such innate propositions stamped on their minds they could easily be able to distinguish them from other truths that they afterwards learned and deduced from them and there would be nothing more easy than to know what and how many they were There could be no more doubt about their number than there is about the number of our fingers and it is so.

But as they cannot blame those who doubt of these innate principles nor even they who require men to believe that there are such innate propositions do not tell us what they are It is easy to foresee that if different men of different sects should go about to give us a list of those innate practical principles

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401
402
403
404
405
406
407
408
409
410
411
412
413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421
422
423
424
425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433
434
435
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451
452
453
454
455
456
457
458
459
460
461
462
463
464
465
466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500
501
502
503
504
505
506
507
508
509
510
511
512
513
514
515
516
517
518
519
520
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
528
529
530
531
532
533
534
535
536
537
538
539
540
541
542
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556
557
558
559
560
561
562
563
564
565
566
567
568
569
570
571
572
573
574
575
576
577
578
579
580
581
582
583
584
585
586
587
588
589
590
591
592
593
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618
619
620
621
622
623
624
625
626
627
628
629
630
631
632
633
634
635
636
637
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668
669
670
671
672
673
674
675
676
677
678
679
680
681
682
683
684
685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724
725
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
737
738
739
740
741
742
743
744
745
746
747
748
749
750
751
752
753
754
755
756
757
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780
781
782
783
784
785
786
787
788
789
790
791
792
793
794
795
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836
837
838
839
840
841
842
843
844
845
846
847
848
849
850
851
852
853
854
855
856
857
858
859
860
861
862
863
864
865
866
867
868
869
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
898
899
900
901
902
903
904
905
906
907
908
909
910
911
912
913
914
915
916
917
918
919
920
921
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948
949
950
951
952
953
954
955
956
957
958
959
960
961
962
963
964
965
966
967
968
969
970
971
972
973
974
975
976
977
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000

1 Cf. Bk. II ch. xxviii, § 47, 8

that, by design freedom to mankind and the
by making men the than bar machines,
they take away not only innate but all moral
necessaries to be

3. Lord Herbert's argument is
I had written thus, be informed that my Lord
Herbert had, in his book *De Veritate* assumed
these innate principles, I presently consulted him,
hoping to find in many of his great parts some-
thing that might satisfy me in this point, and
pertained to my query In his chapter *De I-*
stius natural p. 7 ed 166 I met with these
six marks of his *Vita Commune* — *Prioritas*
2. Idem 3. *Universalitas* 4. *Certitudo* 5.
Veritas as he explains it, *facientia hominum*
consuetudinem 6. *Modus informatio* c. *Assen-*
sus 1. *clero* 1. *mors* And the latter of
his little treatise *De Religione* Laus h. says thus of
these innate principles *Ad ut no unumquodque*
dignum sibi appetitur quod bonum est
in se 2. *p. d. mens* 1. *has d. scripta nullis*
que tradidit natus in scriptis nec in scriptis
sensu p. 3. And *Veritas* 1. *a. holic* *que*
loquuntur ad b. Deum 1. *for tenore d. scripta*
Thus, having given the marks of the innate
principles or common notions, and asserted their
being imprinted in the minds of men by the
hand of God he proceeds to set them down, and
they are these *Esse aliquid et per se ipsum*
Veritas *Judicium boni* 3. *Veritas cum p. t.*
concordiam optimum 4. *concordiam d. veritas* 4. *Re-*
parationem 5. *p. d. his* 3. *Dari primum* 6. *d. p.*
non post hanc transactionem The first I allow
these to be clear truths and such as, if fully
explained, would be clear to all men, and
giving his assent to them I think he is far from
proving them innate impressions for tenore
descript For I must take leave to observe —

6. The first three not more than three
or every First, that these three propositions
are not all, or more than all those im-
pressions which are written on our minds by the
finger of God if it were reasonable to believe any
at all to be so written. Since there are other pro-
positions which, even by his own rules he as
justly pretends to be such an original and may be
as well admitted for innate principles, as I last
some of these five hundred, viz. Do as
thou wouldst be done unto And perhaps some
hundreds of others, when well considered.

17. The fifth mark wants the second, viz. that
all his marks are not to be found in each of his
five propositions, viz. his first, second and third
marks agree perfectly to the first and sixth marks
the first second third fourth and fifth propo-
sitions agree but all to his third fourth and fifth propo-
sitions For besides that we are assured from
history of many men may while nations who
doubt disbelieve some or all of them I can
not see how the third, viz. That virtue joined
with piety is the best worship of God can be an
innate principle while the name or sound itself
is so hard to be understood I believe it is so much
uncertainty as its signification and the thus it
stands for so much contended about and diffi-
cult to be known And the effect of this cannot be
but very uncertain rule of human practice
and serve but very little to the conduct of our
lives, and is therefore very unfit to be assigned
as an innate practical principle

For I thus

most commonly it is, for those nations which
according to the different principles of several
countries are accounted laudable will be a propo-

God—whereas it is the true and only measure of
virtue which virtue is used to signify what is in
its own nature right and good—the third propo-
sition That virtue is the best worship of God

may certainly know to be true without know-
ing what it is that God doth command and so
be as far from any rule or principle of his actions
as he was before And I think very few will take
the proposition which amounts to more than
this, viz. That God is pleased with the doing of
what he himself commands, for an innate moral
principle written in the minds of all men,
(how true and certain it may be) since it
teaches so little Whosoever does so will have
reason to think he directs his position to innate
principles in which are many which have as
good title as this to be esteemed such which
in body, yet even put into that rank of innate
principles.

9. Scarce possible that God should ever reveal

ples in words of uncertain meaning Nor is the fourth proposition (viz Men must repent of their sins) much more instructive till what those actions are that are meant by sins be set down For the word *peccata* or sins being put as it usually is to signify in general all actions that will draw punishment upon the doers what great principle of morality can that be to tell us we should be sorry and cease to do that which will bring mischief upon us without knowing what those particular actions are that will do so? Indeed this is a very true proposition and fit to be in-cated on and received by those who are sup-posed to have been taught *what* actions in all kinds are sins but neither this nor the former can be imagined to be *innate principles* nor to be of any use if they were innate unless the par-ticular measures and bounds of all virtues and vices were engraven in men's minds and were innate principles also which I think is very much to be doubted And therefore I imagine it will scarcely seem possible that God should engrave principles in men's minds in words of uncertain signifi-cation such as *virtues* and *sins* which amongst different men stand for different things nay it cannot be supposed to be in words at all which being in most of these principles very general names cannot be understood but by knowing the particulars comprehended under them And in the practical instances the meas-ures must be taken from the knowledge of the actions themselves and the rules of them—ab-stracted from words and antecedent to the knowl-edge of names which rules a man must know what language soever he chance to learn whether English or Japan or if he should learn no language at all or never should understand the use of words as happens in the case of dumb and deaf men When it shall be made out that men ignorant of words or untaught by the laws and customs of their country know that it is part of the worship of God not to kill another man not to know more women than one not to procure abortion not to expose their children not to take from another what is his though we want it ourselves but on the contrary relieve and supply his wants and whenever we have done the contrary we ought to repent be sorry and resolve to do so no more—when I say all men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these and a thousand other such rules all of which come under these two general words made use of above viz *virtutes et peccata* virtues and sins there will be more reason for admitting these and the like for common notions and prac-tical principles Yet after all universal consent

(were there any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be attained other-wise would scarce prove them to be innate which is all I contend for

20 *Objection innate principles may be corrupt-ed answered* Nor will it be of much moment here to offer that very ready but not very mate-rial answer viz that the innate principles of morality may by education and custom and the general opinion of those amongst whom we converse be darkened and at last quite worn out of the minds of men Which assertion of theirs if true quite takes away the argument of universal consent by which this opinion of in-nate principles is endeavoured to be proved un-less those men will think it reasonable that the private persuasions or that of their party should pass for universal consent—a thing not un-frequently done when men presuming themselves to be the only masters of right reason cast by the votes and opinions of the rest of mankind as not worthy the reckoning And then their argu-ment stands thus—The principles which all mankind allow for true are innate those that men of right reason admit are the principles al-loved by all mankind we and those of our mind are men of reason therefore we agree—

Understand how there be some principles which all men do acknowledge and agree in and yet there are none of those principles which are not by depraved custom and ill education blotted out of the minds of many men which is to say that all men admit but yet many men do deny and dissent from them And indeed the supposi-tion of such first principles will serve us to very little purpose and we shall be as much at a loss with as without them if they may by any hu-man power—such as the will of our teachers or opinions of our companions—be altered or lost in us and notwithstanding all this boast of first principles and innate light we shall be as much in the dark and uncertainly as if there were no such thing at all it being all one to have no rule and one that will warp any way or amongst various and contrary rules not to know which is the right But concerning innate principles I desire these men to say whether they can or cannot by education and custom be blurred and blotted out if they cannot we must find them in all mankind alike and they must be clear in everybody and if they may suffer variation from adventitious notions we must then find them clearest and most perspicuous near

est the fountain, in children and slaterate people who have received least impression from foreign customs. Let them talk which ad they please, they will certainly find it inconsistent with the matter of fact and daily observati n.

Conspicuously Leavelle I still grant
that there are great numbers of opinions which,
by men of different countries, educations, and
tempers, are received and embraced as first and
unquestionable principles man whereof both
for their absurdity as well as oppositions to one
another is impossible should be true. But yet
all those propositions, how remote soever from
reason, are so sacred somewhere or other that
men even of good understanding in their mat-
ters, will sooner part with their lives, and what
ever is dearest to them, than suffer themselves
to doubt, or others to question, the truth of them.

22. *How men commonly come by their faith* !
This, however strange it may seem, is that which every day experience confirms and will not, perhaps, appear so wonderful, if we consider the ways and steps by which it is brought about and how really it may come to pass, that doctrines that have been derived from no better original than the superstition of nurse or the authority of an old woman, may by length of time and consent of neighbours, grow up to the dignity of principles in religion or morality. For such, who are careless (as they call it) to principle children well, (and few there be who have not set of those principles for them, which they believe in,) instil into the unwary and as yet uneducated, understanding (for who paper receives any character,) those doctrines they would have them retain and profess. These believe that as soon as they have any opportunity and still as they grow up confirmed to them, thereby the open profession or tacit consent of all they have to do with or at least by those whose wisdom, knowledge and piety they have an opinion, who never suffer those propositions to be otherwise mentioned but as the basis and foundation on which they build their religion and manners, come by these means, to have the reputation of unquestionable self-evident, and innate truths.

3. Principle is based on the fact that we do not
may add, that when men so unstructed are grown up,
and reflect on their own minds, they cannot
find yth g more ther th n thos
opinions, which were ta ght them be ore their
memory began to keep register f th ir
tions, or date the time when any new thing p-
peared to them and therefore make no scruple

to conclude that those propositions of whose knowledge they can find in themselves no original, were certain the impress of God and nature upon their minds, and not taught them by any one else. These they certainly submit to as many do to their parents, their veneration not because it is natural nor do children do it where they are not so taught but because it is in been always so educated and having no remembrance of the beginning of this respect, they think it is natural.

4. *Hæc sunt præcepta quæ debent haberi* This will appear very lik^e and almost una^voidable to come to pass, if we consider the natur^e of mankind & the nature of human affairs wherein most men cannot live without employing their time in the daily labours of their callings nor be quiet in their minds without some foundation or principle to rest their souls on. There is scarcely any one so floating and superficial in his understanding who hath not some revered propositions, which are to him the

being taught that they ou ht not to examine
there are few to be found who are not exposed
by th ir ignorance, laziness, education or pre
cipitancy to take them for trust

25. For *et passim* This is evidently the case of all children and young folk and custom, a greater power than nature seldom failing to make them worship for divine what they hath insured them to bow their minds and submit their understandings to, it is no wonder that grown men, either perplexed in the necessary affairs of life or hot in the pursuit of pleasures, should sit cross at down to examine their own tenets especially when one of their principles is, that principles ought not to be questioned. And had men leisure parts, and will, who is there almost that dares shake the foundations of all his past thoughts and notions, and endure to bring upon himself the shame that hath been long time who, in mistake and error? Who is there hardy enough to contend with the reproach which is every where prepared for those who dare venture to dissent from the received opinions of the country or party. And where is the man that be found that can patiently prepare himself to bear the name of whimsical, sceptical, or theist which he is sure to meet with, who does in the least scruple any of the common opinions And he will be much more afraid to question those principles

ciples when he shall think them —
do the star
be the rule
And what
sacred whe
thus them the earliest of all his
own thoughts and the most revered by
others?

6 *Aurship of idols* It is easy to imagine how by these means it comes to pass that men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds grow fond of the notions they have been long acquainted with there and stamp the characters of divinity upon absurdities and errors become zealous votaries to bulls and monkeys and contend too fight and die in defence of their opinions *Dum solos credit habendos esse deos quos ipse colit* For since the reasoning faculties of the soul which are almost constantly though not always warily nor wisely employed would not know how to move for want of a foundation and footing in most men who through laziness or avocation do not or for want of time or true helps or for other causes cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge and trace truth to its fountain and original it is natural for them and almost unavoidable to take in —

any other proof themselves Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles never venturing to examine them but accustoming himself to believe them because they are to be believed may take up from his education and the fashions of his country any absurdity for innate principles and by long poring on the same objects so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity and the workmanship of his hands

27 *Principles must be examined* By this progress how many there are who arrive at principles which they believe innate may be easily observed in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men And he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of their principles will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary tenets which are firmly believed confidently asserted and which great numbers are ready at any time

know not what may not be believed or how any one's principles can be questioned If they may and ought to be examined and tried I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters whereby the genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others that so amidst the great variety of pretenders I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this When this is done I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions and till then I may with modesty doubt since I fear universal consent which is the only one produced will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice and assure me of any innate principles

From what has been said I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles wherein all men agree and therefore none innate

Chap. III Other considerations concerning Innate Principles both Speculative and Practical

1 *Principles not innate unless their ideas be innate* Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made they would not perhaps have been so forward to believe they were innate Since if the ideas which made up those truths were not it is as impossible that the propositions made up of them should be innate or our knowledge of them be born with us For if the ideas be not innate there is as a time when the mind is as without those principles and then they will not be innate but be derived from some other original For where the ideas themselves are not there can be no knowledge no as sent no mental or verbal propositions about them

2 *Ideas especially those belonging to principles are born with the mind* If we will attentively consider new-born children we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them Forbating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger and thirst and armth and some pains which they may have felt in the womb the rest is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them especially of ideas concerning the terms which make up those universals as the terms *eternity* *infinity* *nothing* *one* may perceive how by degrees after these ideas come in to their minds and that they get no more nor other than what experience and the observation of things that come in their way furnish them with which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters stamped on the mind

3. *I am my own Liberty* I mean as
It is impossible for the same thing to be and not
to be, is certain (if there be an such) an in-

nat. ¶ are the two different ideas of d. un-
both t

5. *What makes the one man* Nor is it any one
t

na t, they must needs be so. Hath child an
idea of impossibility and de. un. before it has
f. white or black, sweet or bitter. And is t
from t. knowledge of this princip. that t. co-
cures. That wormwood rubbed w. th. suppli-
eth no the same taste that t. used to rece. v
from t. Hence is t. th. actual knowledge of m-
from it. *It is not the same* that makes child
distinguish between m. mother and stran-
or that makes t. fond of th. one and flee the
other. Or does t. mind regulat. itself and as-
sent by id. as that t. never yet had. Or th.
understanding draw conclus. ns from pri. ca-
ples. hich t. ever yet knew or d. rstood.
The names of *innateness* and *idea* stand for two
ideas, so far fr. m. being, innate: or born w. th.
us. That I think t. requires gr. care and t.
rection to form them ri. ht in our understand-
ing. They are m. far from be. g. brought to
the world w. th. us, so remot. from the thoughts
of infancy and childhood, that I beli. v. po-
ssible. t. will be found that many grown
men want them.

4. *Liberty and necessity* If *necessity* (to
stance that also) be. nat. v. impress. and
consequentl. so I ar. and be. out. us that we
must needs know. even from our cradles, I would
gladl. be reso. ved by an. n. of seven, or seven-
ty years old, whether man, being cre. ture
consist. of soul and body, be th. sam. man
when his bod. is changed. Wh. the Euph. bus
and Pythagoras, ha. in had the sam. soul, were
the sam. men, thou. h. they liv. d. several ces.
ar. under. whether th. cock two, which had
the same soul, were no. the same w. th. both. f
them. Wher. by perhaps, t. will ppear that our
id. of *sameness* is t. so settled and cl. ar. as to
deserve to be though. innate in us. For if those
innate ideas ar. no. clear and distinct, so as t.
be univ. rsal. known and naturall. agreed on,
they cannot be subjects of univ. rsal. and
doubted truths, bu. will be th. na. vidabl. oc-
casion of perpetual uncertainty. For I suppose
every one id. f. id. t. v. will not be th. same
that Pythagoras and thousands of his f. flowers
ha. v. And t. ch. the shall be true. Which in
Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxvii.

3. *How can think t. be* when he cons. d. rs
[that] t. d. as t. compreh. nds in t. a. id. and
last

as *solid* ideas, ext. ns. and mbe must be
so too. t. being impossibl. t. ha. v. an. d. a. of a
reason, w. thout ha. ving an. t. all f. th. thing
to hich t. belong, and which t. is founded.
Now wh. ther th. minds of men ha. v. naturall.
imprinted on th. m. the d. as f. ext. ns on and
numbe. I lea. v. t. be cons. d. ed b. those who
are the patrons of innate principles.

7. *Let fear typ not us* That God t. b. v. v. v.
t. p. p. d. is, w. thout doubt, as ere t. truth as any
that can e. ter into th. mind of man. nd de-
serves th. first place amo. g. st. al. practical prin-
ciples. But yet t. can by no means be thought in-
nate, unless th. d. as f. God and v. v. v. are in-
nat. That the d. the t. r. m. worship. t. and for
is not in th. und. rstanding of children, and
charact. stamped th. mind in its first origi-
nal, I think will be. asily granted by an. one
that considers how few there be amo. g. st. grown
men who ha. v. cl. ar. and distinct not. of t.
And I suppose, th. can t. be anyth. v. more
diculous than t. say that childr. n. ha. v. th. s.
practical princip. innate. That God is to be
worshipped. and v. t. that they know n. t. what
that worship of God is, which is t. v. d. ty. But
to pass by th. s.

Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxvii.

Cf. Bk. II. ch. and vii. §

principles which are
do
be told
And

sacred which the minds them the earliest of all his own thoughts and the most revered by others?

26 *A worship of idols* It is easy to imagine how by these means it comes to pass than men worship the idols that have been set up in their minds grow fond of the notions they have been long

of their opinions *Dum solos credit habere deos esse deos quos ipse colit* For since the reasoning faculties of the soul which are almost constantly though not always rarely nor wisely employed could not know how to move for want of a foundation and footing in most men who through laziness or avocation do not or for want of time or true helps or for other causes cannot penetrate into the principles of knowledge and trace truth to its fountain and original it is natural for them and almost unavoidable to take up with some borrowed principles which being reputed and presumed to be the evident proofs of other things are thought not need any other proof themselves Whoever shall receive any of these into his mind and entertain them there with the reverence usually paid to principles never venturing to examine them but accustoming himself to believe them because they are to be believed may take up from his education and the fashions of his country any absurdity for innate principles and by long poring on the same objects so dim his sight as to take monsters lodged in his own brain for the images of the Deity and the workmanship of his hands

7 *Principles must be examined* By this process how many there are who arrive at principles which they believe innate may be easily observed in the variety of opposite principles held and contended for by all sorts and degrees of men And he that shall deny this to be the method wherein most men proceed to the assurance they have of the truth and evidence of the principles will perhaps find it a hard matter any other way to account for the contrary effects which are firmly believed confidently asserted

their own authority without examination I
Cf Bacon *Acum Organum* 3 aph 23

know not what may not be believed or how any one's principles can be questioned If they may and ought to be examined and tried I desire to know how first and innate principles can be tried or at least it is reasonable to demand the marks and characters whereby the genuine innate principles may be distinguished from others that so amidst the great variety of pretenders I may be kept from mistakes in so material a point as this When this is done I shall be ready to embrace such welcome and useful propositions and till then I may with modesty doubt since I fear universal consent which is the only one produced will scarcely prove a sufficient mark to direct my choice and assure me of any innate principles

From what has been said I think it past doubt, that there are no practical principles herein all men agree and therefore none innate

Chap III Other considerations concerning Innate Principles both Speculative and Practical

1 *Principles not innate unless the ideas be innate* Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made they could not perhaps have been so forward to believe they were innate Since if the ideas which made up those truths were not it is as impossible that the propositions made up of them should be innate or our knowledge of them be born with us For if the ideas be not innate there as a time when the mind is without those principles and then they will not be innate but be derived from some other original For where the ideas themselves are not there can be no knowledge no assent no mental or verbal propositions about them

Ideas peculiarly those belonging to principles not born with the child If we attentively consider newly born children we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them For bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger and thirst a dim armchair and some pains which they may have felt in the womb there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them especially of degrees the terms which make up the universal propositions like to estate and principle One may perceive how by degrees afterwards ideas come into their minds and that they get no more nor other than that experience and the observation of things that come in their way furnish them with which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters stamped on the mind

and communication with it, that seems stranger to me, that a whole nation of men should be anywhere found so brutish as to want the notion of God, than that there should be without any notion of numbers, or fire.

o *That if God and id* *if fire* The name of God being once mentioned in any part of the world, to express superior powerful, wise invisible Being, the suitability of such notions to the principles of common reason, and that every man will always have to mention it oft, must necessarily spread far and wide and continue down to all generations though yet the general reception of that name and some imperfect and unsteady notions conveyed thereby to the unlearned part of mankind prove not the idea to be innate but only that they who made the discovery had made right use of their reason, thought maturely of the causes of things, and traced them to their original from whom other less considerate people having once received so important a notion it could not easily be lost again.

Let if God not exist This is all could be learned from the notion of a God, were it to be found universal in all the tribes of mankind, and generally acknowledged, by men grown to maturity in all countries. For the generality of the acknowledging of God, as I imagine, is extended no further than that which, if it be sufficient to prove the idea of God innate, will as well prove the idea of fire innate since I think it may be truly said, that there is no person in the world who has notion of God, who has not also the idea of fire I doubt not but if colonies of young children should be placed in an island where no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such thing, nor name for it, how general a power were received and known in all the world besides and perhaps too their apprehensions would be as far removed from any name, or notion, of God, till some of amongst them had employed his thoughts to inquire into the constitution and causes of light, which would easily lead him to the notion of God which having once taken to themselves, reason, and the natural propensity of their own thoughts, would afterwards propagate, and continue amongst them.

2. *Since it is God's goodness that all men build him an idea of Him, the far naturally imprinted by Him, exercised, led to, that it is just*
to the goodness of God, to imprint upon the minds of men characters and notions of himself, and not to leave them in the dark and doubt in so grand concernment and also, by that

means, to secure to himself the homage and veneration due from so intelligent a creature as man and therefore he has done it.

hath done for men that which is best for them, because it is suitable to his good news so to do, it will prove not only that God has imprinted on the minds of men an idea of himself but that he hath plainly stamped thereon four characters, all that men ought to know of the eye of him all that they ought to do in obedience to his will and that he hath given them a will and affections conformable to it. Thus, no doubt, every one will think better for men, than that they should, in the dark, grope after knowledge as St. Paul tells us all nations did after God (Acts 17. 23) that that their wills should clash with their understandings, and that their appetites cross their duty. The Reasoners say it is best for men, and so suitable to the goodness of God, that there should be an infallible judge of controversies on earth and therefore there is one.

therefore it is best. But it seems to me that too much confidence of our own wisdom to say — I think best and therefore God hath made it so." And in the matter in hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a topic, that God hath done so, when certain experience shows us that he hath not. But the goodness of God hath not been wanting to men, without such original impressions of knowledge or ideas stamped on the mind since he hath furnished man with those faculties which will serve for the sufficient discovery of all things requisite to the end of his being and I doubt not but to show that man, by the right use of his natural abilities, may without innate principles, attain a knowledge of a God, and other things that concern him. God hath endued man with those faculties of knowledge which he hath, was no more obliged by his goodness to plant those innate notions in his mind, than that, having given him reason, hands, and materials, he should build him bridges or houses, — which some people in the world have

8 *Idea of God not innate* If any idea can be imagined innate the idea of God may of all others for many reasons be thought so since it is hard to conceive how there should be innate moral principles without an innate idea of a Deity Without a notion of a law maker it is impossible to have a notion of a law and an obligation to observe it Besides the atheists taken notice of amongst the ancients and left branded upon the records of history hath not navigation discovered in these later ages whole nations at the bay of Soldania in Brazil [in Boranday] and in the Caribbee islands &c amongst whom there was to be found no notion of a God no religion? Nicholaus del Techo in *Literis ex Paraguaria de Caguaram Co versione* has these words *Reperi eam gentem nullum nomen habere quod Deum et hinc namque sic fieri nulla sacra habet nulla idola* These are instances of nations where uncultivated nature has been left to itself without the help of letters and discipline and the improvements of arts and sciences But there are others to be found who have enjoyed these in a very great measure yet for want of a due application of their thoughts this way want the idea and knowledge of God It will I doubt not be a surprise to others as it was to me to find the Siamites of this number But for this let them

than we do of it from others did not the fear of the magistrate's sword or their neighbour's ensurance tie up people's tongues which were the apprehensions of punishment or shame taken away would as openly proclaim their atheism as their lives do?

9 *The name of God not universal or obscure in me* But had all mankind everywhere a notion of a God (whereof yet history tells us the contrary) it would not from thence follow that the idea of him was innate For though no nation were to be found without a name and so no few dark notions of him yet that would not prove them to be natural impressions on the mind no more than the names of fire or the sun heat or number do prove the ideas they stand for to be innate because the names of those things and the ideas of them are so universally received and known amongst mankind Nor on the contrary is the want of such a name or the absence of such a notion out of men's minds any argument against the being of a God any more than it could be a proof that there was no loadstone in the world because a great part of mankind had neither a notion of any such thing nor a name for it or be any show of argument to prove that there are no distinct and various species of angels or intelligent beings above us because we have no ideas of such distinct species or names for them For men being furnished with words by the common language of their own countries can scarce avoid having some kind of ideas of those things whose names those they converse with have occasion frequently to mention to them And if they carry with it the notion of excellency greatness or something extraordinary if apprehension and concernment accompany it if the fear of absolute and irresistible power set it on upon the mind — the idea is likely to sink the deeper and spread the further especially if it be such an idea as is agreeable to the common light of reason and naturally deducible from every part of our knowledge as that of a God For the visible marks of extraordinary wisdom and power appear so plainly in all the works of the creation that a rational creature who will but seriously reflect on them cannot miss the discovery of a Deity And the influence that the discovery of such a Being must necessarily have on the minds of all that have but once heard of

Voyages vol 1 and *Hist. Cultus Sensus* m And perhaps if we should with attention mind the lives and discourses of people not so far off we should have too much reason to fear that many in more civilized countries have no very strong and clear impressions of a Deity upon their minds and that the complaints of atheism made from the pulpit are not without reason And though only some profligate wretches men it too barefacedly no yet perhaps we should hear more

Cf Bk II ch xv § 12 xx § 21 33-36
Bk IV h x
Cf Bk IV ch x
R in Thevenot's *Rel. d. d. V. ges*

Cur ux

Jo de Lery p 16
Ma t n c 321 Terry f y g t the M g l 343
and 225 O ingt n 133 (Ovingt n s f y g t Sur t
in 1689)

La Loubé in *D. R. ysaume de S. m. tom. c. 11*
§ 15 c 20 §§ 4-22 c 22 § 6 and c 23

considerable part of men, making for the greater number took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, which are much better than their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, because all wise men had it, virtue too must be thought innate for that also wise men have always had.

On the other side, the idea of God is not innate. This was evident by the case of all Gentiles. Nor hath even amongst Jews, Christians, and Mahomedans, who acknowledged but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in those nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed so far as to make men to have the same and true ideas of him. How many even amongst us, will be found upon enquiry to fancy him in the shape of man sitting in heaven, and to have many other absurd and untrue conceptions of him. Christians as well as Turks have had who, seeing owning and conceding earnestly for that the Deity was corporeal, and of human shape and those who find few now amongst us who profess themselves Atheists, (though some I have met with that own it) yet I believe he will make it his business to find amongst the ignorant and uneducated Christians many of that opinion. Talk but with country people almost of any age, or young people almost of any condition, and you shall find that, though the name of God be frequent in their mouths, yet the notions they apply the name to are so odd, low and trivial, that nobody can imagine they were his, if by a rational man much less that they were characters written by the finger of God himself. Nor do I see how it derives as more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds furnished with these ideas of himself, than that he hath put us into the world with bodies unclothed and that there is no art or skill born with us. For being fitted with faculties to turn these, it is want of industry and consideration in us, and not of bounty in him, we have them not. I was certain that there is God, as that the opposite angles made by the intersection of two straight lines are equal. There was never any rational creature that ever himself sincerely examined the truth of these propositions that could fail to assent to them though yet by past doubt that there are many men, who, having not mind though it is the way to reason, both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of it extend) an *innate* must, such an one I easily answer but such an universal consent as this proves not the idea of

God, any more than it does the idea of a triangle, innate.

18. If the idea of God be not innate so let us take the second branch. Since then though the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as I think is evident from what has been said. I imagine there will be scarce any other idea found that can pretend to it. Since if God hath set an impression, any character on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it should have been some clear and universal idea of Himself as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive so incomprehensible and infinite an object. But our minds being first void of that idea which we are most concerned to have, it is a strong presumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can observe I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other.

19. I *fantasy* not innate I confess there is another idea which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk as if they had it and that is the idea of *reality* which we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be such as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves but we see, on the contrary, that since by those ways whereby other ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no such idea at all and therefore signify nothing by the word *reality* but only an uncertain supposition of we know not what, i. e. something whereby we have no [particular distinct positive] ideas, which we talk to be the *reality*, or support, of those ideas we do know.

20. I *find* it not innate *reality* as *reality* or *idea*. Whatever then we talk of innate, either speculative or practical, principles, I may with as much probability be said, that a man hath £100 sterling in his pocket, and yet demand that he hath three either penny shining crown, or other coin or of which the sum is to be made up as to talk that certain *figures* are innate when the *lines* by which they are can be no means be supposed to be so. The general reception and assent that is given doth not at all prove, that the ideas expressed in them are innate for in many cases, however the ideas came thence,

See Ek. II. h. III. §§ 7-20 ch. XIII. *First*
 Cf. Lock *Third Letter to Samuel*, pp. 3
 etc.

Cf. Lock *Third Letter* pp. 375, etc. also *First*
Letter pp. 1 et alio the *Letter* Samuel Bold,
 5 May 602.

Cf. *Third Letter to Samuel*, pp.

both cases being that they never employed their parts faculties and powers industriously that way but contented themselves with the opinions fashions and things of their country as they found them without looking any further Had you or I been born at the Bay of Soldania possibly our thoughts and notions had not exceeded those brutish ones of the Hottentots that inhabit there And had the Virginia king Apochancana been educated in England he had been perhaps as knowing a divine and as good a mathematician as any in it the difference between him and a more improved Englishman lying barely in this that the exercise of his faculties was bounded within the ways modes and notions of his own country and never directed to any other or further inquiries And if he had not any idea of a God it was only because he pursued not those thoughts that would have led him to it

13 *Ideas of God various in different men* I grant that if there were any ideas to be found imprinted on the minds of men we have reason to expect it should be the notion of his Maker as a mark God set on his own workmanship to mind man of his dependence and duty and that herein should appear the first instances of human knowledge But how late is it before any such notion is discoverable in children? And when we find it there how much more does it resemble the opinion and notion of the teacher than represent the true God? He that shall observe in children the progress whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have will think that the objects they do first and most familiarly converse with are those that make the first impressions on their understandings nor will he find the least footsteps of any other It is easy to take notice how their thoughts enlarge themselves only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of sensible objects to retain the ideas of them in their memories and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them and several ways put them together How by these means they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a Deity I shall hereafter show

14 *Contrary and inconsistent ideas of God under the same name* Can it be thought that the ideas men have of God are the characters and marks of himself engraven in their minds by his own finger when we see that in the same country under one and the same name men have far different nay often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him? The agreeing in a name or sound will scarce prove an innate notion of him.

¹ See Bk II ch. xxiii. §§ 33 36 Bk IV ch. x.

15 *Gross ideas of God* What true or tolerable notion of a Deity could they have who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? Every deity that they owned above one was an infallible evidence of their ignorance of Him and a proof that they had no true notion of God where unity infinity and eternity were excluded To which if we add their gross conceptions of corporeity expressed in their images and representations of their deities the amours marriages copulations, lusts quarrels and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods we shall have little reason to think that the heathen world the greatest part of mankind had such ideas of God in their minds as he himself out of care that they should not be mistaken about him was author of And this universality of consent, so much argued if it prove any native impressions it will be only this — that God imprinted on the minds of all men speaking the same language a name for himself but not any idea since those people who agreed in the name had at the same time far different apprehensions about the thing signified If they say that the variety of deities or shipped by the heathen world were but figurative ways of expressing the several attributes of that incomprehensible Being or several parts of his providence I answer that they might be in the original I will not here inquire but that they were so in the thoughts of the vulgar I think nobody will affirm And he that will consult the voyage of the Bishop of Beryte c. 13 (not to

††† it consists properly in acknowledging no God at all

16 *Idea of God not innate although wise men of all nations come to have it* If it be said that wise men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the Deity I grant it But then this

First excludes universality of consent in anything but the name for those wise men being very few perhaps one of a thousand this universality is very narrow

Secondly it seems to me plainly to prove that the truest and best notions men have of God were not imprinted but acquired by thought and meditation and a right use of their faculties since the wise and considerate men of the world by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reason attained true notions in this as well as other things whilst the lazy and in

² Cf Bk IV ch. x.

then, appears perfectly new and unknown before and is not in the memory, or in the mind, however it is suggested by the memory, appears not to be new to the mind finds it in it, and knows it was there before. But this it can be tried whether there be any such ideas in the mind before impression from sensation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man who, when he came to the use of reason, or at any early time, remembered any of them, and to him, as if he was born, they were never new. As one will say, there are ideas in the mind as soon as it is in the memory. I desire him to examine himself, and make what he says true.

2. *Propter idcirco quia fides est vera.*
scilicet. Besides what I have already said, there is another reason why I doubt that neither time nor any other principles are innate. I was once persuaded that the truth which wise God made all things in perfect wisdom, cannot satisfy itself. He should be supposed to print upon the minds of men some universal principles, whereof those that are pretended mathematics and concerns philosophy are of no great use, and which concern practice not so evident and tenacious (firmly distinguishable) from some other truths not allowed to be innate. For to what purpose would characters be written on the mind by the finger of God, which are no clearer there than those which are afterwards introduced, or must be distinguished from them. If any one thing there are such innate ideas and propositions, which by their clearness and usefulness are distinguished from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, will not be hard matter for him to tell us what they are, and then every one will be fit to judge whether they be so or no. Since if there be such innate ideas and propositions, such different from all other propositions and how led to every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of this I supposed some examples, I have spoken already. If the occasion I shall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

3. *Deinde non dicimus de eis esse effectum, ut sunt factus.* To consider secondly, as I have said, of themselves as a man understood, and some sorts of truths resulting from any ideas, as soon as the mind puts them into propositions, other truths require train of ideas joined in order, due comparison of them, and deductions made with necessity, before they can be discovered and asserted to. Some of the first sort, because of their general and easy reception,

has been mistaken for matter by the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and sciences though some of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others, and there are more generally received though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed. God having fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind is, from the different use they put their faculties to. Whilst some (and those the most) taking things upon trust, misemploy the power of assent, by leaving employed their minds to the dictates and domination of others, in doctrines which it is their duty careful to examine and not blindly with an implicit faith, to swallow others, employ the thoughts only about some few truths, grow acquainted superficially with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all that has any never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are quite equal to two right ones is a truth as certain as any truth can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles and yet there are millions, however expert in other truths, who know not this at all, because they never set their thoughts on work about such a thing. And be that certainly knows this proposition may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propositions, in mathematics itself, which are as clear and evident as this because in his search of those mathematical truths, he stopped his thoughts short and went not so far. The same may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity. For though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that will content himself with things as he finds them in this world, as they minister to his pleasures and passions, and not make inquiry after the further and their causes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long, without any notion of such Being. And if any person hath by this put such a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it, but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge will be no perfecter than his, who having been told, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes upon trust, without examining the demonstration, and may yield his assent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth

the assent to words expressing the agreement or disagreement of such ideas will necessarily follow. Every one that hath a true idea of *God* and *worship* will assent to this proposition. That *God* is to be worshipped when expressed in a language he understands and every rational man that hath not thought on it to-day may be ready to assent to this proposition to-morrow and yet millions of men may be well supposed to want one or both those ideas to-day. For if we will allow savages and most country people to have

have some time or other and then they will also begin to assent to that proposition and make very little question of it ever after. But such an assent upon hearing no more proves the *idea* to be innate than it does that one born blind (with cataracts which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the sun or light or saffron or yellow because when his sight is cleared he will certainly assent to this proposition. That the sun is lucid or that saffron is yellow. And therefore if such an assent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate it can much less the *propositions* made up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas I would be glad to be told what and how many they are.

21 *No innate ideas in the memory.* To which let me add if there be any innate ideas any ideas in the mind which the mind does not actually think on they must be lodged in the memory and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance i.e. must be known when they are remembered to have been perceptions in the mind before unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive anything with memory or with a consciousness that it was perceived or known before. Without this whatever idea comes into the mind is new and not remembered this consciousness

every idea in the mind is either an actual perception or else having been an actual perception is so in the mind that by the memory it can be made an actual perception again. When ever there is the actual perception of any idea without memory the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. When ever the memory brings any idea into actual view it is with a consciousness that it had been

there before and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not so I appeal to every one's observation. And then I desire an instance of an idea pretended to be innate which (before any impression of it by any sense hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known without which consciousness of a former perception there is no remembrance and whatever idea comes into the mind without that consciousness is not remembered or comes not out of the memory nor can be said to be in the mind before that appearance. For what is not either actually in view or in the memory is in the mind no way at all and is all one as if it had never been there. Suppose a child had the use of his eyes till he knew and distinguishes colours but then cataracts shut the windows and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark and in that time perfectly loses all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the case of a blind man I once talked with who lost his sight by the small pox when he was a child and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I ask whether any one can say this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind any more than one born blind? And I think nobody will say that either of them had in his mind any ideas of colours at all. His cataracts are couched and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours *de novo* by his restored sight conveyed to his mind and that without any consciousness of a former acquaintance. And these now he can revive and call to mind in the dark. In this case all these ideas of colours which when out of view can be revived with a consciousness of a former acquaintance being thus in the memory are said to be in the mind. The use I make of this is—that whatever idea being not actually in view is in the mind is there only by being in the memory and if it be not in the memory it is not in the mind and if it be in the memory it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view without a perception that it comes out of the memory which is that it had been known before and is now remembered. If therefore there be any innate ideas they must be in the memory or else nowhere in the mind and if they be in the memory they can be revived without any impression from without and whenever they are brought into the mind they are remembered i.e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a constant and distinguishing difference between what is and what is not in the memory or in the mind—that what is not in the memory whenever it appears

of towns where, if the ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is further inquiry for whom it is borrowed nor whom it belongs to, so it affords but a fit rise for the present purpose. But in the future part of this Discourse, desirous to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with itself, as far as my own experience and observation will assist me I hope to erect on such basis that I shall not need to shore it up with props and buttresses, leaning on borrowed or borrowed foundations or at least, if more prove cast in the air I will endow our walls be all of a piece and ban together

Wherein I warn the reader not to expect undeniable cogent demonstrations, unless I may be allowed the privilege, not seldom assumed by others, to take my principles for granted and then, I doubt not, but I can demonstrate too. All that I shall say for the principles I proceed on is, that I can only appeal to men's own unprejudiced experience and observation whether they be true or not and thus is now left for a man who professes no more than to lay down candidly and freely his own conjectures, concerning a subject lying somewhat in the dark, without any other design than an unbiased inquiry after truth.

BOOK II Of Ideas

Chap I Of Ideas in general and their Origin

I illustrate by thinking Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the *ideas* that are there it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas,—such as are those expressed by the words *whiteness, hardness, six stress, striking me on, man, reflection, every drunkenness*, and others it is in the first place then to be inquired, *How he comes by them.*

I know this received doctrine that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have already examined already and, I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily dimmed when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas has and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind—for which I shall appeal to every one's own observations and experience.

All ideas come from sensation or reflection. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we saw when I perceived all children as we utter any ideas—How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the *ideas* of reason and knowledge? Thus I answer in one word, from *EXPERIENCE*. In that all our knowledge is founded and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of

thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have or can naturally have do spring.

3. *The objects of sensation are sense ideas.* First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convert into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those *ideas* we have of *yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet*, and all those which we call sensible qualities which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding I call *SENSATION*.

4. *The operations of our minds, the other source of them.* Secondly the other fountain from which experience furnisheth the understanding with ideas is,—the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got—such operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider and furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. And such are *perception, thinking, doubting, imagining, knowing, willing*, and all the different actions of our own minds—which we become conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called *INTERNAL SENSE*. But as I call the other *SENSATION* so I call

Ch. ch. xii. § 5.

Ch. § 3 also ch. xii. §

of it which yet his faculties if carefully employed were able to make clear and evident to him But this only by the by to show how much *our knowledge depends upon the fit use of those powers nature hath bestowed upon us* and how little up on such innate principles as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direction which all men could not but know if they were there or else they would be there to no purpose And which since all men do not know nor can distinguish from other adventitious truths we may well conclude there are no such

24 *Men must think and know for themselves* What censure doubting thus of innate principles may deserve from men who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty I cannot tell—I persuade myself at least that the way I have pursued being conformable to truth lays those foundations surer This I am certain I have not made it my business either to quit or follow any authority in the ensuing Discourse Truth has been my only aim and wherever that has appeared to lead my thoughts have impartially followed without minding whether the footsteps of any other lay that way or not Not that I want a due respect to other men's opinions but after all the greatest reverence is due to truth and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to say that perhaps we should make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge if we sought it in the fountain *in the consideration of things themselves* and made use rather of our own thoughts than other men's to find it For I think we may as rationally hope to see with other men's eyes as to know by other men's understandings So much as we ourselves consider and comprehend of truth and reason so much we possess of real and true knowledge The floating of other men's opinions in our brains makes us not one jot the more knowing though they happen to be true What in them was science is in us but opiatiety whilst we give up our assent only to reverend names and do not as they did employ our reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation Aristotle was certainly a knowing man but nobody ever thought him so because he blindly embraced and confidently vented the opinions of another And if the taking up of another's principles without

considerable addition to his stock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth like fairy money though it were gold in the hand from which he received it will be but leaves and dust when it comes to use

5 *Whence the opinion of innate principles* When men have found some general propositions that could not be doubted of as soon as understood it as I know a short and easy way to conclude them innate This being once received it eased the lazy from the pains of search and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once styled innate And it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers to make this the principle of principles—that principles must not be questioned For having once established this tenet—that there are innate principles it put their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such which was to take them off from the use of their

and made useful to some sort of men who had the skill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a small power it gives one man over another to have the authority to be the dictator of principles and teacher of unquestionable truths and to make a man swallow that for an innate principle which may serve to his purpose who teacheth them Whereas had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many universal truths they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves when duly considered and that they were discovered by the application of those faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them when duly employed about them

6 *Conclusion* To show how the understanding proceeds herein is the design of the following Discourse which I shall proceed to when I have first premised that hitherto—to clear my way to those foundations which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge—it hath been necessary for me to give an account of the reasons I had to doubt of innate principles And since the arguments which are against them do some of them rise from common received opinions I have been forced to take several things for granted which is hardly avoidable to any one whose task is to show the falsehood or improbability of any tenet—it happens in controversial discourses as it does in as

knowers and comprehends What he believes on ly and takes upon trust are but shreds which however well in the whole piece make no con

world few things, which by a constant
ta fth ir senses, d with mind constantly
in them forward t tak n tce fnew a dapt
to bed l ighted w th th ar ty fch g goba

is necessary t bed ne if t be not self-evident
p oposition But weth r thus, That the soulal
w ys th ls, be a self-ev dent propos t on that
crybody assents t t first h aring I appeal to
m nk nd H doubted wh ther I th ight t ll
last ght no The q est on being about
m tt r ff ct, is begging t to b ing as p oof

th bal n ut is, ~~was~~
proved nd past d ubt, that my watch thought

horr g d as d per pt being th sam th g
I know t an p that th so lalway th nks
and that t has th ctual pe c pt f d as in
self constaly as l gas texts a d that c
tual thinking is as ns par bl f m th soul as
a nual e tens n is from the body which if tru
to inquir after th begi ng of man d as
is th sam as t quir ft th begi n g f
his soul. F r by ths ccou t soul and is d as
as body and is ext ns will begi n t ex t both
t the same tim

The soul ths t la y for th n nts
proof B tw th r th oul bes ppos d t just
antecede t to or coe alw th s m tme af
t th first rud m ts f organ zai n th
beginnings f l f m th body l l t be dis-
puted by those wh h bett thought f that
man I n f s s my l f t h f those
dull souls, that d th ope c is f alw ys to
cont mpl t d as orca ce ta ymo c
cessary for th so lalw ys t think than f r
the bodyal y to m th perc pu f deas
be (as l co ce s) to th soul wh t m t n is
t h body t s s b t f tsope
t na. A d th for though think g be sup-
posed eve s m ch th prope m f the
soul y t t s t n cessary t suppose th t t
ould be l w y th k g alw y n at
That, pe haps, is th p l g f th ft
A thor nd Preserv f l l th n s h ever
l mbers or sleeps but is t c mpet t t
any fnt be g t last t t th l f man
W k ow certainly b xpe th tw m
t think and th d w th f l l bl con
seq ce — th t th is som thing us th t
has po t t think. B t w h that b-
sta ce *perp tually* thinks or we can be f
ther assured than pe ce f rms F t
say that ctual thinking g is esse t al t th soul
and insepar bl f m t s t beg what is
question, nd not t prove by aso — wh h

his hypoth sis th t is, because h suppos s t t
be so which w y f p oving amounts t thus,
that I must necessarily think all last ght be
caus an th supposes I alw ys think tho gh I
myself cann t pe ce e that I alwa d so

But men in l ew th the op n ns m y n t
only suppose wh t n qu stio but alleg
wro g matt ff ct. How lse could v o
mak t n nf ce f rme that th g s n t

thoughts and to th m t a d to th m t l
ays w ll be n essary t l w can think tho t
being conscous f t.

It is not alw y c nss us f t I grant th t
the l s n w king man is ne e w th t
th ight, becaus t is th co d u n f be g
w k B t h th sl ping with t dr m q
be t ff cu n of th wh l man m d s
w ll as body maybe th waking man s c n
d t e being hard m th t y
th g hould think d t be c nscous f t. If
th sould th th l l p man with t
be co ous f t I ask h th dur su h
th l k g thas y pl as or p o be
p bl fh pp ss r m ry I m ur the m
is t m th th bed or ea th h l es
F to be happy m ble w th t be ge
scs us f t, ems to me utt ly cons t t d
impos bl O f t be pos bl th t th / ca
whilst th body l p g h e t s th nk
joym is, d co s, t spl asu es p in
part, wh h th m is t conscious f n par
takes — t ce tain th t Socr tes asl p a d
Socr tes wak t the sam perso but his
Cf h x. § § 7 8

this REFLECTION the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then in the following part of this discourse I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations and the manner of them by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two I say viz external material things as the objects of SENSATION and the operations of our

some unusual qualities come in the way that

here I use in a large sense as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

5 *All our ideas are of the one or the other of these* The understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities which are all those different perceptions they produce in us and the mind¹ furnishes the understanding with ideas of its own operations.²

These when we have taken a full survey of them and their several modes combinations and relations we shall find to contain all our whole stock of ideas and that we have nothing in our minds which did not come in one of these two ways. Let anyone examine his own thoughts and thoroughly search into his understanding and then let him tell me whether all the original ideas he has there are any other than of the objects of his senses or of the operations of his mind considered as objects of his reflection. And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there he will upon taking a strict view see that he has not any idea in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted — though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding as we shall see hereafter.³

so ordered as to have but a very few even of the ordinary ideas till he were grown up to a man. But all that are born into the world being surrounded with bodies that perpetually and diversely affect them variety of ideas whether care be taken of it or not are imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand everywhere when the eye is but open sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their proper senses and force an entrance to the mind — but yet I think it will be granted

let or green than he that from his childhood never tasted an oyster or a pine apple has of those particular relishes

7 *Men are differently furnished with these according to the different objects they converse with* Men then come to be furnished with fewer or more simple ideas from without, according to the objects they converse with afford greater or less variety and from the operations of their minds within according as they more or less reflect on them. For though he that contemplates the operations of

any landscape or of the parts and motions of a clock who will not turn his eyes to it and with attention on heed all the parts of it The picture or clock may be so placed that they may come in his way every day but yet he will have but a confused idea of all the parts they are made up of till he applies himself with attention to consider them each in particular

8 *As far as reflection is concerned because they need attention* And hence we see the reason why it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the operations of the mind

stored with plenty of ideas that are to be true ideas comes to the mind before the memory begins to keep a register of time or order yet it is often so late before

understanding turns inward upon itself reflects on its own operations and makes them the objects of its own contemplation. Children when they come first into it, are surrounded with a

¹ Cf Bk IV ch ix and x

² Cf Bacon *Novum Organum* I Aph 1

³ See ch x u-xxviii

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

125

use of n thinking a d that the mem ry of
thou. his retained by th impress ons that are
mad n the brain, and th traces the e left after
such thinking but that in the thinking of the
soul is a sleeping man

be satisfied in —whether the soul wh n it thinks
thus part and as t we e separate f om the body
a ts less rati nally than wh n co jo dly w th it
o no If ts separat thoughts be less rati nal
then these m n mu t y that the soul owes th
perfection fr tional thinking t the body if it
does n t it is a wo der that our dr ams h uld
be fo th most part sof colous and irrat onal
f is more

ings, and contemplati ns, to what purpose does
it think. Th y wh mak the soul a thinking
thing at this te, will n t make t much more
bl being than those d whom th y co demn
for allowing t to be n thing but the subtilist
pars f matt Char cters dr wn n dust, that
the first breath f wand ff es or impress ns
mad o a heap f atoms, or animal purits, ar
altogeth as useful, and r d th subject as
noble, as th thoughts of soul that pe ish in
thinking that, ce out f ght, are g e for
ev and lea n memory f th msel es behind
them. N tur n makes cell nt things for
mean or ouses and t is hardly to be co ce ved
that our infinitely wise Creator, h uld mak so
admirabl af culty as th pow f thinking that
faculty hich comes near st th excell ncy f his
own comp h ns bl being t be so dly and
ulessly employed, t l ast fourth part f is
time her ast think constantly without emem
bering any f those thoughts, w thout d ing any
good to self or th rs, being any way us ful
to any th part f th cr u n. If we will ex
amine t, we shall t find I suppose the moti n
of dull and senseless n tier any where in th
universe mad so littl use of and so wh lly
thrown w y

16 ■ the hypothesis th soul must have ideas not
derived f om sensation or flect on f ha h ther no
f rance I tstru we ha som times nsta ces
of percep on whilst w are asleep and tain th
memory of those thoughts but how xtravagant
and incohe t for th most part th y are how
lil conformable t th perfect and order l
raoual being those wh are equainted w th
dreams need not be t ld. Thus I would willingly

oul o a
the body before t hath rece ved any by sensa
tion. The dreams of leeping men are, as I tal
it, all m d up f th waking mans deas though
f th most part oddly put togeth r It is strange
f th soul has d as of t sown that t deri ed n t

thinking (so p t that th man m m m m m
or es t not,) tain any f them the very moment
t wakes out of th m, and then make the man
glad w th ne disco er es Who can find tr ason
that th soul should in ts r treme t during
sleep ha so ma y hours thoughts, and yet
never light any f those ideas t borrowed n t
fr m sensation or effecti n or t least preserve
th memory f non but such, which being oc
cas ed f m the body must needs be less natu
al t pur t. It s trange th soul should nev
ce m man s wh le life ecall ove any f t s

be s pposed but that during sleep t ecoll ■ t s
nati d as and dur g that turem nt from
communicating w th th body whilst t thinks
by its lf th deas t is bus ed bout should be

does n t or lse that memory belo gs only t
such d as as are d m ed fr m th body or the
minds per t ns bout th m.

18. How know. any ne that the soul alway thinks.

soul when he sleeps and Socrates the man consisting of body and soul when he is waking are two persons since waking Socrates has no knowledge of or concernment for that happiness or misery of his soul which it enjoys alone by itself whilst he sleeps without perceiving anything of it no more than he has for the happiness or misery of a man in the Indies whom he knows not.

It is at the concernment that accompanies it it will be hard to know wherein to place personal identity.¹

12 *If a sleeping man thinks without knowing, it the sleeping and waking man are two persons.* The soul during sound sleep thinks say these men. Whilst it thinks and perceives it is capable certainly of those of delight or trouble as well as any other perceptions and it must necessarily be conscious of its own perceptions. But it has all this apart the sleeping man.

which is no impossible supposition for the men I have here to do with who so liberally allow life without a thinking soul to all other animals. These men cannot then judge it impossible or a contradiction that the body has

to think apart. Let us suppose too that it chooses for its scene of thinking the body of another man, e.g. Pollux, who is sleeping without a soul. For if Castor's soul can think whilst Castor is asleep what Castor is never conscious of it is no matter what place it chooses to think in. We have here then the bodies of two men with only one soul between them which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns and the soul still thinking in the waking man whereof the sleeping man is never conscious has never the least perception. I ask then whether Castor and Pollux thus

distinct persons as Castor and Hercules, or as Socrates and Plato were? And whether one of them might not be very happy and the other very miserable? Just by the same reason they make the soul and the man two persons who make the soul think apart what the man is not conscious of. For I suppose nobody will make

identity of persons to consist in the soul's being united to the very same numerical particles of matter. For if that be necessary to identity it will be impossible in that constant flux of the particles of our bodies that any man should be the same person two days or two moments, together.

13 *Impossible to convince those that sleep without dreaming that they think.* Thus methinks every drowsy nod shakes their doctrine who teach that the soul is always thinking. Those at least, who do at any time sleep without dreaming can never be convinced that their thoughts are some times for four hours busy without their knowing of it and if they are taken in the very act waked in the middle of that sleeping contemplation can give no manner of account of it.

14 *That men dream without remembering it is vain urged.* It will perhaps be said—That the soul thinks even in the soundest sleep but the memory retains it not. That the soul in a sleeping man should be this moment busy a thinking and the next moment in a waking man not remember nor be able to recollect one jot of all those thoughts is very hard to be conceived and would need some better proof than bare assertion² to make it be believed. For who can without any more ado but being barely told imagine that the greatest part of men do during all their lives for several hours every day think of something which if they were asked even in the middle of these thoughts they could remember nothing at all of? Most men I think, pass a great part of their sleep without dreaming. I once knew a man that was bred a scholar and had no bad memory who told me he had never dreamed in his life till he had that fever he was then newly recovered of which was about the five or six and twentieth year of his age. I suppose the world affords more such instances at least every one's acquaintance will furnish him with examples enough of such as pass most of their nights without dreaming.

15 *Upon this hypothesis the thoughts of a sleeping man ought to be most rational.* To think often and never to retain it so much as one moment is a very useless sort of thinking and the soul in such a state of thinking does very little if at all except that of a looking glass which constantly receives variety of images or ideas but retains none they disappear and vanish and there remain no foot

¹ Cf. ch. xxvii.

² Cf. W. James *Principles of Psychology* ch. viii.

For if it be not a self evident proposition it needs proof I could be glad also to learn from these men who so confidently pronounce that the human soul or which is all one that a man always thinks how they come to know it nay how they come to know that they themselves think when they themselves do not perceive it This I am afraid is to be sure without proofs and to know without perceiving It is I suspect a confused notion taken up to serve an hypothesis and none of those clear truths that either their own evidence forces us to admit or common experience makes it impudence to deny For the most that can be said of it is that it is possible the soul may

it should sometimes not think than that it should often think and that a long while together and not be conscious to itself the next moment after that it had thought

19 *Th t a m should be busy in th king and y t not r t in it the next moment very improb ble* To suppose the soul to think and the man not to perceive it is as has been said to make two persons in one man And if one considers well these men's way of speaking one should be led into a suspicion that they do so For they who tell us that the soul always thinks do never that I remember say that a man always thinks Can the soul think and not the man? Or a man think and not be conscious of it? This perhaps could be suspected of jargon in others If they say the man thinks always but is not always conscious of it they may as well say his body is extended without having parts For it is altogether as intelligible to say that a body's extended without parts as that anything thinks without being conscious of it or perceiving that it does so They who talk thus may with as much reason if it be necessary to the hypothesis say that a man's always hungry but that he does not always feel it whereas hunger consists in that very sensation as thinking consists in being conscious that one thinks If they say that a man is always conscious to himself of thinking I ask How they know it? Consciousness is the percept on of what passes in a man's own mind Can another man perceive that I am conscious of anything when I perceive it not myself? No man's knowledge here can go beyond his experience Wake a man out of a sound sleep and ask him what he was that moment thinking of If he himself be conscious of nothing he then thought on he must be a notable divider of thoughts that can assure him that he was thinking May he not with more

reason assure him he was not asleep? This is something beyond philosophy and it cannot be less than revelation that discovers to another thoughts in my mind when I can find none there myself And they must needs have a penetrating sight who can certainly see that I think when I cannot perceive it myself and when I declare that I do not and yet can see that does or elephants do not think when they give all the demonstration of it imaginable except only tell us that they do so This some may suspect to be a step beyond the Rosicrucians it seeming easier to make one self invisible to others than to make another's thoughts visible to me which are not visible to himself But it is but defining the soul to be a substance that always thinks and the business is done If such definition be of any authority I know not what it can serve for but to make many men suspect that they have no souls at all since they find a good part of their life pass away without thinking For no definitions that I know no suppositions of any sect are of force enough to destroy constant experience and perhaps it is the affectation of knowing beyond what we perceive that makes so much useless dispute and noise in the world

20 *No ideas but from sensation and reflection evident if we observe child en* I see no reason therefore to believe that the soul thinks before the senses have furnished it with ideas to think on and as those are increased and retained so it comes by exercise to improve its faculty of thinking in the several parts of it as well as afterwards by compounding those ideas and reflecting on its own operations it increases its stock as well as facility in remembering imagining reasoning and other modes of thinking

1 *St te of a child in th m ther's womb* He that will suffer himself to be informed by observation and experience and not make his own hypothesis the rule of nature will find few signs of a soul accustomed to much thinking in a new born child and much fewer of any reasoning at all And yet it is hard to imagine that the rational soul should think so much and not reason at all And he that will consider that infants newly come into the world spend the greatest part of their time in sleep and are seldom awake but when either hunger calls for the teat or some pain (the most importunate of all sensations) or some other violent impression on the body forces the mind to perceive and attend to it—he I say who considers this will perhaps find reason to imagine that a fetus in the mother's womb differs not much from the state of a vegetable but passes the greatest part of its time without perception

postern to be admitted by another way to turn
themselves into law and be perceived by the
understanding

The most considerable of those belonging to the touch, are heat and cold and solidity: all the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible configuration, as smooth and rough or less more or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and soft, tough and brittle, are obvious enough.

2. For the sake of brevity I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible if we would there be great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for. Thus for instance, smells, which

Chap 14 *of* Solidity

It enters the soul from without. The idea of solidity we receive by our touch and arises from the resistance which we find in bodies to the entrance of another body into the place it possesses. All has life. There is no idea which receives more constant from sensation than solidity. Whether we move or rest, in what posture we are we always feel something under us that supports us, and hinders our further sinking downwards, and the bodies which we deal handle make us perceive that, whilst they remain between them, they do, by an insurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our hands that press them. *That which thus hinders the approach of two bodies when they are moved one towards another I call solidity. I will not*

dispute whether this acceptance of the word solid be nearer to its original signification than that which math. matheians use in. It suffices that I think the common notion of solidity will allow if not justify this use. It but if any one think it better to call it *entrailability* has my consent. Only I have thought the term solid by the more proper to express this idea, not only because of

materially connected with, and esse uau uuu, so as nowhere let be found or imagined but only in matter. And though our senses take notice of it, but in masses of matter of a bulk sufficient to cause sensation in the mind, having we got this idea from such grosser sensible bodies, traces it further and considers it, as well as figure in the minutest particles of matter that can exist and finds it inseparable, inherent in body wherever or however modified.

Sol^{ty}fi per. This is the idea which be-
longs to body whereby we conceive it to fill space.
The idea of which filling of space is,—that where
we imagine any space taken up by solid sub-
stance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it ex-
cludes all the solid substances and will for ever
hinder any other two bodies, that move towards

3 *Distinct from* For This resistance, whereby it keeps their bodies out of the space which it possesses, is so great, that no force, how great soever can surmount it. All the bodies in the world, pressing a drop of water on all sides, will never be able to overcome the resistance which it will make so soft as it is, to their approaching on another side till it be removed out of their way: where by our idea of solidity is distinguished both from pure space which is capable neither of resistance nor motion and from the ordinary idea of hardness. For man may conceive two bodies to

sold to For (not to go so far as annihilation of any particular body) I ask, whether a man can not have the idea of the motion of one single body alone, without any other succeeding immediately into its place. I think it is evident he can the

and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and whiteness of a lily or as the taste of sugar and smell of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man than the clear and distinct perception he has of those simple ideas which being each in it self —
no
the
idea

2 *The mind can neither make nor destroy them* These simple ideas the materials of all our knowledge are suggested and furnished to the mind only by those two ways above mentioned viz sensation and reflection. When the understanding is once stored with these simple ideas it has the power to repeat compare and unite them even to an almost infinite variety and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted it or enlarged understanding by any quickness or variety of thought to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind not taken in by the ways before mentioned nor can any force of the understanding destroy those that are there. Thence

world of
the same

things which power however managed by art and skill reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand but can do nothing towards the making the least particle of new matter or destroying one atom of what is already in being. The same inability will every one find in himself who shall go about to fashion in his understanding one simple idea not received in by his senses from external objects or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I could have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt and when he can do this I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours and a deaf man true distinct notions of sounds.

¶ *Only the quality is that if it the sense are imaginable* This is the reason why though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature

mankind been made but with four senses the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice imagination and conception as now any below

may not have will be a deny He t
top of all th

of

fi

may be apt to think that in other mansions of it there may be other and different intelligent beings whose faculties he has as little knowledge or apprehension as a worm shut up in one drawer of a cabinet hath of the senses or understanding of a man such variety and excellency being suitable to the wisdom and power of the Maker. I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses though perhaps there may be justly counted more—but either supposition serves equally to my present purpose.

Chap. III. Of Simple Ideas of Sense

1 *Division of simple ideas* The better to conceive the ideas we receive from sensation it may not be amiss for us to consider them in reference to the different ways whereby they make their approaches to our minds and make themselves perceivable by us.

First then There are some which come into our minds by one sense only.

Secondly There are others that convey themselves into the mind by more

shall consider them apart under these several heads

Idea of one sense There are some ideas which have admittance only through one sense which is peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus light and colours as white red yellow blue with their several degrees or shades and mixtures as green scarlet purple sea green and the rest come in only by the eyes. All kinds of noises sounds and tones only by the ears. The several tastes and smells by the nose and palate. And if these organs or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain—the mind's presence room (as I may so call it)—are any of them so disordered as not to perform their functions they have no

of any man to imagine any other qualities in bodies however constituted whereby they can be taken notice of besides sounds tastes smells visible and tangible qualities. And had

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CHAP. IV.

posern to be admitted by no other way to bring
themselves into view and be perceived by the
understanding

The most consider-able of those belongin-
to the touch, are heat and cold and solidity all
the rest, consisting almost wholly in the sensible
configuration, as smooth and rough or less more
or less firm adhesion of the parts, as hard and
soft, tough and brittle are obvious enough.

For *purple* &c. as *her names* I think it will be
needless to enumerate all the particular simple

we have names for. The variety is immense, which

sufficiently cause sensation in us. It is evident
having once got this idea from such gross sen-

lates, that by our palates we receive as
much better provided with names. Sweet, bitter
sour harsh, and salar almost all the paths
we have to denote that numberless variety
of relishes, which are to be found distinct not
only in almost every sort of creatures, but in the
different parts of the same plant, fruit, or animal.
The same may be said of colours and sounds. I
shall, therefore, in the account of simple ideas as I
am here giving, omit myself to set down only
such as are most material to our present purpose,
or are in themselves less apt to be taken notice of
though they are very frequently the ingredients
of our complex ideas as amongst which I think, I
may well reckon solidity which therefore I shall
treat first in the next chapter.

Chap. IV. *Idea of Solidity*

I think it is evident from the nature of
solidity we receive by our touch and arises from
the extension which we find in bodies that the en-
tance of any thing into the place it pos-
sesses, till has its fullness. This is so of which
we conceive more constantly from sensation than
from reflection. Whether we move or rest, in what po-
sition we are we feel some support. And this support
is that which we feel when we are further
sinking downwards and the bodies which we
daily handle make us perceive that, whilst they
remain between them, they do, by their insur-
mountable force hinder the approach of the
parts of our hands that press them. That which
thus hinders the approach of the bodies when they are
moved one towards another I call solidity. I will

longest body whereby we conceive it to be
The idea of which filling of space is,—that where
we imagine any space taken up by a solid sub-
stance, we conceive it to possess that that

3 *Dist act from far* This resistance whereby
it keeps other bodies out of the space which it
possesses, is so great that no force how great so-
ever can surmount it. All the bodies in the world
pressing drop for that small distance, will ex-
hibit little or room the resistance which it will
make soft as this, to the irrepres-
sible till it be removed out of the way where
bodies are. Solidity is distinguished both from
pure space which is capable neither of resistance
nor motion and from the ordinary idea of hard-
ness. For man may conceive two bodies at a
distance so as they may approach one another
without touching or displacing any solid thing
till their superficies come to meet whereby I
think we have the clear idea of space without
solidity. For (it is to go so far as annihilation of

idea of motion in one body no more including the idea of motion in another than the idea of a square figure in one body includes the idea of a square figure in another. I do not ask whether bodies do so exist that the motion of one body cannot really be without the motion of another. To determine this either way is to beg the question for or against *vacuum*. But my question is—whether one cannot have the idea of one body moved whilst others are at rest? And I think thus no one will deny. If so then the place it deserted gives us the idea of pure space without solidity whereinto any other body may enter without either resistance or protrusion of any thing. When the sucker in a pump is drawn the space it filled in the tube is certainly the same whether any other body follows the motion of the sucker or not nor does it imply a contradiction that upon the motion of one body another that is only contiguous to it should not follow. The necessity of such a motion is built only on the supposition that the world is full but not on the distinct ideas of space and solidity which are as different as resistance and not resistance protrusion and not protrusion. And that men have ideas of space without a body their very disputes about a vacuum plainly demonstrate as is shown in another place.

dies out of the space it possesses but hardness in a firm cohesion of the parts of matter making up masses of a sensible bulk so that the whole does not easily change its figure. And indeed hard and soft are names that we give to things only in relation to the constitutions of our own bodies that being generally called hard by us which will put us to pain sooner than change

painful touch

But this difficulty of changing the situation of the sensible parts amongst themselves or of the figure of the whole gives no more solidity to the hardest body in the world than to the softest

is not that the parts of the diamond are more solid than those of water or resist more but because the parts of water being more easily separated

Ch. xii. §§ 21-23

table from each other they will by a side motion be more easily removed and give way to

proach of these two pieces of marble as much as the diamond and it would be as impossible by any force to surmount their resistance as to surmount the resistance of the parts of a diamond. The softest body in the world will as invincibly resist the coming together of any other

ing soft body itself with air or water will quickly find its resistance. And he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands from approaching one another may be pleased to make a trial with the air inclosed in a foot ball. The experiment I have been told was made at Florence with a hollow globe of gold filled with water and exactly closed which further shows the solidity of so soft a body as water. For the golden globe thus filled being put into a press which was driven by the extreme force of screws the water made itself way through the pores of that very close metal and finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within got to the outside where it rose like a dew and so fell in drops before the sides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compression of the engine that squeezed it.

5 On solidity depend impulse resistance and protrusion. By this idea of solidity is the extension of body distinguished from the extension of space—the extension of body being nothing but the cohesion or continuity of solid separable movable parts and the extension of space the continuity of unsolid inseparable and immovable parts. Upon the solidity of bodies also depends their mutual impulse resistance and protrusion. Of pure space then and solidity there are several (amongst which I confess myself one) who persuade themselves they have clear and distinct ideas and that they can think on space without anything in it that resists or is protruded by body. This is the idea of pure space which they think they have as clear as any idea they can have of the extension of body the idea of the distance between the opposite parts of a concave superficies being equally as clear as that out as with the idea of any solid parts between and

truded by the impulse of other bodies, or resist

their motion. If there be others that have not these two ideas distinct, but confound them, and make but one of them, I know not how men, who have the same idea under different names, or different ideas under the same name can in the case make with one another any more than a man who is not blind or deaf has distinct ideas of the colour of scarlet and the sound of trumpet, could discourse concerning scarlet to colour to the blind man I mentioned in another place, so I feared that the idea of scarlet was like the sound of trumpet.

6. *Of the way* If an one ask me What is a man? I send him to his senses to inform him. Let him put a flint or football between his hands, and then I deliver our to join them, and he will know if he thinks this is not a sufficient explanation of solidity what it is, and wherein it consists. I promise to tell him what it is, and wherein it consists, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it consists, or explains to me what extension or motion is, which perhaps seems much easier. The simplified as we have are such as experience teaches them us but if, beyond that, and our by words to make them clearer in the mind, we shall succeed no better than if we went about to clear up the darkness of a blind man's mind by talking and to discourse into him the ideas of light and colour. The reason of this I shall show in another place.

Chap V. Of Simplified Ideas as of Sensations

I have stored both by seeing and touching. The ideas we get by more than one sense are, of force or extension, of figure and extension. For these make perceptible impressions, both on the eyes and on the touch and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extensions on figure, motion, and rest of bodies, both by seeing and feeling. But having occasion to speak more at large of this in another place I here only enumerate them.

Chap VI. Of Simplified Ideas as of Reason

1. *Simple* as are the operations of mind, both the ideas of it. The mind receives in the ideas mentioned the foregoing chapters from without, then turns inward upon itself and observes its own motions about these ideas that, takes from thence the ideas of it, which are as capable to be the objects of simple ideas as any of those that receive from foreign things.

2. The ideas of perception, and of force are from sensation. The two great and principal

contents of the mind, which are most frequently considered, and which are so frequent that every one that places may take notice of them in himself, are these two —

Perception or Thinking, and
Will or Motion

The power of thinking is called the *Understanding*, and the power of motion is called the *Will* and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated *Faculties*.

Of some of the powers of these simplified as of reflection, such as are *comprehension, discerning, judging, knowing, faith*, &c. I shall have occasion to speak hereafter.

Chap VII. Of Simple Ideas as of Sensations, or of Perception

1. *Ideas of perception and passion.* There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz. pleasure or delight and its opposite pain, or any other power existing within.

Maximam autem illam habemus Delight or Pleasure

molests us whether it rises from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operation on our bodies. For whether we call it satisfaction or

ease, such are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas.

3. *As motion for action.* The infinite wise Author of our being having given us the power over several parts of our bodies, to move or keep them in rest as we think fit and also by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which consist all the actions of our body, he has also given power to our minds, in several instances, to choose among them as we will think fit, and to pursue the inquiry of this or that subject with consideration and intent, to exert us in these motions of thinking and motion that we are capable of, —

Cl. Bk. II ch. xxx. § 5.

See ch. 2, xi, and Bk. IV ch. xvii, xiv-xv, xxi, xxvii.

has been pleased to join to several thoughts and

reason to prefer one thought or action to another negligence to attention or motion to rest And so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our minds but
it) run adrift
and suffer the
ed shadows to make their appearances there as
it happened without attending to them In which

lazy lethargic dream It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects and the ideas which we receive from them as also to several of our thoughts a concomitant pleasure and that in several objects to several degrees that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us

4 *An end and use of pain* Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that as to pursue this only this is worth our consideration that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us This their near conjunction which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure gives us new occasion of adverting the wisdom and goodness of our Maker who designing the preservation of our being has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies to warn us of the harm that they will do and as advices to withdraw from them But he not designing our preservation barely but the preservation of every part and

degree by a little greater increase of it proves no ordinary torment and the most pleasant of all sensible objects light itself if there be too much of it if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes causes a very painful sensation Which is usefully and favourably so ordered by nature that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future The consideration of

¹See chh. xx and xx

those objects that produce it may well persuade us that this is the end or use of pain For though great light be insufferable to our eyes yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all decrease them because that causing no disorderly motion in it leaves that curious organ unharmed

preservation of life and the exercise of the several functions of the body and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth or if you please a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds

5 *Another end* Beyond all this we may find another reason why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain in all the things that environ and affect us and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with —that we finding imperfection dissatisfaction and want of complete happiness in all the enjoyments which the creatures can afford us might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him with whom there is fullness of joy and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore

6 *Goodness of God in annexing pleasure and pain to our other ideas* Though what I have here said may not, perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does which is the only way that we are capable of having them yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all things may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts and the proper business of all understandings

7 *Ideas of existence and unity* Existence and Unity are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without a necessary idea within. When ideas are in our minds we consider them as being actually there as well as we consider things to be actually without us — which is that they exist or have existence² And whatever we can consider as one thing whether a real being or idea suggests to the understanding the idea of unity

8 *Idea of power* Power also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflect on For observing in ourselves that we do and can think and that we can at pleas

²Cf. Berkeley *Principles* § 89 also the letter to S. Bold (16 May 1699)

are move several parts of our bodies which were
the effects, also, that natural bodies are
able to produce in one another occurring every
moment to our senses,—we both these ways meet
the idea of power

4. *Let* *perception*. Besides these there is another
idea, which, though suggested by our
senses, yet is more constantly offered to us by
what passes in our minds, and that is the idea of
perception. For if we look immediately into our
senses, and reflect on what is observable there,
we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are
awake or have any thought, passing in train,
one instant and another coming without inter-
mission.

10. *See* *is* *ideas* *the* *materials* *of* *all* *our* *knowledge*.
These if they are not all, are at least (as I think)
the most considerable of those simple ideas which
the mind has, and out of which is made all its
other knowledge and which it receives chiefly by
the two first-mentioned ways of sensation and
reflection.

Let any one think these too narrow bounds
for the spacious mind of man to expatiate in
which takes its flights further than the stars, and
cannot be confined by the limits of this world
that extends its thoughts of us even beyond the
 utmost expansion of Matter and makes excu-
rions into that incomprehensible Inane I grant
all this, but desire an one to assign an *idea*
which is not received from one of those in-
stances before-mentioned, or an *example* *which* *is* *not*
made out of those simple ones. Nor will I be so
traverse to think these few simple ideas sufficient
to employ the quickest thought, or the largest ca-
pacity and to furnish the materials of all that
various knowledge, and more various fancies
and opinions of all mankind if we consider how
many words may be made out of the various
composition of twenty-four letters or if you
enquire further we will but reflect on the ar-
bitrary combinations that may be made with
but only one of the above-mentioned ideas, viz.
under whose stock is inexhaustible and truly
infinite and what large and immense field
this extension alone affords the mathematicians.

CHAP. VIII Some further considerations
concerning the Simple Ideas of Senses

1. *Part* *of* *ideas* *from* *primary* *causes*. Concern-
ing the simple ideas of Sensation, it is to be con-
sidered,—that whatsoever is so constituted
nature as to be able, by affecting our senses, to
cause an impression in the mind, doth thereby

Obtain in which “simple modes” of the sim-
ple idea of power are described.

produce in the understanding a simple idea of a
whole, whatever be the external cause of it
when it comes to be taken notice of by our dis-
cerning faculty it is by the mind looked on and
considered there to be a real positive idea in the
understanding, as much as any other whatso-
ever though perhaps, the cause of it be but a
privation of the subject.

Less *or* *the* *mind* *distinguished* *from* *the* *causes*
that *give* *rise* *to* *them*. Thus the ideas of
heat and cold, light and darkness, white and
black, motion and rest, are equal clear and
positive ideas in the mind though, perhaps,
some of the causes which produce them are hard
privations, in those subjects from whence our
senses derive these ideas. These the understand-
ing is enabled to consider as all as distinct
positive ideas, without taking notice of the causes
that produce them which is an inquiry not be-
longing to the idea as it is in the understanding

and quite another to examine what kind of pa-
tients they must be and how ranked in the su-
perficies, so that any object appear white or
black.

§ II *may* *be* *the* *less* *when* *we* *are* *ignorant* *of*
the *physical* *causes* *A* *person* *or* *other* *who* *has* *not*
inquired into their causes hath the idea of white
and black, and other colours, as clearly per-
ceived as if he were acquainted with the causes

than that of white however the cause of that
colour in the external object may be only pri-
vation.

4. *How* *primary* *causes* *in* *which* *may* *be* *seen* *in*
positive *ideas*. If I were the design of my present
undertaking to inquire into the natural causes
and manner of perception, I should offer this
as reason why privative cause might in some
cases at least produce positive ideas viz. that
all sensation being produced in us only by dif-
ferent degrees and modes of motion in our ani-
mal spirits, various animated by external ob-
jects, the bottom of an former motion must
as necessarily produce a new sensation as the
variation or increase of it and so introduce
new ideas which depend only on a different
motion of the animal spirits in that organ.

CL. Intro. § 2

reason to prefer one thought or action to another negligence to attention or motion to rest And so we should neither stir our bodies nor employ our minds but

it) run adrift and suffer the

ed shadows to make their appearances there as it happened without attending to them In which state man however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will would be a very idle inactive creature and pass his time only in a lazy lethargic dream It has therefore pleased our wise Creator to annex to several objects and the ideas which we receive from them as also to several of our thoughts a concomitant pleasure and that in several objects to several degrees that those faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us

4 *An end and use of pain* Pain has the same efficacy and use to set us on work that pleasure has we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that as to pursue this only this is worth our consideration that pain is often produced by the same objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us Thus their near conjunction which makes us often feel pain in the sensations where we expected pleasure gives us new occasion of admiring the wisdom and goodness of our Maker who designing the preservation of our being has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies to warn us of the harm that they will do and as advices to withdraw from them But he not designing our preservation barely but the preservation of every part and

degree by a little greater increase of it proves no ordinary torment and the most pleasant of all sensible objects light itself if there be too much of it if increased beyond a due proportion to our eyes causes a very painful sensation Which is wisely and favourably so ordered by nature that when any object does by the vehemency of its operation disorder the instruments of sensation whose structures cannot but be very nice and delicate we might by the pain be warned to withdraw before the organ be quite put out of order and so be unfitted for its proper function for the future The consideration of

¹ See chh. xx and xxi

those objects that produce it may well persuade us that this is the end or use of pain For though great light be insufferable to our eyes yet the highest degree of darkness does not at all dis-ease them because that causing no disorderly motion in it leaves that curious organ unharmed in its natural state But yet excess of cold as well as heat pains us because it is equally destructive to that temper which is necessary to the preservation of life and the exercise of the several functions of the body and which consists in a moderate degree of warmth or if you please a motion of the insensible parts of our bodies confined within certain bounds

5 *Another end* Beyond all this we may find another reason why God hath scattered up and down several degrees of pleasure and pain in all the things that environ and affect us and blended them together in almost all that our thoughts and senses have to do with — that — finding imperfection dissatisfaction and want of com-

fullness of joy and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore

6 *Goodness of God in annexing pleasure and pain to our other ideas* Though what I have here said may not perhaps make the ideas of pleasure and pain clearer to us than our own experience does which is the only way that we are capable of having them yet the consideration of the reason why they are annexed to so many other ideas serving to give us due sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of the Sovereign Disposer of all things may not be unsuitable to the main end of these inquiries — the knowledge and veneration of him being the chief end of all our thoughts and the proper business of all understandings

7 *Idea of existence and unity* Existence and Unity are two other ideas that are suggested to the understanding by every object without and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we consider them as being actually there as well as we consider things to be actually without us — which is that they exist or have existence² And whatever we can consider as one thing whether a real being or idea suggests to the understanding the idea of unity

8 *Idea of power* Power also is another of those simple ideas which we receive from sensation and reflection For observing in ourselves that we do and can think and that we can at pleas-

² Cf. Berkeley *Principles* § 89 also the letter to S. Bold (16 May 1699)

we move several parts of our bodies which were
rest the effects, also that natural bodies are
able to produce in one another occurring every
moment to our senses,—we both these ways get
the idea of power

9. *Ide succession.* Besides these there is an
other idea, which, though suggested by our
senses, it is more constantly referred to us by
what passes in our minds and that is the idea of
succession. For if we look immediately into our
senses, and reflect on what is observable there
we shall find our ideas always, whilst we are
asleep or have a y thought, passing in train,
one going and another coming without inter-
mission.

10. *Simpleness as the materials of all our knowledge.*
These if they are not all, are at least (as I think)
the most considerable of those employed as which
the mind has, and out of which is made all its
other knowledge all which it conceives only by
the two aforementioned ways of sensation and
reflection.

Let any one think these too narrow bounds
for the capacious mind of man to expiate in
which takes us flight further than the stars and
cannot be confined by the limits of this world
that extend to thoughts fitting beyond the
most expansion of matter makes curious
ones into that incomprehensibility I agree to
all this, but desire any one to assign a simple
idea which is not conceived from those
I have before mentioned any employed in it
made out of those simple ones. I will therefore
strange to think these few employed as sufficient
to employ the quickest thought, or large capacity
and to furnish the materials of all the
various knowledge and manner of our faculties
and pains of all mankind for consider how
many words may be made out of the letters of our
composition of twenty four letters or if we go
one step further we will but reflect on the variety
of combinations that may be made with
barely on fifteen or more natural ideas
number whose stock is inexhaustible and truly
infinite and what large and numerous families
of them extend on all afford the mathematicians

Chap VIII *Simple further considerations
concerning our Simple Ideas of Sensation*

Primary ideas from sensation. Concerning
the simple ideas of Sensation that is to be con-
sidered,—that whatsoever so constituted in
nature is to be obtained by reflecting upon it
cause any perception in the mind of that by

Ch. xxi. in which simple modes of the simple
idea of power are described.

produce in the understanding a simple idea
which is to be the eternal cause of it
when it comes to be taken notice of by our dis-
cerning faculty it is by the mind looked on and
considered there to be a real positive idea in the

2. *Ideas the mind distinguishes from its
objects which gives rise to them.* Thus the ideas of
heat and cold light and darkness, white and
black, motion and rest, are equally clear and
positive as in the mind though, perhaps,
some of the causes which produce them are barely

but the nature of the things existing without it
us. These are two very different things, and care-
fully to be distinguished it being necessary that
perception and knowledge of white or black,
and quite a different matter to examine what kind of par-
ticles they must be, and how arranged in the
particles to make any object appear white or
black.

3. *It may have the idea as when are ignorant of
the physical causes.* As paint or dyer who ever
acquainted with their causes hath the idea of white
and black, and other colours, as clearly per-

the mind is in its cause positive or passive and
the idea of black is less positive in his mind
than that of white how the cause of that
colour in the external object may be largely per-
vaded.

4. *Why positive causes nature may occur
positive ideas.* If the things designed for my use
understandings inquire into the natural causes
of them I perceive that I hold fast this
as reason why privative cause might, in some
cases at least, produce positive ideas viz that
all sensation being produced in us only by direct
factors degrees of modes of motion in our
material parts, are usually generated by external ob-

5 *Negative* \equiv *mes* need not be meaningless But whether this be so or not I will not here determine but appeal to every one's own experience whether the shadow of a man though it consists of nothing but the absence of light (and the more the absence of light is the more discernible is the shadow) does not when a man looks on it cause as clear and positive idea in his mind as a man himself though covered over with clear sunshine? And the picture of a shadow is a positive thing Indeed we have negative names which stand not directly for positive ideas but for their absence such as *insipid* \equiv *insulence* *nilil* &c which words denote positive ideas \vee \parallel *taste sound being* with \equiv signification of their absence

6 *Whether any ideas are due to causes really privative* And thus one may truly be said to see darkness For supposing a hole perfectly dark from whence no light is reflected it is certain one may see the figure of it or it may be painted or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea is a question The privative causes I have here assigned of positive ideas are according to the common opinion but in truth it will be hard to determine whether there be really any ideas from a privative cause till it be determined whether rest be any more a privation than motion

7 *Ideas in the mind qualities in bodies* To discuss cover the nature of our ideas the better and to discourse of them intelligibly it will be convenient to distinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds and as they are modifications of matter in the body so that we use such perceptions in us that so we may not think (as perhaps usually is done) that they are exactly the images and resemblances of something inherent in the subject most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likeness of something existing without us than the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us

8 *Our ideas of the qualities of bodies* Whatsoever the mind perceives in itself or as the immediate object of perception thought or understanding that I call *idea* and the power to produce any idea in our mind I call *quality* of the subject wherein that power is Thus a snowball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white cold and round—the power to produce those ideas in us as they are in the snowball I call

percep
m ideas
s in the

things themselves I could be understood to

mean those qualities in the objects which produce them in us

9 *Primary qualities of bodies* Qualities thus considered in bodies are

First such as are utterly inseparable from the body in what state soever it be and such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers all the force can be used upon it it constantly keeps and such as sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived and the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter though less than to make itself singly be perceived by our senses \vee g Take a grain of wheat divide it into two

the parts become insensible they must retain still each of them all those qualities For division (which is all that a mill or pestle or any other body does upon another in reducing it to insensible parts) can never take away either solidity extension figure or mobility from any body but only makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter of that which as but one before all which distinct masses reckoned as so many distinct bodies after division make a certain number These I call *original* or *primary* qualities of body which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us viz solidity extension figure motion or rest and number

10 *Secondary qualities of bodies* Secondly such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities i.e. by the bulk figure texture and motion of their insensible parts as colours sounds tastes &c These I call *second* qualities To these might be added a third sort which are allowed to be barely powers though they are as much real qualities in the subject as those which I to comply with the common way of speaking call qualities but for distinction secondary qualities For the power in fire to produce a new colour or consistency in wax or clay—by its primary qualities is as much a quality in fire as the power it has to produce in us a new idea or sensation of warmth or burning which I felt not before—by the same primary qualities viz the bulk texture and motion of its sensible parts

11 *How bodies produce ideas in us* The next

Of B k lcy P napt § § 123 etc
Of h v § 8
Of Bk IV h § 11
Of Lock R ply t S nd Letter (1699) p
468 Iso Bk IV ch i § 6

ing to be considered is, how far it proceeds ideas in us and that is manifest by impulse the only way which we can conceive bodies to operate in.

2. By nature, external and our organism. If the external objects be tuned to our minds then they produce ideas in us and yet we perceive these external qualities in such of them as easily fall under our senses it is evident that some motion must be the cause moved by our senses, or animal spirits, by some parts of our bodies, to the brains or the seat of sensation there to produce in our minds the particular ideas of them. And certainly in fire, figure, number and motion of bodies of sensible bigness, may be perceived distinctly

of them in us.

3. How necessary it is to produce these ideas after the same manner that the ideas of the original qualities are produced in us, may conceive that the ideas of sensible qualities are also produced, viz. by the perception of insensible particles on our senses. For it be manifest that there are bodies and good sensible bodies, each whereof are so small that we cannot by any of our senses discover the bulk, figure, or motion — as we do of the particles of air and water and the extremely smaller than those perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air and water as the particles of air and water are smaller than peas or hail stones — let us suppose to present to the different motions and figures, bulk and unbecome of such particles, affecting the several organs of our senses, produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smells of bodies, that let, by the impulse of such insensible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degree and modifications of their motions, causes that ideas of the blue colour and sweet scent of the flower to be produced in our minds. It be so manifestly impossible to conceive that God should annex such ideas to such motions, with which they have resemblance than that he should annex the ideas of pain to the motion of peace feeling dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath resemblance.

4. They depend on the primary qualities. What I have said concerning colour and smells may be understood also of tastes and sounds, and therefore

the like sensible qualities which we never really see by our naked attributes to the mind, are true in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us and depend on those primary qualities, viz. bulk figure

these second qualities have no existence of themselves at all. There is that like our ideas, existing in the bodies themselves. They are in the bodies we do not find in them, only a power to produce those sensations in us and what is sweet, hot or warm in a body is but the certain bulk, figure and motion of the insensible parts, in the bodies themselves, which we call so.

6 Example: Fire is distinguished by heat and

as the most perfect resemblance of the other as they are in mirror and it would be most men be judged very extraordinary if I should say the reverse. And yet he that will consider that the same fire that, in one instance produces in us the sensation of warmth, does, in another approach produce in us the contrary sensation of pain ought to bethink himself what reason he has to say — that thus the fire of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is not the fire and has no idea of pain, which the same fire produced in him the same way is not in the fire. Why are what news and coldness in snow and pain in it, when it produces the same and the other in us and can do the same but by the bulk, figure number and motion of its solid parts.

7 The ideas of the primary qualities exist. The particular bulk, unbecome figure and motion of the parts of fire or snow are really in the matter — which the senses perceive distinctly and therefore they may be called actual qualities, because they really exist in those bodies. But light, heat, what news, or coldness, are not more really in the matter than cleanness or pain is in manna. Take away the sensation of them and it is not the eyes see light, colours, or the ears hear sounds and it is the palate not taste nor the nose

Clap. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding sect. 11. pt.

smell and all colours tastes odours and sounds as they are such particular ideas vanish and cease and are reduced to their causes 1 e bulk figure and motion of parts

18 *The secondary exist in thin s only as modes of the primary* A piece of manna of a sensible bulk is able to produce in us the idea of a round or square figure and by being removed from one place to another the idea of motion This idea of motion represents it as it really is in manna moving a circle or square are the same whether in idea or existence in the mind or in the manna And thus both motion and figure are really in the manna whether we take notice of them or no thus everybody is ready to agree to Besides manna by the bulk figure texture and motion of its parts has a power to produce the sensations of sickness and sometimes of acute pains or gripings in us That these ideas of sickness and pain are not in the manna but effects of its operations on us and are nowhere 1 hen 1 e feel them not thus also every one readily agrees to And yet men are hardly to be brought to think that sweetness and whiteness are not really in manna which are but the effects of the operations of manna by the motion size and figure of its particles on the eyes and palate as the pain and sickness caused by manna are confessedly nothing but the effects of its operations on the stomach and guts by the size motion and figure of its insensible parts (for by nothing else can a body operate as has been proved) as if it could not operate on the eyes and palate and thereby produce in the mind particular distinct ideas which in itself it has not as well as we allow it can operate on the guts and stomach and thereby produce distinct ideas which in itself it has not These ideas being all effects of the operations of manna on several parts of our bodies by the size figure number and motion of its parts 1 hy those produced by the eyes and palate should rather be thought to be really in the manna than those produced by the stomach and guts or 1 hy the pain and sickness ideas that are the effect of manna should be thought to be now here 1 hen they are not felt and yet the sweetness and whiteness effects of the same manna on other parts of the body by ways equally as unknown should be thought to exist in the manna 1 hen they are not seen or tasted 1 ould need some reason to explain

19 *Examples* Let us consider the red and white colours in porphyry Under light from striking on it and its colours vanish it no longer produces any such ideas in us upon the return of light it produces these appearances on us

again Can any one think any real alterations are made in the porphyry by the presence or absence of light and that those ideas of whiteness and redness are really in porphyry in the light when it is plain it has no colour in the dark? It has indeed such a configuration of particles, both night and day as are apt by the rays of light rebounding from some parts of that hard stone to produce in us the idea of redness and from others the idea of whiteness but whiteness or redness are not in it at any time but such a texture that hath the power to produce such a sensation in us

20 Pound an almond and the clear white colour will be altered into a dirty one and the sweet taste into an oily one What real alteration can the beating of the pestle make in any body but an alteration of the texture of it?

21 *Explains how water felt as cold by one hand may be warm to the other* Ideas being thus distinguished and

an account time made and of the way one other whereas it is impossible that the same water if those ideas were really in it should at the same time be both hot and cold For if we imagine water as it is in our hands to be nothing but a certain sort and degree of motion in the minute particles of our nerves or animal spirits 1 e may understand how it is possible that the same water may at the same time produce the sensations of heat in one hand and cold in the other which yet figure never does that never producing the idea of a square by one hand which has produced the idea of a globe by another But if the sensation of heat and cold be nothing but the increase or diminution of the motion of the minute parts of our bodies caused by the corpuscles of any other body it is easy to be understood that if that motion be greater in one hand than in the other if a body be applied to the two hands which has in its minute particles a greater motion than in those of one of the hands and a less than in those of the other it will increase the motion of the one hand and lessen it in the other and so cause the different sensations of heat and cold that depend thereon

22 *A note*

separation a little understood and make the difference between the qualities in bodies and the ideas produced by them in the mind to be distinctly conceived without which it were impossible

possible, to excuse the licentiousness of them — I know I shall be pardoned this little excursion into natural philosophy: it being necessary in our present inquiry to distinguish the primary and real qualities of bodies, which are always in them (as solidity, extension, figure, number, and motion, or rest, and are sometimes perceived by us, viz. when the bodies they are in are big enough nearly to be discerned) from their secondary and varied qualities, which are but the powers of several combinations of those primary ones, when they operate without being directly discerned — whereby we may also come to know what ideas are, and what are not, resemblances of something real existing in the bodies we denominate from them.

23. *There are three sorts of qualities in bodies* The qualities, then, that are in bodies, rightly considered, are of three sorts —

First, The bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest of their solid parts. Those are in them, whether we perceive them or not — and when they are of that size that we can discover them, we have by them an idea of the thing as it is in nature, as is plain in artificial things. These I call primary qualities.

Secondly, The power that is in any body by reason of its insensible primary qualities, to operate in a peculiar manner on any of our senses, and thereby produce in us the different ideas of several colours, sounds, smells, tastes, &c. These are usually called *secondary qualities*.

Thirdly, The power that is in any body by reason of the particular constitution of its primary qualities, to make such change in the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of another body as to make it operate on our senses differently from what it did before. Thus the sun has a power to make wax warm, and fire to make lead fluid. These are usually called *powers*.

The first of these, as has been said, I think may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or not, and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend.

The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.

24. *The first sort of qualities is the most lasting* It is not the third nor the second sort of qualities. But, though the two latter sorts of qualities are powers barely and nothing but

Of Et. II. ch. xxiii. §

Of ch. xix. § 2.

powers, relative to several other bodies, and resulting from the different modifications of the original qualities, yet they are generally better wise thought of. For the second sort, viz. the powers that produce several ideas in us, by our senses, are looked upon as real qualities in the things. Thus affecting us, but the third sort are called and esteemed barely powers. The idea of heat or light, which we receive by our eyes, or touch, from the sun, are commonly thought real qualities existing in the sun, and something more than mere powers in it. But when we consider the sun in reference to wax, which it melts or blanches, we look on the whiteness and softness produced in the wax, not as qualities in the sun, but as effects produced by powers in it. Whereas, if rightly considered, these qualities of light and warmth, which are perceptions in me when I am warmed or enlivened by the sun, are no otherwise in the sun, than the changes made in the wax, when it is blanchied or melted, are in the sun. They are all of them equally powers in the sun, depending on its primary qualities, whereby it is able in the one case so to alter the bulk, figure, texture or motion of some of the insensible parts of my eyes or hands, as thereby to produce in me the idea of light or heat, and in the other it is able so to alter the bulk, figure, texture, or motion of the insensible parts of the wax, as to make them fit to produce in me the distinct idea of whiteness and fluid.

25. *Why the second sort of qualities is taken for qualities, and not the first power* The reason why the one are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be

appear not, to our senses, to operate in their production, and with which they have not an apparent connexion or conceivable connexion. Hence it is that we are so forward to imagine that those ideas are the resemblances of something really existing in the objects themselves, since reason discovers nothing of bulk, figure, or motion of parts in their production, nor can reason show how bodies, by their bulk, figure, and motion, should produce in the mind the ideas of blue or yellow &c. But, in the other case, in the operations of bodies changing the qualities one of another, we plainly discover that the quality produced hath commonly no resemblance with anything in the thing producing, wherefore we look on it as a bare effect of power. For through receiving the idea of heat or light from the sun, we are permitted

think it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun yet when we see wax or a fair face receive change of colour from the sun we cannot imagine that to be the reception or resemblance of anything in the sun because we find not those different colours in the sun itself For our senses being able to observe a likeness

is for the most part only passive and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving

2 *Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is* What perception is every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself when he sees hears feels &c or thinks, than by any discourse of mine Whoever is

not the communication of any quality which

unlikeness between the idea produced in us and the quality of the object producing it we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance

6 *Seconda y qu lities twofold first immediately perceivable secondly mediately perceivable* To conclude Besides those before mentioned primary qualities in bodies viz bulk figure extension number and mot on of their solid parts all the rest whereby we take notice of bodies and distinguish them one from another are nothing else but several powers in them depending on those primary qualities whereby they are fitted either by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different ideas in us or else by operating on other bodies so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did The former of these I think may be called secondary qualities immediately perceivable the latter secondary qualities mediately perceivable

Chap IX Of Perception

1 *Perceptio n the first simple idea of reflection* PERCEPTION as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection and is by some called thinking in general Though thinking in the propriety of the English tongue signifies that sort of operation in the mind about its ideas wherein the mind is active where it with some degree of voluntary attention considers anything For in bare naked perception the mind

Of Bk IV ch § 2 h i § 14 &c S 150 Bk II ch x § 5 f r t h e e differ nt m anings of perc pti n in the Ex y

of it

3 *Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression* This is certain that whatever alterations are made in the body if they reach not the mind whatever impressions are made on the outward parts if they are not taken notice of within there is no perception Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a bullet unless the motion be continued to the brain and there the sense of heat or idea of pain be produced in the mind wherein consists actual perception

4 *Impulse on the or an insufficient* How often may a man observe in himself that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation

of hearing with the same alteration that we see be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ but it not reaching the observation of the mind there follows no perception and though the motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear yet no sound is heard Want of sensation in this case is not through any defect in the organ or that the man's ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea though conveyed in by the usual organ not being taken notice of in the understanding and so imprinting no idea in the mind there follows no sensation So that wherever there is sense or perception there some idea is actually produced and present in the understanding

5 *Children tho' they have id as the womb have no este* Therefore I doubt not but children by the exercise of their senses about ob-

or else of those wants or diseases they are amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and thirst are two which probably are some of the first that children

CRAP IX

dre ha ve and which they scarce er part th
ain.

6. *The Acts farus on the womb* But thou h
it be reasonabl t magin that children rece e
some id as before they com in th world yet
these imple id as are far from those *unat frar*
ph huch some cont nd for and we abo e
hav rejected These here mentioned being th
effects of sensation, ar only from some affec
tions f the bod which happen t them th e,
and so depend on som th genex ort th m d
no otherwise differing n th r mann f pro
duction from th ideas d ed from sense but
only in the precedency of time Wh reas those
nat princip es ar supposed to be quit f
another natur not comin into th mind by
an cond tal alter tions or per t ns n
t bod b t, as t were or gt al char cters m
pressed pon t, in th very first moment f its
be n and constitutu n.

7 *Which deas fear for t, is t eident or um*
portant As ther ar some deas which we may
reasonably suppose may be introd ced int th
minds f children in th omb subser e t t
the necessaries f th lif and bein there so
after they are bo those d as are the earliest
imprim ed huch happen to be th sent bl qual
ties huch first occur to th m m gt which
l-ht is t th l ast cons derabl nor f the
weakest efficacy And how covetous the mind is
t be furnished w th all such d as ar ha e no
pain accompanying th th, may be liti guessed
by what is bservabl in childre new born who
always turn their eyes t that part f m wh ce
the light comes, lay th m how you pl ase. But
the id as that are most f miliar t first, be
various according to th di vers circumstances of
child en first entertainment in th world, th
order wherein th several d as come t first in
to the mind is ry arious, d uncertain also
th is t m ch ma ial t know t.

8. *Sensat ons fien hang d by the judgment* W
ar further t consider co cerning pe ceptu
hat the id as w rece by sensation are ft n
in grown peopl altered by th j digne t, w th
out our taking uce f t. Wh n w set before
our eyes round gl be f any unif rm colour
g. gold, alabast or j t, t is certain that th
idea thereby imprinted n our mind is f flat
circel ariously shadowed w th several d grees
of light and brightness coming t our yes But
we ha ing by use, bee crust med t perce e
hat kind of ppearance co ex bodies are wo t
to make in us what alt tions are mad in th
reflections f light by the difference of th sens
ble figures of bodies — th judgme t presently

an hab tual cust m alt es th ppe r ces
int th r causes. So that f om th t which is
truly ar ty f shado r col u coll u g th
figure t makes t pass for a mark of figure a d
frames t self th pe ception f co ex figure
a d a unif m col ur wh n th de e e
ce f m th ce is n d a plane ariously col
oured as is ex d t n p t e To which pur
pose I shall here nsert problem of that cry
ve ous d tud ous promoter f realk or l
edge th l arned and worthy M M lyneux,
which he as pl ased t se d me alet som
months since d t is thus — S ppose ma
born bl d d not dult and ta tch by his
touch t d t gush between cube d a sphe e

~ t d them he could n w

fects his t ch, yet he has n t yet obtai ed th
xpert ce that what affects his touch so or so,
~ t

how much he may be beholden t xpert ce
improvement and cquired not ons, where he
thinks h had n t the l ast use f h lp from
them. And the th because this bserving
g d man further dds, that ha ing upon the
occas f my book, proposed thast di vers ery
ingeni u men, he hardly ever met w th one
that firs ga eth answer t t which h thinks
tru ull by hearing his asons they were con
vinced

9. *This judgment pt to b mistaken for direct per*
pt om B t this is n t, I think, usual in any of
our d as, but those ecc ed by sight. Because
sight, the most comp ehens f all our senses,
co eying t ur minds th d as f light and
colours, which are peculiar nly t that sense

think it is a perception and resemblance of such a quality in the sun yet when we see wax or a fair face receive change of colour from the sun we cannot imagine that to be the reception or resemblance of anything in the sun because we find not those different colours in the sun itself For our senses being able to observe a likeness or unlikeness of sensible qualities in two different external objects we formerly enough conclude the production of any sensible quality in any subject to be an effect of bare power and not the communication of any quality which as really in the efficient when we find no such sensible quality in the thing that produced it But our senses not being able to discover any unlikeness between the idea produced in us and the quality of the object producing it we are apt to imagine that our ideas are resemblances of something in the objects and not the effects of certain powers placed in the modification of their primary qualities with which primary qualities the ideas produced in us have no resemblance

§ Secondary qualities twofold first immediately perceivable secondly mediately perceivable To conclude Besides those before mentioned primary

qualities which distinguish them one from another are nothing else but several powers in them depending on those primary qualities whereby they are fitted either by immediately operating on our bodies to produce several different ideas in us or else by operating on other bodies so to change their primary qualities as to render them capable of producing ideas in us different from what before they did The former of these I think may be called secondary qualities immediately perceivable the latter secondary qualities mediately perceivable

Chap. IV. Of Perception

1 Perceptio est the first simple idea Perception PERCEPTION as it is the first faculty of the mind exercised about our ideas so it is the first and simplest idea we have from reflection and is by some called thinking in general Though think

some degree of voluntary attention considers anything For in bare naked perception the mind

Cf Bk IV ch 1 § 2 ch § 4 &c See also Bk II ch xxi § 5 for three different meanings of perception in the Essay

for the most part only passive and what perceives it cannot avoid perceiving

Reflection alone can give us the idea of what perception is What perception is, every one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself when he sees hears feels &c. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine Whoever reflects on what passes in his own mind cannot miss it And if he does not reflect all the words in the world cannot make him have any notion of it

3 Arises in sensation only when the mind notices the organic impression This is certain that whatever alterations are made in the body if they reach not the mind whatever impressions are made on the outward parts if they are not taken notice of within there is no perception Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a bell unless the motion be continued to the brain and there the sense of heat or idea of pain be produced in the mind wherein consists actual perception

4 Impulse on the organ insufficient How often may a man observe in himself that whilst his mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects and curiously surveying some ideas that are there it takes no notice of impressions of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing with the same alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A sufficient impulse there may be on the organ but it not reaching the observation of the mind there follows no perception and though it be made

the organ or that the man's ears are less affected than at other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea though conveyed in by the usual organ not being taken notice of in the understanding and so imprinting no idea in the mind there follows no sensation So that wherever there is sense or perception there some idea is actually produced and present in the understanding

5 Child & though it may have ideas in the womb have none in it Therefore I doubt not but children by the exercise of their senses about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas before they are born as the unavoidable effects either of the bodies that environ them, or else of those ants or diseases they suffer amongst which (some may conjecture concerning things not very capable of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two which probably are some of the first that children

and principles) is in his knowledge and intellectual faculties above the condition of a cock, or a horse. I leave to be considered. And if a man had passed sixty years in such a state, as it is possible he might, as well as three days, I wonder what difference there would be, in intellectual perceptions, between him and the lowest degree of a man.

15. *Perception* is the first step of all manner of knowledge. Perception then being the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the subject of all the materials of the lower senses any man, as well as any other creature hath, and the fewer and clearer the impressions are that are made by them, and the clearer the faculties are that are employed about them, — the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in some men. But this being in great measure defective (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the several species of animals, much less in their particular individuals. It suffices me only to have remarked here, — that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the subject of all knowledge in our minds. And I am apt too to imagine that it is perception, in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention not as my conjecture by the way, but being indifferent to the manner in hand which way the learned will determine of it.

Chap. V. Of Retention

1. *Continuation*. The next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a further progress towards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or continuance of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done two ways.

First, by keeping the idea which is brought into it, for some time actually in view which is called *continuation*.

2. *Memory*. The other way of retention is, the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which, as it is possible, have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight. And thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, — the object being removed. This is memory which is as were the storehouse of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have repository to lay up those ideas which, at another time, it might have use of. But, our

being nothing but casual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be actual when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory serves no more but this, — that the mind has a power in many cases to revive perceptions which it has once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that *this is the same*. And in this sense it is that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually nowhere — but only there is an *idea* in the mind when it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them anew on itself though some with more some with less difficulty some more lively and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty that we are said to have all those ideas in our understandings which, though we do not actually consider them we can bring in sight, and make repeat again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible quantities which first impressed them there.

3. *Attention, repetition, pressure and pain*. *Attention* and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory. But those which natural strength first make the deepest and most lasting impressions, are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain. The great business of the senses being, to make us take notice of what hurts or advantages the body it is wisely ordered by nature, as has been shown, that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas which, supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children, and acting quicker than consideration in grown men, makes both the old and young avoid painful objects with that haste which is necessary for their preservation and in both serves in the memory a caution for the future.

4. *Less false in the memory*. Concerning the several degrees of lastingness, whereof ideas are impressed on the memory we may observe, — that some of them have been produced in the understanding by an object affecting the senses once only and no more than once others, that have more than once offered themselves to the senses, have yet been little taken notice of the mind, either heedless, as in children, or otherwise employed, as in men intent only on one thing, not setting the stamp deep into itself. And in some, where they are set on with care and repeated impressions, either through the temper of the body or some other fault, the memory is very weak. In all these cases, ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no more footsteps or remaining

and also the far different ideas of space figure and motion the several varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object viz light and colours 1 = bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other This in many cases by a settled habit — in things whereof we have frequent experience is performed so constantly and so quick that we take that for the perception of our sensation which is an idea formed by our judgment so that one viz that of sensation serves only to excite the other and is scarce taken notice of itself — attention and 1 of the character but of the ideas that are excited in him by them

10 How by habit ideas of sensation are unconsciously changed into ideas of judgment Nor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice if we consider how quick the actions of the mind are performed For as itself is thought to take up no space 1 to have no extension so its actions seem to require no time but many of them seem to be crowded into an instant I speak this in comparison to the actions of the body Any one may easily observe this in his own thoughts who will take the pains to reflect on them H- 1000 -

11 put it into words and step by step show it another? Secondly we shall not be so much surprised that this is done in us with so little notice if we consider how the facility which 1 = get of doing things by a custom of doing makes them often pass in us 1 without our notice Habits especially such as a e begun very early come at last to produce actions in us which often escape our observation 12

12 by custom have got the use of a by word do almost in every sentence pronounce sounds 1 huch though taken notice of by others they themselves neither hear nor observe And therefore it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of its sensation into that of its judgment and make one serve only to excite the other 1 without our taking notice of it

13 Perception is the difference between animals and vegetables This faculty of perception seems to me to be that which puts the distinction between the animal kingdom and the inferior parts of nature For however vegetables have many of them some degrees of motion and upon the 1st ch. xxvii § 2 on the 'place of spirits

different application of other bodies to them do very briskly alter their figures and mor 1 50 h - 1 from 1

14 all the turning of a wild oat beard by the insinuation of the particles of moisture or the shortening of a rope by the affusion of water All which is done without any sensation in the subject; or the having or receiving any ideas

15 Perception in all animals 1 D lieve that

16 the reception of sensations are so few and the perception they are received 1 with so obscure and dull that it comes extremely short of the quickness and variety of sensation which is in other animals but yet it is sufficient for and wisely adapted to the state and condition of that sort of animals who are thus made So that the wisdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this stupendous fabric and all the several degrees and ranks of creatures in it

17 According to their condition We may I think from the make of an oyster or cockle reasonably conclude that it has not so many nor so quick senses as a man or several other animals nor if it had would it in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another be bettered by them What good would sight and hearing do to a creature that cannot move itself to or from the objects wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of sensation be an inconvenience to an animal that must lie still where chance has once placed it and there receive the afflux of colder or warmer clean or foul water as it happens to come to it?

18 Decay of perception in old age But yet I can not but think there is some small dull perception whereby they are distinguished from 1

19 of his past knowledge and clearly wiped out the ideas he had as formerly stored with and has by destroying his sight hearing and smell quite and his taste to a great degree stopped up almost all the passages for new ones to enter or if there be some of the inlets yet half open the impressions made are scarcely perceived or not at all retained How far such an one (notwithstanding all that is boasted of in

—

where the knowledge of separate spirits may exceedingly surpass ours.

10 But *has memory* This faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought into the mind several times in animals seems to have to a great degree as well as man. For to pass by the

of the

have perceptions, and retain ideas in its memory, and use them for patterns. For it is easy to imagine that they should be able to compare the voice to the note (as it is plain that the bird of which they had ideas. For though I should grant sound may mechanically cause a certain motion in the animal parts in the brains of those birds, but the motion actually plays upon and that motion may be continued on the muscles of the wings, and so the bird mechanically be directed in any way by certain noises, because this may tend to the birds preservation

show conform to the notes of a foreign sound which imitation can be of no use to the birds preservation. But, which is more, it cannot with any appearance of reason be supposed (much less proved) that birds, without sense and memory can approach their notes near and nearer by degrees. I have heard yesterday which if they have ideas of their memory is now nowhere nor can be a pattern for them to imitate or which they repeated says can bring them nearest. Since there is no reason why the sound of a peep should lead to their notes, which is at first, but by their after-idea ours, should produce the like sounds and why the sounds they make themselves, should make the peeps which they should follow as well as those of the peep is impossible to conceive.

Chap VI Of Discerning and other operations of the Mind

1. *Knowledge of the discernment* Another faculty may take its firmness is that of discerning and distinguishing between the several ideas as they are. It is enough to have a con-

—

are now and then mind were continually etc
C. W. James Principles of Psychology, p. 111

calls for them, we are almost as good as lost as to them quite since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man, who loses the opportunity whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than is that is perfectly ignorant. It is the business the faculty has to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas as much as it has present occasions for in the handling them ready to hand on all occasions, consists that which we call invention, fancy and quickness of parts.

9. *And facts which belong to the memory of man as far as* These are the facts we may observe in the memory of a man compared with another. There is another fact which we may conceive to be in the memory of man in general — compared with some superior created intellectual beings, which in this faculty may surpass far more than that they may have instantly with the whole set of all their former notions, which remain on their thoughts they have even had may slip out of their sight. The musician of God who knows all things, past, present, and to come and to whom the thoughts of men and animals are like pen, may satisfy us of the possibility of this. For we can doubt but God may communicate to those glorious spirits, his immediate attendants, any of his perceptions of what positions he places, as far as created finite beings can be capable. It is reported that prodigy of parts, Monsieur Pascal that till the decay of his health had impaired his memory he forgot nothing of what he had done or thought, in any part of his life. This is probably a little known most men that it seems almost incredible to those who are in the ordinary way measure all others by themselves but yet, which considered, may help us to enlarge our thoughts towards the perfect spirits, in superlatives.

of spirit. For this Monsieur Pascal was told that the narrowness that human minds are confined to here — of having great variety of ideas only by success on all at once. Where as the several degrees of sense is may probably have larger and some of them be deduced from the capacities to retain together and constantly before them, as in a picture, all their past knowledge at once. Thus, we may conceive would be a small advantage to the knowledge of a thinking man — if all his past thoughts and reasonings could be always present to him. And therefore we may suppose that those who yet,

characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn and the mind is as void of them as if they had never been there

5 *Causes of oblivion* Thus many of those ideas which were produced in the minds of children in the beginning of their sensation (some of which perhaps as of some pleasures and pains were before they were born and others in their infancy) if the future course of their lives they are not repeated again are quite lost without the least glimpse remaining of them. Thus may be observed in those who by some mischance have lost their sight when they were very young in whom the ideas of colours having been but slightly taken notice of and ceasing to be repeated do quite wear out so that some years after there is no more notion nor memory of colours left in their minds than in those of people born blind. The memory of some men it is true is very tenacious even to a miracle. But yet there seems to be a constant decay of all our ideas even of those which are struck deepest and in minds the most retentive so that if they be not sometimes renewed by repeated exercise of the senses or reflection on those kinds of objects which at first occasioned them the print wears out and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Thus the ideas as well as children of our youth often die before us and our minds represent to us those tombs to which we are approaching where though the brass and marble remain yet the inscriptions are effaced by time and the imagery moulders away. The pictures drawn in our minds are laid in fading colours and if not sometimes refreshed vanish and disappear. How much the constitution of our bodies and the make of our animal spirits are concerned in this and whether the temper of the brain makes this difference that in some it retains the characters drawn on it like marble in others like freestone and in others little better than sand I shall not here inquire though it may seem probable that the constitution of the body does sometimes influence the memory since we oftentimes find a disease quite strip the mind of all its ideas and the flames of a fever in a few days call in all those images to dust and confusion which seemed to be as lasting as if graven in marble.

6 *Constantly repeated ideas can scarcely be lost* But concerning the ideas themselves it is easy to remark that those that are oftener refreshed (amongst which are those that are conveyed into the mind by more ways than one) by a frequent return of the objects or actions that produce them fix themselves best in the memory and remain clearest and longest there and therefore those

which are of the original qualities of bodies, viz. solidity extension figure motion and rest and those that almost constantly affect our bodies as heat and cold and those which are the affections of all kinds of beings, as existence, duration and number which almost every object that affects our senses every thought which en

7 *In remembering the mind is often active* In this secondary perception as I may so call it or viewing again the ideas that are lodged in the memory the mind is oftentimes more than barely passive the appearance of those dormant pictures depending sometimes on the will. The mind very often sets itself on work in search of some hidden idea and turns as it were the eye of the soul upon it though sometimes too they start up in our minds of their own accord and offer themselves to the understanding and very often are roused and tumbled out of their dark cells into open daylight, by turbulent and tempestuous passions our affections bringing ideas to our memory which had otherwise lain quiet and unregarded. This further is to be observed concerning ideas lodged in the memory and upon occasion revived by the mind that they are not only (as the word *revive* imports) none of them new ones but also that the mind takes notice of them as of a former impression and renews its acquaintance with them as with ideas it had known before. So that though ideas formerly imprinted are not all constantly in view yet in remembrance they are constantly known to be such as have been formerly imprinted i.e. in view and taken notice of before by the understanding.

8 *Two defects in the memory oblivion and slowness* Memory in an intellectual creature is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great moment that here it is wanting all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless. And we in our thoughts reasonings and knowledge could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories where in the memory may be the defects —

First, That it loses the idea quite and so far it produces perfect ignorance. For since we can know nothing further than we have the idea of when that is gone we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves slowly and retrieves not the ideas that it has and are laid up in store quick enough to serve the mind upon occasion. This if it be to a great degree is stupid

and useful only to abstract reasonings, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.

6. *Composing*. The next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas is composition whereby it puts together several of those simple ones it has received from sensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of composition may be reckoned also that of *enlarging* wherein, though the composition does not so much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless putting several ideas together though of the same kind. Thus, by adding several units together we make the idea of dozen and put together the repeated ideas of several perches, we frame that of furlong.

But we need not stop here. In this also, I suppose brutes come far short of man. For though they take in, and retain together several combinations of simple ideas, as possibly the shape, smell, and voice of his master make up the complex idea of dog has of him, or rather are so many distinct marks whereby he knows him yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex ideas. And perhaps even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one impression that directs them to the knowledge of some one thing.

to
be

For instance, you can buy a dog once it sucks her so long that her milk may go through them. And those animals which have numerous broods of young, once it once, appear not to have any notion of their number for though they are much concerned for an infant their young that are taken from them whilst they are in sight or hearing yet if one or two of them be stolen from them in their absence or without noise, they appear not to miss them, or to have any sense that their number is lessened.

8. *Learning*. When children have by repeated sensations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin by degrees to learn the use of signs. And as they have not the skill to produce the organs of speech, the frame of articulate sounds, they begin to make use of words, to signify their ideas to others. These verbal signs they sometimes borrow from others, and sometimes make themselves, as one may observe among the new and unusual names children often give to things in the first use of language.

9. *Abstraction*. The use of words when being to see clearly, and distinctly.

stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and those ideas being taken from particular things,

they are in the mind such appearances,—separate from all other existences, and the circumstances of real existence as time, place, or any other concomitant idea. This is called *abstraction* whereby ideas taken from particular beings become general representatives of all of the same kind and their names general names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract ideas. Such precise naked appearances in the mind, without consideration how where or with what others they came there the understanding separates (with names common annexed to them) as the standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same colour being observed to-day in chalk or snow which the mind yesterday received from milk, it considers that appearance alone, makes it representative of all of that kind and having given it the name *white* by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met with and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.

10. *Brutes abstract not*. If it may be doubted whether brutes compound and enlarge their ideas as that was an degree this, I think, I may be positive in,—that the power of abstracting is not at all in them and that the highest of general ideas is that which puts a perfect distinction between man and brutes, and is an excellent mark which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain to. For it is evident we observe no footings in them of making general ideas for universal ideas from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, since they have no use of words, or any other general signs.

Brutes abstract not yet so as to be made as we can't be imputed their want of fix or ways to fix me articulate sounds, that they have no use or knowledge of general words since many of them, we find, can fashion such sounds, and pronounce words distinctly now and then, but never with an such application. And, on the other side, men who, through some defect in the organs, want words, yet fail not to express their universal ideas by signs, which serve them in-

OF THE IV. ch. xvii. § 8.

OF THE III. ch. iii. § 6. OF THE IV. ch. vii. § 9.

ployed in thinking On this faculty of distinguishing one thing from another depends the evidence and certainty of several even very general propositions which have passed for innate truths — because men overlooking the true cause why those propositions find universal assent impute it wholly to native uniform impressions whereas it in truth depends upon this clear discerning faculty of the mind whereby it perceives two ideas to be the same or different But of this more hereafter

2 *The difference of wit and judgment* How much the imperfection of accurately discriminating ideas one from another lies either in the dulness or faults of the organs of sense or want of acuteness exercise or attention in the understanding or hastiness and precipitancy natural to some tempers I will not here examine it suffices to take notice that this is one of the operations that the mind may reflect on and observe in itself It is of that consequence to its other knowledge that so far as this faculty is in itself dull or not rightly made use of for the distinguishing one thing from another — so far our notions are confused and our reason and judgment disturbed or misled If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand consists quickness of parts in this of having them unconfused and being able nicely to distinguish one thing from another where there is but the least difference consists in a great measure the exactness of judgment, and clearness of reason which is to be observed in one man above another And hence perhaps may be given some reason of that common observation — that men who have a great deal of wit and prompt memories have not always the clearest judgment or deepest reason For uniting most in the assemblage of ideas and putting those together with quickness and variety wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy judgment on the contrary lies quite on the other side in separating carefully one from another ideas wherein can be found the least difference thereby to avoid being misled by similitude and by affinity to take one thing for another This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allusion wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleasantries of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy and therefore is so acceptable to all people because its beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labor of thought to examine what truth or reason there is in it. The mind with

out looking any further rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture and the gaiety of the fancy And it is a kind of affront to go about to examine it, by the severe rules of truth and good reason whereby it appears that it consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to them.

3 *Clearness alone hinders confusion.* To the well distinguishing our ideas it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate And when they are so it will not breed any confusion or mistake about them though the senses should (as some times they do) convey them from the same object differently on different occasions and so seem to err For though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste which at another

only gall Nor does it make any more confusion

than it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and sweet or white and round that the same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time And the ideas of orange-colour and azure that are produced in the mind by the same parcel of the infusion of *ergum niphaticum* are no less distinct ideas than those of the same colours taken from two very different bodies

4 *Comparing* The comparing them one with another in respect of extent degrees time place or any other circumstances is another operation of the mind about its ideas and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas comprehended under reflection which of how vast an extent it is I shall have occasion to consider hereafter

5 *Brutes compare but imperfectly* How far brutes partake in this faculty is not easy to determine I imagine they have it not in any great degree for though they probably have several ideas distinct enough yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of human understanding when it has sufficiently distinguished any ideas so as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and so consequently two to cast about and consider in what circumstances they are capable to be compared And therefore I think beasts compare not the ideas further than some sensible circumstances annexed to the objects themselves The other power of comparing which may be observed in men belongs to general ideas,

¹ Cf Bk IV chh xiv xv xvi.

² See chh. xx xvi 1

I must appeal to experience and observation
 whether I am in the right. The best way to come
 to truth being, to examine things as really they
 are, and not to conclude there as we fancy
 of ourselves, or have been taught by others to

5.1. *edba miz* T d'altrul this is the
 ex. wa that I can discover whereby the *ideas*
 /*ide* are brought into the understanding. If
 other men ha'e either innate ad as or caused
 principles, they ha'e reason // for them and
 if they are sure of it, it is impossible for others to
 deny them the principle. But they ha'e above
 their neighbours. I can speak but of what I find
 in myself, and is treacable to those notions.
 And, if we will examine the whole course of
 men in their several *es*, countries, and ed *es*,
 nations, seen to depend on those foundations which
 I have laid, and to correspond with this method
 to all the parts and degrees thereof.

Dark room. I pretend not to see it, but to know it, and therefore cannot but confess here again—that external and internal sensation are the only passages I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the window by which light is let into the dark room. For metaphysics, the understanding is not much worse closed wholly shut from light, with only some little prunings left, to let in external, visible resemblances, or ideas of things that would otherwise come in so fresh as direct rays but stay here, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding of man, in reference to all objects of light, and the ideas of it.

These are my guesses concerning the means whereby the understanding comes to have and retain simple ideas, and the modes of them, with some other operations by them.

I proceed now to examine some of these same
 ideas and their modes. Let me particu-

Chap VII Of Com ex Ideas

Made by the mind out of simple ones. We have
 hitherto considered those ideas, in the reception
 whereof the mind is only passive, which are those
~~any~~ ones received from sensation and reflection
 before the mind, whereof the mind cannot
 take care to itself, nor have any idea which does
 not wholly consist of them. But as the mind is
 the passive in the reception of all its simpli-
 fied, so it exerts several acts of its own, where-
 by out of simple ideas, as the materials and
 foundations of the rest, the others are framed.
 The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power

over its simple ideas, are hief these three: (1) Combining several simple ideas into one compound one and thus all the words are made. (2) The second is bringing two ideas together, whether simple or compound, together and setting them by one another so as to take view of them together.

company them in their real existence this is called abstraction and thus all its general laws are made. This shows man's power and is a law of operation, to be much the same in the material and intellectual world. For the materials in both being such as it has no power over them to make or destroy all that man can do is either to unite them together or to set them by one another or who'd separate them. I had here been with the first of these in the consideration of complex ideas, and come to the other two in their due places. As simple ideas are observed to exist in several combinations united together so the mind has a power to consider several of them united together as one idea and that not only as they are united in external objects, but as itself has joined them together. It is thus made up of several simple ones put together I call an *idea*—such as a beautiful creature, a man, an arm, the universe which, though compounded of various simple ideas, or complex ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind pleases, considered each by itself, as if it were thus united and unified by one name.

2. Universal in this faculty (repeated and joining together) is id. as, the mind has great power in trying and multiplying the bits of its own info. el beyond what sensation or reflection furnished it with but all this still confined to those simple ideas which traced from those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of all its compositions. For simple ideas are all from things themselves, and of these the mind can have no more nor other than what are supplied to it. It can have no other ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without by the senses nor any other kind of operations of thinking, e.g. instance, than what it finds in itself. But when it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined barely to observation, and what flows itself from without, it can, by its own power put together those ideas it has, and make new combinations, which it never received so simple.

3. Can the laws of nature be understood, in nature or otherwise. **COMPLEX IDEAS**, however compounded including God. Cf. Ek. II. ch. xiii. § 33.

stead of general words a faculty which we see beasts come short in And therefore I think we may suppose that it is in this that the species of brutes are discriminated from man and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly separated and which at last extends to so vast a distance For if they have any ideas at all and are not bare machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some reason It seems as evident to me that they do some of them in certain instances reason as that they have sense but it is only in particular ideas just as they received them from their senses They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraction

1 *Idiots and madmen* How far idiots are concerned in the want or weakness of any or all of the foregoing faculties an exact observation of their several ways of faulting would no doubt discover For those who either perceive but dully or retain the ideas that come into their minds but ill who cannot readily excite or compound them will have little matter to think on Those who cannot distinguish compare and abstract would hardly be able to understand and make

And indeed any of the forementioned faculties

the defect in naturals seems to proceed from want of quickness activity and motion in the intellectual faculties whereby they are deprived of reason whereas madmen on the other side seem to suffer by the other extreme For they do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning but having joined together some ideas very wrongly they mistake them for truths and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles For by the violence of their imaginations having taken their fancies for real ties they make right deductions from them Thus you shall find a distracted man fancying himself a king with a right inference require suitable attend

125 Hence it comes to pass that a man who is very sober and of a right understanding in all other things may in one particular be as frantic as any in Bedlam either by any sudden very strong impression or long fixing his fancy upon one sort of thoughts incoherent ideas have been

cemented together so powerfully as to remain united But there are degrees of madness, as of folly the disorderly jumbling ideas together in some more and some less In short here it seems to lie the difference between idiots and madmen that madmen put wrong ideas together and so make wrong propositions but argue and reason right from them but idiots make very few or no propositions and reason scarce at all

14 *Method followed in this explicit method of faculties* These I think are the first faculties and operations of the mind which it makes use of in understanding and though they are exercised about

faculties of the mind to that of simple ideas before I come to what I have to say concerning complex ones for these following reasons —

First Because several of these faculties being exercised at first principally about simple ideas, we might, by following nature in its ordinary method trace and discover them in their rise progress and gradual improvements

Secondly Because observing the faculties of the mind how they operate about simple ideas, which are usually in most men's minds much more clear precise and distinct than complex ones — we may the better examine and learn how the mind extracts denominates compare and exercises in its other operations about those which are complex wherein we are much more liable to mistake

Thirdly Because these very operations of the mind about ideas received from sensations refer themselves when reflected on another set of ideas derived from that other source of our knowledge

abstracting &c I have but just spoken having occasion to treat of them more at large in other places

15 *The true beginning of human knowledge* And thus I have given a short and I think true history of the first beginnings of human knowledge — whence the mind has its first objects and by what steps it makes its progress to the laying in and storing up those ideas out of which it is to be framed all the knowledge it is capable of here

implies especially of extension — treat of the human mind — Cf Bk IV ch. § 2 Chh xi — xx § 6–8 Bk III ch. i

& The historical plain matter of fact method (Introd § 2)

— — — — —

extremities come within our reach and the eye takes both from bodies as deors, whose bodies are as with theirs, where observing how the extremities terminate—either in straight lines which meet at discernible angles or in crooked lines wherein the angles can be perceived.

those distinct simple modes of a degree is a gross, a million.

2 *Idea of space* I shall begin with the simple idea of space I have showed before in chap. V that getting the degree of space both by our sight and touch which, I think, is so evident, that it would be as needless to go to prove that men perceive by their sight, distance between bodies of different colours, between the parts of the same body as that they see colours themselves nor is it less obvious, that they can do so in the dark by feeling and touch.

3 *Space and extension.* This space considered barely in length between any two beings without considering anything else between them is called *distance* if considered in length, breadth, and thickness, I think it may be called *property* (The term *extension* is usually applied to it in that manner soever considered)

4 *Immutability* Each different distance is of different modification of space and each degree of any different distance, or space is *simple mode* of this idea. Men, for the use of both the custom of measuring set in their minds the degrees as of certain stated lengths,—such as are an inch, foot, yard, fathom, mile diameter of the earth &c. which are so many distinct degrees made up only of space. When any such stated lengths or measures of space are made familiar to men, though they can, in their minds, repeat them as often as they will, without mixing or joining to them the degree of body or anything else and frame to themselves the degrees as of a square cubit feet, yards of the measure, the utmost bounds of all bodies and, by adding these till one to another enlarge their degrees as of pace as much as they please. The power of repeating or doubling the degree of any distance and adding it to the former as often as we will without being ever able to come to any top or stint, let us enlarge it as much as we will, is that which gives us the idea of *immunity*

5 *Figure* There is another modification of this idea, which is thing but the limits in which the parts of the terminate figures on or are circumscribed space have most themselves. Thus the touch discovers in sensible bodies, whose

the stock that the mind has in its power by varying the degrees of space and thereby making till new compositions, by repeating the same degrees, and joining them as it pleases, is perfectly inexhaustible. And so it can multiply figures

Enam

6 *Endless variety of figures* For the mind having power to repeat the degrees of length directly

or fourth, or what part it pleases without being able to come to an end of any such degrees, it can make an angle of any bigness. So also the lines that are to be described, what lengths it pleases, which joining gain to other lines, of different lengths, and of different angles, till it has wholly enclosed any space it is evident that it can multiply figures, both in their shape and capacity

Enam all which are but so many different simple modes of space

The same that it can do with straight lines it can also do with crooked or crooked and straight together and the same it can do in lines, it can also in superficies by which we may be led into farther thoughts of the endless variety of figures that the mind has power to make, and that by it multiply the simple modes of space

7 *Place* Another idea coming under this head,

and decomposed though their number be in finite and the variety endless wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men yet I think they may be all reduced under these three heads —

- 1 MODES
- 2 SUBSTANCES
- 3 RELATIONS

4 *Ideas of modes* First *Modes* I call such complex ideas which however compounded contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves but are considered as dependences on or affections of substances — such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle gratitude murder &c And if in this I use the word mode in some hat is different sense from its ordinary signification I beg pardon it being unavoidable in discourses differing from the ordinary received notions either to make new words or to use old words in somewhat a new signification the later whereof in our present case is perhaps the more tolerable of the two

5 *Simple and mixed modes of simple ideas* Of these *modes* there are two sorts which deserve distinct consideration

First there are some which are only variations or different combinations of the same simple idea without the mixture of any other — as a dozen or score which are nothing but the ideas of so many distinct units added together and these I call *simple modes* as being contained within the bounds of one simple idea

Secondly there are others compounded of simple ideas of several kinds put together to make one complex one — v g beauty consisting of a certain composition of colour and figure causing delight to the beholder theft which being the concealed change of the possession of any thing without the consent of the proprietor contains as visible a combination of several ideas of several kinds and these I call *mixed modes**

6 *Ideas of substances single or collective* Secondly the ideas of *Substances* are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct

also there are two sorts of ideas — one of *single substances* as they exist separately as of a man or a sheep the other of several of those put together as an army of men or flock of sheep — which *collective ideas* of several substances thus put together are as much each of them one simple idea as that of a man or an unit

7 *Ideas of relation* Thirdly the last sort of complex ideas is that we call *Relation* which consists in the consideration and comparing one idea with another

Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order

■ *The abstrusest ideas we can have are all from two sources* If we trace the progress of our minds and with attention observe how it repeats adds together and unites its simple ideas received from sensation or reflection it will lead us further than at first perhaps we should have imagined And I believe we shall find if carefully observe the originals of our notions that even the most abstruse ideas how remote soever they may seem from sense or from any operations of our own minds are yet only such as the understanding frames to itself by repeating and joining together ideas that it had either from objects of sense or from its own operations about them so that those even large and abstract ideas are derived from sensation or reflection being no other than what the mind by the ordinary use of its own faculties employed about ideas received from objects of sense or from the operations it observes in itself about them may and does attain unto

Thus I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of space time and infinity and some few others that seem the most remote from those originals

Chap XIII Complex Ideas of Simple Modes —and First of the Simple Modes of the Idea of Space

1 *Simple modes of simple ideas* Though in the foregoing part I have often mentioned simple ideas which are truly the materials of all our knowledge yet having treated of them there rather in the way that they come into the mind than as distinguished from others more com-

thought and reasoning joined to substance make the ordinary idea of a man Now of substances

* Treated in chapters XIII–XXI.

* See ch. XXII.

without the help of any extraneous object, or any foreign suggestion

Those modifications of any one simple idea

some that would persuade us, that body and extension are the same, that whoever change the signification of words, which I would not suspect them from—they having so severely condemned the philosophy of others, because it hath been too much placed in the uncertain meaning or doubtful security of doubtful or insignificant terms. If therefore they mean by body and extension the same that other people do, viz. by body something that is solid and extended, whose parts are separable and movable in different ways, and by extension, only the space that lies between the extrinsecal figures of those solid coherent parts, and which is possessed by them,—they confound very different ideas of which one is other for I appeal to every man's own thoughts, both that if space be not as distinct from that of solidity as it is from that of scarlet to our eyes. It is true, solidity cannot exist without extension, nor the scarlet colour exist without extension, but this hinders not, but that they are distinct ideas. Many ideas equate there, as necessary to the intellect or conception, which yet are very distinct ideas. As you can neither be or be conceived, without space, and yet motion is not space nor space motion, space can exist without it, and they are very distinct ideas and so I think, are those of space and solidity. Solidity is so inseparable an idea from body that so that depends is filled with space, contact, impulse and communication of motion upon impulse. And if it be reason to prove that spirit is different from body because think

superficies where before there was a continuity and consider them as moved or removed from the other which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated and by separation of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they think have not, but are capable of being either of these ways of separation whether real or mental as I think, compatible to pure space.

It is true a man may consider so much of such a piece as is answerable or commensurate to a foot, without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a partial consideration, but not so much as mental separation or division. Since a man can no more mentally divide without considering in two superficies separated one from the other than he can actually divide without making two superficies divided from each other but partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun without its heat, or mobility in body without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration, terminating in each alone and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately.

needs be a perpetual extension one cannot stand thus. Thus the divided terminated division is complete division.

body then and extension, is extended, as two distinct ideas.

2. *Extension not solidity.* First, Extension includes no solidity nor distance to the mind of body as body does.

3. *The parts of matter are both ally and unally.* Secondly, The parts of pure space are inseparable off from each other so that continuity cannot be separated, neither really nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove as part from another with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. I divide and separate again, as I think, by removing the parts one from another to make two superficies, where before there was continuity and to divide mentally is, to make in the mind two

5. *The definition of extension plain: not.* If an one ask me what this space I speak of I will tell him when he tells me what his extension is. For to say as is usually done, that extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, extension consists of extended parts. As if one, asking what fibre was, I should answer him,—that was a thing made up of several fibres. Would he thereby be enabled to understand what fibre was better than he did before? Or rather would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him.

6. *Duration fibres.* So bodies and mixtures are not one and body the same. Those who contend of Spinoza, Ethics Part I Prop. xv Schol.

same place but if it hath sensibly altered its distance with either of those points we say it hath changed its place though vulgarly speaking in the common notion of place we do not always exactly observe the distance from these precise points but from larger portions of sensible objects to which we consider the thing placed to bear relation and its distance from which we have some reason to observe

p. 2

pari
of
they are all in the same place or unmoved though perhaps the chess board hath been in the mean time carried out of one room into another because we compared them only to the parts of the chess board which keep the same distance one with another The chess board we also say is in the same place it was if it remain in the same part of the cabin though the ship which
ship is said to

kept the same distance with the parts of the neighbouring land though perhaps the earth hath turned round and so both chess men and board and ship have every one changed place in respect of remoter bodies which have kept the same distance one with another But yet the distance from certain parts of the board being that which determines the place of the chess men and the distance from the fixed parts of the cabin (with which we made the comparison) being that which determined the place of the chess board and the fixed parts of the earth that by which we determined the place of the ship—these things may be said to be in the same place in those respects though their distance from some other

ter we did no
undoubtedly

we ourselves as usual so when we have occasion to compare them with those other

¶ *Place relative to a present position* But this modification of distance we call place being made by men for their common use though they are able to describe where they have

men consider as a determination of this place by reference to those adjacent things which best served to their present purpose without considering other things which to another purpose would better determine the place of the same thing Thus in the chess board the use of the designation of the place of each chess man being determined only within that chequered piece of wood

* Cf. W. James *Psychol.* 77 p. 552

it would cross that purpose to measure it by any thing else but when these very chess men are put up in a bag if any one should ask where the black king is it would be proper to determine the place by the part of the room it is in and not by the chess board there being another use of designing the place it is not in than to play

deter

ask

the story of Nisus and Euryalus it would be very improper to determine this place by saying they were in such a part of the earth or in Bodley's library but the right designation of the place would be by the parts of Virgil's works and the proper answer would be that these verses were about the middle of the ninth book of his *Æneids* and that they have been always constantly in the same place ever since Virgil was printed which is true though the book itself hath moved a thousand times the use of the idea of place here being to know in what part of the book that story is that so upon occasion we may know where to find it and have recourse to it for use

10 *Place of the universe* That our idea of place is nothing else but such a relative position of anything as I have before mentioned I think is plain and will be easily admitted when we consider that we can have no idea of the place of the universe though we can of all the parts of it because beyond that we have not the idea of any fixed distinct particular beings in reference to which we can imagine it to have any relation of distance but all beyond it is one uniform space or expansion wherein the mind finds no variety no marks For we say that the world is somewhere means no more than that it does exist this though a phrase borrowed from place signifying only its existence not location and when one can find out and frame in his mind clearly and distinctly the place of the universe he will be able to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable infinity of infinite space though it be true that the word place has sometimes a more confused sense and stands for that space which anybody takes up and so the universe is in place

The idea therefore of place we have by the same means that we get the idea of space (here of this is but a particular limited consideration) viz by our sight and to which by either of which we receive to our minds the ideas of extension or distance

11 *Extent and body not the same* There are
Bk. IV. lines 176-502

some Lat would persuad us, that body and extension are the same thing who e ther change the signification f words, which I would n t suspect them f —they ha'ing so severely condemned the philosophy of theirs, because it hath been too much placed in th uncertain meaning or deceitful security f doubtful or insufficient terms. If, therefore they mean by body and extension th same that other peopl do, i. e. by body something that is solid & extended, these parts are separable and movab. differ ent ways and by extension, only th space that lies between the extremities f those solid coher

superficies, where be f re there was a continuity and consider them as removed = e from th other which can only be do in things considered by the mind as capabl f being separated and by separation of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then ha' not, but are capable of But ther f these ways of separat on, wh th real or mental is, as I think, comp u ble to pure sp ce

It is true, a man may consider so much of such space as is answer ble or commensurate

extension, be the can scarce t colour exist w th out extension, but this hinders t, but that they are distinct deas. Many ideas require thers, as necessary to their existe ce or concept n, hich yet are very distinct id as. Motion can n ther be nor be conce ed, w thout pace and yet motion is t space, or space motion space can exist w thout t, and they are very distinct ideas and so I think, are those of space and Solidity is so inseparabl n d from bod that pon that d pends to fill n of space is contact, impulse and commun cation f motion upon impulse. And if t be reason t provi that sp n is different from body because think mg includs the id f extension in th same reason will be as alid, I suppose, to prove

in two superficies separat one from the other than be can ctually di d w thout making two superficies disjunct on from the other but a partial consid ration is p t separat ng A man may cons der light in the sun w thout is h t, or mobility in body w thout is ext n, w th out thinking f th separat on. O is nly a partial consid t n, terminat n in on al and the other is a consideration of both as exist ng separately

14. The parts f pure space f Thirdly The parts of pure sp ce are immovable which fol low n from th ir insepar ability mot n being n thing but change f distance between any two th n s but this cannot be between p rts that are inseparable, which therefore must needs be at perpetual rest on amon t an h

Thus th d termined dea f impl space dist n s shes t plainly and sufficiently from body since is parts ar inseparabl immovab and w thout estant n t motion of bod

15. The d f n t on f extension f Thus t not If any o ask m hat this sp ce I speak of is I will t ll him wh n h t Ls me what his extension is. For say as is usually do that xtens on is t ha' e part ext part is to say only that exten. is extens n. For what am I th better informed in th nature of extension, when I am told that xtens on is t ha' e parts that ar extended, exterior t parts that are extended, extens con sists f extended parts As if one, ask g what fibre was, I should answer him, — that t as thing mad up f several fibres. Would h ther by be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than h did before Or rath would h n t ha' e ason to think that my design was to mak sport w th him, rather than ser oul t instru thum.

¶ Division f bodies into bodie and parts pro es at h e and body the same Those who contend Cf. Spinoza, Ethic. Part I Prop xv Schol.

Body then and extension t is evident, are two distinct id as. For

2. Extension not solid t First, Ext n s in th n s no so' d nty nor resistance to th motion of body as body does.

13. The parts f pure space f Secondly The parts of pure space are inseparable o f from the ther so that th continuity can t be separat n ther really nor mentally For I demand of am on to emov as part f from another with which t is cont nced, even so much as in thout h t. T d d and separ ctual is, as I think, by removin t parts one from another to mak two s per fices, here before ther was continuity and to d v d mentally is, to make in th mind two Cf. Eth. II, ch. iv

that space and body are the same bring this dilemma—either this space is something or nothing if nothing be between two bodies they must necessarily touch if it be allowed to be something they ask Whether it be body or spirit? To which I answer by another question Who told them that there was or could be nothing but solid beings which could not think and thinking beings that were not extended?—which is all they mean by the terms *body* and *spirit*

17 Substance *is* *h*

space without do

it is) whether

it *is* or *accide* *is* *a* small readily answer I know not nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance till they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance

18 Different meanings of *substance* I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves by taking words for things It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none by making a noise with sounds without clear and distinct significations Names made at pleasure neither alter the nature of things nor make us understand them but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables *substance* to consider whether applying it as they do to the infinite incomprehensible God to finite spirits and to body it be in the same sense and whether it stands for the same idea when each of those three so different beings are called substances If so whether it will thence follow—that God spirits and body agreeing in the same common nature of substance differ not any otherwise than in a bare different modification of that substance as a tree and a pebble being in the same sense body and agreeing in the common nature of body differ only in a bare modification of that common matter which will be a very harsh doctrine If they say that they apply it to God finite spirit and matter in three different significations and that it stands for one idea when God is said to be a substance for another when the soul is called substance and for a third when body is called so—if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas they could do well to make known those distinct ideas or at least to give three distinct names to them to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term which is so far from being suspected to have three dis-

tinct that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

19 Substance and accidents of little use in philosophy They who first ran into the notion of accidents as a sort of real beings that needed some thing to inhere in were forced to find out the word *substance* to support them Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it and a tortoise to support his elephant the word *substance* could have done it effectually And he that inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher—that substance without knowing what it is which supports the earth as we take it for a sufficient answer and good doctrine from our European philosophers—that substance without knowing what it is which supports accidents So that of substance we have no idea of what it is but only a confused obscure one of what it does

20 Sticking on and under propping Whatever a learned man may do here an intelligent American who inquired into the nature of things would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if desiring to learn our architecture he should be told that a pillar is a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar Would he not think himself mocked in stead of taught with such an account as this? And a stranger to them could be very liberally instructed in the nature of books and the things they contained if he should be told that all learned books consisted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper and paper a thing that held forth letters a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper But were the Latin words *inhere* *ti* and *sub* *pono* put into the plain English ones that answer them and were called *stick on* and *under* *prop* *g* they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents and shew of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy

21 I *vacu* *um* *beyond* *the* *lim* *its* *b* *onds* *of* *body* But to return to our idea of space If body be not supposed infinite (which I think no one will affirm) I could ask whether if God placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could then he could put his arm where there was before space without body and if there he

spread his fingers, there would still be place between them without body. If he could stretch out his hand, it must be because of some natural hindrance (for we suppose him alive without such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now which is not in itself impos-

ible. For need some better proof than a supposed matter can never make

on between space and solidity. It will be said, can we then stretch without the other? And those who dispute for against a vacuum, do thereby confess they have distinguished as of vacuum and plenum, that they have an idea of extension of solidity though they deny it. For then either they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the significations of words, as to call extension on body and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension without solidity must talk absurdly whenever they speak of vacuum since it is impossible for extension to be without extension.

all bodies) body part in motion may move, as where there is thin between there two bodies must necessarily touch. For pure space between is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact but bare part in the way is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must think their own thoughts that they think body infinite though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that space is not body. For I could fain meet with that thinking man that can in his thoughts set any bound to space more than he can to duration or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of ether. And therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite so is his idea of immensity they are both finite infinite alike.

view and neighbourhood seems to manifestly

2 The power of annihilating on pure vacuum. Farther those who assert the impossibility of pure extension without matter must not only make body infinite but must also deny power in God to annihilate any part of matter. Now I suppose, will deny that God can put an end to all motion that is in matter and fill all the bodies of the universe in perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow that God can during such

3 At rest, annihilate in this book the body of hum that does it, must necessarily admit the possibility of vacuum. For it is evident that the space that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body will still remain and be space without body. For the circumambient bodies being in perfect rest, as walls of a mansion and in that state making perfect impossibility for any other body to get into that space. And indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed is but consequence from the supposition of plenitude which will there

a mustard seed be requisite to make room for the motion of the parts of the dissolved body within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100 000 000 less than mustard seed. This must also be possible of solid matter as big as 100 000 000 particles of mustard seed. For if it be dissolved in the ocean will hold the other and so on infinitely. And let this be demonstrated as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For if there can be a space of body equal to the smallest separate par-

24 *The ideas of space and body distinct* But the question being here — Whether the idea of space or extension be the same with the idea of body?

there be a *vacuum* or no For if they had not the idea of space without body they could not make a question about its existence and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of space they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world and it would be as absurd to demand whether there were space without body as whether there were space without space or body without body since these were but different names of the same idea

25 *Extension being inseparable from body proves it not the same* It is true the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible and most tangible qualities that it suffers us to see no one or feel very few external objects without taking in impressions of extension too This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas has been the occasion I guess that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension which is not much to be wondered at since some have had their minds by their eyes and touch (the busiest of all our senses) so filled with the idea of extension and as it were wholly possessed with it that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extension I shall not now argue with those men who take the measure and possibility of all being only from their narrow and gross imaginations but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension because they may they can not imagine any sensible quality of any body

and touch nay had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst and several other pains they could have found that they included in them no idea of extension at all which is but an affection of body as well as the rest discoverable by our senses which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things

26 *Essences of things* If those ideas which are

out doubt the essence of everything, but it is not any object of sensation or reflection which does not carry with it the idea of one but the

weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently

27 *Ideas of space and solidity distinct* To conclude whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a *vacuum* this is plain to me—that we have as clear an idea of space distinct from solidity as we have of solidity distinct from motion or motion from space We have not any two more distinct ideas and we can as easily conceive space without solidity as we can conceive body or space without motion though it be never so certain that neither body nor motion can exist without space But whether any one will take space to be only a relation resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance or whether they will think the words of the most knowing King Solomon The heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St Paul In him we live move and have our being are to be understood in a literal sense I leave every one to consider only our idea of space is I think such as I have mentioned and distinct from that of body For whether we consider in matter itself the distance of its coherent solid parts and call it in respect of those solid parts extension or whether considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions we call it length breadth and thickness or else considering it as lying between any two bodies or positive beings without any consideration whether there be any matter or not between we call it distance—how ever named or considered it is always the same uniform simple idea of space taken from objects about which our senses have been conversant whereof having settled ideas in our minds we can revive repeat and add them one to another as often as we will and consider the space or distance so imagined either as filled with solid parts so that another body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before or else as void of solidity so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure space may be placed in it without the removing or expulsion of anything that is there But to avoid confusion in discourses concerning this matter it were possibly to be wished that the name *extension* were applied only to matter or the distance of the extremities of particular bodies and the term *expansion* to space in general with or without solid matter possessing it—so as to say space is expanded and body extended But in this every one has his liberty I propose it only for the more clear and distinct way of speaking

28 *Men differ little* I or *simple* dear The
know precisely what our words stand for
could, I imagine in this as well as greet many
— F I am

perhaps confound one another with
names. I imagine that men who abstract their
thoughts, and dwell upon the ideas for their
own minds cannot comprehend thinking how
ever they may perplex themselves with words,
according to the way of speaking of the several
schools sects which have been bred up in the
most unthinking men who cannot be
scrupulously and carefully their own ideas and
strip them from their marks in use of them,
but confound them with words, they must be
endless dispute wrangling and jargon especially
if they be so called bookish men devoted to some
— F I am

ing imagination in the brains is precisely of
that sort (I do as I speak of it is not any for the
mind to put off those confused ideas and per-
ceptions that are bound in the mind, and to
and common conversation on. It is equally
anxiety to examine it as to all these things
into those clear and distinct impressions out of
which they are compounded and to see which
are genuine impressions, have the right nature
very common and depend on upon an
other Till man do this in the primary ideas
or general notions of things, he builds upon
in and certain principles and will find
himself to lose.

Chap. XIV. *I do as I speak of it* and its Simplest

Do I not say I think N. Th. There is an
sort of distance I give the ideas of which
it is from the permanent parts of perception but
from the fleeting and perpetually perishing parts
of consciousness. This we call duration in simple
modes hereof as any differ to it gives it
be of which has duration as, as *hour* &c.
year &c. in and term of

It is of some of them on the 10th of our dear
Th. answer I greet man to whom asked
that time was I no gas telling (which
amount to this Th. mo. I set myself to think
of it, the less I understand it) might perhaps

persuade one that time which reveals all other
things is itself not to be discovered. Duration
time, a duration are not without as
thought to have something very obscure in the
nature. But how remote these may seem from
our comprehensions yet I trace them right
thence to the origin, I do not but to see if those
of our knowledge is sensate and effec-
tive will be able to furnish us with these ideas
as clear and distinct as many others which are
thought much less obscure and we shall find
that the idea of eternity itself is derived from
the same common or general with the rest of our
ideas.

3 *A few and origin of the idea of duration* To
understand the duration of things, we give with
attention to consider what it is which we
call duration and how it came by it is evident to
any who will but observe what passes his
own mind that there is a train of ideas which
constantly succeed one another in the
mind as I go as I awake Reflection on these
appearances of several ideas one after another
in our minds, that which furnishes us with the
idea of succession and the distance between
parts of that success or between the appear-
ance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we
call duration. For whilst we are thinking of
we receive successively several ideas in our
minds, we know that they do exist and so we call
the existence the co-existence of the existence of
ourselves, of ourselves, of ourselves, of ourselves
the succession of ideas as in our minds the
duration of ourselves, or any such thing the
co-existence with our thinking.

4. *Proof that the idea of duration is not*
from four ideas That the duration is not
consciousness and duration of the mind or general, is from
reflection that the ideas which we find
appear after one another in our minds, seems
plain to me that we have no concept
of duration but by considering the train of ideas
that take their turns in our minds.
When the succession of ideas increases, we per-
ceive the duration to increase with it which is
clearly experience to himself whilst he sleeps
soundly with an hour day in the
a year of which duration of things, but he
sleeps thinks that he has perceived that it
but is quite lost to him and that he is not where
he is but thinks, till the moment he be-
gins to think, he must himself be dis-
tance. And so I do not think it would be
greatest I am possible for him to keep only
of it in his mind without variation and the
success of it there. And we see, that the

fixes his thoughts very intently on one thing so as to take but little notice of the succession of ideas that pass in his mind whilst he is taken up with that earnest contemplation lets slip out of his account a good part of that duration and thinks that time shorter than it is. But if sleep commonly unites the distant parts of duration it is because during that time we have no

recapitulation in his mind one after another he hath then during such dreaming a sense of duration and of the length of it By which it is to me very clear that men derive their ideas of duration from their reflections on the train of the ideas they observe to succeed one another in their own understandings with out which observation they can have no notion of duration whatever may happen in the world

5 The idea of duration applicable to things whilst we sleep Indeed a man having from reflecting on the succession and number of his own thoughts got the notion or idea of duration he can apply that notion to things which exist while he does not think as he that has got the idea of extension from bodies by his sight or touch can apply it to distances where no body is seen or felt And therefore though a man has no perception of the length of duration which passed whilst he slept or thought not yet having observed the revolution of days and nights and found the length of their duration to be in appearance regular and constant, he can upon the supposition that that revolution has proceeded after the same manner whilst he was asleep or thought not as it used to do at other times he can I say imagine and make allowance for the length of duration whilst he slept But if Adam and Eve (when they were alone in the world) instead of their ordinary night's sleep had passed the whole twenty four hours in one continued sleep the duration of that twenty four hours had been irrecoverably lost to them and been for ever left out of their account of time

6 The idea of succession of motion Thus by reflecting on the appearing of various ideas one after another in our understandings, we get the notion of succession which if any one should think we did rather get from our observation of motion by our senses he will perhaps be of my

tion at all unless that motion produces a constant train of successive ideas e.g. a man being calmed at sea out of sight of land in a fair day may look on the sun or sea or ship a whole hour together and perceive no motion at all in either though it be certain that two and perhaps all of them have moved during that time a great way But as soon as he perceives either of them to have changed distance with some other body as soon as this motion produces any new idea in him then he perceives that there has been motion But wherever a man is with all things any he has observed a succession where he could observe no motion

7 Very slow motions unperceived And thus I think is the reason why motions very slow though they are constant are not perceived by us because in their remove from one sensible part towards another their change of distance is so slow that it causes no new ideas in us but a good while one after another And so not causing a constant train of new ideas to follow one another immediately in our minds we have no perception of motion which consisting in a constant succession we cannot perceive that succession with out a constant succession of varying ideas arising from it

8 Very swift motions unperceived On the contrary things that move so swift as not to affect the senses distinctly with several distinguishable distances of their motion and so cause not any train of ideas in the mind are not also perceived For anything that moves round about in a circle in less time than our ideas are wont to succeed one another in our minds is not perceived to move but seems to be a perfect entire circle of that matter or colour and not a part of a circle in motion

9 The train of ideas has a certain degree of quickness Hence I leave it to others to judge whether it be not probable that our ideas do whilst we are awake succeed one another in our minds at certain distances not much unlike the images in the inside of a lantern turned round by the heat of a candle This appearance of their train, though perhaps it may be sometimes faster and sometimes slower yet I guess varies not very much in a waking man there seem to be certain bounds to the quickness and slowness of

on a body really moving perceives yet no motion Cf. W. James *Psychol. gy.* pp. 398-99

guess — used by Lock for conjecture in several places (See ch. xii. § 25.)

the success on of those id as one to another = our minds, beyond which they can neither delay nor hasten.

10. *F* I succeed in swift motion as without ease I start from. The reason I have for this odd conjecture is, from observing that, in the impressions made upon any of our senses, we can but to a certain degree perceive any success on which, if exceeding quick, the sense of success is lost, even in cases where it is evident that there is a real success on. Let can a bullet pass through a room, and in a way take with it any limb or fleshy parts of man, it is as clear as any demonstration can be that it must strike successively the two sides of the room; it is also evident that it must touch one part of the flesh first, and another after, and so in success; and yet, I believe, no body who ever felt the pain of such a hurt, or heard the blow against the two distant walls, could perceive a succession either in the pain or sound; so swift a stroke in each part of duration as this, where we perceive no success on, is that which we call an instant, and is that which takes up the time of only one idea in our minds, without the succession of another, wherein, therefore, we perceive no success at all.

11. *I slow in time* This also happens where the motion is so slow as not to supply a constant train of fresh ideas to the senses, as fast as the mind is capable of receiving new ones into it, and no other ideas of our own thoughts, having room to come into our minds between those offered to our senses by the moving body, there the sense of motion is lost, and the body though it really moves, yet, no changing perceptible distance with some other bodies as fast as the ideas of our own minds naturally flow one another in train, the thing seems to stand still as is evident in the hands of clocks, and shadows of sundials, and there constant slow motion is, here, though after certain intervals, we perceive, by the changing distance that it hath moved, yet the motion itself we perceive not.

12. *In train, it measures other successions* So that to me it seems, that the constant and regular success on of ideas in a waking man, is, as it were, the measure and standard of all other successions. Whereof if any one other exceeds the pace of our ideas, as when two sounds or pains, &c., take place in their succession the duration of but one idea, or else where any motion or succession is so slow as that it keeps its pace with the ideas in our minds, or the quickness in which they take their turns, as when any or more ideas in their ordinary course come into our

mind between those which are offered to the sight by the different perceptible distances of a body in motion, or between sounds or smells flowing in an ether—there also the sense of a constant continued success on is lost, and we perceive it not, but with certain gaps of rest between.

13. *Them it can fix long one more bit* If it be so that the ideas of our minds, whilst we have any there, do constantly change and shift in continual success on, it would be impossible, may any man say for a man to think of any one thing. By which, if it be meant that a man may have one self-same single idea a long time alone in his mind without any variation at all, I think in matter of fact, it is not possible. For which (not knowing how the ideas of our minds are formed of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they come to make their appearances) I cannot give the reason but experience and I would have any one try whether he can keep one unvaried single idea in his mind without any thought for any considerable time together.

14. *Proof of trial, let him take any figure,*

way as he can.

15. *The extent of our power over the succession of our d* As all that is a man's power in this case I think, is only to mind and observe what the ideas are that take their turns in his understanding, or else to direct the sort, and call in such as he hath a desire or use for, but hinder the constant succession of fresh ones, I think he cannot, though he may commonly choose whether he will heedfully observe and consider them.

16. *I as however made include no sense of motion* Whither these several ideas in a man's mind be made by certain motions, I will not here dispute; but thus I am sure, that they include no dependence in the appearance, and if a man had not the ideas of motion therein, I think he would have none at all, which is enough to my present purpose and sufficiently shows that the necessity we take of the ideas of our own minds, appearing the one after another is that which gives us the idea of success on and duration, without which we should have no such ideas at all. It is not that motion, but the constant train

of ideas in our minds whilst we are waking that furnishes us with the idea of duration whereof motion no other use gives us any perception than as it causes in our minds a constant succession of ideas as I have before showed and we have as clear an idea of succession and duration by the train of other ideas succeeding one another in our minds without the idea of any motion as by the train of ideas caused by the uninterrupted sensible change of distance between two bodies which we have from motion and therefore we should as well have the idea of duration were there no sense of motion at all

17 *Time is duration set out by measures* Having thus got the idea of duration the next thing natural for the mind to do is to get some measure of this common duration whereby it might judge of its different lengths and consider the distinct order herein several things exist without which a great part of our knowledge would be confused and a great part of history be rendered very useless This consideration of duration as set out by certain periods and marked by certain measures or epochs is that I think which most properly we call time

18 *A good measure of time must divide its whole duration into equal parts* In the measuring of extension there is nothing more required but the application of the standard or measure we make use of to the thing of whose extension we would be informed But in the measuring of duration this cannot be done because no two different parts of succession can be put together to measure one another And nothing being a measure of duration but duration as nothing is of extension but extension we cannot keep by us any standing unvarying measure of duration which consists in a constant fleeting succession as we can of certain lengths of extension as inches feet yards &c. marked out in permanent parcels of matter Nothing then could serve well for a convenient measure of time but what has divided the whole length of its duration into apparently equal portions by constantly repeated periods What portions of duration are not distinguished or considered as distinguished and measured by such periods come not so properly under the notion of time as appears by such phrases as these viz Before all time and When time shall be no more

19 *The revolutions of the sun and moon the properest measure of time for mankind* The diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun as having been from the beginning of nature constant regular and universally observable by all mankind and

¹ Cf. § 24.

supposed equal to one another have been with reason made use of for the measure of duration But the distinction of days and years having depended on the motion of the sun it has brought this mistake with it that it has been thought that motion and duration were the measure one of another For men in the measuring of the length of time having been accustomed to the ideas of minutes hours days months years, &c. which they found themselves upon any mention of time or duration presently to think on all which portions of time were measured out by the motion of those heavenly bodies they were apt to confound time and motion or at least to think that they had a necessary connexion one with another Whereas any constant

well distinguished the intervals of time as those that have been made use of For supposing the sun which some have taken to be a fire had been lighted up at the same distance of time that it now every day comes about to the same meridian and then gone out again about twelve

such regular appearances serve to measure out the distances of duration to all that could observe it as well without as with motion? For if the appearances were constant universally observable in equidistant periods they could serve mankind for measure of time as well as the motion of the sun

20 *But not by their motion but periodical appearances* For the freezing of water or the blooming of a plant returning at equidistant periods in all parts of the earth could as well serve men to reckon their years by as the motions of the sun and in effect we see that some people in America counted their years by the coming of certain birds amongst them at their certain seasons and leaving them at others For a fit of an ague the sense of hunger or thirst a smell or a taste or any other idea returning constantly at equidistant periods and making itself universally be taken notice of could not fail to measure out the course of succession and distinguish the distances of time Thus we see that men born blind count time well enough by years whose revolutions yet they cannot distinguish by motions that they perceive not And I ask whether a blind man who distinguished his years either by the heat of summer or cold of winter by the smell of any flower of the spring or taste of any

fruit of the autumn, could not have a better measure of time than the Romans had before their reformation of their calendar by Julius Caesar or many other people whose years, now the

years counted by are hard to be known, vary differently much from another and I think I may say all of them from the precise motion of the sun. And if the sun moved in the circle with the flood constantly in the quarter and so equally dispersed to light and heat all the habitable parts of the earth in different lengths, without any annual variations to the tropics, as late ingenious authors suppose, I do not think it very easy to imagine that (notwithstanding the motion of the sun) men should in the antediluvian world find the beginning count by years, or measure the duration by periods that had no sensible marks or obvious distinction in the year.

It is *per se* for the sun and certainly known to be a regular motion such as the sun's some other how could it ever be known that such periods were equal. To which I answer—the equality of any other returning appearances might be known by the same—that that of day was known, presumed to be so first which was only by judging of the motion by the train of day as which had passed in many months in the intervals by which the day was discovered unequal, the natural day, but in the artificial day, the artificial day, *synthetice*, or guessed to be equal which was sufficient to make them serve for measure though after search has been discovered inequality in the diurnal evolution of the sun, and we know that the annual also is not unequal. These, yet, by the presumed difference of appearance equality serves as well to reckon time by (though not in assurance the parts of duration exactly) as if they could be proved to be exactly equal. We must, therefore, carefully distinguish between duration itself and the measures we make use of to judge of it. Duration in its life is to be considered as going on in constant equal, uniform course but in the measures of it which we make use of can be known to be so, or we may be assured that the assigned periods are equal in duration on the other for two successive years of duration, however

measured can never be demonstrated to be equal. The motion of the sun which the world used to judge and so confidently for an exact measure of duration has, as I said been found to be several parts unequal. And though men have flatly made use of a period, as a more regular motion than that of the sun, (it speaks more truly) of the earth—yet if any should be asked how he certainly knows that the two successive swings of a pendulum are equal it could be very hard to satisfy him that they are infallibly so since we cannot be sure that the cause of that motion which is unknown to us, shall always operate equally and be sure that the medium in which the pendulum moves is not constantly the same the which may alter the equality of the periods, and thereby destroy the exactness of the measure by motion, as well as any other periods of their appearances the notion of duration will remain clear though our measures of it cannot (yet of them) be demonstrated to be exact. Since then a regularity of success can be brought together it is impossible even certainly to know the equality of all that we can do for measure of time is, to take such as have the most usual success appearances seemingly equidistant period of which seeming equality we have no other assurance but such as the train of our own day has lodged our memory with the concurrence of the probable reasons, to persuade us of their equality.

22 *Time is the measure of motion* O the gods seems strange to me—that whilst all men manifestly measure time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the sky yet should be fined to be measured by the motion of the least of every one which reflects so little on it, that it is more than appears as necessary to be considered as time and those who look little farth will find also that bulk of the time measured necessary to be taken to the computation, by any which will estimate in assurance to so astound right faith. Indeed does motion in any other wise coincide to the measuring of duration than as it constantly begins about the turn of certain sensible days, in seeming equidistant period. For if the motion of the sun were as unequal as the ship driven by unsteady winds sometimes runs slow and sometimes irregularly runs swift or if being constantly equally swift, yet was not circular and proceeded not in the same appearances,—twould not tall his just measure time, any more than the seeming unequal motion of a comet does.

3 *Minutes hours days and years not necessary measures of duration* Minutes hours days and years are then no more necessary to time or duration than inches feet yards and miles marked out in any matter are to extension. For though we in this part of the universe by the constant use of them as of periods set out by the revolutions of the sun or as known parts of such periods have fixed the ideas of such lengths of duration in our minds which we apply to all parts of time whose lengths we could consider yet there may be other parts of the universe where they no more use these measures of ours than in Japan they do our inches feet or miles but yet something analogous to them there must be. For without some regular periodical returns we could not measure ourselves or signify to others the length of any duration though at the same time the world were full of motion as it is now but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions. But the different measures that may be made use of for the account of time do not at all alter the notion of duration which is the thing to be measured no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit alter the notion of extension to those who make use of those different measures.

4 *Our measure of time applicable to duration before time* The mind having once got such a measure of time as the annual revolution of the sun can apply that measure to duration wherein that measure itself did not exist and in which in the reality of its being it had nothing to do. For should one say that Abraham was born in the two thousand seven hundred and twelfth year of the Julian period it is altogether as intelligible as reckoning from the beginning of the world though there were so far back no motion of the sun nor any motion at all. For though the Julian period be supposed to begin several hundred years before there were really either days nights or years marked out by any revolutions of the sun yet we reckon as right and thereby measure durations as well as if really at that time the sun had existed and kept the same ordinary motion to it doth now. The idea of duration equal to an annual revolution of the sun is as easily applicable in our thoughts to duration where no sun or motion was as the idea of a foot or yard taken from bodies here can be applied in our thoughts to duration where no sun or motion was as the idea of a foot or yard taken from bodies here can be applied in our thoughts to distances beyond the confines of the world where there are no bodies at all.

5 *As we can measure space in our thoughts where there is no body* For supposing it were 5639 miles or millions of miles from this place to the remotest body of the universe (for being finite it must be at a certain distance) as we suppose it to be 5639 years from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world—we can in our thoughts apply this measure of a year to duration before the creation or beyond the duration of bodies or motion as we can this measure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies and by the one measure duration where there was no motion as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts where there is no body.

26 *The assumption that the world is neither boundless nor eternal* If it be objected to me here that in this way of explaining of time I have begged what I should not viz that the world is neither eternal nor infinite I answer That to my present purpose it is not needful in this place to make use of arguments to evince the world to be finite both in duration and extension. But it being at least as conceivable as the contrary I have certainly the liberty to suppose it as well as any one hath to suppose the contrary and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it may easily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion though not of all duration and so may come to a step and non ultra in his consideration of motion. So also in his thoughts he may set limits to body and the extension be-

most bounds of number are beyond the largest comprehension of the mind and all for the same reason as we shall see in another place.

7 *Et cetera* By the same means therefore and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time we have also that idea which we call Eternity &c having got the idea of succession and duration by reflecting on the train of our own ideas caused in us either by the natural appearances of those ideas coming constantly of themselves into our waking thoughts or else caused by external objects successively affecting our senses and having from the revolutions of the sun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration—we can in our thoughts add such lengths of duration to one another as often as we please and apply them so added to duration past or to come. And thus we can continue to do so without bounds or limits, and proceed in infinitum and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the sun to duration supposed

before the sun & or any other motion had us being which is a more difficult to be heard, than to apply the notion I have of the motion of a shadow one hour to-day upon the sun-dial to the duration of something last night, w^{ch} the burning of a candle which is now absolutely separable from all actual motion and is as impossible for the duration of that flame for an hour last night to co-exist with any motion that now is, or for ever shall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exist with the motion of the sun now. But yet this hinders not but that, having the *line* of the length of the motion of the shadow on the dial between the marks of two hours, I can as distinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle light last night, as I can the duration of anything that does now exist and it is no more than to think, that, had the sun shone then on the dial, and moved after the same rate it doth now the shadow on the dial would have passed from one hour line to another whilst that flame of the candle lasted.

28. *Our measure of duration is dependent on our ideas*

The notion of an hour day or year being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all time co-exist, but only the ideas I have of them in my memory derived from my senses or reflection I can with the same ease, and for the same reason, apply to my thoughts to duration antecedent to all manner of motion as well as to anything that is but minute or a day antecedent to the motion that at this very moment the sun is in. All things past are equally and perfectly present and to this way of consideration of them are all on whether they were before the beginning of this world, or but yesterday the measuring of any duration by some motion depending not at all on the co-existence of that thing to that motion, or any other periods of evolution but the having clear to the intellect of some periodical known motion, or their interval of duration in my mind and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

29. *The duration of anything does not become co-existent with the motion in which it is by* Hence we see that some men imagine the duration of the world from its first existence to this present year 689, to have been 5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual revolutions of the sun, and others great deal more as the Egyptians of old who in the time of Alexander counted 3000 years from the reign of the sun and the Chinese on which account the world 3269,000 years old, or more

which I conceive the duration of the world according to their computation, though I should not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand and say one is longer than the other as I understand that Jerusalem itself was longer than Enoch's And if the common reckoning of 5639 should be true (as it may be as well as any other assigned) it hinders not at all my imagining what others mean when they make the world one thousand years older since every one may with the same facility imagine (I do not say believe) the world to be 5000 years old, as 5639 and may as well conceive the duration of 50000 years as 5639. Whereby it appears that, in the measuring the duration of anything by time, it is not requisite that that thing should be co-existent to the motion we measure by or any other periodical revolution but it suffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of any regular period

I

duration of light before the sun was created as so long as (if the sun had moved the as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his universal revolutions so be the same way I can have an idea of the chaos, angels, being created before there was either light or any continued motion, minute an hour day year one thousand years. For if I can but consider dura-

such parts of the sun's revolutions, or any other period whereof I have the idea proceed from them and suppose duration exceeding as many such periods as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will, which I think is the notion we have of eternity whose infinity we have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number to which we can add forever without end.

31. *Of the nature of our ideas of duration, and of the measure of it* And thus I think it is plain that from those two fountains of all knowledge before mentioned, viz. *sight* and *sensation*, we get the ideas of duration, and then measure of it.

For First, by observing what passes in our minds, how our ideas as there in train constantly some vanish and others begin to appear we come by the idea of *succession*

Secondly by observing a distance in the parts of this succession we get the idea of *duration*

Thirdly by sensation observing certain appearances at certain regular and seeming equidistant periods we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of *duration* as minutes hours days years &c

Fourthly by being able to repeat those measures of time or ideas of stated length of duration in our minds as often as we will we can come to imagine *duration* where nothing does really endure or exist and thus we imagine to-morrow next year or seven years hence

Fifthly by being able to repeat ideas of any length of time as of a minute a year or an age as often as we will in our own thoughts and adding them one to another without ever coming to the end of such addition any nearer than we can to the end of number to which we can always add we come by the idea of *eternity* as the future eternal duration of our souls as well as the eternity of that infinite Being which must necessarily have always existed

Sixthly by considering any part of infinite duration as set out by periodical measures we come by the idea of what we call *time* in general

Chap. XV. *Ideas of Duration and Expansion considered together*

1 Both capable of greater and less Though we have in the precedent chapters dealt pretty long on the considerations of space and duration yet they being ideas of general concernment that have something very abstruse and peculiar in their nature the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of use for their illustration and we may have the more clear and distinct conception of them by taking a view of them together Distance or space in its simple abstract conception to avoid confusion I call *expansion* to distinguish it from extension which by some is used to express this distance only as it is in the solid parts of matter and so includes or at least intimates the idea of body whereas the idea of pure distance includes no such thing I prefer also the word expansion to space because space is often applied to distance of fleeting successive parts which never exist together as well as to those which are permanent 2 In both these (viz. expansion and duration) the mind has the common idea of continued lengths capable of greater or less quantities For a man has as clear an idea of the difference of the length of an hour and a day as of an inch and a foot.

Expansion not bounded by matter The mind having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion let it be a span or a pace or what length you will can as has been said repeat that idea and so adding it to the former enlarge its idea of length and make it equal to two spans or two paces and so as often as it will till it equals the distance of any parts of the earth one from another and increase thus till it amounts to the distance of the sun or remotest star By such a progression as this setting out from the place where it is or any other place it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths and find nothing to stop its going on either in or without body It is true we can easily in our thoughts come to the end of solid extension the extremity and bounds of all body which has no difficulty to arrive at but when the mind is there it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endless expansion of that it can neither find nor conceive any end Nor let any one say that beyond the bounds of body there is nothing at all unless he will confine God within the limits of matter Solomon whose understanding was filled and enlarged with wisdom seems to have other thoughts when he says Heaven and the heavens cannot contain thee And he I think very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding who persuades himself that he can extend his thoughts further than God exists or imagine any expansion where He is not.

3 Nor do I mean by motto Just so is it in duration The mind having got the idea of any length of duration can double multiply and enlarge it not only beyond its own but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings and all the measures of time taken from the great bodies of all the world and their motions But yet every one easily admits that though we make duration boundless as certainly it is we cannot yet extend it beyond all being God every one easily allows fills eternity and it is hard to find a reason why any one should doubt that He likewise fills immensity His infinite being is certainly as boundless one way as another and methinks it ascribes a little too much to matter to say where there is no body there is nothing

4 Whym may we easily admit if it be demonstrated that infinite expansion Hence I think we may learn the reason why every one so familiarly and without the least hesitation speaks of and supposes Eternity and sticks not to ascribe finally to duration but it is with more doubting and reserve that many

¹ e.g. distance or space of duration Cf. § 8

² Cf. ch. xiii. § 2

belonging to other beings, we easily conceive in God infinite duration, and we cannot add do-
in so but, attributing to Him extension, but
only to matter which is finite we are proper to
doubt of the existence of space without mat-
ter of which all we commonly suppose it an
attribute. And, therefore when men pursue their
thoughts of space they are proper to stop at the
confines of body as if space were there to an
end too, and checked further. Or if their
ideas, upon consideration, carry them further
yet they term what is beyond the limits of the
universe, imaginary space as if it were nothing
because there is no body existing in it. Whereas
duration antecedent to all body and to the mo-
tions which it is measured by they never term
imaginary because it is even supposed to be
some other real existence. And if the names of
things make at all direct our thoughts towards
the original of men's ideas, (as I am proper to think
they make very much,) it may have occasion to
think by the name *duration* that the continu-
ance of existence, with kind of resistance to any
destructive force, and the continuance in solid-
ity (which is proper to be confounded with and if
we will look into the minutest anatomical parts of
matter is little different from, hardness) were
thought to have some analogy and gave occa-
sion to words so near like as *durare* and *duramen*.
And that *durare* is proper to the idea of
hardness, as well as that of existence, we see in
Horace, Epod. xvi. *ferre duravit calce* B. 1, be-
cause as it will thus be taken, that whoever pur-
sues his own thoughts, will find them some times
launch out beyond the extent of body into the
infinity of space or expansion the idea whereof
is distinct and separate from body and all the
things which may (to those who please) be a
subject of further meditation.

5. *Time to duration is as place to extension.* Time
general is to duration as place to extension.
They are so much of those boundless oceans of
ternity and immensity by as is set out and distin-
guished from the rest, as it were by landmarks
and so are made use of to denote the position of
finite real beings, in respect to all the
those universal finite oceans of duration and
space. These, rightly considered are only as
of determined distances from certain known
points, fixed in distinguishable sensible things,
and supposed to keep the same distance from
another. From such points fixed in sensible be-
ings we reckon, and from them measure our
portions of those finite quantities which, so
considered are that which we call *time* and *place*.

CL. II. XII. § 7

For duration and place being in themselves ex-
tensive and boundless, the order and position of
things, without such known settled points, would
be lost in them and all things would be jumbled
in an incurable confusion.

6. *Time and place are taken for much farther as
are set out by the extent and matter of body.* Time
and place taken thus for determined to distin-
guishable portions of those infinite abysses of
space and duration set out or supposed to be
distinguished from the rest, by marks and known
boundaries, have each of them a twofold accep-
tation.

First Time is generally commonly taken for
so much of infinite duration as is measured by
a determined co-existent thing which exists not as
of the great bodies of the universe as far as we

Place likewise is taken sometimes for that por-
tion of infinite space which is possessed by and
comprehended within the material world and
is the by distinguished from the rest of expan-
se though this may be more properly called
extension so than place. Where these two are co-
fined and by the observable parts of them are
measured and determined the particular time
or duration and the particular tense and
place, of all corporeal beings.

7. *Sometimes for much farther as is used by
or as is taken from the bulk or matter of body.* See

cal motions of bodies, the two are proper to be taken from
the beginning of the signs and for season and
for days and years, and accordingly our
measures of time by such things as too
that infinite uniform duration which we upon
any occasion suppose equal to certain things of
measured time and consider them as bounded
and determined. For if we should suppose there
to fall forth any length, was it the begin-
ning of the Julian period which would speak pro-
perly enough, it should be understood if we
said, this is the time since the creation of
things than the course of the world by 64
years where by we would mark out so much of
that undistinguished duration as we suppose
equal to a determined duration 64 annual
revolutions of the sun in the circle of the
world. And thus likewise we sometimes speak of
place distance bulk the great nature be

yond the confines of the world when we consider so much of that space as is equal to or capable to receive a body of any assigned dimensions as a cubic foot or do suppose a point in it at such a certain distance from any part of the universe

8 *They belong to all finite beings Where and when* are questions belonging to all finite existences and are by us always reckoned from some known parts of this sensible world and from some certain epochs marked out to us by the motions observable in it Without some such fixed parts or periods the order of things would be lost, to our finite understandings in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expansion which comprehend in them all finite beings and in their full extent belong only to the Deity And therefore we are not to wonder that we comprehend them not and do so often find our thoughts at a loss when we would consider them either abstractly in themselves or as anyway attributed to the first incomprehensible Being But when applied to any particular finite beings the extension of any body is so much of that infinite space as the bulk of the body takes up And place is the position of any body when considered at a certain distance from some other As the idea of the particular duration of anything is an idea of that portion of infinite duration which passes during the existence of that thing so the time when the thing existed is the idea of that space of duration which passed between some known and fixed period of duration and the being of that thing One shows the distance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the same thing as that it is a foot square or lasted two years the other shows the distance of it in place or existence from other fixed points of space or duration as that it was in the middle of Lincoln's Inn Fields or the first degree of Taurus and in the year of our Lord 1671 or the 1000th year of the Julian period All which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of space and duration—as inches feet miles and degrees and in the other minutes days and years &c

9 *All the parts of extension are extension and all the parts of duration are duration* There is one thing more wherein space and duration have a great conformity and that is though they are justly reckoned amongst our simple ideas yet none of the distinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of composition it is the very nature of both of them to consist of parts but their parts being all of the same kind and without the mixture of any other idea hinder them not from

having a place amongst simple ideas Could the mind as in number come to so small a part of extension or duration as excluded divisibility that would be as it were the indivisible unit or idea by repetition of which it would make its more enlarged ideas of extension and duration But, since the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts instead thereof it makes use of the common measures which by familiar use in each country have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet or cubits and parasangs and so seconds minutes hours days and years in duration)—the mind makes use I say of such ideas as these as simple ones and these are the component parts of larger ideas h h h ~

mal

whu

the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number when the mind by division would reduce them into less fractions Though on both sides both in addition and division either of space or duration when the idea under consideration becomes very big or very small its precise bulk becomes very obscure and confused and it is the number of its repeated additions or divisions that alone remains clear and distinct as will easily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vast expansion of space or divisibility of matter Every part of duration is duration too and every part of extension is extension both of them capable of addition or division in infinitum But the least portions of either of them wherefore we have clear and distinct ideas may perhaps be fittest to be considered by us as the simple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of space extension and duration are made up and into which they can again be distinctly resolved Such a small part in duration may be called a *moment* and is the time of one idea in our minds in the train of their ordinary succession there The other wanting a proper name I know not whether I may be allowed to call a *sensible part* meaning thereby the least particle of matter or space which can discern which is ordinarily about a minute and to the sharpest eyes seldom less than thirty seconds of a circle whereof the eye is the centre

" T "

yet their parts are not separable one from another no not even in thought though the parts of bodies from whence we take our measure of the one and the parts of motion or rather the succession of ideas in our minds from whence we

at the *present* of the other may be interrupted and separated as this one is often by rest, and the other is by sleep, which we call rest too.

1. *Duration is as length as extension is solid.* But there is the manifest difference between them, — That the ideas of length which we have of expansion are turned every way and so make figure, width, and breadth, and thickness but duration is but as were the length of one straight line, extended in *extension*, not capable of multiplicity variation, or figure but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever wherein all things, whilst they exist, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one single being and we may truly say they all exist in the *same moment* of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this, in respect to expansion, is beyond my comprehension and perhaps for us, who have understanding and comprehension suited to our own perception, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings, it is not as hard to conceive any existence or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expansion, as it is to have the idea of any real existence with perfect negation of all manner of duration. And therefore that points have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that bodies do each singly possess its proper portion of it, according to the extent of solid parts and thereby include all their bodies from having any share in that particular portion of space whilst it remains there.

12. *Duration has never two parts together as expansion does.* Duration, and time which is part of it, is the idea we have of *perishing* distance, of which no two parts exist together but if flow each other in succession an *expansion* is the idea of living distance, all whose parts exist together and are not capable of succession. And therefore, though we cannot conceive any duration without succession, nor can put it together in our thoughts that any being does so exist tomorrow or possess it once more than the present moment of duration yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty by different reason of man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends in his knowledge or power all past and future things has thoughts

all finite beings who though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power yet are no

edge and infinite power. He sees all things, past and to come and they are no more distant from His knowledge no further removed from His sight, than the present they all lie under the same view and there is nothing which He cannot make exist each moment He pleases. For the existence of all things, depending upon His good pleasure, all things exist every moment that He thinks fit

found in all that give testimony we do or can conceive, and may afford matter for further speculation.

Chap. XVI. *Idea of Number*

1. *Number is the simplest and most universal of* Amongst all the ideas we have, as there is no suggestion to the mind by more ways, so there is none more simple, than that of unity or one. It has no shadow of variety or composition in every object our senses are employed about every idea in our understandings every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things,

idea in our minds, and adding the repetitions together we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus, by adding one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple by putting two units together we have the complex idea of a dozen and so of a score, or million or any other number.

3. *Each mode distinct from the simplest mode.* These are of all other the most distinct every the least variation, which is an unit, makes each combination as clearly different from that which approacheth nearest to it, as the most remote two being as distinct from one, as two hundred and the idea of two as distinct from the idea of three, as the man-made of the whole earth is

from that of a mite This is not so in other simple modes in which it is not so easy nor perhaps possible for us to distinguish betwixt two approaching ideas which yet are really different For who will undertake to find a difference between the white of this paper and that of the next degree to it or can form distinct ideas of every the least excess in extension?

4 *Therefore demonstrations in numbers the most precise* The clearness and distinctness of each mode of number from all others even those that approach nearest makes me apt to think that demonstrations in numbers if they are not more evident and exact than in extension yet they are more general in their use and more determinate in their application Because the ideas of numbers are more precise and distinguishable than in extension where every equality and excess are not so easy to be observed or measured because our thoughts cannot in space arrive at any determined smallness beyond which it cannot go as an unit and therefore the quantity or proportion of any the least excess cannot be discovered which is clear otherwise in number where as has been said 91 is as distinguishable from 90 as from 9000 though 91 be the next immediate excess to 90 But it is not

which appear of an equal length one may be longer than the other by innumerable parts nor can any one assign an angle which shall be the next biggest to a right one

the idea marked by the name two And whoever can do this and proceed on still adding one more to the last collective idea which he had of any number and gave a name to it may count or have ideas for several collections of units distinguished one from another as far as he hath a series of names for following numbers and a memory to retain that series with their several names all numeration being but still the adding of one unit more and giving to the whole together as comprehended in one idea a new or distinct name or sign whereby to know it from those before and after and distinguish it from every smaller or greater multitude of units So that he that can add one to one and so to two and so go on with his tale taking still with him the distinct names belonging to every progression and so again by subtracting an unit from each collection retreat and lessen them is

capable of all the ideas of numbers within the compass of his language or for which he hath names though not perhaps of more For the several simple modes of numbers being in our minds but so many combinations of units which have no variety nor are capable of any other difference but more or less names or marks for each distinct combination seem more necessary than in any other sort of ideas For without such names or marks we can hardly well make use of numbers in reckoning especially where the combination is made up of any great multitude of units which put together without a name or mark to distinguish that precise collection will hardly be kept from being a heap in confusion

6 *Another reason for the necessity of names in numbers* This I think to be the reason why some Americans I have spoken of (who were otherwise of quick and rational parts enough) could not as we do by any means count to 1000 nor had any distinct idea of that number though they could reckon very well to 10 Because their language being scanty and accommodated only to the few necessities of a needy simple life unacquainted either with trade or mathematics had no words in it to stand for 1000 so that when they were discoursed with of those greater numbers they would show the hairs of their head to express a great multitude which they could not number which inability I suppose proceeded from their want of names The *Tououpinambos* had no names for numbers above 5 any number beyond that they made out by showing their fingers and the fingers of others who were present And I doubt not but our selves might distinctly number in words a great deal further than we usually do would we find out but some fit denominations to signify them by whereas in the way we take now to name them by millions of millions of millions &c. it is hard to go beyond eighteen or at most four and twenty decimal progressions without confusion But to show how much distinct names conduce to our well reckoning or having useful ideas of numbers let us see all these following figures in one continued line as the marks of one number viz

<i>A</i> 1 ns	<i>O</i> 1 ns	<i>S</i> 1 ns	<i>S</i> 1 ns	<i>Q</i> 1 ns
857324	162486	345896	437918	423147
<i>Q</i> 1 ns	<i>T</i> 1 ns	<i>B</i> 1 ns	<i>A</i> 1 ns	<i>U</i> 1 ns
248106	235421	261734	36849	623137

H 1 *d* 1 *y* 1 *g* 1 *e* 1 *f* 1 *t* 1 *T* 1 *e* 1 *r* 1 *r* 1 *d* 1 *B* 1 *i* 1
par J n de Lery ch p xx pp 3 7-382

The ordinary way of naming this number in English, will be the often repeating I millions, of millions, of millions, of millions, (which is the denomination of the second six figures) I which way it will be very hard to have any distinguishing notions of this number. But whether by giving every six figures a new and orderly denomination, these, and perhaps a great many more figures in progression, might not easily be collected distinct and as if them both got more easily to ourselves, and more plainly assisted to letters, I leave it to be considered. Thus I mention only to show how necessary distinct names are to numbering without pretending to introduce new ones of my invention.

Why write number so early? Thus children, either for want of names to mark the several progressions of numbers, or for having yet the faculty to collect scattered ideas into complex ones, and range them in regular order and so retain them in their memories, as is necessary to reckoning, do not begin to number very early nor proceed in it very far or readily till a good while after they are well furnished with good store of other ideas and one may of them serve them discourse and reason pretty well, and have very clear conceptions of several other things, before they can tell twenty. And some, through the default of their memories, who cannot retain the several combinations of numbers, with their names, annexed in their distinct orders, and the dependence of so long train of numeral progressions, and their relation one to another are not fit all their lifetime to reckon, or regularly go over any moderate series of numbers. For both this will count twenty or have any idea of that number must know that nineteen went before with the distinct name or mark of every one of them, as they stand marked in their order for wherever this fails, a gap is made, the chain breaks, and the progress in

8. Number *is* *measures* *all* *measures* *is* This faculty is observable in number that is that which the mind makes use of in measuring all things that by us are measurable, which principally are *extension* and *duration* and our idea of infinity even when applied to those, seems to be nothing but the infinity of number. For what else are our ideas of Eternity and Immensity but the repeated additions of certain ideas of imagined parts of duration and extension, with the infinity of number in which we can come to the end of addition. For such an inexhaustible stock, number (of all the other denominations) furnishes us with, as is obvious to every one. For let man collect into one sum as great a number as he pleases, this multitude, how great soever lessens not one jot the power of adding to it, or brings him any nearer the end of the inexhaustible stock of number where still there remains as much to be added, as if none were taken out. And this end is *addition* or *infinity* (if any one like the word better) of numbers, so apparent to the mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity of which more in the following chapter

Chap. XVII Of Infinity

1. *Infinity* *is* *its* *original* *idea* *is* *attributed* *to* *space* *duration* *and* *number* He that would know what kind of idea it is to which we give the name of infinity cannot do it better than by considering to what infinity is by the mind more immediately attributed and then how the mind comes to frame it.

First and second seem to me to be looked upon by the mind as the *mode* of figures and to be attributed primarily in their first designation only to those things which have parts, and are capable of increase or diminution by the addition or subtraction of any the least part and such are the ideas of space, duration, and number which we have considered in the foregoing chapters. It is true, that we cannot but be assured, that the great God, of whom and from whom are all things, is incomprehensibly infinite but yet, when we apply to that first and supreme Being our idea of infinite, in our weak and narrow thoughts, we do it primarily in respect to his duration and ubiquity and, I think, more figuratively to his power, wisdom, and goodness, and other attributes, which are properly inexhaustible and incomprehensible, &c. For when we call them infinite, we have no other idea of this infinity but what carries with it some reflection on, and imitation of, that number or extent of what acts or effects of God power, wisdom,

traction of the unit () That I retain in memory the names or marks of the several combinations, from an unit to that number and that not confusedly and randomly, but in that exact order that the numbers follow one another. In other of which, if it trips, the whole business of numbering will be disturbed, and there will remain only the confused idea of multitude, but the ideas necessary to distinct numeration will not be retained to.

and goodness which can never be supposed so great or so many which these attributes will not always surmount and exceed let us multiply them in our thoughts as far as we can with all the infinity of endless number I do not pretend to say how these attributes are in God who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow par
all
of c
infi

2 *The idea of finite easily got* Finite then and infinite being by the mind looked on as *modifications* of expansion and duration the next thing to be considered is — *How the mind comes by them* As for the idea of finite there is no great difficulty The obvious portions of extension that affect our senses carry with them into the mind the idea of finite and the ordinary periods of succession whereby we measure time and duration as hours days and years are bounded lengths The difficulty is how we come by those *boundless ideas* of eternity and immensity since the objects we converse with come so much short of any approach or proportion to that largeness

3 *How*
that has a
as a foot f
joining it
feet and ten a succession of a third three feet and so on without ever coming to an end of his additions whether of the same idea of a foot or if he pleases of doubling it or any other idea he has of any length as a mile or diameter of the earth or of the *orbis magnus* for whichever of these he takes and how often soever he doubles or any other use multiplies it he finds that after he has continued his doubling in his thoughts and enlarged his idea as much as he pleases he has no more
the end of
ting out it
by further
hence take the idea of infinite space

4 *Our idea of space boundless* This I think is the way whereby the mind gets the idea of infinite space It is a quite different consideration to examine whether the mind has the idea of such a boundless space actually existing since our ideas are not always proofs of the existence of things but yet since this comes here in our way I suppose I may say that we are apt to think that space in itself is actually boundless to which imagination the idea of space or expansion of itself naturally leads us For it being considered by us either as the extension of body or as existing

by itself without any solid matter taking it up (for of such a void space we have not only the idea but I have proved as I think) —

as it is, or be stopped anywhere in its progress in this space, how far soever it extends its thoughts Any bounds made with body even adamantine walls, are so far from putting a stop to the mind in its further progress in space and extension that it rather facilitates and enlarges it For so far as that body reaches so far no one can doubt of extension and when we are come to the utmost extremity of body what is there that can there put a stop and satisfy the mind that it is at the end of space when it perceives that it is not nay when it is satisfied that body itself can move into it? For if it be necessary for the motion of body that there should be an empty space though ever so little here amongst bodies and if it be possible for body to move in or through that empty space — nay it is impossible for any particle of matter to move but into an empty space the same possibility of a body —

utmost
space
rema
space
all bodies using exactly the same differing not in nature though in bulk and there being nothing to hinder body from moving into it. So that wherever the mind places itself by any thought, either amongst or remote from all bodies it can in this uniform idea of space nowhere find any bounds any end and so must necessarily conclude it by the very nature and idea of each part of it, to be actually infinite

5 *And so of duration* As by the power we find in ourselves of repeating as often as we will any

out it thus with all the endless additions of number we come by the idea of eternity For we find in ourselves we can no more come to an end of such repeated ideas than we can come to the end of number which every one perceives he cannot But he again it is another question quite different from our having an idea of eternity to know whether there ever any real being whose duration has been eternal And as to this I say he that considers something non-existing must necessarily come to Something eternal But having spoke of this in another place I shall say here no more of it,

— now the considerations of thought to have and so discourse or reason about an infinite quantity as an infinite space or an infinite duration. For as our idea of infinity begets as I think, an *endless* greatness of degrees but the mind has being at that

minds as that other and yet necessary. Hence infinite sweetness, or infinite whiteness, though he can repeat the idea of white, as frequently as those of a yard or a day. To which I answer — All the ideas that are considered as having parts, and are capable of increase by the addition of any equal or less parts, afford us, by their repetition the idea of infinity because, with this endless repetition they are continued — — — — —

increase but so that perfectest idea in the whitest white is, if I add the less or equal white is, (idea of white than I have) I cannot add the idea of it makes no increase — — — — —

an insignificant success. I can fully distinguish between the idea of the infinity of space and the idea of space infinite. The first is thus but is supposed endless progression of the mind over what repeated ideas of space it please but to have actually in the mind the idea of space infinite is to suppose the mind already passed over and actually to have reviewed all those repeated ideas of space which an *endless* repetition necessarily presents to it which carries in it a plain contradiction.

It has no idea of infinite power. Thus, perhaps, will be a little plain. If we consider numbers. The infinity of numbers, to the idea of whose addition every perfectness there is no approach, easily appears to any that reflects on it. But, how clear see this idea of the infinite — — — — —

their parcel. I now you see to-day I put this in your mind they embody as it were, and run into it, and the idea of whiteness is that all increase and if we add a less degree of whiteness to a greater we are so far from increasing that we diminish it. Those ideas that consist of parts cannot be greatest or to what proportion in place as or best reached beyond what they are enclosed by their senses but space duration and number being capable of increase by repetition in the mind deal of endless room for motion nor can we conceive anywhere to put a further duration or progression and so those ideas alone lead our minds towards the thought of infinity.

7. Difference between finity and infinity. I. Though our idea of infinity arises from the contemplation of quantity and the idea of increase the mind is able to make in quantity by the repeated addition of what portions the contemplation yet I guess we cannot get confused our thoughts, when we are in infinity to any supposed idea of quantity the mind can be

number I think must be so great, they are still finite but when we suppose an inexhaustible remainder from which we cannot call bounds, and wherein we allow the mind an endless progression of thought, with it every contemplation of the idea we have our idea of infinity which though it seems to be pretty clear when we consider this as being a fact but the negation of it end yet, when we would frame in our minds the idea of infinite progression duration that

it is plain the mind is not terminated in that which is contrary to the idea of infinity which consists in supposing an endless progression. And therefore I think it is that we are so easily confused when we come to argue and also about infinite space or duration &c. Because the parts of chance being perceived to be, as they are inconsistent, though on side their always perplexed, whatever consequences we draw from them as an demonstration to pass go. Cf. Hume Enquiry sec. III.

on would perplex any one who should argue from such an idea which is not better than an idea of motion at rest And such another seems to me to be the idea of a space or (which is the same thing) a number infinite i. e. of a space or number which the mind actually has and so views and terminates in and of a space or number which in a constant and endless enlarging and progression it can in thought never attain to For how large soever an idea of space I have in my mind it is no larger than it is that instant that I have it though I be capable the next instant to double it and so on in *infinitum* for that alone is infinite which has no bounds and that the idea of infinity in which our thoughts can find none

9 *Number affords us the clearest idea of infinity* But of all other ideas it is number as I have said which I think furnishes us with the clearest and most distinct idea of infinity i. e. are capable of For even in space and duration when the mind pursues the idea of infinity it there makes use of the ideas and repetitions of numbers as of millions and millions of miles or years which are so many distinct ideas — kept best by number from running into a confused heap wherein the mind loses itself and when it has added together as many millions &c. as it pleases of known lengths of space or duration the clearest idea it can get of infinity is the confused incommprehensible remainder of endless addable numbers which affords no prospect of stop or boundary

10 *Our different conceptions of the infinity of number contrasted with those of duration* a *deduction* It will perhaps give us a little further light into the idea we have of infinity and discover to us that it is nothing but the finity of number applied to determine the parts of which we have in our minds the distinct ideas if we consider that number is not generally thought by us infinite whereas duration and extension are apt to be so which arises from hence — that in number i. e. are at one end as it were for there being in number nothing less than an unit i. e. there stop and are at an end but in addition or increase of number we can set no bounds and so it is like a line where of one end terminating with us the other is extended still forwards beyond all that we can conceive But in space and duration it is otherwise For in duration i. e. consider it as if this line of number were extended both ways — to an un-

turning this infinity of number both ways *à parte ante* and *à parte post* as they speak For when we would consider eternity *à parte ante* i. e. what do we but beginning from ourselves and the present time we are in repeat in our minds the ideas of years or ages or any other assignable portion of duration past with a prospect of proceeding in such addition with all the infinity of number and when we would consider eternity *à parte post* i. e. just after the same rate begin from ourselves and reckon by multiplied periods yet to come still extending that line of number as before And these two being put together are that infinite duration we call *Eternity* which as we turn our view either way forwards or backwards appears infinite because we still turn that way the infinite end of number i. e. the power still of adding more

11 *How we conceive the finity of space* The same happens also in space wherein conceiving ourselves to be as it were in the centre we do on all sides pursue those indeterminable lines of number and reckoning any way from ourselves a yard mile diameter of the earth or a *bismarus* — by the infinity of number i. e. add others to them as often as we will And having no more reason to set bounds to those repeated ideas than we have to set bounds to number we have that indeterminable idea of immensity

12 *Infinite divisibility* And since in any bulk of matter our thoughts can never arrive at the utmost divisibility therefore there is an apparent infinity to us also in that which has the infinity also of number but with this difference — that in the former considerations of the infinity of space and duration i. e. only use addition of numbers whereas this is like the division of an unit into its fractions wherein the mind also can proceed in infinity as well as in the former additions it being indeed but the addition still of new numbers though in the addition of the one we can have no more the positive idea of a space

may say a growing or fugitive idea still in a boundless progress on — that can stop nowhere

13 *A positive idea of finity* Though it be hard I think to find anyone so absurd as to say he has the positive idea of an actual infinite number — the infinity whereof lies only in a power still of adding any combination of units to any former number and that as long and as much as one will the like also being in the infinity of space and duration which power I shall say to the mind room for endless additions — yet

there be those who imagine they have posited as infinite duration and power. It would, I think, be worth to destroy any such positive idea of infinity, to ask him that has it, whether he could add to it or no which would only show the mistake of such a positive idea. We can, I think, have no positive idea of any pace or duration which is not made up of and commensurate to repeated numbers of feet or yards, or days and years which are the common measures, whereby we have the idea as in our minds, and whereby we judge of the greatness of this sort of quantities. And therefore since an infinite space or duration must needs be made of infinite parts, I can have the infinity

miles, which possibly we double and multiply several times. All that we thus amass together in our thoughts is position, and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of space or duration.

let down large ports in this same manner he
s achieved his end. Whereby he knows the pit
t becomes yfathomable, and more but how much
the more is, he hath no distinct notion of it
and could he all supply new line and find
th plummet again sink, he utters opping
he would be some thing in the posture of
minding change of complaisance and posture

15

therwise prod on the d of ~~million~~ ^{times} as
umber does which, consisting of dozens of
Easi units one to th suggests the idea of
infinit only by power we find we have of still
increasingly num, and doing more of the same
kind a without coming on yet after the d of
ch progression.

4. How can we have past & de f ucy
past? Th y w b would prove th ir dea fin
to be possib e, seem s me t d t by a
pl asant argum t, taken from th negat v f
an end which be g negative th n gats n f i
is possib e. H th consid es that th od is, no
bod but th r msty or supe fices of that
body will not perhaps be forward grant that
the end is bar negat and b that pette res
th end f his pe is black or white, will be apt
to think that the od is something more than
pur reason. Nor is t, when plied to dur
wor, th bare negation f existence but more
properly th last mom t f t. B t if they will
ha e the nd to be nothing but th ha era
wo I evs nec I am sur they can ed ny
but the beginning is th first instant f being
and is ot by any body conce ed to be bare
negation and therefore by th r own argu
ment, th idea f eternal, d parts or of f a
duration without begining is but negativ
idea.

3. What is part of what is in the world of
The idea of infinity has, I confess, some
thing of position in all those things which apply
When we would think of infinity, space or
duration, we first usually make some very
large idea, as perhaps millions of years, or
C. Bacon, New York Oregon, Bk. 48.

comp eh nds f any space it has posu a
of but a endea vour to make t infinit — t
bein always alurging, always dvancin —
th dea is still imperfect and incomple So
much pace as th mind takes a vew of n is
contemplation of greatness, is a clear picture
and pos u in the understanding but infin t
is still greater e Then the dea f s start is pos-
u and clear Th dea f s start is also clear
but it is but a compar u e dea, the idea f s
each gr ter as ~~the~~ the compr ehend d g And thus
is plainly egati n t pos u For h has no
pos u e d as dea (the largeness f any exten-
sion, (which is that wrought for in th d a of in-
finit e) that has a c comprehensid of the
dimensions f t and such, body I think, p e-
t and t in what is infinit For to say, ma has
posu in clear d f any quantity without
known how gr t as, is as reasonable as to
say he has th pos u e clear d a f th number
f the sands on th se with re, wh knows not
how many ther be, but only that they are more
than nre ty For just such p e fect and pos u e
id has be f an infinit space durati n, wh
say is larger than th exte (ordur n often

Security and has the and constant confusion
 fan gative dea, wherein I know I ne ther do
 not can compr hnd all I would, t being too
 large for first and narrow capacity And that
 cannot but be very far from positive compo
 dea, wh reat. greatest part what I would

comprehend is left out under the undetermined intimation of being still greater. For to say that having in any quantity measured so much or gone so far you are not yet at the end is only to say that that quantity is greater. So that the negation of an end in any quantity is in other words only to say that it is bigger and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you in all the progressions your thoughts shall make in quantity and adding this idea of still greater to all the ideas you have or can be supposed to have of quantity. Now whether such an idea as that be positive I leave any one to consider.

16 We have no positive idea of an infinite duration. I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity whether their idea of duration is not

perhaps there may be others as well as I who will own to their weakness of understanding in this point and acknowledge that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive that whatever has duration is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday. If to avoid succession in external existence they return to the *punctum stans* of the schools I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession. Besides that *punctum stans* if it signify anything being not *quantum* finite or infinite cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite succession of moments of duration wherein anything does exist and whether any one has or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number I leave him to consider till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it and as long as he can increase it I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it a little too scanty for positive infinity.

17 No complete idea of eternal being. I think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature that will but examine his own or any other existence to have the notion of an eternal use. Being who had no beginning and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have. But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a positive thing scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity which I whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to I confess myself at a

loss and I find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

I
I
pos
leas
easy
then
is all capable only of a comparative idea of smallness which will always be less than any one hereof we have the positive idea. All our positive ideas of any quantity whether great or little have always bounds though our comparative idea whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other hath no bounds. For that which remains either great or little not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have lies in obscurity and we have no other idea of it but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other without ceasing. A pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indistinguishable as the acutest thought of a mathematician and a surveyor infinite flight of
hence it will be to have a positive idea of it. He

and so on till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very little but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehensible littleness which division can produce. What remains of smallness is as far from his thoughts as when he first began and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness which is consequent to infinite divisibility.

19 What is it to be what negation in our idea of infinity. Every one that looks towards infinity does as I have said at first glance make some very large idea of that which he applies it to let it be space or duration and possibly he wears his thoughts by multiplying in his mind that first large idea but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a positive clear idea of what remains to make up a positive infinity than the country fellow had of the water which was yet to come and pass the channel of the river where he stood.

Rusticus est latet in d. f. t. m. i. l. l.
Lob. t. l. b. t. m. e. r. o. l. b. i. a. r. u. m.

20 Some think they have a positive idea of infinity and I find it is but space. There is some I have met that put so much difference between infi-

CHAP. XVII

nite duratiⁿ dⁱnfinⁱ p^oce, that th^e y^e p^oce
sund^r th^e msel^f s^e that th^e y^e ha^ve p^ostⁱue dea^t
fⁱnⁱty but that th^e y^e ha^ve n^t, n^r can ha^ve
any dⁱ fⁱnⁱit space The eason of which
mistake I suppose to be this—th^e tⁱ finding by a
dⁱ contemplati^on of caus^e and ffⁱ us th^e tⁱ
ad^m tⁱ som^e Eteⁿal Beⁿg a^d

F^r whatsoe^r r^opositi^on deas a maⁿ has n^t his
mⁱdⁱ fⁱnⁱty he caⁿ p^ostⁱue tⁱ and add
it to the fⁱnⁱty r^o as asy as he can add tog^e the
th^e dⁱ as fⁱ two days r^o two p^oces such are
p^ostⁱue dⁱ as fⁱ ngth^e h^e has iⁿ his mⁱdⁱ and
so on lⁱ gⁱ as h^e p^oses he eby fⁱ a man
had p^ostⁱue dⁱ aof fⁱ te e th^e r^o ratioⁿ r^o
sp^e e, h^e ould add tⁱ o fⁱnⁱtes togeth^r r^o nay
mak^e fⁱnⁱty fⁱnⁱty b^e gg^r than an th^e r^o
—absurd ties too gross tⁱ be confuted

fⁱnⁱty
n^t ho
r^o p^oses

Which onsequ^ece I eo
collected because th^e iust n^e fⁱmat^t is no
way necessary tⁱ th^e eⁱce fⁱ p^oce, n^rom re
than th^e iust cⁱ fⁱmⁱuo th^e sun

edg^e they h^e no uch) to be ue uⁱ dⁱ
by th^e r^o commuⁿ cati^on. For I ha^ve beⁿ h^e th^e
e to p^ostⁱue th^e gre^t a dⁱ n^etr cabl^e
dⁱ fficulties such perpet^u ally o^f all dⁱ
courses n^ece n^e fⁱnⁱty—wh^e th^e r^o fⁱ p^oce
durati^on dⁱ b^e ty h^e been th^e certaⁿ
marks fⁱ a dⁱ fⁱ tⁱ ur dⁱ as fⁱ fⁱnⁱty dⁱ
the dⁱ p^ostⁱue the nature th^e eof has to the
comp^h ns fⁱ ur narrow cap^e ties Fⁱ

bush lⁱ wⁱ th^e tⁱ co th^e h^e ll tⁱ n^e ces

hulst mⁱ talk a dⁱ disp^o tⁱ fⁱnⁱty sp^ece r^o
dⁱ tⁱ as fⁱ th^e y had as e mⁱpl^e te dⁱ p^ostⁱue
dⁱ as fⁱ th^e mⁱ as they ha^ve fⁱ th^e n^e mes th^e y u^e
fⁱ th^e mⁱ or as th^e y ha^ve of a ya dⁱ or n^e hou^r
any oth^r detⁱ mⁱ natⁱ quaⁿ ty tⁱ sⁿ
dⁱ if th^e comp^h ns ble natur^e fⁱ the
th^en they discou^s e fⁱ r^o aso abo^t lⁱ ads
th^e mⁱ at p^ostⁱue dⁱ coⁿ trⁱ dⁱ us, and
the mⁱnds be oⁿ lⁱ adⁱ by an b^eject too large
dⁱ mighty to be surv^yed and man^ged by
th^e mⁱ.

ou dⁱ fⁱnⁱit p^o qu^estⁱ th^e alⁱ us
ce fⁱmat^t tⁱ support tⁱ wh^e fⁱ dⁱ th^e tⁱ
ha^v as clⁱ ar dⁱ fⁱnⁱit dⁱ tⁱ
com^o as wⁱ h^e fⁱ fⁱ dⁱ tⁱ pastⁱ
Thou h^e lⁱ p^o bodⁱ th^e lⁱ s^t ble
th^e tⁱ anyth^e gⁱ does or has xⁱsed th^e tⁱ fⁱ ture
durⁱ tⁱ on^e r^o is tⁱ possⁱ bl^e tⁱ) ou dⁱ fⁱ

All the ar^o modⁱ fⁱidⁱ as gⁱ fⁱ mⁱ sensⁱ
nd fⁱct If I ha^ve dwelt pr^o tⁱ y lⁱ ng n^e th^e

durⁱ on than fⁱnⁱit p^oce becaus^e tⁱ is past
doub^t that God has exis^ted fⁱ mⁱ allⁱ r^o nity
but there is alⁱ matter coⁿ e tⁱ dⁱ wⁱ th^e
fⁱnⁱ p^oce yet those philosoph^ers who ar^e fⁱ
on that fⁱnⁱit sp^ece is poss^essed by God
fⁱ te mⁱnⁱpresence as well as n^e fⁱ tⁱ duraⁿ

mⁱdⁱ gⁱ mⁱ e cas^e tⁱ th^e thoughts of mⁱn
than those dⁱ p^ostⁱue tⁱ tⁱ trⁱ tⁱ of them in
th^e full latitudo It suffice to my desⁱgn to
how h^e wⁱ the mⁱdⁱ ecc^e es th^e mⁱ, such as th^e y^e
ar^e from ensati^on dⁱ fⁱcti^on and how n^e
th^e dⁱ wⁱ ha^ve fⁱnⁱty how emⁱ tⁱ soe
tⁱ may se mⁱ tⁱ be fⁱom any b^e tⁱ of sense o^f
p^ostⁱue fⁱour mⁱdⁱ has, neverth^e less as all
our th^e r^o dⁱ as, tⁱ eual th^e r^o. Some math^e
maticians p^ose, fⁱ dⁱanced peculⁱ tⁱ us
may h^e th^e wⁱys tⁱ introd^e ce into th^e r^o
mⁱdⁱ dⁱ as fⁱ fⁱnⁱty B^e tⁱ this hind^e n^e tⁱ but
that th^e y th^e msel^f es, as wⁱ ll as all th^e mⁱn
got th^e first dⁱ as which they had fⁱnⁱty

comprehend is left out under the undetermined intimation of being still greater. For to say that having *n* is gone so I to say that negation of *n* is in any quantity is in other words only to say that it is bigger and a total negation of an end is but carrying this bigger still with you in all the progressions; our thoughts shall make in quantity and adding this idea of still greater to all the ideas you have or can be supposed to have of quantity. Now whether such an idea as that be positive I leave any one to consider.

15 *We have no positive idea of an infinite duration.* I ask those who say they have a positive idea of eternity whether their idea of duration includes in it succession or not? If it does not they ought to show the difference of their notion of duration when applied to an eternal Being and to a finite since perhaps there may be others as well as I who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point and acknowledge that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive that whatever has duration is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday. If to avoid succession in eternal existence they return to the punctum stans of the schools I suppose they will thereby very little mend the matter or help us to a more clear and positive idea of infinite duration there being nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession. Besides that punctum stans if it signify anything being not quantum finite or infinite cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehensions cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite succession of moments of duration where anything does exist and whether any one has or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number I leave him to consider till his infinite number be so great that he himself can add no more to it and as long as he can increase it I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it a little too scanty for positive infinity.

17 *No conceivable eternal being.* I think it unavoidable for every considering rational creature that will but examine his own or any other existence to have the notion of an eternal wise Being who had no beginning and such an idea of infinite duration I am sure I have. But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a positive thing scarce gives me a positive idea of infinity which whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to I confess myself at a

loss and I find I cannot attain any clear comprehension of it.

18 *No positive idea of infinite space.* He that thinks he has a positive idea of infinite space will when he considers it find that he can no more have

po
lea
cas
her
ide
as such will always be less than any one whereof we have the positive idea. All our positive ideas of any quantity whether great or little have always bounds though our comparative idea whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other hath no bounds. For that which remains either great or little not being comprehended in that positive idea which we have lies in obscurity and we have no other idea of it but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other without ceasing. A pestle and mortar will as soon bring any particle of matter to indivisibility as the acutest thought of a mathematician and a surveyor may as soon with his chain measure out infinite space as a philosopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it or by thinking comprehend it which is to have a positive idea of it. He

cl
ca
as and so on till he has the idea in his thoughts of something very little but yet reacheth it. prehens
What re
thoughts as when he first began and therefore he never comes at all to have a clear and positive idea of that smallness which is consequent to infinite divisibility.

19 *Is it possible what negative in our idea of finite.* Every one that looks towards infinity does, as I have said at first glance make so very large an idea of that which he applies it to let it be space or duration and possibly he enlarges his thoughts by multiplying in his mind that first large idea but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a positive clear idea of what remains to make up a positive infinite than the country fellow had of the water which was yet to come and pass the channel of the river where he stood.

Rusticus pe tat d m d f i a l m s i l l
Lab i t l b i mne vol b l acum

o Some think they have a positive idea of eternity and not of infinite space. There are some I have met that put so much difference between inf

note duratio a d infinit sp ce, that they pe
squad themselves that th y ha pos u e dea
f t nity but that th y ha e t n can ha e
y d f infinit space Th easo f huch
mistake I suppose t be this—that finding by a
er

For whatsoe er pos u e deas a man has i his
mind of a y qu tity he can repeat i and add
it t th f m r as asy as h can add tog th
the d as f two days, two paces huch are
pos u d as f l nghts h has his mind and
f m

ter Which consequ ce I co ce e is ry ill
collected because the vst ce f matt r is o
ys necessary t th exist ce f p ce nom re
than th vst ce f m u the sun nec
wlt t be

t thousand years w thout any body so ld it
seems as asy t m t ha th d f sp ce
-mpy f body as to think f th cap city f
bush l without co or the h ll w f an t h ll
thout k rnel in t t be g m es-
sary that th re should be vst g sold body
nfin ly tended becaus w h d of
th infinity f p ce tha t is necessary th t th
orld should be t rnal becau h id a
f nfinst dur tion. A d why should th k
our d f infinit p ce equ es th al vst
ce f matt t supp t t, h find th t
ha as cl ar de f infi t d t
t come as w ha e f i t d u past.
Thou h I suppose body th is t co ce ill
th t yth g does has v ed n th t f tur
duration Nor is t poss bl t j ur d f
future dur u w th prese t past exist ce,
y more than t is poss bl t mak th d of
yes erd y to-d y and to-m row t be the sam
or bring ges past and f tur to- ther and mak
th m co t mporary But if these m n ar f th
mud that they h e cl ar id as f infi t
dur on tha f infinit sp ce because t is past
doubt that God has xisted from ll t rnty
but there is al matt co-exte ded w th in
finit sp ce yet those philosophers who ar f
p tha infin te space is possessed by God
finit omnis p esence as w ll as infinit dura
tion by h t al vst ce must be allowed to
ha e as cl ar an id f finit sp ce as f m
finite dur tion though th f them, I think,
has any pos tive idea f infinity in either case.

CL. ch. xv § 4.

lak But yet is alte all this, u w m m
persuad them l es that th y h e clear pos
n f h m

co rses co cer g infin ty—wh th r f space
durati r d us bility ha e be n the certain
marks f a d f ct in our d as f nfinity a d
th disp po u n th tur th eof has to the
comprehens of our narrow cap cit es For
hulst m n talk d disput f finit sp ce
d u n, as f th y had as compl t d pos t
d as f them th y ha e f th mes th y use
f them, as th y ha e f a yard a hour
any th d t rminat qu tity t is no
d f th uncomp eh ns bl tur f the
th th y discou e f ason bo t l ds
th m t perpl xities d contr d ct ns, and
th r minds be ov laid by an object too large
and m ghty t be surv yed and man g d by
th m.

All the er mode f d as g t f m rns t
and fl t n. If I ha e dwelt p tly l g the
considerati f dur u sp ce and numbe
nd what arises f om th co templ t n of th m
—Infinity t is poss bly n mor tha the mat
ter quires th e being few umple d as hose
mod g e mo is to th thoughts f m n
tha those d l p t d t to tr t f them n
th r full l t tud It suffices t my des gn t
how how th m d ec es th m ch as they
ar fr mse sat d r fl m and how n
the d w ha f infinity how em t soc
t may seem to be f m any b j ct f sens or
pe tion f our mind has, neverth less, as ll
our other id as, is gual there. Som math
matici ns pe haps f advan ed speculati ns
may ha e th w ys t introd ce t th r
—

from sensation and reflection in the method we have here set down

Chap XVIII Other Simple Modes

1 *Other simple modes of simple ideas of sensation* Though I have in the foregoing chapters shown how from simple ideas taken in by sensation the mind comes to extend itself even to infinity which however it may of all others seem most remote from any sensible perception yet at last hath nothing in it but what is made out of simple ideas received into the mind by the senses and afterwards there put together by the faculty the mind has to repeat its own ideas — Though I say these might be instances enough of simple modes of the simple ideas of sensation and suffice to show how the mind comes by them yet I shall for method's sake though briefly give an account of some few more and then proceed to more complex ideas

■ *Simple modes of motion* To slide roll tumble walk creep run dance leap skip and aboundance of others that might be named are words which are no sooner heard but every one who understands English has presently in his mind distinct ideas which are all but the different modifications of motion Modes of motion answer those of extension swift and slow are two different ideas of motion the measures whereof are made of the distances of time and space put together so they are complex ideas comprehending time and space with motion

3 *Modes of sounds* The like variety have we in sounds Every articulate word is a different modification of sound by which we see that from the sense of hearing by such modifications the mind may be furnished with distinct ideas to almost an infinite number Sounds also besides the distinct cries of birds and beasts are modified by diversity of notes of different length put together which make that complex idea called a tune which a musician may have in his mind when he hears or makes no sound at all by reflecting on the ideas of those sounds so put together silently in his own fancy

4 *Modes of colours* Those of colours are also very various some we take notice of as the different degrees or as they were termed shades of

5 *Modes of tastes* All compounded tastes and smells are also modes made up of the simple ideas of those senses But they being such as generally we have no names for are less taken notice of and cannot be set down in writing and therefore must be left without enumeration to the thoughts and experience of my reader

6 *Some simple modes have no names* In general it may be observed that those simple modes which are considered but as different degrees of the same simple idea though they are in themselves many of them very distinct ideas yet have ordinarily no distinct names nor are much taken notice of as distinct ideas where the difference is but very small between them Whether men have neglected these modes and given no names to them as wanting measures nicely to distinguish them or because when they were so distinguished that knowledge would not be of general or necessary use I leave it to the thoughts of others It is sufficient to my purpose to show that all our simple ideas come to our minds only by sensation and reflection and that when the mind has them it can variously repeat and compound them and so make new complex ideas But though white red or sweet &c have not been modified or made into complex ideas by several combinations so as to be named and thereby ranked into species yet some others of the simple ideas viz those of unity duration and motion &c above instanced in as also power and thinking have been thus modified to a great variety of complex ideas with names belonging to them

7 *Why some modes have and others have not names* The reason hereof I suppose has been this — That the great concernment of men being with men one amongst another the knowledge of men and their actions and the signifying of them to one another was most necessary and therefore they made ideas of actions very nicely modified and gave those complex ideas names that they might the more easily record and discourse of those things they were daily conversant in without long ambages and circumlocutions and that the things they were continually to give and receive information about might be the easier and quicker understood That this is so and that men in framing different complex ideas and giving them names have been much governed by the end of speech in general (which is a very short and expeditious way of conveying their thoughts one to another) is evident in the names which

as in painting carving needleworks &c — those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mixed modes as being made up of ideas of divers kinds viz figure and colour such as beauty rainbow &c

in their direction or discourses about them. Which ideas are not generally framed in the minds of men not conversant about these perceptions. And though the words that stand for them, by the greater part of men of the same language are understood & yet each shall fill it on a whole, as are words standing for or signifying complex ideas which being held in the minds of any but those few whose particular employment is directed at every turn suggest them to them though these names of them are not generally understood but by smiths and chymists who have framed the complex ideas which these words stand for and having given names to them, or received them from others, upon bearing of these names in communication, are duty to convey those ideas to the minds of others as by example all the simple ideas of distilling and then pouring the liquor distilled from anything back upon the retorting matter and distilling it again. Thus we see that there are great varieties of simple ideas, as of tastes and smells, which have no names and so many in which there is change being generally neglected else it being necessary to be taken notice of in the affairs and concerns of men they have not had names given to them and pass unnoticed for species. Thus we shall have occasion hereafter to consider more at large, when we come to speak of words.

Chap. XIX. Of the Modes of Thinking

1. *Sensation* *memory* *and* *contemplation* *the* *three* *modes* *of* *thinking* *g* When the mind turns its view inwards upon itself directed contemplates its own actions, thinking is the first that occurs in the mind preserves great variety of modifications, and in the perception is distinct ideas. Thus the perception or thought which actually comprehends, and is annexed to any impression the body made by external object, being distinguished from all the modifications of thinking furnishes the mind with distinct ideas which we call *ideas* — which is, as it were, the natural trace of any distinct understanding by the senses. The same idea, when it again occurs without the presence of the like object on the external sensory is *memory* and if it be suggested after by the mind without pain and without being brought again into view it is *reflection* if it be held together and it is *consideration* if it is *contemplation* when directed as to in our mind, without any reflection or re-

taken notice of and as it were regarded as a mere ordinary sensation when the mind with great earnestness, directed at it fixes its view on it

without doing is rest from all these and directing itself is thinking of it as (what it is)

is known occurs on nor under any circumstance of the understanding of all and which is that which we call *creativity* or not directing with the yet open idea to be examined.

2. *Other modes of thinking g* These are some few instances of those various modes of thinking which the mind may preserve in itself and so have as distinct ideas as if it had white and red a square or a circle I do not pretend to enumerate them all nor to treat at large of this sort of ideas which are got from reflection that would be to make a volume It suffices to my present purpose to have shown how they by some few examples, of what sort these ideas are and how the mind comes by them especially since I shall have occasion hereafter to treat more at large of *reasoning* *judging* *volition*, and *knowledge* which are some of the most considerable perceptions of the mind and modes of thinking

3. *The grounds of reflection* *the* *three* *perceptions* *may* *be* *an* *un* *per* *ceptible* *grasping* *so* *or* *wholly* *impossible* *to* *our* *present* *sign*, if we reflect there upon the different state of the mind in thinking which those instances of attention, even, directed and before we turned naturally enough suggest. The ideas are directed as, some or other always present in the mind if waking man every now and then comes him to the mind and represents it about them with several degrees of attention. Some times the mind fixes itself with so much earnestness on that to explain from objects that it turns it as in all degrees marks the relation and circumstances and views every part so nicely and with such intent that it huts

See Bk. III
1. Bk. III ch. vi.
Cf. B. I. § 3.

sible perceptions at other times it barely observes the train of ideas that succeed in the understanding without directing and pursuing any of them and at other times it lets them pass almost quite unregarded as faint shadows that make no impression

4 Hence it is probable that thinking is the action not the essence of the soul. Thus difference of intention and remission of the mind in thinking with a great variety of degrees between and very near I think has a

little further as you find the mind in sleep retired as it were from the senses and out of the reach of those motions made on the organs of sense which at other times produce v

6 as seeing the lightning or feeling the shaking of the house which are sensible enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the mind from the senses it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of thinking which we call dreaming. And last of all sound sleep closes the scene quite and puts an end to all appearances. This I think almost every one has experience of.

7 What since the mind can sensibly put on at several times several degrees of thinking and be sometimes even in a waking man so remiss as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that degree that they are very little removed from none at all and at last in the dark retirements of sound sleep loses the sight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever since I say this is evidently so in matter of fact and constant experience I ask whether it be not probable that thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul? Since the operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission but the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation. But this by-the-by

Chap. XX. Of Modes of Pleasure and Pain

1 Pleasure and pain simple ideas. Amongst the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection pain and pleasure are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself or accompanied with pain or pleasure so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so or else accompanied also

with pleasure or pain. Delight or trouble call it how you please. These like other simple ideas cannot be described nor their names defined the way of knowing them is as of the simple ideas of the senses only by experience. For to define them by the presence of good or evil is no other wise to make them known to us than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds as they are differently applied to or considered by us.

2 Good and evil what. Things then are good or evil only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good which is apt to cause or increase pleasure or diminish pain in us or else to procure or preserve us the possession of any other good or absence of any evil. And on the contrary we name that evil which is apt to produce or increase any pain or diminish any pleasure in us or else to procure us any evil or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain I must be understood to mean of body or mind they are commonly distinguished though in truth they be only different constitutions of the mind sometimes occasioned by disorder in the body sometimes by thoughts of the mind.

3 Our passions moved by good and evil. Pleasure and pain and that which causes them—good and evil are the hinges on which our passions turn. And if we reflect on ourselves and observe how these und

they produce in us we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our passions.

4 Love. Thus any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him has the idea we call love. For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them or in spring when there are none that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the delight of their taste and he then can be said to love grapes no longer.

5 Hatred. On the contrary the thought of the pain which anything present or absent is apt to produce in us what we call hatred. Were it my business here to inquire any further than into the bare ideas of our passions as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain I should r

¹ Cf. h. i. §§ 10-19.

² Cf. ch. vi. §§ 1-6.

³ Cf. i. use and application any way to our senses though with the destruction. But hatred or love

to beings capable of happiness or misery is often the uneasiness or delight which we find in our selves, arising from consideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing constant delight in him, he is said constantly to love them. But it suffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the dispositions of the mind, in respect of pleasure and pain in general, however caused in us.

6. *Desire* The uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call *desire* which is greater or less, as that uneasiness is more or less vehement. Where, by the by it may perhaps be of some use to remark, that the chief, if not only proper to human industry and action is *uneasiness*. For whatsoever good is proposed, if its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare vanity the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything that it carries a man no further than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. Desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as the uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. This might carry our thoughts further were it reasonable in this place.

7. *Joy* is delight of the mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approach or possession of a good and we are then possessed of a good, when we have it so in our power that we can use it when we please. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief even before he has the pleasure of using it and father in whom the very well being of his children causes delight, is always, as long as his children are in such state, in the possession of that good for he needs but to reflect on it, to have this pleasure.

8. *Sorrow* is uneasiness in the mind, upon the thought of good lost, which might have been enjoyed longer or the sense of present evil.

9. *Happiness* is the pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself upon the thought of a probable future enjoyment of things which is pleasant to delight him.

10. *Fear* is an uneasiness of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befall us.

¶ Aristotle *Rhetoric* Lib. I.

11. *Dejection* is the thought of the unattainableness of any good, which works differently in men's minds, sometimes producing uneasiness or pain, sometimes rest and indolence.

12. *Anger* is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury with a present purpose of revenge.

13. *Envy* is an uneasiness of the mind caused by the consideration of good we desire obtained by one we think should not have had it before us.

14. *What passions all men have* These two last, *envy* and *anger* not being, caused by pain and pleasure simply in themselves, but having in them some mixed considerations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts, of *ambition* their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them. But all the rest, terminating purely in pain and pleasure are I think, to be found in all men. For we love, desire, rejoice and hope, only in respect of pleasure we hate, fear and grieve only in respect of pain ultimately. In fine all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the subject (at least, if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us because the fear it leaves is constant pain but we do not so constantly love what has done us good because pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain, and because we are not so ready to have hope it will do so again. But this by the by.

15. *Pleasure and pain, what* By pleasure and

16. *Removal or lessening of pleasure* It is further to be considered, that, in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates, as a pleasure and the loss or diminution, of pleasure, as pain.

Slaves The passions too have most of them, in most persons, operations on the body and cause various changes in it which not being all we sensibly do not make necessary part of the idea of each passion. For *love* which is an uneasiness of the mind upon the thought of having done something which is indecent, or will lessen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always laughing accompany in it.

18 *These instances to show how our ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection.* I would not be mistaken here as if I meant thus as a Dis course of the Passions they are many more than those I have here named and those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse I have only mentioned these here as so many instances of modes of pleasure and pain resulting in our minds from various considerations of good and evil I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more simple than these as the pain of hunger and thirst and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them the pain of teeth set on edge the pleasure of music pain from captious uninstrucive wrangling and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth But the passions being of much more concernment to us I rather made choice to instance in them and show how the ideas we have of them are derived from sensation or reflection

Chap XXI Of Power

1 *This idea how got* The mind being every day informed by the senses of the alteration of those simple ideas it observes in things without and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be and another begins to exist which was not before reflecting also on what passes within itself and observing a constant change of its ideas sometimes by the impression of outward objects on the senses and sometimes by the determination of its own choice and concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like agents and by the like ways — considers in one thing the possibility of having any of its simple ideas changed and in another the possibility of making that change and so comes by that idea which we call *power* Thus we say Fire has a power to melt gold to destroy the consistency of its insensible parts and consequently its hardness and make it fluid and gold has a power to be melted that the sun has a power to blanch wax and wax a power to be blanchied by the sun whereby the yellowness is destroyed and white-ness made to exist in its room In which and the like cases the power we consider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas For we cannot observe any alteration to be made in or operation upon anything but by the observable

Cf ch v § 8 h x vi § 1 Hum Eng 3 ect. vii p 472 fn 1 bel w ch. xi § 11 ch. x ii

change of its sensible ideas nor conceive any alteration to be made but by conceiving a change of some of its ideas

2 *Power active and passive* Power thus considered is two fold viz as able to make or able to receive any change The one may be called *active* and the other *passive* power Whether matter be not wholly destitute of active power as its author God is truly above all passive power and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power may be worth consideration I shall not now enter into that inquiry my present business being not to search into the original of power but how we come by the idea of it But since active powers make so great a part of our complex ideas of natural substances (as we shall see hereafter) and I mention them as such according to common apprehension yet they being not perhaps so truly active powers as our hasty thoughts are apt to represent them I judge it not amiss by this intimation to direct our minds to the consideration of God and spirits for the clearest idea of active power

3 *Power includes relation* I confess power includes in it some kind of relation (a relation in action or change) as indeed which of our ideas of what kind soever when attentively considered does not? For our ideas of extension duration and number do they not all contain in them a secret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more visibly And sensible qualities as colours and smells &c what are they but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perception &c? And if considered in the things themselves do they not depend on the bulk figure texture and motion of the parts? All which include some kind of relation in them Our idea therefore of power I think may well have a place amongst other simple ideas and be considered as one of them being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of substances as we shall hereafter have occasion to observe

4 *The clearest idea of active power had from spirit* We are abundantly furnished with the idea of passive power by almost all sorts of sensible things In most of them we cannot avoid observing their

Cf Bk II ch xii § 8 Chh xxi xxvi § 2 Bk IV chh ix x x Iso Aristotl At phy 4 Bk

H me T i Bk I pt ect Bl. II h xxi §§ 7-11 also ch viii §§ 3-

26 Ch §§ 13 14. Cl xxii § 8

sensible qualities, nay the very substances, to be in continual flux. And therefore with respect so look them as liable till the same change. Nor have we self-acting power (which is the more proper signification of the word power) few instances. Since whatever changes observed the mind must collect powersomehow, to make that change as well as possibility of the thing itself. Therefore it is evident if we will consider the body by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of the power as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. For all power relating to action and the being both two so to say, is hereof we have an idea, viz. thinking and motion. Thus consider which we have the clearest as the powers which produce these actions. (1) Of thinking body affords us no idea at all; it is only from reflection that we have it. (2) Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it sets motion to itself that motion is rather passive than active in itself. For when the ball begins its motion, a billiard ball, it is not any action of the ball, but has passive. Also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion, it lays in the way to only communicates the motion it had received from another and loses in itself so much as it then receives which gives us but a very obscure and faint representation of moving in body whilst we have not nearly to suffer but to produce any motion. For it is but a very obscure and faint power which checks the production of the motion, but the continuation of the motion is not made in itself from itself, but is continued by another action, than the continuation of itself after it is figured by the same billiard ball. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves. Here we find by experience that, barely by will, it barely by thought the mind we can move the parts of our bodies, which we be for the rest. So that the most in we have from the observation of the operation of the body by our senses, but very imperfectly obscure of active power, since they afford us many ideas of themselves of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought. But if from the impulse of the body as observed to make upon another, any one thinks he has a clear and distinct power, it serves as well to my purpose sensation being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas, only I thought it worth while to

consider hereby the way whether the mind did not receive the idea of its power clearer from reflection on its own operations than it did from any external sensation.

§ 5 *Will and understanding, the powers of the spirit.* Thus, at least, I think evident, — That we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear continue or end several actions of our minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind order, as it were commanding the doing or not doing such such particular actions. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest and order in any particular instance is that which we call the *Will*. The usual example of that power by directing any particular action is self-bearingance is that which we call *volition* or *will*. The self-bearingance of that action is consequent to such order or command of the mind is called *voluntary*. And whatsoever action is performed without such a thought of the mind is called *involuntary*. The power of perception is that which we call the *Understanding*. Perception which we make that act of the understanding is of three sorts — The perceptible as in our minds. 2 The perceptible of the signification of signs. 3 The perceptible of the connexion or repugnancy agreeable to disassemble, that there is between any of our ideas. All these are attributed to the understanding. The perceptible power though it be the two latter, namely the use allow us to say we understand.

§ 6 *Faculties not of being.* These powers of the

be so as to breed any confusion in thoughts, by being supposed (as I suspect it has been) to be some albeings in the soul that perceive those actions of understanding and volition. When we say that will is commanding and superior of culture of the soul that it is is that that it returns the uncultures that it flows that it takes the understanding &c. — though these and the like press on, by those that carefully tend to the own ideas, and conduct the thoughts by the conduct of things than the soul itself may be understood in clear and distinct sense — yet I suspect, I say that this way of speaking of faculties has misled many into a confused notion.

tion of so many distinct agents in us which had their several provinces and authorities and did command obey and perform several actions as so many distinct beings which has been no small occasion of wrangling obscurity and uncertainty in questions relating to them

7 Hence the ideas of liberty and necessity Every one I think finds in himself a power to begin or forbear continue or put an end to several actions in himself From the consideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man which everyone finds in himself arise the ideas of liberty and necessity

8 Liberty what All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves as has been said to these two viz thinking and motion so far as a man has power to think or not to think to move or not to move according to the preference or direction of his own mind so far is a man free Wherever any performance or forbearance

9 directing it there he is not free though perhaps the action may be voluntary So that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action

10 power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition there he is not at liberty that agent is under necessity So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought no volition no will but there may be thought there may be will there may be volition where there is no liberty A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear

11 Suppose understanding and will A tennis ball whether in motion by the stroke of a racket or lying still at rest is not by any one taken to be a free agent If we enquire into the reason we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis ball to think and consequently not to have any volition or preference of motion to rest or vice versa and therefore has not liberty is not a free agent but all its both motion and rest come under our idea of necessary and are so called Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty is not a free agent. For though he has volition though he prefers his not falling to falling yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power

12 Every one pities him as acting by necessity and constraint

13 Belongs not to volition Again suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where

14 I am going away I ask is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it and yet being locked fast in it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay he has not freedom to be gone So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or preferring but to the person having the power of doing or forbearing to do according as the mind shall choose or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power and no farther For wherever restraint comes to check that power or compulsion takes away that in difference of ability to act or to forbear acting there liberty and our notion of it presently ceases

15 Voluntary opposed to involuntary not necessary We have instances enough and often more than enough in our own bodies A man's heart beats and the blood circulates which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop and therefore in respect of these motions where rest depends not on his choice nor would follow the determination of his mind if it should prefer it he is not a free agent Convulsive motions agitate his legs so that though he wills it ever so much he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion (as in that odd disease called chorea sancti viti) but he is perpetually dancing he is not at liberty

16 A palsy or the stocks hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind if it could thereby transfer his body to another place In all these instances want of freedom though the sitting still even of a paralytic whilst he prefers it to a removal is truly voluntary Voluntary then is not opposed to necessary but to involuntary For a man may prefer what he can do to what he cannot do the state he is in to its absence or change though necessity has made it in itself unalterable

17 Liberty what As it is in the motions of the body so it is in the thoughts of our minds where any one is such that we have power to take it up or lay it by according to the preference of

choice and then he is in respect of his own choice as he is in respect of bodies he rests on he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. But yet some dead to the mind like some men to the body are such as in certain circumstances cannot do nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort they can use. A man then is not at liberty to fly by the

tribute or modification of the will, which is also but power.

15. I have said. Such is the difficulty of explaining and giving clear notions of internal actions by sounds, that I must be so warn my reader that *order* *g* *direct* *g* *choosing* *preferring* &c. which I have made use of will not distinctly enough express a union unless he will reflect on what he himself does when he wills. For example preferring which seems perhaps best to express the act of his does it not precisely. For though a man would prefer flying to walking yet we can say he wills it. Voluntas it is plain is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any

body, with little regard to the liberty of the things which we would rather choose. But as soon as the mind gains the power to stop or continue began if bear any of these motions of the body without thoughts then, according as it thinks fit to prefer rather to the other we then consider the man as a free agent gain

to the producing continuing or stopping as yet as far as it depends on us. For can it be denied that whatever he has a power to think on is within him, and to prefer their doing

to do of bearing any particular action according as to do or forbearance has the actual preference in the mind which is the same thing as to say continue as he himself wills it.

16. Power belongs to gentis. It is plain that the will is thus bound to power or liberty and freedom the power liberty so that, to ask, whether the will has freed man, is to ask whether the power has another power

liberty and the liberty a question at first sight too grossly absurd to make a dispute on need an answer. For whether it seems to the powers belong to liberty is clear to be true by itself subalterns and not powers themselves. So that this way of putting the question (viz. whether the will be free) is in effect to ask, whether there will be a substance and it, or at least

liberty, whether the beginning of continuation of any motion is contrary to that power of the mind is called compulsion without hindering or stopping any action is contrary to his liberty. It is called restraint. Age is that has no thought, of no talk, as in everything necessary gentis

4. Liberty belongs to the will. If this be so, (as I imagine it is,) I have to be considered

be regarded applicable to the will as swiftness of motion is to leap or swiftness to virtue. Every would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as this because it is obvious that the modifications of motion belong to the power nor the difference of figure and virtue and when well considered, I think he will as plainly perceive that liberty which is but power or belongs only to gentis and cannot be an

to produce or forbear producing motion in parts of his body by choice or preference which is that which dominion man testifies free and is freed from itself. If any one should ask, whether freedom were free, he would be suspected in not to understand well what he said and he would be thought to deserve Midas ears which know that rich was de minimis of the possessors

of riches should demand whether riches themselves were rich

If we say that the will and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting may by an appropriation that disguises its true sense serve a little to palliate the absurdity yet the will in truth signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose and when the will under the name of a faculty is considered as it is barely as an ability to do something the absurdity in saying it is free or not free will easily discover itself For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act (as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a

will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking And we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings and the dancing faculty dances as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives or as is usual that the will directs the understanding or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking

18 *This way of talking & uses confusion of thought* This way of talking nevertheless has prevailed and as I guess produced great confusion For these being all different powers in the mind or in the man to do several actions he exerts them as he thinks fit but the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action For the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing or the power of singing on the power of dancing as any one who reflects on it will easily perceive And yet this is it which we say when we thus speak that the will operates on the understanding or the understanding on the will

19 *Powers are relations not agents* I grant that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition or exercising the power a man has to choose or the actual choice of the mind the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing as the actual singing of such a tune may be the

cause of dancing such a dance and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune But in all these it is not one power that operates on another but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers It is the man that does the action it is the agent that has power or is able to do For powers are relations not agents and that which has the power or not the power to operate is that alone which is or is not free and not the power itself For freedom or not freedom can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act

20 *Liberty belongs to the mind*

introducing into discourses concerning the mind

and mention of the like invention of faculties in the operations of the body has helped us in the knowledge of physics Not that I deny there are faculties both in the body and mind they both of them have their powers of operating else neither the one nor the other could operate For nothing can operate that is not able to operate and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate Nor do I deny that those words and the like are to have their place in the common

not a gaudy dress yet when it appears in public must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity But the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents For it being asked what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say that it was the *digestive faculty* What was it that made anything come out of the body? the *expulsive faculty* What moved? the *motive faculty* And

short to say that the ability to digest digested and the ability to move moved and the ability to understand understood For faculty ability and power I think are but different names of the same things which ways of speaking when put into more intelligible words will I think

127 by something bl t und rstand And in truth, t would be evv strange if t sh uld be otherwise as traner as t would be f man to be free w thout being bl t be f

1 But to l e r d or ma Tor turn then to th quiry bout liberty I think th questu n is t prope hether the ill b f but whether as b f Thu I think,

First, That so far as any one can by th direc on or ch ce f his mind pref rring th exst erce f any action t th n n-exst ce f that cu and n r d mak it xst o t ex st, so far he is free F ilica by thought d rectu g th mo f my fin er mak i m e be t was t est or r r d t dent, that respect f that I am free d ilica by lik thou ht of my mud pref rring t th ther prod ce th wo ds or il ce I m t liberty peak or h id any pea nd as far as thus pow re ches, f u n t ung by th d i rminau of his own th ght pr ferring ther so far is man fee Fo h we can think any on fee thant ha th pow t d what h ill And so far as any can by p ef rring an to is t being estt yact n, prod ce that t rest so far ca h d what be ul. For such pref rring f ct n to is b- vnce is th wills f t and we can scar t ll how t imagin any bein free thant t be bl to d hat h wills So that respect f tions un the ch f such power him, man seems as free as t is poss bl f freed m to mak him.

I fect f l g man not f But th inq mind f man will to sh f f f m himself as f ll ca all thoughts f guilt, hou h be by pu un himself vorse tat han that f l tal excess n is t co t t th thus freed m, unless t re ches f rther than thus, ul serve th tur and t passe for good p a, tha ma is not fee t ll fh be not f to ul as h is to act what he ll Co ce g man l be n th et th for used thus f u h q estu n, f t ther m b f t ll Which I think is wh t is m ant whe is dis p d hether th will be fr And as t that I m n

3 If a man arnot b f t u ll Seco dly, Tha ll g of be gan t and t erdom cons u g pon f ct g t act e ma to espec f will g th ct f ction wh y his pow is ce proposed to his thou his aspre d t bed ca not be free Th aso wh f is evv ma dnt For t be g na v d bl that th n

Cl W James Psych gy p 8

d pe d g on his will should exist or not exist, d is v t ce m t ex tence f llowing pe fectly th determin t n d prefere ce of his ill he can ot a v d will g th exstence or n -exst ce f that a n t is abs l t ly n essary that h will th e rth the t pref f th ct th th since of th m must necessarily f ll w and that which does f llow follows by th ch ce and d termination of his f h d d

liberty consisting in pow t act or not a t which, in regard f vlt n, a man upon ch p posal has t. F r t u o d bly eces- sary: p f th d in or forbeara c f an ac t n in mans powe which is ce so p posed t h th his man must necessarily will th e th ther of them pon which pref nce o vlt o th actu r ul f bear ce cer tain f llow n d is truly voluntary B t th ct of l u pref rring f th t v be g that luch h cann t v d a man in respect of that a t f wills is u d a esty and cann t be fee unless ecess n and freed m ca consist g th and man can be f and bound t ce Bes dest mak man fee afte this manner by making th ct n of willing t d pe d o his will, th must be anoth re ced t will t d t mu e th cta f this will and an ther t d t rmine that and so f m t m f wherem t ps, the tions of the

such.

4 Liberty f idom t cut what u ll d Thus th m is ev dent Th t man t ll liberty t all or not u ll anyt n, t p er that t or v s der f liberty consistu g to ct t forbear t e and that ly F ma that is u ll s a d y t t be t l be ty be cause h can walk f h wills t. A ma that walks is a libe ty lso because h walks m es but beca se he can t a d u ll f h wills t. B t f man u g u ll has n t pow t mo himself ll is n t t l liberty so likewise man falling down a p op ce th h in motu n is

of riches should demand whether riches themselves were rich

17 *How the will instead of the man is called free* However the name of *faculty* which men have given to this power called the will and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting may by an appropriation that disguises its true sense serve a little to palliate the absurdity yet the will in truth signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose and when the will under the name of a faculty is considered as it is barely as an ability to do something the absurdity in saying it is free or not free will easily discover itself For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act (as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a walking faculty and a dancing faculty by which these actions are produced which are but several modes of motion as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking And we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings and the dancing faculty dances as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives or as is usual that the will directs the understanding or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speak

This way of talking nevertheless has prevailed and as I guess produced great confusion For these being all different powers in the mind or in the man to do several actions he exerts them as he thinks fit but the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action For the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing or the power of singing on the power of dancing as any one who reflects on it will easily perceive And yet this is it which we say when we thus speak that the will operates on the understanding or the understanding on the will

19 *Powers are relations not agents* I grant that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition or exercising the power a man has to choose or the actual choice of the mind the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing as the actual singing of such a tune may be the

cause of dancing such a dance and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune But in all these it is not one power that operates on another but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers it is the man that does the action it is the agent that has power or is able to do For powers are relations not agents and that which has the power or not the power to operate is that alone which is or is not free and not the power itself For freedom or not freedom can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act

20 *Liberty belongs not to the will* The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them has given occasion to this way of talking but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind with the name of faculties a notion of their operating has I suppose as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties in the operations of the body has helped us in the knowledge of physics Not that I deny there are faculties both in the body and mind they both of them have their powers of operating else neither the one nor the other could operate For nothing can operate that is not able to operate and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate Nor do I deny that those words and the like are to have their place in the common use of languages that have made them current. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by and philosophy itself though it likes not a gaudy dress yet when it appears in public must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity But the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents For it being asked what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say that it was the digestive faculty What was it that made anything come out of the body? the expulsive faculty What moved? the motive faculty And so in the mind the intellectual faculty or the understanding understood and the elective faculty or the will willed or commanded This is in short to say that the ability to digest, digested and the ability to move moved and the ability to understand understood For faculty ability and power I think are but different names of

formed by something that is able to digest motion by something able to move and understand

not by something able to understand. And, in truth, would be very strange if it should be otherwise as man as I would be for man to be free without being able to be free.

2. *Edith Leavelle, et al.* To return, then, to the question how I liberty. I think the question is not correct. *As it is* will be free but *what it is* is free. Thus, I think,

First, That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, prevent the existence of an action, the non-existence of that action, and prevent, make it exist or not exist so far as it is free. For if I can, by thought, determine the motion of my finger, make it move

then I was free or not free, it is evident, that in power of that I am free and if I can, by like thought of my mind, prevent or to the thought produce either words or silence I am still free to speak or hold my peace and as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought, preferring rather so, I am free. For how can we think of one freer than to have the power to do what he will? And so far as a man can, by preferring an action to a no being or resting, produce the action or rest, so far can he do what he will. For such preference of action to a being or to a will, if it and we can scarce tell how to imagine an being freer than to be able to do what he wills. So that in respect of actions which he can reach of such power in him, man seems as free as is possible for freedom to make him.

Thus, man is free by the

depending on his will should exist or not exist and as much as not existence follows perfectly the determination and preference of his will he cannot avoid willing the existence or non-existence of that action as he chooses. It is necessary that he will the one or the other i.e. prefer the one to the other since one of them must necessarily follow and that which does follow follows by the choice and determination of his mind that is, by his will; and if he did not will it, it would not be so that, in respect of the act of willing a man such a case is not free liberty consists in a power to do or not do.

non such a

of volition, or preference of one or the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man, in respect of that act of willing, is under necessity and so cannot be free unless necessity and freedom can consist together and man can be free and bound together. Besides that, to make a man free after this manner by making the action of will to depend on his will, there must be another antecedent will, to determine the acts of this will and another to determine that, and so on forever for wherever one stops, the actions of the last will cannot be free. Nor is a being as far as I can comprehend being, however capable of such freedom of will, that it can forbear to will, to prefer the being or not being of anything in its power which it has once considered as such.

4. *Liberty is freedom to exist as it is or not.* This, then, is evident. This is not at all liberty to be or not to be anything. *As power to be* is essential of liberty consists in power to act or forbear to act and in this only. For a man that sits still is said yet to be a liberty because he can walk if he wills it. A man that walks is at liberty also not because he walks or moves but because he can stand still if he wills it. But if man sitting still has not power to remove himself, he is not at liberty so likewise man falling down preserves though in motion, is not at liberty because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain that man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking, or not, he must necessarily prefer one or the

than that of fatal necessity is not consistent with this freedom, unless it reaches further than that, it does serve the turn and passes for good.

Which I think is what is meant, when it is discussed whether we will be free. And as to that I cannot say.

3. *How man can be free to act.* Second. The willing or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting in power of acting, or not acting, man in respect of willing or the act of volition, when in any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as preferred to be done cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest. For being unavoidable that the action

of riches should demand whether riches themselves were rich

17 *How the will instead of the man is called free* However the name *faculty* which men have given to this power called the will and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting may by an appropriation that disguises its true sense serve a little to palliate the absurdity yet they ill in truth signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose and when the will under the name of a faculty is considered as it is barely as an ability to do something the absurdity in saying it is free or not free will easily discover itself For if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act (as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a walking faculty and a dancing faculty by which these actions are produced which are but several modes of motion as well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced which are but several modes of thinking And we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings and the dancing faculty dances as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives or as is usual that the will directs the understanding or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking

18 *This way of talking causes confusion of thought* This way of talking nevertheless has prevailed and as I guess produced great confusion For these being all different powers in the mind or in the man to do several actions he exerts them as he thinks fit but the power to do one act on is not operated on by the power of doing another action For the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking no more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing or the power of singing on the power of dancing as any one who reflects on it will easily perceive And yet this is which we say when we thus speak that the will operates on the understanding or the understanding on the will

19 *Powers are relations not a entities* I grant, that this or that actual thought may be the occasion of volition or exercising the power a man has to choose or the actual choice of the mind the cause of actual thinking on this or that thing as the actual singing of such a tune may be the

cause of dancing such a dance and the actual dancing of such a dance the occasion of singing such a tune But in all these it is not one power that operates on another but it is the mind that operates and exerts these powers it is the man that does the action it is the agent that has power or is able to do For powers are relations not agents and that which has the power or not the power to operate is that alone which is or is not free and not the power itself For freedom or not freedom can belong to nothing but what has or has not a power to act.

20 *Liberty belongs not to the will* The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them has given occasion to this way of talking but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind with the name of faculties a notion of their operating has I suppose a little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties in the operations of the body has helped us in the knowledge of physics Not that I deny there are faculties both in the body and mind they both of them have their powers of operating else neither the one nor the other could operate For nothing can operate that is not able to operate and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate Nor do I deny that those words and the like are to have their place in the common use of languages that have made them current It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by and philosophy itself though it likes not a gaudy dress yet when it appears in public must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity But the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents For it being asked what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say that it was the digestive faculty What was it that made anything come out of the body? the expulsive faculty What moved the muscles? the motive faculty And so in the mind the intellectual faculty or the understanding understood and the executive faculty or the will led or commanded This is no short to say that the ability to digest digested and the ability to move moved and the ability to understand understood For faculty ability and power I think are but different names of the same things which ways of speaking when put into more intelligible words will I think amount to thus much — That digestion is performed by something that is able to digest motion by something able to move and understand

other of them walking or not walking And so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed which are the far greater number For considering the vast number of voluntary act ons that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will till the time they are to be done and in all such actions as I have shown the mind in respect of willing has not a power to act or not to act wherein consists liberty The mind in that case has not a power to forbear wills it cannot avoid some determination concerning them let the consideration be as short the thought as quick as it will it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking or changes it continues the action, or puts an end to it Whereby it is manifest that it orders and directs one in preference to or with neglect of th other and thereby either the continuation or change becomes *unavoidably* voluntary

25 The will determined by something without it. Since then it is plain that in most cases a man is not at liberty whether he will or no (for when an action in his power is proposed to him, his thoughts are of forbearance or of doing it, and he chooses one way or the other).

is upon the change of state or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for shortness' sake we will call desire. (The will, which is all more as large explain.

§1 *Will is desire that is determined* But to, in order to it, it will be necessary to premise, that, though I have before endeavoured to express the act of volition, by *choosing prefering*, and the like terms, that signify desire as well as volition, for all of other words it mark that of the mind whose proper name is willing or volition yet, it being a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it

he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more fatal part, his will is never determined to any one action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that desire, and willing are two distinct acts of the mind and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.

§1 *Unsettled desire is not to return*, then, is the inquiry what is it that determines the will in regard to our choice. And that, upon second thought, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view but some (and for the most part the most pressing) *uneasiness* a man is at present under. This is that which necessarily determines the will, and sets us upon those actions we perform. This uneasiness

will and several parts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire and content for the other and that by men who would not willingly be thought of to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have written very clearly about them. Thus, I imagine has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter and therefore it, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts towards what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is content about nothing but our own *uneasiness* terminates there and reaches no further and that volition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind whereby barely by thought, the mind endeavours to

the want of an absent good, in reference to all pain if it, ease is that absent good and that that ease be attained, we may call that desire nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of with desire equals that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent painful good and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As much as we desire an absent good, so much are we in pain for it. But he all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have cause pain equal to that greatness as all pain causes desire equal to itself because the absence of good is not always pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire. But so much as there is an *uneasiness* of desire so much there is of uneasiness.

§3 *Desire is uneasiness* That desire is *uneasiness*, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being deferred makes the heart sick and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, "Give me children," give me the thing desired, or I die." Let self

same action, may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny may blige to use perceptions to another which, at the same time I am speaking I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain that will and desire run counter I will that even that tends one way whilst my desire tends another and that the direct contrary way. A man who, by removing of the goat in his limbs, finds *doorness* in his head, or want of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is desire to be rid of it) though he yet, whilst

Cl. ch. xx. § also the letter to Molyneux, 5 Jul 693.
Cl. Montaigne, Essay. Bk. II. ch. p. 735.
Cl. § § 48-53.

For considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will till the time they are to be done and in all such actions as I have shown the mind in respect of willing has not a power to act or not to act wherein consists liberty The mind in that case has not a power to forbear

the man in the state he was before thinking or changes it continues the action, or puts an end to it Whereby it is manifest that it orders and directs one in preference to or with neglect of the other and thereby either the continuation or change becomes *unavoidably* voluntary

25 *This will be determined by something without it*

might thereby sufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will For to ask whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or silence which he pleases is to ask whether a man can will what he wills or be pleased with what he is pleased with? A question which I think needs no answer and they who can make a question of it must suppose one will

joined to avoid these and the like absurdities nothing can be of greater use than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration If the ideas of liberty and volition be well fixed in our understandings and with us in our minds as they ought, all questions that are raised about them are a great part of the difficulties in our thoughts and entangle them could be much easier resolved where the confused signification of the nature of the

fully to be re

membered That freedom consists in the dependence of the existence or not existence of any action upon our volition of it and not in the dependence of any action or its contrary on our preference A man standing on a cliff is at liberty to leap twenty yards down wards into the sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary action which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do but he is therefore free because he has a power to leap or not to leap But if a greater force than his either holds him fast,

that in a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square being at the north side of his chamber is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward because he can walk or not walk it but is not, at the same time at liberty to do the contrary i.e. to walk twenty feet northward

In this then consists freedom viz. in our being able to act or not to act according as we shall choose or will.

tion of any action, and thereby exert it, is power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I will here under the word action intend the forbearance too of any

mere forbearances it being as often a right mination of the will and the contrary actions in their consequences as well enough pass for may on that consideration may not be mis actions too but this I say shall thus taken if (for brevity's sake) only the will

9 *What I determine the will to do and to direct being nothing but a power in the mind to rest, the operation of faculties of a man in relation to the as far as they depend on such as the true question What it determines what it should and proper answer is The mind is not to this determine the general power of it but the or that particular direction is that particular itself exercising the power it is plain particular way If this answer shall determine*

power of directing is a power — The motion or rest? And the same state or action is on for continuing action in it the motive fully the present uneasiness nothing set change in all

un. is upon the change of state or upon any new action, but some uneasiness. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon a new action, which for shortness' sake we will call desire, meaning of the will, which I shall more largely explain.

§1. *Unpleasantness is the cause of desire.* It is, in the way to it, will be necessary to premise, that, though I have before endeavoured to express the act of volition, by choosing *propter*, and the like terms, that signify desire as well as volition for want of other words to mark that act of the mind whose proper name is *volition* or *electio*. It being very simple act, whosever desires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflection on his own mind, and observe what it does when it wills, than by an artificial artifice that sounds whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it. I think it more necessary because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially *desire* and one part for the other and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. Thus, I imagine has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts towards upon what passes in his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition is conversant about good and bad out of our own terms as there and reaches no further and that volition is nothing but that particular determination of the mind whereby hardily by thought the mind endeavours to give rise to passion, or to give an action which takes place in its power. Thus, well considered, plainly show that the will is perfectly distinguished from desire which, in the very same action, may have quite contrary tendency from that which our will sets us upon. A man, whom I cannot deny may blame me to use perspicuous to another which, the same time I am speaking I may wish may not prevail on him. In this case, it is plain the will and desire run counter I will the action that is not one way what my desire tends another and that the direct contrary way. A man who, by violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds dizziness in his head, or wants of appetite in his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of this pain if his feet or hands, (for wherever there is pain, there is desire to be rid of) though yet, whilst

he prehends that the removal of the pain may translate the noxious humour to a more fatal part, his will is never determined to an action that may serve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind and consequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more distinct from desire.

§2. *Unpleasantness is the cause of desire.* To return, then, to the inquiry what it is that determines the will in regard to our choices. And that, upon second thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally supposed, the greater good in view but some (and for the most part the most present) uneasiness a man is at present under. Thus it is that which successively determines the will, and sets us upon those choices we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, *desire* which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. All pain of the body (what sort soever and degree of the mind, is uneasiness and with this is always joined desire, equal to the pain or uneasiness if it is and is scarce distinguishable from it. For desire being nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an absent good, in reference to any pain of it, ease is that absent good and till that ease be attained, we may call it desire nobody feeling pain that it wishes not to be eased of without a desire equal to that pain, and inseparable from it. Besides this desire of ease from pain, there is another of absent positive good and here also the desire and uneasiness are equal. As much as we desire any absent good, so much as we are pained for it. But here all absent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is capable of, know how to have cause pain equal to that greatness as all pain causes desire equal to itself because the absence of good is not always pain, as the presence of pain is. And therefore absent good may be looked on and considered without desire. But so much as there is an where of desire, so much there is of uneasiness.

§3. *Desire is a passion.* That desire is a state of uneasiness, nobody now who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in desire what the wise man says of hope (which is not much different from it) that it being "disturbed makes the heart sick" and that still proportionable to the greatness of the desire, which sometimes raises the uneasiness to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, "Give me children, give me the thing desired, or I die. Life itself

¶ Cf. ch. xx. § also the letter to Molyneux, 5 July 693.

¶ Cf. Montaigne, *Essays* Bk. II. ch. p. 255. Cf. §§ 48-53.

and all its enjoyments is a burden cannot be borne under the lasting and unremoved pressure of such an uneasiness

33 *The uneasiness of desire determines the will* Good and evil present and absent it is true work upon the mind But that which immediately determines the will from time to time to every voluntary action is the uneasiness of desire fixed on some absent good either negative as indolence to one in pain or positive as enjoyment of pleasure That it is this uneasiness that determines the will to the successive voluntary actions whereof the greatest part of our lives is made up and by which we are conducted through different courses to different ends I shall endeavour to show both from experience and the reason of the thing

34 *This is the spring of action* When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in—which when he is perfectly without any uneasiness—what industry what action what will is there left but to continue in it? Of this every man's observation will satisfy him And thus we see our all wise Maker suitably to our constitution and frame and knowing what it is that determines the will has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst and other natural desires that return at their seasons to move and determine their wills for the preservation of themselves and the continuation of their species For I think we may conclude that if the bare contemplation of these good ends to which we are carried by these several uneasinesses had been sufficient to determine the will and set us on work we should have had none of these natural passions and perhaps in this world little or no pain at all It is better to marry than to burn says St Paul and here we may see that it is that chief desire which drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life A little burning felt pushes us more powerfully than greater pleasures in prospect draw or allure

35 *The great still positive good determines the will but present uneasiness leads to it* It seems so established and settled a maxim by the general consent of all men that after good

his subject I took it for granted and I imagine that, by a great many I shall be thought more excusable for having then done so than that now I have ventured to recede from so received an opinion But yet upon a stricter inquiry I am forced to conclude that good the greater good though apprehended and acknowledged to be

§§ 34-35.

§ 36 &c

so does not determine the will until our desire raised proportionably to it makes us uneasy in the want of it Convince a man never so much that plenty has its advantages over poverty make him see and own that the handsome conveni-

the advantages of virtue that it is as necessary to a man as he has any great aims in this world or hopes in the next as food to life yet till he hungers or thirsts after righteousness till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it his will will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater good but any other uneasiness he feels in himself shall take place and carry his will to other actions On the other side let a drunkard see that his health decays, his estate wastes discredit and decreases and the want of all things even of his beloved drink attends him in the course he follows yet the returns of uneasiness to miss his companions the habitual thirst after his cups at the usual time drives him to the tavern though he has in his view the loss of health and plenty and perhaps of the joys of another life the least of which is no inconsider-

of viewing the greater good for he sees and acknowledges it and in the intervals of his drinking hours will take resolutions to pursue the greater good but when the uneasiness to miss his accustomed delight returns the great acknowledged good loses its hold and the present uneasiness determines the will to the accustomed action which thereby gets stronger footing to prevail against the next occasion though he at the same time makes secret promises to himself that he will do so no more thus in the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods And thus he is from time to time in the state of that unhappy complainer I do me ill to part with the wine which sentence al-

36 *Because the motion of uneasiness is the first step to happiness* If we inquire into the reason of that experience makes so evident in fact and examine why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will and determines it in its choice we shall find that being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once the pres-

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CHAP. XXI

ent uneasiness that we are under does naturally determine the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions. For as much as whilst we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourselves happy or in the way to it, pain and uneasiness being by every one concluded and if it to be inconsistent with happiness, spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have a little pain serving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in. And therefore, that which of course determines the choice of our will in the next action will always be—the removing of pain, as long as we have any left, as the first and necessary step towards happiness.

37. *Because no uneasiness alone is sufficient.* Another reason why this uneasiness alone determines the will, is this because that action is present and is against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not. It may be said that absent good may by contemplation be brought home to the mind and made present. The idea of it indeed may be in the mind and viewed as present there but nothing will be in the mind as present good, but to counterbalance the removal of any uneasiness which we are under and raises our desire and the uneasiness of that has the prevalence in determining the will. Till then, though it is in the mind, what ever is good is there only like other ideas, the object of bare unactive speculation but operates no on the will, nor sets us on work the reason hereof I shall show by and by. How many are to be found that have had lively representations set before their minds of the unspeakable joy of heaven, which they acknowledged both possible and probable too, yet would be content to take pleasure in their happiness here. And so the prevailing uneasiness of their desires, let loose after the enjoyments of this life take their courses in the determining their wills and all this while they take not pleasure nor are moved, towards the good things of another life, considered as ever so great.

38. *Because all who allow the joy of heaven for to pursue them.* Yet the will is determined by the view of good, as it appears in comparison greater or less to the understanding which is the cause of all these good and that which, in the eternal opinions, the will is supposed to move and to be moved by.—I do so we how could ever get loose from this in finite eternal joy of heaven, except posed and considered as possible. For all these good by which also barely proposed, and coming in view the will is then to be determined, and

so to set us on action, being only possible, but

keep constantly and steadily in our course towards heaven, without ever standing still or directing our actions to any other end than eternal condition of a future state infinitely out weighing the expectation of riches, or honour or any other worldly pleasure which we can propose to ourselves, though we should grant these the more probable to be obtained for nothing future is yet in possession, and so the expectation even of these may deceive us. If it were so that the greater good in heaven determines the will, so great a good once proposed, could not but seize

the mind fixed to that good.

39. *But every joy of uneasiness is never rejected.* This would be the state of the mind and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations, were it determined by that which is concluded and in the greater good. But that it is not so, is visible in experience that infinitely greatest confessed good being often neglected, to satisfy the successive uneasiness of our desires pursuing trifles. But, though the greatest test allowed, even everlasting unspeakable good which has sometimes moved and affected the mind does not tedfastly hold the will, yet we see any very great and prevailing uneasiness having once laid hold the will, let it not go by which we may be convinced, what it is that determines the will. Thus an eminent pain of the body the ungovernable passion of man, fully in love or the impatient desire of revenge keeps the will steady and in that and the will, thus determined, never fails the understanding labour by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind and powers of the body are uninterruptedly employed that way by the determination of the will, influenced by that topping uneasiness, as long as it lasts which rebels seems to me evident, that the will, or power of setting us upon action in preference to all others, is determined in us by uneasiness and whether this be not so I desire every one to observe in himself.

4. *Desire accompanies all uneasiness.* I have hitherto chiefly instanced in the way in which desire as that which determines the will because that is the chief and most sensible and the will self

dom orders any action nor is there any voluntary action performed without some desire accompanying it which I think is the reason why the will and desire are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up or at least accompanies most of the other passions as wholly excluded in the case. Aversion fear anger envy shame &c have each their uneasinesses too and thereby influence the will. These passions are scarce any of them in life and practice simple and alone and wholly unmixed with others though usually in discourse and contemplation that carries the name which operates strongest and appears most in the present state of the mind. Nay there is I think scarce any of the passions to be found without desire joined with it. I am sure wherever there is uneasiness there is desire. For we constantly desire happiness and whatever we feel of uneasiness so much it is certain we want of happiness even in our own opinion let our state and condition otherwise be what it will. Besides the present moment not being our eternity whatever our enjoyment be we look beyond the present and desire goes with our foresight and that still carries the will with it. So that even in joy itself that which keeps up the act on whereon the enjoyment depends is the desire to continue it and fear to lose it and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind the will presently is by that determined to some new action and the present delight neglected.

41 *The most pressing uneasiness naturally determines the will.* But we be with sundry uncontent desires that which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action? and to that the answer is — That ordinarily which is the most pressing of those that are judged capable of being then removed. For the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action for some end cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable that could be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end only to lose its labour for so it is to act for what is judged not attainable and therefore very great uneasinesses move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they in that case put us not upon endeavours. But these set apart, the most important and urgent uneasiness is at that time felt which ordinarily determines the will successively in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest present

uneasiness is the spur to action that is constantly most felt and for the most part determines the will in its choice of the next action. For this we must carry along with us that the proper and only object of the will is some action of ours, and nothing else. For it is producing nothing by our willing it but some action in our power, it is there the will terminates and reaches no further.

42 *All desire happiness.* If it be further asked — What it moves desire? I answer — happiness, and that alone. Happiness and

heart of man to conceive. But of some degrees of both we have very lively impressions made by several instances of delight and joy on the one side and torment and sorrow on the other which for shortness sake I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body — With him is fullness of joy and pleasure for evermore. Or to speak truly they are all of the mind though some have their rise in the mind from thought others in the body from certain modifications of motion.

are motions that is the lowest degree of what can be called happiness is so much ease from all pain and so much present pleasure as without which any one cannot be content. Now because pleasure and pain are produced in us by different motions that is apt to produce pain in us we call evil for no other reason but for its aptness to produce pleasure and pain in us where in consists our happiness and misery. Further though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure be in itself good and what is apt to produce any degree of pain be evil yet it often happens that we do not call it so when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort because when they come in competition the degrees of both of pleasure and pain have justly a preference. So that if we will rightly estimate what we call good and evil we shall find it lies much in comparison for the cause of every less degree of pain as well as every greater degree of pleasure has the nature of good and evil reversed.

43 *What good is desired what not.* Though this be that which is called good and evil and all

whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or a remaining in rest, when it would as it be had or even from blow he sees coming it is as much perfection, that desire or the power of preference should be determined by good as by the power of evil it should be determined by the will and the certainty such a determination is the greater is the perfection. We were determined by anything, but the last result of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of an action, we were not free the very end of our freedom being that we may obtain the good we choose. And therefore every man is perfectly under necessity by his constitution as an intelligent being to be determined by will by his own thought and judgment what is best for him to do he would be under the determination of some other than himself which is worst of liberty. And to show that a man's will in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to say that man wills and acts for as good that he would not his will at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his present thought before any other it is plain he then thinks better of it and would have it before any other unless he can have and not have it, will and go will at the same time contradictory two manifest to be admitted.

50. The first is to be determined. If we look upon those superior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we shall have reason judge that they are more readily determined in their choice of good than we and yet we have reason to think we are less happy or less free than are. And if we were to for such poor finite creatures as we are pronounce what wisdom and goodness would do, I think we might say that God himself would choose what is not good by freedom if the Almighty himself not his being determined by what is best.

A second determination to form of the first is to be determined by liberty. To give right view of this mistaken part of liberty let me say, — Would any one be chained long because he is determined by wise considerations than wise man is worth the name if freed not be liberty to put the fool and draw him and many upon man self? If to break loose from the constraint of reason, and to want that restraint of examination and judgment which keeps us from doing or doing the worse. Be liberty our liberty madmen and fools are the only free men but I think, nobody would choose to be mad for the sake of such liberty but it that is mad indeed. The constant desire of happiness, and the constraint to put upon us to act for it,

nobody I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty or is at an abridgment of liberty. It be complained of God Almighty himself is under the necessity of being happy and the more an intelligent being is so the nearer it is approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That, in this state of ignorance we short sighted creatures do not mistake true liberty we are endowed with power to suspend any particular desire and keep it from determining the will, and engage us in action. This is standing still, where we are not sufficiently assured of the way a continuation is consistent good. The determination of the will upon inquiry is following the direction of that good and he that has power to either or to act, according as need or emotion directs, is free. But such determination bridges not that power wherein liberty consists. That has his chains knocked off and the prison doors set open to him, is perfectly free. Liberty because he may then go or stay as he best likes though his preference be determined to stay by the darkness of the night, or illness of the weather or want of other lodging. It ceases not to be free though the desire some other voice he had there because it determines his preference and makes him stay in his prison.

51. The second is fearing true happiness. Let us therefore the highest per-

dation of our liberty. The transition we have to an unequal pursuit of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and which, as such, our desires always follow. The more are we free from a necessary determination of our will any particular action, and from a necessary compulsion with our desire, set upon any particular and the appearing preferable good, will we have duly examined whether that is a true desire so, or be inconsistent with our real happiness and therefore till we are as much informed upon this inquiry as the weight of the matter and the nature of the case demands, we are by the necessity of preference and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to suspend the satisfaction of our desires in particular cases.

52. Power to suspend. This is the hanging on which turns the first of our intellectual beings, in their constant end ours after and steady prosecution of true Liberty. — That they can suspend this prosecution in particular cases, till they have looked before them, and examined themselves in

tom has made natural to us we shall find that a very little part of our life is so vacant from these uneasinesses as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter absent good. We are seldom at ease and free enough from the solicitation of our natural or adopted desires but a constant succession of uneasinesses out of that stock which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up take the will in their turns and no sooner is one action dispatched which by such a determination of the will we are set upon but another uneasiness is ready to set us on work. For the removing of the pains we feel and are at present pressed with being the getting out of misery and consequently the first thing to be done in order to happiness—absent good though thought on confessed and appearing to be good not

peated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind given some relish of it and raised in us some desire which then beginning to make a part of our present uneasiness stands upon fair terms with the rest to be satisfied and so according to its greatness and pressure comes in its turn to determine the will.

47 *Due consideration raises desire.* And thus by a due consideration and examining any good proposed it is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value of that good whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon the will and be pursued. For good though appearing and allowed ever so great yet till it has raised desires in our minds and thereby made us uneasy in its want it reaches not our wills we are not within the sphere of its ac-

tioning and ready at hand to give it all its next determination. The balancing when there is any in the mind being only which desire shall be next satisfied which uneasiness first removed. Whereby it comes to pass that as long as any uneasiness any desire remains in our mind there is no room for good barely as such to come at the will or at all to determine it. Because as has been said the first step in our endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the confines of misery and to feel no part of it the will can be at leisure for nothing else till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed which in the multitude of wants and desires we are beset with in this imperfect state we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.

48 *The power to suspend the prosecution of any desire makes it lay for consideration.* There being in us a great many uneasinesses always soliciting and ready to determine the will it is as natural as I have said that the greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next action and so it does for the most part but not always. For the mind having in most cases as is evident in experience a power to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires and so all one after another is at liberty to consider the objects of them examine them on all sides and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes errors and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives and our endeavours after happiness whilst we precipitate the determination of our wills and engage too soon before due examination. To prevent this we have a power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty in this seems to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called

the suspension of any desire. When we have opportunity to examine view and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do and when upon due examination we have judged we have done our duty all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to desire will and act according to the last result of a fair examination.

49 *To be determined by our own judgment is no restraint to liberty.* This is so far from being a restraint or diminution of freedom that it is the very improvement and benefit of it. It is not an abridgment it is the end and use of our liberty and the further we are removed from such a determination the nearer we are to misery and slavery. A perfect indifference in the mind not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that it thought to attend its choice could be so far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature that it could be as great an imperfection as the want of indifference to act or not to act till determined by

those dishes which are set out to them. Hence it is, I think, that the philosophers of old did in vain inquire whether human happiness consisted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contentment, and they might have as reasonably disputed, whether the bestrelish was to be found in pleasures, or in riches, or in virtue, and have decided them.

Happiness consists in the attainment of such things which produce the greatest pleasure and the absence of those which cause any disturbance, or pain. Now these, to different times are very different things. If, therefore, men in this life only have hope, if in this life only they can procure it, is not strange or unreasonable, that they should seek their happiness by a variety of all things that please them here, and by pursuing all that delight them wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference. For if there be no prospect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly right—Let us stand drink, let us enjoy, let us lighten, for to-morrow we shall die.

Thus, I think, may serve to show us the reason why though all men desires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by the same object. We may choose different things, and yet all choose right supposing them only like company of poor insects which of some are bees, and lighted

ther by it is become part of his happiness. It raises desire, and that proportionably gives him uneasiness which determines his will and sets him at work in pursuit of his choice on all occasions that offer. And here we may see how it comes to pass that a man may justly incur punishment, though it be certain that, in all the particular choices that he wills, he does, and necessarily does, will that which he then judges to be good. For though his will be always determined by that which is judged good by his understanding, yet it excuses him not because by a too hasty choice of his own making he has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil which, however false and fallacious, have the same influence on all his future conduct, as if they were true and right. He has sated his own palate and must be answerable to himself for the sickness and death that follows him. The eternal law and nature of things must not be altered to comply with his ill-ordered choice. If he neglect or abuse of the liberty he had to choose what would really and truly make for his happiness, misleads him, the miscarriages that follow on it must be imputed to his own election. He had power to suspend his desire when it was given him, that he might examine and take care of his own happiness, and look that he were not deceived. And he could never judge that it was better to be deceived than to, in a matter so great and near concerning it.

§8 Why men choose what make them miserable? What has been said may also discover to us the reason why men in this world prefer different things, and pursue happiness by contrary courses. But yet, since in a manner always constant and in earnest in matters of happiness and misery the question still remains, How men come often to prefer the worse to the better and to choose that, which, by their own confession has made them miserable.

§9 Power to suspend of non-suspensions pointed out for all how. These things, did we enquire will give us, as I think, clear evidence in the state of human liberty. Liberty is plain, consists in a power to do or not to do, or to forbear doing as we will. This can only be decided. But this seeming to comprehend almost the essence of man, consents to be upon, it is further inquired—Whether he be at liberty to will or not. And to this it has been answered that, in most cases, man is not at liberty to forbear the exercise of his own will, must exert an act of his will, whereby the action proposed is made to exist. But yet there is case wherein man is at liberty in respect of willing and that is in choosing for himself good as an end to be pursued. Here man may suspend the act of his choice from being determined for or against the thing proposed till he has examined whether he really of nature, in itself and consequences, to make him happy or not. For when he has not chosen it, and

preference of each voluntary action has the influence

(1) From bodily pains. Some of them come from causes not in our power such as are often the pains of the body from want, disease, or outward injuries, as the rack, &c. which, when present and violent, operate for the most part forcibly the will, and turn the courses of men from virtue to vice and from happiness to misery before they are led to lead to happiness every on it tend either through disease, or

whether that particular thing which is then proposed or desired lie in the way to their main end and make a real part of that which is their greatest good. For the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness is an obligation and motive to them to take care not to mistake or miss it and so necessarily puts them upon caution, deliberation and wariness in the direction of their particular actions which are the means to obtain it. Whatever necessity determines to the pursuit of real bliss the same necessity with the same force establishes suspense, deliberation and scrutiny of each successive desire whether the satisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness and mislead us from it. This as seems to me is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings and I desire it may be well considered whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have are capable of or can be useful to them and that whereon depends the turn of their actions does not lie in this — That they can suspend their d

as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do and when we have done it we have done our duty and all that is in our power and indeed all that needs. For since the will supposes knowledge to guide its choice all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire. What follows after that follows in a chain of consequences linked one to another all depending on the last determination of the judgment which whether it shall be upon a hasty and precipitate view or upon a due and mature examination is in our power experience showing us that in most cases we are able to suspend the present satisfaction of any desire.

54 *Governments of our passions the right improvement of liberty.* But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger or any other violent passion running away with us allows us not the liberty of thought and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly — God who knows our frailty pities our weakness and requires of us no more than we are able to do and sees what is and what was not in our power. I judge as a kind and merciful Father. But the forbearance of a too hasty compliance with our desires the moderation and restraint of our passions so that our understandings may be free to examine and

reason unbiassed give its judgment being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we should take pains to suit the relish of our minds to the true intrinsic good or ill that

gre
with
ther
“ “ “ consideration of its true worth we have formed appetites in our minds suitable to it and made ourselves uneasy in the want of it or in the fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one's power by making resolutions to himself such as he may keep is easy for every one to try. Nor let any one say he cannot govern his passions nor hinder them from breaking out and carrying him into action for what he can do before a prince or a great man he can do alone or in the presence of God if he will.

55 *How men come to pursue different and fien evil courses.* From what has been said it is easy to give an account how it comes to pass that though all men desire happiness yet their wills carry them so contrarily and consequently some of them to what is evil. And to this I say that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world do not argue that they do not all pursue good but that the same thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of pursuits shows that every one does not place his happiness in the same thing or choose the same way to it. Were all the concerns of man terminated in this life why one followed study and knowledge and another having and hunting why one chose luxury and debauchery and another sobriety and riches could not be because every one of these did not aim at his own happiness but because the happiness was placed in different things. And therefore it was a right answer of the physician to his patient that had sore eyes — If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the use of your sight, wine is good for you but if the pleasure of seeing be greater to you than that of drinking.

Th
pa
“ “ “ as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory (which yet some men place their happiness in) as you could to satisfy all men's hunger with cheese or lobsters which though very agreeable and delicious fare to some are to others extremely nauseous and offensive and many persons would with reason prefer the griping of an hungry belly to

better than a great deal to come and so for small matters in possession part with great ones in others. But that this is a wrong judgment

1

but hereby pleasure or pain.
Secondly It because not only present pleasure and pain but that also which is present by its efficacy consequently brings it upon us at a distance as proper object of our desires, and apt to move creature that has so much there for itself that does suffer them pleasure and pain, as understood as good and evil

64. As a horse misery will gladly be taken by wrong judgment. The wrong judgment that misleads us, and makes the will fasten on the misreported lies misreports upon the various comparisons with itself. The wrong judgment is speaking is what a man may think of the termination farther but what every man himself must confess to be wrong since

itself its full dimensions, misused as a full mistake who judged by unequal measures. We therefore assure drinking accompanied with merriment as a man takes off his glass, with that cheerful stomach and cheerful heart, and some men are sure to follow not many hours after. I think nobody whatever pleasure he had in his cups would in these conditions ever let him touch his lips which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of little difference time itself, of pleasure or pain can be so lessened only by a

It comes upon us and the takes its true dimensions. This is the way we usually impose on ourselves, in the part of bare pleasure and pain in the true degrees of happiness and misery the future loses its just proportion and what is present obtains the preference as the greater in the present rather than the wrong judgment, whereby the better is not only lessened but reduced to perfect nothing when men enjoy what they can in present, and make sufficient concluding amidst that evil will the

which scarce deserves the name
judgment but that we judge of which every man himself must confess to be so

65. Men may err in comparing present and future
Therefore as to present pleasure and pain mind as has been said, mistake that which is ally good evil that which is interpleasure or either ter pain, is ally just appears. But, though present pleasure and show the difference of degrees so plain as to fool us into mistake yet, when we compare present pleasure or pain with future (which is usually the case in most important decisions of the will) we frequently make wrong judgment. If men take our measures with the present proportion of distance. Objections are our war present be the greater than those of the future is that are more mot. And so it is with pleasures and pains the present is present to the future and those that distance has the disadvantage in the comparison. Thus most men like to spend their lives, as present to judge little in hand
CC. Ek. IV ch. xx.

66. Cause of our judgment is when we compare present pleasure and pain with future. The cause of our judging amiss, when we compare our present pleasure or pain with future, seems to me to be the neglect and inconsistency of our minds. We cannot tell enjoy two pleasures at once in which less any pleasure almost, whilst pain possesses us. The present pleasure, if it be very languid and almost nothing at all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind that scarce leaves any thought of things better or savor of our pleasure than some which are not strong

Of the tongue Every person — If better saidness came to us before drunkenness we would guard ourselves against drinking too much to deceive us pleasure goes before and hides from us what it flows.

being able by the contemplation of remote and future good to raise in himself desires of them strong enough to counterbalance the uneasiness he feels in those bodily torments and to keep his will steady in the choice of those actions which lead to future happiness. A neighbouring country has been of late a tragical theatre from which we might fetch instances if there needed any and the world did not in all countries and ages furnish examples enough to confirm that received observation *Necessitas coit ad turpia* and therefore there is great reason for us to pray Lead us not into temptation

(2) *From unreasoning desires arise from unreasoning judgments* Other uneasinesses arise from our desires of absent good which desires always bear proportion to and depend on the judgment we make and the relish we have of any absent good in both which we are apt to be variously misled and that by our own fault.

60 *Our judgment of present good or evil always right* In the first place I shall consider the wrong judgments men make of future good and evil whereby their desires are misled. For as to present happiness and misery when that alone comes into consideration and the consequences are quite removed a man never chooses amiss he

or pleasure being just so great as it is felt the present good or evil is really so much as it appears. And therefore were every action of ours concluded within itself and drew no consequences after it we should undoubtedly never err in our choice of good we should always infallibly prefer the best. Were the pains of honest industry and of starving with hunger and cold set together before us nobody would be in doubt which to choose were the satisfaction of a just and the joys of heaven offered at once to any one's present possession he would not balance or err in the determination of his choice.

61 *Our wrong judgments have regard to future good and evil only* But since our voluntary actions carry not all the happiness and misery that depend on them along with them in their present performance but are the precedent causes of good and evil which they draw after them and bring upon us when they themselves are past and cease to be our desires look beyond our present enjoyments and carry the mind out to absent good according to the necessity which we think there is of it, to the making or increase of our happiness

It is our opinion of such a necessity that gives it its attraction without that we are not moved by absent good. For in this narrow scantling of capacity which we are accustomed to and sensible of here wherein we enjoy but one pleasure at once which when all uneasiness is over is whilst it lasts sufficient to make us think ourselves happy it is not all remote and even apparent good that affects us. Because the indolence and enjoyment we have sufficing for our present happiness we desire not to venture to change since we judge that we are happy already being content and that is enough. For who is content is happy. But as soon as any new uneasiness comes in this happiness is disturbed, and we are set afresh on work in the pursuit of happiness.

62 *A reason of judgment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness* Their aptness therefore to conclude that they can be happy without it is one great occasion that men often are not raised to the desire of the greatest absent good. For whilst such thoughts possess them, the joys of a future state move them not they have little concern or uneasiness about them and the relief from the determination of such desires is left to the pursuit of nearer satisfactions, and to the removal of those uneasinesses which it then feels in its want of and longings after them. Chastity but a man's view of these things let him see that virtue and religion are necessary to his happiness let him look into the future state of his

or mild ready to render to every man according to his deeds to them an answer by patient continuance in well-doing seek they glory and honour and immortality eternal life but unto every soul that doth evil indignation and wrath tribulation and anguish. To him I say to place his hope in the different state of perfect happiness or misery that attends all men after this mortal life depend on their behaviour here the measure of reward or of evil that govern his choice are made by his behaviour. For since nothing of pleasure and joy paid to this life can bear any proportion to the endless happiness or exquisite misery of an immortal soul hereafter actions in his power will have their preference not according to the transient pleasure or pain that accompanies or follows them here but as they serve to secure that perfect durable happiness hereafter.

63 *A method of reasoning about future judgments* But to account more particularly for the misery that men often bring on themselves notwithstanding that they do all in earnest pursue happiness we must consider how things come to be

represented our desires under deceitful appearances and that is by the judgment pronouncing wrong concerning them. To see how far this reaches, and what are the causes of wrong judgment —

or but hardly of any or pain.

Second! But because not only present pleasure and pain, but that also which is apt by its efficacy or consequence to bring it upon us at distance is a proper object of our desires, and apt to move a creature that has foresight therefore to *desire what does for him of any and from a contrary as good and evil*

64. *A man has misery only but only by wrong judgment.* The wrong judgment that misleads us, and makes the will fasten the worse side lies in misreporting upon the various comparisons of these. The wrong judgment I am here speaking of is what man may think of the determination of another but what every man himself must confess to be wrong. For since I lay it for certain ground that every intelligent being really seeks happiness, which consists in the enjoyment of pleasure without any con-

better than a great deal to come and so for small matters in possession part with greater ones in reversion. But that this is a wrong judgment every one must allow let his pleasure consist in whatever it will since that which is future will certainly come to be present and then, having the same advantage of nearness, will show itself in its full dimensions, and discover his wilful mistake which is judged of by unequal assurances. Were the pleasure of drinking accompanied, the very moment a man takes off his glass, with that sick stomach and churning head which, in some men, are sure to follow not many hours after I think nobody whatever pleasure had in his cups, would on these conditions, ever let wise touch his lips — which yet he daily swallows, and the evil side comes to be chosen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But, if pleasure or pain can be so lessened only by a

way we usually impose on ourselves, in respect of bare pleasure and pain or the true degrees of happiness or misery the future loses its just proportion, and what is present obtains the preference as though I mention not here the wrong judgment, wherein the present are not only lessened but reduced to perfect nothing where men enjoy what they can in present, and make sure of that, concluding amidst that no evil will therefore flow for that less than comparing the greatness of future good and evil, which is that we are here speaking of but in another sort of wrong judgment, which is concerning good or evil, as it is considered to be the cause and procurer of pleasure or pain that will flow from it.

66. *Causes of error judgment arise when we compare present pleasure and pain with future.* The cause of our judging amidst, when we compare our present pleasure or pain with the future, seems to me to be the weak and erring constitution of our minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once much less an pleasure almost, whilst pain possesses us. The present pleasure, if it be not very large and, and almost none at all, fills our narrow souls, and so takes up the whole mind that scarce leaves any thought of things absent, or if among our pleasures there are some which are not strong

Of Montaigne's Essay p. 1. — If better sadness came us before drunkenness, we would guard ourselves against drinking too much but, deceive us, pleasure goes before and hides from us what follows.

and the competing of his happiness, but only by wrong judgment I shall not here speak of that mistake which is the consequence of error or error which scarce deserves the name of wrong judgment but of that wrong judgment which every man himself must confess to be so.

65. *Men very often compare present and future.* (1) Therefore as to present pleasure and pain, the mind, as has been said, never mistakes that which is really good or evil that which is the greater pleasure, or the greater pain, is really just as it appears. But, though present pleasure and pain show their difference and degrees so plainly as to let a room mistake yet, when we compare present pleasure or pain with future (which is usually the case in most important determinations of the will,) we often make wrong judgments of them taking our measures of them in different positions of distance. Objects nearer our view are put to be though greater than those of larger size that are more remote. And so it is that pleasures and pains the present is put to carry and those at distance have the disadvantage in the comparison. Thus most men, like spend their hours, are put to judge little in hand

driven up and down as a bubble by the force of the wind. The being acted by blind impulse from without, or from within is little odds. The first, the false, and great use of liberty is to hunt blind precipitancy the principal verities of freedom is to stand till the eyes look about, and take advantage of the consequences of what we are going to do as much as the weight of the matter requires. How much sloth and negligence, heat and passion, the prevalence of fashion or acquired dispositions do severally con-

cern. The richness of the mind is as various as that of the body and like that too may be altered and it is a mistake to think that men cannot change their dispositions or indifference that is in accordance into pleasure and desire if they will do but what is within their power. A due consideration will do it in some cases and practice application, and custom in most. Bread or tobacco may be neglected where they are shown to be useful to health, because of an indifference or

to it only, judgment of what is necessary in our happiness. All our dear happiness, that is past doubt but, as has been already observed when they are disappointed they are apt to take up with any pleasure to hand or that custom has endeared to them to be satisfied in that and so being happy till some new desire by making them any disturbs their happiness and shows them that they are that they look further no use till directed to any union in pursuit of any thing known or appearing good. For since we find that we cannot enjoy all sorts of good, but exclude one thing we do not fix our desires every appearance of good unless it be judged to be necessary to our happiness if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. Thus is the occasion of judging of what they take to be necessary to their happiness which really is so. This mistake misleads us, both the choice of the good to aim at, and every fit means to the means to that, which is remote good. But, which way ever it be either by placing truth really to us not, or by glorifying them in as necessary to us, when a man misses his great happiness, he will knowledgely judge not right. That which contributes to this mistake is the real or supposed unpleasantness of the things which are the way to this end seeming so posterior to the thing to make themselves necessary in order to happiness, that they do not easily bring themselves to it.

It is an hang the great blene or disorder of our thing. There is inquiry for concerning this matter is.—Whether there be man power to change the pleasantness of unpleasantness that accompanies any sort of it. And as that, it is plain in many cases he can. Men may and should correct their palates, and grow to relish what they have, or they suppose has

without respect to any other end to which we consider too of the pleasure there is in health and tranquility (to which that meat is subservient) may add a new quality to make us swallow an ill-lushed pot on. In the latter of these any action is derided in or less pleasing only by

its fitness and pleasure into what we custom ourselves to that we cannot so bear to do or least be assy in the omission of things, which habitual practice has suited and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very sensible and every experience shows him he can do so yet it is partly in the conduct of him towards their happiness, neglected to disagree that it will be possibly not retained as a parallel if it be said that men can make things contemptuous or less pleasant to themselves and the by means of that, to which on may justly impute great deal of their wandering fashion and the common opinion having settled wrong notions, and education and custom ill habits, that just as if things are misperceived and the palate formed corrupt. Pains should be taken to satisfy the second contrary habit is to change our pleasures, and gradually to shift to which is necessary condition to our happiness. Thus every man must confess he can do and when happiness is lost, and misery overtakes him, he will confess he did

amiss in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it and I ask every one whether he has not often done so?

7 *Preference of vice to virtue is manifest upon judgment* I shall not now enlarge any further on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power whereby men mislead themselves This would make a volume and is not my business But whatever false notions or shameful neglect of what is in their power may put men out of their way to happiness and distract them as we see into so different courses of life this yet is certain that morality established upon its true foundations cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider and he that will not be so far a rational creature as to reflect ser-

— must
at use
is and

punishments of another life which the Almighty has established as the enforcements of his law are of weight enough to determine the choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility which nobody can make any doubt of He that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here and the contrary state the possible reward of a bad one must own himself to judge very much amiss if he does not conclude — That a virtuous life with the certain ex-

evidently so though the pleasure is nothing but pain and the vicious contentual pleasure which yet is for the most part quite other wise and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of even in the present possession nay all things rightly considered have I think even the worse part here But when infinite happiness is put into one scale against infinite misery in the other if the worst that comes to the pious man if he mistakes be the best that the wicked can attain to if he be in the right who can without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within a possibility of infinite misery which if he miss there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the other side the sober man ventures nothing

if the wicked man be in the right he is not hap-

the preference is to be given? I have forbore to mention anything of the certainty or probability of a future state designing here to show the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes upon his own principles laid how he pleases who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration whilst he knows and cannot but be certain that a future life is at least possible

73 *Recapitulation—liberty of indifference* To conclude this inquiry into human liberty which as it stood before I myself from the beginning fearing and a very judicious friend of mine since the publication suspecting to have some mistake in it though he could not particularly show me I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter Wherein lighting upon a very easy and scarce observable slip I had made in putting one seemingly indifferent word for another that discovery opened to me this present view which here in this second edition I submit to the learned world and which in short is this Liberty is a power to act or not to act according as the mind directs A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the will That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is some present ease or uneasiness which more or at least always accompanied with that of desire Desire is always moved by evil to fly it because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness but every good may every greater good does not constantly move desire because it may not make or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness For all that we desire is only to be happy But though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient act on till we have maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness or be contented or discontent with it. The result of our judgment upon that exam-

— desire in man

placed in an indifference of the mind antecedent to the determination of his will. I wish then who is so much stress on such an antecedent indifference as they call it, had told us plainly whether this proposed indifference be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding as well as to the decree of the will. For

perpetrator to state it between them, is unnecessary if the judgment of the understanding precedes the determination of the will be cause the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the understanding and in place liberty in an indifference antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor ascribe of it. Last place take a subject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty but in consequence of thought and judgment. I am not more bold passages, and therefore consent to say with those that love to speak so, that liberty is placed in indifference but it is an indifference which remains after the judgment of the understanding, yea, even after the determination of the will and that is an indifference even not of the mind, (for a man has once judged)

which is better viz. to do or forbear. he is no longer indifferent,) but an indifference of the operative power of the mind, which remains equally able to overcome or to forbear, operating after as before the decree of the will, are in that which, if one passes, may be called indifference and as far as this indifference reaches, man is free, and no further e.g. I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it rest. That operative power is indifferent to move or not to move my hand. I am then, in this respect perfectly free my will determines that operative power to rest. I am not free because the indifference of that my operative power to act, or not to act, still remains the power of moving my hand is not at all impaired by the determination of my will, which previous orders rest the indifference of that power to act, or not to act, is just as it was before as will appear if the will proceeds to the trial, by ordering the contrary. But then, during the rest of my hand, is seized with the sudden palsy the indifference of that operative power is gone, and where my liberty I have no longer freedom in that respect, but am under necessity of letting my hand rest. On the other side, if my hand be put into motion by convulsion, the indifference of that operative faculty is taken away by that motion and my liberty in that case is lost, for I am under necessity of letting my hand move. I have added this, to show in what sort

of indifference liberty seems to me to consist and not in another, their real or imaginary.

§. *Active and passive power in nature etc.* It is strange, True notions concerning the nature and extent of liberty are of so great importance that I hope I shall be pardoned this digression, which my attempt to explain I have led me into. The ideas of will, nature, liberty and necessity in this Chapter of Power came naturally in my way. In former edition of this Treatise I gave an account of my thoughts concerning them, according to the light I then had. And not as lover of truth, and not a worshipper of my own doctrines, I own some change in my opinion which I think I have discovered ground for. In what I first writ, I was an unbiased indifference followed truth, whether I thought I should. But neither being so vain as to fancy infallibility nor so dissimulous as to dissemble my mistakes for fear of diminishing my reputation, I have, with the same sincere design for truth only not been ashamed to publish what severer scrutiny has survived. It is not impossible but that some may think my former notions right and some (as I have already found) these latter and some neither. I shall not at all wonder this variety in men's opinions, impartial deductions of reason in controverted points being so rare, and exact ones in abstract notions not so very easy especially if of any length. And, therefore I should thank myself not little be beholden to an one who would, upon these or any other grounds, fairly ease this subject of liberty from any difficult that may yet remain.

Before I close this chapter I may perhaps be to our purpose, and help to give us clearer conceptions about power if we seek our thoughts take a little more exact survey of action. I have said above that we have ideas but of two sorts of action, viz. motion and thinking. These in truth, though called and counted actions, yet, if nearly considered, will not be found to be actions.

And all consequence so far the strict barrel of *active power* in those respects, which yet on their accounts are thought actions. For in these instances, the substance that hath motion or thought receives the impression, whereby it is put in this action, pure from without, and so acts merely by the capacity has it received such an impression from some external agent and such power is no properly an active power but mere passive capacity in the subject. Some Of Locke's Letter to Molyneux, Jan. 30, 693.

amiss in neglecting it and condemn himself for it and I ask every one whether he has not often done so?

7 *Preference of vice to virtue a manifest wrong judgment* I shall not now enlarge any further on the wrong judgments and neglect of what is in their power whereby men mislead themselves. This would make a volume and is not my business. But whatever false notions or shameful neglect of what is in their power may put men out of their way to happiness and distract them as we see into so different courses of life this yet is certain that morality established upon its true foundations cannot but determine the choice in any one that will but consider and he that will not be so far a rational creature as to reflect seriously upon infinite happiness and misery must

are of weight enough to determine the choice against whatever pleasure or pain this life can show when the eternal state is considered but in its bare possibility which nobody can make any doubt of. He that will allow exquisite and endless happiness to be but the possible consequence of a good life here and the contrary state

is to be preferred to a vicious one with the least

evidently so though the virtuous life here had nothing but pain and the vicious continual pleasure which yet is for the most part quite other wise and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of even in their present possession nay all things rightly considered have I think even the worse part here. But when infinite happiness is put into one scale against infinite misery in the other if the worst that comes to the pious man if he mistakes be the best that the wicked can attain to if he be in the right who can with out madness run the venture? Who in his wits could choose to come with a possibility of infinite misery which if he misses there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the other side the sober man ventures nothing

the preference is to be given? I have forborne to mention anything of the certainty or probability of a future state designing here to show the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes upon his own principles laid how he pleases who prefers the short pleasures of a vicious life upon any consideration whilst he knows and cannot but be certain that a future life is at least possible.

73 *Recapitulation—liberty of indifference* To conclude this inquiry into human liberty which as it stood before I myself from the beginning fearing and a very judicious friend of mine since the publication suspecting to have some mistake in it though he could not particularly show it me I was put upon a stricter review of this chapter. Wherein lighting upon a very easy and

here in this second edition I submit to the learned world and which in short is this Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the will. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is some present uneasiness which is or at least is always accompanied with that of desire. Desire is always moved by evil to fly it because a total freedom from pain always makes a necessary part of our happiness but every good nay every greater good does not constantly move desire because it may not make or may not be taken to make any necessary part of our happiness. For all that desire is only to be happy. But though this general desire of happiness operates constantly and invariably yet the satisfaction of any particular desire can be suspended from determining the will to any subservient action till we have maturely examined whether the particular apparent good which we then desire makes a part of our real happiness or be consistent or inconsistent with it. The result of our judgment upon that examination what ultimately determines the man who could not be free if his will were determined by anything but his own desire guided by his own judgment. I know that liberty by some is

Of Lock 1111 to M. lyneu 15th July 1693
also M. lyneu to Locke August 12 and Lock's
reply August 23

modes, being also such combinations of simple ideas as are not looked upon to be characteristic marks of an real beings that have steady existence, but scattered independent ideas put together by the mind are thereby distinguished from the complex ideas of substances.

2. *Use by the mind.* That the mind, respect to simple ideas, is wholly passive and receives them all from the existence and perceptions of things, such as sensation or reflection of them, and

mind of a man understands those words, though that complex combination of simple ideas were never offered to his mind by the real existence of things. Thus a man may come to have the idea of a *factum* or *order* by enumerating him the simple ideas as which these words stand for without ever seeing either of them committed.

4. *The want of parts framed modes.* Every mixed mode consisting of many distinct simple ideas, it seems reasonable to inquire. Why necessity has to unity and how such precise multitude comes to make but one idea since that combination does not always exist together in nature. To which I answer it is plain that has to unity from an act of the mind combining those several simple ideas as together and considering them as one complex one consisting of those parts and the mark of this union or that which is looked on generally to comprehend it, is so assigned to that combination. For it is by this it names that men commonly regulate their account of their distinct species of mixed modes, seldom allowing or considering any number

different. The mind first exercises another power in making these several combinations. For being once furnished with simple ideas, it can put them together in several combinations, and so make variety of complex ideas, without examining whether they exist so together in nature. And hence I think it is that these ideas are called *manus* as if they had their original, and constant existence, more in the thoughts of men, than in the reality of things and to form such ideas, it sufficed that the mind put the parts of them together and that they were consistent in the understanding without considering whether they had any real being: though I do not deny but several of them may be taken from observation, and the existence of several simple ideas so combined, as they are put together in the understanding. For the man who first framed the idea of *hypocrisy* might have rather taken it at first from the observation of one who could show good qualities which he had not himself. He framed that idea in his mind without having any such pattern to fashion it by. For is evident that in the beginning of languages and societies of men, several of those complex ideas, which were consequent to the constitutions established amongst them, must needs have been in the minds of men, before they existed anywhere else and that many names that stood for such complex ideas were in use and so those ideas framed, before the combinations they stood for ever existed.

3. *Sometimes got by the explanation of their names.* Indeed, now that languages are made, and bound with words standing for suitable combinations, an usual way for getting these complex ideas is, by the explanation of those terms that stand for them. For consisting of compound ideas combined, they may by words standing for those simple ideas be expressed to the

CL. II. III. h. § 6, where Lock gives examples of his meaning

killing man for the other, there being no name standing precisely for the other as there is the name *forbearance* to mark the other. It is taken for particular complex ideas, not distinct species of things from that of killing a young man, or an old man.

5. *The cause of making gross modes.* If we should inquire little further to see what it is that occasions men to make several combinations of simple ideas into distinct, and, as it were settled modes, and neglect others, which in the nature of things themselves, have as much an aptness to be combined and make distinct ideas, we shall find the reason for it to be the end of language which being to mark, or communicate men thoughts to another with all the dispatch that may be, they usually make such collections of ideas into complex modes, and assign names to them, as they have frequently use for in their way of living and conversation. I think others, which they have but seldom an occasion to mention, loose and without names that unite them together they rather choosing to enumerate (when they have need) such ideas as make them up, by the particular names that stand for them, than to trouble their memories by multiplying of complex ideas with names to them, which the seldom or never have any occasion to make use of.

times the substance or agent puts itself into action by its own power and this is properly *active power*. Whatsoever modification a substance has whereby it produces any effect that is called action v. a solid substance by motion operates on or alters the sensible ideas of another substance and therefore this modification of motion we call *action*. But yet this motion in that solid substance is when rightly considered but a passion if it received it only from some external agent. So that the active power of motion is in no substance which cannot begin motion in itself or in another substance when at rest. So likewise in thinking a power to receive ideas or thoughts from the operation of any external substance is called a power of thinking but this is but a passive power or capacity. But to be able to bring into view ideas out of sight at one's own choice and to compare which of them one thinks fit this is an active power. This reflection may be of some use to preserve us from mistakes about powers and actions which grammar and the common frame of languages may be apt to lead us into. Since what is signified by verbs that grammarians call active does not always signify action v. g. this proposition I see the moon or a star or I feel the heat of the sun though expressed by a verb active does not signify any action in me whereby I operate on those substances but only the reception of the ideas of light roundness and heat wherein I am not active but barely passive and cannot in that position of my eyes or body avoid receiving them. But when I turn my eyes another way or remove my body out of the sunbeams I am properly active because of my own choice by a power within myself I put myself into that motion. Such an action is the product of active power.

75 Summary of our original ideas. And thus I have in a short draught given a view of our original ideas from whence all the rest are derived and of which they are made up which if I could consider as a philosopher and examine on what causes they depend and of what they are made I believe they all might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones v. 12

Extension

Solidity

Mobility or the power of being moved

which by our senses we receive from body

Perceptivity or the power of perception or thinking

Motivity or the power of moving

which by reflection we receive from our minds

I crave leave to make use of these few words to avoid the danger of being mistaken in the use of those which are equivocal

To which if we add

Existence

Duration

Number

which belong both to the one and the other we have perhaps all the original ideas on which the rest depend. For by these I imagine might be explained the nature of colours sounds tastes smells and all other ideas we have if we had but faculties acute enough to perceive the severally modified extensions and motions of these minute bodies which produce those several sensations in us. But my present purpose being only to inquire into the knowledge the mind has of things by those ideas and appearances which God has fitted it to receive from them and how the mind comes by that knowledge rather than into their causes or manner of production I shall not contrary to the design of this Essay set myself to inquire philosophically into the peculiar constitution of bodies and the configuration of parts whereby they have the power to produce in us the ideas of their sensible qualities. I shall not enter any further into that disquisition it sufficing to my purpose to observe that gold or saffron has a power to produce in us the idea of yellow and snow or milk the idea of white which we can only have by our sight without examining the texture of the parts of those bodies or the particular figures or motion of the particles which rebound from them to cause in us that particular sensation though when we go beyond the bare ideas in our minds and would inquire into their causes we cannot conceive anything else to be in any sensible object whereby it produces different ideas in us but the different bulk figure number texture and motion of its insensible parts

Chap XXII Of Mixed Modes

1 Mixed modes what Having treated of simple modes in the foregoing chapters and given several instances of some of the most considerable of them to show what they are and how we come by them we are now in the next place to

See that the mind is hereby runned to too many
number of ideas, if we consider what an open
branch, stock of simple modes number and
how they afford us. How then mixed
modes, which admit of a various combina-
tion of different simple ideas, and their simple
modes, are from being few and scarce, we may
see. Therefore so that, before we have done,
we have seen that nobody need be afraid he shall
be lost, or have some and compass error in his
thoughts to raise in, though they be, as I pre-
tend, confined only to simple ideas received
from sensation or reflection, and their several
combinations.

2. If we consider, and peruse the first of
of it is worth our observation, which of all
our simple ideas has been most modified, and
had most mixed id as raised out of them, with
easiest access to them. And those have been these
three — thinking and willing (which are the two
ideas which comprehend in them all others,)
and power from whence these notions are con-
ceived to flow. These simple ideas, I say, of
these notions, and power have been those
which have been most modified, and of it
whose modifications have been made most com-
plex modes, in which names to them. For what be-
ing the great business of mankind, and the whole
matter upon which all laws are con-stituted, is
no wonder that the several modes of thinking
and motion should be taken notice of. The ideas
of them observed, and laid up in the memory
and have names annexed to them without which
laws could be but ill made, or vice and disorders
repressed. Nor could any communication be well
had between men in such complex ideas,
with names to them, and there are men have
mixed names, and approved settled ideas in
these modes of modes, of actions, distinguished
by their causes, means, objects, ends, instru-
ments, time, place, and other circumstances,
and also of their powers fitted for those actions.
The first is the power to speak or do what we
will, before others, without fear or disorder,
and the Greeks call the confidence of speech.
by peculiar names, as *prolepsis*, which power
is but in man only, and is called when it has
been acquired by frequent doing the same, as
is the idea we call *habit* when it is forward,
and ready upon every occasion to break into
action, we call it *virtue*. Thus, *firmness* is
determination or power to be angry.

To conclude Let us examine any modes of
action. 3. *Consideration* and *will*, which are

actions of the mind, and *power*, which
are actions of the body, and *motion*, which
are actions of both together, and we shall find
them but so many collections of simple ideas,
which, together, make up the complex ones
signified by those names.

1. *Simple ideas* are *regularly* formed, *simple*
but the first power being the source from whence
all action proceeds, the substances wherein these
powers are, when they exert this power to act,
are called *causes*, and the substances which are
upon are produced, or the simple ideas which
are introduced into a subject by the exerting
of that power are called *effects*. The *cause*
whereby the new substance or idea is produced
is called, as the subject exerting that power
is called, but in the subject wherein any simple
idea is changed or produced, it is called *passive* —
which efficacy however various, and the effects
almost infinite, yet we can, I think, confine it
in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but
modes of thinking and willing in con-
formity, or in case but modifications of motion.
I say I think we cannot conceive it to be any
other but these two. For whatever sort of action
beyond these produce any effects, I conceive my-
self to have no notion nor idea of, and so it is
quite remote from my thoughts, apprehensions,
and knowledge, and as much in the dark to me
as five other senses, or as the ideas of colours to
blind men. And therefore many words which
seem to express some action, signify nothing
of the action or motion itself. I shall touch the
effect, in some circumstances of the subject
wrought on, or cause operating, or creature,
or relation, contain in them no idea. The
motion or manner whereby they are produced, be-
fore of the cause, and the time done. And
when contrivance is the cold freezes water,
though the word freezing seems to import some
action, yet truly it signifies nothing but the ef-
fect, viz. that water was before fluid is be-
come hard and constant, without retaining
an idea of the motion whereby it is done.

Mixed modes made also of simple ideas have
been proposed before. I think I shall not need
to remark here that though power and motion
make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked
by names, and familiar in the minds and mouths
of men, yet other simple ideas, and then several
combinations, are not excluded much less, I
think, will it be necessary for me to enumerate
all the mixed modes which have been settled,

6 *Why words in one language have none answering in another* This shows us how it comes to pass that there are in every language many particular words which cannot be rendered by any one single word of another. For the several fashions, customs, and manners of one nation making several combinations of ideas familiar and necessary in one, which another people have had never an occasion to make, or perhaps so much as take notice of, names come of course to be annexed to them, to avoid long periphrases in things of daily conversation, and so they become so many distinct complex ideas in their minds. Thus *δωρακιον* amongst the Greeks, and *proscriptio* amongst the Romans, were words which other languages had no names that exactly answered, because they stood for complex ideas which were not in the minds of the men of other nations. Where there was no such custom, there was no notion of any such actions, no use of such combinations of ideas as were united, and as it were tied together by those terms, and therefore in other countries there were no names for them.

7 *And languages change* Hence also we may see the reason why languages constantly change, take up new and lay by old terms. Because change of customs and opinions, bringing with it new combinations of ideas, which it is necessary frequently to think on and talk about, new names to avoid long descriptions are annexed to them, and so they become new species of complex modes. What a number of different ideas are by this means wrapped up in one short sound, and how much of our time and breath is thereby saved, any one will see, who will but take the pains to enumerate all the ideas that either *responde* or *appeal* stand for, and instead of either of those names use a periphrasis to make any one understand their meaning.

8 *Mixed modes where they exist* Though I shall have occasion to consider this more at large when I come to treat of Words and their use, yet I could not avoid to take this much notice here of the names of mixed modes, which being fleeting and transient combinations of simple ideas, which have but a short existence anywhere but in the minds of men, and there too have no longer any existence than whilst they are thought on, have not so much anywhere the appearance of a constant and lasting existence as in their names, which are therefore in this sort of ideas very apt to be taken for the ideas themselves. For if we should inquire here the idea of a *triumph* or *apothecosis* exists, it is evident

¹In Book III.

they could neither of them exist altogether anywhere in the things themselves, being actions that required time to their performance, and so could never all exist together, and as to the minds of men, where the ideas of these actions are supposed to be lodged, they have there too a very uncertain existence, and therefore we are apt to annex them to the names that excite them in us.

9 *How we get the ideas of mixed modes* There are therefore three ways whereby we get these complex ideas of mixed modes — (1) By experience and observation of things themselves, thus by seeing two men wrestle or fence, we get the idea of wrestling or fencing. (2) By intention or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our own minds, so he that first invented printing or etching had an idea of it in his mind before it ever existed. (3) Which is the most usual way, by explaining the names of actions we never saw, or motions we cannot see, and by enumerating and thereby as it were setting before our imaginations all those ideas which go to the making them up, and are the constituent parts of them. For having by sensation and reflection stored our minds with simple ideas, and by use got the names that stand for them, we can by those means represent to another any complex idea we would have him conceive, so that it has in it no simple ideas but what he knows, and has with us the same name for. For all our complex ideas are ultimately resolvable into simple ideas, of which they are compounded, and originally made up, though perhaps their immediate ingredients, as I may so say, are also complex ideas. Thus the mixed mode which the word *lie* stands for is made of these simple ideas — (1) Articulate sounds. (2) Certain ideas

— 1. (3) The words the

ideas they stand for are in the mind of the speaker. I think I need not go any further in the analysis of that complex idea we call a *lie*, that I have said is enough to show that it is made up of simple ideas. And it could not be but of a sensitive tediousness to my reader, to trouble him with a more minute enumeration of every particular simple idea that goes into this complex one, which from what has been said he cannot but be able to make out to himself. The same may be done in all our complex ideas whatsoever, which however compounded and decomposed may at last be resolved into simple ideas, which are all the materials of knowledge or thought we have, or can have. Nor shall we have reason to

4. A clear or distinct idea of substance general. Hence when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horses, trees, &c. though the idea we have of the substance may be but the complicated collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which used to find united in the thing called horses or stones yet, because we cannot see how they could exist alone or in another we suppose them existing in and supported by some common substance, which support we denote by the name substance, though it be certain we have no clear distinct idea of that thing we suppose support.

5. A clear and distinct idea of substantiality. The same thing happens concerning the perception of the mind, viz. thinking, reasoning, fearing, &c. when we conceive the idea of a substance itself, nor apprehend how it can be the body or be produced by it, we are persuaded that these things are in some other substance, which we call spirit, which by yet is distinct from that, in which the ordinary notion of matter but in a thing which in those many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist by supposing substance, when thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. distinct, which we call as clear as a substance itself, as we have of the body, the one being supposed to be without the other.

of their several species in our minds, and such only do we, by the specific names, signify. In other words, when we say man, horse, sun, water, iron, upon which a long which words, every one who understands the language frames in his mind a combination of those several simple ideas, as which has usually observed or fancied to exist together under that denomination, all which he supposes to rest in and be, as it were, adherent to that unknown common subject, which adheres not in anything but the thing, in the creation of the matter, and very soon upon inquiry into his own thoughts, will find that he has no other idea of any substance, e.g. let it be gold, silver, iron, man, or oil, but that he has barely of those senses which he has observed to exist in it.

Thus, the idea of the sun, what is it but an aggregate of those several simple ideas, bright, hot, red, dish, has a constant regular motion, at a certain distance from us, and perhaps some the which thinks and discourses of the sun is been more less occur to us in those

6. Hence matter is as much as matter, p. 16

substance of matter as say the is part, because we have clear and distinct idea of the substance of spirit.

6. Our clear particular sort of substance. What can therefore be the secret nature of substance general, all the ideas we have of it.

g. be, that we represent particular sorts of substance to ourselves such as the idea we have

among which it be considered is a power, and passive capacities, which though not simple ideas, in that respect, for they are not may conceivably enough be considered as parts of them. The power of thinking is one of the ideas of the complex of that substance we call thought, and power to be so derived is part of the complex we call it, which powers pass for inherent qualities of those subjects. Because every substance, being as part, by the powers we observe in it, to change some sensible qualities in the subjects, as it is produced by us those simple ideas which we immediately form it, does, by those new sensible qualities introduced to the subjects discover to us those powers which do it by medially affect our senses, as regularly as it sensible qualities need immediately, e.g. we immediately by our senses perceive in fire heat and light, which are, if truly considered nothing but powers that produce those ideas in us, by our senses perceive the colour and brightness of charcoal, which by we come by the knowledge of an the power of fire which has to change the

with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made use of in divinity, ethics, law, and politics, and several other sciences. All that is requisite to my present design is to show what sort of ideas those are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compositions made up of simple ideas got from sensation and reflection, which I suppose I have done.

Chap. XXIII

Of our Complex Ideas of Substances

1. *Ideas of particular substances how made.* The

by reflection on its own operations takes notice also that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together, which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called so united in one sub-

many ideas together, because as I have said, we do not imagine how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves; we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance.

■ Our obscure idea of substance in general. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his

in general, he will find

nly a sup-

of such

ing simple

only called

ed, what is

colour or weight inheres, he

ld extend

what is it

that solidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better case than the Indian before mentioned, who saying that the world was supported by a great elephant, was asked what the elephant rested on, to which his answer was—a great tortoise; but being again pressed to know what gave support to the broad backed tortoise, replied—something he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cases where we use words without having clear and distinct ideas, we talk

like children, who being questioned what such

children or men, but that they know not, and that the thing they pretend to know, and talk of, is what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark. The idea then we have to which we give the general name substance, being nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine can not subsist *sine re substantia* without something to support them, we call that support *substantia*, which according to the true import of the word is in plain English, standing under or upholding.

3. *Of the sorts of substances.* An obscure and relative idea of substance in general, being thus made, we come to have the ideas of particular sorts of substances, by collecting such combinations of simple ideas as are, by experience and observation of men's senses, taken notice of to exist together, and are therefore supposed to flow from the particular internal constitution or unknown-ness of that substance. Thus we come to have the ideas of a man, horse, gold, water, &c. of which substances, whether any one has any other clear idea, further than of certain simple ideas co-existent together, I appeal to every one's experience. It is the ordinary qualities observable in iron, or a diamond, put together, that make the true complex idea of those substances, which a smith or a jeweller commonly knows better than a philosopher, who whatever substantial forms he may talk of, has no other idea of those substances, than what is framed by a collection of those simple ideas, which are to be found in them. Only we must take notice, that our complex ideas of substances, besides all those simple ideas they are made up of, have always the confused idea of something to which they belong, and in which they subsist, and therefore when we speak of any sort of substance, we say it is a thing having such or such qualities, as body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion, spirit a thing capable of thinking, and so hardness, friability, and power to draw iron, we say are qualities to be found in a loadstone. These, and the like fashions of speaking intimate that the substance is supposed always something besides the extension, figure, solidity, motion, thinking, or other observable ideas, though we know not what it is.

Of Bk III ch. § 15

Of Locke's Letter to Stillingfleet pp. 32

altern as it were the proportion of the bulb of the human eye parts of coloured objects is usual in it, produces different ideas from what it did before. Thus, sand or pounded glass, which opaque and white to the naked eye is pellucid in microscope and has seen in this way loses its former colour and is, in a great measure pellucid, with the mixture of some brightsparkling colours, such as appear from the refraction of diamonds, and the pellucid bodies Blood, to the naked eye appears all red but by good microscope wherein the lesser parts appear shows only some few globules of red, swimming in a pellucid liquor and how these red globules would appear if glasses could be found that could yet multiply them thousand to a thousand times more, is uncertain.

Our faculties for discovery of the qualities and power of substances that surround us. The infinite variety of Contraries of us, and all things about us, hath fitted our senses, faculties, and organs, to the conveniences of this and the business we have to do here. We are able, by our senses, to know and distinguish things and to examine them so far as to apply them to our uses, and several ways to accommodate the exigencies of this life. We have insight enough into the admirable contrivances and wonderful effects, to admire and magnify the wisdom, power and goodness of God. A thorough knowledge as this, which is suited to our present condition we want if cultures to retain. But appears to the God-tended we should have perfect, clear and distinct knowledge of them that perhaps is not in the comprehension of any finite being. We are furnished with faculties (both weak and strong as they are) to discover now the directions to lead us to the knowledge of the Creator to end the knowledge of our duty and we are fitted well enough to abilities to provide for the necessities of living these are our business in this world. But were our senses altered and made much quicker and curious appearance and outward scheme of things would have quite another face to us and, I am permitted to think, would be inconsistent with our being or last well-being in this part of the universe which we inhabit. If that considers how little our constitution is able to bear removal to parts of this air not much higher than that we commonly breathe in, will have reason to be satisfied that in this globe of earth allotted for our mans the all-wise Architect has suited our organs, and the bodies that are fitted to meet any other. If our sense faculties were but thousand of production, § 5.

times quicker than this, how would a perpetual noise distract us. And we should in the quietest retirement be less able to sleep or meditate than in the middle of a sea-fight. Nay if that most instructive of our senses, seeing were in any man thousand or hundred thousand times more cut than it is by the best microscope, the several millions of times less than the smallest object of his sight now would then be visible to his naked eyes, and so he would come nearer to a discovery of the nature and motion of the most parts of corporeal things and in many of them, probably of the ideas of the internal constitution but then he would be in a great difference from other people nothing would appear the same to him and others the visible ideas of everything would be different. So that I doubt whether he and the rest of men could discourse concerning the objects of sight, or have any communication about colours, the appearances being so wholly different. And perhaps such a quickness and tenderness of sight could endure bright sunshine or so much as penetrate light no take in but a very small part of any object to see, and that too only a very

would not make any great advantage by the change, if such an acute sight would not serve to direct him to the market and when he could not see things he was to vend at convenient distance or distinguish things he had to do with by those sensible qualities others do. If that was sharp-sighted ought to see the configuration of the minute particles of the spring of a clock, and observe upon what peculiar structure and impulse is latent in non-durable would no doubt discover something very durable but if eyes so framed could never once touch the hand and the characters of the hour plate and then by that distance see what a clock it was the owner could not be much benefited by the curiosity which, whilst it discovered the secret of contrivance of the parish smith made him lose its use.

3 *Conjectures about the corporeal organs of sense.* And here gentlemen let me propose another conjecture of mine. That since we have some reason (if there be any credit to be given to the report of things that our philosophy cannot account for) to imagine that Spirits can assume themselves bodies of different bulk, figure and conformation of parts—where the great advantage some of them have over us may

colour and consistency of wood By the former fire immediately by the latter it mediately discovers to us these several powers which therefore we look upon to be a part of the qualities of fire and so make them a part of the complex idea of it For all those powers that we take cognizance of terminating only in the alteration of some sensible qualities in those subjects on which they operate and so making them exhibit to us new sensible ideas therefore it is that I have reckoned these powers amongst the simple ideas which make the complex ones of the sort of substances though these powers considered in themselves are truly complex ideas And in this looser sense I crave leave to be understood when I name any of these *potentialities* among the simple ideas which we recollect in our minds when we think of *particular substances* For the powers that are severally in them are necessary to be considered if we will have true distinct notions of the several sorts of substances

§ And why Nor are we to wonder that powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances since their secondary qualities are those which in most of them serve principally to distinguish substances¹ one from another and commonly make a considerable part of the complex idea of the several sorts of them For our senses failing us in the discovery of the bulk texture and figure of the minute parts of bodies on which their real constitutions and differences depend² we are fain to make use of their secondary qualities as the characteristic notes and marks³ hereby to frame ideas of them in our minds and distinguish them one from another all which secondary qualities as has been shown are nothing but bare powers For the colour and taste of opium are as well as its soporific or anodyne virtues mere powers depending on its primary qualities which hereby it is fitted to produce different operations on different parts of our bodies

9 *These sorts of ideas make our complex ones of corporeal substances* The ideas that make our complex ones of corporeal substances are of these three sorts First the ideas of the primary qualities of things which are discovered by our senses

which depending on these are nothing but the powers those substances have to produce several ideas in us by our senses which ideas are not in the things themselves otherwise than as any thing is in its cause Thirdly the aptness we consider in any substance to give or receive such alterations of primary qualities as that the substance so altered should produce in us different ideas from what it did before these are called active and passive powers all which powers as far as we have any notice or notion of them terminate only in sensible simple ideas For what ever alteration a loadstone has the power to make in the minute particles of iron we should have no notion of any power it had at all to operate on iron did not its sensible motion discover it and I doubt not but there are a thousand changes that bodies we daily handle have a power to cause in one another which we never suspect because they never appear in sensible effects

10 *Powers thus make a great part of our complex ideas of particular substances* Powers therefore justly make a great part of our complex ideas of substances He that will examine his complex idea of gold will find several of its ideas that make it up to be only powers as the power of being melted but of not spending itself in the fire of being dissolved in *aqua regia* are ideas as necessary to make up our complex idea of gold as its colour and weight which if duly considered are also nothing but different powers For

heat which we cannot leave out of our ideas of the sun is no more really in the sun than the white colour it introduces into wax These are both equally powers in the sun operating by

in a man the idea of white

11 *The non-secondary qualities of bodies would*

1 substances matter substances not particular
are what has in view in §§ 7-14
Cf Bk II ch v §§ 10 13 14 23-26
Cf Bk II ch viii §§ 10 13 14 23-26
Cf Bk IV ch iii § 11

naked eyes produces a certain colour as by thus augmenting the acuteness of our senses discovered to be quite a different thing and the things

coloured, and all other sensible qualities, which is all we know of it, we are as far from the idea of the substance of body as if we knew nothing at all, nor all the acquaintance and familiarity which we imagine we have with that matter and the many qualities men assure themselves they perceive and know in bodies, will perhaps upon examination be found, that they have any more or clearer primary ideas below to be had than they have belonging to immaterial spirit.

Concerning *solid parts and extension* the primary idea must be this. The primary idea as we have found is body as contradistinguished to spirit, as the *extension* of matter and *extension* of spirit, and *solid parts* of matter and *solid parts* of spirit. These, I think, are the original ideas proper and pertinent to body for future use but the consequence of future extension.

18. *Thinking* is the primary idea of *extension* is motion. The ideas we have belonging and pertaining to motion are the idea of *distance* or *space* of *moving bodies* and *time* by which it is measured. For as body cannot but communicate its motion by impulse to another body which meets with it, so the mind can put bodies into motion, or forbear it so, as it pleases. The idea of *extension* and *motion* are common to both.

a. *Space* is the primary idea. There is no reason should be thought that I make motion to be one to spirit for his having no other idea of motion, but that distance with which he begins to be considered as rest and find motion, as well as bodies, cannot operate but where both are and the spirits do operate.

Several times in several places, I cannot but think of place to all finite spirits (for of the infinite I speak no here) For my soul being real being as well as my body is certainly as capable of changing distance with any other body or being as body itself and so of *local motion*. And if a mathematician can consider certain distance, or change of distance between two points, certainly he can consider distance and change of distance between two men, and so consider their motion, their approach or removal, or from another.

20. *Place* is the primary idea in himself that his soul can think, will and operate on his body. Cf. ch. vi. § 3, and the enumeration of the real or primary qualities of matter in ch. vii. § 9. Cf. ch. xii. § 3. Cf. ch. xii. § 3. Cf. ch. xii. § 3 also ch. xv § on the place of spirits, and their relation to space.

in the place where that is, but cannot operate on a body or in a place an hundred miles distant from it. Nobody can imagine that his soul can think or move a body at Oxford whilst he is at London and cannot but know that, being united to his body constantly changes place all the way journey between Oxford and London, as the coach or horse does that carries him, and I think may be said to be true, all that while in motion or if that will not be allowed to afford us clear view enough of its motion, its being separated from the body in death, I think, will so consider it as going out of the body or leaving it, and yet it has no idea of its motion, seems to me impossible.

1. *God* is the primary idea. If it be said by an one that it cannot change place because it has none for the spirits are not as bodies but I suppose that way of talking will not now be of much weight to mind in an one that is not much disposed to admire or suffer themselves to be deceived by such usual flimsy ways of speaking. But if one thinks there is any sense in that distinction, and that it is applicable to our present purpose I desire him to put it into intelligible English and then from thence draw a reason to show that immaterial spirits are not capable of motion. Indeed motion cannot be attributed to God not because he is an immaterial, but because he is an infinite spirit.

2. *Our own* is the primary idea. Let us compare, then, our own ideas of an immaterial spirit with our own ideas of body, and see whether there be an more obscurity in one than in the other.

3. *Our own* is the primary idea. These I think, are our own ideas of soul and body as contradistinguished and now let us examine which has most obscurity in it, and difficulty to be apprehended. I know that people whose theories are immersed in matter and have so directed their minds to their senses that they seldom reflect on anything beyond them, are so that they cannot comprehend a spirit, that which perhaps is true but I am firm, when they consider it well, they can no more comprehend an extended mind.

3. *Colour* is the primary idea. If an one so knows no what is black in him, he means he knows not what the substance of that black thing is, nor so I know he knows the sub-

not lie in this that they can so frame and shape to themselves organs of sensation or perception as to suit them to their present design and the circumstances of the object they would consider For how much would that man exceed all others in knowledge who had but the faculty so to alter the structure of his eyes that one sense as to make it capable of all the several degrees of vision which the assistance of glasses (casually at first lighted on) has taught us to conceive? What wonders would he discover who could so fit his eyes to all sorts of objects as to see when he pleased the figure and motion of the minute particles in the blood and other juices of animals as distinctly as he does at other times the shape and motion of the animals themselves? But to us in our present state unalterable organs so contrived as to discover the figure and motion of the minute parts of bodies whereon depend those sensible qualities we now observe in them would perhaps be of no advantage God has no doubt made them so as is best for us in our present condition He hath fitted us for the neighbourhood of the bodies that surround us and we have to do with and though we cannot, by the faculties we have attain to a perfect knowledge of things yet they will serve us well enough for those ends above mentioned which are our great concernment I beg my reader's pardon for laying before him so wild a fancy concerning the ways of perception of beings above us but how extravagant soever it be I doubt whether we can imagine anything about the knowledge of angels but after this manner some way or other in proportion to what we find and observe in ourselves And though we cannot but allow that the infinite power and wisdom of God may frame creatures with a thousand other faculties and ways of perceiving things without them than what we have yet our thoughts can go no further than our own so impossible it is for us to enlarge our very guesses beyond the ideas received from our own sensation and reflection The supposition at least, that angels do sometimes assume bodies,

is unknown to us

14 *Our specific ideas of substances* But to return to the matter in hand—the ideas we have of substances and the ways in which they come by them. I say our specific ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of certain number of simple ideas considered as united in one thing. These ideas of substances though they are commonly simple

ifies by the name swan is white colour long neck, red beak black legs, and whole feet, and all these of a certain size with a power of swimming in the water and making a certain kind of noise and perhaps to a man who has long observed this kind of birds some other properties which all terminate in sensible simple ideas all united in one common subject.

15 *Our ideas of spiritual substances as clear as of bodily substances* Besides the complex ideas we have of material sensible substances of which I have last spoken—by the simple ideas we have taken from those operations of our own minds, which we experiment daily in ourselves, as thinking understanding willing knowing and power of beginning motion &c. co-existing in some substance we are able to frame the complex idea of an immaterial spirit And thus by putting together the ideas of thinking perceiving liberty and power of moving themselves and other things we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material For putting together the ideas of thinking and willing or the power of moving or queting corpor

coherent solid parts and a power of being united joined with substance of which likewise we have no positive idea we have the idea of matter The one is as clear and distinct an idea as the other the idea of thinking and moving a body being as clear and distinct ideas as the ideas of extension solidity and being moved For our idea of substance is equally obscure or

to think that our senses show us nothing but immaterial things Every act of sensation when duly considered gives us an equal view of both parts of nature the corporeal and spiritual For whilst I know by seeing or hearing &c. that there is some corporeal being without me the object of that sensation I do more certainly know that there is some spiritual being within me that sees and hears Thus I must be convinced cannot be the action of bare insensible matter nor ever could be without an immaterial thinking being

16 *No idea of abstract substance either in body or spirit* By the complex idea of extended figured

1 Cf. Bk IV ch. 11 and xi
2 Cf. Bk IV ch. 11 § 6

or their perpetual motion, we must allow them to have no cohesion one with another and yet let the sharp cold come, and they unite they consolidate these little atoms cohere, and are so without great force separable. If that could find the bonds that tie these heaps of loose little bodies together so firmly that could make known the cement that makes them stick so fast one to another would discover a great and yet unknown secret and yet when that was done would be far enough from making the extension of body (which is the cohesion of its solid parts) intelligible, till he could show wherein consisted the union, or consolidation of the parts of those bodies, or if that cement, or if the least parcel of matter that exists. Whereby it appears that this primary and supposed obvious quality of body will be found, when examined, to be as incomprehensible as anything belonging to our minds, and solid extended substance as hard to be conceived as thinking immaterial or whatever difficulties some would raise against it.

73 —

like as the cohesion itself. For if matter be considered, as no doubt it is, finite, let any one send his contemplation to the extremities of the universe, and there see what conceivably hoopa, what bond he can imagine to hold this mass of matter in so close pressure together from whence steel has its firmness, and the parts of diamond their hardness and indissolubility. If matter be finite it must have its extremes and there must be something to hinder from scattering asunder. To avoid this difficulty any one will throw himself into the supposition and byss of infinite matter let him consider what light he thereby brings to the cohesion of body and whether he be ever the clearer making intelligible by resolving into supposition the most absurd and most incomprehensible of all — so far as our extension of body (which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts) from being clearer or more distinct, then we would inquire into the nature cause or manner of it, than the of thinking.

3. Communication of motion by impulse or by contact. — *Communication of motion by impulse* is the power of communicating motion by impulse and of our souls, the power of moving motion by thought. These ideas, the one of body the other of our minds, every day experience clearly furnishes us with but if here again we inquire how this is done, we are equally in the dark. For

in the communication of motion by impulse, wherein as much motion is lost to one body as is got to the other which is the ordinary case, we can have no other conception, but of the passing of motion out of one body into another which, I think, is as obscure and inconceivable as how our minds move or stop our bodies by thought, which we every moment find they do. The increase of motion by impulse which is observed or believed sometimes to happen, is yet harder to be understood. We have by daily experience clear evidence of motion produced both by impulse and by thought but the manner how hardly comes within our comprehension on we are equally at a loss in both. So that, however we consider motion, and its communication, either from body or spirit, the idea which belongs to spirit is at least as clear as that which belongs to body. And if we consider the active power of moving or as I may call it, motivity is much clearer in spirit than body since two bodies, placed by one another at rest, will never afford us the idea of a power in the one to move the other but by a borrowed motion whereas the mind every day affords us ideas of an active power of moving of bodies and therefore it is worthy our consideration, whether active power be not the proper attribute of spirit, and passive power of matter. Hence may be conjectured that created spirits are not totally separable from matter because they are both active and passive. Pure spirit, viz. God is only active pure matter

— — —

4. Communication of motion by thought, which we attribute to spirit, is as evident as that by impulse which we ascribe to body. Constant experience makes us sensible of both these though our narrow understandings can comprehend neither. For when the mind would look beyond those original ideas we have from sensation or reflection, and penetrate into their causes, and manner of production, we find still it discovers nothing but its own short-sightedness.

29. Summary. I conclude. Sensation convinces us that there are solid extended substances and reflection, that there are thinking ones experience assures us of the existence of such beings, and that the one hath power to move body by impulse, the other by thought thus we cannot doubt of. Experience, I say every moment fur

stance of that solid thing Further if he says he knows not how he thinks I answer Neither knows he how he is extended how the solid parts of body are united or cohere together to make extension For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter that are grosser than the particles of air and have pores less than the corpuscles of air yet the weight or pressure of the air will not explain nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves And

bodies yet it cannot make bonds for itself and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materi subtilis* So that that hypothesis however ingeniously soever explained by showing that the parts of sensible bodies are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies reaches not the parts of the æther itself and by how much the more evident it proves that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the æther and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of the parts of the corpuscles of the æther itself which we can neither conceive without parts they being bodies and divisible nor yet how their parts cohere they wanting that cause of cohesion which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies

24 *Not explained by an ambient fluid* But in truth the pressure of any ambient fluid how great soever can be no intelligible cause of the cohesion of the solid parts of matter For though such a pressure may hinder the separation of polished superficies one from another in a line perpendicular to them as in the experiment of polished marbles yet it can never in the least hinder the separation by a motion in a line parallel to those surfaces Because the ambient fluid having a full liberty to succeed in each point of space deserted by a lateral motion resists such a motion of bodies so joined no more than it would resist the motion of that body were it on all sides environed by that fluid and touched no other body and therefore if there are no other cause of cohesion all parts of bodies must be easily separable by such a lateral sliding motion For if the pressure of the æther be the adequate cause of cohesion wherever that cause operates not there can be no cohesion And since it cannot operate against a lateral separation (as has been shown) therefore in every imaginary plane in

intersecting any mass of matter there could be a separation of polished surfaces.

another So that perhaps how clear an idea soever we think we have of the extension of body which is nothing but the cohesion of solid parts, he that shall well consider it in his mind may have reason to conclude That it is as easy for him to have a clear idea how the soul thinks as how body is extended For since body is no further nor otherwise extended than by the union and cohesion of its solid parts we shall very ill comprehend the extension of body without understanding wherein consists the union and cohesion of its parts which seems to me as incomprehensible as the manner of thinking and how it is performed

5 *We can as little understand how the parts cohere in extension as how our spirits perceive or move* I allow it is usual for most people to wonder how any one should find a difficulty in what they think they every day observe Do we not see (I will they be ready to say) the parts of bodies stick firmly together? Is there anything more common? And what doubt can there be made of it? And the like I say concerning thinking and voluntary motion Do we not every moment experience it in ourselves and therefore can it be doubted? The matter of fact is clear I confess but when we would a little nearer look into it, and consider how it is done there I think we are at a loss both in the one and the other and can as little understand how the parts of body cohere as how we ourselves perceive or move I could have any one intelligibly explain to me

come in a few moments to be situated here so strongly one to another that the utmost force of men's arms cannot separate them? A considering man will I suppose be here at a loss to satisfy himself or another man's understanding

extend'd sub
it com
remely
how

by a microscope (and yet I have heard of some that have magnified ten thousand ways to much above a hundred thousand times) pretended to perceive their distinct bulk figure or motion and the particles of matter are also so perfectly loose one from another that the least force sensibly separates them Nay I consider

of the simpl ideas we receive from reflecti-
 g having from what we experime t in our
 sel ts, got the ideas f exist ce and durati n
 of knowledge and pow r of pleasure and happi-
 ness and of several ther qualities and powers,
 which t is bette to have than t be w th ut
 hen we would fram an dea the most sustabl
 e can to the S preme Being we nlarge vry
 on of these w th our d f infinity and so p t
 in them tog th mak our complet idea of
 God. F that the mind has such pow of n
 know som f t deas, receiv d fr m sensa

compos d yet I think I may say we ha e no
 oth dea of him, but a compl x e of exis-
 tence knowledge power happiness, &c. infinit
 and ternal huch are all distinct id as, nd
 some f them, being relat e are gain com-
 pounded f oth rs all which being as has been
 sho vn, originally got from sensati n and reflec-
 tion go to mak up the dea r notion we ha e
 f God.

36 A deas our mpl deas f spirits but

The same also I can d of knowing them more
 perfectly all th ir qualities, powers, causes
 consequences, and latu ns, &c. till all be pe-
 ctly known that is in them, r can any way
 late to them and thus frame th d f infinite
 or boundless knowledge Th sam may also be
 done of power till we come to that we call in-
 finite and also of th dur ti f exist ce w th
 out beginning or d and so frame the d f
 an eternal being Th degrees or extent wherein
 ascribe exist ce pow r wisdom, and all
 the perfections (which we can ha any id as
 of) to that sover gn Be g which we call God
 being all boundless and infinite, w frame the
 best idea f him our minds are cap bl f all
 which is d e, I say by enlargi g those imple
 ideas e ha e tak from th pe ti ns f our
 own minds, by effectio by our senses, fr m
 exterior things, to that astness to which infinity
 can extend th m.

35 God his own sense re g as bl For t is
 unity, joined to ur deas f existe ce
 power knowledge &c. makes that comple
 idea, whereby w represe t to ursel m th best
 we can, the S preme Being For though m has
 own essence (which certainly w d t know
 not knowing th real esse ce of a pebbil
 ly or f our own sel es) God be impl and un

Of t e

tion we rece e from th operation of our own
 minds we can tribute to spirits no ther but
 what we rece e from thence and all th diff

ce we can put between them, in our co t m
 plation of spirits, is only in the several ext ts ard
 d gres f their kn wledge powe durati
 happiness, &c. For that in our deas as well f
 spirits as of ther things, we are restrained t
 that a ccess f om sens t and flection, is ev
 d t from h ce—That, in our deas f p rits,
 how much soev d anced in perfecti n be
 yo d those f bodies, even to that f infinite we
 cann tyet ha e any d f th manner we cin
 th y discover their thoughts to an th
 though we must necessarily conclud that sep-
 ar te p rits, which are beings that ha e per-
 fecter kn wledge and gr ter happiness than w
 must needs ha e also a perfect way of com-
 municating th ir thoughts than we ha h
 ar fau to mak use of corporeal signs, and par-
 ticular sounds which are th fore f most g n
 eral use as being th best and quickest e ar
 capabl of B t f immediat commu cati n
 ha ing m experim t in oursel es, and conse-
 q ntly no n upon f t t all, we ha e no d
 how spirits, which use not words, can w th qu ck-
 ness, much less how spirits that ha e bodies
 can be mast m f th ir own thoughts, and com-
 municate or convey them t pleaur though
 we cann t but ecessarily suppose they ha
 such a pow

37 Recapitulation. And thus cha ese n what
 f

Of Berk ley Principle § th exagger
 to f our blindness as t th tru and real na-
 ture of things. Cf. Bk. IV chh. ix, x, xi.

Cf Bk. I m bn. §§ 8-7 Bk. II ch. xv §§
 Bk. IV ch. xvii. § regarding our complex
 ideas nd knowledge f God, as its gradual develop-
 ment.

nishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas as received from their proper sources our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire further into their nature causes and manner we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any further one is as easy as the other and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should by thought set body into motion than how a substance we know not should by impulse set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist, than those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts beyond which the mind whatever efforts it would make is not able to advance one jot nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas.

30 *Our idea of spirit and our idea of body compared.* So that in short the idea we have of spirit compared with the idea we have of body stands thus the substance of spirits is unknown to us and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. Two primary qualities or properties of body viz solid coherent parts and impulse we have distinct clear ideas of so likewise we know and have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities or properties of spirit viz

ideas of them which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts and their motion. We have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking viz believing doubting intending fearing hoping all which are but the several modes of thinking. We have also the ideas of willing and moving the body consequent to it and with the body it self too for as has been shown spirit is capable of motion.

31 *The notion of spirit involves no more difficulty in it than that of body.* Lastly if this notion of immaterial spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it not easily to be explained we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more

perplexed or nearer a contradiction than the very notion of body includes in it the disability in infinitum of any finite extension involving us whether we grant or deny it in consequences impossible to be explicated or made in our apprehensions consistent consequences that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance.

32 *We know nothing of things beyond our ideas of them.* Which we are not at all to wonder at since we having but some few superficial ideas of things discovered to us only by the senses from without or by the mind reflecting on what it experiments in itself within have no knowledge beyond that much less of the internal constitution and true nature of things being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge and the power of voluntary motion as certainly as we experiment or discover in things without us the cohes on and separation of solid parts which is the extension and motion of bodies we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit as with our notion of body and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking they being both but simple ideas, independent one from another and having as clear and distinct ideas in us of thinking as of solidity. I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without solidity i.e. immaterial to exist as a solid thing without thinking i.e. matter to exist especially since it is not harder to conceive how thinking should exist without matter than how matter should think. For whenever we would proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection and defer further into the nature of things we fall presently into darkness and obscurity perplexedness and difficulties and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be clearest, that of body or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection and so is it of all our other ideas of substances even of God himself.

33 *Our complex idea of God.* For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being we shall find that it comes by it the same way and that the complex idea we have both of God and separate spirits, are made

of the simple ideas we receive from reflection
g. having from what we experiment in our
elves, got the ideas of existence and duration
of knowledge and power of pleasure and happi-
ness and of several other qualities and powers,
which it is better to have than to be without
when we would frame an idea the most suitable
we can to the Supreme Being we enlarge every
one of these with our idea of infinity and so put
ing them together make our complex idea of
God. For that the mind has such a power of en-
larging some of its ideas, collected from sense

compounded yet I think I may say we have no
other idea of him, but a complex one of exist-
ence, knowledge, power happiness, &c. infinite
and eternal which are all distinct ideas, and
some of them, being relative are again com-
pounded of others all which being as has been
shown, originally got from sensation and reflec-
tion, go to make up the idea or notion we ha
of God

36 *As ideas of our complex ideas of spirits but*

or all, perhaps imperfectly I can frame an idea
of knowing twice as many which I can double
again, as far as I can do to number and thus
enlarge my idea of knowledge by extending its
comprehension to all things existing or possible.
The same also I can do of knowing them more
perfectly i.e. all their qualities, powers, causes
consequences, and relations &c. till all be per-
fectly known that is in them, or can any way be

tion we receive from the operation of our own
minds we can attribute to spirits no other but
what we receive from thence and all the diffi-
culty we can put between them, in our contem-
plation of spirits, is only in the several extents and
degrees of their knowledge power duration
happiness, &c. For that in our ideas as well of
spirits as of other things, we are restrained to
those ideas from sensation and reflection, is evi-
dent from hence — That, in our ideas of spirits,
how much soever advanced in perfection be-
yond those of bodies even to that of infinity we
cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein
they discover their thoughts one to another
though we must necessarily conclude that sepa-
rate spirits, which are beings that have per-
fecter knowledge and greater happiness than we
must needs have also a perfecter way of com-
municating their thoughts than we have who
are vain to make use of corporeal signs, and par-
ticular sounds which are therefore of most ge-
neral use as being the best and quickest we are
capable of. It is of immediate communication
having no experiment in ourselves, and conse-
quently no notion of it at all, we have no idea
how spirits, which use not words, can with quick-
ness or much less how spirits that have no bodies
can be masters of their own thoughts, and com-
municate or conceal them to pleasure though
we cannot but necessarily suppose they have
such power

other perfections (which we can have any ideas
of) to that sovereign Being, which we call God
being all boundless and infinite we frame the
best idea of him our minds are capable of all
which is done, I say by enlarging those simple
ideas we have taken from the operations of our
own minds, by reflection by our senses, from
external things, to that vastness to which infinity
can extend them.

35 *God as has an essence not sensible* For this
infinity which, joined to our ideas of existence
power knowledge &c. makes that complex
idea, whereby we represent to ourselves, the best
we can, the Supreme Being. For though in his
own essence (which certainly we do not know
nor know the real essence of a pebble, or
fly or four wheelers) God be simple and un-

37 *Recapitulation.* And thus we have seen what
kind of ideas we have of substance of all kinds
wherein they consist, and how we came by them.
From whence I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our ideas of the several sort of

Ex. Ek. I ch. iii. §§ 8-7 E. II ch. xv. §§
Ex. IV ch. xvi. § regarding our complex
ideas and knowledge of God, in its gradual develop-
ment.

Cl. Locke's letter to Anthony Collins June 9,
1693. *Milnerus* to Locke March 693 and
Locke's reply March 8
Cl. ch. xvi. §§ 8-3-2
Cl. *Assurance*, *Consciousness* Ek. x. par 8-
Ex. xi. par 6
Cl. *Berkeley's Principle* § on the exag-
geration of our blindness as to the true and real na-
ture of things. Cl. Ek. IV ch. ix, x, xi.

nishes us with the clear ideas both of the one and the other. But beyond these ideas as received from their proper sources our faculties will not reach. If we would inquire further into their nature causes and manner we perceive not the nature of extension clearer than we do of thinking. If we would explain them any further one is as easy as the other and there is no more difficulty to conceive how a substance we know not should by thought set body into motion than how a substance we know not should by impulse set body into motion. So that we are no more able to discover wherein the ideas belonging to body consist than those belonging to spirit. From whence it seems probable to me that the simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts beyond which the mind whatever efforts it would make is not able to advance one jot nor can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideas.

30 *Our idea of spirit and our idea of body compared.* So that in short the idea we have of spirit compared with the idea we have of body stands thus the substance of spirits is unknown to us and so is the substance of body equally unknown to us. There are primary qualities or properties of body viz solid coherent parts and impulse we have distinct clear ideas of so likewise we know and have distinct clear ideas of two primary qualities or properties of spirit viz thinking and a power of action i.e. a power of beginning or stopping several thoughts or motions. We have also the ideas of several qualities inherent in bodies and have the clear distinct ideas of them which qualities are but the various modifications of the extension of cohering solid parts and their motion. We have likewise the ideas of the several modes of thinking viz believing doubting intending fearing hoping all which are but the several modes of thinking. We have also the ideas of willing and moving the body consequent to it and with the body itself too for as has been shown spirit is capable of motion.

31 *The notion of spirit involves more difficulty in it than that of body.* Lastly if this notion of immaterial spirit may have perhaps some difficulties in it not easily to be explained we have therefore no more reason to deny or doubt the existence of such spirits than we have to deny or doubt the existence of body because the notion of body is cumbered with some difficulties very hard and perhaps impossible to be explained or understood by us. For I would fain have instanced anything in our notion of spirit more

perplexed or nearer a contradiction than the very notion of body includes in it the divisibility in infinitum of any finite extension involving us whether we grant or deny it consequences impossible to be explicated or made our apprehensions consistent consequences that carry greater difficulty and more apparent absurdity than anything can follow from the notion of an immaterial knowing substance.

32 *We know nothing of things beyond our simple ideas of them.* Which we are not at all to wonder at since we having but some few superficial ideas of things discovered to us only by the senses from without or by the mind reflecting on what experiments in itself within have no knowledge beyond that much less of the internal constitution and true nature of things being destitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge and the power of voluntary motion as certainly as we experiment or discover in things without us the cohesion and separation of solid parts which is the extension and motion of bodies we have as much reason to be satisfied with our notion of immaterial spirit as with our notion of body and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it being no more a contradiction that thinking should exist separate and independent from solidity than it is a contradiction that solidity should exist separate and independent from thinking they being both but simple ideas, in

to exist especially since it is not hard to conceive how thinking should exist without matter than how matter should think. For we henceover we could proceed beyond these simple ideas we have from sensation and reflection and delve further into the nature of things we fall presently into darkness and obscurity perplexedness and difficulties and can discover nothing further but our own blindness and ignorance. But which ever of these complex ideas be clearest that of body or immaterial spirit, this is evident that the simple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from sensation or reflection and so of all our other ideas of substances even of God himself.

33 *Our complex idea of God.* For if we examine the idea we have of the incomprehensible Supreme Being we shall find that it comes by it the same way and that the complex ideas we have both of God and separate spirits are made

of the simple ideas we receive from reflection. As having, from what we experiment in our selves, got the ideas of existence and duration of knowledge and power of pleasure and happiness, and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have than to be without when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the Supreme Being. We enlarge every one of these with our ideas of infinity and so put them together make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has such a power of enlarging some of its ideas, received from sensation and reflection, has been already shown.

34. Our complex idea of God is this. If I find that I know some few things, and some of them, or all, perhaps imperfect. I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many which I can doubt at all, as far as I can add to number and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge by extending its comprehension to all things existent or possible. The same also I can do of knowing them more perfectly see all their qualities, powers, causes, consequences, and relations, &c., till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can an way relate to them. and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundless knowledge. The same may also be done of power till we come to that we call infinite and also of the duration of existence, without beginning or end, and so frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent wherein we ascribe existence, power wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that sovereign Being which we call God being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best idea I hum our minds are capable of. and which is done, I say by enlarging those simple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection by our senses, from exterior objects, to that vastness to which infinity can extend them.

35. God is his own source or essence. For it is Infinity which, joined to our ideas of existence, power knowledge, &c., makes that complex idea, whereby we represent to ourselves, the best we can, the Supreme Being. For though in his own essence (which certainly we do not know not knowing the real essence of a pebble, or a fly or of our own selves) God be simple and un-

compounded yet I think I may say we have in other sorts of him, but complex one of existence knowledge, power happiness, &c., infinite and eternal which are all distinct ideas, and some of them, being relative are compounded of others; all which being, as has been shown, originally got from sensation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God.

Of the use of our complex idea of spirits that

tion we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to spirits no other but what we receive from thence and all the difference we can put between them, in our conception of spirits, is only in the several extents and degrees of their knowledge power duration, happiness, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of spirits as of other things, we are restrained to that it comes from sensation and reflection, is evident from hence, — That, in our ideas of spirits, how much soever advanced in perfection beyond those of bodies, even to that of infinity we cannot yet have an idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another though we must necessarily conclude that separate spirits, which are beings that have perfect knowledge and greater happiness than we must needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have who are fain to make use of corporeal signs, and particular sounds which are therefore of most general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication having no experiment in ourselves, and consequently no notions of it at all, we have no idea how spirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much less how spirits that have no bodies can be masters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them to pleasure, though we cannot but necessarily suppose they have such power.

37. Recapitulation. And thus we have seen what kind of ideas we have of substances of all kinds wherein they consist, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our ideas of the several sorts of

Et. xi. par. 6.

Cl Berkeley Principles § on the exaggeration of our blindness as to the true and real nature of things. Cl. Et. IV. chh. xi. x. xi.

Cl. Et. I. ch. iii. §§ 8-7 Et. II ch. xv §
Et. IV ch. xvii § regarding our complex idea and knowledge of God, as its gradual development.

substances are nothing but collections of simple ideas with a supposition of *something* to which they belong and in which they subsist though of this supposed something we have no clear distinct idea at all

Secondly That all the simple ideas that thus united in one common *substratum* make up our complex ideas of several *sorts* of substances are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions we cannot go beyond those simple ideas And even in those which seem most remote from all we have to do with and do infinitely surpass anything we can perceive in ourselves by reflection or discover by sensation in other things we can attain to nothing but those simple ideas which we originally received from sensation or reflection as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels and particularly of God himself

Thirdly That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances when truly considered are only *powers* however we are apt to take them for positive qualities e.g. the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of *gold* are yellowness great weight ductility fusibility and solubility in *aqua regia* &c. all united together in an unknown *substratum* all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances and are not really in the gold considered barely in itself though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution & hereby it has a fitness differently to operate and be operated on by several other substances *

Chap. XXIV Of Collective Ideas of Substances

1 A collective idea is one idea Besides these complex ideas of several single substances as

up of many particular substances considered together as united into one idea and which so joined are looked on as one viz the idea of such

great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever signified by the name *world* is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it it sufficing to the unity of any idea that it be considered as one representation or picture though made up of ever so many particulars

2 Made by the power of composing in the mind These collective ideas of substances the mind makes by its power of composition and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas united in one substance And as the mind by putting together the repeated ideas of unity makes the collective mode or complex idea of any number as a score or a gross &c. —so by putting together several particular substances it makes collective ideas of substances as a troop an army a swarm a city a fleet each of which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea in one view and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one as one ship or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man and consider them all together as one

3 Artificial things that are made up of distinct substances & our collective ideas Amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances and in truth if we consider all these collective ideas aright as army constellation universe as they are united into so many single ideas they are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things very remote and independent on one another into one view the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception and signified by one name For there are no things so remote nor so contrary which the mind cannot by the art of composition bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the name *universe*

Chap. XXV Of Relations

1 Relatio what Besides the ideas whether simple or complex that the mind has of things as they are in themselves there are others it gets from their comparison one with another The understanding in the consideration of anything is not confined to that precise object it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself or at least look

distinct idea at all

Secondly That all the simple ideas that thus united in one common *substratum* make up our complex ideas of several sorts of substances are no other but such as we have received from sensation or reflection So that even in those which we think we are most intimately acquainted with and that come nearest the comprehension of our most enlarged conceptions we cannot go be

ceive in ourselves by reflection or discover by

dent in the complex ideas we have of angels and particularly of God himself

Thirdly That most of the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas of substances when truly considered are only *powers* however we are apt to take them for positive qualities v.g. the greatest part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellowness great ductility fusibility and solubility in *aqua regia* &c. all united together in an unknown *substantiality* all which ideas are nothing else but so many relations to other substances and are not really in the gold considered barely in itself though they depend on those real and primary qualities of its internal constitution whereby it has a fitness differently to operate and be operated on by several other substances

Chap. XXIV Of Collective Ideas of Substances

1 A collective idea is one idea Besides these complex ideas of several single substances as

up of many particular substances considered together as united into one idea and which so

as much one idea as the idea of a man

great collective idea of all bodies whatsoever signified by the name *world* is as much one idea as the idea of any the least particle of matter in it it sufficing to the unity of any idea that it be considered as one representation or picture though made up of ever so many particulars

2 Made by the power of composition in the mind These collective ideas of substances the mind makes by its power of composition and uniting severally either simple or complex ideas into one as it does by the same faculty make the complex ideas of particular substances consisting of an aggregate of divers simple ideas united in one substance And as the mind by putting together the repeated ideas of unity makes the collective mode or complex idea of any number as a score or a gross &c. — so by putting together several particular substances it makes collective ideas of substances as a troop an army as an arm a city a fleet each of which every one finds that he represents to his own mind by one idea in one view and so under that notion considers those several things as perfectly one as one ship or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive how an army of ten thousand men should make one idea than how a man should make one idea it being as easy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number of men and consider it as one as it is to unite into one particular all the distinct ideas that make up the composition of a man and consider them all together as one

3 Artificial things that are made up of distinct rubric names require collective ideas Amongst such kind of collective ideas are to be counted most part of artificial things at least such of them as are made up of distinct substances and in truth if we consider all these collective ideas aright as *my constellation* as they are united into so many single ideas they are but the artificial draughts of the mind bringing things very remote and independent on one another into one view the better to contemplate and discourse of them united into one conception and signified by one name For there are no things so remote nor so contrary which the mind cannot by the part of composition bring into one idea as is visible in that signified by the name *universe*

Chap. XXV Of Relation

1 Relations which Besides the ideas whether simple or complex that the mind has of things as they are in themselves there are others it gets from their comparison with another The understanding in the consideration of anything is not confined to that precise object it can carry an idea as it were beyond itself or at least look

beyond it, to see how it stands in conformity to
 2. the Will the mind so considers the
 that it does as it were bring it to and set it by an
 other and carries it out of its net the ther-
 out

man, red it something || man

as brought

2,
 me
 ed
 ch
 m
 du-
 h n

man. So likewise, when I see Caius a
 man, I have him but the bare consideration
 of a man who hath that white colour. But when
 I give Caius the name husband I think some-
 thing of the person and when I give him the name
 of a Latinus some other thing in both cases
 may thou be misled to some thing beyond Caius,
 and there are two things brought into considera-
 tion. And since any word, which the intellect com-
 plex, may be the occasion why the mind thus
 brings two things together and as it were takes a
 view of them, though still considered as
 distinct, therefore any word as may be the
 foundation of a relation. As the word man
 is used to denote the nature and essence of
 marriage with Sempronius is the occasion of the
 denomination and relation of husband and the
 word which the occasion which is as to be
 further than free-ness

It is for this reason without our let terms not
 only is heard. There are the like relations, ex-
 pressed by relation terms that have others an-
 swers them, with reciprocal intimation, as fa-
 ther and son, brother and brother, cause and effect,
 are reciprocal to every one, and everybody is
 first in respect to his relation. For father and
 son, husband and wife, and other correla-
 tive terms, are so as to belong one to another
 and therefore cannot be divided and divided and an-
 swer one another in people's memories, the po-
 tency of the names. If the mind, that thou has are
 present carried beyond the thing so named and
 nobody overlooks or doubts of relation where
 so plainly intimated. But where language ex-
 has failed to give correla-
 tive names, there the
 relation is always so as to take notice of.
 Consider it, doubt, language name, as well as
 if be in language where this and the like
 words have no correla-
 tive term, there people
 at no so as to take
 them to be so as want
 the end mark of relation which is between

correla-
 tive, which seems to explain one another
 and not to be able to exist, but together. Hence
 it is, that many of those names, which, duly co-
 sidered do not denote relations, have been

includes a relation

3. Some say, that the terms relation
 Another sort of relation terms there is, which are
 not looked on to be other relations or so much
 as rational denominations which, under the
 form and appearance of signifying something ab-
 solute in the subject, do conceal a latent, though
 less obvious relation. Thus the word perfect, which
 points to terms of old Greek perfect, &c. where
 I shall have occasion to speak more at large in
 the following chapters.

4. Relations derived from the things themselves. This
 further may be observed. That the word as (rela-
 tion) may be the same men who have far dis-
 ference as if the things that are related or that
 are thus compared, as those who have far dis-
 ference of man may yet agree the no-
 tion of father which is a superadded
 to the substance, or man, and refers to it
 in that thing called man whereby he is be-
 lieved to be the father of one (human kind), it
 may be what it will.

5. Consider the way of comparison. The nature therefore of relation
 consists in the referring or comparing two things
 one to another from which comparison one
 both comes to be denominated. And if the
 those things be moved, or cease to be the re-
 lation ceases, and the denomination con-
 sists in that the thing referred to in itself no al-
 teration. Thus Caius, whom I consider as
 father, ceases to be so to-morrow, only by the
 death of his son without an alteration made in
 himself. So barely by the mind than the
 object which it compares as the signifi-
 cation is capable of having contrary denomi-
 nations at the same time. Thus Caius, compared to
 several persons, may be truly be said to be older
 and younger to some and weaker &c.

6. Relations only between two things. Whatsoever
 does not or can exist, be considered as one thing
 is pointed out and so not only simple as and sub-
 jects but modes. The relation of beings
 though their parts of which they consist are very

often relative one to another but the whole together considered as one thing and producing in us the complex idea of one thing which idea is in our minds as one picture though an aggregate of divers parts and under one name it is a positive or absolute thing or idea Thus a triangle though the parts thereof compared one to another be relative yet the idea of the whole is a positive absolute idea The same may be said of a family a tune &c for there can be no relation but betwixt two things considered as two things There must always be in relation two ideas or things either in themselves really separate or considered as distinct and then a ground or occasion for their comparison

7 *All things capable of relation* Concerning relation in general these things may be considered

First That there is no one thing whether simple idea substance mode or relation or name

part of men's thoughts and words v.g. one single man may at once be concerned in and sustain all these following relations and many more viz father brother son grandfather grandson father in law son in law husband friend enemy subject general judge patron client professor European Englishman islander servant master possessor captain superior inferior bigger less older younger contemporary like unlike &c to an almost infinite number he being capable of as many relations as there can be occasions

from that comparison and sometimes give us even the relation itself a name

8 *Our ideas of relation so often clearer than of the subjects related* Secondly This further may be considered concerning relation that though it be not contained in the real existence of things but something extraneous and superinduced yet the ideas which relate words stand for are often clearer and more distinct than of those substances to which they do belong The notion we have of a father or brother is a great deal clearer and more distinct than that we have of a man or if you will *paternity* is a thing hereof it is easier to have a clear idea than of *humanity* and I can much easier conceive that a friend is than that God because the knowledge of one action or one simple idea is oftentimes sufficient to give me the notion of a relation but to the knowing of any

substantial being an accurate collection of sundry ideas is necessary A man if he compares two things together can hardly be supposed not to

more perfect and distinct in our minds than those of substances Because it is commonly hard to know all the simple ideas which are really in any substance but for the most part easy enough to know the simple ideas that make up any relation I think on or have a name for v.g. comparing two men

and those being all either simple or made up of simple ones it suffices for the knowing the precise

to Thus having the notion that one laid the egg out of which the other was hatched I have a clear idea of the relation of dam and chick between the two cassowaries in St James's Park though perhaps I have but a very obscure and imperfect idea of those birds themselves

Thirdly another and so a multitude of relations yet they all terminate in and are concerned about those simple ideas either of sensation or reflection which I think to be the whole materials of all our knowledge To clear this I shall show it in the most considerable relations that we have any notion of

past doubt that the notions we have of them are

than are supposed really to exist in that which such the words are applied are relative words v.g. a black man the giftful sister a good friend these and the like are all absolute because they neither signify nor intimate anything but what does or is supposed really to exist in the man thus denominated but whether the other as good as

the relation of that duration to some other and mean no more but this That the duration of her existence was equal to sixty nine and the duration of her government to forty five annual revolutions of the sun and so are all words answering *How Long* Again William the Conqueror invaded England about the year 1066 which means this That taking the duration from our Saviour's time till now for one entire great length of time it shows at what distance this invasion is from the two extremes and so do all words of time answering to the question *When* which show only the distance of any point of time from the period of a longer duration from which we measure and to which we thereby consider it as related

4 *Some ideas of time supposed positive and found to be relative* There are yet besides those other words of time that ordinarily are thought to stand for positive ideas which yet will when considered be found to be relative such as *young* &c. which include and intimate the relation anything has to a certain length of duration whereof we have the idea in our minds Thus having settled in our thoughts the idea of the ordinary duration of a man to be seventy years when we say a man is *young* we mean that his age is yet but a small part of that which usually men attain to and when we denominate him *old* we mean that his duration is run out almost to the end of that which men do not usually exceed And so it is but comparing the particular age or duration of this or that man to the idea of that duration which we have in our minds as ordinarily belonging to that sort of animals which is plain in the application of these names to other things for a man is called *young* at twenty years and very *young* at seven years old but yet a horse we call *old* at twenty and a dog at seven years because in each of these we compare their age to different ideas of duration which are settled in our minds as belonging to these several sorts of animals in the ordinary course of nature But the sun and stars though they have outlasted several generations of men we call not *old* because we do not know what period God hath set to that sort of beings This term belonging properly to those things which we can observe in the ordinary course of things by a natural decay to come

5 *Relations of place and extension* The relation also that things have to one another in their *Places* and distances is very obvious to observe as above below a mile distant from Charing cross in England and in London But as in duration so in extension and bulk there are some ideas that are relative which we signify by names that are thought positive as *great* and *little* are truly relations For here also having by observation settled in our minds the ideas of the bigness of several species of things from those we have been most accustomed to we make them as it were the standards whereby to denominate the bulk of others Thus we call a great apple such a one as is bigger than the ordinary sort of those we have been used to and a little horse such a one as comes not up to the size of that idea which we have in our minds to belong ordinarily to horses and that will be a great horse to a Welchman which is but a little one to a Fleming they two having from the different breed of their countries taken several sized ideas to which they compare and in relation to which they denominate their great and their little

6 *Absolute terms* *Men stand for relations* So likewise weak and strong are but relative denominations of power compared to some ideas we have at that time of greater or less power Thus when we say a weak man we mean one that has not so much strength or power to move as usually men have or usually those of his size have which is a comparing his strength to the idea we have of the usual strength of men or men of such a size The like when we say the creatures are all weak things for each there is but a relative term signifying the disproportion there is in the power of God and the creatures And so abundance of words in ordinary speech stand only for relations (and perhaps the greatest part) which at first sight seem to have no such signification e.g. the ship has necessary stores *Acres* and *stores* are both relative words one having a relation to the accomplishing the voyage intended and the other to future use All which relations however they are confined to and terminate in ideas derived from sensation or reflection is too obvious to need any explication

Chap. XXVII Of Identity and Diversity

h

do to a ruby or a diamond things whose usual periods we know not.

its If its length be the time and thereon form it

See Locke's Letters to M^{rs} Molyneux Aug 1693 and March 8 1695

ideas of *identity* and *diversity* When we see any thing to be in any place in a y instant time, we sur (he twat will) that it is that very thing and t an th r which at that sam time exists in an th r pla = how like and u disti gushabl soever it may be in all oth r respects and in this consists *identity* when th d as it is attributed: ary ot at all f m what they w re that mome t wherein we consider th = f mter existe ce and = which we compare the present. For we finding n reco ce ving i possible, that tw things f th same ki d should exist in th same place at th same tun we ghly con el d that, whatever exists anywh r at any time, excl d all of th same ki d a d u th r itself also: Wh ther for we demand wh th r a y th g be th same or = t ferial yet some thing that existed such time in such a place huch twas certain t that instant, was the same w th itself and no ther F m wh pce it fllows, that = things ca ths two beginn gs f e uence, tw things o begin g t being imposibl for tw th gs f th sam kind t be exist in th m t nt, in th ery sam pla d the same th g in d f f re t

places. That, ther f that had e beginning th sam thing and that wh ch had a d ffer t beginning in tun and place f m that, is not th same, but d erse Th t which has mad the difficulty bout this latio has be th little ear and the uon used in ha ring p ceise n t ns of th things t wh ch t is t r busted

2 *Identity f substance* Wha th deas but of three sorts f substances t *God*. 2 *Finite n-tell genus* 3 *Body*

First, *God* = w thout beginning ternal, un alt bl and r yw h and th f con cerning his d tuty th can be no d bt.

re d

exists.

Thirdly Th same will hold *f e v r y part d f matter* to which d d uon or subtr ti f matt be g m d t is the me f th gh these thr so = f substances, as w te m them, d t cl d an th ou f th sam place y tw can co ce but th t they must ces sarily ch f th m cl d any f th am ki d out f th sam pl or lse th t and names f d i y and d y would be ain, and th could be ch d uon t ns f sub-

stances, or anyth ng else o e from another * For example could two bod m be t the same place at the sam time th n those two parcels of mat ter must be one and the same tak them gre t or till may all bod es must be one a d the same For by the sam reason th t two particles of mat te may be n o e place all bod es may be n n pl ce wh h wh n t ca be supposed takes away th distincti n of de tity a d d ers ty of o e d more nd re ders it r d culous. B t t be g a contr d ction that two or more should be ne de tity a d d ers ty are r latus and ways f comp ring well founded a d of use to the u d rsta ding

Identity f modes and e l tions All oth th gs being but modes = elations lumately t r m nated n substances, th id tity a d d ers ty f each particular es, t ce of them too will be by th samew yd t ermined only as th ngs w lose exist nce is = succession such as are the ctions of fi t bei gs v g m i and th gh t both wh ch consist in co t ued train of succession co cerning ther d ers ty there can be no q es t = because ach perish g the mome t t be guns, they can t exist n d f f re t times, or d f f e nt places, a perma ent beings can t d f f e nt times exist d ustant pl ces a d therf = no motion or thought, consid ed as t d f f e nt times, can be th same, e ch part thereof ha g a d f f e nt begi ng f e lse ce.

3 *Principium Indivisibile* From what has been said t s easy to discover what is so much quired after the *principium indivisibile* d that, t is plain is exist ce itself which d t mines being f any sort to a particular time a d pl ce, commun cabl t tw beings of the s m ki d Thus, though t seems as to co ce n

mutabl p e fi s e ut g a d t muned tun d place t is evd t, that, considered n any insta t of t s exist ce t is that t a t th sam w th is l f Fo be g at that insta t what t a and thing is t i th same, a d so must continue as l g as = exist nce s co tun u d f l g t will be the sam and th In h k ma f tw mo e t ms be j d togeth to th sam mass, ry f those toms will be the same by th for = ing rule and whilst th y vst united t geth the mass, con t g f th m t ms, must be the sam

Cf Bk I ch. iii. §§ 4-5 on th origin f th dea f den ty

Cf h xxv also Bk IV chh ix, xi.

Cf ch xxv. §§ 9-2 as t Lock me g where h supposes p r t s be subject t la ions f place d p e ks f God tun present

mass or the same body let the parts be ever so

of living creatures their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles but on something else For in them the variation of great parcels of matter alters not the identity an oak growing from a plant to a great tree and then lopped is still the same oak and a colt grown up to a horse sometimes fat, sometimes lean ■ all the while the same horse though in both these cases there may be a manifest change of the parts so that truly they are not either of them the same masses of matter though they be truly one of them the same oak and the other the same horse The reason whereof ■ that, in these two cases—a mass of matter and a living body—identity is not applied to the same thing

4 *Identity of vegetables* We must therefore consider wherein an oak differs from a mass of matter and that seems to me ■ be in this that the one is only the cohesion of particles of matter any how united the other such a disposition of them as constitutes the parts of an oak and such an organization of those parts as is fit to receive and distribute nourishment so as to continue and frame the wood bark and leaves &c of an oak in which consists the vegetable life That being then one plant which has such an organization of parts in one coherent body partaking of one common life it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes of the same life though that life be communicated to new particles of matter vitally united to the living plant in a like continued organization conformable to that sort of plants For this organization being at any one instant in any one collection of matter is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other and ■ that in individual life which existing constantly from that

identity which makes the same plant and all the parts of it parts of the same plant during all the time that they exist united in that continued organization which ■ fit to convey that common life to all the parts so united

5 *Identity of anim* Is The case is not so much different in brutes but that any one may hence see what makes an animal and continues it the same Something we have like this in machines and may serve to illustrate it For example what is a watch? It is plain it is nothing but a fit organization or construction of parts to a certain end which when a sufficient force is added to it,

ished by a constant addition or separation of in sensible parts with one common life we should have something very much like the body of an animal with this difference That in an animal the fitness of the organization and the motion wherein life consists begin together the motion coming from within but in machines the force coming sensibly from without, ■ often as ay when the organ is in order and well fitted to receive ■

6 *The identity of man* This also shows wherein the identity of the same man consists viz in nothing but a participation of the same continued life by constantly fleeting particles of matter in succession vitally united to the same organized body He that shall place the identity of man in any thing else but like that of other animals in one fitly organized body taken in any one instant

make an embryo one of years mad and sober the same man by any supposition that will not make it possible for Seth Ismael Socrates Pilate St Austin and Cæsar Borgia to be the same man For if the identity of soul also ■ makes the same man and there be nothing in the nature of

ferent tempers may have been the same man which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration and are of opinion that the souls of men may for their miscarriages be detruded into the bodies of beasts as fit habitations with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations But yet I think nobody could be sure that the soul of Helioabalus were in one of his hogs would yet say that hog were a man or

is applied to such as ■ the same substance another the same man and a third the same person if person ■ and substance are three names standing for three different

ideas—for such as is the idea belonging to that name, such must be the notion which, if it had been laid more carefully attended to, would possibly have prevented great deal of that confusion which often occurs about this matter with so small seeming difficulties, especially concerning *person*. I did not which therefore we shall in the next place a little consider.

¶ *Man*. An animal is a living organized body: and consequently the same animal as we have observed is the same continued if communicated to different particles in manner as they happen successively to be united to that organized living body. And whatever is talked of their definitions, upon our observation puts it past doubt, that the idea in our minds, of which the sound man in our mouths is the sign is nothing else but an animal of such certain form. So I think I may be confident, that, whoever should see a creature of his own shape or make, though it had no more reason in it than a cat or a parrot, would call him still *man* or whoever should hear a cat parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but *cat* or *parrot* and say the one was dull irrational man and the other very intelligent rational parrot. A relation we have in an author I forget the name, is sufficient to countenance the supposition of a rational parrot.

His words are: I had mind to know from Prince Maurice's own mouth, the account of common but muchereded that I had heard so far in many there, a friend parrot had in Brazil during his government there, that he asked and answered common questions, like reasonable creature so that those of his train there generally concluded it be a chery or possess and faithful, and bolded gafferwards. He said would ever from that time dure parrot, but said they all had devil them. I had heard many particulars of this tried assured by people hard to be discredited which made me ask Prince Maurice what it was. I told him said with his usual plainness and dryness in talk, there was something true but great deal false what had been reported. I desired to know from him what there was first. He told me short and coldly that he had heard of such an old parrot when he had been in Brazil and though he believed nothing of it, and it was good why if yet he had so much curiosity as to end for that it was cry great and cry loud and when

it came first into the room where the prince was, with a great many Dutchmen about him, it said presently *What company fast men or her*. They asked it, what it thought that man was, pointing to the prince. It answered *Some General or so*. When they brought it close to him, he asked it, *Do you remember*. It answered *De Viceroy*. The Prince asked it *What*. The Parrot answered *vous garde, I peul*. The Parrot answered *Oa rous ty gar ten far*—and made the chuck four or five times that people use to make to chicks when they call them. I set down the words of this worthy dialogue in French, just as Prince Maurice said them to me. I asked him in what language the parrot spoke and he said in Brazilian. I asked whether he understood Brazilian he said No, but he had taken care to have two interpreters by him, the one a Dutchman that spoke B

and what may pass for good one for I dare say this Prince at last believed himself not all he told me having passed for very honest and pious man I leave it to naturalists to reason and to others to believe, as they please upon it however it is not, perhaps, much to relieve or enlarge a busy one sometimes with such digressions, whether to the purpose or no.

I have taken care that the reader should have the story told large in the thorough words, because he seems to me not to have thought it incredible for it cannot be imagined that so

as a man as he who had suffered enough to warrant all the testimonies he gave of himself should take so much pains, and play what he had thing to do, to put so close to only a man who mentions it as a history and but a Prince in whom he acknowledges every great honesty and piety story which, if he himself thought incredible he could not but also think ridiculous. The Prince is a plain who you hear this story and our author who relates it from him, both of them call this talk parrot and

The parrot was asked, Whence come ye. It

I ask any one else who thinks such a story fit to be told whether if this parrot and all of its kind had always talked as we have a prince's word for it this one did—whether I say they would not have passed for a race of *rational animals* but yet whether for all that, they would have been allowed to be men and not *parrots*? For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the *idea of a man* in most people's sense but of a body so and so shaped joined to it and if that be the idea of a man the same successive body not shifted all at once must as well as the same immaterial spirit go to the making of the same man

¶ *Personal identity* This being premised to find wherein personal identity consists we must consider what *person* stands for—which I think is a thinking intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself the same thinking thing in different times and places which it does only by that consciousness¹ which is inseparable from thinking and as it seems to me essential to it it being impossible for any one to perceive without *perceiving* that he does perceive. When we see hear smell taste feel meditate or will anything we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions and by this every one is to himself that which he calls *self*—it not being considered in this case whether the same *self* be continued in the same or divers substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls *self* and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things in this alone consists personal identity i.e. the sameness of a rational being and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought so far reaches the identity of that person it is the same *self* now it was then and it is by the same *self* with this present one that

reason to doubt of if these perceptions with their consciousness always remained present in the mind whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present and as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view but each the

best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another² and sometimes, and that the greater part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves being intent on our present thoughts and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts³—I say in all these cases our consciousness being interrupted and *we* lose the sight of our past selves doubts are raised whether

The question being what makes the same person and not whether it be the same identical substance which always thinks in the same person which in this case matters not at all different substances by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person as well as different bodies by the same *life* are united into one animal whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued *life*. For it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself personal identity depends on that only whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For as far as any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first and with the same consciousness it has of any present action so far it is the same personal *self*. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions that it is *self to itself* now and so will be the same *self* as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come and would be by distance of time or change of substance no more to a person than a man be to a man by wearing other clothes to-day than he did yesterday with a long or a short sleep between the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person whatever substances contributed to their production

¶ *P so l d e t y in change of subst nce* That this is so we have some kind of evidence in our very bodies all whose particles whilst vitally united to this same thinking conscious *self* so that *we* feel when they are touched and are affected

are to every one a part of himself he sympathizes and is concerned for them. Cut off a hand and thereby separate it from that consciousness he

Cf ch x § 9.

Cf ch x §§ 10-17

¹Cf. ch. 1. § § 10-19.

had of its heat, cold, and other affections, and it is then no looser part of that which is human, & more than the remotest part of matter. Thus, we see the nature whereof personal self consists, some time may be varied than other.

About the nature of personal identity there being no question about the same person, though the limbs which but now were a part of it, be cut off.

12. *Person* is the *first answer* But the question is, Whether if the same substance which thus be cut off, I can be the same person or retaining the same, I can be different persons.

And to this I answer First, This can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal construction, void of an immaterial substance. For whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance as animal identity is preserved in identity of life and of substance. And therefore those who place thought in an immaterial substance only before they can come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial beings, as well as animal identity is preserved in the change of material substances, or variety of particular bodies unless they

will say it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men which the Cartesians at least will not admit, for fear of making brutes thinking things too.

13. *Whether it is the same thinking substance that is the same person.* But next, as to the first part of the question, Whether if the same thinking substance (supposing immaterial substances only to think) be changed, I can be the same person. I answer this cannot be resolved but by those who know what kind of substances they are that do think, and whether the consciousness of past actions can be transferred from one thinking substance to another. I grant were the same consciousness the same individual creature could not, but it being present representation of past action, why may it not be possible that that may be represented to the mind so having been which really never was, will remain to be shown. And therefore how far the consciousness of past actions is annexed to any individual creature, so that another cannot possibly have it, will be hard for us to determine, till we know what kind of creature is this cannot be done without flexing of perception accompanying it, and how performed.

Of this more fully, &c.

by thinking substances, who cannot think without being conscious of it. But that which we call the same consciousness, not being the same individual act, why or how it reflects substance may not have represented it, as done by itself, what I never did and was perhaps done by some other agent—why I say so, for a representation may not possibly be without reality of matter off it, as well as several representations in dreams are which yet whilst dreaming we take for true—will be difficult to conclude from the nature of things. And that I never is so, will by us, till we have clearer views of the nature of the thinking substances be best resolved into the goodness of God who as far as the happiness or misery of an of his sensible creatures is concerned in it, will not, by fatal error of the spirit, transfer from one to another that consciousness which deserves reward or punishment with it. How far this may be an argument against those who would place thinking in a system of fictitious animal spirits, I leave to be considered. But yet, to return to the question before us, it must be allowed that, if the same consciousness (which has been shown, is quite different from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.

4. *Whether the same immaterial substance can say I have said two persons.* As to the second part of the question, Whether the same immaterial substance remaining there may be two distinct persons which question seems to me to be built on this,—Whether the same immaterial being being conscious of its own existence of its past duration, may be wholly stripped of all the consciousness of its past existence and lose it beyond the power of ever retrieval. I mean and so as I were begun a new person from a new period, having consciousness that could reach beyond this new state. All those who hold pre-existence are excluded of this mind since they allow the soul to have no remaining consciousness of what it did in that pre-existent state, their whole separated from body or informed another body and if they should not, it is plain experience would be against them. So the personal identity reaching no further than consciousness reaches, pre-existent spirit not having continued so many ages in state of silence, must needs make different persons. Suppose a Christian Platonist or Pythagorean should, upon God having ended all

his works of creation the seventh day, think his soul hath existed ever since and should imagine it has revolved in several human bodies as I once met with one who was persuaded his had been the *soul* of Socrates (how reasonably I will not dispute this I know that in the post he filled which was no inconsiderable one he passed for a very rational man and the press has shown that he wanted not parts or learning)—would any one say that he—being not conscious of any of Socrates's actions or thoughts—could be the same *person* with Socrates? Let any one reflect upon himself and conclude that he has in himself an immaterial spirit, which is that which thinks in him and in the constant change of his body keeps him the same and is that which he calls *himself* let him also suppose it to be the same soul that was in Nestor or Thersites at the siege of Troy (for souls being as far as we know anything of them in their nature indifferent to any parcel of matter the supposition has no apparent absurdity in it) which it may have been as well as it is now the soul of any other man but he now having no consciousness of any of the actions either of Nestor or Thersites does or can he conceive himself the same person with either of them? Can he be concerned in either of their actions? Attribute them to himself or think them his own more than the actions of any other men that ever existed? So that this consciousness not reaching to any of the actions of either of those men he is no more one *self* with either of them than if the soul or immaterial spirit that now informs him had been created and began to exist, when it began to inform his present body though it were

more make him the same person with Nestor than if some of the particles of matter that were once a part of Nestor were now a part of this man the same immaterial substance without the same consciousness no more making the same person by being united to any body than the same particle of matter without consciousness united to any body makes the same person But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Nestor he then finds himself the same person with Nestor

15 *The body as well as the soul goes to the making of a man* And thus may we be able without any difficulty to conceive the same person at the resurrection though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here—the same consciousness going along with the soul that

inhabits it. But yet the soul alone in the change of bodies would scarce to any one but to him that makes the soul the man be enough to make the same man For should the soul of a prince carrying with it the consciousness of the prince's past life enter and inform the body of a cobbler as soon as deserted by his own soul every one sees he could be the same person with the prince accountable only for the prince's actions but who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to the making the man and could I guess to everybody determine the man in this case wherein the soul with all its princely

of speaking the same person and the same man stand for one and the same thing And indeed every one will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit and change them as often as he pleases But yet, when we inquire what makes the same spirit man or person we must fix the ideas of spirit, man or person in our minds and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them it will not be hard to determine in either of them or the like when it is the same and when not

16 *Consciousness alone unites actions into the same person* But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone wherever it be and in whatsoever state make the same man yet it is plain consciousness as far as ever it can be extended—should it be to ages past—unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person as well as it does the instances and actions of the immediately preceding moment so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah's flood as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter or as that I write now I could no more doubt that I have

in what substance you please—than that I have written this am the same myself If now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance matter or immaterial or no) that I was yesterday For as to this point of being the same self it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances—I being as much concerned and as justly accountable for any action that is done a thousand years since as

¹Cf. Bk. IV ch. XVIII § 7

²Cf. § 6

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CHAP XXVII

is related to me now by this self-consciousness

that of the same consciousness Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person. And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never conscious of would be no more for thought, than to punish one twin for what his brother twin did whereof he knew in this because their souls were so like that they could not be distinguished for

concerned for as it tends. Thus every finger says that, whilst it may pretend that consciousness in the little finger is as much a part of himself as that is most so Upon separation of this little finger should this consciousness go along with the little finger

though I have now forgot them? I wish not to say that we must here take notice what the

each on part is separate from another but makes the same person, and constitutes this instances

as far as the consciousness reaches, and no further as very white reflects will perceive

yet is concerned in considering what becomes of any substance in being separated with that consciousness For as it is divided in the instance of the body with the consciousness essential to it with the little finger which was cut off it would be the same self which was connected with the whole body yesterday as making part of itself whose unity it cannot but admit as is now now Though if the same body should still be immediately from the separation of the little finger it has its own peculiar use as when the little finger knew things it would it could be concerned for it, as part of itself could own any of its things have any of them imputed to it him.

§ 9 Which has heretofore personal identity asserts This may show us where personal identity consists in the identity of substance but, as I have said in the identity of consciousness wherein if Socrates and the present may of Queen in borough were, they are the same person if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do it par

ted as if those who now are at least first used them, thought that since it was changed the self same person was not in that man
21 Difference between identity of man and of person
But it is hard to conceive that Socrates the same individual man should be two persons To help us here in this we must consider what is meant by Socrates or the individual man

First, it must be either the same individual immaterial thinking substance in itself, the same universal soul and nothing else.

Secondly either the same animal without any regard to an immaterial soul.

Thirdly the same immaterial spirit united to the same animal

Now take which of these suppositions you please it is impossible to make personal identity

For curious cases of identity and of alternation personal by James Psychology pp 244 ff

to consist in anything but consciousness or reach any further than that does

For by the first of them it must be allowed possible that a man born of different women and in distant times may be the same man. A way of speaking which whoever admits must allow it possible for the same man to be two distinct persons as any two that have lived in different ages without the knowledge of one another's thoughts

By the second and third Socrates, in this life and after it cannot be the same man any way but by the same consciousness and so making human identity to consist in the same thing wherein we place personal identity there will be no difficulty to allow the same man to be the same person. But then they who place human identity in consciousness only and not in something else must consider how they will make the infant Socrates the same man with Socrates after the resurrection. But whatsoever to some men makes a man and consequently the same individual man wherein perhaps few are agreed personal identity can by us be placed in nothing but consciousness (which is that alone which makes what we call *self*) without involving us in great absurdities

2 But is not a man drunk and sober the same person? why else is he punished for the fact he commits when drunk though he be never afterwards conscious of it? Just as much the same person as a man that walks and does other things in his sleep is the same person and is answerable for any mischief he shall do in it. Human laws punish both with a justice suitable to their way of knowledge—because in these cases they cannot distinguish certainly what is real what counterfeit and so the ignorance in drunkenness or sleep is not admitted as a plea. For though punishment be annexed to personality and per-

stance there is however framed without consciousness there is no person and a carcass may be a person as well as any sort of substance be so without consciousness

Could we suppose two distinct incommunicable consciousnesses acting the same body the one constantly by day the other by night and on the other side the same consciousness acting by intervals in two distinct bodies I ask in the first case whether the day and the night—man could not be two as distinct persons as Socrates and Plato? And whether in the second case there would not be one person in two distinct bodies, as much as one man is the same in two distinct clothings? Nor is it at all material to say that this same and thus distinct consciousness in the cases above mentioned is owing to the same and distinct immaterial substances, bringing it with them to those bodies which whether true or no alters not the case since it is evident the personal identity could equally be determined by the consciousness whether that consciousness were annexed to some individual immaterial substance or no. For granting that the thinking

consciousness and be restored to it again as appears in the forgetfulness men often have of their past actions and the mind many times recovers the memory of a past consciousness which it had lost for twenty years together. Make these intervals of memory and forgetfulness to take their turns regularly by day and night, and you have two persons with the same immaterial spirit as much as in the former instance two persons with the same body. So that self is not determined by identity or diversity of substance which it cannot be sure of but only by identity of consciousness

4. Not the substance with which the consciousness may be united. Indeed it may conceive the substance whereof it is now made up to have existed formerly united in the same conscious being but consciousness removed that substance is no

it may be reasonable to think that he who is made to answer for what he knows nothing of but shall receive his doom his conscience accusing or excusing him

3 Consciousness alone unites remote existences into

heat or cold or other affections have no longer any consciousness it is no more of a man's self than any other matter of the universe. In like

¹ Cf. Locke letters to M. Lyneux Jan. 19 1694 and May 26 1694.

part of its existence which I cannot upon recollection

in with the present thinking being a part of that which is united to

has thought of which I can
and by my consciousness make my own thought
and then, twill in me be the first which
er a part of me thought of did it, that if it had
been thought of or done by any other immaterial
being anywhere existing.

25. Consciousness not subsistent in temporal or sp
tial with the same personalty I agree the im
probable opinion is, that this consciousness is an
extended and affected individual immaterial
material substance.

But I am disposed to think that they
potheses, resolve that as they please. Thus every
intelligent being sensible of happiness or misery
must grant—that there is some thing that is him
self that is concerned for and would be
happy, that this self has existed in continued
duration more than one instant, and therefore
it is possible may exist, as it has done, more than
one year together without any certain bounds
to be set to its duration and may be the same
self, by the same consciousness continued on for
the future. And thus, by this consciousness he
finds himself to be the same of which did such
and such an action some years since, by which
he comes to be happy or miserable now. I allow
which cannot find the same numerical sub
stance is not considered as making the same self
but the same continued consciousness in which sev
eral substances may have been united and again

then a different

— But as I take it

tends to it by up
past only by consciousness—whereby it be
comes of account to own a different

things I can conceive of proper to that
present self by consciousness it can be more
concerned in this if they had never been done
and therefore please or pain, reward or
punishment, on the account of any such action
is all east be made happy or miserable. I
first being without any effect at all. For sup
posing unpunished on for what he had done
— it would be made to be

apostle thus, that each of us today who never
shall receive concerning his doings the
secrets shall be laid open. The sen
tence shall be justified by the consciousness all
persons shall have, that they themselves in what
bodies so they appear or what substances
soever that consciousness directs it are the same
that committed those actions, and deserve that
punishment for them.

7 Suppose one that looketh on as pardonable

selfes but parted from the self on
by which the consciousness is communicated,
that which moment was part of the self,
is now no more so than part of another man.
If it is part of me and is impossible but
in little time may become a part of another
person. And so we have the same immaterial sub
stance become part of two different persons
and the same person preserved without change
of various instances. Could we suppose any
person wholly tripped fall in memory or con
sciousness of past actions, as we find our minds
always are of great part of ours, and sometimes
of them all the memory or separation of such
personal sensation would make a great
personal difference any more than that of any par
ticle of matter. Any substance vitally united

they are such as pardonable things
and we are in the nature of that thinking thing
that is us, and which we look on as our
Did we know what it was, or how it was tied to
certain part of fleeting immaterial parts
which it could or could not perform in pe

CL. 19.

CL. 3. 18.

CL. PL. IV. ch. 12.

tions of thinking and memory out of a body or organized as ours is and whether it has pleased God that no one such spirit shall ever be united to any but one such body upon the right constitution of whose organs its memory should depend we might see the absurdity of some of those suppositions I have made. But taking as we ordinarily now do (in the dark concerning these matters) the soul of a man for an immaterial substance independent from matter and indifferent alike to it all there can from the nature of things be no absurdity at all to suppose that the same soul may at different times be united to different bodies and with them make up for that time one man as well as we suppose a part of a sheep's body yesterday should be a part of a man's body to-morrow and in that union make a vital part of Melibœus himself as well as it did of his ram.

28 *The difficulty from ill use of names* To conclude Whatever substance begins to exist it must during its existence necessarily be the same whatever compositions of substances begin to exist during the union of those substances the concrete must be the same whatsoever mode begins to exist, during its existence it is the same and so if the composition be of distinct substances and different modes the same rule holds. Whereby it will appear that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter rather rises from the names ill used than from any ob-

of anything into the same and divers will easily be conceived and there can arise no doubt about it.

¶ *Consequence of that which we have made to be our complex idea of man makes the same man* For supposing a rational spirit be the idea of a man it is easy to know what is the same man viz the same spirit—whether separate or in a body—will be the same man. Supposing a rational spirit vitally united to a body of a certain conformation of parts to make a man whilst that rational spirit, with that vital conformation of parts though continued in a fleeting successive body remains it will be the same man. But if to any one the idea of a man be but the vital union of parts in a certain shape as long as that vital union and shape remain in a concrete no otherwise the same but by a continued succession of fleeting particles it will be the same man. For whatever be the composition whereof the complex idea is made when ever existence makes it one particular thing under any denomination the same existence continued

preserves it the same individual under the same denomination.

Chap XXVIII Of Other Relations

1 *Ideas of proportional relations* Besides the before mentioned occasions of time place and causality of comparing or referring things one to another there are as I have said infinite others, some whereof I shall mention.

First The first I shall name is some one simple idea which being capable of parts or de-

more &c. These relations depending on the equality and excess of the same simple idea in several subjects may be called if one is proportional and that these are only conversant about those simple ideas received from sensation or reflection is so evident that nothing need be said to evince it.

2 *Natural relation* Secondly Another occasion of comparing things together or considering one thing so as to include in that consideration some other thing is the circumstances of their origin or beginning which being not afterwards to be altered make the relations depending thereon as lasting as the subjects to which they belong v.g. father and son brothers, cousins, Germans &c. which have their relations by one community of blood wherein they partake in several degrees countrymen i.e. those who were born in the same country or tract of ground and these I call natural relations wherein we may observe that mankind have fitted their notions and words to the use of common life and not to the truth and extent of things. For it is certain that in reality the relation is the same betwixt the begetter and the begotten in the several races of other animals as well as men but yet it is seldom said this bull is the grandfather of such a calf or that two pigeons are cousins Germans. It is very convenient that, by distinct names these relations should be observed and marked out in mankind there being occasion

obligations of several duties amongst men i.e. as in brutes men having very little or no cause to mind these relations they have not thought fit to give them distinct and peculiar names. Thus by the way may we see some light into the different state and growth of languages which being suited only to the convenience of communi-

Of Bk. IV ch. ix.

cation, are proportioned to the nature of men have, and the commerce of thoughts familiar amongst them, and not to the rationality or extent of things, nor to the various respects might be found among them: no the different abstract considerations might be framed about them. Where they had no philosophical notions, there they had no terms to express them, and it is no wonder therefore should have framed no name for those things they found occasion to discourse of. From whence it is easy to imagine why, as in some countries, they may have not so much as the name for horse, and in others, where they are more careful of the pedigrees of their horses, than of their own, that there they may have not only names for particular horses, but also of their several relations of kindred to another.

3. *Idea of natural or voluntary law.* Thirdly. Sometimes the foundation of considering things, with reference to one another is some act whereby any one comes by a moral right, power or obligation to do something. Thus, a general is one that hath power to command an army, and an army under a general is a collection of armed men, obliged to obey one man. A citizen, or burgher is one who has a right to certain privileges in this or that place. All this sort depending upon men's wills, or agreement in society I call natural or voluntary, and may be distinguished from the natural, in that they are most infirm of them, some way or other alterable and separable from the persons to whom they have sometimes belonged though either of the substances, so related be destroyed. Now though these are all accidental, as well as the first, and contain in them a reference of two things to a third yet, because of the two things often wants relation to a third import that reference men usually take notice of, and the relation is commonly overlooked. A patron and client are easily allowed to be relations, but constableness, dictatorship is not so readily the first hearing considered as such. Because there is no peculiar name for those who are under the command of a dictator or constable, expressing relation to either of them though it be certain that both of them have a certain power or some others, and so is so far related to them, as well as a patron is to his client, or general to his army.

4. *Idea of moral law.* Fourthly. This is another sort of relation, which is the conformity or disagreement in voluntary actions has to a rule to which they are referred and by which they are judged of which, I think, may be called moral law, as being that which determines

our moral actions, and deserves well to be examined the being no part of knowledge where

various cases, and in various instances, they are framed to distinct considerations, are as has been shown so many modes a great part whereof have names annexed to them. Thus, supposing gratitude to be a readiness to acknowledge and return kindness received polygamy to be the having more wives than one at once when we frame these notions thus in our minds, we have there so many de-

what name belonging to such and such considerations. And as we have a further and greater concernment, and that is, to know whether such actions, so made up are morally good or bad.

5. *Moral good and evil.* Good and evil as hath been shown, (Bk. II chap. xx. § 2 and chap. xxi. § 3) are nothing but pleasure or pain, or that which occasions or procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good and evil therefore is only the formality or disagreement of our voluntary actions as to some law: what by good or evil is drawn on us from

6. *Moral rules.* Of these moral rules or laws, to which men generally refer and by which they judge of the rectitude or propriety of their actions, there seem to me to be three sorts with their three different enforcements, or rewards and punishments. For since it would be utterly vain to suppose a rule set to the free actions of men without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will, we must, whenever we suppose a law suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law. It would be in vain for one intelligent being to set a rule to the actions of another if he had not in his power to reward the compliance with and punish deviation from his rule, by some good and evil that is not in the natural order and consequence of the action itself. For that, being a natural consequence or inconsequence, would pervert itself without a law. Thus, if I mistake not, is the true nature of all law properly so called.

7. *Law.* The laws that men generally refer their actions to to judge of their rectitude or

obliquity seem to me to be these three — 1 The *divine law* 2 The *civil law* 3 The *law of opinion or reputation* if I may so call it By the relation they bear to the first of these men judge whether their actions are *sins or duties* by the second whether they be criminal or innocent and by the third whether they be virtues or vices

8 *Divine law the measure of sin and duty* First, the *divine law* whereby that law which God has set to the actions of men — whether promulgated to them by the light of nature or the voice of revelation That God has given a rule whereby men should govern themselves I think there is nobody so brutish as to deny He has a right to do it we are his creatures he has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is best and he has power to enforce it by rewards and punishments of infinite weight and duration in another life for nobody can take us out of his hands This is the only true touchstone of moral rectitude and by comparing them to this law it is that men judge of the most considerable moral good or evil of their actions that is whether as duties or sins they are like to procure them happiness or misery from the hands of the ALMIGHTY

9 *Civil law the measure of crimes and innocence* Secondly the *civil law* — the rule set by the commonwealth to the actions of those who belong to it — is another rule to which men refer their actions to judge whether they be criminal or no This law nobody overlooks the rewards and punishments that enforce it being ready at hand and suitable to the power that makes it which is the force of the Commonwealth engaged to protect the lives liberties and possessions of those who live according to its laws and has power to take away life liberty or goods from him who does obeys which is the punishment of offences committed against his law

10 *Philosophical law the measure of virtue and vice* Thirdly the *law of opinion or reputation* Virtue and vice are names pretended and supposed every where to stand for actions in their own nature right and wrong and as far as they really are so applied they so far are coincident with the divine law above mentioned But yet what ever is pretended this is visible that these names virtue and vice in the particular instances of their application through the several nations and societies of men in the world are constantly attributed only to such actions as in each country and society are in reputation or discredit. Nor is it to be thought strange that men cry here should give the name of virtue to those

actions which amongst them are judged praise worthy and call that vice which they account blamable since otherwise they could condemn themselves if they should think anything right to which they allowed not commendation anything wrong which they let pass without blame Thus the measure of what is every where called and esteemed virtue and vice is this approbation or dislike praise or blame which by a secret and tacit consent establishes itself in the several societies tribes and clubs of men in the world whereby several actions come to find credit or disgrace amongst them according to the judgment maxims or fashion of that place For though men uniting into politic societies have resigned up to the public the disposing of all their force so that they cannot employ it against any fellow citizens any further than the law of the country directs yet they retain still the power of thinking well or ill approving or disapproving of the actions of those whom they live amongst and converse with and by this approbation and dislike they establish amongst themselves what they will call virtue and vice

11 *The measure that men commonly apply to determine what they call virtue and vice* That this is the common measure of virtue and vice will appear to any one who considers that though that passes for vice in one country which is counted a virtue or at least not vice in another yet everywhere virtue and praise vice and blame go together Virtue is every where that which is thought praiseworthy and nothing else but that which has the allowance of public esteem is called virtue³ Virtue and praise are so united that they are called often by the same name *Sunt sua præmia laud* says Virgil⁴ and so Cicero *Nihil habet natura præstantius quam hoc est inquam laudem quam dignitatem quam decus* which he tells you are all names for the same thing This is the language of the heathen philosophers who well understood wherein their notions of virtue and vice consisted And though perhaps by the different temper education fashion or interest of different sorts of men it fell out that what was thought praiseworthy in one place escaped not censure in another and so in different societies virtues and vices were changed yet as to the main they for the most part kept the same every where For since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one

Cf Lock II to Tyrrell Aug 4 690

³ See Epist to the Reader where he refers to the criticisms of M Lowd

Cf Virgil *Aeneid* l. 461

fools his advantage and to blame and discom-

law of God hath established there be... in th
not so direct and visible sources and ad-
vances the general good of mankind in this world
as obedience to the laws he has set them, and
nothing that breeds such mischiefs and con-
fusion, as the neglect of them. And therefore men,
without renouncing all sense and reason, and
their own interest, which they are so constantly
true to, could not errably mistake, in placing
their commendation and blame on that side
that really deserved it not. Yet even those men
whose practice was otherwise failed not to give
their approbation right, few being so pra-ised to
that degree as not to condemn, at least in others,
the faults they themselves were guilty of where-
by even in the corruption of manners, the true
boundaries of the law of nature which ought to
be the rule of virtue and vice, were pretty well
preferred. So that even the exhortations of im-
pious teachers, have not failed to appeal to
common reputation. Whatsoever is lovely whatso-
ever is of good report, if there be any virtue, if
there be any praise &c. (Phil. 4. 8.)

2. *Let virtue is commendation and disgrace.*
If any one shall imagine that I have forgot my
own notion of law when I make the law
whereby men judge of virtue and vice to be
nothing else but the consent of private men, who
have not authority enough to make laws espe-
cially wanting that which is so necessary and
essential to law power to enforce it I think
I may say that he who imagines commendation
and disgrace not to be strong motives to men to
accommodate themselves to the opinions and
fashions of the world is mistaken.

is of God, or the magistra. The penalties
that attend the breach of God's laws some, may
perhaps most men, seldom seriously reflect on
and amongst those that do, many whilst they
break the law entertain thoughts of future retri-
bution, and make their peace for such
breaches. And as to the punishments due from
the law of the commonwealth, they frequently
flatter themselves with the hopes of impunity.
But no man escapes the punishment of their
censure and disgrace who offends against the

fashion and opinion of the company he keeps,
and would recommend himself to. Nor is there
one of ten thousand, who is stiff and insensible
enough, to bear up under the constant dislike
and condemnation of his own club. He must be
of strange and unusual constitution, who can
content himself to live constant disgrace and
disrepute with his own particular society. Sol-
tudo many men have sought, and been recon-
ciled to but nobody that has the least reason
or sense of mankind about him, can live in society
under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his
familiar, and those he converses with. This is a
burden too heavy for human sufferance and he
must be made up of unconciliable contradic-
tions, who can take pleasure in company and
yet be insensible of contempt and disgrace from
his companions.

3. *That there are three rules of moral good and
evil.* These three then, first, the law of God
secondly the law of polite societies thirdly the
law of fashion, or private censure are those to
which men variously compare their actions and
it is by their conformity to one of these laws that
they take their measures, when they would
judge of their moral rectitude, and denominate
their actions good or bad.

4. *Whether it be the nature of voluntary actions to
take rules.* Whether the rule, to which, as to a
touchstone, we bring our voluntary actions, to
examine them by, and try their goodness, and
accordingly to name them, which is, as it were,
the mark of the value we set upon them, whether
I say we take that rule from the fashion of the
country or the will of a law make the mind
is easily able to observe the relation and choice
to.

formity or not conformity of any action to that
rule and there are is of an called moral recti-
tude. This rule being nothing but collection of
several simple ideas, the conformity the eto is
but so ordering the action, that the simple ideas
belonging to it may correspond to those which
the law requires. And thus we see how moral
beings and notions are founded on, and termi-
nated in, these simple ideas we have receiv-
ed from sensation or reflection. For example let us
consider the complex idea we signify by the
word murder and when we have taken it asun-
der and examined all the particulars, we shall
find it made up of several collection of simple
ideas derived from reflection or sensation, viz.
First, from reflection on the operations of our own
Cl. Bk. I. ch. ii. § 5.

motion Secondly from *sensation* we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man and of some action whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word *murder* This collection of simple ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame I call the action virtuous or vicious if I have the will of a supreme invisible Lawgiver for my rule then as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God I call it good or evil sin or duty and if I compare it to the civil law the rule made by the legislative power of the country I call it lawful or unlawful a crime or no crime So that whence soever we take the rule of moral actions or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices they consist only and are made up of collections of simple ideas which we originally received from sense or reflection and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law

15 *Moral actions may be regarded either absolutely or as ideas of relation* To conceive rightly of moral actions we must take notice of them under this two fold consideration First as they are in themselves each made up of such a collection of simple ideas Thus drunkenness or lying signifies such or such a collection of simple ideas which I call

this respect they are *relative* it being their conformity to or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular good or bad and so as far as they are compared with a rule and thereupon denominated they come under relation Thus the challenging and fighting with a man as it is a certain positive mode

God will deserve the name of *sin* to the law of fashion in some countries valour and virtue and to the municipal laws of some governments a capital crime In this case when the positive mode has one name and another name as it stands in relation to the law the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances where

one name *v.g. man* is used to signify the thing another *v.g. father* to signify the relation

16 *The denominations of actions often mislead us* But because very frequently the positive idea of the action and its moral relation are comprehended together under one name and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action and its moral rectitude or obliquity therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action and the reference it has to a rule By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds and are forward to take names for things are often misled in their judgment of actions Thus the taking from another what is his without his knowledge or allowance is properly called *stealing* but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action and to denote its contrariety to the law men are

though it be properly denominated stealing the name of such a mixed mode yet when compared to the law of God and considered in it

considerable here mentioned And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law which therefore I call *moral relations*

It would make a volume to go over all sorts of relations it is not therefore to be expected that I should here mention them all It suffices to our present purpose to show by these what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive consideration called *relation* Which is so various and the occasions of it so many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules or under just heads Those I have mentioned I think are some of the most considerable and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations and wherein they are founded But before I quit this argument from what has been said give me leave to observe

18 *All relations terminate in simple ideas* First That it is evident that all relation terminates in and is ultimately founded on those simple ideas we have got from sensation or reflection so that all we have in our thoughts ourselves (if we think of any thing or have any meaning) or would say

and to others. When we use word standing for relations, is nothing but some simple ideas, or collections of simple ideas, compared new with another. This is so manifest in that sort called proper names that nothing can be more. For when a

father and thereby became his mother and that afterward in the same manner should proceed. Cause out of the parsley-bed I had as clear notion of the relation of brothers between them, as if I had all the skill as mudwif between them.

all the rest; though where they are compounded, or de-compounded, the simple ideas they are made up of, are, perhaps, seldom taken notice of. When the word father is mentioned first, there is meant that particular species, or collection of simple ideas, signified by the word man secondly those possible simple ideas, signified by the word generation and, thirdly the effects of it, and all the simple ideas signified by the word child. So the word friend, being taken for a man who loves and is ready to do good to another has all these following ideas to the making of it up first, all the simple ideas, comprehended in the word man, or intelligent being secondly the idea of love thirdly the idea of readiness or disposition fourthly the idea of action, which is any kind of motion fifthly the idea of good, which signifies anything that may advance his happiness, and terminates it last, I examined, in particular simple ideas, of which the word good in general signifies any one but, if removed from all simple ideas quite, it signifies nothing at all. And thus also all moral words terminate last, though perhaps more remotely in a collection of simple ideas the immediate signification of relative words, being very of their supposed known relations which, if traced one in another shall end in simple ideas.

eg. I have ordinarily as clear notion of the relation, as if the simple idea in which it is founded. Second. That in relations, we have for the most part, if not always, as clear notion of the relation as we have of the simple ideas where it is founded. Agreement or disagreement, whereon relation depends, being things whereof we have commonly as clear ideas as fancy the whatsoever it be; but the distinguishing simple ideas, or their degrees one from another without which we could have no distinct knowledge at all. For if I have a clear idea of sweetness, light, or extension, I have, too, of equal, or more or less, of each of these if I know what it is for one man to be born of a woman. 22. Sempronia I know what it is for a man to be born of the same woman Sempronia and so have as clear a notion of brothers as of births, and perhaps clearer. For if I believed that Sempronia digged Titus out of the parsley-bed, (as they used to tell chil-

I grounded the relation and that they should be that circumstance of birth, I might be what I will. The comparing them then in the descent from the same person, without knowing the particular circumstances of that descent, is enough to found in notion of the having or not having the re-

lative terms than those of substances yet the names belonging to relation are often of as doubtful and uncertain signification as those of substances or mixed modes and much more than those of simple ideas. Because relative words, being the marks of this comparison, which is made only by mens thoughts, and is an idea only

respond with those of others using the same name.

no. The notion of relation is like one which is the rule every action is compared to be true or false. Thirdly That in these I call relative notions I have a true notion of relation, by comparing the notion with the rule, whether the rule be true or false. For if I measure anything by a yard, I know whether the thing I measure be longer or shorter than that supposed yard though perhaps the yard I measure by be not exactly the standard which indeed is another inquiry. For though the rule be erroneous, and I mistaken in it yet the agreement or disagreement observable in that which I compare with the rule makes me perceive the relation. Though, measuring by a wrong rule I shall thereby be brought to judge amiss of its moral rectitude because I have tried it by that which is not the true rule yet I am not mistaken in the relation which that notion bears to that rule. I compare it to which is agreement or disagreement.

Chap XXX Of Clear and Obscure
Distinct and Confused Ideas

minds we have the ideas of willing considering purposing beforehand malice or wishing ill to another and also of life or perception and self motion Secondly from *sensation* we have the collection of those simple sensible ideas which are to be found in a man and of some action whereby we put an end to perception and motion in the man all which simple ideas are comprehended in the word murder This collection of simple ideas being found by me to agree or disagree with the esteem of the country I have been bred in and to be held by most men there worthy praise or blame I call the action virtuous or vicious if I have the will of a *supreme* invisible Lawgiver for my rule then as I supposed the action commanded or forbidden by God I call it good or evil sin or duty and if I compare it to the civil law the rule made by the legislative power of the country I call it lawful or unlawful a crime or no crime So that whence soever we take the rule of moral actions or by what standard soever we frame in our minds the ideas of virtues or vices they consist only and are made up of collections of simple ideas which we originally received from sense or reflection and their rectitude or obliquity consists in the agreement or disagreement with those patterns prescribed by some law

15 *Moral actions may be regarded either absolutely or as ideas of relation* To conceive rightly of moral actions we must take notice of them under this two fold consideration First as they are in them

mixed modes and in this sense they are as much

as ideas of the

thus respect they are *relative* it being their conformity to or disagreement with some rule that makes them to be regular or irregular good or

— — — — —

fashion in some countries valour and virtue and to the municipal laws of some governments a capital crime In this case when the positive mode has one name and another name as it stands in relation to the law the distinction may as easily be observed as it is in substances where

one name
another

16

But because very frequently the positive idea of the action and its moral relation are comprehended together under one name and the same word made use of to express both the mode or action and its moral rectitude or obliquity therefore the relation itself is less taken notice of and there is often no distinction made between the positive idea of the action and the reference it has to a rule By which confusion of these two distinct considerations under one term those who yield too easily to the impressions of sounds and are forward to take names for things are often misled in their judgment of actions Thus the taking from another what is his without his knowledge or allowance is properly called *steal* in, but that name being commonly understood to signify also the moral pravity of the action and to denote its contrariety to the law men are apt to condemn whatever they hear called steal

— — — — —

though it be properly denominated stealing the name of such a mixed mode yet when compared to the law of God and considered in its

17 *Relations innumerable and only the most considerable here mentioned* And thus much for the relation of human actions to a law which therefore I call *moral relations*

It would make a volume to go over all sorts of relations it is not therefore to be expected that I should here mention them all It suffices in our present purpose to show by these what the ideas are we have of this comprehensive consideration called *relation* Which is so various and the occasions of it so many (as many as there can be of comparing things one to another) that it is not very easy to reduce it to rules or under just heads Those I have mentioned I think are some of the most considerable and such as may serve to let us see from whence we get our ideas of relations and wherein they are founded But before I quit this argument from what has been said give me leave to observe

— — — — — First

all we have in our thoughts ourselves (if we are of any thing or have any meaning) or could say

plex and observed how the complex ones are divided into those of modes substances and relations—all which I think is necessary to be done by any one who would acquaint himself thoroughly with the progress of the mind in its apprehension and knowledge of things—it will perhaps be thought I have dwelt long enough upon the examination of *ideas* I must nevertheless crave leave to offer some few other considerations concerning them

The first is that some are *clear* and others *obscure* some *distinct* and others *confused*¹

2 *Clear and obscure explained by sight* The perception of the mind being most aptly explained by words relating to the sight we shall best understand what is meant by *clear* and *obscure* in our ideas by reflecting on what we call clear and obscure in the objects of sight Light being that which discovers to us visible objects we give the name of *obscure* to that which is not placed in a light sufficient to discover minutely to us the figure and colours which are observable in it and which in a better light would be discernible In like manner our simple ideas are *clear* when they are such as the objects themselves from whence they were taken did or might in a well ordered sensation or perception present them Whilst the memory retains them thus and can produce them to the mind whenever it has occasion to consider them they are clear ideas So far as they either want anything of the original exactness or have lost any of their first freshness and are as it were faded or tarnished by time so far are they obscure Complex ideas as they are made up of simple ones so they are clear when the ideas that go to their composition are clear and the number and order of those simple ideas that are the ingredients of any complex one is determinate and certain

3 *Causes of obscurity* The causes of obscurity in simple ideas seem to be either dull organs or very slight and transient impressions made by the objects or else a weakness in the memory not able to retain them as received For to return again to visible objects to help us to apprehend this matter If the organs or faculties of perception like wax over hardened with cold will not receive the impression of the seal from the usual impulse wont to imprint it or like wax of a temper too soft will not hold it well when well imprinted or else supposing the wax of a temper fit but the seal not applied with a sufficient force to make a clear impression² in

any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure This I suppose needs no application to make it plainer

4 *Distinct and confused what* As a clear idea is that whereof the mind has such a full and evident perception as it does receive from an outward object operating duly on a well disposed organ so a *distinct* idea is that wherein the mind perceives a difference from all other and a *confused* idea is such an one as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it ought to be different.

5 *Objection* If no idea be confused but such as is not sufficiently distinguishable from another from which it should be different it will be hard may any one say to find anywhere a *confused* idea For let any idea be as it will it can be no other but such as the mind perceives it to be and that very perception sufficiently distinguishes it from all other ideas which cannot be otherwise different without being perceived to be so No idea therefore can be undistinguishable from another from which it ought to be different, unless you would have it different from itself for from all other it is evidently different.

6 *Confusion of ideas is in reference to their names* To remove this difficulty and to help us to conceive aright what it is that makes the confusion ideas are at any time chargeable with we must consider that things ranked under distinct names are supposed different enough to be distinguished that so each sort by its peculiar name may be marked and disengaged apart upon any occasion and there is nothing more evident than that the greatest part of different names are supposed to stand for different things Now every idea a man has being visibly that it is and distinct from all other ideas but itself that which makes it confused when it is such that it may as well be called by another name as that which it is expressed by the difference which keeps the things (to be ranked under those two different names) distinct and makes some of them belong rather to the one and some of them to the other of those names being left out and so the distinction which was intended to be kept up by those

Complex Ideas made up of several simple ones First when any complex idea (for it is complex ideas that are most liable to confusion) is made up of too small a number of simple ideas and such only as are common to other things whereby the differences that make it deserve a different

¹ On the Terms clear and distinct of Epistle to the Reader
Cf. Plato *Theaetetus*

sure, we are apt to use it for that confused part, and draw deductions from it in the obscure part of signification, as confidently as we do from the other.

5. *Instance eternity* Having frequently in our mouths the name Eternity we are apt to think we have positive comprehension of the idea of it, which is as much as to say that the idea is no part of confused

when we talk of division of bodies: if from our idea of the distinct bulk, which is the subject and foundation of division, comes, after a little progression, to be confounded and almost lost in obscurity. For that idea which is to represent only bigness must be very obscure and confused which we cannot distinguish from one ten times as big but only by number so that we have clear distinct ideas, we may say of ten and on but no distinct ideas of two such extensions. It is plain from hence, that, when we talk of infinite divisibility of body or extension, our distinct and clear ideas are only of numbers but the clear distinct ideas of extension after some progress of division, are quite lost and such minute parts we have no distinct ideas of but it returns, as all our ideas of infinite do, at last to that of number always to be added but thereby never amounts to any distinct idea of actual parts. We have it is true a clear idea of division, as often as we think of it but thereby we have no more a clear idea of infinite parts in matter than we have a clear idea of an infinite number by being able

any duration: it is the same as if we said that the idea of duration is not clear and that part of his idea, which is still beyond the bounds of that large duration he represents to his own thoughts, is very obscure and undetermined. And hence it is that in disputes and reasonings concerning eternity or any other infinite, we are very apt to blunder and in our own selves in manifest absurdities.

senses and therefore, when we talk of the divisibility of matter in infinitum, though we have clear ideas of division and divisibility and have also clear ideas of parts made out of whole by division yet we have but very obscure and confused ideas of corpuscles, or minute bodies, so to be divided when, by former divisions, they are reduced to smallness much exceeding the per-

added (where consists the y and n) obscure, imperfect, and confused idea from or about which we can argue or reason with no certainty or clearness, no more than we can in arithmetic, about a number of which we have such distinct ideas as we have of 4 or 100 but only this relative obscure one, that compared to any other is still bigger and we have no more a clear positive idea of it, when we say or conceive it is bigger or more than 400,000,000, than if we should say it is bigger than 40 or 4,000,000,000 having no nearer a proportion to the end of division or number than 4. For he that

the smallest atom of dust he ever saw he has any distinct idea (having still the number which concerns not extension) between the 100,000,000 and the 1,000,000,000 part of it. Or if he think he can refine his ideas to that degree, without losing sight of them, let him add ten cyphers to each of those numbers. Such a degree of smallness is not unreasonable as he supposed since a division carried on so far brings it no nearer the end of infinite division, than the first division is to two halves does. I must confess, for my part, I have no clear distinct ideas of the different bulk or extension of those bodies, having but very obscure one of either of them. So that, I think,

eternity is that has an idea but is plain, has as much positive complete idea of eternity as he that has of 400,000,000 of years for what remains of eternity beyond these two numbers of years, is as clear to the one as the other. Hence neither of them has any clear positive idea of it at all. For he that adds only 4 years to 4, and so on, shall as soon reach eternity as he that adds 400,000,000 of years, and so on

tinct from all ideas belonging to other names even those that approach nearest to it and there by all confusion with them is avoided

11 *Confusion concerns always two ideas* Confusion making it a difficulty to separate two things that should be separated concerns always two ideas and those most which most approach one another Whenever therefore we suspect any idea to be confused we must examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot easily be separated from and that will always be found an idea belonging to another name and so should be a different thing from which yet it is not sufficiently distinct being either the same with it or making a part of it, or at least as properly called by that name as the other it is ranked under and so keeps not that difference from that other idea which the different names import.

12 *Causes of confused ideas* This I think is the confusion proper to ideas which still carries with it a secret reference to names At least if there be any other confusion of ideas this is that which most of all disorders men's thoughts and discourses ideas as ranked under names being those that for the most part men reason of within themselves and always those which they commune about with other And therefore where there are supposed to be different ideas marked by two different names which are not as distinguishable as the sounds that stand for them there never fails to be confusion and where any ideas are distinct as the ideas of those two sounds they are marked by there can be between them no confusion The way to prevent it is to collect and unite into one complex idea as precisely as is possible all those ingredients whereby it is differentiated from others and to them so united in a determinate number and order apply steadily the same name But this neither accommodating men's ease or vanity nor serving any design but that of naked truth which is not always the thing aimed at such exactness is rather to be wished than hoped for And since the loose application of names to undetermined variable and almost no ideas serves both to cover our own ignorance as well as to perplex and confound others which goes for learning and superiority in knowledge it is no wonder that most men should use it themselves whilst they complain of it in others Though I think no small part of the confusion to be found in the notions of men might by care and ingenuity be avoided

retain the very same precise combination of simple ideas under one name much less are we able constantly to divine for what precise complex idea such a name stands in another man's use of it. From the first of these follows confusion in a man's own reasonings and opinions within himself from the latter frequent confusion in discoursing and arguing with others But having more at large treated of Words their defects, and abuses in the following Book I shall here say no more of it

13 *Complex ideas may be distinct in one part and confused in another* Our complex ideas being made up of collections and so variety of simple ones, may accordingly be very clear and distinct in one part, and very obscure and confused in another In a man who speaks of a *chilae-dron* or a body of a thousand sides the ideas of the figure may be very confused though that of the number be very distinct so that he being able to discourse and demonstrate concerning that part of his complex idea which depends upon the number of thousand he is apt to think he has a distinct idea of a *chilae-dron* though it be plain he has no precise idea of its figure so as to distinguish it by that from one that has but 999 sides the not observing whereof causes no small error in men's thoughts and confusion in their discourses

take another parcel of the same uniform mat-

terial make it another by the number of sides and reason and argue distinctly about them whilst he keeps his thoughts and reasoning to that part only of these ideas which is contained in their numbers as that the sides of the one could be divided into two equal numbers and of the others not &c. But when he goes about to distinguish them by their figure he will there be presently at a loss and not be able I think to frame in his mind two ideas one of them distinct from the other by the bare figure of these two pieces of gold as he could if the same parcels of gold were made one into a cube the other a figure of five sides In which incomplete ideas we are very apt to impose on ourselves and tangle with others especially where they have particular and familiar names For being satisfied in that part of the ideas which we have clear and the name which is familiar to us, being applied to the whole containing that part also which is imperfect and ob-

to be done and to exert it readily in mixed
good, or complex ideas of all those which are
good. But to be undisturbed in doing without
using one reason or inducement is what is also
possible to be and so is as real an idea as the
other. Through the first I know, having the name
only, that to me in respect of that name
be right or wrong idea, but the other would
be a just common perception of a fact known
himself-assured to it, is not capable of being
falsely being made with no reference to an
thing but itself.

5. *Concerning the nature of ideas*—I have
seen that the nature of them is that they are
complex ideas of nature, but that all of them in
reference to things exist without us, and con-
sidered to be in the mind of the senses as they
real are, are no further real than as they are
such combinations of simple ideas as are really
mixed, and coherent in the mind of us. On the
contrary, those are false ideas which are made
up of such combinations of simple ideas as were
real, but mixed, never were found together in
any substance. A rational creature, consider-
ing of brass lead joined to body of human
shape, or such as the nature are described or
brill yellow very common, flesh and fixed,
but like the common water or an animal,
incorruptible body conceived as to sense all of
such parts, with perception and voluntary mo-
tion joined to it. I never such a creature as
these can possibly exist or no. I am prob-
ably do not know but be that as will, these ideas
of substances being made coherent to no
pattern existing in the world, and coherence
of such conceptions. I ideas as no substance ever
showed as mixed together they ought to pass
with us for barely imaginable but much more
are those complex ideas so which contain in
them a necessary error or contradiction of their
parts.

Chap. XXX Of Animals and the Nature of Ideas

Animals are not as perfect as men
are. Of our real ideas some are adequate
and some are inadequate. Those I call adequate
which perfectly represent those archetypes which
the mind supposes them taken from, which I
mean to be the mind of God and to which
them. Inadequate ideas are such, which are but
partial or imperfect representation of those
archetypes to which they are referred. Upon
which account it is plain,

Some ideas are adequate. First, that all our
simple ideas are adequate. Because being nothing,

but the effects of certain powers in nature, fixed
and ordained by God to produce such sensations
in us, they cannot but be conveyed in and ad-
equately to those powers. And we are sure they
agree to the reason of nature. For if sense pro-
duced ideas in the places which we call with reason and
sweetness, we are sure there is a power in nature
to produce those ideas in our minds, or be they
could not have been produced by it. And so each
sensation answers the power that causes it on
all of our senses the ideas so produced are real
ideas. (And not a fiction of the mind, which has
no power to produce an adequate idea) and can-
not but be adequate, since for every such an-
swer that power and all other ideas are ad-
equately. It is true the mind produces its own
simple ideas are but few of them demonstrated
by us as if they were real, the cause of them be-
ing as if those ideas were real beings in nature. For
though fire be caused by the touch, where
by is increased the power of feeling in us the
idea of pain, yet it is demonstrated also light and
heat, as if light and heat were really something in
the fire more than power to excite those ideas
in us and therefore are called qualities in or of
the fire. But these being no more in truth, but
powers to excite such ideas in us, I must in that
sense be understood, when I speak of secondary
qualities as being in nature or of their ideas as
being the objects that excite them in us. Such
ways of speaking, though accommodated to the
natural notions, is a sort which one cannot be
well understood, yet truly satisfy people. But
those powers which are in nature to excite cer-
tain sensations or ideas in us. Since were there
no organs to receive the impressions fire makes
on the touch and touch, nor mind joined to
those organs to receive the ideas of light and heat
by those impressions from the fire or sun, there
would yet be no more light or heat in the world
than there would be pain if there were no sensi-
ble creature to feel. Though the sun should con-
tinue just as it is now, and Mount Atlas flame
it, yet there would be no light and extension,
and the termination of it, fire which motion
and rest whereof we have the ideas, would be
real in the world as they are, whether there
were any sensible beings to perceive them or not
and therefore we have reason to look on those as
the real modifications of matter and such as are
the external causes of all our various sensations
from bodies. But being an inquiry not be-
longing to this place, I will enter no further in-
to it, but proceed to show what complex ideas
are adequate and what not.

or if he please doubles the increase as often as he will the remaining abyss being still as far beyond the end of all these progressions as it is from the length of a day or an hour For nothing finite bears any proportion to infinite and therefore our ideas which are all finite cannot bear any Thus it is also in our idea of extension when we increase it by addition as well as when we diminish it by division and would enlarge our thoughts to infinite space After a few doublings of those ideas of extension which are the largest we are accustomed to have we lose the clear distinct idea of that space it becomes a confusedly great one with a surplus of still greater about which when we would argue or reason we shall always find ourselves at a loss confused ideas in our arguings and deductions from that part of them which is confused always leading us into confusion

Chap XXX Of Real and Fantastical Ideas

I Ideas considered in reference to their archetypes
Besides what we have already mentioned concerning ideas other considerations belong to them in reference to *things from whence they are taken or which they may be supposed to represent* and thus I think they may come under a three fold distinction and are —

First either real or fantastical

Secondly adequate or inadequate

Thirdly true or false

I

such as have no foundation in nature nor have any conformity with that reality of being to which they are tacitly referred as to their archetypes If we examine the several sorts of ideas before mentioned we shall find that,

the images or representations of what does exist the contrary whereof in all but the primary qualities of bodies hath been already shown But, though whiteness and coldness are no more in snow than pain is yet those ideas of whiteness and coldness pain &c being in us the effects of powers in things without us ordained by our Maker to produce in us such sensations they are real ideas in us whereby we distinguish the qualities that are really in things themselves For these several appearances being designed to be

the mark whereby we are to know and distinguish things which we have to do with our ideas do as well serve us to that purpose and are as real distinguishing characters whether they be only constant effects or else exact resemblances of something in the things themselves the reality lying in that steady correspondence they have with the distinct constitutions of real beings But whether they answer to those constitutions as to causes or patterns it matters not it suffices that they are constantly produced by them. And thus our simple ideas are all real and true because they answer and agree to those powers of things which produce them in our minds that being all that is requisite to make them real and not fictions at pleasure For in simple ideas (as has been shown) the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to itself no simple idea more than what it has received

3 Complex ideas are voluntary combinations
of

united under one general name it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty in forming those complex ideas however it comes it to pass that one man's idea of gold or justice is different from another's but because he has put in or left out of his some simple idea which the other has not? The question then is Which of these are real and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things and what not? And to this I say that,

the minds of men there is nothing more requisite to this kind of ideas to make them real but that they be so framed that there be a possibility of existing conformable to them These ideas themselves being archetypes cannot differ from their archetypes and so cannot be chimerical unless any one will jumble together in them inconsistent ideas Indeed as any of them have the names

man could give the name of justice to that which common use calls liberality But this fantasticalness relates more to propriety of speech than realty of ideas For a man to be undisturbed in danger sedately to consider what is fittest

as to their substance. These men (scattered
 and have been kept up in the learning taught
 in this part of the word) do suppose certain
 remote essences of substances, which each in-
 dividual in a several kind is made com-
 mune to, and parcels of, as is fit from nature
 and the will be the better stranger if any con-
 sider it otherwise. And thus they ordinarily
 apply the remote essences but such particular
 substances made to us as distinguished by
 such remote real essences. Who is there amongst
 who would say that I am not if I should be
 divided whether he could know it, or not, as
 if it were matter that is true, the real es-
 sence of a man. And yet if you demand what
 these real essences are it is plain you are not
 told, and know them not. From whence it flows,
 that we shall not have in them, much less
 referred to real essences, as to substances which
 are unknown, may be so far from being
 clear, that they shall be removed to be a
 representation of them all. The common ideas
 of the remote essences are a little been shown
 certain essences or essences that have been
 claimed or supposed constantly to exist together
 but still, common ideas cannot be the real
 essence of any substance for then the properties
 we discover in the body would depend on that
 essence itself, and be deducible from it, and
 therefore necessary which it be known as
 all properties of matter depend on, and as
 far as they are discoverable are deducible from
 the common idea of the body including space.
 It is plain too in our common ideas of sub-
 stances are not contained such ideas, on which
 all the other qualities that are to be found in
 them depend. The common ideas men have
 of men is, body of certain colors, weight, and
 actions, and properties that they look on as
 belonging to it in nature. It is not the
 essence, as no necessary connection with that
 essence itself, or a part of it, and there is no
 connection with the substance depends
 on the colors, weight, and actions, and the
 essence of the world depends on no such
 one. And yet, when we know nothing of the
 real essence, there is nothing more ordinary
 than to consider matter the source of all
 such essences. The particular parcel of mat-
 ter which makes us men I have an idea of, and
 it is really by our own regard to the real
 essence whereby it is first, and from whence
 our qualities flow which I find in it, and so
 we are not at all, but by the bare
 notions and ideas of matter upon a slight

touch of essence &c. This essence, from which
 all these properties flow when I inquire into it
 and search a, or b, I perceive I cannot
 discover the furthest I can go is, not to pre-
 sent the thing being nothing but body, a real
 essence or an eternal extension, on which these
 qualities depend, can be nothing but the mat-
 ter, and continuance of a solid parts of matter
 of which he has a distinct perception. I call
 this I have a notion of essence, which is the
 cause that this last particular substance re-
 ceives a greater weight than a body I know of
 the same bulk, and a stress to have it con-
 sidered by the touch of quicksilver. If any one
 will say that the real essence and the eternal
 extension, on which these properties depend, is
 not the figure, size, and arrangement or con-
 tinuance of a solid parts, but something else,
 called a particular form, I am further from ha-
 ving any idea of a real essence than I was before.
 For I have an idea of figure, size, and continuance
 of solid parts in general, though I have none of
 the particular figure, size, or parts together
 of parts, whereby the qualities we mentioned
 are produced, which qualities I find in that par-
 ticular parcel of matter that is on the floor and
 not in another parcel of matter, as in which I
 cut the pen I write with. But when I am told
 that essence, besides the figure, size, and pos-
 ture of the solid parts of that body, is an essence,
 something called a natural form of the body, I con-
 fess I have no idea of it, but only of the solid
 form, which is far enough from an idea of a
 real essence or continuation. The like ignorance
 as I have of the real essence of the particular
 substance, I have also of the real essence of all
 other natural essences of which essences I confess
 I have no distinct ideas at all. And I am not to
 suppose others, when they examine their own
 knowledge, will find in themselves, in that con-
 point, the same sort of ignorance.

Before we have at a mind given to us
 shows how then, when men come to the par-
 ticular parcel of matter on the floor a general
 notion already in use and determined upon
 they not ordinary, or are they no, understood
 to give it the name, as belonging to particu-
 lars of bodies, the real natural essence
 by nature of which essence this particular sub-
 stance comes to be of that essence, and to be
 called by that name. If it be so, as is plain it
 is, the name by which things are marked as
 having the essence must be referred prior
 to that essence, and consequently the idea to
 which that name is given must be referred also
 to the essence, and be intended to represent it.

3 *Modes are not adequate* Secondly our complex ideas of modes being voluntary collections of simple ideas which the mind puts together without reference to any real archetypes or standing patterns existing anywhere are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Because they not being intended for copies of things really existing but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by cannot want anything they having each of them that combination of ideas and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they should so that the mind acquiesces in them and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure with three sides meeting at three angles I have a complete idea wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the mind is satisfied with the perfection of this its idea is plain in that it does not conceive that any understanding hath or can have a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it signifies by the word triangle supposing it to exist than itself has in that complex idea of three sides and three angles in which is contained all that is or can be essential to it or necessary to complete it wherever or how ever it exists. But in our ideas of substances it is otherwise. For there desiring to copy things as they really do exist and to represent to ourselves that constitution on which all their properties depend

adequate But it is not

at first put together the idea of danger perceived absence of disorder from fear sedate consideration of what was justly to be done and executing that without disturbance or being deterred by the danger of it had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination and intending it to be nothing else but what is nor to have in it any other simple ideas but what it hath it could not also but be an adequate idea and laying this up in his memory with the name courage annexed to it to signify to others and denominate from thence any action he should observe to agree with it had thereby a standard to measure and denominate actions by as they agreed to it. This idea thus made and laid up for a pattern must necessarily be adequate being referred to nothing else but itself nor made by any other original but the good liking and will of him that first made this combination

4 *Modes in reference to settled names may be in*

adequate Indeed another coming after and in conversation learning from him the word

idea in thinking should be conformable to the other's idea as the name he uses in speaking is conformable in sound to his from whom he learned it his idea may be very wrong and inadequate because in this case making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking as the other man's word or sound is the pattern of his in speaking his idea is so far defective and inadequate as it is distant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to and intends to express and signify by the name he uses for it which name he would have to be a sign of the other man's idea (to which in its proper use it is primarily annexed) and of his own as agreeing to it to which if his own does not exactly correspond it is faulty and inadequate

5 *Because then meant in propriety of speech to correspond to the ideas in some other mind* Therefore these complex ideas of modes which they are referred by the mind and intended to correspond to the ideas in the mind of some other intelligent being expressed by the names we apply to them they may be very deficient, wrong and inadequate because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern in which respect only any idea of modes can be wrong imperfect or inadequate. And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other but this refers more to proper speaking than knowing right.

6 *Ideas of substances as referred to real essences not adequate* Thirdly what ideas we have of substances I have above shown. Now those ideas have in the mind a double reference. 1. Some times they are referred to a supposed real essence of each species of things. 2. Sometimes they are only designed to be pictures and representations of those that do exist by

originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate

First it is usual for men to make the names of substances stand for things as supposed to have certain real essences whereby they are of this or that species and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds they must constantly refer their ideas to such real essences

Ch. xxiii.

as to the archetype. That man (especially such as has been bred in the learned gentleman) in this part of the world does suppose certain specific substances which each man does deal in to be rational kinds is made conformable to and partakes of so far from needing proof that it will be thought strange for a young man should do otherwise. And though they do apply the specific name to the particular substances under the things as distinguished by such specific real essences. What is that almost he would take to amaze the scholar be doubted whether he called himself a man with any other meaning than as having the real essence of a man. And yet for you do mind what those real essences are to place man against, and know them to be from his intellect. That the deal as they have their minds being referred to real essences, as to archetypes which are unknown must be far from being adequate to that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of the material. The model deal as has substance as has been shown certain conclusions implied as that he be in observed or supposed constantly to exist.

But such a completion cannot be the use of any substance for the theperveries of the body would depend on that completion, and be deduced from it, and the necessary connection with the known as all pertains to the general dependence as far as they are discovered by the deal from the completion of the intellect. But it is plain that in our complex deal substances are related to the deal as of the deal all the qualities that are to be found in them depend. The common deal men have for us, body of certain colour weight, hardness and property that they look as belonging to it, is made by us. But yet the property has necessary connection with that complex deal, or any part of it and there is no more cause to think that the deal depends on that colour weight hardness than the deal colour the weight depends on the smallness. And yet, though we know that these are the real essences.

to the of mercury &c. The essence from which all these properties flow. In the quality to it does search after it I plainly perceive I cannot discover the furthest I can go in the presumption that, the being nothing but body its essence is of the rational constitution which these qualities depend on can be thought but the figure is the deal of the solid parts of the matter of which the general distinct perception of all can have the dependence of the essence which is the cause that the particular shining flows from the general light than anything glow of the same body deal a fitness to the colour changed by the touch of the qualities. If a young man will say that there is essence and rational constitution which these properties depend on the figure is a disarrangement or connection of its solid parts, but some things are

the particular figure is the proportion of parts, which by the qualities above mentioned are produced which quality I find: the particular conclusion from the

term which far enough from man depends

as now then, which man applies to the particular parcel of matter my finger general matter already used deal matter the deal

as the deal is given must be referred also to that essence and be intended to present the

that
ter
for many most men supposed to have real essence, he by this gold and from whence those qualities flow which I find in it, is its peculiar weight hardness flexibility fixedness, and hanging from four points light

Which essence since they who so use the names know not their ideas of substances must be all inadequate in that respect as not containing in them that real essence which the mind intends they should

8 *Ideas of substances when regarded as collections of their qualities are all inadequate* Secondly those who neglecting that useless supposition of unknown real essences whereby they are distinguished endeavour to copy the substances that exist in the world by putting together the ideas of those sensible qualities which are found co-existing in them though they come much nearer a likeness of them than those who imagine they know not what real specific essences yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of those substances they would thus copy into their minds nor do those copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes Because those qualities and powers of substances whereof we make their complex ideas are so many and various that no man's complex idea contains them all That our complex ideas of substances do not contain in them the simple ideas that are united in the things themselves is evident in that men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance all the simple ideas they do know to exist in it Because endeavouring to make the signification of their names as clear and as little cumbersome as they can they make their specific ideas of the sorts of substance for the most part of a few of those simple ideas which are to be found in them but these having no original precedency or right to be put in and make the specific idea more than others that are left out it is plain that both these ways our ideas of substances are deficient and inadequate The simple ideas whereof we make our complex ones of substances are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of some sorts) powers which being relations to other substances we can never be sure that we know all the powers that are in any one body till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to or receive from other substances in their several ways of application which being impossible to be

those never went into his idea of that species of body but its peculiar colour perhaps, and weight were the first he abstracted from it, we make the complex idea of that species Which both are but powers the one to affect our eyes after such a manner and to produce in us that idea we call yellow, and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk they being put into a pair of equal scales one against another Another perhaps added to these the ideas of fusibility and fixedness two other passive powers in relation to the operation of fire upon it another its ductility and solubility in equal measures to other powers relating to the operation of other bodies in changing its outward figure or separation of it into insensible parts These or parts of these put together usually make the complex idea in men's minds of that sort of body we call gold

10 *Substances have innumerable powers united in our complex ideas of them* But no one who hath considered the properties of bodies in general or this sort in particular can doubt that this called gold has infinite other properties not contained in that complex idea Some who have examined this species more accurately could I believe enumerate ten times as many properties in gold all of them as inseparable from it as

there could be an hundred times as many ideas go to the complex idea of gold as any one man yet has in his and yet perhaps that not be the thousandth part of what is to be discovered in it The changes that that one body is apt to receive and make in other bodies upon a due application exceeding far not only what we know but what we are apt to imagine Which will not appear so much a paradox to any one who will but consider how far men are yet from knowing all the properties of that one no very compound figure a triangle though it be no small number that are already by mathematicians discovered of it

11 *Ideas of substances being grossly by collections of qualities are all defective* So that all our complex ideas of substances are imperfect and inadequate Which could be so also in mathematics

properties

9 *Their powers usually make up our complex ideas of substances* Whosoever first lighted on a parcel

real essence or internal constitution therefore

imperfect could our ideas be of an ellipsis, if we had no other idea of it but some few of its properties? Whereas having in our plan an idea the which is essence of that figure we from thence see

cover those properties, and demonstrate how they flow and are inseparable from it.

12 Sem. d. as *extrema*, and *adequate*. Thus the mind has three sorts of basic ideas: nominalistic con-

First, ~~impl~~ ideas, which are ~~form~~ or cop es but yet certainly dequ te. Because he g in t ded t xpress n thing but the power in thinst prod ce in th mind such sensati that sensati n wh t is p oced cann t but be th effect f that power. So th ■ per I writ th power in th light (I speak e

th power to prod ce any
and being me t f thing else but th ffect
I such powe that simpl d is real and
deq t th sensation f what in my mind
bein th ffect f that powe which is in th
p pe t prod ce t, is perfectly dequat t
tha power or lse that powe would produce
diff tid a.

3 I as I sub tunc ar i rura, id ad quas
Secondly th compl d as i rura ar ec
types, cop es too but i perfect ones, tad
quat which is ry d t to th mind in that
plainly perce es, that what collectu n f
impl d as i makes of any substance that ex
ists, cann t be sure that i vactly answers all
tha are in that substance Since, i having
tr ed all th pera ns f all oth substances
po t, and found all th alt t us i would
rece e from, or cause in, ther substances, i
cannot ha e an xact dequ i collectu fall
u u e and pass cap cities and so tha e
an dequat complex des fth powers of any
substance using nd is elat ns which is
tha sort f compl dea of substances we h e.
And as all f we would ha and ctually
h d our complex rd an xact collectu f
all the secondary quali es pow rs f any sub
ta ec n should t yet th by ha an d
fth me ftha thing for since th powers

nd / ions ar or ginals, and arch types are
a t p es, nor mad afi th p ttern f any
real vut nec to which the mind intends them
t be conformable and exactly t answer There
be g such collect ns of simple deas that the
mind telf puts togeth t d such collect ns
th t e ch of them contains in t p etically all th
th m d at ds that t should they ar arch
types and esse ces of modes that may exist nd
so a d signed only so and belong only to such
modes as, wh n th y do ex t, ha t an exact
conf mty w th thos complex d as The deas,
th refore of modes and relations cannot but be
adequate.

Chap XXXII Of True and False Ideas

hour yet ideas of it are true or
false (as what words are there that are not used
with great latitude and with some d

th reason f that den minati n. t uul u 43,
 hem thing but bare pparanc t o percep-
 -
 d mpt

true or false.

2 Ideas and words may b said t b tru nasmuch as they ally w t eand. I Ind ed both deas and words may be said to be true in a m ta phy cal sense f th word truth as ll oth things that anyw y xstar said t be tru i.e.

tak n tice f

3 A ad as pp orange the m nd either true
or fal B t is no in that m taphys cal sense

+ Ideas of mod and 11 as arct types and
mod to ad just Thirdly complete ideas I made

minds, being only so many perceptions or appearances that exist in the material world of a creature having no more falsehood in them

it appears in our minds than the name centaur has falsehood in it when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation mental or verbal our ideas are not capable any of them of being false till the mind passes some judgment on them that is affirms or denies something of them

4 *Ideas referred to anything extraneous to them may be true or false* Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them they are then capable to be called true or false Because the mind in such a reference makes a

denominated The most usual cases wherein this happens are these following

5 *Other men's ideas real existence and supposed real essences are what men usually refer their ideas to* First when the mind supposes any idea it has so conformable to that in other men's minds called by the same common name v.g. when the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice temperance religion to be the same with what other men give those names to

Secondly when the mind supposes any idea it has in itself to be conformable to some real existence Thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur supposed to be the ideas of real substances are the one true and the other false the one having a conformity to what has really existed the other not

Thirdly when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution and essence of anything whereon all its properties depend and thus the greatest part if not all our ideas of substances are false

6 *The cause of such reference* These suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas But yet if we will examine it we shall find it is chiefly if not only concerning its abstract complex ideas For the natural tendency

shortens its way to knowledge and make each perception more comprehensive the first thing it does as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge either by contemplation of the things themselves that it could know or conference with others about them is to bind them into bundles and rank them so into sorts that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort

and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great business knowledge Thus as I have else here shown is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas with names annexed to them into genera and species into kinds and sorts

7 *Names of things supposed to carry them knowledge of their essences* If therefore we will only attend to the motions of the mind and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge we shall I think find that the mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse the first thing it does is to abstract it and then get a name to it and so lay it up in its storehouse the memory as containing the essence of a sort of things of which that name is all ways to be the mark Hence it is that we may often observe that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not he presently asks what it is meaning by that inquiry nothing but the name As if the name carried with it the knowledge of the species or the essence of it whereof it is indeed used as the mark and is generally supposed annexed to it

8 *How men suppose that their ideas must correspond to things and to the customary meanings of names* But this abstract idea being something in the mind between the thing that exists and the name that is given to it it is in our ideas that both the rightness of our knowledge and the propriety and intelligibility of our speaking consists And hence it is that men are so forward to suppose that the abstract ideas they have in their minds are such as agree to the things existing without them to which they are referred and are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of that language belong For without this double conformity of their ideas they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves and talk of them unintelligibly to others

9 *Simple ideas may be false in reference to others of the same name but are least liable to be so* First then I say that when the truth of our ideas is judged of by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have and commonly signify by the same name they may be any of them false But yet simple ideas are least of all

their several names that are in common use stand for they being but few in number and such as if he doubts or mistakes in he may easily

Cf Bk III li 150 Bk IV ch xvii. § 8

ily rectify by th objects they are to be found in. Therefore tis said in that any man takes in his names f imple deas or applies th nam red t th idea gree o th name sweet t th id bitter much less are m n pt to confound th names f id as bel oning to different senses, and call colour by th name f taste &c. Whereby tis evident that the imple d as they call by any name are commonl th same that others ha and mean hen they use th same

ing th truth and falsehood f our deas, in reference t th ir names.

stances.

f mixed mode much more than unan stances because in substances (especially those which th commo and unborrowed names of any language are applied to) some remarkable sens b qualities, serving ordinarily t distinguish one sort from anothe easily preserve those wh tak y care in th use f their words, from applying them to sorts f substances to which they d t all bel g ll t in mixed modes e are much more uncertain t being n t so

pppearances as ar produced in us, and must be suitable t those powers he has placed external objects lse they could n t be produced in us a d thus answering those powers, they are

God in his wisdom ha n set them as marks f distincti n in things, whereby we may be able t discern thm from another and so choose any f them for our uses as we ha e occas on t alters not th n ture f our simple d a, wheth r we think that th d a f blue be: the let t

we express by th word just may perhaps be that which ou hit to ha e an ther nam

i Or at least t b thou ht false But wh ther or no our deas f mixed modes are more liable than an sort to be diff m t from those f ther men, which are marked by the same names, thus t least is ertain, That this sort f falsehood is much mor familiarly tributed to our id as of mixed modes than t any ther Wh n man is thought to ha e false d f justice or gratitude glory t is for no th ason, but that his gree not w th the d as which each f those names are th gns f in ther m n.

And by Th reason whereof seems to me be us That the abstract deas f mixed modes, be g r voluntary combinati ns f such a precise collection of impl ideas, and so th essence f ch species being mad by men al ne, whereof e ha e no ther sens bl standard existing anywhere but th name itself, th d f inution f that name we ha ing nothing lse t

f these our ideas f mixed modes to, as standard to which we would conform them, but th id as f those who are thought t use those names in their most proper significati ns, and so as our ideas conform or differ from them they pass for tru or false. And thus in ch concern

bject, by regular and constant peration produced the same d of bl e in us, t serves us to distinguish, by ur eyes, that f m any ther
is equally from that ppearance to be d m-
inated bl e, wh the t be that real colour or
nly peculiar texture in t, that causes us
that dea ince the name blue n tes p ope ly
n thing but that mark of distun ti n that is in a
rol t, discernible only by our eyes, whatever t
consists in that being beyond our cap ciues dis-
tinctly t know and perhaps would be f less
use to us, if we had f culties to discern.

5. Though our own ide f bl should b d ffer
and f om another? Ne ther would t carry any im-
putati f falsehood t our simple d as, if by
th different structur f our organs t were so
ordered, that if same object should produce
erall men's minds d fferent ideas at the same time

it appears in our minds than the name centaur has falsehood in it when it is pronounced by our mouths or written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation mental or verbal our ideas are not capable any of them of being false till the mind passes some judgment on them that affirms or denies something of them.

4 *Ideas referred to anything extraneous to them may be true or false.* Whenever the mind refers any of its ideas to anything extraneous to them they are then capable to be called true or false. Because the mind in such a reference makes a tacit supposition of their conformity to that thing which supposition as it happens to be true or false so the ideas themselves come to be denominated. The most usual cases wherein this happens are these following.

5 *Other men's ideas real existence and supposed real essences are what men usually refer their ideas to.* First when the mind supposes any idea it has conformable to that in other men's minds called by the same common name. v.g. when the mind intends or judges its ideas of justice temperance religion to be the same with what other men give those names to.

Secondly when the mind supposes any idea it has in itself to be conformable to some real existence. Thus the two ideas of a man and a centaur supposed to be the ideas of real substances are the one true and the other false the one having a conformity to what has really existed the other not.

Thirdly when the mind refers any of its ideas to that real constitution and essence of anything whereon all its properties depend and thus the greatest part if not all our ideas of substances are false.

6 *The cause of such reference.* These suppositions the mind is very apt tacitly to make concerning its own ideas. But yet if we will examine it we shall find it is chiefly if not only concerning its

and so advance by larger steps in that which is its great business knowledge. This as I have else here shown is the reason why we collect things under comprehensive ideas with names annexed to them into genera and species into kinds and sorts.

7 *Names of things supposed to carry in them knowledge of their essences.* If therefore we will only attend to the motions of the mind and observe what course it usually takes in its way to knowledge we shall I think find that the mind having got an idea which it thinks it may have use of either in contemplation or discourse the first thing it does is to abstract it and then get a name to it and so lay it up in its storehouse the memory containing the essence of a sort of things of which that name always to be the mark. Hence it is that we may often observe that when any one sees a new thing of a kind that he knows not, he presently asks what it is

deed used as the mark and is generally supposed annexed to it.

8 *How men suppose that their ideas must correspond to things and to the customary meanings of names.* But this abstract idea being something in the mind between the thing that exists and the name that is given to it it is in our ideas that

the minds are such as agree to the things existing without them to which they are referred and are the same also to which the names they give them do by the use and propriety of that language belong. For without this double conformity of their ideas they find they should both think amiss of things in themselves and talk of them unintelligibly to others.

very slow and its work endless therefore to shorten its way to knowledge and make each perception more comprehensive the first thing it does as the foundation of the easier enlarging its knowledge either by contemplation of the things themselves that it would know or conference with others about them is to bind them into bundles and rank them so into sorts that what knowledge it gets of any of them it may thereby with assurance extend to all of that sort.

judged of by the conformity they have to the ideas which other men have and commonly signify by the same name they may be any of them false. But yet simple ideas are least of all liable to be so mistaken. Because a man by his senses and every day's observation may easily satisfy himself what the simple ideas are which their several names that are in common use stand for they being but few in number and such as if he doubts or mistakes in he may eas

CF Bk III ch. 10 Bk IV ch. xvii. § 8

h mpl th d a of p f e t abso-
— de
as
j
th t
uit w th j in
—

22 When judg d t gr t r l ex t nec hen
they d t () When a havi g e mpl idea
mad p f su h a coll ct n f s mple on s s
A it to agr e
when
b lty

to (3)
ria
st to-

gr d

p ta t t u t
h gn j d par t d a c d g
to th gr m t d gr m t f th th g
th y tand f Th gna we hu fly u ar
th d as w ds wh ew th w m k e th
tal b l p p os t Truth l e so
j nu g separ u g th r pr tat e as
th th g th y stand f d th mael gre
d gr d fal hood th trary as
hull be m fully h w th h ft
s Id th mael ther true or f l A y
d th wh h w h our m d wh th
co f rmabl t to th t f th g
— h m can t

wh ch e lly t
d as f s bsta ce yellow m lle ble most hea y
and f ble t tak s th t compl x d a to be the
e mpl t id f gold when yet its pecul ar fix
ed ss and l b lty qua g are as na p-
ar bl fr m those ther deas = q al t s of
th t body as they are o e fr m anothe

4 Wh jud d t p f th t s ne (4)

The mistak is tgr tr h n l jud that d
compl d e n t r a t th r al ce f
any body t g wh n t l a t t conta ns but
some f w of thos p pert es which flow f om is
r al se ce d e n s u t i I y ly me
few f thos p pert s for th p pert e on
ung mostly the ct e d pas e pow =
t has t r fer t othe th ngs all that ar
vulgarly k w n l y n body of h ch th
e mpl d f th t kind f th gs is usually
mad are but ry few n mpar so of h t
a man that has ev alw ystr d dexam d
t know t that t f th g nd all that
th m t x p e t m n k w s ar but f w an
= mpar on of wh t ar r lly n th t body and
d p d n s u n t n al o s n t al co s u r u t o n
Th esse of tr angl h e n a y l t u com
pas co is n ry f deas thr el s n
cl d g a p ce make up that e nce but the
p pert e that fl w f m th s = ar m
than ca be as ly know m t d S I
mag t s subst ce th eal e c s l
l t d compas th gh th p p e u es flow
g f m th t e al n s u t n ar d l s s
5 Id wh all d f l T cl d a man
ha g n t n Ca y th g w th th m but
by th d h has f t h u m d (wh h dea
he has pow r t call by what m h ple se)

t be thought fals be g va t p tat ns
f someth g or y t f th y h y th g
th m d fl ung f m th lty f th gs can
he y p e ly be d be false p tat ns
d as f th g th y d t p t But th
utak d fals hood
B or f l — u h judg d g bl t noth
r

us usual mistak m m d mod th gh
h d as also liabl to t

Cf Bk IV h xxi § 4.
Cf Bk IV chh — vul.

deah has f t g wh l frame an d of
Cf Bk III h vi.

v.g. if the idea that a violet produced in one man's mind by his eyes were the same that a marigold produced in another man's and *vice versa*. For since this could never be known because one man's mind could not pass into another man's body to perceive what appearances were produced by those organs neither the ideas hereby nor the names would be at all confounded or any falsehood be in either. For all things that had the texture of a violet producing constantly the idea that he called blue and those which had the texture of a marigold producing constantly the idea which he as constantly called yellow whatever those appearances were in his mind he would be able as regularly to distinguish things for his use by those appearances and understand and signify those distinctions marked by the name blue and yellow as if the appearances or ideas in his mind received from those two flowers were exactly the

minds are most commonly very near and unconcernably alike. For which opinion I think there might be many reasons offered but that being besides my present business I shall not trouble my reader with them but only mind him that the contrary supposition if it could be proved is of little use either for the improvement of our knowledge or conveniency of life and so

these appearances or perceptions consisting as has been said only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects to

alone it represents it cannot upon that account or as referred to such a pattern be false. Blue and yellow bitter or sweet can never be false ideas these perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there answering the powers appointed by God to produce them and so are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be misapplied but that in this respect makes no falsehood in the ideas as if a man ignorant in the English tongue should call purple scarlet.

¹⁷ *Modes not false cannot be false in reference to*

¹⁸ Cf. § 14, closely followed in § 15

essences of things. Secondly neither can our complex ideas of modes in reference to the essence of anything really existing be false because what ever complex ideas I have of any mode it hath no reference to any pattern existing and made by nature it is not supposed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath nor to represent anything but such a complication of ideas as it does. Thus when I have the idea of such an action of a man who forbears to afford himself such meat drink and clothing and other conveniences of life as his riches and estate will be sufficient to supply and his station requires I have no false idea but such an one as represents an action either as I find or imagine it and so is

be supposed to agree with that idea to which in propriety of speech the name of frugality doth belong or to be conformable to that law which is the standard of virtue and vice

there needs nothing to be said of it. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things of which patterns they are the supposed copies and in this reference of them to the existence of

ence of things. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things of which patterns they are the supposed copies and in this reference of them to the existence of

ly joined with them. I shall therefore pass over that chimerical supposition and consider them as collections of simple ideas in the mind taken from combinations of simple ideas existing together constantly in things of which patterns they are the supposed copies and in this reference of them to the existence of

Cf. Bk. III ch. iv § 17 ix. § 19.

¹⁹ Cf. ch. xxxi. § 6

all of him come to be so
 needed the whole as
 themselves for their

677 *Section m* by *cast*. This two g
 combination of ad as, not ad by nature the
 mind makes in itself their voluntarily or by
 chance and hence it comes in of it men
 be very different, according to their different
 education, education in arts, &c. Custom
 ties habits of thinking in the understanding as
 well as of determining in the will, and of mo-
 tions in the body, all which seems to be but trains
 of motions in the animal spirits, which, we set
 going contains in the same parts they h
 used it, which, by *fen tre dia* are worn into
 smooth paths. The mind in it becomes
 easy and as it were natural. As far as we can
 comprehend thinking thus does seem to be pro-
 duced in our minds if they are not, thus may
 we explain the following one which in
 an habitual train, which or they are put into
 its track, as well as does it explain such mo-
 tions of the body. A musician used to a tune
 will find that it is but once begun in his head,
 the id as of the several notes of it will flow o
 in her order in his understanding without
 any care or reflection, as regularly as his fingers
 move over the keys. The organist play
 on the organ he has begun through his unatten-
 tion he has been wandering. We there-
 fore natural cause of these ideas, as well as of that
 regular dance of his fingers be the motion of
 his animal spirits, which will determine how prob-
 ably soever by this instance it appears to be so
 but this may help us little to conceive of the ac-
 tual habits and of the train of their ideas.

in men, which work as strongly and pro-
 duce as regular effects as if they were natural
 and are therefore called so, though they first
 had no other original but the casual connex-
 ion of ideas, which by the strength of the
 first impression or future indulgence so united,
 have always afterwards kept company
 together that man himself, as if they were but
 one idea. I say most of the passions, I do not

say all for some of them are truly natural &
 depend on our original constitution and are born
 with us but agree to part of those which are con-
 sidered natural, would have been known to be from
 unheeded though perhaps early impressions,
 and custom fancies first, which would have
 been known led to the original of them, if they
 had been well observed. A grown person sur-
 vives the honey in soot bears the name of
 it, but his fancy immediately carries darkness and
 and he cannot bear the
 and ch
) to, and
 not to
 got this
 h m by n
 me
 said
 ted

natural.

8. *If we fix our attention to the track of the*
your flame. I mean too this, not out of great
 necessity there is in this present argument dis-
 tinguish nicely between natural and acquired
 antipathies but I take notice of it for another
 purpose viz. that those who have children or
 the charge of their education would think it
 worth the while diligently to watch, and care-
 fully to prevent the undue connection of ideas in
 the minds of young people. This is the time most
 susceptible of lasting impressions and though
 those relating to the health of the body are by
 discreet people guarded and need against, yet

suspect, been by most men highly treasured.
 9. *If we fix our attention to the track of the*
 This wrong connection in our minds of ideas in
 themselves loose and independent of one another
 has such an influence and is so great that it
 sets us wrong in our notions, as well moral as
 natural, passions, reasonings, and notions them-
 selves that perhaps there is any thing
 that deserves more to be looked after

10. *If we fix our attention to the track of the*
 have really more to do with darkness than

frightful ideas, and they shall be so joined, that
 he can no more bear them than the north

the legs arms and body of a man and join to this a horse's head and neck, I do not make a false idea of anything because it represents nothing without me. But when I call it a *man* or *Tartar* and imagine it to represent some real being without me or to be the same idea that others call by the same name in either of these cases I may err. And upon this account it is that it comes to be termed a false idea though indeed the falsehood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental proposition wherein a conformity and resemblance is attributed to it which it has not. But yet, if having framed such an idea in my mind without thinking either that existence or the name *man* or *Tartar* belongs to it, I will call it *man* or *Tartar*. I may be justly thought fantastical in the naming but not erroneous in my judgment nor the idea any way false.

26 *More properly to be called right or wrong* Upon the whole matter I think that our ideas as they are considered by the mind—either in reference to the proper signification of their names or in reference to the reality of things—may very fitly be called *right* or *wrong* ideas according as they agree or disagree to those patterns to which they are referred. But if any one had rather call them true or false it is fit he use a liberty which every one has, to call things by those names he thinks best though in propriety of speech *truth* or *falsehood* will, I think, scarce agree to them, but as they some way or other virtually contain in them some mental proposition. The ideas that are in a man's mind simply considered cannot be wrong unless complex ones wherein inconsistent parts are jumbled together. All other ideas are in themselves right, and the knowledge about them right and true knowledge but when we come to refer them to anything as to their patterns and archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong as far as they disagree with such archetypes.

Chap. XXXIII. Of the Association of Ideas¹

1 *Something unreasonable in most men* There is scarce any one that does not observe something that seems odd to him, and is in itself really extravagant, in the opinions reasonings and actions of other men. The least flaw of this kind if at all different from his own every one is quick

in his own tenets and conduct, while he perceives and will cry hardly, if at all be convinced of

2 *Not wholly from self-love* This proceeds not wholly from self-love though that has often a great hand in it. Men of fair minds and not given up to the overweening of self-flattery are frequently guilty of it and in many cases one with amazement hears the arguings and is astonished at the obstinacy of a worthy man, who yields not to the evidence of reason though laid before him as clear as daylight.

3 *Not from education* This sort of unreasonableness is usually imputed to education and prejudice and for the most part truly enough, though that reaches not the bottom of the disease nor shows distinctly enough whence it rises or where in it lies. Education is often rightly assayed for the cause and prejudice is a good general name for the thing itself but yet, I think, he ought to look a little further how would trace this sort of madness to the root it springs from, and so explain it, as to show whence this flaw has its original in very sober and rational minds and where in it consists.

4 *A degree of madness found in most men* I shall be pardoned for calling it by so harsh a name as madness when it is considered that opposition to reason deserves that name and is really madness and there is scarce a man so free from it, but that if he should always on all occasions argue or do as in some cases he constantly does would not be thought fitter for Bedlam than civil conversation. I do not here mean when he is under the power of an unruly passion but in the steady calm course of his life. That which will yet more apologize for this harsh name and ungrateful imputation on the greatest part of mankind is that, inquiring a little by the bye into the nature of madness (Bk. I. ch. xi. § 13) I found it to spring from the very same root, and to depend on the very same cause we are here speaking of. This consideration of the thing itself at a time when I thought not the least on the subject which I am now treating of suggested it to me. And if this be a weakness to which all men are so liable if this be a taint which so universally infects mankind the greater care should be taken to lay it open under its due name thereby to excite the greater care in its prevention and cure.

5 *From a wrong connexion of ideas* Some of our ideas have a natural correspondence and connexion one with another it is the office and excellency of our reason to trace these and hold them together in that union and correspondence which is founded in their peculiar beings. Besides this there is another connexion of ideas wholly owing to chance or custom. It is that in

¹ Cf. Hobbes *Leviathan*, I. iii.

n t all f kin come t be s

s y all f r som f them are truly natur l de
pe d po ur ga alc nst tuti n a dare bo n
w thus but agre t part f those wh ch eco nt
ed tural would h bee known t be f om
unhe ded tho gh pe haps a ly impress ons
or wanton f n s at fir t, wh h uld ha e
been k o lged the or g al of them, f they
had been ar ly bserved. A grown person sur
w th h cy no soo c he rs th n m f

ted th wh l g g a)
th msel es tow th

G Th n n xi m d by cu t m This tr g
mbinatu f d as n t all ed by ature the
m d makes us lf her l ntarily by
ch ce d h t com n d ffe t m t
be ery differe t, cording t th ur d ffe t
cl u ns, ed cat o t ts, &c. Cust m t
derst d q as

useu
mooth p th d th m t t bec mes
as d as t we tu al As far as w can

n tural.

h b tual tr h th yar p
th ur tr k, as w ll as t doe t xpla such mo-
u ns f th body A mus ia sed to y tune
w ll find that, l t t but o begi has h ad
th d as f th se al t f t w ll f flow c
th ord ly h u d rsta d g thout
y car m u as gularly as his fingers
mov ord ly th key f th org t ply

purpos iz th t thos h ha enu
th charg f th ir ed cat ould th k t
th th r hul did g tly to wat h and car
fully to p cv t the und co u f d as

discr t peopl mu ded d f ced ag nst, y t
l m ptt d bt, that thos wh ch l t m
peculiarly t th m d a dt mu t n the n
d rstand g pas ns ha be n m ch les
h ed d tha th th u g deserve nay thos
l u pu ly t th und rstand g ha e I
suspect, bee by most m wh lly e looked
g ll g non f d as g t aus ferror
T

su hassociati ns f th r m ad b cu m, in th

bl m wh h w k as tr gly and p o-
d as gular ff ts as f th y w tu al
nd th for called so though they t first
h d th ginal but th cid tal nne.
f w d as wh h th th stre gth f th
f rst mp ess m f tu d l ce so nited
th th y al ay ft wards k pt company
tog th th t m ma d as if they we but
d a l say most f th t p th es l d n t

n tural pas ns aso gs a d t nst m
sel s, that pe haps th t any thin
that d crves mo to be looked aft
A nstanc Th d as fg blun d p t
li re ally m t d w th darkness tha
li ht yet l t but fool h ma d culcat th
fren th m d f chuld and aise th mth r
tog th pos bly h hall ev be bl t p-
ar t th m an so lo g as h l es but dark
n ss hall ev afterwards b g w th t thos
frightf l d as, d th y shall be so j ed th t
h can mor bear th o than th ther

11 *Another instance* A man receives a sensible injury from another thinks on the man and that action over and over and by ruminating on them strongly or much in his mind so cements those two ideas together that he makes them almost one never thinks on the man but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it so that he scarce distinguishes them but has as much an aversion for the one as the other Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions and quarrels propagated and continued in the world

12 *A third instance* A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place he saw his friend die in

pression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it he confounds them in his mind and can as little bear the one as the other

13 *Why time cures some disorders in the mind which reason cannot cure* When this combination is settled and while it lasts it is not in the power of reason to help us and relieve us from the effects of it Ideas in our minds when they are there will operate according to their natures and circumstances And here we see the cause why time cures certain affections which reason though in the right and allowed to be so has not power over nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases The death of a child that was as the daily delight of its mother's eyes and joy of her soul renders from her heart the whole comfort of her life and gives her all the torment imaginable use the consolations of reason in this case and you were as

separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss from the idea of the child returning to her memory all representations though ever so reasonable are in vain and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved spend their lives in mourning and carry an incurable sorrow to their graves

14 *A other instance of the effect of the association of ideas* A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation The gentleman who as thus recovered with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment owned the cure all his life after as the greatest obligation he could have received but what

only which he suffered from his hands which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure

15 *More instances* Many children imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for so join those ideas together that a book becomes their aversion and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after and thus reading becomes a torment to them which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives There are rooms convenient enough that some men cannot study in and fashions of vessels which though ever so clean and commodious they cannot drink out of and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them and make them offensive and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him but because having once on some occasion got the ascendant the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person and he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them

young gentleman who having learnt to dance and that to great perfection there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well yet it was only whilst that trunk was there nor could he perform well in any other place unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances a little beyond precise nature I answer for myself that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man upon his own knowledge as I report it and I dare say there are many who have not met with accounts of not examples of this nature that may parallel or at least justify this

17 *Influence of association on intellectual habits* Intellectual habits and defects thus contracted are not less frequent and powerful though less observed Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined either by education or much thought whilst these are still combined in the mind what notions what reasonings will there be about separate spirits? Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God and what absurdities will that

mind be liable to about the Deity. Let the ideas of infallibility be inseparably joined to any person, and these two constantly together possess the mind and then one body in two places: the one shall unexamined be swallowed for certain truth, by an implicit faith, however that imagined infallible person dictates and demands as without inquiry.

8. *Observe* *it is the same nature both in different sects* *still softy and soft* *it is not*. Some such wrong and unnatural combinations of ideas will be found to establish the irreconcilable opposition between different sects of philosophy and religion for we cannot imagine every one of their followers to impose willfully on himself and knowingly refuse truth offered by plain reason. I interest, though it does great deal in the case yet cannot be thought to work while some use *it* men to so many

as that every one of them understands, and makes them not see the falsehood of what they embrace for all truth. That which thus captivates their reasons, and leads men of sincerity blindfold from common sense will, when examined, be found to be what we are speaking of some independent ideas, if

there together and they can no more separate them in their thoughts than if they were but one and they persist as if they were so. This gives sense to jargon demonstration to absurdities and consists of nonsense and is the foundation of the greatest, I had almost said of all the errors in the world or if it does not reach

so far as to the most dangerous one since so far as it obtains, it hinders men from seeing and examining. When two things, in themselves disjoined appear to the right constantly united if the eye sees these things united which are loose where will you begin to rectify the mistakes that follow in two ideas that they have been accustomed so to join in their minds as to substitute one for the other and as I am apt to think, of even without perceiving the mistake. Thus whilst they are under the deceit of it, makes them incapable of correction, and they applaud themselves as zealous champions for truth, when indeed they are contending for error and the confusion of two different ideas, which a customary connexion of them in their minds hath rendered them mad in effect but never fills their heads with falsehood, and their reasonings with false consequences.

10. *Conclusion*. Having thus given an account of the original sorts, and extent of our ideas, with several other considerations about these (I know not whether I may say) instruments, or materials of our knowledge the method I at first proposed to myself would now require that I should immediately proceed to show what use the understanding makes of them, and what knowledge we have by it. This was that which, in the first general view I had of this subject, was all that I thought I should have to do but, upon nearer approach, I find that there is so close connexion between ideas and words, and our abstract ideas and general words have so constant relation one to another that it is impossible to speak clearly and distinctly of our knowledge, which all consists in propositions, without considering first, the nature use and signification of language which, therefore must be the business of the next Book.

BOOK III Of Words

Chap I Of Words or Language in General

Mankind is from natural sense God, having designed man for sociable creature made him not only with an inclination, and understanding to have fellowship with those of his own kind, but furnished him also with language which was to be the great instrument and communication of society. Man, therefore had by nature his organs so far joined, as to be fit to form articulate sounds, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language for parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to

make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet by no means are capable of language.

1. *Of the sounds as in* *ideas* Besides articulate sounds, therefore twofold necessary that he should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions and to make them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind whereby they might be made known to others, and that thoughts from men's minds be conveyed from one to another.

3. *To make them general news* But neither was this sufficient to make words so useful as they are. Cf. ch. n. § 2.

11 *Another instance* A man receives a sensible injury from another thinks on the man and that action over and over and by ruminating on them strongly or much in his mind so cements those two ideas together that he makes them almost one never thinks on the man but the pain and displeasure he suffered comes into his mind with it so that he scarce distinguishes them but has as much an aversion for the one as the other Thus hatreds are often begotten from slight and innocent occasions and quarrels propagated and continued in the world

12 *A third instance* A man has suffered pain or sickness in any place he saw his friend die in such a room though these have in nature nothing to do one with another yet when the idea of the place occurs to his mind it brings (the impression being once made) that of the pain and displeasure with it he confounds them in his mind and can as little bear the one as the other

13 *Why time cures some disorders in the mind which reason cannot cure* When this combination is settled and while it lasts it is not in the power of reason to help us and relieve us from the effects of it Ideas in our minds when they are there will operate according to their natures and circumstances And here we see the cause why time cures certain affections which reason though in the right, and allowed to be so has not power over nor is able against them to prevail with those who are apt to hearken to it in other cases The death of a child that was the daily delight of its mother's eyes and joy of her soul rends from her heart the whole comfort of her life and gives her all the torment imaginable use the consolations of reason in this case and you were as

separated the sense of that enjoyment and its loss from the idea of the child returning to her memory all representations though ever so reasonable are vain and therefore some in whom the union between these ideas is never dissolved spend their lives in mourning and carry an incurable sorrow to the graves

14 *Another instance of the effect of the association of ideas* A friend of mine knew one perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation The gentleman who was thus recovered with great sense of gratitude and acknowledgment vowed the cure all his life after as the greatest obligation he could have received but that

only which he suffered from his hands which was too mighty and intolerable for him to endure

15 *More instances* Many children imputing the pain they endured at school to their books they were corrected for so join those ideas together that a book becomes their aversion and they are never reconciled to the study and use of them all their lives after and thus reading becomes a torment to them which otherwise possibly they might have made the great pleasure of their lives There are rooms convenient enough that some men cannot study in and fashions of vessels which though ever so clean and commodious they cannot drink out of and that by reason of some accidental ideas which are annexed to them and make them offensive and who is there that hath not observed some man to flag at the appearance or in the company of some certain person not otherwise superior to him but because having once on some occasion got the ascendant the idea of authority and distance goes along with that of the person and he that has been thus subjected is not able to separate them

16 *A curious instance* Instances of this kind are so plentiful everywhere that if I add one more it is only for the pleasant oddness of it It is of a young gentleman who having learnt to dance and that to great perfection there happened to stand an old trunk in the room where he learnt The idea of this remarkable piece of household stuff had so mixed itself with the turns and steps of all his dances that though in that chamber he could dance excellently well yet it was only whilst that trunk was there nor could he perform well in any other place unless that or some such other trunk had its due position in the room If this story shall be suspected to be dressed up with some comical circumstances a little beyond precise nature I answer for myself that I had it some years since from a very sober and worthy man upon his own knowledge as I report it and I dare say there are very few inquisitive persons who read this who have not met with accounts of not examples of this nature that may parallel or at least justify this

17 *If the force of association on intellect and habits* Intellectual habits and defects thus may contracted are not less frequent and powerful though less observed Let the ideas of being and matter be strongly joined either by education or much thought whilst these are still combined in the mind that notions and that reasonings will there be about separated spiritus? Let custom from the very childhood have joined figure and shape to the idea of God and what absurdities will that

tion of lowly was necessary that man should find out some external sensible signs, which would be made up of might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was so fit for plenty or quickness, as those articulate sounds, which with so much ease and variety he found himself able to make. Thus remain concepts which were by nature so well adapted to this purpose came to be made use of by men as the signs of their ideas. In this way natural concepts that there is between particular articulations so disordered as for the most part there would be but one language amongst all men but by voluntary imposition, whereby such words are made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. These words, of words, is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the words as they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.

How then are these signs made use of? The use is in these marks being either to record their own thoughts as it were to bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others words, in this primary manner to signify and stand for nothing but as letters do for things. As to how imperfectly soever carelessly these ideas are collected from the things which they are supposed represent. When man speaks to another is that he may be understood and the end of speech is, that those sounds, as marks, may make known his ideas to the hearer. Thus then which words are the marks are the ideas of the speaker nor can any other apply them as marks immediately to anything else but the ideas that himself hath for this would be make themselves of his own concepts, and yet apply them to their ideas which would be to make them signs and not signs of his ideas at the same time and so in effect to have no signification. All words being voluntary signs, they can be arbitrary signs imposed by him that uses them. Thus would be to make them signs of no living sounds without signification. A man cannot make his words the signs of other quantities in things, or of conceptions in the mind of another whereof he has none in his own. Till he has some ideas of his own, he cannot propose them correspond with the concepts of another man nor can he use any signs for them. For the man can use any signs for them for thus they would be the signs of he knows no what which is in truth to be the signs of nothing. But when he represents himself their own ideas by some of his own, if he consents to

give them the same names that other men do, it means that he has, and

in the wrong and the ignorant, the learned and the ignorant use the words they speak with any meaning all alike. They in every man's mouth stand for the same ideas. A child having taken notice of nothing in the material he is called gold but the bright shining yellow colour he applies the word gold only to his word. That colour and nothing else and therefore calls the same colour in peacock tail gold. Another that hath better observed adds to shining yellow green and blue and then the sound gold, when he uses it, stands for a complex idea joining yellow and a very weighty substance. Another adds to those qualities softness and then the word gold signifies the human body bright, yellow, fusible and very heavy. Another adds malleability. Each of these uses equally the word gold, when they have occasion to express the idea which they have applied it but it is evident that each can apply it only to his own idea nor can he make it stand as a sign of such complex idea as he has in it.

are in the mind of the speaker yet they in their thoughts are secret and set to their things.

First, *They are not to be taken for as it were as if from intention common* for he that should talk in vain, and could not be understood if the sounds they applied to the ideas were such as by the hearer were applied to another which is to speak two languages. But this men understand usually to examine whether the ideas themselves and those they discourse with have in their minds be the same but think it enough that they use the word, as they imagine in the common conceits of that language, in which they suppose that the ideas they make the sign of is precisely the same to which the understanding men of that country apply that name.

5. *The difficulty* Secondly Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own imagination, but of things as really they are therefore they often suppose that words stand also for the things. But this relation, more particularly to substances and their names, as perhaps the former does to simple ideas and modes, we

ought to be. It is not enough for the perfection of language that sounds can be made signs of ideas unless those signs can be so made use of as to comprehend several particular things for the multiplication of words would have perplexed their use had every particular thing need of a distinct name to be signified by. To remedy this inconvenience language had yet a further improvement in the use of *general terms* whereby one word was made to mark a multitude of particular existences & high advantageous use of sounds was obtained only by the difference of the ideas they were made signs of those names becoming *general* which are made to stand for *general ideas* and those remaining particular where the *ideas* they are used for are *particular*.

4 To *mean* them *signify* the absence of positive ideas
Besides these names which stand for ideas there
be other words which men make use of not to
signify any idea but the want or absence of some
ideas simple or complex or all ideas together

It should be possible to postulate to pos

5 It is ultimately de ned fr m such as signify sen
sible ideas. It may also lead us a little towards the
original of all our not ons and know ledge if we
find a c ad huc

quite removed from sense have their rise from
thence and from obvious sensible ideas are
transferred to more abstruse significant ones and
made to stand for ideas that come not under the
cognizance of our senses v.g. to *imagine* *perceive*
comprehend *conceive* *discern* *contend* *intend* *dis-*
turb *balance* *tranquillity* &c. are all words taken from
the operations of sensible things and applied to
certain modes of thinking *Spirit* in its primary

felt in themselves or any other ideas that came
not under their senses they were fain to borrow
words from ordinary known ideas of sensation
by that means to make others the more easily to
conceive those operations they experimented
in themselves which made no outward sensi-
ble appearances and then when they had
got known and agreed names to signify those
internal operations of their own minds they
were sufficiently furnished to make known by
words all their other ideas since they could con-
sist of nothing but either of outward sensible
perceptions or of the inward operations of their
minds about them we having as has been
proved no ideas at all but what originally come
either from sensible objects without or what we
feel within ourselves from the inward workings
of our own spirits of which we are conscious to
ourselves within

6 *Distribution of subjects to be treated of* But to understand better the use and force of Language as subservient to instruction and knowledge it will be convenient to consider

First *To what it is that names in the use of language are immediately applied*

Secondly Since all (except proper) names are general and so stand not particularly for this or that single thing but for sorts and ranks of things it will be necessary to consider in the next place

shall the better come to find the right of words the natural advantages and defects of language and the remedies that ought to be used to avoid the inconveniences of obscurity or uncertainty in the signification of words without which it is impossible to discourse with any clearness or order concerning knowledge which being conversant about propositions and those most commonly universal ones has greater connexion with words than perhaps is suspected

These considerations therefore shall be the matter of the following chapters.²

Chap II Of the Signification of Words

sible ideas By which we may give so it we
guess what kind of notions they were and
whence derived which filled the minds how
were the first beginners of languages and how
nature even in the naming of things unassisted
suggested to men the originals and principles of
all their knowledge whilst to give names that
might make known to others any operations they

¶ *Non datur sensible signis necesse est ut* *et non fideas* Man though he ha e great anietie of thoughts and such from v h ch others as yett as himself m ght recei e profit and del g t ells they are all within h s o vn b east int v sible and h dden from others nor can of themselves be made to appear The comfort and advantage of societie not be ng to be had v ithout commun ca

Cf Lock s l i t r to M l y n u J n 20 1603

trous understanding. If it be looked on as an instance of a prodigious memory that some generals have been able to call every soldier by his proper name we may easily find reason why men have never attempted to give names to each sheep in their flock, or crow that

particular horses as often as we have to mention particular men we should have proper names for

her and Bucephalus
Alexandrian
jockeys,
own and
crave is
occasi
hen he

cause it would not serve the purpose. Men would increase the proper names of particular things, that would hinder them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood which is then only done when, by use or custom, the sound is made by the organs of speech excites in another man's mind

is out of sight.

6 *How general words are made.* The next thing to be considered is, — How general words come to be made. For since all things that exist are only particulars, how come we by general terms or where find we those general natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas and become general by separating from them their circumstances of time and place and any other

duals than on each of which having conformity to that abstract idea is (as we call it) of that sort.

7 *Shown by the way we enlarge our concepts.* Some say that, to deduce thus little more distinctly of all in it perhaps be amiss to trace our notions and names from the beginning and observe by what degrees we proceed and by what steps we enlarge our ideas from our first infancy

particular things. I guess is if by general ideas to which things reduced into sorts, and general names, are properly subservient. These, though names belonging to them, come within some compass, and do not multiply every moment, beyond what their thought can contain, or use require. And thus these men have for the most part stopped but it is so as to hinder themselves from distinguishing particular things by appropriated names, where common words make do. And thus refer to their own species which they have most difficulty with, and wherein they have oft occasion to mention particular persons, they make use of proper names and there distinct individuals have distinct denominations.

8 *It has the same imperfection as the first.* Besides persons, countries also cities, rivers, mountains, and their several distinctions of place have usually found particular names, and that for the same reason they being such as men have frequent occasion to mark particularly and as it were set before others in their discourses with them. And I doubt not but, if we had reason to make two par-

minds and like pictures of them there, represent only those individuals. The names they first gave to them are confined to these individuals and the names few and warms the child uses, detain themselves to those persons afterwards, when time and all things acquire to see have made them observe that there are a great many other things in the world that some common general is of shape and several the qualities, resemble their father and mother and those persons they have been used to they frame an idea, which they find those many particulars do partake in and that they give with others, the name man for example. And thus they come to have all names of general ideas. When they make a thing new but only out of the compound of a they had before and

Bk. II. ch. xi. §§ Bk. IV. h. vii. § 9.
Of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge Intro-
trod. § 6 Also C. Bk. II. ch. xi. §§ 9.

shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large when we come to treat of the names of mixed modes and substances in particular though give me leave here to say that it is a perverting the use of words and brings unavoidable obscurity and confusion into their signification whenever we make them stand for any thing but those ideas we have in our own minds

6 *Words by use readily excite ideas of their objects* Concerning words also it is further to be considered

First that they being immediately the signs of men's ideas and by that means the instruments whereby men communicate their conceptions and express to one another those thoughts and imaginations they have within their own breasts there comes by constant use to be such a connexion between certain sounds and the ideas they stand for that the names heard almost as readily excite certain ideas as if the objects themselves which are apt to produce them did actually affect the senses Which is manifestly so in all obvious sensible qualities and in all substances that frequently and familiarly occur to us

7 *Words are often used without signification as a duty* Secondly That though the proper and immediate signification of words are ideas in the mind of the speaker yet because by familiar use from our cradles we come to learn certain articulate sounds very perfectly and have them readily on our tongues and always at hand in our memories but yet are not always careful to examine or settle their significations perfectly it often happens that men even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration do set their thoughts more on words than things Nay because words are many of them learned before the ideas are known for which they stand therefore some not only children but men speak several words no other wise than parrots do only because they have learned them and have been accustomed to those sounds But so far as words are of use and signification so far is there a constant connexion between the sound and the idea and a designation that the one stands for the other without which application of them they are nothing but so much insignificant noise

8 *Things signify too perfectly arbitrary to the con-*

ceive them But that they signify only men's peculiar ideas and that by a perfect arbitrary imposition is evident in that they often fail to excite in

others (even that use the same language) the same ideas we take them to be signs of and every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has when they use the same words that he does And therefore the great Augustus himself in the possession of that power which ruled the world acknowledged he could not make a new Latin word which as much

It is true common use by a tacit consent appropriates certain sounds to certain ideas in all languages which so far limits the signification of that sound that unless a man applies it to the same idea he does not speak properly and let me add that unless a man's words excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking he does not speak intelligibly But whatever be the consequence of any man's using of words differently either from their general meaning or the particular sense of the person to whom he addresses them this is certain their signification in his use of them is limited to his ideas and they can be signs of nothing else

Chap. III Of General Terms

1 *The greatest part of words are general terms* All things that exist being particulars it may perhaps be thought reasonable that words which ought to be conformed to things should be so too—I mean in the signification but yet we find quite the contrary The far greatest part of words that make all languages are general terms which has not been the effect of neglect or chance but of reason and necessity

2 *The very particular things should be a name for itself is impossible* First It is impossible that every particular thing should have a distinct peculiar name For the signification and use of words depending on that connexion which the mind makes between its ideas and the sounds it uses as signs of them it is necessary in the application of names to things that the mind should have distinct ideas of the things and retain also the particular name that belongs to every one with

things we meet with every bird and beast men saw every tree and plant that affected the senses could not find a place in the most capa-

which makes nothing to be of that species a d
th co f r m ty to th de t wh ch the name is
an ed being that wh ch g ves a r g t t that
name the ha g the essence nd th ha g
that f r m ty must ed be th sam th g
since to be f any peces nd to ha e a right to
th n me f that peces, is all e As, fo x
ample, t be a man or of the p a man nd to
ha ht th name man is the s me th g
Ag t be a man o f the species man a d
ha th ence f a man the same th g No
s ce th g can be a man r ha ght to
th me ma but what has conf r m ty to th
abstr ct d then me man tands for nor any
thing be a ma ha e a right to the speci s
ma but what has th es nec f that species t
f llow that th abstr ct d f r wh ch th n me
sta ds and th esse ce f th peces, is one a d
the sam From h e tis asy to bs rve that
the esse ces f the sorts f l h ngs, a d cons
q nly th so t g f things, is th wo k man
hup f the u d tand g that bstr m and
m les thos ge cral d as

has been said when used for "m's fge al
d as, and so ar ppl cabl d ff dly to ma y
particular things d d as ar g ral wh n
th y are set up as the p ese tat es f ma y
articular th but un rsality bel gs ott

th g ral natur be g th g
p city they ar p t to by th und rstand g
f gn fyng or prese ung ma y particulars.
F th gn ficau they b as th g but
l t that, by th mind f man m dded to
th m.

th m. 4b tract d as ar the er f g er and
f c1 Thach thing th f t be cons d ed
1a. Wha k d f gnifica t is that g al
words h F as t i e d that they d t
gnaf bar ly particular thi g f th th y
ould be g erat t rms, bu pr pc names,
so on th th d t as d t they d t

f is or f things and ch f th m does
th t, by being gn fan betr ct d th
d h h dea, as things xstr gar f d
sr so they m to be nked d that
m or wh ch is all be f th so Wh
by ev d that th ene f th sorts f
th Lau word plase be te per f th es,
ar noth lse bu these bstr ct d as f th
haing th esse ce f any pccies, being that

Cf. Bk. IV h. xxi. § 4.
Cf. § 3.

m b v s e p e c i a l l y n t h r c e o
 and all t h n g s p o p a t e d b y s d B u t e t I
 t h i n k w e m a y s a y t h o r t f t h m d e r n a m e s
 a s t h e w o r k m a n s p f t h e n d e r t n d g t h g o c
 a n n o n f m t h e s i m l t u d t b e r e a m g e t t h e m
 m a k b t a c t g e r a l d a s a n d s e t t h e m p i n t h
 m i d w t h m e s n n e x d t t h m, a s p t t r n s
 o f f r m s (f n t h a t s n s t h w d f o r m h a s
 r y p p e g n f i c a t) t o w h i h a s p a r u c u
 l a r t h i n g s t t g a r e f d t o g r t h y
 c o m t o b e o f t h a t s p e h t h a t d m u
 u n a r p u t t h t l a s t F o h n w s a y
 t h i s i s m t h a t h r s e t h i s j u t h a t
 c r u l t y t h w t h, t h t j o k w h a t d w l s e
 b u t n k t h i n g s u d d f f n p e f c n a m e s,
 a s g r e e i n g t t h o s e b a t e t d a s o f w h i c h w
 h m a d t h o s e m t h g n s A d h a t a r e
 t h s s e n c e f t h o s e p e c i e s t u t a n d m a r k e d
 b y n m e s b u t t h o s e a b s t a c t d a s t h m d

abstr deas are th med m that un te th m
so that th sse ce f pcc es, as dis ingu hed
and d mnt d by us n th rar ca be
See Bk III ch vi. Iso *Th d Letter to Stilling*
fleet, p 356

James Mary and Jane that which is peculiar to each and retain only what is common to them all

8 *And further enlarge our complex ideas by still leaving out properties contained in them* By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of *man* they easily advance to more general names and notions For observing that several things that differ from their idea of *man* and can not therefore be comprehended under that name have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with *man* by retaining only those qualities and uniting them into one idea they have again another and more general idea to which having given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension which new idea is made not by any new addition but only as before by leaving out the shape and some other properties signified by the name *man* and retaining only a body with life sense and spontaneous motion comprehended under the name *animal*

9 *General notions are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones* That this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas and general names to them I think is so evident that there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a man's self or others and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge And he that thinks *general notions* or *ideas* are any thing else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones taken at first from particular instances will I fear be at a loss where to find them For let any one effect and then tell me wherein does his idea of *man* differ from that of *Peter* and *Pul* or his idea of *horse* from that of *Bucephalus* but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular instances as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names *man* and *horse* leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ and retaining only those wherein they agree and of those making a new distinct complex idea and giving the name *animal* to it one has a more general term that comprehends with *man* several other creatures Leave out of the idea of *man* life sense and spontaneous motion and the remaining complex idea made up of the remaining simple ones of body life and nourishment becomes a more general one under the more comprehensive

stand for any of our ideas whatsoever To conclude this whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the schools and are with justice so little regarded out of them is nothing else but *abstract ideas* more or less comprehensive with names annexed to them In all which this is constant and unvariable That every more general term stands for such an idea and is but a part of any of those contained under it

10 *Why the genus is ordinarily made use of in definitions* This may show us the reason why in the defining of words which is nothing but declaring their signification we make use of the *genus* or next general word that comprehends it Which is not out of necessity but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general word or *genus* stands for or perhaps sometimes the shame of not being able to do it But though defining by *genus* and *difference* (I crave leave to use these terms of art though originally Latin since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to) I say though defining by the *genus* be the shortest way yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best This I am sure it is not the only and so not absolutely necessary For definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined and if instead of such an enumeration men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term it has not been out of necessity or for greater clearness but for quickness and dispatch sake For I think that to one who desired to know what idea the word *man* stood for if it should be said that *man* is a solid extended substance having life sense spontaneous motion and the faculty of reasoning I doubt not but the meaning of the term *man* would be as well understood and the idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known when it is defined to be a rational animal which by the several definitions of a *malicious* and *capricious* sets itself into those enumerated ideas I have in explaining the term *man* followed here the ordinary definition of the schools which though perhaps not the most exact yet serves well enough to my present purpose And one may in this instance see what gave occasion to the rule that a definition must consist of *genus* and *difference* and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is of such a rule or advantage in the strict observing of it For definitions as has been said being only the explaining of one word

to be a thing and such universal terms which

by several others, so that the meaning of d a t
lands f may be certainly k wn langu ges
no no lwa 1 so mad a cordin t th rules

trary or to those who have made this definition, that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it. But if definitions more in the next chapter

General and particular
stand and together to the all existent first
Turn to general words this plan, by what
has been said that general notions are bel-
to the real existence of things but are given
to us and are rules for the understanding made
by each for its own use and concern only ones,
whether words or ideas. Words are general as
has been said when used for general things
ideas, and so are applicable and refer to many
particular things. Ideas are general when
they are set pass as representatives of many
particular things but not really belong to
things themselves, which are all first parti-
cular in their existence. Those words and
ideas which in their significance are general.
Where therefore we quit particulars, the general
that are only rules for our own making
their general nature being this but the con-
cept they are put into, by the understanding
of each or representing many particulars.
For the significant they have is no thing but
that, by the mind of man is added to
them.

Abstract d as ar the ster f gener and
en Th ex th gth for t be ns d red
is, Wha kind ll gnificau t is th a ge al
ords ha F as is e v d th a they d t
nif barely part cular thing for th they
ould t be g al rms, but p pe names,
so, on th th d is as e v den they d t
nif pluralis f man nd men would th
gnif th same nd th disticu f umbers
as th grammarians call th m) would be per
fuous nd useless Th a th whicg al words
nif is ori f things nd each f them does
hat, by being gn f an abstract id in th
mind huch dea, as th gys xisting ar found
to agree so they com t be ranked d that
name or huch is al be f that sort. Wh re
by is e d th th sur f th sorts or if
Latin word pleases bett fm f th o,
ar noth lse but these bstr d as. F th
ha ng be essence f any species, being that

Cl. Bk. IV ch. xxx. § 4.
Cl. 1 3.

whi h makes anything to be f that species and
 th conformity t th de to which the name is
 an e ed be g that whi ch giv es a right t that
 name th ha g the essence a d th ha g
 that conf rmity must needs be th sam thing
 s cet be f any species and to ha e right to
 the name of that species, is all e As, f r ex
 ample, to be a man, or f the f a man and to
 ha r ht t th nam man is the same thi
 Aga to be ma or f the pecies man and
 ha eth e of a man th sam th g Now
 s c thing can be a ma or ha e a ght to
 th nam man but what has a co f rmity t the
 abstr ct th n m man s ds f or any
 thing be a man o ha e r ght t th spec es
 man but what has th esse ce of that species is
 f llows, that th bstr ct d for which th name
 tands, d th esse ce f th pecies, is o and
 the sam From h nce t us any t bserve that
 the essences f the sorts of th g s, nd conse
 qu ly th sort f th g s, is th wo kma
 ship f the und rsta d g that bstr cts and
 makes those ec ral d as.

13 *They are the kmansh p f the under t nds g*
but t l e a f o d t the mul tud f t g
 I would th beth htt forg t, m ch less
 to deny that ture in th prod ct n of thins,
 makes sev al of th m alk ther is thin
 more bvous, especially in th ace of animals
 and all th gs pr p g ted by e d But yet I
 think y may say it ort f them under nam
 is the *orkmansh p f th under land g t k ng oe*
anon f om the mul tud t b e e am t them to
mak b tract g neral d as d set them up n the
mind w th names ann ed t them, as patt rns
oe f rns, (f in that sen. th o d f rm has a
ery p pc onificatu) to which as part cu
lar things eu ting are sou d to agree so they
com t be f that species, ha that d mina
t n, are put into th t lassu F wh y say
this is ma th t horse th just th t
eru f th this wa h th t j k wha d lso
 but rank th gs und d fter t pecifi names,
 as greeting to those bstract d as, of which we
 ha mad thos mes th gns And hat ar
 th esse es f those species se ut and marked
 by n mes, but those bstr ct d as th mind
 which as t we th bo ds betw n par
 ticular things that xist, and th names they ar
 to be ranked und And wh n g neral ames
 ha yconn v n w th particular be gs, these
 bstr ct deas ar th med utn that un tes them
 so tha th esse es f pecies, as distinguished
 and d min ed by us, n ther are nor can be

See Bk. III ch. vi, also *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet, p. 36

James Mary and Jane that which is peculiar to each and retain only what is common to them all

8 *And further enlarge our complex ideas by still leaving out properties contained in them* By the same way that they come by the general name and idea of man they easily advance to more general names and notions For observing that several things that differ from their idea of man and can not therefore be comprehended under that name have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man by retaining only those qualities and uniting them into one idea they have again given and more general idea to which having given a name they make a term of a more comprehensive extension which new idea is made not by any new addition but only as before by leaving out the shape and some other properties signified by the name man and retaining only a body with life sense and spontaneous motion comprehended under the name animal

9 *General natures are nothing but abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones* That this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas and general names to them I think is so evident that there needs no other proof of it but the considering of a man's self or others and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge And he that thinks general natures or notions are anything else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones taken at first from particular existences will I fear be at a loss where to find them For let any one effect and then tell me whether it does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul or his idea of horse from that of Bucephalus but in the leaving out something that is peculiar to each individual and retaining so much of those particular complex ideas of several particular existences as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas signified by the names man and horse leaving out but those particulars wherein they differ and retaining only those wherein they agree and of those making a new distinct complex idea and giving the name animal to it one has a more general term that comprehends it all man several other creatures leave out of the idea of animal sense and spontaneous motion and the remaining complex idea made up of the remaining simple ideas of

stand for any of our ideas whatsoever To conclude this whole mystery of genera and species which make such a noise in the schools and are with justice so little regarded out of them is nothing else but abstract ideas more or less comprehensive with names annexed to them In all which this is constant and unvariable That every more general term stands for such an idea and is but a part of any of those contained under it

10 *Why the genus is ordinarily made use of in definitions* This may show us the reason why in the defining of words such is nothing but declaring their signification we make use of the genus or next general word that comprehends it Which is not out of necessity but only to save the labour of enumerating the several simple ideas which the next general word or genus stands for or perhaps sometimes the shame of not being able to do it But though defining by genus and difference (I crave leave to use these terms of art though originally Latin since they most properly suit those notions they are applied to) I say though defining by the genus be the shortest way yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am sure it is not the only and so not absolutely necessary For definition being nothing but making another understand by words what idea the term defined stands for a definition is best made by enumerating those simple ideas that are combined in the signification of the term defined and if instead of such an enumeration men have accustomed themselves to use the next general term it has not been out of necessity or for greater clearness but for quickness and dispatch sake For I think that to one who desires to know what idea the word man stood for if it should be said that man is a solid extended substance having life sense spontaneous motion and the faculty of reasoning I doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood and the idea it stands for be at least as clearly made known as when it is defined to be a rational animal which by the several definitions of natural philosophers resolves itself into those enumerated ideas I have in playing the term man followed here the ordinary definition of the schools which though perhaps not the most exact yet serves well enough to my present purpose And one may in this instance see that general ideas occur on the rule that a definition must consist of genus and difference and it suffices to show us the little necessity there is of such a rule or advantage in the strict observing of it For definitions as has been said being only the explaining of one word

to being thing and such universal terms will

by several others, so that the meaning or idea it stands for may be certainly known. Languages are not always so made according to the rules of logic, that every term can have its signification exact, and clearly expressed by two others. Experience sufficiently satisfies us that the contrivance of those who have made this rule have done ill, that they have given us so few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions more in the next chapter.

General and several or particular ideas standing on ideas. It is demonstrated that, I return to general words is plain, by what has been said, that general and several belong not to the real existence of things, but to the notions and creatures of the understanding made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been said, when used for signs of several ideas, and so are much indifferent to man, particular things and ideas are general when they are set up as the representatives of many particular things, but universal belongs not to things themselves, which are all several particular in their existence: even those words and ideas which in their signification are general. When there are many particular, the generals that refer are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into, by the understanding of signifying or representing many particulars. For the signification they have is no him, but a relation that, by the mind of man, is added to them.

A sign is not a word, if general. The next thing therefore to be considered is, What kind of signification is the general words have. For as is evident, the word does not stand bare for one particular thing, for then they would not be general terms, but proper names, so on the other side, as is evident, they do not stand plain for many and yet would not reach the name and the distinction of numbers as the grammarians call them) would be superfluous and useless. Then which general words are signs of many, and each of them does this by being signs of an abstract idea in the mind, such ideas, as things exist, are found to refer so they come to be ranked under that name of such is a one, be of a sort. Whereby evident, that the user of the sorts, or if the Latin word pleases better, the sciences, is nothing, but these abstract ideas. For laying the essence of any species, being that

which makes an thing to be of that species, and the composition of the ad to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name, the having in the essence and the having that conformity must needs be the same thing, since it be of a species, and it have right to the name of that species, is all one. As, for example, it be man, or of the man, and to have right to the name man, is the same thing. Again, to be a man, or of the species man, and have the name of a man, is the same thing. Now since nothing can be a man, or have right to the name man, but what has conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for, nor any thing can be a man, or have right to the species man, but what has the essence of that species it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name stands, and the essence of the species, is one and the same. From whence it is easy to observe that the essences of the sorts of things, and, consequently the sorting of things, is the workmanship of the understanding that abstracts and makes those general ideas.

They are the workmanship of the understanding. It is the workmanship of the understanding, as I have said, that I would not here be thought to forget, much less to deny that nature in the production of things, makes several of them alike: there is nothing more obvious, especially in the race of animals, and all things propagated by seed. If it yet I think we may say, that the workmanship of the understanding is the workmanship of the understanding, that of animals, from the species, and of vegetables, from the seed, and yet them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms. (for in that sense the word form has its proper signification,) it which as particular things exist, are found to agree so they come to be of that species, have that denomination, or are put into that class. For when we say this is man, that horse, this justice, that cruelty, this watch, that jack, what do we do but rank things under different peculiar names, as relating to those abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the sign. And what are the essences of those species set out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind which are, as it were, the bonds between particular things that exist, and the names they are to be ranked under. And when general names have an connexion with particular beings, these abstract ideas are the medium that unites them, so that the essences of species, as distinguished and denominated by us, neither are nor can be

anything but those precise abstract ideas we have in our minds. And therefore the supposed real essences of substances if different from our abstract ideas cannot be the essences of the species we rank things into. For two species may be one as rationally as two different essences be the essence of one species: and I demand what are the alterations [which] may or may not be made in a horse or lead without making either of them to be of another species? In determining the species of things by our abstract ideas this is easy to resolve: but if any one will regulate himself herein by supposed real essences he will I suppose be at a loss and he will never be able to know when anything precisely ceases to be of the species of a horse or lead.

14. Each distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence. Nor will any one wonder that I say these essences or abstract ideas (which are the measures of name and the boundaries of species) are the workmanship of the understanding who considers that at least the complex ones are often in several men different collections of simple ideas and therefore that in coextensiveness to one man which is not so to another. Nay, even in substances where their abstract ideas seem to be taken from the things themselves they are not constantly the same: no not in that species which is most familiar to us and with which we have the most intimate acquaintance it having been more than once doubted whether the fetus born of a woman were a man even so far as that it hath been debated whether it were or were not to be nourished and baptized which could not be if the abstract idea or essence to which the name man belonged were of nature's making and were not the uncertain and various collection of simple ideas which the understanding put together and then abstracting it, affixed a name to it. So that in truth every distinct abstract idea is a distinct essence and the names that stand for such distinct ideas are the names of things essentially different. Thus a circle is as essentially different from an oval as a sheep from a goat and rain is as essentially different from snow as water from earth that abstract idea which is the essence of one being impossible to be communicated to the other. And thus any two abstract ideas that in any part vary one

But since the essences of things are thought by some (and not without reason) to be wholly unknown it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word *essence*.

Real essences First Essence may be taken for the very being of anything whereby it is what it is. And thus the real internal but generally (in substances) unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend may be called their essence. This is the proper origin

it is still used when we speak of the essence of particular things without giving them any name.

Nominal essences Secondly The learning and disputes of the schools having been much busied about genus and species the word essence has almost lost its primary signification and instead of the real constitution of things has been almost wholly applied to the artificial constitution of genus and species. It is true there is ordinarily supposed a real constitution of the sorts of things and it is past doubt there must be some real constitution on which any collection of simple ideas coexisting must depend. But it being evident that things are ranked under names into sorts or species only as they agree to certain abstract ideas to which we have annexed those names the essence of each genus or sort comes to be nothing but that abstract idea which the general or sortal (if I may have leave so to call it from sort as I do general from genus) name stands for. And this we shall find to be that which the word essence imports in its most familiar use.

These two sorts of essences, I suppose may not unfailily be termed the one the *real* the other *nominal* essence.

16. Connection between the name and nominal essence. Between the nominal essence and the name there is so near a connexion that the name of any sort of things cannot be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence where by it answers that abstract idea whereof that name is the sign.

17. Suppose that the species are distinguished by their real essences useless. Concerning the real essences of corporeal substances (to mention these only) the case is if I mistake not two opinions. The one is of those who using the word essence for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those essences according to which all natural things are made and wherein they do exactly every one of them partake and so become

Cf. Aristotle *Metaphysics* iv c 4.

f this or that species. The other and more
 natural point is those who look at all natural

essences, &c. which makes it to be general, or general

as on to rank them into sorts under common
 denominations. The former of these points,
 which supposes these essences as a certain num-
 ber of forms or moulds wherein all natural things
 that exist are cast, and do equally partake has,
 I imagine very much perplexed the knowledge
 of natural things. The frequent productions of
 mistakes in all the species of animals and of
 changelings and the strange issues of human
 bodies carry with them difficulties not possible
 to consist with this hypothesis since it is as im-
 possible that things partaking exactly of the
 same real essence should have different proper-
 ties, as that two figures partaking of the same real
 essence should have different properties.

an exact. But thus distinguished, these essences, be-
 lieved particularly to substances we shall when we
 come to consider them, have no occasion
 to treat of more fully.

19 *En generabilis et corruptibilis* That
 such abstract ideas, the names to them as we
 have been speaking of are essences, may further
 appear by what is to be observed concerning
 viz. that they are all in general ad corrupti-
 ble. Which cannot be true of the real con-
 tinuities of things which being not perish-
 ing. All things exist, besides that they
 are all liable to change especially those things
 which are qualified with, and have ranked into
 bodies and distinct names or signs. Thus
 that the human generation-day is not the
 flesh of sheep and within few days after be-
 comes part of man in all which and the lik-
 enesses, considered in the essence—that
 constituted with respect to the properties of these sev-
 eral things depends—is destroyed and perishes
 with them. But these essences taken for estab-
 lished the mind with names annexed to
 them, they are supposed to remain steadily the
 same whatever mutation the particular sub-
 stances are liable to. For whatever becomes of
Alcander and *Bucphalus* the dead to which
 and which are annexed are proposed even though
 they remain the same and so the essences of those
 persons are preserved while the destruction of
 the bodies changes happen to any rational being
 the individuals of those species. By this means the es-
 sence of species rests satisfied with the
 things existences from chaos and dual that
 kind of variety.

to make us lay it by and consider it ourselves with

But if we consider the same simple ideas
 and modes differently situated. Essences being
 distinguished into modal and actual we
 may further observe that, in the species simple
 ideas and modes, they are always the same but
 in substances always qualified differently. Thus, fig-
 ure and colour between the celestial is the
 real as well as minimal essence of a triangle
 being truly abstracted from which the ge-
 ometrical name is exact but the sensory and be-
 lieved thing itself that is different from which
 all its properties flow and so which they are all
 inseparably annexed. But thus the reason co-
 cerning that parcel of matter.

is necessary to be as it returns to determine
 which of the particular figures we meet with have
 been right to the name circle and so to
 show which of them, by having that essence was
 of that species. And though then the we re-
 membered been nature such beast as an *orn*
 such fish as *mermaid* by proposing those
 names to take for complete abstracted as that
 contained inconsistency in them, the essence
 of *mermaid* is as intelligible as that of a man
 and the difference is no more as the steady and

as now not, and so having par-
 ticular ideas of having names that is the gen-
 eral of the body is to color or weight, sensibility fix

I. h. vi.

Cf. *Armstrong's metaphysics* vii.

permanent as that of a horse. From what has been said it is evident that the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas and founded on the relation established between them and certain sounds as signs of them and will always be true as long as the same name can have the same signification.

20 *Recapitulation* To conclude 'This is that which in short I would say viz. that all the great business of *genera* and *species* and their *essences* amounts to no more but this — That men making abstract ideas and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them do thereby enable themselves to consider things and discourse of them as it were in bundles for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

Chap. IV Of the Names of Simple Ideas

1 *Names of simple ideas modes and substances have each somethin peculiar* Though all words as I have shown signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker yet upon a nearer survey we shall find the names of simple ideas mixed modes (under which I comprise relations too) and natural substances have each of them something peculiar and different from the other. For example

2 *Names of simple ideas and of substances intimate real existence* First the names of simple ideas and substances with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify intimate also some real existence from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of mixed modes terminate in the idea that is in the mind and lead not the thoughts any further as we shall see more at large in the following chapter.

3 *Names of simple ideas and modes signify always both the idea and the essence* Secondly The names of simple ideas and modes signify always the real as well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of natural substances signify rarely if ever anything but barely the nominal essences of those species as we shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular.

It has not that I know been yet observed by any body what words are and what are not capable of being defined the want whereof (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses whilst some demand definitions of terms that can

not be defined and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word and its restriction (or to speak in terms of art by a genus and difference) even after such definition made according to rule those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. This at least I think that the showing what words are and what are not capable of definitions and wherein consists a good definition is not wholly besides our present purpose and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas as to deserve a more particular consideration.

5 *If all names were definable it would be a process in infinitum* I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable from that process in infinitum which it will visibly lead us into if we should allow that all names could be defined. For if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another where at last should we stop? But I shall from the nature of our ideas and the signification of our words show why some names can and others cannot be defined and which they are.

6 *What a definition is* I think it is agreed that a definition is nothing else but the showing the meaning of one word by several other not synonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them the meaning of any term is then showed or the word is defined when by other words the idea it is made the sign of and annexed to in the mind of the speaker is as it were represented or set before the view of another and thus its signification is ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions and therefore the only measure of what is or is not a good definition.

7 *Simple ideas undividable* This being premised I say that the names of simple ideas and those only incapable of being defined. The reason hereof is this That if several terms of a definition signifying several ideas they can all together by no means represent an idea which has no composition at all and therefore a definition which properly nothing but the showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing can in the names of simple ideas have no place.

8 *Instances of the difference of definitions of motion* The not observing this difference in our ideas and their names has produced that eminent trifling in the schools which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas. For as to the greatest part of them even those masters of definitions are fain to leave

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CH P IV

them unto hed m ly by the imposs bl ty
Wh t mo q is t jargon

m no ppears t thursts ghtsouseless because
t escapes this w y ftrial For this simpl dea
entering by the touch as well as s ght, it is m
poss bl to show xampl f yo cwh has
→ with d of mot on but bar

ould ha ece equus p w
language, that twas tus us pot tuqua
s pote ua lask h ther any eca
magin h could ther by ha u derstood what
th word br g g gnifi d h guessed
wh t d a D t hman rd uly h d his
mand and would enifyt an th wh nh used
that sou d

g Moder d fi t ns f m t N h e th
mod rn philosoph rs who ha dea ured to
throv fith jarg fith schools, d peak in
libly m ch bett succeeded d fining m
p d as, wh th by plain g th r causes, or
any th rwise Th tomists h defin m t n
to be passag f m pla t th r what
d they mor than put syn mous w df
th Fo wh pass g th than m t on
And f th w re asked what passag was, h
would th bett d fin t than by m t For
t t l ast as p per d nificant t say
Passa m t fr m pla t th r
as to sa M t n is passag &c. This is t
ir nslate and tod fin wh w chang two
w rd f th sam gnificau for an th
wh h, wh is better u d tood than th
th may serv t disco what d th un
known ta dsf but is eryf from d fin
is nl s w ll say ev ry E glish w rd in th
d nary is th d fin u f th Laun w rd t
nw rs d tha m u is d finit of m t us
N will th success e pplicat f th parts
of th superficies of body those of an ther
wh ch th Cart ians g us, pr m ch bet
d finit f motu wh n well camund

Definitions f l ght Th t f perspcu us
as far forth as perspcuous is an th P p tic
d fin f impl d which though n t
more beurd tha th form f motu y be
y is l d gn fi y mor
plainly because petri ce will asily co mce
any on tha ca t mak th mea g of th
w d f ght (h h t p t ds t d fin) t all
und rstood by blind man but th d finit f

Cf. Aristotl *Metaphysic* xi. 9.
Bra rgi g is th Du h for movem t (so Ger
ma Bewegung)
Cf. Aristotl *O th Soul* ii. 3.

simpl d as fo sense, ar tw deas anu w
id as so diff t and dista t ef ma ther
that not w can be mor so And th f e hould
Descartes gl bules strike ne r sol g n the
r una fa man wh as blind by gull serena
h w uld th by nev ha e any d of light,
r anyth g pp chu g t, though h unde
stood ex sow ll hat l t d gl bules we e, d
h t tri k g n an th body as And th r
f th Carte ans ry lli d unguish betw n
that light wh ch is th cause f th t sensation
us, and th de huch is p odu ed in us by t,
and is that wh ch is p pe ly light.

t Simpl d why und finabl further plan d
Simpl d as as has be n h n ar nly t be
got by those mpress ns by ects th msel mak
n ur mu ds, by th p pe nl u ppo ted t
ch so e. If th yar ot ec d th s w y ll
thw rds in th world mad use ft ex pl
d fin any fth r names, will nev be bl top o-
d us th d tsta dsf For rds being
sounds, can produce us n th impl deas
than of thos ry sound xrite any n us,
but by that l tary co xi n h ch is known
is be betw th m and those impl d as whi h
common use has mad th m th ns of H
that thinks th rws l th m try f any w ds can
gi him th tast f pin ppl and mak him
ha th tru d f th l h f that l br ted
d licious fruit. So far as h is t ld th as a esem
blance w th any tas es wh eof h has th d as
Cf. Bk. II eh

permanent as that of a horse. From what has been said it is evident that the doctrine of the immutability of essences proves them to be only abstract ideas and is founded on the relation established between them and certain sounds as signs of them and will always be true as long as the same name can have the same signification.

20 *Recapitulation* To conclude This is that which in short I would say viz that all the great business of *genera* and *species* and their *essences* amounts to no more but this — That men making abstract ideas and settling them in their minds with names annexed to them do thereby enable themselves to consider things and discourse of them as it were in bundles for the easier and readier improvement and communication of their knowledge which would advance but slowly were their words and thoughts confined only to particulars.

Chap. IV Of the Names of Simple Ideas

1 *Names of simple ideas modes and substances* *h* *is* *each* *something* *peculiar* Though all words as I have shown signify nothing immediately but the ideas in the mind of the speaker yet upon a nearer survey we shall find the names of *simple ideas* *mixed modes* (under which I comprise *relations* too) and *natural substances* have each of them something peculiar and different from the other. For example

2 *Names of simple ideas and substances intimate real existence* First the names of *simple ideas* and *substances* with the abstract ideas in the mind which they immediately signify intimate also some real existence from which was derived their original pattern. But the names of *mixed modes* terminate in the idea that is in the mind and lead not the thoughts any further as we shall see more at large in the following chapter.

as well as nominal essence of their species. But the names of natural substances signify rarely if ever anything but barely the nominal essences of those species as we shall show in the chapter that treats of the names of substances in particular.

4 *Names of simple ideas are undefinable* Thirdly The names of simple ideas are not capable of any definition the names of all complex ideas are. It has not that I know been yet observed by any body what words are and what are not capable of being defined the want hereof is (as I am apt to think) not seldom the occasion of great wrangling and obscurity in men's discourses whilst some demand definitions of terms that can

not be defined and others think they ought not to rest satisfied in an explication made by a more general word and its restriction (or to speak in terms of art by a genus and difference) when even after such definition made according to rule those who hear it have often no more a clear conception of the meaning of the word than they had before. Thus at least I think that the showing what words are and what are not capable of definitions and wherein consists a good definition is not wholly besides our present purpose and perhaps will afford so much light to the nature of these signs and our ideas as to deserve a more particular consideration.

5 *If all names were definable it would be a process in infinitum* I will not here trouble myself to prove that all terms are not definable from that progress in infinitum which it will visibly lead us into if we should allow that all names could be defined. For if the terms of one definition were still to be defined by another here at last should we stop? But I shall from the nature of our ideas and the signification of our words show why some names can and others cannot be defined and which they are.

6 *What a definition is* I think it is agreed that a definition is nothing else but the showing the meaning of a word by several other not synonymous terms. The meaning of words being only the ideas they are made to stand for by him that uses them the meaning of any term is then showed when the word is defined when by other words the idea it is made the sign of and annexed to in the mind of the speaker is as it were represented or set before the view of another and thus its signification is ascertained. This is the only use and end of definitions and therefore the only measure of what is or is not a good definition.

7 *Simple ideas are undefinable* This being premised I say that the names of simple ideas and that is only are incapable of being defined. The reason here of is this That the several terms of a definition signifying several ideas they can all together by no means represent an idea which has no composition at all and therefore a definition which is properly nothing but the showing the meaning of one word by several others not signifying each the same thing cannot the names of simple ideas have no place.

8 *Instances which last of definitions of matter* The not observing this difference in our ideas and their names has produced that eminent trifling in the schools which is so easy to be observed in the definitions they give us of some few of these simple ideas. For as to the greatest part of them even those masters of definitions were fain to leave

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CHAP. V

stands for an idea, man is equalled with but
the term is the sign of it, then

only for our simple perception
part easily and perfectly agree in their signification
and there is little room for mistake and
wringling about their meaning. That know-
ledge that whiteness is the name of the colour
which has been observed in snow or milk, will not be apt
to misapply that word as long as he retains that
idea which when he has quite lost, he is not per-
fectly

by a word which denotes only the way they get
into the mind. For when the red and yellow
are all comprehended under the genus or name
colour, the signification is no more, but such ideas as are
produced in the mind only by the sight, do
have their notice only through the senses. And when
they would find in yet a more general term to
comprehend both colours and sounds, and the
like simple ideas, they do it by a word that sig-
nifies all such as come into the mind only by one
sense. And so the general term equally in its ordi-
nary conceptions, comprehend colours, sounds,
tastes, smells, and tangible qualities, the dis-
tinction from extension, number, and pleas-
ure and pain which make impressions on the
mind and introduce them as by more senses
than

17. Some of simple ideas are arbitrary but per-
fectly taken from the nature of the things. Sixthly The
names of simple ideas, substances, and mixed
modes have also this difference that those of
mixed modes stand as perfectly arbitrary
those of substances are not perfectly so but refer
to a pattern though with some latitude and
those of simple ideas are perfectly taken from the
existence of the things, and are not arbitrary at all.
Which, what difference it makes in the con-
sideration of their names, we shall see in the follow-
ing chapters.

Simple modes. The names of simple modes differ
little from those of simple ideas.

Chap. V. Of the Names of Mixed Modes

Mixed modes and for that act as as the
general names. The names of mixed modes be-
ginning, therefore, stand as has been shewed for
sorts or species of things, each of which has its
peculiar essence. The essences of these species
also as has been shewed are in the genus but the
abstracted as in the mind is which the name
is annexed. Thus far the names and essences of
mixed modes have in them, but what is common
to them with the ideas as but if take little
nearer survey of them, we shall find that they
have something peculiar which perhaps may
deserve our attention.

For the first The tract of ideas as they stand for us made
by the understanding. The first particularity I shall
observe in them, is, that the best tract of ideas, or
if you please, the essences, of the several species
of mixed modes, are made by the understanding
wherein they differ from those of simple ideas
in which sort the mind has no power to make
any one but only receives such as are presented

CHAP. V.

Ibid

to the name is known to once and usually
no of parts, whereof more or less being put in,
the idea may be varied and so the signification
of the name be obscure, or uncertain.

¶ Simple ideas have few or no in them for dis-
tinction. Fifthly Thus further may be observed
concerning simple ideas and their names, that
they have but few associations. I need not repeat...

Some name is the genus of the two gen-
eral, is nothing that can be left out of the
idea and ed make them agree in one
common appearance and so have on general
name as animals by being left out of the complex
idea of man, makes agree with brute in the
more general idea and name of animal. And
because for when to word unpleasant enumerations,
men would improve both what and
ed and several times such simple ideas, under
one general name they have been said to

Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum* l. ph 59, 60.

already in his memory imprinted there by sensible objects not strangers to his palate so far may

— 3 6

true taste of that fruit itself In light and colours and all other simple ideas it is the same thing for the signification of sounds is not natural but only imposed and arbitrary And no definition of light or redness is more fitted or able to produce either of those ideas in us than the sound light or red by itself For to hope to produce an idea of light or colour by a sound however formed is to expect that sounds should be visible or colours audible and to make the ears do the office of all the other senses Which is all one as to say that we might taste smell and see by the ears a sort of philosophy worthy only of Sancho Pança who had the faculty to see Dulcinea by hear say And therefore he that has not before received into his mind by the proper inlet the simple idea which any word stands for can never come to know the signification of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever put together according to any rules of definition The only way is by applying to his senses the proper object and so producing that idea in him for which he has learned the name already A studious blind man who had mightily beat his head about visible objects and made use of the explication of his books and friends to understand those names of light and colours which often came in his way bragged one day That he now understood what scarlet signified Upon which his friend demanding what scarlet was? The blind man answered It is as like the sound of a trumpet Just such an understanding of the name of any other simple idea will he have who hopes to get it only from a definition or other words made use of to explain it

12 *The contrary shewn in complex ideas by instances of a statue and rainbow* The case is quite otherwise in complex ideas which consist of several simple ones it is in the power of words standing for the several ideas that make that composition to imprint complex ideas in the mind which were never there before and so make their names be understood In such collections of ideas passing under one name definition or teaching the signification of one word by several others has place and may make us understand the names of things which never came within the reach of our senses and frame ideas suitable to those in other men's minds when they use those

1 D n Q. old Second Part Bk I ch ix.

names provided that none of the terms of the definition stand for any such simple ideas which he to whom the explication is made has never yet had in his thought. Thus the word *statue* may be explained to a blind man by other words when

prize to the painter against the statuary each of which contending for the excellency of his art, and the statuary bragging that his was to be preferred because it reached further and even those who had lost their eyes could yet perceive the excellency of it The painter agreed to refer himself to the judgment of a blind man who being brought where there was a statue made by the one and a picture drawn by the other he was first led to the statue in which he traced with his hands all the lineaments of the face and body and with great admiration applauded the skill of the workman But being led to the picture and having his hands laid upon it was told that now he touched the head and then the forehead eyes nose &c as his hand moved over the parts of the picture on the cloth without finding any the least distinction whereupon he cried out that certainly that must needs be a very admirable and divine piece of workmanship which could represent to them all those parts where he could neither feel nor perceive anything

13 *Colours undefinable to the born blind* He that should use the word *rainbow* to one who knew all those colours but yet had never seen that phenomenon would by enumerating the figure largeness posit on and order of the colours so well define that word that it might be perfectly understood But yet that definition how exact and perfect soever would never make a blind man understand because several of the simple ideas that make that complex one being such as he never received by sensation and perception no words are able to excite them in his mind

14 *Complex ideas definable only when the simple ideas of which they consist have been got from experience* Simple ideas as has been shown can only be got by experience from those objects which are proper to produce in us those perceptions When by this means we have our minds stored with them and know the names for them then we are in a condition to define and by definition to understand the names of complex ideas that are made up of them But when any term stands for a simple idea that a man has never yet had in his mind it is impossible by any words to make known its meaning to him When any term

Ch ix. § 8

CHAPTER 1

matter of the person I do not say this
 as done without also as shall be made by
 and but this I say that it done by the free
 of the mind pure is own and
 that, therefore these species formed modes are
 the wisdom of the understanding of God
 there is nothing more and than that, so the
 most perfect, in the formation of these things, the mind
 searches it up to its nature and reflects it
 and as it makes to the real world of things, but
 puts such together as may be served to win pur-
 poses, with it trying itself a precise imitation
 of anything that ally exists

But still is better than the end of the world and
 it is made in the mind of these complex
 and as these species formed modes depend on the
 mind and are made by the things themselves yet
 they are not made in the mind, and jumbled to-
 gether without any reason at all. Though these
 complex ideas as being taken from nature
 yet they are always suited to the end for which
 they are made and though they become
 human beings made of things that are loose enough,
 and have as little in them as several
 things which the mind never gives occasion
 that combines them together, yet they are
 of communication

and language which have in it
 answer to the mind in another which plainly shows
 that those for us try by the customs and
 from occasions to make sense

collections made and betrayed by the mind
 of naming and for the confusion of

only bundles of particulars may be
 retained, but also give variety and find it
 as collected into complete ideas. The making
 in the foregoing species formed modes, men
 have had regard only to such combinations as
 they had occasion in the use of them.
 Those they have combined into distinct complex
 ideas, and give names to whole things, that in
 nature has as far as it is fit to be and
 is regarded for the further human
 concerns of themselves, if they would make distinction
 between ideas of things and ideas which might be

Jews, have now the language answer
 to them also he explains from what has

words which in translations and discourses are
 proposed to win in the system as
 scarce of names of things names of complex
 ideas, especially formed modes, that stands for
 the same precise idea which the word does that
 in discourses is rendered by them. There are
 ideas more common and less compounded than
 the measures of time, extent and weight and
 the Latin names, *horæ* *pes* *libra* with tedious
 difficulty ordered by the English names, *hour* *foot*
 and *pound* but yet there the manner of it
 than that which is as a Roman annexed to these
 Latin names, were very far different from those
 which an Englishman expresses by those English
 names. And if these should make use of
 the measures that those of the other language do

of these mixed modes as they find they have oc-
 casion to have names for in the ordinary occur-
 rences of the affairs. If they join the dea of
 killing and of father or mother and so make
 distinct species of killing a man so
 neighbour is because of the difference of the
 of the crime and the punishment
 of the murder of a man father and mother

Of § 1. Of § 2.
 Of ch. vi. § 2.

to it by the real existence of things operating upon it¹

3 *Secondly made arbitrarily and without patterns*
In the next place these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made by the mind but made very arbitrarily made without patterns or reference to any real existence Wherein they differ

able But in its complex ideas of mixed modes the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly It unites and retains certain collections as so many distinct specific ideas

cations Nor does the mind in these of mixed modes as in the complex idea of substances examine them by the real existence of things or verify them by patterns containing such pe

it true because any one has been witness to such an action? No but it suffices here that men have put together such a collection into one complex idea that makes the archetype and specific idea whether ever any such action were committed in *rerum natura* or no

4 *How this is done* To understand this right we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists and that is not in the

tain number securely and makes them into one idea Thirdly It ties them together by a name If we examine how the mind proceeds in these and what liberty it takes in them we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind and consequently that the species themselves are of men's making

5 *Evidently arbitrary in that the idea is often before the existence* Nobody can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas put together in the mind independent from any original patterns in nature who will but reflect that this sort of complex ideas may be made abstracted and have names given them and so a species be constituted before any one individual of that species ever existed Who can doubt but the ideas of *sacrilege* or *adultery*

might be framed in the minds of men and have names given them and so these species of mixed modes be constituted before either of them was ever committed and might be as well discoursed of and reasoned about and as certain truths discovered of them whilst yet they had no being but in the understanding as well as now that they have but too frequently a real existence Whereby it is plain how much the sorts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding where they have a being as subservient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge as when they really exist And we cannot doubt but law makers have often made laws about species of actions which were only the creatures of their own understandings beings that had no other existence but in their own minds And I think nobody can deny but that the resurrection was a species of mixed modes in the mind before it really existed

6 *Instances murder incest stibbin* To see how arbitrarily these essences of mixed modes are made by the mind we need but take a view of almost any of them A little looking into them will satisfy us that it is the mind that combines several scattered independent ideas into one complex one and by the common name it gives them makes them the essence of a certain species without regulating itself by any connexion they have in nature For what greater connexion in nature has the idea of a man than the idea of a sheep with killing that this is made a particular species of action signified by the word *murder* and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father with killing than that of a son or neighbour that those are combined into one complex idea and thereby made the essence of the distinct species *parricide* whilst the other makes no distinct species at all But though they have made killing a man's father or mother a distinct species from killing his son or daughter yet in some other cases son and daughter are taken in too as well as father and mother and they are all equally comprehended in the same species as in that of *incest* Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas such as it finds convenient whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature are left loose and never combined into one idea because they have no common name It is evident then that it is made by us free choice gives a connexion to a certain number of ideas which in nature have no more union with one another than others that it leaves out but else is the part of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with taken notice of to make the distinct species called *stibbin* and the figure and

works of nature confirmable I say to this, we find that their names lead our thoughts to them, and no further. When we speak of just — we well meet ourselves in imagination

the effect of that led to of

when we speak of honor, ideas we consider as barriers in the mind but as in things themselves, such affections or original patterns of those ideas. But in mixed modes, the last the most considerable parts of them, such as moral beings, without the original pattern

15 *Hyphen* — — — — — *then* *as*
This also may show us that also why for the most part the names of fixed modes are got by the ideas they stand for are perfectly known. Because the being in species of these ordinarily taken out of but what has names, and those species rather than essences, being abstract

as unless man will fill his mind with the property of abstract complex ideas he has other things in his mind so he has in the good with

13 *I* — — — — — *us*
Hence likewise we may learn why the complex ideas of mixed modes are more commonly compounded and decomposed than those of natural substances. Because they being the work

coherence and so understood in bundle together — — — — — recommended and d

as such in his frequent occasions to use and communicate and in such, I ask whether the ordinary method that children learn the names of mixed modes before they have their ideas. What I thought of ever frames the abstract ideas of *glory* and *ambition* before he has heard the names of them. I imagine ideas and substances I grant to be otherwise which, being such as as has actual existence and union in nature, the ideas and names are got together before they as happens

16 *Reas* *for my* *beginning* *the* *subject*
What has been said here from mixed modes, which very little difference applicable also to ideas which, since every man himself may observe

in small number of examples and in the species of animals, the set of which have and commonly make the whole animal essence. *I am* *from* *mixed* *stand* *for* *the* *idea* *such* *as* *the* *workmanship* *four* *in* *hands*
Another thing we may observe from what has been said is, That the names of mixed modes signify (when they have been determined by signification) the essences of the species. For these being abstracted as being the workmanship of the mind, the real existence of the things, the real supposition of anything more signified by that name, but by the complete idea the mind itself has formed, which is all that could have been expressed by the idea is that on which all the properties of the species depend, and for in
Of Lock Second Letter to Stillingfleet.

subject required. I allow it might be brought in a narrower compass but I as will get to my end — an argument that appears to me clear and I did out of this way (I am sure it is). I thought I would begin to write that, by searching the bottom, and turning to every different part the might in the every new thoughts, and give occasion to the most verse or neglect to effect a general misarranging which, though for consequences, should taken notice of. What thus considered what puddle is made by the sense and has much

signed by their names he would be quite out in his account. These are too sensible proofs to be doubted and we shall find this much more so in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas such as are the greatest part of those which make up moral discourses whose names when men come curiously to compare with those they are translated into in other languages they will find very few of them exactly to correspond in the whole extent of their significations.

9 *This shews species to be made for communication.* The reason why I take so particular notice of this is that we may not be mistaken about genera and species and their essences as if they were things regularly and constantly made by nature and had a real existence in things when they appear upon a more wary survey to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding for the easier signifying such collections of ideas as it should often have occasion to communicate by one general term under which divers particulars as far forth as they agreed to that abstract idea might be comprehended. And if the doubtful signification of the word *species* may make it sound harsh to some that I say the species of mixed modes are made by the understanding yet I think it can by nobody be denied that it is the mind makes those abstract complex ideas to which specific names are given. And fit it be true as it is that the mind makes the patterns for sorting and naming of things I leave it to be considered who makes the boundaries of the sort or species since with me *species* and *sort* have no other difference than that of a Latin and English idiom.

10 *Mixed modes it is the name that ties the combination of simple ideas tother and makes it a species.* The near relation that there is between species and their general name at least in mixed modes will further appear when we consider that it is the name that seems to preserve those essences and give them their lasting duration. For the connexion between the loose parts of those complex ideas being made by the mind this union which has no particular foundation in nature could cease again were there not

the name which is as it were the knot that ties them fast together. What a vast variety of different ideas does the word *sumphus* hold together and deliver to us as one species! Had this name been never made or quite lost, we might, no doubt, have had descriptions of what passed in that solemnity but yet, I think that which holds those different parts together in the unity of one

complex idea is that very word annexed to it without which the several parts of that would no more be thought to make one thing than any other show which having never been made but once had never been united into one complex idea under one denomination. How much therefore in mixed modes the unity necessary to any essence depends on the mind and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common use annexed to it, I leave to be considered by those who look upon essences and species as real established things in nature.

11 Suitable to this we find that men speaking of mixed modes seldom imagine or take any other for species of them but such as are set out by name because they being of man's making only in order to naming no such species are taken notice of or supposed to be unless a name be

otherwise cease to have any as soon as the mind laid by that abstract idea and ceased actually to think on it. But when a name is once annexed to it wherein the parts of that complex idea have a settled and permanent union then is the essence as it were established and the species looked on as complete. For to what purpose should the memory charge itself with such compositions unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpose make them general unless it were that they might have general names for the convenience of discourse and communication? Thus we see that killing a man with a sword or a hatchet are looked on as no distinct species of action but if the point of the sword first enter the body it passes for a distinct species where it has a distinct name as in England in whose language it is called *stabbing* but in another country where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name it passes not for a distinct species. But in the species of corporeal substances though it be the mind that makes the nominal essence yet since those ideas which are combined in it are supposed to have an union in nature whether the mind joins them or not therefore those are looked on as distinct species without any operation of the mind either abstracting or giving a name to that complex idea.

12 *The originals four mixed modes use to know further than the mind which also shows them to be the*

creatures of the understanding rather than the

the ordinary use of the word relates to, and that is considered in particular by us further than as they are ranked into sorts, appears from hence that, taken but away with abstracted as by duals, and ranked into mind

they are the name *body* to be

hence non-*ti* is much plainly how the relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am God's nature has made me so but this is not the I have essential in. An accident or disease may very much alter my colour shape sex or fall make any reason in many both and a people's I neither sense nor understand or less. Other virtues I may have may be made them re and better or fewer degrees of qualities than I have and they may have reason and sense shape and body very different from one another if these are essential to them

that as soon as it supposes *person* is distinguished from *person* by the complex distinguished by some *name* comes to his mind and is referred to that that thus *person* is said to be essential. So that if

thus I will have usual particular being being considered with so many and the other in general the essential to it supposes also to be part of the complexed thing manifest as to

the qualities that are obeyed once the load is not would neither be drawn by it nor receive direction from it, could a you question whether it is tied any thing essential. It would be hard to ask whether a thing really existed any thing essential. It could be demanded whether this made an essential peculiar of reference to no, or whether it is assured of essential or specific but our business is as And to talk of specific differences without reference to general ideas in men, is to talk unreasonably. For I would ask any man whether it is sufficient to make an essential difference between any two particular beings, without my regard had to some abstracted idea which looked upon as the essence and standard of *person*. All such particularities and standards being quite laid aside particular beings considered barely in themselves will be found to have all their qualities equally essential and conversive to each other dual will be essential to each other such is more than all. For though it may be reasonable to ask, whether being *person* is the essential to it or not yet I think this is very improper and insignificant to ask whether the essential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen the thing considered to be the same or as being of the same species. And if as has been said our business is as, which

is called by the name of *person* is called by the name of *person* is

so people be bare as path
and is no essential body of the same

Cf. h. § 5
Cf. Bk. IV. h. § 5

for *person* F be that real constitution
Cf. Spinoza *Ethics* Pt. II. xl. Schol. in
analogy with h. § 4 5.

all sorts of knowledge discourse and conversation are pestered and disordered by the careless

it is not impossible but that in propriety of speech that might be a sun to one which is a star to another

dwelt long on an argument which I think therefore needs to be inculcated because the faults men are usually guilty of in this kind are not only the greatest hindrances of true knowledge but are so well thought of as to pass for it Men would often see what a small pittance of reason and truth or possibly none at all is mixed with those huffing opinions they are swelled with if they would but look beyond fashionable sounds and observe what ideas are or are not comprehended under those words with which they are so armed at all points and with which they so confidently lay about them I shall imagine I have done some service to truth peace and learning if by any enlargement on this subject I can make men reflect on their own use of language and give them reason to suspect that since it is frequent for others it may also be possible for them to have sometimes very good and approved words in their mouths and writings with very uncertain little or no signification And therefore it is not unreasonable for them to be wary herein themselves and not to be unwilling to have them examined by others With this design therefore I shall go on with what I have further to say concerning this matter

Chap VI Of the Names of Substances

1 *The common names of substances stand for sorts*
The common names of substances as well as other general terms stand for sorts which is nothing else but the being made signs of such complex ideas wherein several particular substances do or might agree by virtue of which they are capable of being comprehended in one common conception and signified by one name I say do or might agree for though there be but one sun existing in the world yet the idea of it being abstracted so that more substances (if there were several) might each agree in it it is as much as sort as if there were as many suns as there are stars They want not their reasons who think there are and that each fixed star would answer the idea the name sun stands for to one who was placed in a due distance which by the way may show us how much the sorts or if you please

The essence of each sort of substance is our abstract idea to which the name is annexed The measure and boundary of each sort or species whereby it is constituted that particular sort and distinguished from others is that we call its essence which is nothing but that abstract idea to which the name is annexed so that every thing contained in that idea is essential to that sort This though it be all the essence of natural substances that we know or by which we distinguish them into sorts yet I call it by a peculiar name the nominal essence to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances upon which depends this nominal essence and all the properties of that sort which therefore as has been said may be called the real essence viz the nominal essence of gold is that complex idea the word gold stands for let it be for instance a body yellow of a certain weight, malleable fusible and fixed But the real essence is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body on which those qualities and all the other properties of gold depend How far these two are different though they are both called essence is obvious at first sight to discover

3 *The nominal and real essence different* For though perhaps voluntary motion with sense and reason joined to a body of a certain shape be the complex idea to which I and others annex the name man and so be the nominal essence of the species so called yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source of all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that sort The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients of our complex idea is something quite different and had it such a knowledge of that constitution of man from which his faculties of moving sensation and

than what now is contained in our definition that species be it what it will and our idea of any individual man would be as far different from what it is now as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and other contrivances in of the famous clock at Strasburg from that which a gazing countryman has of it who barely sees the motion of the hand and hears the clock strike and observes only some of the outward appearances

4 *A thing essential to individual* That essence in
* Cf Bk II l viii

animum y w
makes le d and ir n malic ble, ntm y d
ones not. And y t how fin t ly th
sh rt f th fin contr ances and m on e ble
al esse ces f plants or a mals every
knows. The workmanship f th all wise d
powerful God in th gr t f br f th un erse
and every part thereof further exceed th capac
ty and comp h ns f th most inquis it e
and t llig t man, than th best contr an e
f th most ingenious man d th th co ceptions
f th most gu rant f au ale aures There
fore we in ain pr t d to r g thms to
sorts, and dispose th m t e rtain classes un
der names, by th ir al esse es, th t ar so far
f m our discovery comp eh ns n. A bli d
ma may as soo sort things by th colours,
nd h that has lost his sm ll as w ll distu oush
lily d os by their odours, as by those in
ternal constitut ns which h know t. lie
that th ks h can distingu h h p and goats
by th eal m ces, that ar unkn ot hum
may be pleased t try his lill those pec es
called ar *cray* and *guerechmeh* and by th ir
ternal real esse ces d t rrm th bou dar es
f those species, w th ut knowing th compl
dea f sensibl qualities that ach of those
names tand for in th co tr es w he those
numals are t be fou d.

¶ *¶ The sub tant I form u hich I know I*
Those therefore wh ha bee to ght that th
seal pecies f substance had th ir d u ct
t rnal sub tant al f rrm d that t was thos
form which mad th distinct f substance
t their tru species and g era led y t
f ther out f th w y by ha g th mind
se po fr u l ss quires af bstantial
forma wholly unnt lligibl and wh eof w
ha scarce so m ch as any obscur confused
co ceptu g er l.

¶ *¶ That the nom nal ne as that nly u her by*
d wash per f sub tar further rident f m
eur d as f finite prnt d f God Tha our k
g nd distu oush g ns al subta ces into
pec es cons us th munal see esth mund
makes, nd t th al es ces to be fou d
th things th msel es further ev d fr m
our id as f pur ts For th mand g u g nly
b flec g usown pe t ns, those mpl
d as h h t tr but to p us, hath can
ha no ther no f p t but by tr butu g
all those opera ns t f d in is lft sort f

Cl. § 34.

Cl. Aristotle 34 sophy 2.

beings w th ut cons de ation of matter And
n th most ad anced n tion w h e of God
is but attr buting th same mple ideas hich
ha e got from effectio o what e find in
ours l es d which w co c e to h e m
pe f cu n them than ould be in th ab
se ce attr butu g I say thos simpl deas t
Hum in an unl muted degr ¶ Thus ha ng g t
f m effecti go ours l es th d f exust
ce knowledge po e and pleasur — ch of
huch find t bett r t h than to w t
and th mo e ha e of e ch the bette — j
ing all these tog th r w th infin ty to ach of
th m, we ha e ll complex d a of an et nal
dh b-

species than e of pur ts is mposs u u
ca h g no mo es mple d as (or be g
¶ t fr m m re) appl cabl t ch be g,
but only those few take fr m oursel es, and
f m th too f on m ds th k g
and be g d lighted and m g se e al parts
f our bod es can n th r e disun oush
in ou co c pu ns th seal species f sp is,
from an ther but by tributu g thos per
tions and pow rs w find oursel es to th m
in higher or lo d gree and so ha e no ry
distu t pec fic d as f sp is ex pt o ly f
Go t wh m w tr but both du at nd
all those the d as w th fin ty th oth r
spirts th limitatu n as f humbly co
ce d we betw n God d them in o
deas, p t any diff e ce by any numbe f
s mpl d as huch w ha so and x f
th th but nly th t f infinity All th par
ticular d as f exust ce kn wledg will pow
er and mou n &c. be g d as d r ed f m
th pe t ns of ou m ds tr but all of
u m to all sorts f pur ts, w th the diff e
ce only f d gr es m the utmost w can imagi
ev m infinity wh n w ould f m as w ll as
w can d f the Fir t Be g ¶ y t, t
is tain, is infin tly mor rem te, n th l
excell cy f his natu fr m th highest d
perfectest f all cr ted be gs, than th grea
est man, nay pur t se ph, is f m th most
co t mptbl part f matt and consequ ntly
must infin tly exceed hat our nar o u d
tandings can co ce f Hum.

Of finit p ts ther ar p b bly number!

Cl. Bk II ch xxxi. § § 33-3 d Bk IV h

Cl. S Th mas Aq inas *Summa Theol gica*, Part I Q 108

on which the properties depend it necessarily supposes a sort of things properties belonging only to species and not to individuals \forall supposing the nominal essence of gold to be a body of such a peculiar colour and \forall eight with malleability and fusibility the real essence is that constitution of the parts of matter on which these qualities and their union depend and is also the foundation of its solubility in *aqua regia* and other properties accompanying that complex idea Here are essences and properties but all upon supposition of a sort or general abstract idea which is considered as immutable but there \exists no individual parcel of matter to which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable from it That \forall which \exists essential belongs to it as a condition whereby it \exists of this or that sort but take away the consideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea and then there \exists nothing necessary to it nothing inseparable from it Indeed as to the real essences of substances we only suppose their being without precisely knowing what they are but that which annexes them all to the species is the nominal essence of \forall which they are the supposed foundation and cause ¹

7 *The nominal essence bounds the species for us* The next thing to be considered is by which of those essences it is that substances are determined into sorts or species and that it is evident is by the nominal essence For it is that alone that the name which is the mark of the sort signifies It \exists impossible therefore that anything should determine the sorts of things which \forall rank under general names but that idea which that name is designed as a mark for which \exists that as has been shown \forall which \forall call nominal essence Why do we say this is a horse and that a mule this is an animal that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that sort but because it has that nominal essence or which is all one agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to? And I desire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts when he hears or speaks any of these or other names of substances to know what sort of essences they stand for

8 *The nature of species is formed by us* And that the species of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names according to the complex ideas in us and not according to precise distinct real essences in them \exists plain from hence — That \forall we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one sort called

by one common name and so received as being of one species have yet qualities depending on their real constitutions as far different one from another as from others from which they are accounted to differ specifically Thus as it is easy to be observed by all who have to do with natural bodies so chemists especially are often by sad experience convinced of it, when they sometimes in vain seek for the same qualities in one parcel of sulphur antimony or vitriol which they have found in others For though they are bodies of the same species having the same nominal essence under the same name yet do they often upon severe \forall ways of examination betray qualities so different one from another \exists frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemists But if things were distinguished into species according to their real essences, it would be as impossible to find different properties in any two individual substances of the same species as it is to find different properties in two circles or two equilateral triangles That is properly the essence to us \forall which determines every particular to this or that class or which is the same thing to this or that general name and what can that be else but that abstract idea \forall which that name \exists annexed and so has in truth a reference not so much to the being of particular things as to their general denominations?

9 *Not the real essence or texture of parts which we know not* Nor indeed can \forall rank and sort things, and consequently (\forall which \exists the end of sorting) denominate them by the real essences because we know them not Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction of substances than a collection of those sensible ideas which we observe in them which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness \forall are capable of yet \exists more remote from the true internal constitution from which those qualities flow than as I said a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance of that famous clock at Strasburg heretofore only sees the outward figure and motions There is not so contemptible a plant or animal that does not confound the most enlarged understanding Though the familiar use of things about us take off our consideration yet it cures not our ignorance When \forall come to examine the stones \forall tread on or the iron \forall daily handle \forall especially find we know not their make and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them It is evident the internal constitution \forall therefore the properties depend \forall unknown to us for to go no further than the grossest and most obvious we

in divers sorts of animals have been observed, will always give us reason to doubt of one or both of these.

As monstrosities differ from Third. It ought to be determined whether those we call monsters be real distinct species, according to the scholastic notion of the word species since it is certain that everything that exists has a particular constitution. And yet we find that some of these monstrous productions have a few or none of those qualities which are supposed to result from, and accompany the essence of that species from whence they derive their origin, and to which, by their descent, they seem to belong.

2. Usefulness to us of a species Fourth. The real essences of those things which we distinguish into species, and as so distinguished we name ought to be known to us, in order to have ideas of them. But since we are ignorant in these four points, the supposed real essences of things stand as not in stead for the distinguishing substances into species.

3. Our natural senses find out not perfect relations of a few others that flow from their real essences Fifth. The only inamiable help in this case would be that, having framed perfect complex ideas as of the properties of things flowing from their different real essences, we should thereby distinguish them into species. But we cannot this be done. For being ignorant of the real essence we are impossible to know all those properties that flow from it, and are so annexed to it as an effect from its cause. We may certainly conclude that this essence is not true and so the thing is not of that species. We can never know what is the precise number of properties depending on the real essence of any one of which falls in the real essence of gold, and consequently gold would not be true unless we knew the real essence of gold itself and by that determined what species. By the word gold here I must be understood: a particular piece of matter, and the last nature it was coated. For if should stand here in its ordinary signification for this complex idea which I or any one else can find, i. e. for the nominal essence of gold, would be just as hard as to show the true meaning and imperfection of words, when we have nothing but words to do it by.

How ignorant we are of a species Sixth. By which is clear that our distinguishing substances into species by names is not affounded on their real essences nor can we pretend to

range and determine them exactly in species, according to their internal essential differences.

But and for such observations for such observations, as it has been remarked, we have need of general words, though we know not the real essences of things all we can do is, to collect such a number of implied as as by examination, we find to be united together in things existing and thereof to make one complex idea. Which, though it be not the real essence of any substance that exists, is yet the specific essence to which our name belongs, and is convenient to it by which we may at least try the truth of these nominal essences. For example there be that say that the essence of body is extension if it be so, we can never mistake in putting the essence of anything for the thing itself. Let us then in discourse put extension for body and when we would say that body moves, let us say that extension moves, and see how all it will look. He that should say that one extends on by impulse moves another extension, would, by the bare expression, sufficiently show the absurdity of such a notion. The essence of anything in respect of us, is the whole complex idea comprehended and marked by that name and in substances, besides the several distinct simple ideas that make them up, is confused out of substance or of an unknown support and cause of their union, is always a part, and therefore the essence of body is not bare extension, but an extended solid that moves, and so to say, an extended solid that moves, or impels another solid one and as in himself as to say body moves or impels. Likewise to say that a rational animal is capable of conversation, is all one as to say a man but no one will say that rationality is capable of conversation, because it makes not the whole essence which we give to the name man.

Our strictness in the use of names for the sciences and the sciences is the fourth. There are creatures in the world that have shapes like ours, but are hairy and want language and reason. There are naturals amongst us that have perfectly our shape but want reason, and some of them language too. There are creatures, as it is said (if I speak not wrong) but there appears no contradiction that there should be such) that, with language and reason and a shape in the things resembling ours, have hairy tails, the ears where the males have no beards, and others where the females have. If be asked whether these be all men or no, all of human species. it is

CC. Ed. II. ch. xiii. §

CC. Ed. II. ch. iv. and h. xiii. §

species in a continuous series or gradation It is not impossible to conceive nor repugnant to reason that there may be many species of spirits as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know and observe in them That there should be more species of intelligent creatures above us than there are of sensible and material below us is probable to me from hence that in all the visible corporeal world we see no chasms or gaps All quite down from us the descent is by easy steps and a continued series of things that in each remove differ very little one from the other There are fishes that have wings and are not strangers to the airy region and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water whose blood is cold as fishes and their flesh so like in taste that the scrupulous are allowed them on fish-days There are animals so near of kin both to birds and beasts that they are in the middle between both amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together seals live at land and sea and porpoises have the warm blood and entrails of a hog not to mention what is confidently reported of mermaids or sea men There are some brutes that seem to have as much knowledge and reason as some that are called men and the animal and vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined that if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them and so on till we come to the lowest and the most inorganic parts of matter we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together and differ but in almost insensible degrees And when we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker we may have reason to think that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the universe and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect that the species of creatures should also by gentle degrees ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection as we see they gradually descend from us downwards which if it be probable we may have reason then to be persuaded that there are far more species of creatures above us than there are beneath

caused by us prozed from water and ice But to return to the species of corporeal substances If I should ask any one whether ice and water were distinct species of things I doubt not but I should be answered in the affirmative and it cannot be denied but he that says they are two distinct species is in the right But if an Englishman bred in Jamaica who perhaps had never seen nor heard of ice coming into England in the winter find the water he put in his basin at night in a great part frozen in the morning and not knowing any peculiar name it had should call it hardened water I ask whether this would be a new species to him different from water? And I think it would be answered here It would not be to him a new species no more than congealed jelly when it is cold is a distinct species from the same jelly fluid and warm or than liquid gold in the furnace is a distinct species from hard gold in the hands of a workman And if this be so it is plain that our distinct species are thin but distinct complex ideas with distinct names annexed to them It is true every substance that exists has its peculiar constitution whereon depend those sensible qualities and powers we observe in it but the ranking of things into species (which is nothing but sorting them under several titles) is done by us according to the ideas that we have of them which though sufficient to distinguish them by names so that we may be able to discourse of them when we have them not present before us yet if we suppose it to be done by their real internal constitutions and that things existing are distinguished by nature into species by real essences according as we distinguish them into species by names we shall be liable to great mistakes

14 *Difficulties in the supposition of a certain number of species* To distinguish substantial beings into species according to the usual suppositions into that there are certain precise essences or forms of things whereby all the individuals existing are by nature distinguished into species these things are necessary —

15 *A crude supposition* First To be assured that nature in the production of things always designs them to partake of certain regulated established essences which are to be the model of all things to be produced This in that crude sense it is usually proposed would need some better explanation before it can fully be assented to

16 *Monstrous births* Secondly It would be necessary to know whether nature always attains that essence it designs in the production of things The irregular and monstrous births that

in divers sorts of animals have been observed
all all ways give us reason to doubt of on
bo h f these.

7 *Ar monster ally a distinct specie* Thirdly
It ou h t be determined wh thos we call
monsters be really a distinct pecies, according
to th scholastu u n f th word species
ce is certain that ev rything that xists has

long
8 *Men an ho no deas f al ene* Fourthly

range and d termine th m xa tly nt species
according to int rnal ess ntial diff ences

21 *B t t d for such ll t f mpl sub*
lanc as u ha m de the nam land f But
ince as has been emarked w ha need f
g eral w rds, though w know nt the cal es
se ces f th gs all we can d is to coll ct uch
a numbe f impl d as by examinatio
find to be united tog th r in things xisting and
th reof to mak o complex d a. Which,
th ough it be n t the al essence f any sub-
stance that xists, M yet the specific esse ce to
which our name bel ngs, and is con rt ble w th
it by which we may t least try th truth of
these nominal es ces. F exampl ther be
that y that the esse ce f body is *tension* f t
be so we can er mistak in putting th s-
sence f y th g f r the thi g uelf Let us th n
w r out t ns n f body and when

tances into pecies.

thereby distinguish th m into pecies B t n
her can this be don For being gn ant f th
al esse uelf is imposs bl t kn w all
those properties that flow f m t, and ar so
annexed to t, that any f them be g ay
ma certainly co clud that tha esse ce is
no here, and so th th g u t f tha species
We can ev know what is th p ise umbe
f properties depending th al essen f
gold any f which failing th al ess ce
f gold and consequently g ld would t be
were less we knew th real esse ce f g ld
uelf, and by that d rmmmed that pec es. By
th word g f here I must be u d rstood t d
m particular pce f ma g th las
g ne hat as coined For if s should stand
here is ordinary gn f cats n, for that m
pl id uch l or any lse calls g ld,
for he nominal esse ce f g ld t would be jar
gon So hard to show th ar us meaning
nd impe fecu f words, wbe w ha noth
g s but words t d t by

Her name nd pendet f al er By
d uch is cl ar tha our distinguishing sub-
stances into species by names, is not tall founded
on their real esse ces nor can w pretend t

Cl. Ek. II. ch. viii.

moves an th ext ns n wuu }
exp ess n suffici tly how th baurd ty f
uch n uon. Th ess s of anyth g n
spect f us, is th wh l compl x d comp
h ded and marked by that n m nd n sub-
stances, bes des th sev al distun t simple deas
that mak th m up th confused on f sub-
stance f an unknown s ppo t and cause of
th ir un n, is alw ys part and ther fore th
essence f body n thar vt ns n, but an ex
t nded solid thin and so to say an t nded
solid thing mov s, or imp is an the is all one
and as int ll gibl as to say *body m* im
pels Likew se to say that r ual animal
cap ble f con ers ion is all as to say
ma but n o will say that t alty ca
pabl f con rsau because t mak n t th
wh l esse ce t uch w the nam man

but ar hairy and wa t language and eason.
Ther ar naturals mongst us that ha pe
f tly our shape but want ason, and som f
th m languag too Th are creatur s as t is
said (*sit fid pene auth em* but th ppears
co tr d t that thould be su h) that,
w th languag and eason and hape th
things greeing w th ours, ha hairy tails th
ers wh th males ha n beards and th rs
wh th f males ha If t be asked wh th
these be all *men* or n all f human pecies t is

Cl. Ek. II. h. xiii. §

Cl. Ek. II. h. d. h. xiii. §

plain the question refers only to the nominal essence for those of them to whom the definition of the word man or the complex idea signified by the name agrees are men and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different it is wholly impossible for us to answer no part of that going into our specific idea only we have reason to think that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is in vain to inquire whilst our measures of species be as they are only our abstract ideas which we know and not that internal constitution which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill when they agree in shape and want of reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things.

23 *Species in animals distinguished by generation.* Nor let any one say that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female and in plants by seeds keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire. For grant ing this to be true it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient for if history lie not women have conceived by drills and what real species by that measure such a production will be in nature will be a new question and we have reason to think it is not impossible since mules and juments the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare are so frequent in the world. I once saw

be at a loss about the real essence which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation and has alone a right to the specific name. But further if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?

24 *Not by substantial forms.* Upon the whole matter it is evident that it is their own collections of sensible qualities that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men in sorting them. Much less were any substantial forms ever thought on by any but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools and yet those ignorant men who pretend not any insight into the real essences, nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities are often better acquainted with their differences can more nicely distinguish them from their uses and better know what they expect from each than those learned quick sighted men who look so deep into them and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

25 *The specific essences that are commonly made by men.* But supposing that the real essences of substances were discoverable by those that would merely apply themselves to that inquiry yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions or anything else but their ordinary appearances since languages in all countries have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers or logicians or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men but those more or less

of neither sort alone but to have jumbled them both together. To which he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature will find it hard even in the race of animals to determine by the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is and

qualties they found in them thereby to signify them when absent to others whether they had an occasion to mention to a sort or a particular thing.

26 *Therefore your uncertainty in the designation of different men.* Since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their nominal and not by their real essences the next thing to be considered is how and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter it is evident

1 Cf. Shakespear *Measure for Measure* Act II, sc. 2.

plain the question refers only to the nominal essence for those of them to whom the definition of the word man or the complex idea signified by the name agrees are men and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different it is wholly impossible for us to answer no part of that going into our specific idea only. We have reason to think that where the faculties or outward frame so much differs the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is in vain to inquire whilst our measures of species be as they are only our abstract ideas which we know and not that internal constitution which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill when they agree in shape and want of reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things.

23 *Species in animals not distinguished by generation.* Nor let any one say that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female and in plants by seeds keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire. For granting this to be true it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient for philosophy to note women have conceived by drills and what real species by that measure such a production will be in nature will be a new question and we have reason to think this is not impossible since mules and juments the one from the mixture of an ass and a mare the other from the mixture of a bull and a mare are so frequent in the world. I once saw a creature that as the issue of a cat and a rat and had the plain marks of both about it. Here

be at a loss about the real essence which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation and has alone a right to the specific name. But further if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?

4 *Not by substantial forms.* Upon the whole matter it is evident that it is their own collections of sensible qualities that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men in sorting them. Much less were any substantial forms ever thought on by any but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools and yet those ignorant men who pretend not any insight into the real essences nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities are often better acquainted with their differences can more nicely distinguish them from their uses and better know what they expect from each than those learned quick sighted men who look so deep into them and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

25 *The specific essences that are commonly made by men.* But supposing that the real essences of substances were discoverable by those that could severely apply themselves to that inquiry yet we could not reasonably think that the rankin of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions or anything else but the various appearances since languages in all countries have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers or logicians or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men but those more or less comprehensive terms have for the most part in

qualities they found in them thereby to signify them when absent to others whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.

26 *Therefore you are to ascribe the ideas of different things.* Since then it is evident that we sort and name substances by their nominal and not by their real essences the next thing to be considered is how and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter it is evident

monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature will find it hard even in the race of animals to determine by the pedigree of what species every animal's issue is and

Cf Shakespeare *Measure for Measure* Act II
I 21

they are made by the mind and not by nature for were they by nature workmanship, they could not be so various and differ in several men as experience tells us they are. For if we will examine it, we shall not find the nominal essence of any one species of substances all the same. No, not of that which of all things are the most intimately acquainted with. It could not possibly be that the abstract idea to which the name man is given should be different in several men, if it were of nature making and that to one it should be *beatus homo* and to another *animal rationale*. But that annexes the name to a complex idea, made up of sense and spontaneous motion, joined to body (such shape, has thereby an essence of the species man and he that, upon further examination, discovers that it has another essence. The species he calls man by which means the same individual will be true man to the one which is not so to the other. I think there is scarce any way allow this proper figure, so well known, to be the essential difference of the species man and yet how far men determine of the sorts of animals rather by their shape than descent, is very visible since it has been more than once debated whether several human fortunes should be preserved or received to baptism or no. Only because of the difference of their outward configuration from the ordinary make of children which we know whether they were or no as capable of reason as infants cast in another mould some whereof though of an approved shape, are never capable of as much appearance of reason all this is as is to be found in an ape, or an elephant, and ever give any signs of being led by rational soul. Whereby it is evident, that the outward figure, which only was found wanting and not the faculty of reason, which nobody could know would be wanting in this season, was made essential to the human species. The learned divines and lawyers must on such occasions, use his sacred fiction of *animal rationale* and substitute some thing else for the human species. Monsieur Malouin furnishes us with an example worth taking notice of this occasion. "When the abbot of Saint Martin, says he, was born, he had so little of this figure of man, that he spake him rather monstrous. I was for some time under a liberty whether he should be baptized or no. However he was baptized and declared man provisionally till time should show what he would prove. Nature had moulded him so unowardly that he was called all his life the Abbe Malotru. c. ill-shaped. He was of Caen. (*Memoria*, 78, 430.) This child, we see, was

very near being excluded out of the species of man, barely by his shape. If escaped very narrowly as he was and it is certain, figure all the more oddly turned had cast him, and he had been rejected, as a thing not to be allowed to pass for man. And yet there can be no reasoning with the lineaments of his face had been a little altered the rational soul could not have been lodged in him why a nose somewhat longer or a nose flatter or a wider mouth, could not have consisted as well as the rest of his little figure with such a soul, such parts, as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church.

27 *Several essences of substances are determined by nature and not by art as necessary* Wherein then would I gladly know consist the precise undimovable boundaries of that species. It is plain if we examine there is no such thing made by nature, and established by her amongst men. The real essence of that or any other sort of substances, it is evident, we know not and therefore are so undetermined our nominal essences, which we make ourselves, that, if several men were to be asked concerning some odd,

to distinguish the species of substances, were not made by man with some liberty but were exactly

and could have spoke, it would have increased the difficulty. Had the proper part to the middle been of human shape and all below swine had been murder to destroy it. O must the bishop have been consulted whether it were man enough to be admitted to the altar. No As I have been told it happened in France some years since in somewhat like case. So uncertain are the boundaries of species of animals to us, who have no other measures than the complex ideas of our own collecting and so far are we from certainly knowing what a man is though perhaps it will be judged great ignorance to make any doubt of it. And yet I think I may say that the certain boundaries of that species are so far from being determined and the precise number of simple ideas which make the nominal es-

plain the question refers only to the nominal essence for those of them to whom the definition of the word man or the complex idea signified by the name agrees are men and the other not. But if the inquiry be made concerning the supposed real essence and whether the internal constitution and frame of these several creatures be specifically different it is wholly impossible for us to answer no part of that going into our specific idea only we have reason to think that here the faculties or outward frame so much differs the internal constitution is not exactly the same. But what difference in the real internal constitution makes a specific difference it is in vain to inquire whilst our measures of species be as they are only our abstract ideas which we know and not that internal constitution which makes no part of them. Shall the difference of hair only on the skin be a mark of a different internal specific constitution between a changeling and a drill when they agree in shape and want of reason and speech? And shall not the want of reason and speech be a sign to us of different real constitutions and species between a changeling and a reasonable man? And so of the rest if we pretend that distinction of species or sorts is fixedly established by the real frame and secret constitutions of things.

23 *Species in animals distinguished by generation.* Nor let any one say that the power of propagation in animals by the mixture of male and female and in plants by seeds keeps the supposed real species distinct and entire. For granting this to be true it would help us in the distinction of the species of things no further than the tribes of animals and vegetables. What must we do for the rest? But in those too it is not sufficient for if history lie not upon men have conceived by drills and what real species by that measure such a production will be in nature will be a new question and we have reason to think this is not impossible since mules and ju-

be at a loss about the real essence which he thinks certainly conveyed by generation and has alone a right to the specific name. But further if the species of animals and plants are to be distinguished only by propagation must I go to the Indies to see the sire and dam of the one and the plant from which the seed was gathered that produced the other to know whether this be a tiger or that tea?

24 *Not by substantial forms.* Upon the whole matter it is evident that it is their own collections of sensible qualities that men make the essences of their several sorts of substances and that their real internal structures are not considered by the greatest part of men in sorting them. Much less were any substantial forms ever thought on by any but those who have in this one part of the world learned the language of the schools and yet those ignorant men who pretend not any insight into the real essences nor trouble themselves about substantial forms, but are content with knowing things one from another by their sensible qualities are often better acquainted with their differences can more nicely distinguish them from their uses and better know what they expect from each than those learned quick sighted men who look so deep into them and talk so confidently of something more hidden and essential.

5 *The specific essences that are commonly made by men.* But supposing that the real essences of substances were discoverable by those that would severely apply themselves to that inquiry yet we could not reasonably think that the ranking of things under general names was regulated by those internal real constitutions or anything else but their obvious appearances since languages in all countries have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers or logicians so such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men but those more or less

a creature that was the issue of a cat and a rat, and had the plain marks of both about it here in nature appeared to have followed the pattern of neither sort alone but to have jumbled them both together. To which he that shall add the monstrous productions that are so frequently to be met with in nature will find it hard even in the race of animals to determine by the production of what species every animal's issue is and

qualties they found in them thereby to signify them when absent to others whether they had an occasion to mention a sort or a particular thing.

26 *Therefore every rational creature is the idea of different men.* Since then it is evident that essence and name substances by their nominal and not by their real essences the next thing to be considered is how and by whom these essences come to be made. As to the latter it is evident

¹ Cf. Shakespeare *Widow's* A gift is D am

scia prec se umber of s mple deas mu h
~ wh ch are un ted n n ture. H that

use th m d gree will h easu d
that, though th minal esse ces of s bsta ces
re all pposed t be cop ed from n ture yet
they are all, most f them cry unperfect. S ce
th composu f those complex d as re
seve al m ery d ff rent d th ref re that
these bo daries of spec es are as men d n t
as \ tu e makes th m, if t l ast there re n
nature any such pref. ed bo ds It stru that
ma y particular bsta es are so mad by h
ture, that they ha agre m t d h k esse e
than ther d so fford a fou d u n f be
ing anked int sorta. B th sort g f th gs by
s, th making f d t m t spec es, be g
rd t mu g d mp h d g th m
m l t see h w t can be

nature f w ha ungn ed ig etalna es
for prese t use stay f perfect discovery
f all those q ites wh ch w ld b t show us
th most material differe ces d agree m t

id a, and g t g al m that record
ing ou th ghts and ou disco rs w th th
rs, w may in h rt w d des gn t all th
d vid al th gre un th t compl d w th
t m ratu g th impl deas th t mak t
p and so t wast urtun d breath ted
us descrip ns wh h w see they ar f m to
d wh w uld disco rse f y new sort f things
they ha ty t nam f

3 Et ene f p nes nder the am nam ery d f
fart d ffer t m nds th weve these pe es
of bsta ces pass w ll enough in rdinary co
versatu uplain that this complex idea wh re
in they bscrve several ind vid also to gree is by

colo r makes gold t cn

has as good a right t be p
ide of th t ubstance where they are llj ed
as a ther \ d ther f red ff re t m n f a g
outo putting sev ral mpl d as wh ch oth
ers d not, ac ord ng t ther nous ex m
to sk ll f observ t n of that sul ject, ha re
d fferent esse ces of gold wh ch must therfo e
be f th r own and n t f n t res mak g
32 The mor gener l our d f subst ne t t th
mor ne mp t ad part f they ar f the mbe of
m l ideas that mak the m al essence of

so in the m re comprehens - t m m f
the masters f log c, are called g ner These are
compi t deas des gnedly mperfect a d m is
ble at frst ght, that several f those q al ues
th t re to be f d in th th ngs them sel es are
p rposely f sto t f g rical deas. Fo as the
m d t mak m eral d as compreh d ng sev
ral part cul rs, lea res out those of um a d pl ce
and su ll th that mak th m c m m cable
t m re tha d vid f so t mak other
y t mo g ral d as, that may comprehend
d ff re t sorts t lea es out those qual ites th t
dust guish th m a d p u t is new collectu m
nly such deas as a commo to several sorts.

m t al be g exed th is genus constituted
th esse cwh reof be g that abstract d c n
tain g nly mall bl ess d fus bil ty with
ce tain degrees of w ght d ff ed ess, wh n
som bodies f sev al k ds gre lea es out th
col u and ther qualites pecul to g ld d
al d th th sorts compreh ded u d
th nam m tal Wh by t pl th t m n
f ll w not exactly th p uerns act th m by na

sence so far from being settled and perfectly known that very material doubts may still arise about it. And I imagine none of the definitions of the word *man* which we yet have nor descriptions of that sort of animal are so perfect and exact as to satisfy a considerate inquisitive person much less to obtain a general consent and to be that which men would everywhere stick by in the decision of cases and determining of life and death baptism or no baptism in productions that might happen.

8 *But not so arbitrary as mixed modes.* But though these nominal essences of substances are made by the mind they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed modes. To the making of any nominal essence it is necessary. First that the ideas whereof it consists have such a union as to make but one idea how compounded soever. Secondly that the particular ideas so united be exactly the same neither more nor less. For if two abstract complex ideas differ either in number or sorts of their component parts they make two different and not one and the same essence. In the first of these the mind in making its complex ideas of substances only follows nature and puts none together which are not supposed to have a union in nature. Nobody joins the voice of a sheep with the shape of a horse nor the colour of lead with the weight and fixedness of gold to be the complex ideas of any real substances unless he has a mind to fill his head with chimeras and his discourse with unintelligible words. Men observing certain qualities always joined and existing together therein copied nature and of ideas so united made their complex ones of substances. For though men may make what complex ideas they please and give what names to them they will yet if they will be understood when they speak of things really existing they must in some degree conform their ideas to the things they would speak of or else men's language will be like that of Babel and every man's words being intelligible only to himself would no longer serve to converse on and the ordinary affairs of life if the ideas they stand for be not some way answering the common appearances and agreement of substances as they really exist.

some few sensible obvious qualities and often if not always leave out others as material and as firmly united as those that they take. Of sensible

quality and most characteristical part that determines the species. And therefore in vegetables and animals an extended solid substance of such a certain figure usually serves the turn. For however some men seem to prize their definition of *animal rationale* yet should there a creature be found that had language and reason but partaken not of the usual shape of a man I believe it would hardly pass for a man how much soever it were *animal rationale*. And if Balaam's ass had all his life discoursed as rationally as he did once with his master I doubt yet whether any one would have thought him worthy the name man or allowed him to be of the same species with himself. As in vegetables and animals it is the shape so in most other bodies not propagated by seed it is the colour we must fix on and are most led by. Thus where we find the colour of gold we are apt to imagine all the other qualities comprehended in our complex idea to be there also and we commonly take these to be obvious qualities viz shape and colour for so presumptive ideas of several species that in a good picture we readily say this is a lion and that a rose this is a gold and that a silver goblet only by the different figures and colours represented to the eye by the pencil.

30 *Yet imperfect as they thus are they serve for common converse.* But though this serves well enough for gross and confused conceptions and inaccurate ways of talking and thinking yet men are far from being agreed on the precise number of simple ideas or qualities belonging to any sort of thing signified by its name. Nor is it a wonder since it requires much time pains and skill strict in

are always to be found together in the same subject. Most men wanting either time inclination or industry enough for this even to some tolerable degree content themselves with some few obvious and outward appearances of things there by readily to distinguish and sort them for the common affairs of life and so without further

nature yet the number it combines depends upon the various care industry or fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themselves with

the complex idea the name gold is by any one annexed to, may be said of its peculiar weight, fix'dness, and several other the like qualities for whatever is left out, or put in, it is still the complex idea which that name is annexed to that makes the species and as any particular parcel of matter answers that idea so the name of the sort belongs truly to it and it is of that species. And thus anything is true gold perfect metal. All which determination of the species, it is plain, depends on the understanding of man, making thus or that complex idea.

36. Natural and artificial fix'dness. Thus, then, in short, in the case Nature makes many particularities, which do agree new than other in man sensible qualities, and probably too in their internal frame and constitution but it is not this real essence that distinguishes them into species it is men who, taking occasion from the qualities they find united in them, and wherein they observe on several individuals to agree range them into sorts, in order to their naming, for the convenience of comprehensible signs under which individuals, according to their conformity to this or that abstract idea, come to be ranked as under ensigns so that this is of the blue, that the red regiment this is man, that drill and in this, I think, consists the whole business of genus and species.

3. The manner of sorting particular beings. Let us see how men, though they make things as they like do not deny but nature in the constant production of particular beings, makes them not always new and various, but very much alike and of kind one another but I think it ever the less true, that the boundaries of the species,

hereby men sort them, are made by men since the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are as has been proved of man making and sold inadequate to the internal nature of the things they are taken from. So that we may truly say such manner of sorting of things is the workmanship of men.

38. Error of the doctrine that men make several new. One thing I doubt not but will seem very strange in this doctrine which is, that from what has been said it will follow that each abstract idea, with name to it, makes distinct species. But who can help it, if truth will have so For so must remain till somebody can show us the species of things limited and distinguished by something else and let us see that general terms signify no other abstract ideas, but something different from them. I would fain know why shock and bound are not as distinct species as spaniel and an elephant. We

have no other idea of the different essence of an elephant and a spaniel than we have of the different essence of a shock and bound all the essential difference whereby we know and distinguish them one from another consisting only in the different collection of simple ideas, to which we have annexed those different names.

39. How great and perfect ideas are. How much the making of species and genera is in order to general names and how much general names are necessary if not to the being yet at least to the completing of a species, and making it pass for such, will appear besides what has been said above concerning ice and water in a very familiar example. A blind and a sick man watch are but one species to those who have but one name for them both that has the name

plain they are but one species to him, when he has but one name for them. For what is sufficient in the inward contrivance to make a new species. There are some watches that are made with four wheels, others with five thus a specific difference to the workman. Some have strings and plectrums, and others no some have the balance loose and others regulated by a spiral spring and others by hogs bristles. Are any or all of these enough to make a specific difference to the workman that knows each of these and several the different contrivances in

difference is no, relates only to the complex idea to which the name which is given as long as they all agree in the idea which that name stands for and that name does not as a general name comprehend different species under it they are not essentially nor specifically different. But if an one will make many differences that he knows in the internal frame of watches, and to such precise complex ideas give names that shall prevail they will then be new species, to them who have those ideas with names to them, and can by those different names distinguish watches into these several sorts and then each will be a general name. If they they would be no distinct species to men ignorant of clock work, and the inward contrivances of watches, who had no other idea but the outward shape and bulk, with the marking of the

ture when they make their general ideas of sub

men in making their general ideas seeking more the convenience of language and quick dispatch by short and comprehensive signs than the true and precise nature of things as they exist have in the framing their abstract ideas chiefly pursued that end which was to be furnished with store of general and variously comprehensive names So that in this whole business of genera and species the genus or more comprehensive

one will think that a man and a horse and an animal and a plant &c are distinguished by real essences made by nature he must think nature to be very liberal of these real essences making one for body another for an animal and an

new thing made but only more or less comprehensive signs whereby we may be enabled to express in a few syllables great numbers of particular things as they agree in more or less general conceptions which we have framed to that purpose In all which we may observe that the more general term is always the name of a less complex idea and that each genus is but a partial conception of the species comprehended under it So that if these abstract general ideas be thought to be complete it can only be in respect of a certain established relation between them and certain names which are made use of to signify them and not in respect of anything existing as made by nature

33 *This shall accommodate to the end of speech* This is adjusted to the true end of speech which is to be the easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions For thus he that would discourse

spontaneous motion necessary to signify all which partaked of those ideas and he that had made a complex idea of a body with life sense and motion with the faculty of reasoning and a certain shape joined to it needed but use the short monosyllable *man* to express all particulars that correspond to that complex idea This is the proper business of genus and

species and thus men do without any consideration of real essences or substantial forms which come not within the reach of our knowledge when we think of those things nor within the signification of our words when we discourse with others

ing of something between feathers and hair of a dark brown colour without wings but in the place thereof two or three little branches coming down like sprigs of Spanish broom long great legs with feet only of three claws and without a tail I must make this description of it and so

plex idea mentioned in that description though by that word which is now become a specific name I know no more of the real essence or constitution of that sort of animals than I did before and knew probably as much of the nature of that species of birds before I learned the name as many Englishmen do of swans or herons which are specific names very well known of sorts of birds common in England

35 *Men determine the sorts of substances which may be sorted variously* From what has been said it is evident that men make sorts of things For it being different essences alone that make different species it is plain that they who make those abstract ideas which are the nominal essences do thereby make the species or sort Should there be a body found having all the other qualities of gold except malleableness it would no doubt be made a question whether it were gold or not i.e. whether it were of that species This could be determined only by that abstract idea to which every one annexed the name gold so that it would be true gold to him and belong to

ableness in his specific idea And who is it that makes these diverse species, even under the same name? It is the mere supposition to imagine that a body may be malleable or not

putting in or leaving out of malleableness

chole than usual and imagines it to be from opinion he has of his wife Adah, (whom he most ardently loved) that she had too much kindness for other men. Adam discourses these his thoughts to Eve and desires her to take care that Adah commit not fully and in these discourses with Eve he makes use of these two new words *know* and *suppose*. Adam's mis-

ality to him and the fourth of commit-ting jealousy) lost not their distinct signifi-

plain consisted in precise combination of simple ideas, different in colour from the other I ask, whether the compound Adam-mind, which he called *know* & were dequate not. And it is plain it was for the same combination of simple ideas, which he, without any regard to an archetype without respect to anything as pattern voluntarily put to the abstracted, and gave the name *know* to to express in short to them, by that one sound all the simple ideas contained and united in that complex or it must necessarily follow that it was an dequate idea. His own choice having made that combination, it had all in it the intended sound, and so could not but be perfect, could not but be dequate being referred to no other archetype which it was supposed to represent.

4. These words, *know* & and *suppose* &, by degrees grow into common use, and then the case was somewhat altered. Adam's children had the same faculties, and thereby the same power that he had, to make what complex idea as of mixed modes they pleased in their own minds to abstract from, and make what sounds to express the signs of them. but the use of names began to make our ideas what we know to them, that cannot be done, but when the same sign stands for the same idea in two who would communicate their thoughts and discourse together. Those, therefore, of Adam's children, that found these two words *know* and *suppose*, in familiar use, could not take them for insignificant sounds, but must needs conclude they stood for some

as names of species already established and agreed they were bound to conform the ideas in their minds, signified by these names, to the ideas that they stood for in other men's minds, as to the patterns and archetypes and then indeed their ideas of these compound modes were liable to be inadequate as before every apt (especially those that consisted of combinations of many simple ideas) not to be exactly conformable to the ideas in other men's minds, using the same names though for this there be usually a remedy at hand which is to ask the meaning of any word we understand not of him that uses it it being as impossible to know certainly what the words *palour* and *dultery* (which I think answer *sex* and *no*) stand for in another man's mind, with whom I would discourse about them as it was impossible in the beginning of language to know what *know* and *suppose* stood for in another man's mind without explication they being voluntary signs in every one.

5. *Interpretation of names of substance named Zaphir* Let us now also consider after the same manner the names of substances the first application. O of Adam's children, roaming the mountains, lie on a glittering substance which pleases his eye. Home he carries it to Adam, who upon consideration of it, finds it to be hard to have been of yellow colour and exceedingly great weight. These perhaps, the first, are all the qualities he takes notice of in it. In abstracting this complex idea, consisting of a substance having that peculiar bright yellowness, and weight very great in proportion to its bulk, he gives it the name *zaphir* to denominate and mark all substances that have these sensib-

6. He put ideas together not by his own imagination, not taken from the existence of anything and to them he gave names to denominate all things that should happen to him. He took those his abstract ideas, without considering whether any such thing did exist or not the standard there was of his own making. But in the forming his idea of this new substance, he takes the quite contrary course here. He has standard made by nature and therefore, being to represent that to himself, by the idea he has

hours by the hand For to them all those other names would be but synonymous terms for the same idea and signify no more nor no other thing but ■ watch Just thus I think it is in natural things Nobody will doubt that the wheels or springs (if I may so say) within are different in a rational man and a *changeling* no more than that there is a difference in the frame between a *drill* and a *chan elin* But whether one or both these differences be essential or specifical is only to be known to us by their agreement or disagreement with the complex idea that the name man stands for for by that alone can it be determined whether one or both or neither of those be a man

40 *Species of artificial things less confused than natural* From what has been before said we may see the reason why in the species of artificial things there is generally less confusion and uncertainty than in natural Because an artificial thing being a production of man which the artificer designed and therefore well knows the idea of the name of it is supposed to stand for no other idea nor to import any other essence than what is certainly to be known and easy enough to be apprehended For the idea or essence of the several sorts of artificial things consisting for the most part in nothing but the determinate figure of sensible parts and sometimes motion depending thereon which the artificer fashions in matter such as he finds for his turn it is not beyond the reach of our faculties to attain ■ certain idea thereof and so settle the signification of the names whereby the species of artificial things are distinguished with less doubt obscurity and equivocation than we can in things natural whose differences and operations depend upon contrivances beyond the reach of our discoveries

relations it seldom happens that men have occasion to mention often thus or that particular when it is absent Besides the greatest part of mixed modes being actions which perish in their birth are not capable of a lasting duration as substances which are the actors and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting union

43 *Difficult to lead another by words into the thought of things stripped of those abstract ideas we give them* I must beg pardon of my reader for having dwelt so long upon this subject and perhaps with some obscurity But I desire it may be considered how difficult it is to lead another by words into the thoughts of things stripped of those specific differences we give them which things if I name not I say nothing and if I do name them I thereby rank them into some sort or other and suggest to the mind the usual abstract idea of that species and so cross my purpose For to talk of a man and to lay by at the same time the ordinary signification of the name man which is our complex idea usually annexed to it and bid the reader consider man as he is in himself and as he is really distinguished from others in his internal constitution or real essence that is by something he knows not what looks like trifling and yet thus one must do who would speak of the supposed real essences and species of things as thought to be made by nature if it be but only to make it understood that there is no such thing signified by the general names which substances are called by But because it is difficult by known familiar names to do this give me leave to endeavour by an example to make the different consideration the mind has of specific names and ideas a little more clear and to show how the complex ideas of modes are referred sometimes to archetypes in the minds of other intelligent beings or which is the same to the signification annexed by others to their received names and sometimes to no archetypes at all Give me leave also to show how the mind always refers its ideas of substances either to the substances themselves or to the signification of their names as to the archetypes and also to make plain the nature of species or sorting of things as apprehended and made use of by us and of the essences belonging to those species which is perhaps of more moment to discover the extent and certainty of our knowledge than we at first imagine

44 *Instances of mixed modes named kinneah and mough* Let us suppose Adam in the state of a grown man with a good understanding but in

those of natural substances For why should we not think ■ watch and pistol as distinct species one from another as a horse and a dog they being expressed in our minds by distinct ideas and to others by distinct appellations?

42 *Substances alone of all our several sorts of ideas have proper names* This is further to be observed concerning substances that they alone of all our several sorts of ideas have particular or proper names whereby one only particular thing is signified Because in simple ideas modes and

significations of words are very warily and sparingly to be altered. Because men being furnished already with names for their ideas, and commonly so having appropriated known names to certain ideas, a affected misapplication of them cannot but be very ridiculous. If that hath otherwise will perhaps be true sometimes on the coming of new terms to express them but men think that boldness, and it is uncertain whether common use will ever make them pass for current. But in common conversation with them, it is necessary that they conform themselves as we make the vulgar words (any language standard for to their known proper significations, (such I have explained at large already) or else to make known that new significations require them.

Chap VII Of Particles

1 Particle connect parts or hold sentence together Besides words which are names for ideas in the mind there are great many others that are made use of to signify the action that the mind performs, and as, or, propositional, where than. The mind in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need names of the ideas it has before it, but others also, to how or to unite some particular action of its own, at that time relating to those ideas. This it does several ways as I and I are the general marks, of the mind, affirming and denying. But besides affirmative and negative, without which there is no way to truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentence to others, connect the parts of propositions, but which else it connects another with it in several relations depending on each other, making coherent discourse.

I give us for particle on is the art for all
p for The words whereby signifies what connects together the several affirmations

good to I think well it is not no good that man has as clear added to him his thoughts, or that he observes the agreement disagreeing of some of them but he must think them, and observe the dependence of his thoughts and reason upon them. And to express such in the doctrinal and rational thoughts, the mind has words to show what connects them, as distinction, opposition, emphasis &c. which gives each respect to part of his discourse. To mistake in any of these is a puzzle

and of informing his hearer and therefore it is, that those words which are not truly by themselves the names of any ideas are for such constant and dispensable use in language and do much contribute to men's well expressing themselves.

3 They show what relation the words give to their own thoughts This part of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some others over-diligently cultivated. It is easy for men to write one after another cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and adjectives in these and the like, there has been great diligence used and particles themselves, in some languages, have been, with great show of exactness, ranked to their several orders. But though for prepositions and conjunctions &c. are names well known in grammar and the particles connected and them carefully ranked to their distinct subductions yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what signification and force they have, must take himself more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe closely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

4 They are all marks for some action or relation of the mind There is intention, for the explaining of these words, to render them, as is usual in discourse, by words of another to give which come nearest to the signification of what is meant by them is commonly as hard to be understood, one as another language. They are all marks of some union or union of the mind and therefore to understand them rightly the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations, and exceptions, and several other thoughts of the mind for which we have either no ordinary names, are diligently to be studied. Of these there is a great variety in which exceeding the number of particles that most languages have to express them by, and therefore it is not to be wondered that most of these particles have and some times almost proper significations. In the Hebrew to give the relation particle consisting of but single letter which there are reckoned up as I remember seven, I am sure above fifty several significations.

5 Instance but But is a particle, no

and intimates several relations to the mind gives to the several propositions parts of them which it joins by this monosyllable.

First, But to say more here intimates

of it even when it is absent he puts in no simple idea into his complex one but what he has the perception of from the thing itself. He takes care that his idea be conformable to this archetype and intends the name should stand for an idea so conformable.

47 This piece of matter thus denominated *zahab* by Adam, being quite different from any he had seen before nobody I think will deny to be a distinct species and to have its peculiar essence and that the name *zahab* is the mark of the species and is name belonging to all things partaking in that essence. But here it is plain the essence Adam made the name *zahab* stand for was nothing but a body hard shining yellow and very heavy. But the inquisitive mind of man not content with the knowledge of these as I may say superficial qualities puts Adam upon further examination of this matter. He therefore knocks and beats it with flints to see what was discoverable in the inside he finds it yield to blows, but not easily separate into pieces he finds it will bend without breaking. Is not now ductility to be added to his former idea and made part of the essence of the species that name *zahab* stands for? Further trials discover fusibility and fixedness. Are not they also by the same reason that any of the others were to be put into the complex idea signified by the name *zahab*? If not, what reason will there be shown more for the one than the other? If these must then all the other properties which any further trials shall discover in this matter ought by the same reason to make a part of the ingredients of the complex idea which the name *zahab* stands for and so be the essence of the species marked by that name. Which properties because they are endless it is plain that the idea made after this fashion by this archetype will be always inadequate.

48 The abstract ideas of substances always imperfect and therefore various. But this is not all. It would also follow that the names of substances would not only have as in truth they have but would also be supposed to have different significations as used by different men which would very much cumber the use of language. For if every distinct quality that were discovered in any matter by any one were supposed to make a necessary part of the complex idea signified by the common name given to it it must follow that men must suppose the same word to signify dif-

49 Therefore to fix their nominal species a real essence is supposed. To avoid this therefore they have supposed a real essence belonging to every species from which these properties all flow and would have their name of the species stand for that. But they not having any idea of that real essence in substances and their words signifying nothing but the ideas they have that which is done by this attempt is only to put the name or sound in the place and stead of the thing having that real essence without knowing

either it means that fixedness is a part of the definition is a part of the nominal essence the word gold stands for and so this affirmation all gold is fixed contains nothing but the signification of the term gold. Or else it means, that fixedness not being a part of the definition of the gold is a property of that substance itself in which case it is plain that the word gold stands in the place of a substance having the real essence of a species of things made by nature. In which way of substitution it has so confused and

will always fail us in its particular application and so is of no real use or certainty. For let it be ever so true that all gold is all that has the real essence of gold is fixed what serves this for whilst we know not in this sense what it is or is not gold? For if we know not the real essence of gold it is impossible we should know what parcel of matter has that essence and so whether it be true gold or no

51 Conclusion To conclude what liberty Adam had at first to make any complex ideas of mixed modes by no other pattern but by his own thoughts, the same have all men ever since had. And the same necessity of conforming his ideas of substances to things without him as to archetypes made by nature that Adam was under if he could not willfully impose upon himself the same are all men ever since under too. The same liberty also that Adam had of affixing any new name to any idea the same has any one still (especially the beginners of languages if we can imagine any such) but only with this difference that in places where men in society have already established a language amongst them the

¹Cf. ch. x. § 17

a stop of the mind in the course it was going before it came quite to the end of it

Secondly I saw but two plants here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other

Thirdly You pray but it is not that God would bring you to the true religion

Fourthly But that he would confirm you in your own The first of these *but*s intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it

Fifthly All animals have sense but a dog is an animal here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former as the minor of a syllogism

¶ *This matter of the use of particles but lightly touched here* To these I doubt not might be added a great many other significations of this particle if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude and consider it in all the places it is to be found which if one should do I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of it would deserve the title of *discretive* which grammarians give to it But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs The instances I have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles some whereof constantly and others in certain constructions have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them.

Chap VIII Of Abstract and Concrete Terms

1 *Abstract term of p d ctable one of n ther d why* The ordinary words of language and our common use of them would have given us light into the nature of our ideas if they had been but considered with attention The mind as has been shown has a power to abstract its ideas and so they become essences general essences whereby the sorts of things are distinguished Now each abstract idea being distinct so that of any two the one can never be the other the mind will by its intuitive knowledge perceive their difference, and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another This we see in the common use of language which permits not any two abstract words or names of abstract ideas to be affirmed one of another For how near of kin soever they may seem to be and how certain soever it is that man is an animal or rati-

¹ Cf. BL. IV ch. II. § 1

al or white yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these propositions *humanity is animality* or *rationality* or *whiteness* and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming not one abstract idea to be another but one abstract idea to be joined to another which abstract ideas in substances may be of any sort in all the rest are little else but of relations and in substances the most frequent are of powers v.g. a man is white signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects or a man is rational signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also in it the essence of rationality i.e. a power of reasoning

2 *They show the difference of our ideas* This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas for if we observe them we shall find that our simple ideas have all abstract as well as concrete names the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a substantive the other an adjective as whiteness white sweetness sweet The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations as justice just equality equal only with this difference that some of the con-

substances we have very few or no abstract names

number of names of substances to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coining of abstract ones and those few that the Schools forged and put into the mouths of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use or obtain the license of public approbation Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas which no doubt they would have had had not their consciousness to

of those substances whereof they knew they had no ideas And indeed it was only the doctrine of

² Cf. BL. II ch. XXX. § 12

substantial form and the confidence is mistaken

use amongst the Romans but in a far different sense, and too different the basic essence of any substance. It was the abstract name of mode, and to create human nature.

Chap. IX. Of the Imperfection of Words

Words are used for order and communication. From what has been said in the foregoing chapters, it is easy to perceive what imperfection there is in language, and how the very nature of words makes it almost necessary for many of them to be doubtful and uncertain in their significations. To examine the perfect imperfection of words, it is necessary first to consider their use and end, as they are more or less fitted to attain that, so they are more or less perfect. We have in the former part of this discourse often, upon occasion, mentioned double use of words.

First, Of the ordinary use of words.

Secondly, That their use in communicating of our thoughts to others.

Any words will serve for order. As to the first of these, for the order of words, the help of words is necessary, whereby, as I have said, we talk to ourselves, any words will serve the turn. For since sounds are voluntary and indifferent signs of any ideas, a man may use what words please to signify his own ideas to himself, and there will be no imperfection in them, if he constantly use the same on the same idea of things.

I C. 11

no commerce, about the ordinary affairs and common necessities of life, in the social firmament.

Secondly, By the philosophical use of words, I mean such use of them as may serve to convey the precise notions of things, and to express in

Cf. ch. x. § 3

general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the mind may rest upon and be satisfied with, in its search after truth and knowledge. These two uses are very distinct and altogether different, unless all serve in the same manner as we shall see hereafter.

4. The imperfection of words is the doubtfulness or ambiguity of their signification, which is caused by the sort of wealth they afford for the conveyance of language in communication being to be understood words serve to lift the thought in the mind philosophical discourse. Hence, a word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it awakens in the mind of the speaker. As, for example, has no natural connexion with our ideas, but has all their signification from the arbitrary imposition of meaning doubtfulness and uncertainty of their signification, which is the imperfection here are speaking of. It is a cause more in the ideas they stand for than in the capacity there is to be sound more than in the signification any idea for in that regard they are all equally perfect.

That then which makes doubtfulness and uncertainty in the signification of some more than the words, is the difference of ideas they stand for.

5. Natural causes of the imperfection of words, the that stand for mixed motions and for words of substance. Words having naturally no signification, the ideas which they stand for must be learned and retained by those who will change the thoughts, and hold intelligible discourse with others, in any language. But this is the hardest to be done here.

First, That ideas they stand for are very complex, and made up of a great number of different parts together.

Secondly, Where the ideas they stand for have no certain connexion in nature, and so no settled standard anywhere in nature existing to rectify and adjust them by.

Thirdly, When the signification of the word is referred to a standard which standard is not easy to be known.

Fourthly, Where the signification of the word and the real essence of the thing are not exactly the same.

— as which another has not organs faculties to attain as the names of colour to a blind man, sounds to a deaf man, need not here be mentioned.

In all these cases we shall find an imperfection

a stop of the mind in the course it was going before it came quite to the end of it

Secondly I saw but two plants here it shows that the mind limits the sense to what is expressed with a negation of all other

your own The first of these *but*s intimates a supposition in the mind of something otherwise than it should be the latter shows that the mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before it.

Fifthly All animals have sense but a dog is an animal here it signifies little more but that the latter proposition is joined to the former as the minor of a syllogism

¶ *This matter of the use of particles but lightly touched here* To these I doubt not might be added a great many other significations of this particle if it were my business to examine it in its full latitude and consider it in all the places it is to be found which if one should do I doubt whether in all those manners it is made use of it would deserve the title of *discretion* which grammarians give to it But I intend not here a full explication of this sort of signs The instances I have given in this one may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in language and lead us into the contemplation of several actions of our minds in discoursing which it has found a way to intimate to others by these particles some of hereof constantly and others in certain constructions have the sense of a whole sentence contained in them

Chap VIII Of Abstract and Concrete Terms

1 *Abstract terms of positive and negative* The ordinary words of language and our common use of them, would have given us light into the nature of our ideas if they had been but considered with attention The mind as has been shown has a power to abstract its ideas and so they become essences general essences whereby the sorts of things are distinguished Now each abstract idea being distinct, so that of any two the one can never be the other the mind will by its intuition and knowledge perceive their difference, and therefore in propositions no two whole ideas can ever be affirmed one of another Thus we see in the common use of language which permits

al or white yet every one at first hearing perceives the falsehood of these propositions *humanity is animality* or *rationality* or *whiteness* and this is as evident as any of the most allowed maxims. All our affirmations then are only in concrete, which is the affirming not one abstract idea to be another but one abstract idea may be joined to another which abstract ideas in substances may be of any sort in all the rest are little else but of relations and in substances the most frequent are of powers v.g. a man is white signifies that the thing that has the essence of a man has also in it the essence of whiteness which is nothing but a power to produce the idea of whiteness in one whose eyes can discover ordinary objects or a man is rational signifies that the same thing that hath the essence of a man hath also in it the essence of rationality i.e. a power of reasoning

2 *They show the difference of our ideas* This distinction of names shows us also the difference of our ideas for if we observe them, we shall find that our simple ideas have all abstract as well as concrete names the one whereof is (to speak the language of grammarians) a substantive the other an adjective as whiteness white sweetness sweet The like also holds in our ideas of modes and relations as justice just equality equal only with this difference that some of the concrete names of relations amongst men chiefly are substantives as *pater noster* whereof it were easy to render a reason But as to our ideas of substances we have very few or no abstract names at all For though the Schools have introduced *animalitas* *humanitas* *corporeitas* and some others yet they hold no proportion with that infinite number of names of substances to which they never were ridiculous enough to attempt the coinage of abstract ones and those few that the Schools forged and put into the mouths of their scholars, could never yet get admittance into common use or obtain the license of public approbation. Which seems to me at least to intimate the confession of all mankind that they have no ideas of the real essences of substances, since they have not names for such ideas which no doubt they would have had had not their consciousness

tan soever it is that man is an animal or rational
Cf. Bk. IV ch. II § 1

—
ously ventured on such terms as *auritas* and *saxitas* *metellitas* and *lignitas* or the like names, which should pretend to signify the real essences of those substances whereof they knew they had no ideas And indeed it was only the doctrine of
*Cf. Bk. II ch. xxix. § 12.

does not lend co-tribut to the doubtfulness of their signification. For if we will observe how children learn languages, we shall find that, to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances stand for, people ordinarily show them the things, whereon they would have them fix the idea, and then repeat to them the name that stands for it as *hinc est* *aut, hic est* *aut* *dog*. But as for mixed modes, especially the most material of them, *moral words*, i.e. sounds are usually learned first and then, to know what complex ideas they stand for, they are either beheld to the explication of them, or (which happens for the most part) are left to their own observation and industry, which being laid out in the search of the true and precise meaning of names, these moral words are in most men's mouths little more than bare sounds or when they have any it is for the most part but very loose and undetermined, and consequently obscure and confused signification. And even those themselves who have the more attention settled their notions, do yet hardly sound the inconuenience to have them stand for complex ideas different from those

which their even intelligent and judicious men, make them the signs of. Where shall we find any either controversial debate, familiar discourse, concerning honour faith, grace religion, church, &c., wherein it is not easy to observe the different notions men have of them. Which is nothing but this, that they are not agreed in the signification of those words, no have in their minds the same complex ideas which they make them stand for and so all the contests that follow thereupon are only about the meaning of sound. And hence we see that, in the interpretation of laws, whether divine or human, there is no end comments beget comments, and explications make new matter for explications and of humane distinguishing any thing signification of these moral words there is no end. These ideas of men making are, by men still having the same power multiplied as men. Many men who was pretty well satisfied of the meaning of ex of Scripture, or clause in the cod first reading, has, by consulting commentaries, quite lost the sense of it, and by these citations given rise or increase to his doubts, and drawn obscurity upon the place. I say not this that I think commentaries needless but to show how uncertain the names of mixed modes naturally are, even in the mouths of those who had both the intention and the faculty of speaking as clearly as language was capable to express their thoughts.

10. Hence *mixed modes* signify in general either What obscurity this has undoubtedly brought upon the writings of men who have lived in remote ages, and different countries, I will be needless to take notice. Since the numerous volumes of learned men, employing their thoughts that way are proofs more than enough, to show what attention, study sagacity and reasoning are required to find out the true meaning of ancient authors. But, there being no writings we have any great concernment to be very solicitous about the meaning of but those that contain either truths we are required to believe or laws we are to obey and draw inconueniences on us when we mistake or transgress, we may be less anxious about the sense of their authors who, writing but their own opinions, we are under no greater necessity to know them, than they to know ours. Our good or evil depending not on their decrees, we may safely be ignorant of their notions and therefore in the reading of them, if they do not use their words with due clearness and perspicuity we may lay them aside, and without any injury done them, resolve thus with ourselves,

Si non te istius gr. debet neg. gr.

11. Name of substance of doubtful signification because the ideas they stand for relate to the nature of things. If the signification of the names of mixed modes be certain, because there be no real

the names in the nature of things, for a contrary reason, i.e. because the ideas they stand for are supposed conformable to the reality of things, and are referred to as standards made by nature. In our ideas of substances we have not the liberty as in mixed modes, to frame what combinations we think fit, to be the characteristical notes to rank and denominate things by. In these we must follow nature, suit our complex ideas to real existences, and regulate the signification of their names by the things themselves, if we will have our names to be signs of them, and stand fast in them. Here, it is true, we have patterns to follow but patterns that will make the signification of their names very uncertain for names must be of a very unsteady and various meaning, if the ideas they stand for be referred to standards with it us, that either cannot be known at all, or can be known but imperfectly and uncertainly.

2. Name of substance referred to its essence that cannot be known. The names of substances

in words which I shall more at large explain in their particular application to our several sorts of ideas for if we examine them we shall find that the names of *Mixed Modes* are most liable to doubtfulness and imperfection for the two first of these reasons and the names of *Substances* chiefly for the two latter

6 *The names of mixed modes doubtful* First because the ideas they stand for are so complex First The names of *mixed modes* are many of them liable to great uncertainty and obscurity in their signification

I Because of that great composition on these complex ideas are often made up of To make words serviceable to the end of communication it is necessary as has been said that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker Without this men fill one another's heads with noise and sounds but convey not thereby their thoughts and lay not before one another their ideas which is the end of discourse and language But when a word stands for a very complex idea that is compounded and decompounded it is not easy for men to form and retain that idea so exactly as to make the name in common use stand for the same precise idea without any the least variation Hence it comes to pass that men's names of very compound ideas such as for the most part are moral words have seldom in the different men the same precise signification since one man's complex idea seldom agrees with another's and often differs from his own—from that which he had yesterday or will have to-morrow

7 *Secondly because they have no standards in nature* Because the names of mixed modes for the most part do not stand in nature which men may rectify and adjust their significations therefore they are very various and doubtful They are assemblages of ideas put together at the pleasure of the mind pursuing its own ends of discourse and suited to its own notions whereby it designs not to copy anything really existing but to denominate and rank things as they come to agree with those archetypes or forms it has made. He that first brought the word *sham* or *whiedle* or *banter* in use put together as he thought fit those ideas he made it stand for and as it is with any new names of modes that are now brought into any language so it is with the old ones when they were first made use of Names therefore that stand for collections of ideas which the mind makes at pleasure must needs be of doubtful signification when such collections are nowhere to be found constantly united in nature, nor any patterns to be shown

whereby men may adjust them. What the word *murder* or *sacrilege* &c signifies can never be known from things themselves there be many of the parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the action itself the intention of the mind or the relation of holy things, which make a part of murder or sacrilege, have no necessary connexion with the outward and visible action of him that commits either and the pulling the trigger of the gun with which the murder is committed and is all the action that perhaps is visible has no natural connexion with those other ideas that make up the complex one named murder They have their union and combination only from the understanding which unites them under one name but, uniting them without any rule or pattern it cannot be but that the signification of the name that stands for such voluntary collections should be often various in the minds of different men who have scarce any standing rule to regulate themselves and their notions by in such arbitrary ideas.

8 *Common use or propriety not a sufficient remedy* It is true common use that is the rule of propriety may be supposed here to afford some aid to settle the signification of language and it cannot be denied but that in some measure it does Common use regulates the meaning of words pretty well for common conversation but

not sufficient to adjust all Discourses there being scarce any name of any very complex idea (to say nothing of others) which in common use has not a great latitude and which keeping within the bounds of propriety may not be made the sign of far different ideas Besides the rule and measure of propriety itself being nowhere established it is often matter of dispute whether this or that way of using a word be propriety of speech or no From all which it is evident, that the names of such kind of very complex ideas are naturally liable to this imperfection to be of doubtful and uncertain signification and even in men that have a mind to understand one another do not always stand for the same idea in speaker and hearer Though the names *glory* and *altitude* be the same in every

9 *The utility of the name contributes also to their doubtfulness* The way also wherein the names of mixed modes are ordinarily learned

each of them made it a sign of a different complex idea. This made them perceive that the main of their dispute was about the signification of the word itself, very little in

er it was to be called *I quoro* no
when consid red, th y th ught t not worth the
co tending bo t.

17 *Just a gold H* *How much this is the case in*
the part of the men are
so holy in I shall perhaps have an occasion
to take a new place to take a new use. Let us only
be a little more actively than
we shall see
significantly

[illegible]

admit to be of that perfection, to be comprised under that name gold, only such substance as, having that shining yellow color will by fire be reduced to fusion, and not to ashes. Another by the same reason, does the weight, which being quality as traighly joined with that color as to fusion, he thinks has the same reason to be joined in idea, and to be signified by its name with reference thereto made up of body of such a color and fusibility to be imperfect and so none of all the rest wherein none can show reason why some of these inseparable qualities, that are always united in nature, should be put into the minimal essence, and therefore our why the weight gold, signifying that sort of body the ring his finger is made of should contain that sort ther by its color and weight, and fusibility than by its color and weight, and solubility in aqua regia since the dissolving it by that liquor is as inseparable from it as the fusion by fire and they are both of them nothing but the relation which that substance has to two other bodies, which have power to perform differently upon it. For by what right is that fusibility comes to be part of the essence signified by the word gold, and solubility but property of it. Or why is color a part of the essence, and is not its colorableness but a property. That which I mean is

both sides, I (wh) had been used to suspect, that the most est. par. of disputes in re-
solved the significance of (w)ords than real dif-
ference in the concepts of things desired, that,
before the w. any further in this dispute,
they could first examine and establish among
themselves the words / qu. qualified. They
first were all surprised at the proposal and
had they been persons less ingenious, they might
perhaps have taken it for very firm. I was ex-
tra-gar-dant sure there was more than that
though no himself to understand very perfectly
what the word *lucus* stood for which I think,
too none of the most perplexed names of sub-
stances. However they were pleased to comply
with my motion and upon examination found
that the significance of the word was in so set-
tled certain as they had all imagined but the

have as has been shown¹ a double reference in their ordinary use

First Sometimes they are made to stand for and so their signification is supposed to agree to the *real constitution of things* from which all their properties flow and in which they all centre But this real constitution or (as it is apt to be called) essence being utterly unknown to us² any sound that is put to stand for it must be very uncertain in its application and it will be impossible to know what things are or ought to be called *horse* or *antimony* when those words are put for real essences that we have no ideas of at all And therefore in this supposition the names of substances being referred to standards that cannot be known their significations can never be adjusted and established by those standards

13 To co-exist in qualities which are known but imperfectly Secondly The simple ideas that are found to co-exist in substances being that which their names immediately signify these as united in the several sorts of things are the proper standards to which their names are referred and by which their significations may be best rectified But neither will these archetypes so well serve to this purpose as to leave these names without very various and uncertain significations Because these simple ideas that co-exist and are united in the same subject being very numerous and having all an equal right to go into the complex specific idea which the specific name is to stand for men though they propose to themselves the very same subject to consider yet frame very different ideas about it and so the name they use for it unavoidably comes to have in several men very different significations The simple qualities which make up the complex ideas being most of them powers in relation to changes which they are apt to make in or receive from other bodies are almost infinite. He that shall but observe what a great variety of alterations any one of the baser metals is apt to receive from the different application only of fire and how much a greater number of changes any of them will receive in the hands of a chymist by the application of other bodies will not think it strange that I count the properties of any sort of bodies not easy to be collected and completely known by the ways of inquiry which our faculties are capable of They being therefore at least so many that no man can know the precise and definite number they are differently discovered by different men according to their various skill attention and ways of

handling who therefore cannot choose but have different ideas of the same substance and therefore make the signification of its common name very various and uncertain For the complex ideas of substances being made up of such simple ones as are supposed to co-exist in nature every one has a right to put into his complex idea those qualities he has found to be united together For

with that colour in his idea of gold as any one does its fusibility solubility in *aqua regia* being a quality as constantly joined with its colour and weight as fusibility or any other others put into it ductility or fixedness &c as they have been taught by tradition or experience Who of all these has established the right signification of it? word gold? Or who shall be the judge to determine? Each has his standard in nature which he appeals to and with reason thinks he has the same right to put into his complex idea signified by the word gold those qualities which upon trial he has found united as another who has not so well examined has to leave them out or a third who has made other trials has to put in others For the union in nature of these qualities being the true ground of their union in one complex idea who can say one of them has more reason to be put in or left out than another? From hence it will unavoidably follow that the complex ideas of substances in men using the same names for them will be very various and so the significations of those names very uncertain

14 Thirdly to co-exist in qualities which are known but imperfectly Besides there is scarce any particular thing existing which in some of its simple ideas does not communicate with a greater and in others a less number of particular beings who shall determine in this case which are those that are to make up the precise collection that is to be signified by the specific name? or can with any just authority prescribe which obvious or common qualities are to be left out or which more secret or more particular are to be put in

the names of substances which causes such uncertainty disputes or mistakes when we come to a philosophical use of them.

15 With this imperfection the ym yse of several but of itself philosophical use It is true as to civil

Ch v
 1 Cf Bk II ch viii.

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CHAP. IX.

and figure in things of known seminal propaga-
tion, but especially the most part

meant by the word gold or people, to distinguish
it from the other things which are inquir-
ies and debates, where general truths are to be
established, and consequences drawn from propo-
sitions laid down, there the precise signifi-
cation of the names of substances will be found not only
not to be well established, but also very hard to
be known. For example, he that shall make small

each of them made a sign of a different com-
plexion. This made them perceive that the
main of their dispute was about the signifi-
cation of that term and that they differed very little in
their notions concerning the fluid and sub-
stantial properties, though they thought it was
not so easy to agree whether it was to be called liquor or no, a thing which
when considered they thought it worth the
contending about.

17 I take gold. Herein this is the case in
the great matter of dispute with me near
being so hotly. I shall perhaps have an occa-
sion to take place to take notice. Let us only
be a little more exactly the

gold, take in such signification but in such
as another man can never be forced to admit. No
be convinced of their truth, who makes not mal-
feasance, or the same degree of fixedness, part
of the complex idea that the name gold, in his
use of it, stands for

6 I take liquor. This is a natural and almost
indisputable notion in all the
names of substances, in all languages where
which men will easily find themselves passing
from confused loose notions to more
more strict and close inquiries. For they will
be convinced how difficult and obscure those
words are in their signification which in ordi-
nary use appeared very clear and determinate. I
was not in meeting of very learned and in-
sensible physicians, where by chance there arose
a question, whether any liquor passed through the
filaments of the nerves. The debate having been
managed good while, by an array of arguments

both sides, I (who had been used to suspect,
that the great dispute in re-
solving the signification of words than real dif-
ference in the concepts of things) desired, that,
before they went any further in this dispute,
they could first examine and establish among
themselves what word they meant. They then
first were much surprised at the proposal and
had they been persons less ingenious, they might
perhaps have taken for my first ex-
tra-argument since there was on there that
thought no himself to understand very perfectly
that the word liquor stood for which I think,
too, none of the most perplexed names of sub-
stances. However they were pleased to comply
with my motion and upon examination found
that the signification of that word was so set-
tled or certain as they had all imagined but that

of a body

such being the definition to which children have an
expectation that the shining yellow part of a
peacock's tail is properly their gold. Other
finding fusibility joined with that yellow colour
in certain parcels of matter make of that com-
bination a complex idea to which they give the
name gold to denote sort of substances and so
excluded from being gold all such yellow shining
bodies as by fire will be reduced to ashes and
admit to be of that species, or to be comprehended
under that name gold, only such substances
as, having the shining yellow colour will by fire
be reduced to fusion, and then to ashes. In their
by the same reason, does the weight, which be-
ing quality as straightly joined with that col-
our as fusibility, he thinks has the same reason to
be joined in the idea, and to be signified by the
name and therefore the matter of body
of such colour and fusibility to be imperfect
and so of all the rest wherein one can show
reason why some of these inseparable qualities,
that are all united in nature should be put
into the nominal essence, and others left out. For
why the word gold signifying that sort of body
thinks his finger is made of should denote
more that sort of matter by its colour weight, and
fusibility than by its colour weight, and sol-
ubility in water than the dissolving it by that
liquor as inseparable from it as the fusion by
fire and they are both of them nothing but the
relation which that substance has to two other
bodies, such as powder to percate different-
ly upon it. For by what right is it that fusibility
comes to be part of the essence signified by the
word gold, and solubility but property of it. O
why is it colour part of the essence, and is mal-
feasance but property. That which I mean is

this That these being all but properties depend on its real constitution and nothing but powers either active or passive in reference to other bodies no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain Since as has been said several people observe several properties in the same substance and I think I may say no body all And therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things and words have very uncertain significations

18 *The names of simple ideas the least doubtful* From what has been said it is easy to observe what has been before remarked viz that the names of simple ideas are of all others the least liable to mistakes and that for these reasons First Because the ideas they stand for being each but one single perception are much easier got and more clearly retained than the more complex ones and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes in which the precise number of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed so readily kept in mind And Secondly Because they are never referred to any other essence but barely that perception they immediately signify which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed and gives occasion to so many disputes Men that do not perversely use the words or on purpose set themselves to cavil seldom mistake in any language which they are acquainted with the use and signification of the name of simple ideas *White and sweet flow and bitter* carry a very obvious meaning with them which every one precisely comprehends or easily perceives he is ignorant of and seeks to be informed But what precise collection of simple ideas *modesty* or *frugality* stand for in another's use is not so certainly known And however we are apt to think we well enough know what is meant by *glory* yet the precise complex idea others make them the signs of is not so certain and I believe it is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collection Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes when they are made use of in discourses where men have to do with universal propositions and could settle in their minds universal truths and consider the consequences that follow from them.¹

Cf. Bk. II ch. vi. § 2 also Bk. II ch. viii.

19 *And next to them simple modes* By the same rule the names of simple modes are next to those of simple ideas least liable to doubt and uncertainty especially those of figure and number of which men have so clear and distinct ideas Who ever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of *seven* or a *triangle*? And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names.

20 *The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances* Mixed modes, therefore that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas have usually names of no very uncertain signification But the names of mixed modes which comprehend a great number of simple ideas are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning as has been shown. The names of substances being annexed to ideas that are neither the real essences nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty especially when we come to a philosophical use of them

21 *Why this imperfection charged upon words* The great disorder that happens in our names of substances proceeding for the most part, from our want of knowledge and inability to penetrate in to their real constitutions it may probably be

— — — — —
 tice that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method I must confess, then that when I first began this Discourse of the Understanding and a good while after I had not the least thought that any consideration of words was at all necessary to me But when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge I found it had so near a connexion with words that unless their force and manner of signification were first well observed there could be very little said clearly and pertinently concerning knowledge which being conversant about truth had constantly to do with propositions And though it terminated in things yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge. At least they interpose themselves so much between our understandings and the truth which it could contemplate and apprehend that I like the medium through which visible objects pass the obscurity and disorder do not seldom cast a mist before our eyes and impede upon our un-

In Bk. II

*In Bk. IV

understandings. If we consider the fallacies in
 the position itself, as well as the things, and the
 must be made possible to the
 great part is owing to words, and the reason cer-
 tainly is that, notwithstanding the fact that we
 cannot think thus small but clear in the way to
 knowledge which I could describe are still more
 carefully to be learned of because it has been so
 far from being taken care of as incoherence
 in the things themselves. It has been
 made the business of men's study and obtained
 the reputation of being a good thing as we
 shall see in the following chapter. But I repeat
 it again that, were the imperfections of lan-
 guage as the instrument of knowledge made
 thoroughly weighed a great many of the errors
 that make up the error of the old
 world of themselves cease with the knowledge
 of the depth of the error too large a general
 penetrates than it does.

*The should teach us modesty upon general
 and not fold authors.* Sure I am that the signifi-
 cance of words in all languages depends greatly
 much on the thoughts, and not as of them

may be say cannot choose but be very fallible
 in the understanding of it. It is to be re-
 membered that the will of God is not the same in
 words, and he is able to that doubt and uncer-
 tainty which undoubtedly attends the thing of
 consequence which his Son whilst clothed
 in flesh, was subject to all the faults and in-
 conveniences of human nature sin excepted. And
 the right manner of his goodness, that he hath
 spread before all the world such legible char-
 iters of his works and providence and given all
 mankind so sufficient a light of reason, that they
 may whom it is written in word not in command-
 ment (which nevertheless they set the seal to search) as
 the record of the being of God or of the obed-
 ience to him. Since then the precepts of Na-
 tural Religion are plain and every thing is able to
 all mankind seldom come to be controverted
 and doth contain the truths, which are con-
 veyed to us by books and languages, are liable
 to the common defects of all humanities and dif-
 ficulties and it words methinks it would be
 come us to be more careful and diligent in ob-
 serving the former and less magisterial, posit-
 and imperious, imposing upon our own sense and
 interpretations of the latter

Chap. X. Of the Use of Words

the greatest same words. But hence the natural
 difficulty every country there shall be added
 different countries and remoteness, where the
 speakers and writers had very different notions,
 temperaments, manners and degrees of
 speech, &c. every one of which influenced the
 significance of their words the thought us
 with a lost darkness two would beco-

1 *Useful but of words.* Besides the imperfec-
 tion that is naturally in language and the in-
 security and confusion that is so hard to be re-
 moved in the use of words, there are several other
 faults and neglects which are a great deal of this
 way of communicating which by the rendering
 these signs less clear and distinct in the gen-
 eral than the things they need to be.

2 *It is as if we say.* In this kind the first and
 most palpable abuse, is the using of words which
 are used to stand as which is worse signs
 than the things signified. Of these there are
 three sorts—

1 *Some words are used as if they were the things
 themselves.* Thus for example, I say,

it is plain with the constant signification
 terms, of every thing sense distinct in the
 speaker the thing may be said to be distinct
 certainly to the hearer. And discourses of re-
 ligion, law and morality as they are matters of
 the highest consequence to the human

the effects of the things or promote
 the way of communicating the things, and it is
 some things, or so weakly of
 their hypothesis, and it is to coin new words,

EX. *Verbum O. Verbum Bk I. p. 60, on the*

this That these being all but properties depending on its real constitution and nothing but powers either active or passive in reference to other bodies no one has authority to determine the signification of the word gold (as referred to such a body existing in nature) more to one collection of ideas to be found in that body than to another whereby the signification of that name must unavoidably be very uncertain Since as has been said several people observe several properties in the same substance and I think I may say no body all And therefore we have but very imperfect descriptions of things and words have very uncertain significations

18 *The names of simple ideas the least doubtful* From what has been said it is easy to observe what has been before remarked viz that the names of simple ideas are of all others the least liable to mistakes and that for these reasons First Because the ideas they stand for being each but one single perception are much easier got and more clearly retained than the more complex ones and therefore are not liable to the uncertainty which usually attends those compounded ones of substances and mixed modes in which the precise number of simple ideas that make them up are not easily agreed so readily kept in mind And Secondly Because they are never referred to any other essence but barely that perception they immediately signify which reference is that which renders the signification of the names of substances naturally so perplexed and gives occasion to so many disputes Men that do not perversely use the words or on purpose set themselves to cavil seldom mistake in any language which they are acquainted with the use and signification of the name of simple ideas *White* and *sw* *t* *yellow* and *bitter* carry a very obvious meaning with them which every one precisely comprehends or easily perceives he is ignorant of and seeks to be informed But what precise collection of simple ideas *m* *d* *sty* or *frug* *lity* stand for in another's use is not so certainly known And however we are apt to think we well enough know what is meant by *gold* or *iron* yet the precise complex idea others make them the signs of is not so certain and I believe it is very seldom that in speaker and hearer they stand for exactly the same collection Which must needs produce mistakes and disputes when they are made use of in discourses wherein men have to do with universal propositions and would settle in the minds universal truths and consider the consequences that follow from them.

¹ Cf. Bk II ch. vi. § 2 also Bk II ch. viii.

19 *And next to them simple modes* By the same rule the names of simple modes are next to those of simple ideas least liable to doubt and uncertainty especially those of figure and number of which men have so clear and distinct ideas Whoever that had a mind to understand them mistook the ordinary meaning of *seven* or a *triangle* And in general the least compounded ideas in every kind have the least dubious names

20 *The most doubtful are the names of very compounded mixed modes and substances* Mixed modes, therefore that are made up but of a few and obvious simple ideas have usually names of no very uncertain signification But the names of mixed modes which comprehend a great number of simple ideas are commonly of a very doubtful and undetermined meaning as has been shown. The names of substances being annexed to ideas that are neither the real essences nor exact representations of the patterns they are referred to are liable to yet greater imperfection and uncertainty especially when we come to a philosophical use of them

21 *Why this imperfection charged upon words* The great disorder that happens in our names of substances proceeding for the most part, from our want of knowledge and inability to penetrate in to their real constitutions it may probably be wondered why I charge this as an imperfection rather upon our words than understandings. This exception has so much appearance of justice that I think myself obliged to give a reason why I have followed this method I must confess

words was at all necessary to me But when having passed over the original and composition of our ideas I began to examine the extent and certainty of our knowledge I found it had so

being conversant about truth had constantly to do with propositions And though it terminated in things yet it was for the most part so much by the intervention of words that they seemed scarce separable from our general knowledge At least they interpose themselves so much be

most before our eyes and impose upon our un-
In Bk II *In Bk IV

sometimes seven, and sometimes nine, as best served his advantage, would presently have clapped upon him, one of the two names men are commonly disgusted with. And yet in arguments and learned contests, the same sort of proceedings pass commonly for wit and learning; but to me it appears greater dishonesty than the misplacing of counters in the custom-house, and the cheating the greater by how much truth is of greater concernment and value than money.

6. III. *Affected obscurity as the Peripatetic and other sects of philosophy.* Thirdly Another abuse of language, is an affected obscurity by either applying old words new and unusual significations, or introducing new and ambiguous terms, which denote either or else put them so together as may confound their distinction. Though the Peripatetic philosophy has been most eminent in this way, yet other sects have not been wholly clear of it. There are scarce any of them that are not cumbered with some difficulties (such as the imperfection of human knowledge,) which they have been vain to cover with obscurity of terms, and to confound the significations of words, which, like a mist before people's eyes, might hinder their way from being discovered. That way and error in common we stand for two distinct ideas is plain to an one that will but reflect little. For were their significations precisely the same, would be as proper and as intelligible to the body of an extension, as the extension of body; and yet there are those who find it necessary to confound their significations. Thus this abuse, and the mischief of confounding significations of words, logic, and the liberal sciences as they have been bandied in the schools, have given reputation and the admired Art of Disputing hath added much to the natural imperfection of language, which has been made use of and fitted to perplex the significations of words, more than to discover the knowledge, and truth of things; and he that will look into this sort of learned writings, will find the words there much more obscure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning than they are in ordinary conversation.

Logic and the pure logic which cannot be lost. This is undoubtedly to be so, where men pursue learning as estimated by their skill in disputing. And if reputation and reward shall attend these conquests, which depend mostly the fineness and niceties of words, is no wonder if the use of man so employed, should perplex, in vain and subvert the significations of sounds,

so as never to want something to say in opposing or defending any question the victory being adjudged not to him who had truth on his side, but the last word in the dispute.

8. *Causes of subtlety.* Thus, though a cry use less still, and that which I think the direct opposite to the ways of knowledge, hath yet passed hitherto under the laudable and esteemed names of subtlety and accuracy, and has had the applause of the schools, and encouragement of no part of the learned men of the world. And no wonder since the philosophers of old, (the disputing and wrangling philosophers I mean, such as Lucian truly and with reason taxes) and the School men since, aiming to glory and esteem, for their great and universal knowledge, saw great deal to be pretended to than really acquired, found this good expedient to cover their ignorance, with a curious and inexplicable web of perplexed words, and procure to themselves the admiration of others, by unintelligible terms, which serve to produce wonder because they could not be understood. What it appears in all history that these profound doctors were no wiser nor more useful than their neighbours, and brought but small advantage to human life; the societies wherein they lived unless the coining of new words, where they produced no new things to apply them to, or to perplexing or obscure the significations of old ones, and so bringing all things into question and dispute, were a thing profitable to the life of man, worthy commendation and reward.

9. *This sort of eruditio brevis et utilis.* For notwithstanding these learned disputations, these all known doctors, twas to the unscholarly statesman that the government is of the world, and their peace, defence, and liberties, and from the illiterate and contemptible mechanic (a name of disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful arts. Nevertheless, this artificial ignorance, and learned gibberish, prevailed so fully in these last ages, by the interest and artifice of those who found no easier way to that pitch of authority and dominion they have aimed, than by amusing the men of business, and ignorant, with hard words, or employing the ingenious and skill in intricate disputes, but unintelligible terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless labyrinth. Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or defence to tyrants and absurd doctrines, as to guard them round about with legions of obscure, doubtful, and undefined words. Which yet make these treats more like the dens of robbers, or the lairs of foxes, than the fortresses of fair warriors, which, if it be hard to get them out of, is no for the strength

and such as when they come to be examined may justly be called *insignificant terms*. For having either had no determinate collection of ideas annexed to them when they were first invented or at least such as if well examined will be found inconsistent it is no wonder if afterwards in the vulgar use of the same party they remain empty sounds with little or no signification amongst those who think it enough to have them often in their mouths as the distinguishing characters of their Church or School without much troubling their heads to examine what are the precise ideas they stand for. I shall not need here to heap up instances every man's reading and conversation will sufficiently furnish him. Or if he wants to be better stored the great mintmasters of this kind of terms I mean the Schoolmen and Metaphysicians (under which I think the disputing natural and moral philosophers of these latter ages may be comprehended) have wherewithal abundantly to content him.

3 If Other words to which ideas were annexed at first used afterwards wth shoud distinct meanings Others there be who extend this abuse yet further who take so little care to lay by words which in their primary notation have scarce any clear and distinct ideas which they are annexed to that by an unpardonable negligence they familiarly use words which the propriety of language has affixed to very important ideas without any distinct meaning at all *Wisdom glory &c &c* are words frequent enough in every man's mouth but if a great many of those who use them should be asked what they mean by them they would be at a stand and not know what to answer a plain proof that though they have learned those sounds and have them ready at their tongues ends yet the π are no determined ideas laid up in their minds which are to be expressed to others by them².

4 This occasioned by men learning π mes b f re th y have the id as the π m s belong to Men having been accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily got and retained before they knew or had formed the complex ideas to which they were annexed or which were to be found in the things they were thought to stand for they usually continue to do so all their lives and without taking the pains necessary to settle in their minds determined ideas they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they have contenting themselves with the same words other people use as if their very sound necessarily car-

ried with it constantly the same meaning This though men make π shift with in the ordinary occurrences of life where they find it necessary to be understood and therefore they make π guess till they are so yet this insignificance in their words when they come to reason concerning either their tenets or interest manifestly fills their discourse with abundance of empty unintelligible noise and jargon especially in moral matters where the words for the most part standing for arbitrary and numerous collections of ideas not regularly and permanently united in nature their bare sounds are often only thought on or at least very obscure and uncertain notions annexed to them Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbors and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for use them confidently without much troubling their heads about a certain fixed meaning whereby besides the ease of it they obtain this advantage That as in such discourses they seldom are in the right so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the wrong it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode This I guess to be so and every one may observe in himself and others whether it be so or not.

5 Unsteady application of them Secondly Another great abuse of words is *inconstancy* in the use of them It is hard to find a discourse written on any subject especially of controversy wherein one shall not observe if he read with attention on the same words (and those commonly the most material in the discourse and upon which the argument turns) used sometimes for one collection of simple ideas and sometimes for another which is a perfect abuse of language Words being intended for signs of my ideas to make them known to others not by any natural signification but by a voluntary imposition it is plain cheat and abuse when I make them stand sometimes for one thing and sometimes for another the wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great folly or greater dishonesty And a man in his accounts with another may with as much fairness make the characters of numbers stand sometimes for one and sometimes for another collection of units as I may this character stand sometimes for three sometimes for four and sometimes for eight as in his discourse or reasoning make the same words stand for different collections of simple ideas If men should do so in their reckonings I wonder who would have to do with them? One who would speak thus in the affairs and business of the world and call B

See Epistl to the Reader pp 91 92
Cf Bk II ch xxii § 8 xxix § 9 xxxi § 8 Bk III ch iv § 6

are some things equal. The words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them and therefore they cannot quit the opinion, that they are confirmed to nature and are the pre-estimates of something that really exists. The Platonists have said that Epicureans their

of things as such, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is everywhere the same, everywhere uniform. This being our idea of matter we no more conceive it as a peak of different matter in the world than we do of different solidities though we both conceive and peak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really existing under this precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unimportant disputes which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning matter which may perhaps be of use, how far it may concern great many other general terms it leaves to be considered. Thus, I think it is last say that we should have a

icant and should answer

ce, by the pre-estimation of that doctrine, to be generally considered; here in doubt those terms would make impressions upon men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as Peripatetic forms and Aristotelian fictions have heretofore done.

5. *Instance.* Matter. How much is taken for things are put to mislead the understanding, the title is added of philosophical matters would abundantly discover and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall receive not only, and that very familiar.

ideas

when we argue about matter in any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea agree to anything really existing in nature or no. And if men would tell what ideas they make their words stand for there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is.

16. *This makes errors lasting.* But whatever in consequence flows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be hard matter to persuade any one that the words which his father or schoolmaster has parroted, such as are created doctores used, signified things that really existed in nature which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions are fixed to them should not be removed.

17. *By it given the place for what they can not signify.* Finally, Another abuse of words is this, setting them in the place of what they do not signify by no means signify. We may observe that in the general names of substances whereof the material essences are only known to us when we put them into propositions, and affirm deny something about them, we do most commonly tacitly

different word matter stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body. For if the ideas these two terms stood for, we precisely the same they might indifferently in all places be put for each another. But to see that this is not proper to say There is no matter of all bodies, we cannot say There is no body of all matters. We familiarly say no body is bigger than this but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, the force from hence that, though matter and body be equally distinct, but the latter there is the one there is the other; matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete and but part of the other. For body stands for solid extended figured substance, whereof matter is but partial and more confused conception. It seems to me to be used for the substance and solid body, body the taking in extension and figure and therefore to that, speaking of matter we peak

Cf. Lucretius, *Of the Nature of Things* lib. 2, 6, 5-93.

Cf. ch. II. § 3.
Cf. Arist. *Physics* L. 9 *Metaphysics* II. 3
and *Of the Soul* III. 4.

that is in them but the briars and thorns and the obscurity of the thickets they are beset with For untruth being unacceptable to the mind of man there is no other defence left for absurdity but obscurity

10 *But destroys the instruments of knowledge and communication* Thus learned ignorance and this art of keeping even inquisitive men from true knowledge hath been propagated in the world and hath much perplexed whilst it pretended to inform the understanding For we see that other well meaning and wise men whose education and parts had not acquired that *acuteness* could intelligibly express themselves to one another and in its plain use make a benefit of language But though unlearned men well enough understood the words white and black &c and had constant notions of the ideas signified by those words yet there were philosophers found who had learning and subtlety enough to prove that snow was black i.e. to prove that white was black Whereby they had the advantage to destroy the instruments and means of discourse conversation instruction and society whilst with great art and subtlety they did no more but perplex and confound the signification of words and thereby render language less useful than the real defects of it had made it a gift which the illiterate had not attained to

11 *As useful as to confound the sounds that the letters of the alphabet stand for* These learned men did equally instruct men's understandings and profit their lives as he who should alter the signification of known characters and by a subtle device of learning far surpassing the capacity of the illiterate dull and vulgar should in his writing show that he could put A for B and D for E &c to the no small admiration and benefit of his reader It being as senseless to put black which is a word agreed on to stand for one sensible idea to put it, I say for another or the contrary idea i.e. to call white black as to put this mark A which is a character agreed on to stand for one modification of sound made by a certain motion of the organs of speech for B which is agreed on to stand for another modification of sound made by another certain mode of the organs of speech

12 *This art has perplexed religion and justice* Nor hath this mischief stopped in logical niceties or curious empty speculations it hath invaded the great concerns of human life and society obscured and perplexed the material truths of law and divinity brought confusion disorder and uncertainty into the affairs of mankind and if

1 Cf. Bl. IV ch. xvii §§ 4, 8 On Syll. gism.

not destroyed yet in a great measure rendered useless these two great rules religion and justice What have the greatest part of the comments and disputes upon the laws of God and man served for but to make the meaning more doubtful and perplex the sense? What have been the effect of those multiplied curious distinctions, and acute niceties but obscurity and uncertainty leaving the words more unintelligible, and the reader more at a loss? How else comes it to pass that princes speaking or writing to their servants, in their ordinary commands are easily understood speaking to their people in their laws, are not so? And as I remarked before doth it not often happen that a man of an ordinary capacity very well understands a text or a law that he reads till he consults an expositor or goes to counsel who by that time he hath done explaining them makes the words signify either nothing at all or what he pleases

13 *And ought not to pass for learning* Whether any by interests of these professions have occasioned this I will not here examine but I leave it to be considered whether it could not be well for mankind whose concernment it is to know things as they are and to do what they ought and not to spend their lives in talking about them or tossing words to and fro — whether it would not be well I say that the use of words were made plain and direct and that language which was given us for the improvement of knowledge and bond of society should not be employed to darken truth and unsettle people's right to raise mist and render unintelligible both morality and religion? Or that at least if this will happen it should not be thought learning or knowledge to do so?

14. IV *By the kind of things* Fourthly Another great abuse of words is the taking them for things This I thought in some degree concerns all names in general yet more particularly affects those of substances To this abuse those men are most subject who most confine their thoughts to any one system and engage themselves up to a firm belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of that sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with the

—
Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of that school that is not persuaded that substantial forms exist? suls bhrr ce far eum int i nalspe ts &c.

Cf. Arist. II O the Soul Bk. II

as something real. These words men have learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and so have laid great stress upon them. and therefore they cannot quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have their *solid of the world* and the Epicureans their *atoms* and *void* in their systems when it rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others understand not. But this is gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding serves to tell to palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use almost to those of the same tribe, seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant, and should *eternal* and *eternal* and come to be generally received anywhere, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as Peripatetic *form* and *instrumental force* has heretofore done.

1. *Intense is matter* How much names taken for this are apt to mislead the understanding, the tedious reading of philosophical writers could abundantly discover and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only and that very familiar one. How many intricate disputes have there been about *matter* as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from *body* as it is evident the word *matter* stands for an idea distinct from the idea of *body*. For if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might indifferently in all places be put for one another. But we see that though it be proper to say There is one matter of all bodies, we cannot say There is one body of all matters. We familiarly say one body is bigger than another but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then? It is from hence that, though matter and body be no really distinct, but wherever there is the one there is the other; *matter* and *body* stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but a part of the other. For *body* stands for a solid extended figured substance, whereof *matter* is but a partial and more confused conception. It seems to me to be used for the substance and solidity of *body* though taking in its extension and figure and therefore is this speak of *matter* we speak

of is always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of a solid substance, which is everywhere the same everywhere uniform. Thus being our idea of matter we no more concern ourselves speak of different matters in the world than we do of different solid ties though we both concern and speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something really existing and that precise one, has doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning *matter* for which imposition or abuse, how far it may concern great many other general terms I leave to be considered. Thus, I think, I may at least say that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only and not of things themselves. For when we argue about *matter* or any the like term,

— — —

scarcely or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is.

6. *This much is error* lastly But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, thus I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be a hard matter to persuade any that the words which his father or schoolmaster the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified in this that really existed in nature which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed.

V. *By using them the place of what they can not signify* Finally Another abuse of words is the setting them in the place of things which they do or can by no means signify. We may observe that in the general names of substances whereof the nominal essences are only known to us when we put them into propositions and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly

are something real. These words are learned from their very entrance upon knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them and therefore they cannot quit the passion, that they are conterminable to nature, and are the representations of something that really exists. The Platonists have called soul of the world and the Epicureans their *anima mundi* in their poems when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not distinct set of terms that others understand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to pass for men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant: and should *eternal* and *eternal* *eternity* come once, by the prevalence of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the reality of such things, as much as Peripatetic *forms* and *essential* *essence* have heretofore done.

Language is matter How much names taken for things are apt to mislead the understanding, we see in reading of philosophical writers would abundantly discover: and that perhaps in words little suspected of any such misuse. I shall instance in one only, and that very familiar one. How many intricate disputes have there been about *matter* as if there were some such thing really in nature, distinct from body as it is evident the word *matter* stands for an idea distinct from the idea of body. For if the ideas these two terms stood for were precisely the same, they might be indifferent in all places be put for one another. But we see that though it be proper to say There is one matter of all bodies, one cannot say There is one body of all matters we familiarly say one body is bigger than another but it sounds harsh (and I think is never used) to say one matter is bigger than another. Whence comes this, then? It is, from hence that, though matter and body be no real distinct but wherever there is one there is the other yet matter and body stand for two different conceptions, whereof the one is incomplete, and but part of the other. For body stands for solid extended figured substance, whereof matter is but partial and more confused conception seems me to be used for the substance and solidity of body without taking in its extension and figure and therefore it is that, speaking of matter we speak

of it always as one, because in truth it expressly contains nothing but the idea of solid substance, which is everywhere the same, everywhere uniform. Thus being our idea of matter we no more conceive or speak of different matters in the world than we do of different solid bodies though we both conceive and speak of different bodies, because extension and figure are capable of variation. But, since solidity cannot exist without extension and figure, the taking matter to be the name of something, really existing under that precision, has no doubt produced those obscure and unintelligible discourses and disputes, which have filled the heads and books of philosophers concerning *matters* in which imperfect notions or almost how far they concern great many other general terms fit to be considered. Thus, I think, I may at least say that we should have a great many fewer disputes in the world, if words were taken for what they are, the signs of our ideas only and not for things themselves. For when we argue about *matter* or any the like term, we truly argue only about the idea we express by that sound, whether that precise idea agree to anything, really existing in nature or no. And if men would tell what idea as they make their words stand for there could not be half that obscurity or wrangling in the search or support of truth that there is.

16. *This makes mistakes* But whatever inconvenience follows from this mistake of words, this I am sure, that, by constant and familiar use, they charm men into notions far remote from the truth of things. It would be hard matter to persuade any one that the words which his father or schoolmaster the parson of the parish, or such a reverend doctor used, signified nothing that really existed in nature. which perhaps is none of the least causes that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes, even in opinions purely philosophical, and where they have no other interest but truth. For the words they have long time been used to, remaining firm in their minds, it is no wonder that the wrong notions annexed to them should not be removed.

V. *By setting them the place of what they contain* *False* Another abuse of words is the setting them in the place of things, which they do or can by no means signify. We may observe that in the general names of substances whereof the names and essences are only known to us when we put them into propositions, and affirm or deny any thing about them, we do most commonly tacitly

suppose or intend they should stand for the real essence of a certain sort of substances. For when a man says gold is malleable, he means and would insinuate something more than this. That what I call gold is malleable (though truly it amounts to no more) but would have this understood, viz. That gold, i.e. what has the real essence of gold is malleable, which amounts to thus much, that malleableness depends on, and is inseparable from the real essence of gold. But a man not knowing wherein that real essence consists, the connexion in his mind of malleableness is not truly with an essence he knows not, but only with the sound gold he puts for it. Thus when we say that *anim. l. rationale* is, and *animal implume bipes*

19 Hence we think change of our complex ideas of substances not to change their species. This shows us the reason why in mixed modes any of the ideas that make the composition of the complex one being left out or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, i.e. to be of another species, as is plain in *chance medley manslaughter murder parricide &c.* The reason whereof is, because the complex idea signified by that name is the real as well as nominal essence, and there is no secret reference of that name to any other essence but that. But in substances it is not so. For though in that called *gold*, one puts into his complex idea what another leaves out, and vice versa, yet men do not usually think that therefore the species is

signify that a rational animal better described that real essence than a winged animal with broad nails and without feathers. For else why might not Plato as properly make the word *ανθρωπος* or man stand for his complex idea made up of the idea of a body distinguished from others by a certain shape and other outward appearances, as Aristotle make the complex idea in which he gave the name *ανθρωπος* or man of body and the faculty of reasoning joined together, un-

in *ag. regia* which he put not in it before, is not thought to have changed the species, but only

consisted. But this reference of the name to a thing, whereof we have not the idea, is so far from helping at all, that it only serves the more to involve us in difficulties. For by this tacit reference to the real essence of that species of bodies,

the idea a man professes he would express by it?

18 V.g. *Puttin them for the real essences of substances*. It is true the names of substances would be much more useful, and propositions made in them much more certain, were the real essences of substances the ideas in our minds, which those words signified. And it is for want of those real essences that our words convey so little knowledge or certainty in our discourses about them, and therefore the mind to remove that imperfectness as much as it can, makes them by a secret supposition to stand for a thing having that

ing put for some, that hereof we have no idea

in name, and about a parcel in the body itself, v.g. a piece of leaf gold laid before us, though in discourse we are fain to substitute the name for the thing.

20 *Thence us forth abuse suppositiveness of nature* working ludicrously, setting golden standards to species. That which I think very much disturbs men to substitute their names for the real essences of species is the supposition before mentioned, that nature works regularly in the production of things, and sets the boundaries to each of those species by giving exactly the same real internal constitution to each individual, which rank under one general name. Whereas anyone who observes the different qualities can hardly doubt that many of the individuals called by the same name

yet there is scarce anybody in the use of these words, but often supposes each of those names to stand for a thing having the real essence on which these properties depend. Which is so far from diminishing the imperfection of our words, that by this plain abuse it adds to it, when we would make them stand for something, which not being in our complex idea, the name we use can no ways be the sign of.

use of the words they receive from them yet where truth and knowledge are concerned in the case I know not what fault it can be to desire the explication of words whose sense seems dubious or why a man should be ashamed to own his ignorance in what sense another man uses his words since he has no other way of certainly knowing it but by being informed This abuse of taking words upon trust has nowhere spread so far nor with so ill effects as amongst men of letters The multiplication and obstinacy of disputes which have so laid waste the intellectual world is owing to nothing more than to this ill use of words For though it be generally believed that there is great diversity of opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do in their arguments one with another is that they speak different languages For I am apt to imagine that when any of them quitting terms think upon things and know what they think they think all the same though perhaps what they would have been different.

23 *The ends of language First to convey our ideas* To conclude this consideration of the imperfection and abuse of language The ends of language in our discourse with others being chiefly these three First to make known one man's thoughts or ideas to another Secondly to do it with as much ease and quickness as possible and Thirdly thereby to convey the knowledge of things language is either abused or deficient when it fails of any of these three

First Words fail in the first of these ends and lay not open one man's ideas to another's view 1 When men have names in their mouths without any determinate ideas in their minds whereof they are the signs or 2 When they apply the common received names of any language to ideas to which the common use of that language does not apply them or 3 When they apply them very unsteadily making them stand now for one and by and by for another idea

4 *To do it with quickness* Secondly Men fail of conveying their thoughts with all the quickness and ease that may be when they have complex ideas without having any distinct names for them This is sometimes the fault of the language itself which has not in it a sound yet applied to such a signification and sometimes the fault of the man who has not yet learned the name for that idea he would show another

25 *Thereunto to convey the knowledge of things* Thirdly There is no knowledge of things conveyed by men's words when their ideas agree

not to the reality of things Though it be a defect that has its original in our ideas which are not so conformable to the nature of things as attention study and application might make them yet it fails not to extend itself to our words too when we use them as signs of real beings, which yet never had any reality or existence

26 *How men's words fail in all these First when used without any ideas* First, He that hath words of any language without distinct ideas in his mind to which he applies them does, so far as he uses them in discourse only make a noise without any sense or signification and how learned soever he may seem by the use of hard words or learned terms is not much more advanced there

according to the right construction of grammatical rules or the harmony of well turned periods, do yet amount to nothing but bare sounds and nothing else

27 *When complex ideas are without names annexed to them* Secondly He that has complex ideas, without particular names for them would be in no better case than a bookseller who had in his warehouse volumes that lay there unbound and without titles which he could therefore make known to others only by showing the loose sheets and communicate them only by tale. This man is hindered in his discourse for want of words to communicate his complex ideas which he is therefore forced to make known by an enumeration of the simple ones that compose them and so is fain often to use twenty words to express

--- , ---
sign for the same idea but uses the same words sometimes in one and sometimes in another signification ought to pass in the schools and conversation for as far as a man as he does in the market and exchange who sells several things under the same name

29 *When words are distinct from their common use* Fourthly He that applies the words of any language to ideas different from those to which the

--- a u b y n n ---
to convey much of it to others, without defining his terms. For however the sounds are such as are familiarly known and easily enter the ears of those who are accustomed to them yet standing for other ideas than those they usually are annexed

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CHAP. X

to, and are wot to crite n th m d f the hearers, they cann t make known the thoghts of him wh thus uses them.

3 *Wke they nam ff fustical m gna ns* F thly He that imagin d to himself substances such as ever ha e been and filled his head w th deas which ha e n t any correspondence w th th real nature of things, t h ch yet h g es settled and defined names, may fill his discourse, and perhaps an cher man s head w th th fantastical imagin ns f his n brain, but ill be ery far from d ancing thereby n j t n

a man s drinking all his colour and humour be altere h h t ru trips, and his eyes look red and l to be of amns that dea wh cn ou cr amns sound f anss 4. I may use any of those ames w th inconstancy 5. But, in modes and relations, I t h deas disagreeing to the existence

together and so also an dea f my own maki g these deas can scarce be f und t disagree w th anythi g exsiting since they are not in the mind as the cop es f things regularly made by ature, no as properties inseparably fl wing from the internal constitutu resse ce of any substance but, as t w re, g terns lodged in my memory

rom COLUMBUS 1492

truly knowledg in his understanding and hath instead th reof chimeras

32. *How men u ds fast uke they tand for substances* I ur notions co certing S bstances, we are liable to all th f rmer inco eniences v g h that uses the w rd *tanant* w th ut ha ring any imaginatio dea of what t tands for pronounces good w rd b tso l g means thing a all by t. H that, n ewly disco ered country shall see sev ral so us f mal and eg tables, unknow t him bef re may ha as true deas f th m, as of horse o tag b t can peak f them nly by descripti n, till he shall ther take th names th nati es call th m by g them names himself 3 H that uses th w rd *body* som times f pure extensi and som times f ext ns d sold y t g ther will talk ery fall ciously 4. H that g es th nam f to that idea which common usag calls *mal* talksump perly and villin the understood. 5 H that thinks th nam *nt w* stands f some cal be g impo es n himself and mistakes w ds f things.

33. *How uke they t nd for mode nd lat ns* Modes and Relati ns generally w are liable nly to th f ur first of these inco eniences 12 I may ha in my memory th names f modes, as *gratitudo* charity and j n th any precue deas an c ed in my th ghts to thos names. I may ha deas, and n t kn w th ames th bel g to them g I may ha e th dea f

f them, when I g e wrong ames to them. Only if I p t in my id as f mixed modes r relations any in nsistent deas together I fill my head al so w th chimeras since such ideas if well examined, cann t so m ch as exst in the mi d m ch less any real being e er be denomin ted from them.

34. *Serentially lan uag is fien based by figur t e speech* Since w t and fancy find easier entertain m t in th w ld than dry truth and real kno l ed figurati e peeches and allusio in language will hardly be dmitted as an imperf ctio ab se f t. I confess, discourses wher we seek rather pl asur and delight than informati n and impro ment, ch r m ments as are borrowed from th m can scarce pass f f ulta. But j t if we w uld peak of things as they are, w must all that all the art of h t ric, besides rder and clearness all th artificial and figurati pplation of w rds eloque ce hath in e ted are f othing is but t in in t w g deas, m th passions, and ther by mislead the j dg m t and so indeed are perfect cheat and therf re, howe la d bl allowabl t ry may render them in harangues and popular d dresses, they ar ce tainly in all discourses th t p et d t f m stru t wh lly to be ded and wh truth nd knowl dg ar co cerned, cann t but be tho ght gr t f ult, e ther of the languag perso that makes use

of them. What and how various they are will be superfluous here to take notice. the books of the toric which abound in the world will instruct those who want to be informed. only I cannot but observe how little the preservation and improvement of truth and knowledge is the care and concern of mankind since the arts of fallacy are endowed and preferred. It is evident how much men love to deceive and be deceived since rhetoric that powerful instrument of error and deceit has its established professors is publicly taught and has always been had in great reputation and I doubt not but it will be thought great boldness if not brutality in me to have said thus much against it. Eloquence like the fair sex has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken against. And it is in vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived.

Chap. XI *Of the Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections and Abuses of Words*

1 *Remedies are worth seeking.* The natural and improved imperfections of languages we have seen above at large and speech being the great bond that holds society together and the common conduit whereby the improvements of knowledge are conveyed from one man and one generation to another it would well deserve our most serious thoughts to consider what remedies are to be found for the inconveniences above mentioned.

2 *Are not easy to find.* I am not so vain as to think that anyone can pretend to attempt the perfect reforming the languages of the world no not so much as of his own country without rendering himself ridiculous. To require that men should use their words constantly in the same sense and for none but determined and uniform ideas would be to think that all men should have the same notions and should talk of nothing but what they have clear and distinct ideas of which is not to be expected by any one who hath not vanity enough to imagine he can prevail with men to be very knowing or very silent. And he must be very little skilled in the world who thinks that a voluble tongue shall accompany only a good understanding or that men's talking much or little should hold proportion only to their knowledge.

3 *But yet sees yet those who see riches in truth.* But though the market and exchange must be left to the rovers of talk and gossippings not be robbed of the ancient privilege though the schools and men of argument would perhaps take it amiss to have anything offered to abate

the length or lessen the number of their disputes yet methinks those who pretend seriously to search after or maintain truth should think themselves obliged to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity doubtfulness or equivocation to which men's words are naturally liable if care be not taken.

4 *Misuse of words the great cause of errors.* For he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity the mistakes and confusion that are spread in the world by an ill use of words will find some reason to doubt whether language as it has been employed has contributed more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge amongst mankind. How many are there that when they would think on things fix their thoughts only on words especially when they would apply their minds to moral matters? And who then can wonder if the result of such contemplations and reasonings about little more than sounds whilst the ideas they annex to them are very confused and very unsteady or perhaps none at all who can wonder I say that such thoughts and reasonings end in nothing but obscurity and mistake without any clear judgment or knowledge?

5 *Has made men more conceited and obstinate.* Thus inconvenience in an ill use of words men suffer

others. For language being the great conduit whereby men convey their discoveries, reason

break or stop the pipes by which it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning what does he but lead himself and others into error? And he that designedly does it ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms and insignificant and doubtful expressions capable to make the most attentive or quick sighted very little or not at all the more knowing or orthodox since subtlety in those who make profession to teach or defend truth hath passed so much for a virtue a virtue indeed which consist for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance and more obstinate in their errors.

6. *Answer to my last question.* Let us look
 view of controversy of an kind, there

about things, but names. As of en as such a
 whose significance is not as retained betwixt
 them, comes in use, their understandings ha
 no other object wherein they agree but barely
 the sound the things that they think on at that
 time, as expressed by that word, being quite dif
 ferent.

7. *Instance bat and bird.* Wh the bat be bird
 or no, is not question. Wh ther a bat be another
 thing than indeed it is, or ha other qualities
 than indeed it has for that would be extremely
 absurd to do b of B t the question is, (1) Either
 between those that acknowledged themselves to
 have but imperfect ideas of ne or both of this
 sort of things, for which these names are supposed
 to stand. And then it is real inquiry concernin
 the nature of bird or a bat, to make their yet
 imperfect ideas of t more complete by examin
 ing, whether all the simple ideas to which, com
 bined together they both give the name bird, be
 all to be found in bat. but this is question
 only of inquirers (not disputers) who neither af
 firm nor deny but examine O () It is ques
 tion between disputants whereof th one affirms,
 and the other denies that bat is bird. And
 then the question is barely about the significa
 tion of one or both these words in that they not
 having both the same complex ideas to which they
 give these two names, one holds and the other
 denies, that these two names may be affirmed one
 of another. Were they agreed in th significance
 of these two names, it were impossibl they should
 dispute about them. For they would presently
 and clearly see (were that adjusted between
 them) whether all th simple ideas of the more
 general name bird were found in the complex
 idea of bat or no and so there could be no doubt
 whether ba were bird or no. And here I de
 clare may be considered, and carefully examin
 ed, whether the greatest part of the disputes in
 the world are no merely verbal, and about the
 signification of words and whether if the terms
 were made in were defined, and reduced in
 their signification (as they must be where they
 signify anything) to d determined collections of the
 simple ideas they do or should stand for those
 disputes would not end of themselves, and im
 mediately vanish. I leave it then to be consid

ered, what the learning of disputation is, and how
 well they are employed for the advantage of
 themselves or others, whose business is only the
 ostentation of sounds i.e. those who spend
 their lives in disputes and controversies. When
 I shall see any of those combatants strip all his
 terms of ambiguity and obscurity (which every
 man may do in the words he uses himself) I shall
 think him champion for knowledge, truth, and
 peace, and not the slave of ambiguity, ambiguity,
 or a party

8. *Remedy.* To remedy the defects of perch
 before mentioned to some degree, and to pre
 vent the inconveniences that follow from them,
 I imagin the observance of these following rules
 may be of use, till somebody better able shall
 judge worth his while to think more maturely
 on this matter and oblige the world with his
 thoughts on t

First rule. *To use no word as if it had an ex
 actness to it.* First, A man shall take care to use no
 word without a signification, no name without
 an idea for which it makes stand. This rule
 will not seem altogether needless to any man who
 shall take the pains to recollect how often he has
 met with such words as *distinctly* and *exactly*
 &c. in the discourse of others, so made use

of words, and terms

like occasions. Not but that these words, and the
 like, have every proper signification as in which they
 may be used but there being no natural con
 nexion between any words and any ideas, these,
 and any other may be learned by rote, and pro
 nounced or writ by men who have no ideas in
 their minds to which they have annexed them,
 and for which they make them stand which is
 necessary they should, if men would speak intel
 ligibly even to themselves alone.

9. *Second rule.* To have distinct determinate
 annexed to words especially in maxims & more. Second
 ly It is not enough if a man uses his words as signs
 of some ideas, those he annexes them to, if they
 be simple, must be clear and distinct if complex,
 must be determinate, i.e. the precise collectio
 of simple ideas settled in the mind, with that sound
 annexed to it, as the sign of that precise deter
 mined collection, and no other. This is very nec
 essary in names of modes, and especially moral
 words which, having no settled objects in na
 ture, from whence they are taken, as from
 their original, are apt to be very confused. *jus
 tice* is a word in every man's mouth, but most

See "Epistle to the Reader" p. 9

commonly with a very undertermined loose signification which will always be so unless a man has in his mind a distinct comprehension of the component parts that complex idea consists of and if it be decomposed must be able to resolve it still on till he at last comes to the simple ideas that make it up and unless this be done a man makes an ill use of the word let it be justice for example or any other I do not say a man needs stand to recollect and make this analysis at large every time the word justice comes in his way but this at least is necessary that he have so examined the signification of that name and settled the idea of all its parts in his mind that he can do it when he pleases If any one who makes his complex idea of justice be such a

plex idea of justice it is plain his idea of justice itself will be confused and imperfect. This exactness will perhaps be judged very troublesome and therefore most men will think they may be excused from settling the complex ideas of mixed modes so precisely in their minds But yet I must say till this be done it must not be wondered that they have a great deal of obscurity and confusion in their own minds and a great deal of wrangling in their discourse with others

10 *And distinct and conformable ideas in words that stand for substances* In the names of substances for a right use of them something more is required than barely determined ideas In these the names must also be conformable to things as they exist but of this I shall have occasion to speak more at large by and by This exactness is absolutely necessary in inquiries after philosophical knowledge and in controversies about truth And though it would be well too if it extended itself to common conversation and the ordinary affairs of life yet I think that scarce to be expected Vulgar notions suit vulgar discourses and both though confused enough yet serve pretty well the market and the wake Me chants and lovers cooks and tailors have words very fit to dispatch their ordinary affairs and so I think, might philosophers and disputants too if they had a mind to understand and to be clearly understood

11 *This remedy To apply words to such ideas as common use has annexed them to* Thirdly, it is not enough that men have ideas determined ideas,

for which they make these signs stand but they must also take care to apply their words as near as may be to such ideas as common use has annexed them to For words especially of languages already framed being no man's private possession but the common measure of commerce and communication it is not for any one at pleasure to change the stamp they are current in nor alter the ideas they are affixed to or at least, when there is a necessity to do so he is bound to give notice of it Men's intentions in speaking are, or at least should be to be understood which can not be without frequent explanations demands and other the like incommodious interruptions, where men do not follow common use Propriety of speech is that which gives our thoughts entrance into other men's minds with the greatest ease and advantage and therefore deserves some part of our care and study especially in the names of moral words The proper signification and use of terms is best to be learned from those who in their writings and discourses appear to have had the clearest notions and applied to them their terms with the exactest choice and fitness. This way of using a man's words according to the propriety of the language though it has not always the good fortune to be understood yet most commonly leaves the blame of it on him who is so unskilful in the language he speaks as not to understand it when made use of as it ought to be

12 *Further remedy To declare the meaning in which we use them* Fourthly But because common use has not so visibly annexed any signification to words as to make men know always certainly what they precisely stand for and because men in the improvement of their knowledge come to have ideas different from the vulgar and ordinary received ones, for which they must either make new words, (which men seldom venture to do for fear of being thought guilty of affectation or novelty) or else must use old ones in a new signification therefore after the observation of the foregoing rules it is sometimes necessary for the ascertaining the signification of words to declare their meaning where either common use has left it uncertain and loose (as it has in most names of very complex ideas) or where the term being very material in the discourse and that upon which it chiefly turns is liable to any doubtfulness or mistake

13 *And the third remedy To declare the ideas men's words stand for* are of different sorts so the way of making known the ideas they stand for when there is occasion is also different For though I design to be thought the proper way to make known the proper signification of words yet there are

¹ The famous discussion in the first and second Book of Plato *Republic* of the mixed mode named justice is relevant in this connection

² Cf. § 24 also *Bk. IV* chh. §§ 11-17 v. 11-17

some words that will not be defined, as there are others whose precise meaning cannot be made known but by definition, and perhaps a third, which partake somewhat of both the other as we shall see in the names of simple ideas, modes, and substances.

4. *I in simple ideas, either by synonymous terms or by example.* First, when man makes use of the name of any simple idea, which he perceives to be understood or is in danger to be mistaken, he is obliged, by the law of ingenuity and the end of speech, to declare his meaning, and make known what idea he makes it stand for. Thus, as has been shown, cannot be done by definition, and therefore, when synonymous words fail to do it, there is but one of these ways left. First, Sometimes the same sign subject wherein that simple idea is to be found, will make its name to be understood by those who are acquainted with that subject, and know it by that name. So to make a countryman understand what *falerio* colour signifies, it may suffice to tell him, it is the colour of withered leaves falling from. Secondly but the only sure way of

to do it, for a quite contrary reason, as we shall see by and by.

6. *Morality as a demonstrative.* Upon this ground it is that I am bold to think that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as mathematics since the precise real essence of the moral words stand for may be perfectly known, and so the congruity and incongruity of the things themselves be certainly discovered in which consists perfect knowledge. Nor let any one object, that the names of substances are often to be made use of in morality, as well as those of modes, from which will arise obscurity. For as to substances, when concerned in moral discourses, their different natures are not so much inquired into as supposed. When we say that man is subject to law we mean nothing by man but a corporeal rational creature, what the real essence or other qualities of that creature are in this case is no way considered. And, therefore, whether child or charneling be a man, in physical sense, may amongst the naturalists be as disputable as twul, it concerns not at all the moral man, as I may call him, which is this immovable, unchangeable idea, corporeal rational being. For were there monkey or any other creature, to be found that had the use of reason to such a degree, as to be able to understand general signs, and to deduce consequences about general ideas, he would no doubt be subject to law and in that sense be a man, how much soever he differed in shape from others of that name. The names of substances, if they be used in them as they should, can no more disturb moral than they do mathematical discourses where, if the mathematician speaks of a cube or globe of gold, or of any other body he has his clear settled idea which arises not, though it may by mistake be applied to a particular body to which it belongs not.

Definitions can make moral discourses clear. Thus I have here mentioned, by the way to show of what consequence it is for men, in their names of mixed modes, and consequently in all their moral discourses, to define their words when there is occasion since thereby moral knowledge may be brought to so great clearness and certainty. And it must be great want of ingenuity (to say no worse of it) refuse to do it, since a definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of moral words can be known and yet away where by their meaning may be known certainly and without leaving any room for any contest about it. And therefore the negligence or perverseness of mankind cannot be excused, if their discourses

5. *II. I mixed modes by definition.* Secondly Mixed modes, especially those belong to morality being most of them such combinations of ideas as the mind puts together of its own choice, and whereof there are no always standing patterns to be found existing the signification of their names cannot be made known, as those of simple ideas, by any showing but, in recompense thereof may be perfectly and exactly defined. For

composition, and so both use these words in certain and undoubted signification, and perfectly declare, when they is occasion, what they stand for. Thus, if well considered, would lay great blame those who make not their discourses about moral things very clear and distinct. For since the precise signification of the names of mixed modes, or which is all one, the real essence of each species is to be known, they being not of nature's, but man making, is great negligence and perverseness to discourse of moral things with uncertainty and obscurity which is unpardonable in treating of natural substances, where doubtful terms are hardly to be

in morality be not much more clear than those in natural philosophy since they are about ideas in the mind which are none of them false or disproportionate they having no external beings for the archetypes which they are referred to and must correspond with It is far easier for men to frame in their minds an idea which shall be the standard to which they will give the name justice with which pattern so made all actions that agree shall pass under that denomination than having seen Aristides to frame an idea that shall in all things be exactly like him who is as he is let men make what idea they please of him For the one they need but know the combination of ideas that are put together in the *r* own minds for the other they must inquire into the whole nature and abstruse hidden constitution and various qualities of a thing existing without them

18 *And is the only way in which the meaning of mixed modes can be made known* Another reason that makes the defining of mixed modes so necessary especially of moral words is what I mentioned a little before viz that it is the only way whereby the signification of the most of them can be known with certainty For the ideas they stand for being for the most part such whose component parts nowhere exist together but scattered and mingled with others it is the mind alone that collects them and gives them the union of one idea and it is only by words enumerating the several simple ideas which the mind has united that we can make known to others what their names stand for the assistance of the senses in this case not helping us by the proposal of sensible objects to show the ideas which our names of this kind stand for as it does often in the names of sensible simple ideas and also to some degree in those of substances

19 III *In substances both by shewing and by defining* Thirdly for the explaining the signification of the names of substances as they stand for the ideas we have of their distinct species both the foregoing ways viz of shewing and defining are requisite in many cases to be made use of For there being ordinarily in each sort some leading qualities to which we suppose the other ideas which make up our complex idea of that species annexed we hardly give the specific name to that thing wherein that characteristic mark is found which we take to be the most distinguishing idea of that species These leading or characteristic (as I may call them) ideas in the sorts of animals and vegetables are (as has been before remarked ch vi § 9 and ch ix § 15) mostly figure and in inanimate bodies colour and in some both together Now

-- --
of our specific ideas and consequently the most observable and invariable part in the definitions of our specific names as attributed to sorts of substances coming under our knowledge For thou h

-- --
to stand for a sort of creatures we count of our own kind perhaps the outward shape is as necessary to be taken into our complex ideas signi

the name man standing for that sort of creatures

-- -- -- -- --
they can be excused from murder who kill mon

-- -- --
discerned in a well formed than ill shaped infant as soon as born And who is it has informed us that a rational soul can inhabit no tenement unless it has just such a sort of frontispiece or can join itself to and inform no sort of body but one

I may say
a thousand times better And the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any description of it but only by the frequent exercise of the eyes about it as evident in those who are used to this metal who will frequently distinguish true from counterfeit pure from adulterated by the sight where others who have not as

-- -- --
it, no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal

2. *The Ideas of the powers of substances are to be known by definition.* But because many of the simple ideas that make up our specific ideas of substances are powers which lie not obvious to our senses in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore, in the signification of our names of substances, some part of the signification will be to be formed known by enumerating those simple

the ideas of great u
and sol bility in qua
idea of gold than h
of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only
in various qualities. It is if the formal constituti
on of this shining hea-y ductile thing (from

our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our senses. For how possible, separate from bodies, (those knowledge and ideas of these things are certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, without notion, no idea tall. The whole extent of our knowledge imaginative reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our way of perception. Though yet it be not to be doubted that spirits of higher rank than those immersed in flesh may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution of substances as we have of man's, and so perceive all their proper ties and operations flow from thence but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions.

24. *IV Ideas of substances must also be conformable to the thing.* For truly But, though definitions will serve to explain the names of substances as they stand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without that great imperfection as they stand for things. For our names of substances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made use of ultimately to represent things, and so are put in their place, their signification must agree with the truth of things as well as with men's ideas. And therefore, in substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea commonly received as the signification of that word, but must go a little further and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our ideas of their distinct properties else learn them from such as are

used to that sort of things, and are experienced in them. For since it is not needed their names should stand for such collections of simple ideas as do really exist in things themselves, as well as for the complex ideas in their men's minds, which in the ordinary conception they stand for, they refer to define their names right, natural history is to be required into, and their properties are, with care and examination to be found out. For this is not enough, for the finding in con

tinuances in discourse and arguments about natural bodies and substantial things to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common, but confused and every imperfect, idea to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that sort of things, rectify and settle our complex idea being going to each specific name and discourse in them, (if we find them mistaken) we ought to tell what the complex idea is that we make such name stand for. This is the more necessary to be done by all those who search after knowledge and philosophical erudition in that children, being taught words, whilst they have

erations) they are permitted to continue when they are men and so begin with the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly but make the notions to which they apply those words afterwards very wrongly. By this means it comes to pass, that men speaking the language of their country are

truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imaginations and matters not much for the improvement of our knowledge how they are called.

5. *As to say to be made so.* It were therefore to be wished, That men versed in physical inquiries, and acquainted with the several sorts of natural bodies, would settle in those simple ideas where in they observe the individuals of each sort constantly to agree. This would remedy great deal of that confusion which comes from several persons applying the same name to collection of a smaller or greater number of sensible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or less acquainted with, accurate in examining the qualities of any sort of things which come under

one denomination. But a dictionary of this sort, containing as it were a natural history requires too many hands as well as too much time cost pains and sagacity ever to be hoped for and till that be done we must content ourselves with such definitions of the names of substances as explain the sense men use them in. And it would be well where there is occasion if they would afford us so much. This yet is not usually done but men talk to one another and dispute in words whose meaning is not agreed between them out of a mistake that the significations of common words are certainly established and the precise ideas they stand for perfectly known and that it is a shame to be ignorant of them. Both which suppositions are false no names of complex ideas having so settled determined significations that they are constantly used for the same precise ideas. Nor is it a shame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of anything but by the necessary ways of attaining it and so it is no discredit not to know what precise idea any sound stands for in another man's mind without he declare it to me by some other way than barely using that sound there being no other way without such a declaration certainly to know it. Indeed the necessity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the signification of common words with in some tolerable latitude that may serve for ordinary conversation and so a man cannot be supposed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words by common use in a language familiar to him. But common use being but a very uncertain rule which reduces itself at last to the ideas of particular men proves often but a very variable standard. But though such a Dictionary as I have above mentioned will require too much time cost and pains to be hoped for in this age yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose that words standing for things which are known and distinguished by their outward shapes should be expressed by little draughts and pictures made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more ease and in less time teach the true signification of many terms especially in languages of remote countries or ages and settle truer ideas in men's minds of several things whereof we read the names in ancient authors than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalists that treat of plants and animals have found the benefit of this way and he that has had occasion to consult them will have reason to confess that he has

a clearer idea of *aprum* or *ibex* from a little print of that herb or beast, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And so no doubt he would have of *sin* if and *astrum* if instead of *currycomb* and *cymbal* (which are the English names dictionaries render them by) he could see stamped in the margin small pictures of these instruments as they were in use amongst the ancients. *Toga tunica pallium* are words easily translated by *gown coat and cloak* but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the Romans, than we have of the faces of the tailors who made them. Such things as these which the eye distinguishes by their shapes would be best let into the mind by draughts made of them and more determine the signification of such words than any other words set for them or made use of to define them. But this is only by the bye.

26 V Fifth remedy. *To use the same word constantly in the same sense.* Fifthly If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words and definitions of their terms are not to be had yet this is the least that can be expected that, in all discourses wherein one man pretends to instruct or convince another he should use the same word constantly in the same sense. If this were done (which nobody can refuse without great dissimulation) many of the books extant might be spared many of the controversies in dispute would be at an end several of those great volumes swollen with ambiguous words now used in one sense and by and by in another would shrink into a very narrow compass and many of the philosophers (to mention no other) as well as poets would be contained in a nutshell.

27 *When not used the writer is not to be explained.* But after all the provision of words is so scanty in respect to that infinite variety of thoughts that

different senses. And though in the continuation of a discourse or the pursuit of an argument, there can be hardly room to digress into a particular definition as often as a man varies the signification of any term yet the import of the discourse will for the most part if there be no designed fallacy sufficiently lead candid and intelligent readers into the true meaning of it but where there is not sufficient to guide the reader there it concerns the writer to explain his meaning and show in what sense he there uses that term.

BOOK IV Of Knowledge and Probability

Chap. I Of Knowledge in General

1 Our knowledge consists in the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Since the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does can contemplate, it is evident that our knowledge is only concerned about them.

Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. It consists in the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, we believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that white is not black, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree. When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, what do we more but perceive that equality to two right angles does necessarily agree to and is inseparable from, the three angles of a triangle.

2. This agreement or disagreement may be of four sorts. But to understand it a little more distinctly herein thus greene and disagreeing consists, I think we may reduce it all to these four sorts.

I. Identity or diversity.

II. Relation.

III. Co-existence or necessary connexion.

IV. Real existence.

4. Of identity or diversity. Ideas first. As to the first sort of agreement or disagreement, viz. identity or diversity. It is the first of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all to perceive. It is ideas, and so far as it perceives them to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinction of things at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself and to be what it is, and all distinct ideas to disagree, i. e. the one not to be the other, and thus does without pains, labour or deduction, but first view by the natural power of perception and distinction. And though men of art have

reduced this into those general rules, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be so ready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty is about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind that the ideas he calls out is and that are the very ideas they are and that they are of other ideas which he calls out or queries. It can by a maximum proposition in the world make him know it clearer or more than he did before and though any change at all. This is the first green to disagree

happen any way. — — — — —
to be about the names, and not the ideas as the men
selves, whose density and density will always
be perceived as soon and clearly as the ideas
themselves are, and can't possibly be otherwise.

5. Of distinct ideas distinct as to nature the

— — — — —
between any two ideas, of what kind soever whether substances, modes, any other. For since all distinct ideas must eternally be known to be the same and so be universally and constantly denied of another there could be no room for any positive knowledge at all if we could not perceive any relation between our ideas, and find out the agreement or disagreement of them as we then in several ways the mind takes of comparing them.

6. Of the third sort, viz. necessary substances. Thirdly. The third sort of agreement or disagreement to be found in our ideas, which the perception of the mind is employed about, is co-existence or no co-existence in the same subject and this belongs particularly to substances. Thus when we propose concerning gold, that it is fixed, our knowledge of this truth amounts to no more but this, that fixedness, or power to remain in the fire unconsumed, is an idea that always accompanies and is joined with that particular sort of

agreement is I suppose contained all the knowledge we have or are capable of For all the inquiries we can make concerning any of our ideas all that we know or can affirm concerning any of them ■ That it is or ■ not the same with some other that it does or does not always co-exist with some other idea in the same subject that it has this or that relation with some other idea or that it has a real existence without the mind Thus blue is not yellow ■ of identity

Two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal ■ of relation Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions ■ is of co-existence God is ■ of real existence ■ Though identity and co-existence are truly nothing but relations yet they are such peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our ideas that they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads and not under relation in general since they are so different grounds ■ of affirmation and negation as will easily appear to any one who will but reflect on what is said in several places of this *Essay*

I should now proceed to examine the several degrees of our knowledge but that it is necessary first to consider the different acceptations ■ of the word *known*

■ *Knowledge is either actual or habitual* There are several ways wherein the mind is possessed of

agreement of any of its ideas or of the relation they have one to another

II A man is said to know any proposition which having been once laid before his thoughts he evidently perceived the agreement or disagreement of the ideas whereof it consists and so lodged it in his memory that whenever that proposition comes again to be reflected on he without doubt or hesitation embraces the right & de-assents to and ■ certain of the truth of it. This I think one may call *habitual knowledge* And thus a man may be said to know all those truths which are lodged in his memory by a foregoing clear and full perception whereof the mind ■ assured past doubt

if men had no knowledge of any more than what they actually thought on they would all be very ignorant and he that knew most would know but one truth that being all he was able to think on at one time¹

9 *Habitual knowledge is of two degrees* Of habitual knowledge there are also vulgarly speaking two degrees

First The one is of such truths laid up in the

an intuitive knowledge where the ideas themselves by an immediate view discover their agreement or disagreement one with another

Secondly The other is of such truths whereof the mind having been convinced it retains the memory of the conviction without the proofs² Thus a man that remembers certainly that he once perceived the demonstration that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones is certain that he knows it because he cannot doubt the truth of it In his adherence to a truth where the demonstration by which it was at first known is forgot though a man may be thought rather to believe his memory than really to know and this way of entertaining a truth seemed formerly to me like something between opinion and knowledge a sort of assurance which exceeds bare belief for that relies on the testimony of another — yet upon a due examination I find it comes not short of perfect certainty and is in effect true knowledge That which is apt to mislead our first thoughts into a mistake in this matter ■ that the agreement or disagreement of the ideas in this case is not perceived as it was at first by an ac-

position whose certainty we remember For example in this proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, one who has seen and clearly perceived the demonstration of this truth knows it to be true when that demonstration is gone out of his mind so that at present it ■ not actually in view and possibly cannot be recollected but he knows it in a different way from what he did before The agreement of the two ideas joined in that proposition is perceived but it is by the intervention of other ideas than those which at first produced that perception He remembers ■ he knows (for remembrance ■ but the reviving of some past knowledge) that he was once certain of the truth of this proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones The immutability of the same relations between the same

¹ Cf ch v

² Cf Bk II chh x. §§ 8 9 xxvii. § 10.

¹ Cf Bk II ch

² Cf cl xvi. § 2

ther than a probable conjecture. The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is because those ideas concerning whose agreement or disagreement the inquiry is made cannot by the mind be so put together as to show it. In this case then when the mind cannot so bring its ideas together as by their immediate comparison and as it were juxta position or application one to another to perceive their agreement or disagreement it is fain by the intervention of other ideas (one or more as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches and this is that which we call *reason*. Thus the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagreement in bigness between the three angles of a triangle and two right ones cannot by an immediate view and comparing them do it because the three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once and be compared with any other one or two angles and so of this the mind has no immediate no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality and finding those equal to two right ones comes to know their equality to two right ones.

3 *Demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs* Those intervening ideas which serve to show the agreement of any two others are called *proofs* and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived it is called *demonstration* it being shown to the understanding and the mind made to see that it is so. A quickness in the mind to find out these in

is easily

4 *As certain but not so easy and ready as intuitive knowledge* This knowledge by intervening proofs though it be certain yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so ready as in intuitive knowledge. For though in demonstration the mind does at last perceive the agreement or disagreement of the ideas it considers yet it is not without pains and attention there must be more than one transient view to find it. A steady application and pursuit are required to this discovery and there must be a progression by steps and degrees before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs and the use of reason to show it.

5 *The demonstrated conclusion not without doubt*

precedent to the demonstration Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the agreement or disagreement is perceived yet before the demonstration there was a doubt which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can distinctly see white and black) Whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be a hit in the eyes it will at first glimpse without hesitation perceive the words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper and so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing or the mind of perceiving we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one or clearness of perception in the other.

6 *As clear as intuitive knowledge* It is true the perception produced by demonstration is also very clear yet it is often with a great abatement of that evident lustre and full assurance that always accompany that which I call intuitive like a face reflected by several mirrors one to another where as long as it retains the similitude of an agreement with the object it produces a knowledge but it is still in every successive reflection with a lessening of that perfect clearness and distinctness which is in the first till at last after many removes it has a great mixture of dimness, and is not at first sight so knowable especially to weak eyes. Thus it is with knowledge made out by a long train of proof.

7 *Each step in demonstration knowledge must have its assistance* Now in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof for if it is not so that yet it would need a proof since without the per-

ceived by itself there is need of some intervening idea as a common measure to show their agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge has intuitive certainty which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas concerning which we inquire visible and certain. So that to make anything a

demonstration, is necessary to perceive the immediate agreement of the intervening ideas, whereby the agreement or disagreement of the two ideas under examination (whereof the one is always the first, and the other the last in the account) is found. This intuitive perception of the agreement or disagreement of the intermediate ideas, in each step and progression of the demonstration, must also be carried exactly in the mind, and man must be sure that no part is left out, which, because in longed words, and the use of many proofs, the memory does not always so readily and exactly retain: therefore it comes to pass, that this is more imperfect than intuitive knowledge, and men emboldened often falsehood for demonstration.

c. Hence the mistake is a pre-cognitive, et praeco-
gnita. The necessity of this intuitive knowledge,
in each step of scientific or demonstrative reason-
ing is a constant, I imagine, to that mistaken
axiom. That all reasoning was *pre-cognitive*
processes which, in a far too mistake, I shall
have occasion show more large, will come
to consider propositions, and particularly those
propositions which are called maxims, and to
show that it is by mistake that they are sup-
posed to be the foundations of all our knowledge
and reasoning.

g. *Demonstration not limited to ideas of mathematics*
 al qua i ty It has be n generally taken for
 granted, that mathematicians alone ar capabl
 of demonstrat n certainty b t to ha such an
 agreement or disagreement as may intuiti vly be
 perceived, being, as I imagine, not the pri vilege
 of the d as of umbe extens n, and figure
 al ne, may possibly be th want of d method
 and pplication in us, and m t of sufficient ev
 dence in things, that d monstrat n has been
 thought to ha e so little to d in ther parts
 of knowledge, and been scarce so m ch as assum
 d by any but mathematicians. For whatever
 ideas we ha e where n the mind can percei
 the immediate agreement or disagree m t h

but because, in comparing their equality or excess, the modes of numbers have every the least difference very clear and perceptible and though in extenso every the least excess is not so perceptible, yet the mind has found out ways to examine, and discover demonstrably the just equality of two angles, or extensions, or figures and both these, i.e. numbers and figures, can be set down by visible and lasting marks, wherein the ideas under consideration are perfectly determined which for the most part they are not, where they are marked only by names and words.

Mode of equal but not demonstrable like masses
quantity B (in other simpl. ideas, whose modes and differences are made and counted by degrees, and quantity we have not so nice and accurate distinction of their differences as particles, or fluid weights measure, their just equality the least differences. For those other simple ideas, being appearances of sensations produced in us, by the size, figure, number and motion of min. te corpuscles suitably insensible their different degrees also depend upon the variation of some of all those causes which, since it cannot be observed by us, particles of matter whereof each is too subtil to be perceived, it is impossible for us to have any exact measures of the different degrees of these simple ideas. For supposing the sensation or idea we name whiteness be produced in us by a certain number of globules, which, having a craticity about their own centres, strike upon the retina of the eye, with certain degree of rotation, as well as progressive swiftness it will hence easily follow that the more the superficial parts of any body are so ordered as to reflect the greater number of globules of light, and to give them the proper rotation, which is fit to produce this sensation of whiteness, the more white will that body appear that from an equal space sends to the retina the greater number of such corpuscles, with that peculiar sort of motion. I do not say that the nature of light consists in very small round globules nor of whiteness in such a texture of parts as gives a certain rotation to these globules when it reflects them off. I am not now treating physically of light or colours. But thus I think I may say that I cannot (and I would be glad any one would make it liable that he did) conceive how bodies without us can any way affect our senses, but by the immediate contact of the sensible bodies themselves, as in tasting and feeling or the impulse of some sensible particles coming from them, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling by the different impulse of which parts, caused by their

in small extension, figure, number and their modes.

a. It is not to be so limited. The reason why it has been generally sought for and supposed to be only in those, I imagine has been, not only the general usefulness of those sciences.

Of ch. vii.

ther than a probable conjecture. The reason why the mind cannot always perceive presently the agreement or disagreement of two ideas is because those ideas concerning whose agreement

together as by their immediate comparison and

or more as it happens) to discover the agreement or disagreement which it searches and this is that which we call *reasoning*. Thus the mind being willing to know the agreement or disagree

three angles of a triangle cannot be brought at once and be compared with any other one or two angles and so of this the mind has no immediate no intuitive knowledge. In this case the mind is fain to find out some other angles to which the three angles of a triangle have an equality and finding those equal to two right ones comes to know their equality to two right ones.

3 *Demonstration depends on clearly perceived proofs* Those intervening ideas which serve to show the agreement of any two others are called *proofs* and where the agreement and disagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived it is called *demonstration* it being shown to the understanding and the mind made to see that it is so. A quickness in the mind to find out these intermediate ideas (that shall discover the agreement or disagreement of any other) and to apply them right, is I suppose that which is called *sagacity*.

4 *As certain but not so easy and ready as intuitive knowledge* This knowledge by intervening proofs though it be certain yet the evidence of it is not altogether so clear and bright, nor the assent so

as sides yet it is not without pains and attention there must be more than one transient view to find it. A steady application and pursuit are required to this discovery and there must be a progression by steps and degrees before the mind can in this way arrive at certainty and come to perceive the agreement or repugnancy between two ideas that need proofs and the use of reason to show it.

5 *The demonstrated conclusion not without doubt*

precedent to the demonstration Another difference between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge is, that though in the latter all doubt be removed when by the intervention of the intermediate ideas the agreement or disagreement is perceived yet before the demonstration there was a doubt which in intuitive knowledge cannot happen to the mind that has its faculty of perception left to a degree capable of distinct ideas no more than it can be a doubt to the eye (that can distinctly see white and black) Whether this ink and this paper be all of a colour. If there be a hit in the eyes it will at first glimpse without hesitation perceive the words printed on this paper different from the colour of the paper and so if the mind have the faculty of distinct perception it will perceive the agreement or disagreement of those ideas that produce intuitive knowledge. If the eyes have lost the faculty of seeing or the mind of perceiving we in vain inquire after the quickness of sight in one or clearness of perception in the other.

6 *Not so clear as intuitive knowledge* It is true the certainty produced by demonstration is also

as fire reflected by several mirrors one to another

with a lessening of that perfect clearness and as high as in the first till at last after

by a long train of proof

7 *Each step in demonstrated knowledge must be intuitive evidence* Now in every step reason makes in demonstrative knowledge there is an intuitive knowledge of that agreement or disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate idea which it uses as a proof for if it were not so it at yet would need a proof since without the perception of such agreement or disagreement there is no knowledge produced if it be perceived by itself it is intuitive knowledge if it cannot be perceived by itself there is need of some intervening idea, as a common measure, to show the agreement or disagreement. By which it is plain that every step in reasoning that produces knowledge has intuitive certainty which when the mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the agreement or disagreement of the ideas concerning which we inquire visible and certain. So that to make anything a

ment, and so have but very obscure knowledge of it. But ideas which, by reason of their obscurity or otherwise, are confused, cannot produce any clear or distinct knowledge, because, as far as such ideas are confused, so far the mind cannot perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree. Or to express the same thing in a way less apt to be misunderstood, he that hath not determined ideas to the words he uses, cannot make propositions of them of whose truth he can be certain.

Chap. III Of the Extent of Human Knowledge

1. *Extent of our knowledge.* Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, is so limited from hence That,

1. *It extends no further than we can reach.* First, we can have knowledge no further than we are able to attain.

2. *It extends no far as there can be an agreement or disagreement.* Secondly, That we can have no knowledge further than we can have perception of the agreement or disagreement. Which perception being either by intuition, or the immediate comparing any two ideas or 2. By sense, examining the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of some others, or 3. By reasoning, perceiving the existence of particular things hence also to know.

3. *It extends no far as there is an object and a subject.* Thirdly, That we cannot have an abstract knowledge that shall extend itself above ideas, and all that we would know about them, because we cannot examine and perceive all the relations they have to one another by just position, or an immediate comparison one with another. Thus, he in the midst of an oblique and an acute angled triangle, both drawn from equal bases, and between parallels, I can, by intuition knowledge perceive the one not to be equal, but cannot this way know whether they be equal or no, because their agreement or disagreement in equality can never be perceived by an immediate comparison, them the difference of time makes their parts incapable of an exact immediate proportion, and therefore there is need of some intermediate qualities to measure them by which is demonstrated, rational knowledge.

4. *It extends no far as there is a subject.* Fourthly, It follows also, from what is above considered, that our natural knowledge cannot reach to the whole

extent of our ideas, because between two different ideas we would examine, we cannot always find such mediums as we can connect to answer with an intuitive knowledge in all the parts of the deduction, and wherever that fails, we come short of knowledge and demonstration.

5. *Sensitive knowledge extends no further than by sense.* Sensitive reasoning no further than the existence of things actually present to our senses, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

—
on ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection, and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of truth being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the dull and narrow information that is

be received from some few and not very accurate, way of perception, such as are our senses yet it would be well with us if our knowledge were but as large as our ideas, and there were not many doubts and inquiries concerning the matter, whereof we are not, or I believe ever shall be in this world resolved. Nevertheless, I do not question but that human knowledge under the present circumstances of our beings and constitutions, may be carried much further than it has hitherto been, if men would sincerely and with freedom of mind, employ all that industry and labour of thought, in improving the means of discovering truth, which they do or think to cover.

support of falsehood, to maintain a system, interest, or party they are once engaged in. But yet as I said, I think I may without injury to human perfection so be content that our knowledge would never reach as far as might desire to know concerning those things which have not been, to amount to all the difficulties, and resolve all the questions that may be proposed, and to answer them. We have the use of a compass rule and square, and yet, perhaps, shall never be able to find them equal and square, and certainly know that it is so. We have the use of a balance and scale, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any were eternal being, twins or no, when impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether their Omnipotence has no power in it some

different size figure and motion the variety of sensations is produced in us

12 *Particles of light and simple ideas of colour* Whether then they be globules or no or whether they have a verticity about their own centres that produces the idea of whiteness in us this is cer

here I think we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting For I ask any one Whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception when he looks on the sun by day and thinks on it by night when

1 The first wormy food smells a rose

motion is — the whiter does the body appear from which the greatest number are reflected as is evident in the same piece of paper put in the sun beams in the shade and in a dark hole in each of which it will produce in us the idea of whiteness in far different degrees

13 *The secondary qualities of things not discovered by demonstration* Not knowing therefore what number of particles nor what motion of them is fit to produce any precise degree of whiteness we cannot demonstrate the certain equality of any two degrees of whiteness because we have no certain standard to measure them by nor means to distinguish every the least real difference the only help we have being from our senses which in this point fail us But where the difference is so great as to produce in the mind clearly distinct ideas whose differences can be perfectly retained there these ideas or colours as we see in different kinds as blue and red are as capable of demonstration as ideas of number and extension What I have here said of whiteness and colours I think holds true in all secondary qualities and their modes

14 *Sensitive knowledge of the particular existence of finite beings without us* These two viz intuition and demonstration are the degrees of our knowledge whatever comes short of one of these with what assurance soever embraced is but faith or opinion but not knowledge at least in all general

15 There is indeed another perception of

whether of the foregoing degrees of certainty possesses under the name of knowledge There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds this is intuitive knowledge But whether there be anything more than barely that dead our minds whether we can thence certainly infer the exist

16 exists no such object without us which corresponds

as we do between any two distinct ideas If any one say a dream may do the same thing and all these ideas may be produced in us without any external objects he may please to dream that I make him this answer — 1 That it is no great matter whether I remove his scruple or no where all is but dream reasoning and arguments are

2 With and knowledge nothing 2 That

I answer That we certainly finding that pleasure or pain follows upon the application of certain objects to us whose existence we perceive or dream that we perceive by our senses this certainty is as great as our happiness or misery beyond that has no concernment to know or to form

ence perception and consciousness we have of the entrance of ideas from them and allow these three degrees of knowledge viz intuitive demonstration and sensitive in each of which there are different degrees and ways of evidence and certainty

15 *Knowledge of always clear* whether the ideas that enter into it are clear But since our knowledge is founded on and employed about our ideas only will it not follow from thence that it is conformable to our ideas and that here our ideas are clear and distinct or obscure and confused our knowledge will be so too? To which I answer No for our knowledge consisting in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that perception and not in the clearness or obscurity of the ideas themselves viz a man that has as clear ideas of the angles of a triangle, and of equality to the right ones as any mathematician in the world may yet have but a very obscure perception of their

exists no such object affects their senses but

1 Cf ch. x.

ry on one side of the question but do not at all thereby help us to truth by running into the opposite opinion which, on examination, will be found clogged with equal difficulties. For what safety what advantage to any one is it, for the turning the seeming absurdities, and the human unpardonable rube, he meets with in one opinion, to take refuge in the contrary which is built on something as good as inexplicable, and as far removed from his comprehension. His past controversy that he has in his mind that thinks our very doubts about what is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content our selves in the ignorance of what kind of being this, and thus in vain to go about to be sceptical in this, as it is unreasonable in most other cases to be positive against the being of anything because we cannot comprehend its nature. For I would fain know what substance exists, that has not something in which manifestly baffles our understanding. Other spirits, who see and know the nature and inward constitution of things, how much must they exceed us in knowledge? To which, if we add farther comprehension, which enables them to glance to see the connexion and agreement of very many ideas, and readily to see them the intermediate proofs, which

another we may guess some part of the happiness of superior ranks of spirits, who have quicker and more penetrating sight, as well as a larger field of knowledge.

But to return to the argument in hand our knowledge, I say, is not only limited to the paucity and imperfections of the ideas we have, and which we employ about, but even comes short of that too but how far it reaches, let us now inquire.

How far our knowledge extends. The affirmations or denials we make concerning the ideas he may as I have before intimated in general be reduced these four sorts, 1. identity co-existence, relation, and real existence. I shall examine how far our knowledge extends in each of these.

1. *Our knowledge of identity and diversity is less extensive than our knowledge of real existence.* For it is as I have said (in this way) of agreement or disagreement of our ideas, our intuition knowledge is as far extended as our ideas themselves. and there can be no idea in the mind, which does not presently by an intuitive knowledge, per-

ceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

2. *Of last co-existence extends only very little.* As to the second sort, which is the agreement or disagreement of our ideas in co-existence in this our knowledge is very short though in this consists the greatest and most material part of our knowledge concerning substances. For our ideas of the species of substances being, as I have showed nothing but certain collections of simple ideas united in one subject, and so co-existing together. Our idea of flame is a body hot, luminous, and moving upward of gold, a body heavy to a certain degree, yellow malleable, and fusible. for these, or some such complex ideas as these, in men's minds, all these two names of the different substances, flame and gold, stand for. When we would know anything further concerning these, or any other sort of substances, what do we inquire, but what other qualities or powers these substances have or have not. Which is nothing else but to know what other simple ideas do, or do not co-exist with those that make up that complex idea.

3. *Breath the impression tells us nothing less is not correct is for the most part unknown.* Thus, how weighty and considerable part soever of human science, is yet very narrow and scarce any at all. The reason whereof is, that the simple ideas whereof our complex ideas of substances are made up are, for the most part, such as carry with them, in their own nature, no natural necessary connexion or inconsistency with any other simple ideas, whose co-existence with them we would inform ourselves about.

Especially of the secondary qualities of bodies. The ideas that our complex ones of substances are made up of, and about which our knowledge

we should know which have a necessary union or inconsistency one with another. For not knowing the root they spring from, not knowing what size, figure, and texture of parts they are, on which depend, and from which result those qualities which make up our complex idea of gold, it is impossible we should know what other qualities result from, or are incompatible with, the same.

On the ideas of identity and diversity cf. Bk. II. ch. xxix. § 1. also Bk. IV. ch. I. § 4. Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxix. Bk. III. ch. vi. Cf. Bk. II. ch. iii. etc.

Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.

Cf. ch. II. § 2-3.

systems of matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think or else joined and fixed to matter so disposed a thinking immaterial substance it being in respect of our notions not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can if he pleases superadd to matter a faculty of thinking than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking since we know not wherein thinking consists nor to what sort of substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power which cannot be in any created being but merely by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator

Whether Matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know For I see no contradiction in it that the first Eternal thinking Being or Omnipotent Spirit should if he pleased give to certain systems of created senseless matter put together as he thinks fit some degrees of sense

dently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first thinking Being What certainty of knowledge can any one have that some perceptions such as v.g. pleasure and pain should not be in some bodies themselves after a certain manner modified and moved as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance upon the motion of the parts of body Body as far as we can conceive being able only to strike and affect body and motion according to the utmost reach of our ideas being able to produce nothing but motion so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain or the idea of a colour or sound we are fain to quit our reason go beyond our ideas and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker For since we must allow He has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce what reason have we to conclude that He could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I say not thus that I could any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality I am not here speaking of probability but knowledge and I think not only that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially where we want that evidence that can produce

knowledge but also that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach for the state we are at present in not being that of vision we must in many things content ourselves with faith and probability and in the present question about the Immateriality of the Soul if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty we need not think it strange All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality since it is evident that he who made us at the beginning to subsist here sensible intelligent beings and for several years continued us in such a state can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men according to their doings in this life And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other as some over zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul have been forward to make the world believe Who either on the one side indulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter can allow no existence to what is not material or who on the other side finding not co-existence within the natural powers of matter examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind have the confidence to conclude — That Omnipotency itself cannot give percep-

to extended matter or existence to anything that has no extension at all will confess that he is very far from certainly knowing what his soul is It is a point which seems to me to be put out of the reach of our knowledge and he who will give himself leave to consider freely and look into the

on which soever he views it either as an extended substance or as a thinking extended matter the difficulty to conceive either will be almost insurmountable alone is in his thoughts still directed him to the contrary side An unfair way which some men take with themselves is how because of the inconceivableness of something they find in one throw themselves violently into the contrary hypothesis though altogether as unintelligible to an unbiased understanding This serves not only to show the weakness and the scantiness of our knowledge but the insignificant triumph of such sort of arguments which draw us from our own view may satisfy us that we can find no certain

Cf Lock's *First Letter* to Stillingfleet p 67

Cf Bl. II ch xxiii. § 5

Cf ch x.

Cf Lock's *Third Letter* to Stillingfleet pp 398-

Cf Bl. II ch xxiii. §§ 15-32

urs at the same time? To which I answer that these bodies, to eyes differently placed, may at the same time afford different colours, but I take liberty also to say to eyes differently placed it is different parts of the object that reflect the particles of light, and therefore it is not the same part of the object, and so not the very same subject, which at the same time appears both yellow and azure. For it is as impossible that the very same part of any body should at the same time differently modify or reflect the rays of light, as that should have two different figures and textures at the same time.

6 *Of the limited force co-existence of powers in bodies extends the very limited way.* But as to the powers of substances to change the sensible qualities of other bodies, which make great part of our inquiries about them, and is no inconsiderable branch of our knowledge I doubt as to these, whether our knowledge reaches much further than our experience or whether we can come to the discovery of most of these powers, and be certain that they are in any subject, by the connexion with any of those ideas which to us make its essence. Because the active and passive powers of bodies, and their ways of operating, consist in texture and motion of parts which we cannot by any means come to discover: it is but in very few cases we can be able to perceive their dependence on, or repugnance to, any of those ideas which make our complex one of that sort of thought. I have here intimated in the corpuscularian hypothesis, as that which is thought to go furthest in an intelligible explication of those qualities of bodies, and I fear the weakness of human understanding is scarce able to substitute another which will afford us fuller and clearer discovery of the necessary connexion and co-existence of the powers which are to be observed united in several sorts of them. This at least is certain, that whichever hypothesis be clearest and truest (for of that I am not my business to determine) our knowledge concerning corporeal substances will be very little advanced by any of them, and we are made to see what quantities and powers of bodies have necessary connexion or repugnance one with another which in the presence of philosophy I think we know but to a very small degree, and I doubt whether with those faculties we have, we shall ever be able to carry our general knowledge (if so not particular experience) in this part much further. Experience is that which in this part we must de-

pend on. And it were to be wished that it were more improved. We find the advantages some men & generous pains have this way brought to the stock of natural knowledge. And if others, especially the philosophers by fire, who pretend to it, had been so wary in their observations, and sincere in their reports as those who call themselves philosophers ought to have been, our acquaintance with the bodies here about us, and our insight into their powers and operations had been yet much greater.

7 *Of the powers that co-exist in spirits yet narrow.* If we are at a loss in respect of the powers and operations of bodies, I think it is easy to conceive we are much more in the dark in reference to spirits, whereof we naturally have no ideas but what we draw from that of our souls, by reflecting on the operations of our own souls within us, as far as they can come within our observation. But how inconsiderable a rank the spirits that inhabit our bodies hold amongst those various and possibly innumerable kinds of nobler beings, and how far short they come of the endowments and perfections of cherubim and seraphim, and infinite sorts of spirits above us, is what by a transient hint in another place I have offered to my reader consideration.

8 *Of lines between contraries and is not easy to say how far our limited spirit Thus.* As to the third sort of our knowledge, viz. the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas in any other relation, such as it is the largest field of our knowledge, so it is hard to determine how far it may extend, because the advantages that are made in this part of knowledge, depending on our sagacity in finding intermediate ideas, that may show the relations and habitudes of ideas whose co-existence is not considered, it is a hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such discoveries and when reason has all the helps it is capable of for the finding. I propose to examine the agreement or disagreement of remote ideas. They that are ignorant of Algebra cannot imagine the wonders in this kind are to be done by it, and what further improvements and helps advantages to other parts of knowledge the sagacious mind of man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe, that the sciences are not those alone that are capable of demonstration and knowledge: and that other and perhaps more useful, parts of contemplation, would afford us certainty if fears, passions, and domineering interest did not oppose or menace such endeavours.

constitution of the insensible parts of gold and so consequently must always co exist with that complex idea we have of it or else are inconsistent with it

12 *Because necessary connexion between any secondary and the primary qualities is undiscoverable by us* Besides this ignorance of the primary qualities of the insensible parts of bodies on which depend all their secondary qualities there is yet another and more incurable part of ignorance which sets us more remote from a certain knowledge of the co existence or *inco existence* (if I may so say) of different ideas in the same subject and that is that there is no discoverable connexion between any secondary quality and those primary qualities which it depends on¹

13 *We have no perfect knowledge of their primary qualities* That the size figure and motion of one body should cause a change in the size figure and motion of another body is not beyond our conception these separation of the parts of one body upon the intrusion of another and the change from rest to motion upon impulse these and the like seem to have some connexion one with another And if we knew these primary qualities of bodies we might have reason to hope we might be able to know a great deal more of these operations of them one upon another but our minds not being able to discover any connexion betwixt these primary qualities of bodies and the sensations that are produced in us by them we can never be able to establish certain and undoubted rules of the consequence or co-existence of any secondary qualities though we could discover the size figure or motion of those invisible parts which immediately produce them We are so far from knowing what figure size or motion of parts produce a yellow colour a sweet taste or a sharp sound that we can by no means conceive how any size figure or motion of any particles can possibly produce in us the idea of any colour taste or sound what soever there is no conceivable connexion between the one and the other

14 *And seek in vain for certain and universal knowledge of the essential qualities in substances* In vain therefore shall we endeavour to discover by our ideas (the only true way of certain and universal knowledge)² what other ideas are to be found constantly joined with that of our complex idea of any substance since we neither know the real constitution of the minute parts on which their qualities do depend nor did we know them could we discover any necessary connexion be

tween them and any of the secondary qualities which is necessary to be done before we can certainly know their necessary co existence So that let our complex idea of any species of substances be what it will we can hardly from the simple ideas contained in it certainly determine the necessary co existence of any other quality whatsoever Our knowledge in all these inquiries reaches very little further than our experience. Indeed some few of the primary qualities have a necessary dependence and visible connexion one with another as figure necessarily supposes extension receiving or communicating motion by impulse supposes solidity But though these and perhaps some others of our ideas have yet there are so few of them that have a visible connexion one with another that we can by intuition or demonstration discover the co existence of very few of the qualities that are to be found united in substances and we are left only to the assistance of our senses to make known to us what qualities they contain For of all the qualities that are co existent in any subject without this dependence and evident connexion of their ideas one with another we cannot know certainly any that co exist any further than experience by our senses informs us Thus though we see the yellow colour and upon trial find the weight mal

connexion with the other we cannot certainly know that where any four of these are the fifth

by the observation of our senses or in general by the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves

15 *Of the necessary connexion of the ideas themselves* As to the incompatibility or repugnancy to co-existence we may know that any subject may have of each sort of primary qualities but one particular at once e.g. each particular extension figure number of parts motion excludes all other of each kind The like also is certain of all sensible ideas peculiar to each sense for what ever of each kind is present in any subject excludes all other of that sort e.g. no one subject can have two smells or two colours at the same time To this perhaps will be said Has not an opal or the infusion of ligum nephus two colours

Cf Hume Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding § 5 t v

¹ Cf. Bacon *Novum Organum* II 13-6

Cf. Hume's *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* § Sect. iv also Sect. viii

or disagreement, and the resolution of the question be nothing but the result of the whole made up of such particulars, whereof the mind has a

it would be almost impossible to carry on these different ideas in the mind without confusion and in letting slip some parts of the reckoning and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless. In which case the cyphers or marks help not the mind at all to perceive the agreement of any more numbers, their equality or proportions that the mind has only by intuition of the ideas of the numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helpful to the memory to record and retain the several ideas about which the demonstration is made, whereby man may know how far his intuition of knowledge in surveying several such particulars has proceeded that so he may without confusion to what is yet unknown and to last have in the end before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.

20 *Remedy for difficult dealing demonstration only in moral ideas* O part of these dissipated images in moral ideas which has made them be thought incapable of demonstration may in a good measure be remedied by diligence, setting down the collected simple ideas, which every term shall stand for and then using them as it duly and constantly for the precise collection. And what methods I bra, something of that kind may hereafter suggest, to remove the other difficulties, it is not easy to tell. Consider I am, that, if men would in the same method, and with the same indifference search after moral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have the same connexion as with another and more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfected demonstration than is commonly imagined. But in which this is to be expected, whilst the desire of esteem, riches, or power makes me espouse the well-weighed opinions in fashion, and then seek arguments that make good their beauty and show over and above their deficiency. A thin being so beneficial to the eye as truth is to the mind, things so deformed and irreconcilable to the understanding as lies. For though many men can with a false though a no cry handsome wife his bosom, who is bold enough to openly to show that he has espoused falsehood, and recover. Cf. Bk. III ch. x. §§ 5, 8.

to the mind

the breath power of man will only extend to
21 *Of the truth of existence* *Firstly* As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, that of the actual existence of things we have intuition of knowledge of existence and demonstration of knowledge of the existence of a God of the existence of anything else which is no other but sensate knowledge which extend not beyond the objects present to our senses.

Our notion of our knowledge being so narrow as I have shown, it will perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds if we look little into the dark side and take view of our ignorance, which, being infinitely larger than our knowledge may serve much to the quieting of disputes and improvement of useful knowledge if discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the compass of those things that are within the reach of our understandings and launch not into that byss of darkness, (where

of the folly of such conceits, we need to go far off that knowledge anything less than, in the first place, that he need not seek for instances of

thinking men find themselves puzzled and at loss in every part of matter. We shall therefore find it so when we consider the use

Cf. I. introd. § 5 Bk. IV ch. ii. § 1
Cf. Bk. III ch. x. §§ 6, 7 Bk. IV ch. xii.

Cf. I. introd. §§ 5-7

Morality capable of demonstration The idea of a supreme Being infinite in power goodness and wisdom whose workmanship we are and on whom we depend and the idea of ourselves as understanding rational creatures being such as are clear in us would I suppose if duly considered and pursued afford such foundations of our duty and rules of action as might place *morality* amongst the *sciences capable of demonstration*¹ wherein I doubt not but from self evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifference and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences The relation of other modes may certainly be perceived as well as those of number and extension and I cannot see why they should not also be capable of demonstration if due methods were thought on to examine or pursue their agreement or disagreement Where there is no property there is no injustice is a proposition as certain as any demonstration in Euclid for the idea of property being a right to any thing and the idea to which the name injustice is given being the invasion or violation of that right it is evident that these ideas being thus established and these names annexed to them I can as certainly know this proposition to be true

which require conformity to them and the idea of absolute liberty being for any one to do what ever he pleases I am as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition as of any in the mathematics.

19 *Two things have made moral ideas to be thought incapable of demonstration their unsuitness for sensible representation and their complexness* That which in this respect has given the advantage to the ideas of quantity and made them thought more capable of certainty and demonstration is

First That they can be set down and represented by sensible marks which have a greater and nearer correspondence with them than any words or sounds whatsoever Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of the ideas in the mind and not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in their signification An angle circle or square drawn in lines lies open to the view and cannot be mistaken it remains unchangeable, and may at leisure be considered and examined and the demonstration be revised and all the parts of it

¹ Cf Bk III ch x § 16

may be gone over more than once without any danger of the least change in the ideas. This can not be thus done in moral ideas we have no sensible marks that resemble them whereby we can set them down we have nothing but words to express them by which though when written they remain the same yet the ideas they stand for may change in the same man and it is very seldom that they are not different in different persons²

Secondly Another thing that makes the greater difficulty in ethics is That moral ideas are commonly more complex than those of the figures ordinarily considered in mathematics From whence these two inconveniences follow —First, that their names are of more uncertain signification the precise collection of simple ideas they stand for not being so easily agreed on and so the sign that is used for them in communicational ways and in thinking often does not steadily carry with it the same idea³ Upon which the same disorder confusion and error follow as would if a man going to demonstrate something of an heptagon should in the diagram he took to do it leave out one of the angles or by oversight make the figure with one angle more than the name ordinarily imported or he intended it

name being retained one angle i.e. one simple idea is left out or put in the complex one (still called by the same name) more at one time than another Secondly From the complexness of these moral ideas there follows another inconvenience viz that the mind cannot easily retain those precise combinations so exactly and perfectly as is necessary in the examination of the habitudes and correspondences agreements or disagreements of several of them one with another especially where it is to be judged of by long deductions and the intervention of several other complex ideas to show the agreement or disagreement of two remote ones.

The great help against this which mathematicians find in diagrams and figures, which remain unalterable in their draughts is very apparent and the memory would often have great difficulty otherwise to retain them so exactly whilst the mind ventures over the parts of them step by step to examine the several correspondences. And though in casting up a long sum either in addition multiplication or division every part be only a progress on of the mind taking a view of its own ideas and considering their agreement

Cf Bk III chh v ix §§ 6 7 x §§ 15 18.

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

CHAP. III

or disagreement, and the resolution of the questions being nothing but the result of the whole, made up of such particulars, whereof the mind has clear perceptions, without setting down the several parts by marks, whose precise significations are known, and by marks that last, and remain in view when the memory had left them gone, it would be almost impossible to carry so many different ideas in the mind without confounding, or letting slip some parts of the reckoning, and thereby making all our reasonings about it useless. I which case the cyphers or marks help not the mind to tell it perceives the treatment of any two more numbers, than unequal proportions, that the mind has only by intuition of its own ideas of the numbers themselves. But the numerical characters are helps to the memory to record and retain the several ideas about which the demonstration is made, whereby man may know how far his intuitive knowledge in surveying several of the particulars has proceeded, that so he may without confusion go on to what is yet unknown, and that last has in our way before him the result of all his perceptions and reasonings.

Our discourse found fault dealing, demonstrates the moral ideas O part of these disadvantages in moral ideas which has made them be hitherto incapable of demonstration may in

collection. And what methods algebra, or some kind of the kind may hereafter suggest, to remove the other difficulties, it is not easy to foretell. Confident I am, that, if men would in the same method, and with the same indifference search after moral as they do mathematical truths, they would find them have a more genuine connection with another and more necessary consequence from our clear and distinct ideas, and to our ear perfect demonstration than is commonly imagined. But much of this is to be expected, whilst the desire of riches, power, and the like makes men espouse the false and

corrupted in his breast so ugly a thing as a lie. Whilst the parties of men or interests do not all men's throats whom they can get into their power without permitting them to examine their truths falsehood and will not let truth have fair play in the world, no man has liberty to search after what improvements can be expected of this kind. What greater light can be hoped for in the moral sciences. The subject part of mankind in most places might, instead thereof the Egyptian bondage, expect Egyptian darkness, were it the candle of the Lord set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish.

21 *Of the third of science* *Fourthly* As to the fourth sort of our knowledge, *sc. the actual* *sc. the thing which has intuitive knowledge of our existence* and a demonstration of the knowledge of the existence of a God of the existence of anything else we have other but sensitive knowledge which extends beyond the objects present to our senses.

2 *Our narrow ground* Our knowledge being so narrow as I have shown, it will perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds if we look little into the dark side, and take account of ignorance which, being infinitely larger than our knowledge may serve much to the quieting of disputes, and improvement of our knowledge, if, discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the compass of those things that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not into that byss of darkness, (where we have not yet seen faculties to perceive anything) out of a presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be satisfied of this fully (such a conceit, we need not go far) that knows anything, knows thus, in the first place, that he need not seek for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understanding I think men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of matter. We shall therefore find it so, when we consider the cause

deformed and unsuitable to the understanding as lies. For though many men can with satisfaction enough know no cry handsome wife in his bosom yet who is bold enough to say now that he has espoused falsehood, and re-

four ignorance which from what has been said I suppose will be found to be these three —

Its causes First Want of ideas

Secondly Want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have

Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our ideas

23 *One cause of our ignorance want of ideas* First There are some things and those not a few that we are ignorant of for want of ideas

I *Want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the universe may have* First all the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have shown) to those we receive from corporeal objects by sensation and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection. But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think their span the measure of all things. What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours it is not for us to determine. But to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it that there was no such thing as sight and colours because he had no manner of idea of any such thing nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness of an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power wisdom and goodness of the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so incon siderable mean and impotent a creature as he will find man to be who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings. What faculties, therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours we know not. This we know and certainly find that we want several otherwise soft them best those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of substance itself which is the foundation of all

I may confidently say of it That the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest.

24 *Want of simple ideas that men are capable of* but have not because of their remoteness Secondly Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are capable of. As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able to give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is reasonable to think other beings, perfecter than we have of which we know nothing so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in igno-

— — — these primary qualities of bodies in general yet not knowing what is the particular bulk, figure and motion of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe we are ignorant of the several powers efficacies and ways of operation whereby the effects which we daily see are produced. These are hid from us in some things by being too remote and in others by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken is but a small part of the universe we shall then discover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings how far they are extended what is their motion and how continued or communicated and what influence they have one upon another are contemplations that at first glimmer upon our thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contemplations and confine our thoughts to this little canton—I mean this system of our sun and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it. What several sorts of vegetables animals and intellectual corporeal beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth may there probably be in the other planets, to the knowledge of which even of their outward figures and parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this earth there being no natural means either by sensation or reflection to convey their certain ideas into our minds? They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge and that sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess much less have clear and distinct ideas of them.

2. *Because of less numbers.* If a great, nay far the greater part of the several ranks of bodies in the universe escape our notice by their remoteness, there are others that are no less concealed from us by their minuteness. These *searles* or *faeces*, being the active parts of matter and the great instruments of nature, on which depend not only all their secondary qualities, but also most of their natural operations, our want of precise distinct ideas of their primary qualities keeps us in an incurable ignorance of what we desire to know about them. I doubt not but if we could discover the figure, size, texture, and motion of the minute constituent parts of any two bodies, we should know what trial several of their operations upon another as we do now the properties of square or triangle. Did we know the mechanical affections of the particles of rhubarb, hemlock, opium, and man, as a watch-maker does those of watch, whereby it performs its perambulations, and of a file, which by rubbing on them will alter the figure of any of the wheels we should be able to tell beforehand that rhubarb will purge, hemlock kill, and opium make man sleep as well as a watch-maker can, that a little piece of paper laid on the balance will keep the watch from going till it be removed, or that some small part of it being rubbed by a file, the machine would quit loose its motion, and the watch go no more. The dissolving of silver into frost, and gold into redness, and not into steel, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know than it is to touch to understand why the turning of one key will open a lock, and not the turning of another. But whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough to discover the minute particles of bodies, and give us ideas of their mechanical affections, we must be content to be ignorant of their properties and way of operation nor can we be assured about them any further than some few trials we make are able to reach. III. In other they will succeed again another time, we cannot be certain. Thus hinders our certain knowledge of universal truths concerning natural bodies and our reason carries us hence very little beyond particular cases or of fact.

4. *Hence no science of faculties when we seek.* And therefore I am disposed to doubt that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, science will still be out of our reach, because we want perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those which we have ranked into classes

Of Bacon, *Natural Organon*, the peering philosophy of Bk. II.

under names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have but adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse, yet whilst we want the latter we are not capable of scientific knowledge nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths concerning them. *Geometry* and *demystification* are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the colour, figure, taste, and smell, and other senses

by which we have clear and distinct ideas of

we so much as guess, much less know the manner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations and of bodies more remote we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions.

Much less science from outward parts. This at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings to which if we add the consideration of that infinite number of parts that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no commixture, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance concealed from us, in an impenetrable obscurity almost the whole intellectual world greater certainly and more beautiful world than the material. For hitherto, some very few and those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits, the eternal independent Author of them, and us, and all things, we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself,

of our ignorance which from what has been said I suppose will be found to be these three —

Its causes First Want of ideas

Secondly Want of a discoverable connexion between the ideas we have.

Thirdly Want of tracing and examining our ideas

23 *One cause of our ignorance want of ideas* First There are some things and those not a few that we are ignorant of for want of ideas

I *Want of simple ideas that other creatures in other parts of the universe may have* First all the simple ideas we have are confined (as I have shown) to those we receive from corporeal objects by sensation and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of reflection. But how much these few and narrow inlets are disproportionate to the vast whole extent of all beings will not be hard to persuade those who are not so foolish as to think they span the measure of all things. What other simple ideas it is possible the creatures in other parts of the universe may have by the assistance of senses and faculties more or perfecter than we have or different from ours it is not for us to determine. But to say or think there are no such because we conceive nothing of them is no better an argument than if a blind man should be positive in it that there is no such thing as sight and colours because he had no manner of idea of any such thing nor could by any means frame to himself any notions about seeing. The ignorance and darkness that is in us no more hinders nor confines the knowledge that is in others than the blindness of a mole is an argument against the quicksightedness of an eagle. He that will consider the infinite power wisdom and goodness of the Creator of all things will find reason to think it was not all laid out upon so considerable mean and impotent a creature as he will find man to be who in all probability is one of the lowest of all intellectual beings. What faculties therefore other species of creatures have to penetrate into the nature and inmost constitutions of things what ideas they may receive of them far different from ours we know not. Thus we know and certainly find that we want several other views of them besides those we have to make discoveries of them more perfect. And we may be convinced that the ideas we can attain to by our faculties are very disproportionate to things themselves when a positive clear distinct one of substance itself which is the foundation of all

I may confidently say of it That the intellectual and sensible world are in this perfectly alike that that part which we see of either of them holds no proportion with what we see not and whatsoever we can reach with our eyes or our thoughts of either of them is but a point almost nothing in comparison of the rest

24 *Want of simple ideas that men are capable of having but have not because of their remoteness* Secondly Another great cause of ignorance is the want of ideas we are capable of. As the want of ideas which our faculties are not able to give us shuts us wholly from those views of things which it is reasonable to think other beings perfecter than we have of which we know nothing so the want of ideas I now speak of keeps us in ignorance of things we conceive capable of being known to us. Bulk figure and motion we have ideas of. But though we are not without ideas of these primary qualities of bodies in general yet not knowing what is the particular bulk figure and motion of the greatest part of the bodies of the universe we are ignorant of the several powers efficacies and ways of operation whereby the effects which we daily see are produced. These are hid from us in some things by being too remote and in others by being too minute. When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the world and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our ken is but a small part of the universe we shall then discover a huge abyss of ignorance. What are the particular fabrics of the great masses of matter which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal beings how far they are extended what is their motion and how continued or communicated and what influence they have one upon another are contemplations that at first glimpse our thoughts lose themselves in. If we narrow our contemplations and confine our thoughts to this little canton—I mean this system of our sun and the grosser masses of matter that visibly move about it. What several sorts of vegetables animals and intellectual corporeal beings infinitely different from those of our little spot of earth may there probably be in the other planets to the knowledge of which even of their outward figures and parts we can no way attain whilst we are confined to this earth there being no natural means either by sensation or reflection to convey the certain ideas into our minds. They are out of the reach of those inlets of all our knowledge and that sorts of furniture and inhabitants those mansions contain in them we cannot so much as guess much less have clear and distinct ideas of them.

manner and certainty of their production for the two foregoing reasons, must be content to be very ignorant. In these we can give no further than particular experience informs us of matter of fact, and by analogy to guess what effect it will have on other trials, like the pro-

world, in order to all in the obscurity of uncertain and doubtful ways of talking volumes written of navigation and voyages, theories and stories of zoöses and tides multiplied and disputed may be profitable, and fleets sent out, would never have

3 *As the degree and fixity of our ideas*
(b) Where we have adequate ideas, and where there is certain and discoverable connection be-

er And thus may we gain and fix mathematical truths, not out of any imperfect fitness of faculties, uncertainty in the things themselves, but for want of application in enquiring, examining, and by degrees comparing those ideas. That which has most contributed to hinder the development of our ideas, and finding their relations, and preventing disagreements, is the

ment of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts either become stuck only in so doubtful and uncertain significations. We thus mistake abstracting their thoughts from names, and accumulating themselves to set before their minds the ideas themselves, so that they would consider and no sounds instead of them, have decided

every particular thing in whom that essence is that abstract idea, is itself undoubted and that is once known as such, as will be perpetually and forever true. So that as to all general knowledge must search and find it only in our minds and thus only the examining of our own ideas that furnish us with that. Truths belong to these things (that is to abstract ideas) are eternal and are themselves determined by their own place only of those essences as they exist of

knowledge in general

Chap IV Of the Reality of Ideas

Obj. 1. Knowledge placed over as may be all our other humors of ideas upon the matter, each by this time may be permitted to think that I have been all this while only building a castle in the air and be ready to say to me

"What purpose all this uncertainty? knowledge say you, is only the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas with those who know what those ideas may be. Is there anything so extravagant as that imaginations of men be vain? Where is the head that has chimeras in it? Or if there be a sober and wise man, what difference will there be by his rules between his knowledge and that of the most extravagant fancy in the world? They both have their ideas, and

uncertain signification, they are unable to distinguish true from false, certain from probable, consistent from inconsistent, their opinions. Thus having been the first misfortune of great part of men's letters, the increase brought the stock of real knowledge has been crying loud in proportion to the schools, disputes, and writings, the world has been filled with whilst it is, being lost in the great wood of words, know not what reabounds they were, how far the discoveries were advanced, or what was wanting in their own, or the general stock of knowledge. Had men, in the discoveries of the material alone as they have in those of the intellectual

See Bk III. chh. ix. x.

Cl. Berkeley Principles introd. II 3-25.

I Bk III

Bk IV chh. -viii.

Cl. Bk. II chh. iii, xix.

every man has a reason from their words and actions to be satisfied and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer a man that considers to be ignorant that there is a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God who is there that by his own search and ability can come to know? Much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures conditions states powers and several constitutions wherein they agree or differ from one another and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different species and properties we are in absolute ignorance.

28 *Another cause want of a discoverable connexion between ideas we have.* Secondly What a small part of the substantial beings that are in the universe the want of ideas leaves open to our knowledge we have seen. In the next place another cause of ignorance of no less moment is a want of a discoverable connexion between those ideas we have. For wherever we want that we are utterly incapable of universal and certain knowledge and are in the former case left only to observation and experiment which how narrow and confined it is how far from general knowledge we need not be told. I shall give some few instances of this cause of our ignorance and so leave it. It is evident that the bulk figure and motion of several bodies about us produce in us several sensations as of colours sounds tastes smells pleasure and pain &c. These mechanical affections of bodies having no affinity at all with those ideas they produce in us (there being no conceivable connexion between any impulse of any sort of body and any perception of a colour or smell which we find in our minds) we can have no distinct knowledge of such operations beyond our experience and can reason no otherwise about them, than as effects produced by the appointment of an infinitely Wise Agent which perfectly surpasses our comprehensions. As the ideas of sensible secondary qualities which we have in our minds can by us be no way deduced from bodily causes nor any correspondence or connexion be found between them and those primary qualities which experience shows us produce them in us so on the others the operation of our minds upon our bodies is as inconceivable. How any thought should produce a motion in body is as remote from the nature of our ideas as how any

regular connexion in the ordinary course of things yet that connexion being not discoverable in the ideas themselves, which appearing to have no necessary dependence one on another we can attribute their connexion to nothing else but the arbitrary determination of that All-wise Agent who has made them to be and to operate as they do in a way wholly above our weak understandings to conceive.

29 *Instances.* In some of our ideas there are certain relations habitudes and connexions, so visibly included in the nature of the ideas themselves that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever. And in these only we are capable of certain and universal knowledge. Thus the idea of a right-lined triangle necessarily carries with it an equality of its angles to two right ones. Nor can we conceive this relation this connexion of these two ideas, to be possibly mutable or to depend on any arbitrary power which of choice made it thus or could make it otherwise. But the coherence and continuity of the parts of matter the production of sensation in us of colours and sounds, &c. by impulse and motion may the original rules and com-

I need not I think, here mention the resurrection of the dead the future state of this globe of earth and such other things which are by every one acknowledged to depend wholly on the determination of a free agent. The things that, as far as our observation reaches we constantly find to proceed regularly we may conclude do act by a law set them but yet by a law that we know

in our ideas we can have but an experimental knowledge of them. From all which it is easy to perceive what a darkness we are involved in, how little it is of Being and the things that are, that we are capable to know. And therefore we shall do no injury to our knowledge when we modestly think with ourselves that we are so far from being able to comprehend the whole nature of the universe and all the things contained in it that we are not capable of a philosophical knowledge of the bodies that are about us and make a part of us concerning their secondary qualities powers, and operations we can have no universal certainty. Several effects come every day within the notice of our senses, of which we have so far sensitive knowledge but the causes

never be able in the least to discover to us. These, and the like though they have a constant and
Cl. ch. ii. § 1

6. Hence the duty of mathematical knowledge. I doubt not but it will be easily granted, that the knowledge we have of mathematical truths is not only certain, but real knowledge. And in the bare empty reason of man, insignificant chimeras of the brain and yet, if we will consider it shall find that it is only of our own ideas. The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in his own mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing, mathematically & precisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other mathematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain, even of real things existing because real things are no further concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the *idea* of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right ones? It is true also of a triangle, wherever it may exist. Whatever the figure exists, that it is not exactly answerable to that *idea* of a triangle in his mind, is not at all concerned in that proposition. And therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowledge, because, intending things no further than they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning those figures, when they have been *found* or *exist* in his mind, will hold true of them also when they have *ideal* existence, matter his consideration being barely of those figures, which are the same wherever or however they exist.

And *second*. And hence it follows that moral knowledge will be capable of the same certainty as mathematics. For certainty being, but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonstration nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the intervention of other ideas or mediums, our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so adequate and complete ideas, and the agreement or disagreement which we shall find in them will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

8. *Examined next, whether it be made a strict knowledge.*

For the *stating* of knowledge and certainty is requisite that we have determined ideas, and, to make our knowledge real, it is requisite that the ideas answer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with

so little care and regard (as it may seem) to the real existence of things, since most of those discourses which take up the thoughts and engage the disputes of those who pretend to make it their business to inquire after truth and certainty will, I presume, upon examination, be found to be general propositions, and notions in which existence is not at all concerned. All the discourses of the mathematicians about the squaring of a circle, conic sections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of those figures, but their demonstrations, which depend on their ideas, are the same, whether there be any square or circle existing in the world or no. In the same manner the truth and certainty of moral discourses abstracts from the likes of men, and the existence of those virtues in the world whereof they treat, nor are Tully's Offices less true, because there is nobody in the world that exactly practises his rules, and lies up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which existed not here when he wrote but in idea. If it be true in speculation, i.e. in idea, that murder deserves death, it will also be true in reality of any action that exists conformable to that idea of murder, for their actions, the truth of that proposition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other species of things, which have no other essences but those ideas which are in the minds of men.

9. *Nor is it less true or certain, because moral ideas are of our own making and naming.* But it will

perhaps seem, that the ideas themselves, or the reasonings about them no more than (in mathematics) there could be disturbance in the demonstration, or change in the properties of figures, and their relations on to another if a man should make a triangle with four corners, or trapezium with four right angles, that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if please, *trilateral* or *trifurcatus* or any thing else the properties of, and demonstrations about that idea will be the same as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confess the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will first disturb him who knows not what idea it stands

CL § 9.

CL Lock Third Letter to Samuel, pp. 69, also ch. ii. § 3.

perceive their agreement and disagreement one with another. If there be any difference between them the advantage will be on the warm headed man's side as having the more ideas and the more lively. And so by your rules he will be the more knowing. If it be true that all knowledge lies only in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our own ideas the visions of an enthusiast and the reasonings of a sober man will be equally certain. It is no matter how things are so a man observe but the agreement of his own imaginations and talk conformably it is all truth all certainty. Such castles in the air¹ will be as strongholds of truth as the demonstrations of Euclid. That an harpy is not a centaur is by this way as certain knowledge and as much a truth as that a square is not a circle.

But of what use is all this fine knowledge of men's own imaginations to a man that inquires after the reality of things? It matters not what men's fancies are it is the knowledge of things that is only to be prized it is this alone gives a value to our reasonings and preference to one man's knowledge over another's that it is of things as they really are and not of dreams and fancies.

2 *Inquirer* Not so where ideas agree with things. To which I answer That if our knowledge of our ideas terminate in them and reach no further where there is something further intended our most serious thoughts will be of little more use than the reveries of a crazy brain and the truths built thereon of no more weight than the discourses of a man who sees things clearly in a dream and with great assurance utters them. But I hope before I have done to make it evident that this way of certainty by the knowledge of our own ideas goes a little further than bare imagination² and I believe it will appear that all the certainty of general truths a man has lies in nothing else.

3 But what shall be the criterion of this agreement? It is evident the mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own ideas know that they agree with things themselves? This though it seems not to want difficulty yet, I think, there

¹ Cf. Bk. I. ch. iii. § 25.

² Cf. Locke's *Third Letter to Stillingfleet* p. 245.

³ Cf. ch. § 31.

⁴ Cf. *Hum. Enq.* § 11.

⁵ Cf. ch. § 2 also Locke's *Third Letter to Stillingfleet* p. 246.

be two sorts of ideas that we may be assured agree with things.

4 *Is all simple ideas really conformed to things?* First The first are simple ideas which since the mind as has been shown can by no means make to itself must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way and producing therein those perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies but the natural and regular productions of things without us really operating upon us and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended or which our state requires for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us whereby we are enabled to distinguish the sorts of particular substances to discern the states they are in and so to take them for our necessities and apply them to our uses. Thus the idea of whiteness or bitterness as it is in the mind exactly answering that power which is in any body to produce it there has all the real conformity it can or ought to have with things without us. And this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things⁴ is sufficient for real knowledge.

5 *All complex ideas are pictures of substances as their own archetypes.* Secondly All our complex ideas except those of substances being archetypes of the mind's own making not intended to be the copies of anything nor referred to the existence of anything as to their originals cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge. For that which is not designed to represent anything but itself can never be capable of a wrong representation nor mislead us from the true apprehension of anything by its dissimilarity to it and such, excepting those of substances are all our complex ideas. Which as I have shown in another place⁵ are combinations of ideas which the mind by its free choice puts together without considering any connexion on they have in nature. And hence it is that in all these so the ideas themselves are considered as the archetypes and

tain concerning these ideas is real and reaches things themselves. Because in all our thoughts reasonings, and discourses of this kind we intend things no further than as they are conformable to our ideas. So that in these we cannot miss of a certain and undoubted reality.

¹ Cf. chb. 150 Bk. II. ch. xxi. § 2.

² Cf. Bk. III. ch. v.

e. precisely true in his life. But it is not
 his truths proper to belonging

right ones. It is true also of triangles, however
 they exist. Whatever other figure exists, that
 it is not exactly answerable to that idea of a tri-
 angle in his mind is that all concerned in that
 proposition. And therefore he is certain all his
 knowledge concerning such ideas is real knowl-
 edge because, intending things further than
 they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he
 knows concerning those figures, when they ha-
 barly an ideal sense in his mind will hold true
 of them also when they have all sense in mat-
 ter. He considers them being barely of those fig-
 ures, which are the same whether or however
 they exist.

7 And several And he conceives that moral

concern of things green, by the intervention
 of their ideas or mediations in moral ideas, as
 well as mathematical beings arch types them-
 selves, and so adequate and complete ideas all
 the greenness disagree me to such we shall
 find that will produce real knowledge, as well
 as in mathematical figures.

8. Existence not good to make but to know
 of. For the attainment of knowledge and certain-
 ty it is requisite that we have determined ideas
 and to make unknown real, it is requisite
 that the ideas answer their arch types. Let it
 be wondered, that I place the certainty of our
 knowledge in the consideration of our ideas, with

the way to
 business to inquire after truth and certainty will
 I press me, upon examination, be found to be
 general propositions, and notions in which exist-
 ence is not at all concerned. All the discourses of
 the mathematicians about the square of a
 circle connected, or any other part of mathe-
 matics, concern not the existence of any of those
 figures but their demonstrations, which depend
 on their ideas, are the same, whether there be
 any square or circle existing in the world or no.
 In the same manner the truth and certainty of
 moral discourses bestirred from the lives of men
 and the existence of those virtues in the world
 whereof they treat. nor are Tully's Offices less
 true, because there is nobody in the world that
 exactly practices his rules, and he is proper to that
 pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us,
 and which existed on here when he wrote but
 ideas. If it be true in speculation, even in ideas that
 murder deserves death, it will also be true in re-
 ality of any action that exists conformable to that
 idea of a murderer. As for other actions, the truth of
 that proposition concerns them not. And thus it
 is of all other pieces of truths, which have no
 other essence but those ideas which are in the
 minds of men.

9. Verbum est less true or certain, because more
 ideas are for the making and naming. But it will

themselves, the reasonings about them no
 more than (a mathematician) they would be
 disturbance in the demonstration, change in
 the properties of figures, and their relations
 to one another. If man should make triangles with
 four corners, trapeziums with five right an-
 gles that is, in plain English, change the names
 of the figures, and call that by the name, which
 mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For
 let a man make to himself the idea of a figure
 with three angles, whereof one is right, and
 call it, if he please, *quadrilaterum* or *trapezium* or any
 thing else the properties of, and demonstrations
 about that idea will be the same as if he called it
 a rectangular triangle. I confess the change of the
 name, by the impropriety of speech, will at first
 disturb him who knows not what the idea stands

Cl. § 9.

Cl. Lock. Third Letter. S. Allingfleet, pp. 69,
 7 also ch. ii. § 5.

for but as soon as the figure is drawn the consequences and demonstrations are plain and clear Just the same is it in moral knowledge let a man have the idea of taking from others without their consent, what their honest industry has possessed them of and call this *justice* if he please

name or take it such as it is in the speaker's mind and the same things will agree to it as if you called it *justice* Indeed wrong names in moral discourses breed usually more disorder because they are not so easily rectified as in mathematics where the figure once drawn and seen makes the name useless and of no force For what need of a sign when the thing signified is present and in view? But in moral names that cannot be so easily and shortly done because of the many compositions that go to the making up the complex ideas of those modes But yet for all this, the miscalling of any of those ideas contrary to the usual signification of the words of that language hinders not but that we may have certain and demonstrative knowledge of their several agreements and disagreements if we will carefully as in mathematics keep to the same precise ideas and trace them in their several relations one to another without being led away by the names If we but separate the idea under consideration from the sign that stands for it our knowledge goes equally on in the discovery of real truth and certainty whatever sounds we make use of

10 *Misnaming disturbs not the certainty of the knowledge* One thing more we are to take notice of That where God or any other law maker hath defined any moral names there they have made the essence of that species to which that name belongs and there it is not safe to apply or use them otherwise but in other cases it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common usage of the country But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge which is still to be had by a due contemplation and comparing of those even nick-named ideas

11 *Our complex ideas of substances have their archetypes without us and here knowledge comes short* Thirdly There is another sort of complex ideas which being referred to archetypes without us may differ from them and so our knowledge about them may come short of being real Such are our ideas of substances which consisting of a collection of simple ideas supposed taken from the works of nature may yet vary from them by having more or different ideas united in them

than are to be found united in the things themselves From whence it comes to pass that they may and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves¹

12 *So far as our complex ideas agree with those archetypes without us so far our knowledge concerning substances is real* I say then that to have ideas of substances which by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge it is not enough as in modes to put together such ideas as have no inconsistency though they did never before so exist viz the ideas of sacrilege or perjury &c. were as real and true ideas before as after the existence of any such fact. But our ideas of sub-

consist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts without any real pattern they were taken from though we can perceive no inconsistency in such a combination The reason whereof is because we knowing not what real constitution it is of substances whereon our simple ideas depend and which really is the cause of the strict union of some of them one with another and the exclusion of others there are very few of them that we can be sure are or are not inconsistent in nature any further than experience and sensible observation reach² Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances—That all our complex ideas of them must be such and such only as are made up of such simple ones as have been discovered to co-exist in nature And our ideas being thus true though not perhaps very exact copies are yet the subjects of real (as far as we have any) knowledge of them Which (as has been already shown) will not be found to reach very far but so far as it does, it will still be real

general knowledge But to make it real concerning substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance these we may with confidence join together again and so make abstract ideas of substances For whatever have once had an union in nature may be united again

13 *I our inquiries about substances use must consider ideas and of course our thoughts to names and species supposed to out by names* This, if we rightly con-

¹ Cf. Bk. II ch. xxii. § 1

Cf. Bk. II § 2

² Cf. Bk. II ch. xxii. § 1

sider and confine t ur th his and abstra t
deas to names, as if there ere, could be o
ther or of things than what kn wn names had
already d termined, and, as i were, set ut, e
sh uld think f things w th greater freedom and
less confus n than perhaps we do. It would possi
bly be th ght bold paradox, if n t a ery
dangerous falsehood if I sh uld say that some
hargl g who ha li red f rty) are tog ther
w th t y pp aran f as ar some
thing between a man and a beast which preju
dice is f unded upon n thing else b t a false sup
positi n, that these tw names, man and beast,
stand f distu t pecies so set ut by al s
senses, th t there can come ther species be
tw en th m wher as if w will bstr ct f om
thre mrs. d the suppositi of s ch pecific

th ghts or pinions, n r distinguishes them ac
cording to names and species of our co tri ance.
And w that kn w so l tle f this present world
we are in, may I think, co'tent oursel es th
out being peremptory in defining the diff re t
states which creatures shall come into when they

It may suffice us, that H hath

stat B t, Secondly I ansr cr The f ce of these

and life f man w thout reason, is as m ch a
distinct d a, and makes as m ch distun t sort
of things from man and beast, as the dea of th
hape f an ass with reaso w uld be different
from either that of man r beast, and be a spe
cies of an animal between, or distinct from both.

14. Obj ti gaust chang ling bring om th g
bet m man and b ast n r cr d. Here everybody
will be ready to ask, If changelings may be sup
posed som thing between man and beast, pray
what are they I answer cha li g which is as
good a w rd to signify something different from
th significatu f man b ast as the names man
and beast ar to ha gn ficatu s differ t ne
from th ther Thus, well cons d ed would re
sol this matter and sh w my meaning w th
t any more ado. B t I am tso unacquainted
w th th al f some men, which enables them
to pin consequ ences, and to se relig threat
ened whe ere any en ure t qu t their
forms of peaks g, as not to f cece what names
s ch propositi as this s like to be charged
w th and w th t d bt t w ll be ask d If
ha g l g ar som thi g betw n man and
beast, wh t will becom f th m in the other
world? T which I answer It co cerns me t
to know or inquire. T their own master they
stand or fall. It will make their tal neither bet

such questi ns ill be groundless and ridiculous.
I desire th n those wh think there is more
but an accid tal difference betw themsel es
and changelings, the essence in both being exact
ly th same, to consider h ther they can im
ag ne mm t lity an d to ny outw rd
shape of th body the ery proposing t is, I p
pose no gh us make th m diso n t. No o e
y t, th t ever I heard f how much soever im
mersed matter allowed that excellency to any
figure f the gross sensible o n and parts, as to
affirm ternal lif due t t, a necessary s
seq ce of t that any mass of matter sh uld
after is dissol u n here, be gain esto ed here
after to an everlasting tate f sense, perception,
and kn wledge, nly because t was moulded in
t this that figure, and had s ch a particular
frame f its usible parts. Such an opini n as this,
pl cing immortality in certain superficial fig
ure, turns ut f doors all cons d ti of soul
o pnt upo whose countal some corpo
real bei s ha hithert been c'clud d m
mortal, and thera n. This is to tribute more
to th is de than usd of things and t place

and lif erlasting which h has bo other
material beings, s annex t, I say t th cut f
his beard, or th fashion of his coat. F this
that ward mark of ur bodies no more carries
w th t th hope of an ternal dur uon, than th
fash n f man ut g esh m ason bl
grounds to imagin t will ever wear ut that

it will make him immortal. It will perhaps be said that nobody thinks that the shape makes anything immortal but it is the shape is the sign of a rational soul within which is immortal. I wonder who made it the sign of any such thing for barely saying it will not make it so. It would require some proofs to persuade one of it. No figure that I know speaks any such language. For it may as rationally be concluded that the dead body of a man wherein there is to be found no more appearance or action of life than there is in a statue has yet nevertheless a living soul in it, because of its shape as that there is a rational soul in a changeling because he has the outside of a rational creature when his actions carry far less marks of reason with them in the whole course of his life than what are to be found in many a beast.

16 *Monsters* But it is the issue of rational parents and must therefore be concluded to have a rational soul. I know not by what logic you must so conclude. I am sure this is a conclusion that men nowhere allow of. For if they did they would not make bold as everywhere they do to destroy ill formed and mis shaped productions. Ay but these are *monsters*. Let them be so what will your drivelling unintelligent intractable changeling be? Shall a defect in the body make a monster a defect in the mind (the far more noble and in the common phrase the far more essential part) not? Shall the want of a nose or a neck make a monster and put such issue out of the rank of men the want of reason and understanding not? This is to bring all back again to what was exploded just now this is to place

people do lay the whole stress on the figure and resolve the whole essence of the species of man (as they make it) into the outward shape how unreasonable soever it be and how much soever they disown it we need but trace their thoughts and practice a little further and then it will plainly appear. The well shaped changeling is a man has a rational soul though it appear not this is past doubt say you make the ears a little longer and more pointed and the nose a little flatter than ordinary and then you begin to boggle make the face yet narrower flatter and longer and then you are at a stand add still more and more of the likeness of a brute to it and let the head be perfectly that of some other animal then presently it is a monster and it is demonstration with you that it hath no rational soul

¹Cf ch. III. § 6 also Bl. II ch. xx § 2

and must be destroyed. Where now (I ask) shall be the just measure which the utmost bounds of that shape that carries with it a rational soul? For since there have been human fetuses produced half beast and half man and others three parts one and one part the other and so it is possible they may be in all the variety of approaches to the one or the other shape and may have several degrees of mixture of the likeness of a man or a brute — I would gladly know what are those precise lineaments which according to this hypothesis are or are not capable of a rational soul to be joined to them. What sort of outside is the certain sign that there is or is not such an inhabitant within? For till that be done we talk at random of man and shall always I fear do so as long as we give ourselves up to certain sounds and the imaginations of settled and fixed species in nature we know not what. But after all I desire it may be considered that those who think they have answered the difficulty by telling us that a mis shaped fetus is a monster run into the same fault they are arguing against by

but something neither man nor beast but par

examine them by what our faculties can discover in them as they exist and not by groundless fancies that have been taken up about them

17 *Words and species* I have mentioned this here because I think we cannot be too cautious that words and species in the ordinary notions which we have been used to of them impose not on us. For I am apt to think therein lies one great obstacle to our clear and distinct knowledge especially in reference to substances and from thence has risen a great part of the difficulty about truth and certainty. Would we accustom ourselves to separate our contemplations and reasonings from words might in a great measure remedy this inconvenience within our own thoughts but yet it could still disturb us in our discourse with others as long as we retained the opinion that species and their essence were anything else but our abstract ideas (such as they are) with names annexed to them to be the signs of them

III *Recapitulation* Whenever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge and here we are

Cf Lock's *2^d Letter to Stillingfleet* p. 289

sure those ideas agree with the reality of things, there is certain real knowledge. Of which agreement of our ideas with the reality of things, having been given the marks, I think, I have shown there is that certainty of our unity consists. Which, whatever it was to others, was, I confess, to me heretofore, one of those desiderata which I found great want of.

Chap V Of Truth n General

It had been said, "What is truth," was an inquiry many generations and centuries had searched after, marked either do, we pretend to search after, cannot but be worth our while carefully to examine wherein it consists and so acquaint ourselves with the nature of it, as to observe how the mind struggles to free itself from falsehood.

4. *joining or separating* fives as either
 laws or wide Truth, then, seems me, in the
 proper import of the word, to signify nothing but
joining or uniting fives as the *Thing* fives
 find by them to agree or disagree one whether the
 joining or separating of signs here meant, is what
 by another name we call *five's*. So that truth
 properly belong only to propositions whereof
 there are two sorts, 12. mental and verbal
 there are two sorts of signs commonly made use
 of. 12. ideas and words.

3. *g. h. A mental verbal proposition is To*
form clear notion of truth, it is very necessary
to consider truth of thought, and truth of words,
distinctly one from another but yet it is very dif-
ficult to treat of them asunder. Because it is un-
avoidable, in the using of mental propositions, to
make use of words. and then the instances given
of mental propositions cease immediately to be
bare mental, and become verbal. For men-
tal propositions being nothing but bare considerations

labeled as, as they are in the minds, stripped of names, they lose the nature of purely mental propositions as soon as they are put into words.

4. Words fit entities as they hard to be true of
And two which makes > harder: great of
me tal and bal proposu us separ tely is,
the mos then, if no all, in their thinkin and
reasonings w thin themselves, make use of words
i stead of ideas i least whe the subject of their
mediation contains in i complex id as. Which
is gre t evidence of the inspection and un-
certainty of our ideas of that kind, and may if

tently made use of serve for mark to show
 us what are those things we have clear and per-
 fect established ideas of, and hat not. For if we
 will curious observe the way our mind takes in
 thinking, and reasoning, we shall find, I suppose
 that when we make any propositions within our
 own thoughts about *the* or *that*, *is* or *is not*
a triangle or *a circle* we can and often frame
 in our minds the ideas themselves, without re-
 flecting on the names. But when we should con-
 sider or make propositions about the more com-
 plex ideas, as of *riches*, *eternal felicity* &c. we
 usually put the name for the idea because the
 ideas these names stand for being for the most
 part imperfect, confused, and undetermined, we
 reflect on the names themselves, because they
 are more clear, certain, and distinct, and readier
 occur to our thoughts than the pure ideas and
 so we make use of these words instead of the ideas
 themselves, even when we would meditate and
 reason within ourselves, and make tacit mental
 propositions. In substances, as has been already
 noticed, this is occasioned by the imperfections
 of our ideas. We making the name stand for the
 real essence, of which we have no clear tall. In

which requires time and attention to be recollected and exactly represented to the mind, even in those men who have formerly been at the pains to do it and is utterly impossible to be done by those who, though they have ready in their memory the greatest part of the common words of that language, yet perhaps never troubled themselves in all their lives to consider what precise ideas the most of them stood for. Some confused obscure notions have served their turns and many who talk cry in ch of liberty and justice fear loss and faith of power and right to obstruct as and from a melancholy and cold world perhaps has little left in their show her and meditation as if one should desire them to think only of the things themselves and lay by those words with which they so often confound theirs, and not seldom themselves also.

5. We should not expect to return to the consideration of truth we must, I observe, two sorts of propositions that we are capable of making:-

First, *mental*, wherein the ideas in our understandings are without the use of words put together or separated, by the mind perceiving judgment, of their agreement or disagreement.

Sec dly b b l p o p o s u t i o n s, w h i h a r e

Cl. ch. u. 1 4 m. 1 15-22

Ch. 2, § 6

Of ch. xxi. 14

Cl. Ed. II. ch. XIII. §

words the signs of our ideas put together or separated in affirmative or negative sentences. By which way of affirming or denying these signs made by sounds are as it were put together or separated one from another. So that proposition consists in joining or separating signs and truth

of truth is not so valuable a thing as it is taken to be nor worth the pains and time men employ in the search of it since by this account it amounts to no more than the conformity of words to the chimeras of men's brains. Who knows not what odd notions many men's heads are filled with and what strange ideas all men's brains are capable of? But if we rest here we know the truth of nothing by this rule, but of the visionary words in our own imaginations nor have other truth but what as much concerns harpies and centaurs as men and horses. For

him that the mind either by perceiving or supposing the agreement or disagreement of any of its ideas does tacitly within itself put them into a kind of proposition affirmative or negative which I have endeavoured to express by the terms putting together and separating. But this action of the mind which is so familiar to every thinking and reasoning man is easier to be conceived by reflecting on what passes in us when we affirm or deny than to be explained by words. When a man has in his head the idea of two lines viz the side and diagonal of a square whereof the diagonal is an inch long he may have the idea also of the division of that line into a certain number of equal parts v.g. into five ten a hundred a thousand or any other number and may have the idea of that inch line being divisible or not divisible into such equal parts as a certain number of them will be equal to the sideline. Now whenever he perceives believes or supposes such a kind of divisibility to agree or disagree to his idea of that line he, as it were joins or separates those two ideas viz the idea of that line and the idea of that kind of divisibility and so makes a mental proposition which is true or false according as such a kind of divisibility a divisibility into such aliquot parts does really agree to that line or no. When ideas are so put together or separated in the mind as they or the things they stand for do agree or not that is as I may call it, *mental truth*. But *truth* if it is something more and that is the affirm

true propositions made about them. And it will be altogether as true a proposition to say *all centaurs are animals* as that *all men are animals* and the certainty of one as great as the other. For in both the propositions the words are put together according to the agreement of the ideas in our minds and the agreement of the idea of animal with that of centaur is as clear and visible to the mind as the agreement of the idea of animal with that of man and so these two propositions are equally true equally certain. But of what use is all such truth to us?

8 *Answered* Real truth is about ideas agreeing in things. Though what has been said in the foregoing chapter to distinguish real from imaginary knowledge might suffice here, in answer to this doubt, to distinguish real truth from chimerical or (if you please) barely nominal they depending both on the same foundation yet it may not be amiss here again to consider that though our words signify nothing but our ideas yet being designed by them to signify things the truth they contain when put into propositions will be only verbal when they stand for ideas in the mind that have not an agreement with the reality of things. And therefore truth as well as knowledge may well come under the distinction of verbal and real that being only verbal truth wherein terms are joined according to the agreement or disagreement of the ideas they stand for without regarding whether our ideas are such as really have or are capable of having an existence in nature. But then it is they contain real truth when these signs are joined as our ideas agree and when our ideas are such as we know are capable of having an existence in nature which in substances we cannot know but by knowing that such have existed.

9 *Truth and falsehood genuine* Truth is the marking down in words the agreement or disagreement of ideas as it is. Falsehood is the mark

knowledge which we have spoken of already

7 *Objection* I must verb I truth that thus it may all be chimerical. But he again will be apt to occur the same doubt about truth that did about knowledge and it will be objected that if truth be nothing but the joining and separating of words in propositions as the ideas they stand for agree or disagree in men's minds, the knowledge

g down in words th agreement or disagree
me t of ideas otherwise than t is. And so far as
these d as, thus marked by sou ds agre t
their arch types, so far ly is the truth real. The
knowledge of this truth consists in knowing what
deas the words sta d f r and th perceptu f
th agreem t disagreement f those deas,
according as t is marked by those words.

10. *General truth* t t b t a d f m o r a t
l a y B t because w rd are looked on as the
great co duits of truth and knowledg and that
in co rry n and receiv ng of truth, and com
m nly in asoning bo t t, mak use of
words and propositions, I shall more t large in
quire w b t r n th certainty of real truths con
tained in propositions consists, and where t is to
be h d d endeavor to sho in what sort f

it is for names to be made use of nste d f the
deas themsel es, even when men think and rea
son w thin th r own b easts especially if the
ideas be ery complex, and mad up of a great
collection of simple ones. Thus makes the consid
rati n f words and p r p o s i t i o n s so necessary a
part of th Treatise of knowledge, that t is ery
hard to speak intelligibly of the one, w th ut ex
plaining the other

2. *General truths hardly to be understood, but verb-*
al p r p o s i t i o n s All the knowledge w ha e, being
nly of particular o general truths, t is ev
dent that whatever may be done in th f rmer of
these the latter which is that which w th reason
is mo t so ght aft r can ne er be w ll made
kno n, and is ery seld m pprehended l t as
n d and exp ressed in wo ds It is not,

those which most mpl y ur thoughts, and ex
ercise ur co templ ti n. Ge eral truths are
mos looked after by the mind as those that most
nlar g ur kn wledg and by th r comp
hensi ss satisfying us t ce of many partic
ulars, nlarve our ew and shorten our way to
knowledge.

Moral and met physical truth. Besides truth
taken in th strict sense bef re mentioned, there
ar th so s f truths As, Mo al truth,

hich is speaking of things according to th
sua n o f ur own minds, tho gh th proposi
tio n peak rree not to the real ty f things

Metaphysical truth, hich is nothing b t th
real existence of things, conf r mabl t th ideas
to which w ha annex d th r names. Thus,

had bef re se tled w th the name to t. But these
consider uons of truth, cith ha ng been be
fore taken ce of, t being m ch t ur
present purpose, t may suffice here nly to ha e
men ed them.

Chap VI Of Universal P r p o s i t i o n s thet Truth and Certainty

T i g f u d n e y t k l d g
Thou h the examining and j dging of deas by
themsel es, th r names being quite laid aside,
be th best and surest w y to clear and distin t
knowledg y t, through the prevailin custom
of using sounds for ideas, I think t is ery seld m
practised. E ery ne may berve how common

Chh. vi. viii. viii.

But that we may not be misled in this case by that
hich is th danger erywhere, I mean by the
doubtfulness of terms, t is fit to berr that cer
tainty is n of l d certainty f truth and certainty f
knowl d g : Certainty of truth is, when words are
so p t together in propositions as exa ly t ex
press th agreem t r disagreement of th deas
they stand f as really t is. Certainty of knowl
edg is t percei e th agreem t r disagree
ment of deas, as expressed in any proposition.
Thus w usually call know g, r being certain of
th truth of any propositi n.

4. *Y p r p o s i t i o n s can be certainly known to be true*
when the essence f each p r p o s i t i o n is not
known. Now because we cann t be certain of the
truth of any general propositi n, unless w know
th precise bounds and extent of the species is
terms tand f t is necessary we should know
the essence of each species, which is that which
constitutes and bounds t.

Thus, in all simpl ideas and modes, is th hard
to d For in these the cal and nominal essence
being the same, or which is all the abstract
idea which th general term stands f bei g the
sae essence and boundary that is or can be sup
posed of the species, there can be o doubt how
far th p r p o s i t i o n extends, what things are com
prehended under each term which, t is ev dent,
are all that ha e an exact conformity w th the
idea t tand f and n ther

B t in substances, wherein cal essence, dis
tinct from th omual, is supposed t constitute
d termne, and bound th p r p o s i t i o n s, th exte f f

Cl. Lock Third Letter to Stillingfleet, pp
353-54.

the general word is very uncertain because not knowing this real essence we cannot know what is or what is not of that species and consequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it And thus speaking of a *man* or *gold* or any other species of natural substances as supposed constituted by \equiv precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it For man or gold taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these species with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational or that all gold \equiv yellow But where the nominal essence is kept to as the boundary of each species and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for \equiv to be found there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species nor can be in doubt on this account whether any proposition be true or not I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way and have made use of the terms of *essences* and *species* on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there \equiv to think of them as of any other sort of realities than barely abstract ideas with names to them To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names according as they agree to several abstract ideas of which we make those names the signs is to confound truth and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them Though therefore these things might to people not possessed with scholastic learning be treated of in a better and clearer way yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most people's minds who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world are to be discovered and removed to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty with it

5 This more particularly concerns *bestialities* The names of substances then whenever made to stand for species which are supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding Of the truth of general propositions

¹ Cf Bk III ch ii § 13 also Locke's *Third Letter* p 358

made up of such terms we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence which we not knowing cannot know where it is or is not and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold being incurably ignorant whether it has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold \equiv that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all This being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy \equiv or is

which we know not is v.g. in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is yet could we not be sure that this or that quality could with truth be affirmed of gold since it is impossible for us to know that this or that quality or idea

constitute

6 The truth of few universal propositions concerning substances is to be known On the other side the names of substances when made use of as they should be for the ideas men have in their minds

NAME as you see truth we can be certain Not because in this use of them are uncertain what things are signi-

tion or repugnancy but ideas

7 Because necessary co-existence of simple ideas in substances \equiv in few cases be known The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for are collections of such qualities as have been observed to co-exist in an unknown substratum which we call substance but what other qualities necessarily co-exist with such combinations we cannot certainly know unless we can discover the natural dependence which in the primary qualities we can go but a very little way in and in all their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all for the reasons mentioned chap iii: Viz 1 Because we know not the real constitutions of substances on which each secondary quality partic-

larly depends. 2. Did we know that, the world
serves us only for experimental (universal) know-
ledge and reach with certainty in further
things, then the cause would be

... of the word gold stands

... whose truth we cannot be certain of. But
universally soever to be believed. For if according
to the useless manner of the Schools, any
one supposes the term gold to stand for species
of things set out by nature, by real essence be-
longing to it, it is evident that in the particular
substances are of that species, so can
we with certainty affirm anything universally of
gold. But this makes gold to stand for species de-
termined by its minimal essence, i.e. the nominal
essence, for example, be the complex idea of a
body of certain yellow colour malleable, fus-
ible and heavier than any other known — in
the proper use of the word gold, there is no dif-

... the specific essence the name of gold stands for it
is plain, all gold is malleable is not certain propo-
sition. Because, let the complex idea of gold be
made up of whichever of its other qualities you
please, malleableness will not appear to depend
on that complex idea, nor flow from any simple
idea contained in the conception that malle-
ableness has (if it has any) of those other quali-
ties being only by the intention of the real
constitution of insensible parts which since
we know it, it is impossible without idea perceive
that connexion unless we could discover that
which ties them together.

As far as such a connection can be known,
for universal proposition may be certain. But this is il-
legal but false. The more, indeed, if these co-
existing qualities unite into one complex idea,
under one name, the more precise and determi-
nate we make the signification of that word but it
cannot yet make it thereby more capable of uni-
versal certainty. For if these qualities are not
true and universal, and since we perceive in
their connexion depend on one another
being guaranteed both of that real constitution in
which they are all founded, and also how they
flow from it. For the chief part of our knowledge
concerning substances is not, as in other things,
barely of the relation of two ideas that may exist
separately but is of the necessary co-existence
and co-existence of several distinct ideas in the same
body, etc. of their representation to exist.

Could we begin with the end and discover
what it was where that colour consisted of that
made body light heavier what texture of
parts made it malleable, fusible, and fixed and
fit to be dissolved in this sort of liquid and not
in another — if I say we had such an idea as this
of bodies, and could perceive where in all sensible
qualities ally assist, and how they are
produced we might form such better ideas of
them as would furnish us with matter for mo-
geal knowledge and enable us to make uni-
versal propositions that the world carries all
truth and certainty with them. But whilst our
complex ideas of the sorts of substances are so
mixed with the natural constitution of
which the sensible qualities depend and are
made up of in things but an imperfect collection
of those proper qualities or senses can disco-

too together it is impossible that we should cer-
tainly know the truth of this proposition that all
gold is fixed.

9. I discuss it below any more but
real sense of gold and other simple ideas. As there is
no discovery of colour as yet been fixed
and the colour weight, and other simple ideas
of the nominal essence of gold so if we make
our complex idea of gold, body, flow fusible,
dissolve, weighty and fixed we shall be with
the same uncertainty concerning solubility in
water and the same reason. Since we can ex-
amine from consideration of the idea as it itself is,
with certainty affirm deny of body whose
complex idea is made of yellow weighty
ductile fusible, and fixed that it is soluble in
aqueous and so of the rest of its qualities. I
would gladly meet with the general affirmation
concerning any quality of gold, that any one can
certainly know is true. I will, in doubt, be pre-
sently objected, is it thus an universal propo-
sition, all gold is malleable. To which I answer
... every certain proposition, if malleableness be

the general word is very uncertain because not knowing this real essence we cannot know what is or what is not of that species and consequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus speaking of a *man* or *gold* or any other species of natural substances as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it. For *man* or *gold* taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these species with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational or that all gold is yellow. But here the nominal essence is kept to as the boundary of each species and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species nor can be in doubt on this account whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way and have made use of the terms of *essences* and *species* on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any other sort of realities than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names according as they agree to several abstract ideas of which we make those names the signs is to confound truth and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them. Though therefore these things might to people not possessed with scholastic learning be treated of in a better and clearer way yet those wrong notions of essences or species having got root in most people's minds who have received any tincture from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world are to be discovered and removed to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty with it.

5 *This more particular concerns substances* The names of substances then whenever made to stand for species which are supposed to be constituted by real essences which we know not are not capable to convey certainty to the understanding. Of the truth of general propositions

Cf Bk III ch. iii. § 23 also Locke's *Thd* 4th Letter p. 358

made up of such terms we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence which we not knowing cannot know here it is or is not and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold being incurably ignorant whether it has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold is that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all. Thus being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is or is not to be found whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at all. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real essence which we know not is in what parcels of matter the real essence of gold is yet could we

has a necessary connexion with a real essence of which we have no idea at all whatever species that supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute

6 *The truth of universal propositions concerning substances is to be known* On the other side the names of substances when made use of as they should be for the ideas men have in their minds though they carry a clear and determinate sign

of them we are uncertain what things are signified by them but because the complex ideas they stand for are such combinations of simple ones as carry not with them any discoverable connexion or repugnancy but with a very few other ideas

7 *Because necessary co-existence of simple ideas in substances can in few cases be known* The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for are collections of such quali-

cause we know not the real essences on which each secondary quality partic-

Cf Bk II ch. 21 § 7-26

ularly depends. Did we know that, the world serves us only for experience (not for itself) know ledge and reach the certainty of further than the truth in the case of our understanding can discover no certain connexion between any secondary quality and any modification whatsoever of any sensible particulars. And therefore there are crying general propositions to be made concerning substances, which can carry them down to the certainty.

3. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed as proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of universally so as to be believed. For if according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any proposition is true generally and for all particulars of things set together, by real essence belonging to it, its evidence known without particular instances are sufficient for it. It can then be the certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But this makes gold and for a species determine it by its mineral essence. It is mineral essence for example be the complex idea of body of certain yellow colour malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known — as this particular use of the word gold, is not difficult to try to know what it is. It is gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath determined its inconsistent cy with the mineral essence. Fixed essence for example having necessary connexion with it we can discover that the colour weight, and the sum of all of its complex qualities with the body combined together is impossible that we should be certain known with truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed.

4. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed as proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of universally so as to be believed. For if according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any proposition is true generally and for all particulars of things set together, by real essence belonging to it, its evidence known without particular instances are sufficient for it. It can then be the certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But this makes gold and for a species determine it by its mineral essence. It is mineral essence for example be the complex idea of body of certain yellow colour malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known — as this particular use of the word gold, is not difficult to try to know what it is. It is gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath determined its inconsistent cy with the mineral essence. Fixed essence for example having necessary connexion with it we can discover that the colour weight, and the sum of all of its complex qualities with the body combined together is impossible that we should be certain known with truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed.

5. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed as proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of universally so as to be believed. For if according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any proposition is true generally and for all particulars of things set together, by real essence belonging to it, its evidence known without particular instances are sufficient for it. It can then be the certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But this makes gold and for a species determine it by its mineral essence. It is mineral essence for example be the complex idea of body of certain yellow colour malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known — as this particular use of the word gold, is not difficult to try to know what it is. It is gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath determined its inconsistent cy with the mineral essence. Fixed essence for example having necessary connexion with it we can discover that the colour weight, and the sum of all of its complex qualities with the body combined together is impossible that we should be certain known with truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed.

6. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed as proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of universally so as to be believed. For if according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any proposition is true generally and for all particulars of things set together, by real essence belonging to it, its evidence known without particular instances are sufficient for it. It can then be the certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But this makes gold and for a species determine it by its mineral essence. It is mineral essence for example be the complex idea of body of certain yellow colour malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known — as this particular use of the word gold, is not difficult to try to know what it is. It is gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath determined its inconsistent cy with the mineral essence. Fixed essence for example having necessary connexion with it we can discover that the colour weight, and the sum of all of its complex qualities with the body combined together is impossible that we should be certain known with truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed.

a part of the complex idea the world stands for. But this is nothing affirmed of gold but that it so stands for an idea in which malleableness is contained and such sort of truth and certainty as this is, I say certain is unfounded. But if malleableness make a part of the specification the same gold stands for it is plain that gold malleable is a certain proposition. Because, if the complex idea gold be made up of whichsoever of its qualities you please, malleableness will not appear to be a part of that complex idea, or follow from a simple containing in it the connexion that malleableness has (if it has any) with those other qualities being only by the intervention of the constituent of its inseparable parts which we know not, it is impossible without perception that connexion unless we could discover that which ties them together.

7. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed as proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of universally so as to be believed. For if according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any proposition is true generally and for all particulars of things set together, by real essence belonging to it, its evidence known without particular instances are sufficient for it. It can then be the certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But this makes gold and for a species determine it by its mineral essence. It is mineral essence for example be the complex idea of body of certain yellow colour malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known — as this particular use of the word gold, is not difficult to try to know what it is. It is gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath determined its inconsistent cy with the mineral essence. Fixed essence for example having necessary connexion with it we can discover that the colour weight, and the sum of all of its complex qualities with the body combined together is impossible that we should be certain known with truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed.

8. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed as proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of universally so as to be believed. For if according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any proposition is true generally and for all particulars of things set together, by real essence belonging to it, its evidence known without particular instances are sufficient for it. It can then be the certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But this makes gold and for a species determine it by its mineral essence. It is mineral essence for example be the complex idea of body of certain yellow colour malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known — as this particular use of the word gold, is not difficult to try to know what it is. It is gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath determined its inconsistent cy with the mineral essence. Fixed essence for example having necessary connexion with it we can discover that the colour weight, and the sum of all of its complex qualities with the body combined together is impossible that we should be certain known with truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed.

9. *Instance gold.* All gold is fixed as proposition whose truth we cannot be certain of universally so as to be believed. For if according to the useless imagination of the Schools, any proposition is true generally and for all particulars of things set together, by real essence belonging to it, its evidence known without particular instances are sufficient for it. It can then be the certainty affirm anything universally of gold. But this makes gold and for a species determine it by its mineral essence. It is mineral essence for example be the complex idea of body of certain yellow colour malleable, fusible, and heavier than any other known — as this particular use of the word gold, is not difficult to try to know what it is. It is gold. But yet no other quality can with certainty be universally affirmed or denied of gold, but what hath determined its inconsistent cy with the mineral essence. Fixed essence for example having necessary connexion with it we can discover that the colour weight, and the sum of all of its complex qualities with the body combined together is impossible that we should be certain known with truth of this proposition that all gold is fixed.

the general word is very uncertain because not knowing this real essence we cannot know what is or what is not of that species and consequently what may or may not with certainty be affirmed of it. And thus speaking of a man or gold or any other species of natural substances as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it. For man or gold taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these species with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational or that all gold is yellow. But where the nominal essence is kept to as the boundary of each species and men extend the application of any general term no further than to the particular things in which the complex idea it stands for is to be found there they are in no danger to mistake the bounds of each species nor can be in doubt on this account whether any proposition be true or not. I have chosen to explain this uncertainty of propositions in this scholastic way and have made use of the terms of *essences* and *species* on purpose to show the absurdity and inconvenience there is to think of them as of any other sort of realities than barely abstract ideas with names to them. To suppose that the species of things are anything but the sorting of them under general names according as they agree to several abstract ideas of which we make those names the signs is to confound truth and introduce uncertainty into all general propositions that can be made about them. Though therefore the few things might to people not possessed with

made up of such terms we cannot be sure. The reason whereof is plain for how can we be sure that this or that quality is in gold when we know not what is or is not gold? Since in this way of speaking nothing is gold but what partakes of an essence which we not knowing cannot know where it is or is not and so cannot be sure that any parcel of matter in the world is or is not in this sense gold being incurably ignorant whether it has or has not that which makes anything to be called gold i.e. that real essence of gold whereof we have no idea at all. This being as impossible for us to know as it is for a blind man to tell in what flower the colour of a pansy is or is not to be found whilst he has no idea of the colour of a pansy at all. Or if we could (which is impossible) certainly know where a real essence which is matter

not be sure that this or that truth be affirmed of gold since it is impossible for us to know that this or that quality or idea has a necessary connexion with a real essence of which we have no idea at all whatever species that supposed real essence may be imagined to constitute

6 The truth of few users propositions concerning substances is to be known. On the other side the names of substances when made use of as they should be for the ideas men have in their minds thought

nificat make truth we can be certain. Not because in this use of them we are concerned what things are signi

on or repugnancy but with a very few ideas

7 Because necessary co-existence of simple ideas in substances is in few cases to be known. The complex ideas that our names of the species of substances properly stand for are collections of such qualities as have been observed to co-exist in an unknown substratum which we call substance but whether qualities necessarily co-exist with

who have received any instruction from the learning which has prevailed in this part of the world are to be discovered and removed to make way for that use of words which should convey certainty with it

standing Of the truth of general propositions

Cf. Bk. III ch. iii. § 13. See Locke's *Th. d. Let.* p. 358

a very little way in and in all their secondary qualities we can discover no connexion at all for the reasons mentioned chap. iii. viz. because we know not the real constituents of substances on which each secondary quality partic

Cf. Bk. II ch. 4. § 7-26

made often on several sorts of animals by in-
 bl causes, the certain de th (as are t id) of
 some of them, barely passing the l e or as
 t is certain of ther by being remo ed into a
 ghbr m m d tly sh w that the
 ur
 w thw
 thing to do, is absol tely ecess —
 be what they ppear to us, and to preserve those
 qual u by wh h w kn w a d d s u guish
 th m. W ar then qui t of th way when
 w think that things contain u th them t s the
 qualities th t ppear to u n them and we u
 an search f that constitut u w thn th body
 of a fly an el phant, upo huch d pend those
 q al and powers we bserv th m. F r
 huch, perhaps, to u derstand them aright we
 ght look t nly beyo d this o earth and
 umosphere b t even beyo d th su r remot
 est tar our eyes ha e y t disco ered. F how
 m ch the being and perau n of part cular sub-
 stances in this urgl be depends n causet utter
 ly bey d our ew is impossibl f us to d t
 mine. W see and perce e som of th moti ns
 and grosse perau ns of things her about us
 but when th streams come th t k p all these
 ous machines in mou and par h coo-
 yed and modifi d is bey d our oie a d
 pp ehensio and th gre t parts and wh els, as
 l may so say of this t pendous tru ture of the
 un erse may f gh w know ha e such
 co xi and d pe d in th ir fl es
 and perations po an ther that perhaps
 things in this ur mans w ld p t quit
 an ther f e, and cease t be what they ar if
 som of th tars gre t bod es incompre-
 hensibly emot from us th uld as t be e
 mo as t does. This is ce tain things, however
 boole t dnture th y seem in th msel es are
 b t tain rs to th parts f tu e, f th t
 which th y are most taken notu of by us. Their
 br bl q al u and pow rs are
 wing something w th u th m and there is
 so mpi and perf par th ew kn
 of nature which does t th being t has,
 and the ex llences f t, t is eighbours and
 e mus t co fin ur th ghts w thn th ur
 fac f any body bu look great d al further
 comprehend perfectly those qual ties that are
 t.

Our nominal is f sub tances furnish foun-
 n er al p n xi b t them th t ert. If
 th be so is not to be w nd red that w ha-
 ry imperf ideas of substances, nd that th
 cal essences, wh h d pend their properties
 d pe uons, are unknown to us. W cannot

discover so much as that size f gure d texture
 of th ur man is a d u e parts, which m really
 in th m m ch less the d fferent m uons and im-
 pulses mad in and upo th m by bod es fr m
 w tho t, upo wh h d pe ds, and by wh ch s
 f rmed the greatest and most emarkabl part of
 those qu th rve in th m, and of w l ch

ur con-

consid

all ur l

essences.

se ces mak use of unste d of them wve we
 to furnish us b t rj sparingly w th any g eral
 kno ledg r u ersal propos uons cap ble of
 real certainty

13 Judg ut f f b b l y e ncer g sub tans s
 m y ch further but that s t kno d g. We are
 t the el e to w d r if e t ntainy be t be
 l u d y f w g n al p possi s m de
 co cern g sub t ces u knowl dge of the t
 qual u a d proper es goes rj seldom further
 than ur senses re ch and inf r m us. I oss bly in-
 quisit nd bserving men may by sure gth of
 j dgment, pe utat furt er a d on probabl
 uetaken from wary observ u and h u is ll
 laid toget er oft n guess right t hal experi-
 ence has not y t disco red to them. But this is
 burg eas g still t mounts only t opi on
 and has not that certainty huch is equiste to
 kn wledge. For all gene al kn wledge is only
 n ur n th ights, and consis barely n the
 co templau of ur own bsira t deas. W her
 ew w pe ce any greement r d uagre m nt
 am g t h m th we ha g n al k l
 edg and by p t u g the names of those d as to-
 ge d er rdngly in proposu ns, can w th er
 t ty pro unc g n al truths. But because
 the bsira t deas of substances, for which their
 pefic nam tand wh er they h a y
 di nct and det min t gn ficau h a
 d sc rabl exi n nco ut cy w th

¶ capal inqu ry co ern g th m nd there

bel gr t z, and consta dly co-existng in
 st t w th th t d whe er t is to be
 f d.

+ H h t q t f ur kno d g f b
 tance Bef re can ha e any t l rab kn l
 dg f th l nd must F t kn w what
 Cf. ch. § ch. xi

er there can be few general propositions concerning substances of whose real truth we can be certainly assured since there are but few simple ideas of whose connexion and necessary co-existence we can have certain and undoubted knowledge I imagine amongst all the secondary qualities of substances and the powers relating to them there cannot any two be named whose necessary co-existence or repugnance to co-exist can certainly be known unless in those of the same sense which necessarily exclude one another as I have elsewhere shown No one I

with each of them, as an entire thing by itself having all its qualities in itself and independent of other things overlooking for the most part, the operations of those invisible fluids they are encompassed with and upon whose motions and operations depend the greatest part of those qualities which are taken notice of in them, and are made by us the inherent marks of distinction whereby we know and denominate them. Put a

to make or receive on or from other bodies The same may be said of the sound or taste &c Our specific names of substances standing for any collections of such ideas it is not to be wondered that we can with them make very few general propositions of undoubted real certainty But yet so far as any complex idea of any sort of substances contains in it any simple idea whose necessary co-existence with any other may be discovered so far universal propositions may with certainty be made concerning it v g could any one discover a necessary connexion between malleableness and the colour or weight of gold or any other part of the complex idea signified by that name he might make a certain universal proposition concerning gold in this respect and the real truth of this proposition that all gold is malleable would be as certain as of this the three angles of all right lined triangles are all equal to two right ones

11 The qualities which make our complex ideas of substances depend mostly on external remote and unperceived causes Had we such ideas of substances as to know what real constitutions produce those sensible qualities we find in them and how those qualities flowed from thence we could by the specific ideas of their real essences in our own minds more certainly find out their properties and discover what qualities they had or had not than we can now by our senses and to know the

experiments upon the properties of a triangle that a triangle should exist in any matter the idea in our minds could serve for the one as well as the other But we are so far from being admitted into the secrets of nature, that we scarce so much as ever approach the first entrance to wards them. For we are wont to consider the substances we meet

Cf. ch. II. §§ 11, 13

water in it would cease to be fluid But if inanimate bodies owe so much of their present state to other bodies without them that they would not be what they appear to us were those bodies that environ them removed it is yet more so in vegetables which are nourished grow and produce leaves flowers and seeds in a constant succession And if we look a little nearer into the state of animals we shall find that their dependence as to life motion and the most considerable qualities to be observed in them, is so wholly on extrinsical causes and qualities of other bodies that make no part of them that they cannot subsist a moment without them though yet those bodies on which they depend are little taken notice of and make no part of the complex ideas we frame of those animals. Take the air but for a minute from the greatest part of living crea

which are not vulgarly observed or so much thought on and how many are there which the severest inquiry can never discover? The inhabitants of this spot of the universe though removed so many millions of miles from the sun yet depend so much on the duly tempered motion of particles coming from or agitated by it that were this earth removed but a small part of out of its present situation and

we should find them so often destroyed by excess or defect of the sun's warmth which an accidental position in some parts of this our little globe exposes them to The qualities observed in a lodestone must needs! be the resource far beyond the confines of that body and the ravage

Chap VII Of Maxims

1. *Maxims or axioms of self-evidence for philosophy*
There are sort of propositions, which, under the name of *maxims* and *axioms* have passed for principles of science and because they are self-evident, have been proposed innate, without that anybody (that I know) ever went so far to show the reason and foundation of their clearness or cogency. It may however be worthwhile to inquire into the reason of their evidence, and see whether it be peculiar to them alone and also to examine how far they will enforce and govern our other knowledge.

2. *Whether and if science consists knowledge, as has been shown, consists in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas.* Now where that agreement or disagreement is perceived immediately by itself, without the intervention or help of any other things, we will judge it self-evident. This will appear to be so to

never be capable of any knowledge) to know every of its ideas by itself and distinguish it from others. Every one finds in himself that he knows the ideas he has that he knows also when any one is in his understanding and what it is and that when more than one are there, he knows them distinctly and unconfusedly. It is from another which always being so (it being impossible but that it should perceive what it perceives,) he can never be in doubt when any idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that idea it is and that it is distinct ideas, when they are in his mind, are there, and are not one and the same idea. So that all such affirmations and negations are made without any possibility of doubt, uncertainty or hesitation, and must necessarily be assented to as soon as understood that is, as soon as we have it in our minds determined ideas, which the terms in the proposition stand for. And, therefore, whenever the mind with attention considers any proposition, so as to perceive the two ideas signified by the terms, and affirmed or denied one of the other to be

reason of his assent is from that agreement or disagreement in which the mind, by an immediate comparing them, finds in those ideas answering the affirmation or negation in the proposition.

3. *Self-evidence not peculiar to certain axioms* This being so, in the next place, I thus consider whether this self-evidence be peculiar only to those propositions which commonly pass under the name of maxims, and have the dignity of axioms allowed them. And here it is plain, that several other truths, not allowed to be axioms, partake equally with them in this self-evidence. Thus we shall see, if we go over these several sorts of agreement or disagreement of ideas which I have before mentioned, and real existence which will discover to us, that not only those few propositions which have had the credit of maxims are self-evident, but great many even almost an infinite number of other propositions are such.

4. *It is the identity and diversity of all propositions or really self-evident* For First The immediate perception of the agreement or disagreement of identity being founded in the mind has many distinct ideas, thus affords us as many self-evident propositions as we have distinct ideas. Every one that has any knowledge at all, has, as the foundation of it, various and distinct ideas and it is the first act of the mind (without which it can

terms standing for more general ideas, such as are less so, whether the general idea of Being be affirmed of itself as in this proposition

being in general be denied of not being which is the only (if I may so call it) idea differing from it, as in this other proposition, it is impossible if the same thing to be and not to be or any idea of any particular being be denied of another different from it, as a man is not a horse red is not blue. The difference of the ideas, as soon as the terms are understood, makes the truth of the proposition presently visible, and that with an equal certainty and easiness in the less as well as the more general propositions and all for the same reason, viz. because the mind perceives, in any ideas that it has, the same idea to be the same with itself and two differing ideas to be different, and not the same and thus it is equally certain of whether these ideas be more less general, abstract, and comprehensible. It is not, therefore, alone in these two general propositions—whatsoever is, is and it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be—that this sort of self-evidence belongs by any peculiar right. The perception of being, or not being, belongs no more to these vague ideas, signified by the terms *whatsoever* and

changes the primary qualities of one body do regularly produce in the primary qualities of another and how Secondly We must know what primary qualities of any body produce certain sensations or ideas in us ¹ This is in truth no less than to know all the effects of matter under its divers modifications of bulk figure cohesion of parts motion and rest. Which I think every body will allow utterly impossible to be known by us without revelation Nor if it were revealed to us what sort of figure bulk and motion of corpuscles would produce in us the sensation of a yellow colour and what sort of figure bulk and texture of parts in the superficies of any body were fit to give such corpuscles their due motion to produce that colour would that be enough to make universal propositions with certainty concerning the several sorts of them unless we had faculties acute enough to perceive the precise bulk figure texture and motion of bodies in those minute parts by which they operate on our senses so that we might by those frame our abstract ideas of them I have mentioned here only corporeal substances whose operations seem to be more level to our understandings For as to the operations of spirit both the thinking and moving of bodies we at first sight find ourselves at a loss though perhaps when we have applied our thoughts a little nearer to the consideration of bodies and their operations and examined how far our notions even in these reach with any clearness beyond sensible matter of fact we shall be bound to confess that even in these too our discoveries amount to very little beyond perfect ignorance and incapacity

15 Whilst our complex ideas of substances contain not ideas of their real constitutions we cannot make but few general certain propositions concerning them This is evident the abstract complex ideas of substances for which the general names stand not comprehending their real constitutions cannot afford us very little universal certainty Because our ideas of them are not made up of that on which those qualities we observe in them and would inform ourselves about do depend or with which they have any certain connexion we get the ideas to which we give the name must be as it commonly is a body of the ordinary shape with sense voluntary motion and reason joined to it This being the abstract idea and

which sensation power of motion and reasoning with that peculiar shape depend and hereby they are united together in the same

CONFIRMATION
tauntly affirm That all men sleep by intervals That no man can be nourished by food or stones That all men will be poisoned by hemlock because these ideas have no connexion nor repugnancy with this our nominal essence of man thus this abstract idea that name stands

certainty whilst our specific idea of man contains not that real constitution which is the root wherein all his inseparable qualities are united and from whence they flow Whilst our idea the word man stands for is only an imperfect collection of some sensible qualities and powers in him there is no discernible connexion or repugnance between our specific idea and the operation of either the parts of hemlock or stones upon his constitution There are animals that safely eat man and others that are nourished by food

and tend we must not hope to reach certainty

can afford us such propositions But these are few and of so little moment that we may justly look on our certain general knowledge of substance as none at all

16
To ascertain the terms used in them stand for such ideas whose agreement or disagreement as there expressed is capable to be discovered by us and of it our truth or falsehood

firmed or denied may take not to be found but seek it else without us particulars It is the contemplation of our own abstract ideas that alone is able to afford us general knowledge

Cf. ch. II. § 5.

Because not knowing the real constitution

¹ Cf. Bk. II. ch. I. 1.

² Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxx. § 2

than it does to any other ideas. These two general maxims amounting to no more, in short, but this that *the same is the same* and *the same is not different* are truths known in more particular instances as well as in those general maxims and known also in particular instances before

nothing more visible than that the mind without the help of any proof or reflection on either of these general propositions perceives so clearly and knows so certainly that the idea of white is the idea of white and not the idea of blue and that the idea of white when it is in the mind is there and is not absent that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence

be itself and not to be another and to be in his mind and not away when it is there with a certainty that cannot be greater and therefore the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty nor add anything to this. So that, in respect of identity our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own mind whether this proposition a circle is a circle be not as self-evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms, *whatsoever is is* and again whether this proposition blue is not red be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of as soon as it understands the words, than it does of that axiom it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And so of all the like.

5 II *In co-existence we have few self-evident propositions* Secondly as to co-existence or such necessary connexion between two ideas that, in the subject where one of them is supposed there the other must necessarily be also of such agreement or disagreement as thus the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them. And therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident, though some there are e.g. the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies being annexed to our idea of body I think it is a self-evident proposition that a body cannot be in the same place.

6 III *In other relations we may have many* Thirdly As to the relations of modes mathematicians

have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality. As, equals taken from equals, the remainder will be equal which with the rest of that kind however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any one who considers them will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these—that one and one are equal to two—that if you take from the five fingers of one hand two and from the five fingers of the other hand two the remaining numbers will be equal. These and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers, which at the very first hearing force the assent, and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness, than those mathematical axioms.

7 IV *Concerning real existence we have none* Fourthly as to real existence since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas but that of ourselves, and of a First Being we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings not so much as demonstrative much less a self-evident knowledge and therefore concerning those there are no maxims.¹

8 *These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge* In the next place let us consider what influence these received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the schools that all reasonings are *Ex praecognitis et praecedentibus* seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to suppose them to be *praeconita*. Whereby I think are meant these two things first, that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind and secondly that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend.

9 *Because maxims or axioms are not the truths we first knew* First That they are not the truths first known to the mind so evident to experience as we have shown in another place (Bl. I chap. 1) Who perceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother that its sucking bottle is not the rod long before he is that it is impossible for the same thing to

these general maxims, to which mathematicians in their arguments do sometimes refer them? Whence of the reason is very plain for that which makes the mind assent to such propositions, being nothing else but the perception it has of the agreement or disagreement of its ideas, according

Of ch. II. § 14 also ch. I. § 18.

ing as it finds them affirmed or denied of
another in words it understands and every
idea being known to be what it is, and every two
distinct ideas being known to be the same
it must necessarily follow that such self-evident
truths must be first known which consist of ideas
that are first in the mind. And these ideas first in

general names to them. Thus particular ideas are
first received and distinguished and so knowl-
edge gets above them and next to them, the less
general specific, which are next to particular
Abstract ideas are not so business ready to
children the yet unexercised mind as par-

them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions
and contrary to the nature of the mind, that every

of the most abstract, comprehensive, and diffi-
cult, it must be the bluntest rectan-
gle, either equilateral, equilateral nor scal-
lateral and none of these is perfect effect,
it is something imperfect, that cannot exist an
idea where in some parts of several different and
inconsistent ideas are together. It is true,
the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of
such ideas, and makes all the haste to them
can, for the convenience of common

that the most abstract and general ideas are
those that the mind is first and most easily
acquainted with, no such as the earliest knowl-
edge is concerned with.

It arises perceptibly from the other parts of
our knowledge and not directly from what
has been said plainly follows, that these mag-
nified maxims are not the principles and foun-
dations of all our knowledge. For if there be
greater many other truths, which have as much
self-evidence as they and greater many that we
know before them, it is impossible they should
be the principles from which deduced all the

Of Berkeley Principle I treat, § 3.
Of Book II, ch. x, § 9.

other truths. Is it impossible to know that one and
two are equal to three, but by virtue of this, is
some such axiom, i.e. the whole is equal to all
its parts taken together? Many one knows
that one and two are equal to three, who has
never heard the notion that or any other
axiom by which it might be proved and known
as certainly as any other man knows, that the
whole is equal to all its parts, or any other max-
im and all from the same reason of self-evidence
the equality of those ideas being as visible and
certain to him as that one and any other axi-
om as this, it needing no proof to make it per-
ceived. After the knowledge, that the whole
is equal to all its parts, does he know that one
and two are equal to three better or more cer-
tainly than he did before. For if there be any odds
in those ideas, the whole and its parts are more ob-
scure, or at least more difficult to be settled in
the mind than those of one, two, and three. And
indeed I think, I may ask these men who will
coddle all knowledge besides those general
principles themselves, to depend on general
notions, and self-evident principles. What principle
is requisite to prove that one and one are two
that two and two are four that three times three

called principles else that these are principles
and if these are to be counted principles, great
part of number will be so. To which if we
add all the self-evident propositions which may
be made about all our distinct ideas, principles
will be almost infinite at least among all
which men arrive at the knowledge of different
things and a great many of these innate prin-
ciples they never come to know all their lives.
But whether they come in early in the mind ear-
lier or later this is true of them, that they are all
known by their natural evidence are wholly in-
dependent on any habit, or are capable of
any proof from any other much less the more
particular from the more general the more
simple from the more compounded the more
simple and less abstract being the most familiar
and the easiest and earliest apprehended. But
whichever be the clearest

That
as, and
be de-
der
idea

can truly know that the ideas of numbers and of ne-
cessity, § 7, 8.

than it does to any other ideas. These two general maxims amounting to no more in short but this that *the same is the same* and *the same is not different* are truths known in more particular instances as well as in those general maxims and known also in particular instances before these general maxims are ever thought on and draw all their force from the discernment of the mind employed about particular ideas. There is nothing more visible than that the mind without the help of any proof or reflection on either

have framed many axioms concerning that one relation of equality. As equals taken from equals the remainder will be equal which with the rest of that kind however they are received for maxims by the mathematicians, and are unquestionable truths, yet, I think, that any one who considers them will not find that they have a clearer self-evidence than these — that one and one are equal to two that if you take from the five fingers of one hand two and from the five fingers of the other hand two the remaining numbers will be equal. These and a thousand other such propositions may be found in numbers which at the very first hearing force the assent, and carry with them an equal if not greater clearness than those mathematical axioms.

7 IV Concerning real existence we have none Fourthly as to real existence since that has no connexion with any other of our ideas, but that of ourselves, and of a First Being we have in that, concerning the real existence of all other beings not so much as demonstrative much less a self-evident knowledge and therefore concerning those there are no maxims.

8 These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge. In the next place let us consider what influence these received maxims have upon the other parts of our knowledge. The rules established in the schools that all reasonings are *Ex praecogitis et praecognitis* seem to lay the foundation of all other knowledge in these maxims, and to suppose them to be *praecognita*. Whereby I think are meant these two things first, that these axioms are those truths that are first known to the mind and secondly that upon them the other parts of our knowledge depend.

9 *Bec use maxims & axioms are not the truths first known* First That they are not the truths first known to the mind evident to experience we have shown in another place (Blk. I chap. 1) Who perceives not that a child certainly knows that a stranger is not its mother that its sucking bottle is not the rod long before he knows that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And how many truths are there about numbers which it is obvious to observe that the mind is perfectly acquainted with and fully convinced of before it ever thought on these general maxims, to which mathematicians in their arguments do sometimes refer them? Whence of the reason may cry plain for that which

that the idea of white when it is in the mind is there and is not absent that the consideration of these axioms can add nothing to the evidence or certainty of its knowledge. Just so it is (as every one may experiment in himself) in all the ideas a man has in his mind he knows each to be itself and not to be another and to be in his mind and not away when it is there with a certainty that cannot be greater and therefore the truth of no general proposition can be known with a greater certainty nor add anything to this. So that in respect of identity our intuitive knowledge reaches as far as our ideas. And we are capable of making as many self-evident propositions as we have names for distinct ideas. And I appeal to every one's own mind whether this proposition a circle is a circle be not as self-evident a proposition as that consisting of more general terms whatsoever is is and again whether this proposition blue is not red be not a proposition that the mind can no more doubt of as soon as it understands the words than it does of that axiom it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And so of all the like.

5 II *Inco-existence we have few self-evident propositions* Secondly as to co-existence or such a necessary connexion between two ideas that, in the subject where one of them is supposed there the other must necessarily be also of such agreement or disagreement as thus the mind has an immediate perception but in very few of them. And therefore in this sort we have but very little intuitive knowledge nor are there to be found very many propositions that are self-evident, though some there are viz the idea of filling a place equal to the contents of its superficies being annexed to our idea of body I think it is a self-evident proposition that no bodies cannot be in the same place.

6 III *In other relations we may have many* Thirdly As to the relations of modes mathematicians

ing find them affirmed \equiv denied of
an
d
dis...
I must necessarily follow that such sciences or
truths must be first known which consist of ideas
that are first in the mind. And the ideas first in
the mind that is evident, are those of particular
things, from hence, by slow degrees, the under-
standing proceeds to some few general ideas
which being taken from the ordinary and famil-
iar objects of sense, are settled in the mind, with
general names to them. Thus particular ideas are
first received and distinguished and so knowl-
edge is tabo to them and next to them, the less
general specific, which are next to particular.
For abstract ideas are not so obvious easy to
children, the yet unexercised mind as par-
ticular ones. If they seem to grow to men, it is
only because by constant and familiar use they
are made so. For when nicely effect upon
them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions
and contrivances of the mind that carry diffi-
culty with them, and do not so easily suggest them-
selves as we are apt to imagine. For example,
does not require some pains and skill to form
the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet one
of the most basic to comprehend, and diffi-
cult.) It must be either oblique, rectangular,
gle, neither equilateral, equilateral or scale
both all and no of these together. In effect,
it is something imperfect, that cannot exist in
idea where in some parts of several differ and
inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true
the mind, in this imperfect state, has need of
such ideas, and makes all that has to do with it
can find the convenience of communication and
enlarge the knowledge to both which it is
naturally very much inclined. But yet has
reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our
imperfect state, at least, this is enough to show
that the most abstract and general ideas are
those that the mind is first and most easily
acquainted with, no ideas as earliest knowledge
is common about.

Because perceptions of them that the part of
our knowledge do not depend. Secondly from what
has been said it plainly follows that these mag-
nified maxims are not the principles and foun-
dations of all our other knowledge. For if there be
great many other truths, which have as much
self-evidence as they and great many that we
know before them, it is impossible they should
be the principles from which we deduce all the

Cf. Berkeley, *Principles* Introd. § 3.
Cf. *Ibid.* II. ch. x. § 9.

other truths. Is it impossible to know that one and
two are equal to three, but by virtue of this, or
some such axiom, viz. the whole is equal to all
its parts taken together? Many one knows
that one and two are equal to three, without
having heard or thought on, that or any other
axiom by which it might be proved and knows
it as certainly as any other man knows, that the
whole is equal to all its parts, or any other max-
im of reason of self-evidence.

Considered. For as for the knowledge, that one and
two are equal to three, does he know that one
and two are equal to three, better or more cer-
tainly than he did before? For if there be any odds
in those ideas, the whole and parts are more ob-
scure, or at least more difficult to be settled in
the mind than those of one, two, and three. And
indeed I think, I may ask these men who will
needs have all knowledge besides those general
principles themselves, to depend on general, in-
finite, and self-evident principles. What principle
is requisite to prove that one and one are two
that two and two are four that three times two
are six. Which being known without any proof
does not. That either all knowledge does not de-
pend on certain *premisses* or general maxims,
called principles or else that these are principles
and if these are to be counted principles, a great
part of numeration will be so. To which, if we
add all the self-evident propositions which may
be made about all our distinct ideas, principles
will be almost infinite. I insist in them
which men arrive at the knowledge of and differ-
ent ones and great many of these innate prin-
ciples they never come to know all their lives.
But whether they come into the mind at
first or later this is true of them, that they are all
known by their nature evidence are wholly in-
dependent. No doubt, men are capable of
any proof from another in which less the in-
particular from the more general as the more
imply from the more compounded than the more
simple and less but being the most familiar
and the easier and earlier apprehended. But
whichever be the most correct ideas, the evidence and
certainty of all such propositions as is in this, That
man perceives himself to be the same idea, and
infallibly perceives two different ideas to be dif-
ferent ideas. For when a man has in his under-
standing the ideas of one and of two, the idea of
yet one and the idea of two, he cannot but cer-
tainly know that the idea of one is the idea of one,

Cf. ch. §§ 7 & 8.

and not the idea of tw^o and that the idea of yel-
low is the idea of yellow and not the idea of blue.
For a man cannot confound the ideas in his mind
which he has distinct that would be to have them
confused and distinct at the same time which is
a contradiction and to have none distinct is to
have no use of our faculties to have no knowl-
edge at all And therefore what idea soever is
affirmed of itself or whatsoever two entire dis-
tinct ideas are denied one of another the mind
cannot but assent to such a proposition as infal-
libly true as soon as it understands the terms,
without hesitation or need of proof or regarding
those made in more general terms and called
maxims

11 *What use these general maxims or axioms have*
What shall we then say? Are these general max-
ims of no use? By no means though perhaps their
use is not that which it is commonly taken to be.¹
But since doubting in the least of what hath been
by some men ascribed to these maxims may be
apt to be cried out against as overturning the
foundations of all the sciences it may be worth
while to consider them with respect to other parts
of our knowledge and examine more particular-
ly to what purposes they serve and to what not

(1) It is evident from what I as been already
said that they are of no use to prove or confirm
less general self-evident propositions

(2) It is as plain that they are not nor have
been the foundations whereon any science hath
been built There is I know a great deal of talk
propagated from scholastic men of sciences and
the maxims on which they are built but it has
been my ill luck never to meet with any such sci-
ences much less any one built upon these two
maxims *what is is a d it is impossible for the same*
thin to be and not to be And I would be glad to be
shown where any such science erected upon these
or any other general axioms is to be found and
should be obliged to any one who would lay be-
fore me the frame and system of any science so
built on these or any such like maxims that could
not be shown to stand as firm without any con-
sideration of them I ask Whether these general

silence wranglers and put an end to dispute But
I think that nobody will therefore say that the
Christian religion is built upon these maxims, or
that the knowledge we have of it is derived from
these principals It is from revelation we have re-

ceived it and without revelation these maxims
had never been able to help us to it When we
find out an idea by whose intervention we dis-
cover the connexion of two others, this is a reve-
lation from God to us by the voice of reason for
we then come to know a truth that we did not
know before When God declares any truth to
us this is a revelation to us by the voice of his
Spirit and we are advanced in our knowledge.
But in neither of these do we receive our light or

immediately to us and we see the truth of what
he says in his unerring veracity

(3) They are not of use to help men forward
in the advancement of sciences or new discover-
ies of yet unknown truths Mr Newton in his
never enough to be admired book² has demon-
strated several propositions which are so many
new truths, before unknown to the world and
are further advances in mathematical knowl-

These were not the clues that led him into the
discovery of the truth and certainty of those pro-
positions Nor was it by them that he got the
knowledge of those demonstrations but by find-
ing out intermediate ideas that showed the agree-
ment or disagreement of the ideas as expressed

and advancing these sciences wherein they are far
enough from receiving any help from the con-
templation of these or the like magnified max-
ims Would those who have this traditional ad-
miration of these propositions, that they think no
step can be made in knowledge without the sup-
port of an axiom no stone laid in the building
of the sciences without a general maxim but dis-
tinguish between the method of acquiring knowl-
edge and of communicating it between the meth-
od of raising any science, and that of teaching
it to others as far as it is advanced—they would
see that those general maxims are not the foun-
dations on which the first discoverers raised their
admirable structures not the keys that unlocked
and opened those secrets of knowledge Though
afterwards when schools were erected and sci-
ences had their professors to teach what others
had found out, they often made use of maxims,
we laid down certain propositions which were

¹ Cf Locke's *Third Letter to Stillingfleet* p 340
also p 263

² Cf ch II § 4

² The *Principia*

self-evident, or to be received for true which being settled in the minds of their scholars as unquestionable entries, they on occasion made use of, to convince them of truths in particular instances, that were not so familiar to their minds as those general axioms which had before been inculcated to them, and carefully settled in their minds. Though these particular instances, when well reflected on, are no less self-evident to the understanding than the general maxims brought to confirm them, and it was in those particular instances that the first discoverer found the truth, without the help of the general maxims and so may any one else do, who with attention considers them.

Maxims of use in the point of hat has been discarded, and silencing the naturalangler To come, therefore, to the use that is made of maxims.

(1) They are of use, as has been observed in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are disjoined but of little use in advancing them further.

(2) They are of use in disputes, for the silencing of obstinate wranglers, and bringing those who insist on some conclusion. When their need of them that end came in this manner. I will bring I can leave to inquire. The Schools having made dispute the chief of men's business, and the chief of knowledge, adjudged victory to him that kept the field and held the last word was concluded to have the better of the argument, if not of the cause. But because by this means there was likelihood to be no decisive between skillful combatants whilst on never failed of *modus terminatus* to prove any proposition and that they could as constantly win their own or with distinction deny the major, minor or premise, as much as could be running out of dispute into an endless train of syllogisms, certain general propositions—most of them, indeed self-evident—were introduced into the Schools which being as all men allowed and agreed in, were looked as general measures of truth, and served instead of principles (where the disputants had not laid down any other between them) being decided which there was going and which must not be receded from by either side. And thus these maxims, getting the name of principles, beyond which men in dispute could not retreat, were by mistake taken to be the originals and sources from whence all knowledge began and the foundations whereon the sciences were built. Because when in their disputes they came to any of these, they stopped there, and went no further the matter was determined. But

how much this is a mistake, hath been already shown.

How maxims are to be much to regard This method of the Schools, which has been thought the fountain of knowledge, introduced as I suppose, the like use of these maxims into a great part of conversation out of the Schools, to stop the mouths of cavillers, whom any man excused from arguing with, when they deny these general self-evident principles received by all reasonable men which have once thought of them but yet their use herein is but to put an end to wrangling. They in truth, when urged in such cases, teach nothing that is already done by the intermediate ideas made use of in the debate, whose connexion may be seen without the help of those maxims, and so the truth known without the maxim is produced, and the argument is

test for to try And thus maxims have their use

men to oppose and resist evident truth till they are baffled, even till they are reduced to contradict themselves, some established principles is no wonder that they should in civil conversation be ashamed of that which in the Schools is counted virtue and glory and obstinately maintain that side of the question they have chosen, neither true false to the last extremity even after confusion. A contrary way to attain truth and knowledge and that which I think the rational part of mankind is corrupted by education, could scarce believe should ever be admitted amongst the lovers of truth, and students of philosophy, introduced into the seminaries of those who are to propagate the truths of religion philosophy amongst the ignorant and uneducated. How much such a way of learning is like to turn young men's minds from the sincere search and love of truth away and to make them doubt whether there is any such thing at least, without adhering to I shall not inquire. Thus I think, that, by using those places, which brought forth Peripatetic Philosophy into their schools, where to convene many generations without teaching the world anything but the art of wrangling these maxims were in which they thought they found truths in which the sciences were built, no other great helps to the advancement of knowledge.

Offer as to topu angles disputes but for

the use to the discovery of truths As to these general maxims, therefore they are as I have said of great use in disputes to stop the mouths of wranglers but not of much use to the discovery of unknown truths or to help the mind forwards in its search after knowledge For who ever began to build his knowledge on the general proposition *what is is* or *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* and from either of these as from a principle of science deduced a system of useful knowledge? Wrong opinions often involving contradictions one of these maxims as a touchstone may serve well to show whither they lead But yet however fit to lay open the absurdity or mistake of a man's reasoning or opinion they are of very little use for enlightening the understanding and it will not be found that the mind receives much help from them in its progress in knowledge which would be neither less nor less certain were these two general propositions never thought on It is true as I have said they sometimes serve in argumentation to stop a wrangler's mouth by showing the absurdity of what he saith and by exposing him to the shame of contradicting what all the world knows and he himself cannot but *vn* to be true But it is one thing to show a man that he is in an error and another to put him in possession of truth and I would fain know what truths these two propositions are able to teach and by their influence make us know which we did not know before or could not know without them Let us reason from them as well as we can they are only about identical predication and influence if any at all none but such Each particular proposition concerning identity or diversity is as clearly and certainly known in itself if attended to as either of these general ones only these general ones as serving in all cases are therefore more inculcated and insisted on As to other less general maxims many of them are no more than bare verbal propositions and teach us nothing but the respect and import of names one to another The whole is equal to all its parts what real truth I beseech you does it teach us? What more is contained in that maxim than what the signification of the word *totum* or the *whole* does of itself import? And he that knows that the *whole* stands for what is made up of all its parts knows very little less than that the whole is equal to all its parts And upon the same ground I think that this proposition *A hill is higher than a valley* and several the like may also pass for maxims. But yet masters of mathematics when they would as teachers of what they know instruct others in that science, do not without reason

place this and some other such maxims at the entrance of their systems that their scholars having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with these propositions made in such general terms may be used to make such reflections and have these more general propositions as formed rules and sayings ready to apply to all particular cases Not that if they be equally weighed they are more clear and evident than the particular instances they are brought to confirm but that being more familiar to the mind the very naming them is enough to satisfy the understanding But this I say more from our custom of using them and the establishment they have got in our minds by our often thinking of them than from the different evidence of the things But before custom has settled methods of

better in that particular instance than by this general proposition "The whole is equal to all its parts" and that if one of these have need to be confirmed to him by the other the general has more need to be let into his mind by the par-

the mind takes the quite contrary course and having drawn its knowledge into as general propositions as it can makes those familiar to its thoughts and accustoms itself to have recourse to them as to the standards of truth and falsehood By which familiar use of them as rules to measure the truth of other propositions, it comes in time to be thought that more particular propositions have their truth and evidence from their conformity to these more general ones, which in discourse and argumentation are so frequently urged and constantly admitted And thus I think to be the reason why amongst so many self evident propositions the most general *is* have

the first title of maxims

general maxims That they are so far from improving or establishing our minds in true knowledge that if our notions be wrong loose or unsteady and cres gn up our thoughts to the sound of words, rather than fix them on settled determined ideas of things I say these general maxims will serve to confirm us in mistakes and in such a way of use of words, which is most common will serve to produce contradictions *vn* he that with Descartes shall frame in his mind an

idea of what he calls body to be a thing but extension, may easily demonstrate that there is no vacuum, i.e. no space void of body by this maxim, *What is is*. For the idea of which he annexes the name body, being bare extension, his knowledge that space cannot be without body is certain. For he knows his own idea of extension clearly and distinctly and knows that it is what it is, and not another idea, though it be called by these three names,—extension, body, space. Which three words, standing for one and the same idea, may no doubt, with the same evidence and certainty be affirmed one of another as each of itself and it is as certain, that, whilst I use them all to stand for one and the same idea, this predication is as true and identical in its signification, that space is body as this predication is true and identical, that body is body both in signification and sound.

3. *Instance in action.* But if another should come and make himself another idea, different from Descartes's, of the thing, which yet with Descartes he calls by the same name body and make his idea, which he expresses by the word body to be of a thing that hath both extension and solidity together he will as easily demonstrate, that there may be vacuum or space without body as Descartes demonstrated the contrary. Because the idea of which he gives the name space being barely the simple one of extension, and the idea to which he gives the name body being the complex idea of extension and resistibility or solidity together in the same subject, these two ideas are not exactly one and the same, but in the understanding as distinct as the ideas of one and two white and black, or as of *orphan* and *humanity* if I may use those barbarous terms and therefore the predication of them in our minds, or in words is different.

knowledge of our own ideas, more general or comprehensive, can assure us of nothing that passes without the mind their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each idea by itself and of its distinction from others, about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our minds though we may be and often are mistaken when we retain the names without the ideas or use them confusedly sometimes for one and sometimes for another idea. In which cases the force of these axioms, reaching only to the sound, and not to the signification of the words, serves only to lead us into confusion, mistake, and error. It is to show men that these maxims, however cried up for the great guards of truth, will not secure them from error in careless loose use of their words, that I have made this remark. In all that is here suggested concerning their little use for the improvement of knowledge, or dangerous use in undetermined ideas, I have been far enough from saying or insisting they should be laid aside as some have been too forward to charge me. I affirm them to be truths, self-evident truths and so cannot be laid aside. As far as their influence will reach, it is our aim to endeavor so will I attempt, to abridge it. But yet, without any injury to truth or knowledge, I may have reason to think their use is unnecessary to the great stress which seems to be laid on them and I may warn men not to make an ill use of them, for the confirming themselves in error.

5. *They cannot add to our knowledge of substances and their application is only necessary and dangerous.* But let them be of what use they will in verbal propositions, they cannot discover or prove to us the least knowledge of the nature of substances, as they are found and exist without us, any further than grounded in experience. And though the consequence of these two propositions, called principles, be very clear and their use not dangerous or hurtful, in the probation of such things wherein there is no need at all of them for proof but such as are clear by themselves without them, viz. where our ideas are [determined] and known by the names that stand for them. When these principles, viz. *what is is* and *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* are made use of in the probation of propositions wherein are words standing for complex ideas, as man, horse, gold, &c. where they are of infinite danger and most commonly make men receive and retain falsehood for manifest truth, and uncertainty for demonstration, so which follow error, obstinacy and all the mischiefs that can happen from wrong reasoning. The reason whereof is not, that these principles are less true or of less force in proving

vacuum.

—f

4. *But they prove not the existence of things without us.* But yet, though both these propositions (as you see) may be equally demonstrated, viz. that there may be vacuum, and that there cannot be vacuum, by these two certain principles, viz. *that is is*, and *the same thing cannot be and not be* yet neither of these principles will serve to prove to us, that any what bodies do exist for that we are left to our senses to discover to us as far as they can. Those universal and self-evident principles being only our constant, clear and distinct

propositions made of terms standing for complex ideas than where the propositions are about simple ideas. But because men mistake generally — thinking that where the same terms are preserved the propositions are about the same things though the ideas they stand for are in truth different — therefore these maxims are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions and is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum. So that whilst men take words for things as usually they do these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions as shall yet be further made manifest.

16 *Instance in demonstrations about man which can only be verbal.* For instance let man be that concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything and we shall see that so far as demonstration is by these principles it is only verbal and gives us no certain universal true proposition or knowledge of any being existing without us. First a child having framed the idea of a man it is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the painter makes of

rational men who have actually denied that they are men.

18 *A third instance.* Thirdly Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls man

that a man may have no hands but be *quadupes* neither of those being included in his idea of man and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined that was a man because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that *What is is*.

19 *Little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas.* So that if rightly considered I think we may say That where our ideas are determined in our minds and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations there is little need or use at all of these maxims to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions without the help of these and the like maxims will not be helped by these max

he calls man whereof white or flesh colour in England being one the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man and therefore he can demonstrate by the principle *It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* that a negro is not a man the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition which perhaps he never heard nor thought of but the clear distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black and white which he cannot be persuaded to take nor can ever mistake one for another whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child or any one who hath such an idea which he calls man can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul because his idea of man includes no such notion or idea in it. And therefore to him, the principle of *What is is* proves not this matter but it depends upon collection and observation by which he is to make his complex idea called man.

17 *Another instance.* Secondly Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the idea he calls man and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men by this maxim *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* and I have discoursed with very

requires nor admits any proof one part of it more

that two are equal to two will also have need of a proof to make him admit that what is, is. He that needs a probation to convince him that two are not three that white is not black, that a triangle is not a circle &c. or any other two [determined] distinct ideas are not one and the same will need also a demonstration to convince him that *It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*.

20 *The ridiculous use where we deal not determined.* And as these maxims are of little use where we have determined ideas so they are as I have shown of dangerous use where our ideas are not determined and where we use words that are not annexed to determined ideas but such as are of a loose and wandering signification sometimes standing for one and sometimes for another idea from which follow mistakes and errors.

confirm and rivet.

Chap. VIII Of Truth Principles

Some of maxims have no increase of knowledge

Whether the maxims treated of in the foregoing chapter be of that use to real knowledge as is generally supposed, I leave to be considered. This, I think, may confidently be affirmed. That there are universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add nothing to our understanding things to increase of our knowledge. Such are—

Whatever is said of a man is true. All purely affirmative propositions. These obviously a direct first truth appear to contain no instruction in them for when we affirm the said term of self whether it be bare verbal, or whether it contains any clear and real idea, it shows us nothing, but what we must certainly know before whether such propositions be either made by or proposed to us. Indeed, the most general one *what is, may* serve sometimes to show a man the absurdity he is guilty of, when, by circumlocution or equivocal terms, he would in particular instances deny the same thing of self because nobody will so penal his defiance to common sense, as to affirm such, and direct contradiction in plain words or if he does, may be excused if he breaks.

For a further discourse with him. But I think I may say that either that true maxim, nor any other denucal proposition, teaches us an thing and though in such kind of propositions this great and manifested maxim, boasted to be the foundation of demonstration, may be and of it is made use of to confirm them, yet all proves amounts no more than this. That the same word may with great certainty be affirmed of itself without any doubt of the truth of any such proposition and let me add, also, without an real knowledge.

3. *Example.* For instance, any every ignorant person, who but makes proposition and know what he means when he says y or no, may make millions of propositions of whose truth he may be infallibly certain, and yet not know anything in the world thereby, *g* what is soul, is soul or soul is soul spirit is a spirit fuche is fuche &c. These all being equivalent to this proposition, *it is as is, &c* what hath existence hath existence or who hath soul, hath soul. What is this more than trifling with words. I is but like monkey shifting his

ster from one hand to the other and had his words, might no doubt have said, 'O yes in right hand is subject, and o yes in left hand is

Cf. ch. § 4 in § 8 also Aristotle *Prior Analytics* I. 3 *de sophist.* Eik. IV. chh. iii. vii.

standing a ...
knowledge and bulk together

How it is if it is as it is I know there are some who, because denucal propositions are self-evident, show a great concern for them, and think they do give service to philosophy by crying them up as if in this was contained all knowledge, and the understanding were led into all truth by this only. I grant as farwardly as an one, that they are all true and self-evident. I grant further that the foundation of all our knowledge lies in the faculty we have of perceiving the same idea to be the same, and

— — —
utions, of the improvement of knowledge from the imputation of truth, I do not see. Let any one repeat, as often as he pleases, that the will is the will, may what stress is to be fit of what use is this, and an infinitesimal proposition, for the enlarging our knowledge. Let man be bound as much as the plenty of words which he has will permit, in such propositions as these law is law and obligation

—
or there in the knowledge of morality. Those who know not, nor perhaps ever will know what is right and what is wrong, nor the measures of them, can with as much assurance make and in fallibly know the truth of these direct such propositions, as he that best instructed in morality can do. It is what advance do such propositions give in the knowledge of anything necessary useful for the conduct.

— — —
maxims as these substance is substance and body is body a vacuum is vacuum, and vortex is vortex &c. &c. For these and all such are equally true equally eternal and equally self-evident. Yet they cannot but be counted trifling when made use of as principles of instruction, and therefore laid in them as helps. See also ch. ii. §

propositions made of terms standing for complex ideas than where the propositions are about simple ideas. But because men mistake generally — thinking that where the same terms are preserved the propositions are about the same things though the ideas they stand for are in truth different — therefore these maxims are made use of to support those which in sound and appearance are contradictory propositions and is clear in the demonstrations above mentioned about a vacuum. So that whilst men take words for things as usually they do these maxims may and do commonly serve to prove contradictory propositions as shall yet be further made manifest.

16 *Instance in demonstrations about man which can only be verbal.* For instance let man be that concerning which you would by these first principles demonstrate anything and we shall see that so far as demonstration is by these principles it is only verbal and gives us no certain universal true proposition or knowledge of any being existing without us. First a child having framed the idea of a man it is probable that his idea is just like that picture which the painter makes of

rational men who have actually denied that they are men.

18 *A third instance.* Thirdly Perhaps another makes up the complex idea which he calls man, only out of the ideas of body in general and the powers of language and reason and leaves out the shape wholly. This man is able to demonstrate that a man may have no hands but be quadruped; neither of those being included in his idea of man and in whatever body or shape he found speech and reason joined that was a man because having a clear knowledge of such a complex idea, it is certain that *What is is*.

19 *Little use of these maxims in proofs where we have clear and distinct ideas.* So that if rightly considered I think we may say That here our ideas are determined in our minds and have annexed to them by us known and steady names under those settled determinations there is little need or use at all of these maxims to prove the agreement or disagreement of any of them. He that cannot discern the truth or falsehood of such propositions without the help of these and the like maxims will not be helped by these max-

he calls man whereof white or flesh colour in England being one the child can demonstrate to you that a negro is not a man because white colour was one of the constant simple ideas of the complex idea he calls man and therefore he can demonstrate by the principle *It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* that a negro is not a man the foundation of his certainty being not that universal proposition which perhaps he never heard nor thought of but the clear distinct perception he hath of his own simple ideas of black and white which he cannot be persuaded to take, nor can he mistake one for another whether he knows that maxim or no. And to this child or any one who hath such an idea which he calls man can you never demonstrate that a man hath a soul because his idea of man includes no such notion or idea in it and therefore to him, the principle of *What is is* proves not this matter but it depends upon collection and observation by which he is to make his complex idea called man.

17 *A other instance.* Secondly Another that hath gone further in framing and collecting the idea he calls man and to the outward shape adds laughter and rational discourse may demonstrate that infants and changelings are no men by this maxim *it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be* and I have discoursed with very

— — — — —
requires nor admits any proof one part of it more

that two are equal to two. We all also have need of a proof to make him admit that what is, is. He that needs a probation to convince him that two are not three that white is not black that a triangle is not a circle &c. or any other two [de term need] distinct ideas are not one and the same will need also a demonstration to convince him that *It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be*.

20 *Their use dauger us where our ideas are not determined.* And as these maxims are of little use

— — — — —
are not annexed to determined ideas but such as are of a loose and wandering signification sometimes stand for one and sometimes for another idea from which follow mistake and error which these maxims (brought as proofs to establish propositions herein the terms stand for undetermined ideas) do by their authority confirm and rivet.

ambling horse, or a new thing *ambling animal*, both being all about the signification of words, and make me know but this—That body sense, and motion, or power of sensation and moving are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and signify by the word *man* and where they are not to be found to either the *same man* belongs not to that thing and so of the other—That body sense, and a certain way of going with certain kind of voice, are some of those ideas which I always comprehend and signify by the word *palfrey* and when they are not to be found to either the name *palfrey* belongs not to that thing. It is just the same, and to the same purpose, when any term standing for any or more of the simple ideas, that along ther make

that complex idea which is called *man*, is affirmed of the term *man*—I suppose *R. man* signified by the word *homo* all these distinct ideas united in one subject, *corporeitas, sensus, latitudo, et motus*, as he might, no doubt, with great certainty universally affirm one, more, or all of these together of the word *homo*. I did no more than say that the word *homo* in his country comprehended in its signification all these ideas. As like a romance knight, who by the word *palfrey* signified these ideas—body of certain figure, four legged with sense motion, *ambling, neighing, white*, used to have a woman on his back—might with the same certainty universally affirm also any or all of these of the word *palfrey* but did thereby teach no more, but that the word *palfrey* in his or romance language, stood for all these, and was not to be applied to anything where any of these was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing sense, motion, reason, and laughter were united, that thing had actually

all these

being cast into sleep by prunes, being constrained in the idea signified by the word *man*, we are by such propositions to get something more than barely what the word *man* stands for and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal.

For as it teaches but the signification of words before *man* makes any proposition, he is supposed to understand the terms he uses in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making noise by imitation, and framing certain sounds, which he has learn of others but not as a rational creature, using them for signs of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer also is supposed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or else he

talks jargon, and makes an unintelligible noise. And therefore he trifles with words which makes such a proposition, which when it is made contains no more than one of the terms does, and which *man* was supposed to know before. I grant I hath three sides, or saffron is yellow. And this is no further tolerable than where *man* goes to explain his terms to one who is supposed to declare himself not to understand him and then teaches only the signification of that word, and the use of that sign.

8. *But is no acknowledgment* We can know then the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect certainty. The one is, of those trifling propositions as which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty but not instructive. And, secondly we can know the truth, and so may be certain in propositions, which affirm something of another which is a necessary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it. as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the opposite angles. Which relation of the outward angle to either of the opposite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea signified by the name *triangle*, this is a real truth, and contains within it instructive real knowledge.

9. *General propositions as certain as these are few* I have not a great deal of knowledge of what combinations there be of simple ideas expressing together in substances, but by our senses, we cannot make any universal certain propositions concern things, any further than our nominal essences lead us. Which being to a very few and inconsiderable truths, in respect of those which depend on their real constitutions, the general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling and if they are instructive, are uncertain, and such as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever constant observation and analogy may assist our judgment in guessing. Hence it comes to pass, that we may oftentimes meet with very clear and coherent dis-

affined to them, may with great truth, be joined negatively and affirmatively in propositions, as their relations and definitions make them fit to be so joined and propositions consisting of such terms, may with the same clearness, be deduced one from another as those that convey the most real truths and all this without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things existing without us. By

knowledge since they teach nothing but what every one who is capable of discourse knows without being told viz that the same term is the same term and the same idea the same idea And upon this account it was that I formerly did and do still think, the offering and inculcating such propositions in order to give the understanding

and he that would enlarge his own or another's mind in truths he does not yet know must find out intermediate ideas and then lay them in such order one by another that the understanding may see the agreement or disagreement of those in question Propositions that do this are instructive but they are far from such as affirm the same term of itself which is no way to advance one's self or others in any sort of knowledge It no more helps to that than it would help any one in his learning to read to have such propositions as these inculcated to him— An A is an A and a B is a B which a man may know as well as any schoolmaster and yet never be able to read a word as long as he lives Nor do these or any such identical propositions help him one jot forwards in the skill of reading let him make what use of them he can

If those who blame my calling them trifling propositions had but read and been at the pains to understand what I have above writ in very plain English they could not but have seen that by identical propositions I mean only such wherein the same term importing the same idea is affirmed of itself which I take to be the proper signification of identical propositions and concerning all such I think I may continue safely to say that to propose them as instructive is no better than trifling For no one who has the use of reason can miss them where it is necessary they should be taken notice of nor doubt of their truth when he does take notice of them.

But if men will call propositions identical wherein the same term is not affirmed of itself whether they speak more properly than I others must judge this is certain all that they say of propositions that are not identical in my sense concerns not me nor what I have said all that I have said relating to those propositions wherein the same term is affirmed of itself And I would fain see an instance wherein any such can be made use of to the advantage and improvement of any one's knowledge Instances of other kinds whatever use may be made of them concern not me as not being such as I call identical

4 II Secondly propositions in which a part of any complex idea is predicated of the whole Another sort of trifling propositions is when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole a part of the definition of the word defined Such are all propositions wherein the genus is predicated of the species or more comprehensive of less comprehensive terms For what information what knowledge carries this proposition in it viz

Lead is a metal to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead stands for? All the simple ideas that go to the complex one signified by the term metal being nothing but what he before comprehended and signified by the name lead Indeed to a man that knows the signification of the word metal and not of the word lead it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word lead by saying it is a metal which at once expresses several of its simple ideas than to enumerate them one by one telling him it is a body very heavy fusible and malleable.

5 As part of the definition of the term defined. Alike trifling it is to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined or to affirm any one of the simple ideas of a complex one of the name

with sounds to affirm that of the name gold which is comprehended in its received signification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous to affirm gravely as a truth of moment that gold is yellow and I see not how it is any

What instruction can it carry with it to tell one that which he hath been told already or he is supposed to

body yet to not much instruct me to put it solemnly afterwards in a proposition and gravely say all gold is fusible Such propositions can only serve to

with them but of the signification of words however certain they be

Instance an affirmation as can be knowledge of things than to say a palfrey is an

Chap. IX. *Of our Thirdfold Knowledge
of Existence*

to ourselves of our own being and, in this matter come not short of the highest degree of certainty

Chap. X. *Of our Knowledge of the
Existence of a God*

essences or ideas, and thereby removed in our thoughts from particular existence, (that being the proper operation of the mind, in abstraction, to consider an idea under no other existence but what it has in the understanding) gives us no knowledge of real existence at all. Where, by the way, we may take notice, that universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have certain knowledge concern no existence and further that all particular affirmations or negations that would

characters on our minds, wherein we may read his being*) that having furnished us with those faculties our minds are endowed with, he hath not left himself without witnesses since we have sense, perception, and reason, and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry ourselves about us. Nor can we justly complain of our ignorance in this great point since he has so plentifully provided us with the means to discover and know him, so far as is necessary to the end of our being and the great enjoyment of our happiness. But, though this be the most obvious truth that reason discovers, and though it is evidence be (if I mistake not) equal to mathematical certainty yet it requires thought and attention, and the mind must apply itself to regular deduction of it from some part of our intuitive knowledge, or else we shall be as uncertain and ignorant of this as of other propositions, which are in themselves capable of cleared demonstration. I show therefore, that we are capable of knowing *i. e. being certain* that there is God, and *hence may come by* this certainty I think we need go no further than ourselves, and that undoubted knowledge we have of our own existence.

2. For man knows that he himself exists I think is beyond question, that man has clear ideas of his own being—he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. If that can doubt whether he be an *thing*, or no, I speak not to no more than I would argue with pure nothing or *idea* void to conceive no entity that it were something. If any one pretends to be so sceptical as to deny his own existence, (for reason to doubt of this is manifestly impossible) I tell him for me enjoy his beloved happiness of being in this until hunger or some other pain convince him of the contrary. Thus, then, I think I may take for a truth, which every one certainly knoweth assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting *i. e. that he is something that actually exists*

3. He knows also that nothing cannot exist *i. e. that for something must have existed from eternity* In the next place, man knows, by an intuitive certainty that bare nothing can no more produce any

another place, let us proceed now to inquire concerning our knowledge of the existence of things and how we come by it. I say then, that we have the knowledge of our own existence by intuition of the existence of God by demonstration and of other things by sensation.

3. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive. As for our own existence we perceive it so plainly and so certainly that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evident to us than our own existence. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain—can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence. If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will no more let me in doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evident I have as certain perception of my own existence, as of the existence of the pain I feel or if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubted as of that thought which I doubt. Experience then convinces us that we have an *intuitive knowledge* of our own existence, and an *internal immediate perception* that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, or thinking, we are conscious

Especially in ch. viii. and Ec. III. ch. i.

1. Cf. ch. § 7. u. § 4. iii. § 14. § 4. —

2. Cf. Ec. II. ch. xiii. and xiiii. § 2.

3. Cf. Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode* § 7. p. 17.

Cf. ch. u. § 4. ch. xii.

Cf. Ec. I. ch. u. § 8-6.

Cf. ch. u. § 3.

this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propositions in words and yet there by advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things v g he that having learnt these following words with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them v g *substance man animal form soul vegetative sensitive rational* may make several undoubted propositions about the soul without knowing at all what the soul really is and of this sort a man may find an infinite number of propositions reasonings and conclusions in books of metaphysics school divinity and some sort of natural philosophy and after all know as little of God spirits or bodies as he did before he set out

10 *And why* He that hath liberty to define i e to determine the signification of his names of substances (as certainly every one does in effect who makes them stand for his own ideas) and makes their significations at a venture taking them from his own or other men's fancies and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature of things themselves may with little trouble demonstrate them one of another according to those several respects and mutual relations he has given them one to another wherein how ever things agree or disagree in their own nature he needs mind nothing but his own notions with the names he hath bestowed upon them but thereby no more increases in his own knowledge than he does his riches who taking a bag of counters calls one in a certain place a pound another in another place a shilling and a third in a third place a penny and so proceeding may undoubtedly reckon right and cast up a great sum according to his counters so placed and standing for more or less as he pleases without being one jot the richer or without even knowing how much a pound shilling or penny is but only that one is contained in the other twenty times and contains the other twelve which a man may also do in the signification of words by making them in respect of one another more or less or equally comprehensive

11 *Thirdly using words casually is t ffling with them* Though yet concerning most words used in discourses equally argumentative and controversial there is this more to be complained of which is the worst sort of trifling and which sets us yet further from the certainty of knowledge v e hope to attain by them or find in them viz that most writers are so far from instructing us in the nature and knowledge of things that they use their words loosely and uncertainly and do not by using them constantly and steadily in the same significations make plain and clear deduc-

tions of words one from another and make their discourses coherent and clear (how little soever they were instructive) which were not difficult to do did they not find it convenient to shelter their ignorance or obstinacy under the obscurity and perplexedness of their terms to which perhaps inadvertency and ill custom do in many men much contribute

1 *Marks of verbal propositions* To conclude Barely verbal propositions may be known by these following marks

Predication in abstract First All propositions wherein two abstract terms are affirmed one of another are barely about the signification of sounds For since no abstract idea can be the same with any other but itself when its abstract name is affirmed of any other term it can signify no more but this that it may or ought to be called by that name or that these two names signify the same idea Thus should any one say that parsimony is frugality that gratitude is justice that this or that action is or is not temperate however specious these and the like propositions may at first sight seem yet when we come to press them and examine nicely what they contain we shall find that it all amounts to nothing but the signification of those terms

13 *A part of the definition predicated of any term* Secondly All propositions wherein a part of the complex idea which any term stands for is predicated of that term are only verbal v g to say that gold is a metal or heavy And thus all propositions wherein more comprehensiveness of words called genera are affirmed of subordinate or less comprehensive called species or individuals are barely verbal

When by these two rules we have examined the propositions that make up the discourses

signification of words and contain nothing in them but the use and application of these signs

This I think I may lay down for an infallible rule That wherever the distinct idea any word stands for is not known and considered and something not contained in the idea is not affirmed or denied of it there our thoughts stuck wholly in sounds and are able to attain no real truth or falsehood This perhaps if well considered might save us a great deal of useless amusement and dispute and very much shorten our trouble and wandering in the search of real and true knowledge

the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. Though our being furnishes us, as I have shown, with an evident and incontestable proof of Deity, and I believe nobody can doubt the coeconomy of him who will but as carefully attend to it, as to any other demonstration of it. With this being so fundamental

On this subject
It is more evident than that something must

entirely nothing. This being of all absurdities the greatest, to imagine that pure nothing should perfect negation and absence of all beings, should ever produce any real existence.

It being then undoubted by all rational creatures to conclude that something has existed from eternity, let us examine what kind of thing that must be.

§. There are but two sorts of beings in the world

Secondly, sensible, thinking perceiving beings, such as we find ourselves to be. Which if you please, we will hereafter call *sensative* and *cogitative* beings, which to our present purpose, if for nothing else, are perhaps better terms than material and immaterial.

I cogitate, but cannot produce cogitation.
If, then, there must be something eternal, let us see what sort of being it must be. And that that is very in our reason, that it must necessarily be co-eternal being. For it is as impossible to conceive that we have cogitation in it, should produce thinking intelligent being as that nothing should of itself produce matter. Let us suppose an parcel of matter eternal, great or small, we shall find it in itself able to produce nothing. For example, let us suppose the matter of the ex-pellible we meet with eternal, closely united and the parts firmly tied together: if there were no other being in the world must eternally remain so, and add unto it a lump I possibly conceive it could do more than itself being purely matter or produce anything. Matter then, by its own strength, cannot produce

duce in itself so much as motion: the motion it has must also be from eternity or else be produced and added to matter by some other being more powerful than matter: matter as we are content, having no power to produce motion in itself. But let us suppose motion eternal too; yet matter cannot create matter and motion what it can create is might produce of figure and bulk could not produce the right knowledge will still be as far beyond the power of motion and matter to produce, as matter is beyond the power of motion or nonentity to produce. And I appeal to every one's own thoughts, whether he cannot as easily conceive matter produced by nothing as thought to be produced by pure matter when before there was no such thing as thought or an intelligent being existing. Divide matter into as many parts as you will (which we are permitted to imagine a sort of spiritualizing or making a thinking thing of it,) vary the figure and motion of it as much as you please—a globe, cube, cone, prism, cylinder &c. whose diameters are but one thousandth part of an inch will perate no differently upon the bodies of proportionable bulk, than those of an inch or foot diameter: and you may as rationally expect to produce sense, thought, and knowledge, by putting together in a certain figure and motion gross particles of matter as by those that are the very minutest that do they here exist. They knock, rattle, and resist in other just as the greater do: and that is all they can do. So that, if we will

is evident from hence, that then sense, perception and knowledge must be property intrinsically inseparable from matter and every particle of matter it adds that the general species of conception of matter makes us speak of it as

A grain is each of the line or each of an inch, an inch one-tenth of philosophical foot, a philosophical foot one-third of pendulum, whose diadroms, in the lastness of forty five d

be the common measure in the Commonwealth. Let us see. See Locke corresponds with M. l'neux in Dec. 692 and Jan. 693

real being than it can be equal to two right angles ¹ If a man knows not that nonentity or the absence of all being cannot be equal to two right angles it is impossible he should know any demonstration in Euclid. If therefore we know there is some real being and that nonentity cannot produce any real being it is an evident demonstration that *from eternity there has been something* since what was not from eternity had a beginning and what had a beginning must be produced by something else.

4 *And that eternal Being must be most powerful* Next it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from another must also have all that which is in and belongs to its being from another too. All the powers it has must be owing to and received from the same source. This eternal source then of all being must also be the source and original of all power and so *this eternal Being must be the most powerful*.

5 *And most knowing* Again a man finds in himself perception and knowledge. We have then got one step further and we are certain now that there is not only some being but some knowing intelligent being in the world. There was a time then when there was no knowing being and when knowledge began to be or else there has been also *a knowing being from eternity*. If it be said there was a time when no being had any knowledge when that eternal being was void of all understanding I reply that then it was impossible there should ever have been any knowledge it being as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge and operating blindly and without any perception should produce a knowing being as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones. For it is as repugnant to the idea of senseless matter that it should put into itself sense perception and knowledge as it is repugnant to the idea of a triangle that it should put into itself greater angles than two right ones ².

6 *And therefore God* Thus from the consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth — *That there is an eternal most powerful and most knowing Being* which whether any one will please to call God it matters not. The thing is evident ³ and from this idea duly considered will easily be deduced all those other attributes which we ought to ascribe to this eternal Being. If never

theless any one should be found so senselessly arrogant as to suppose man alone knowing and wise but yet the product of mere ignorance and chance and that all the rest of the universe acted only by that blind haphazard I shall leave it to him that very rational and emphatical rebuke of Tully (1st De Leg.) to be considered at his leisure. What can be more silly arrogant and misbecoming than for a man to think that he has a mind and understanding in him but yet in all the universe beside there is no such thing? Or that those things which with the utmost stretch of his reason he can scarce comprehend should be moved and managed without any reason at all?

Quid est enim verius quam neminem esse oportere tam stulte arrogantem ut in se mentem et rationem putet et se in cælo mundoque non putet? Aut ea quæ vix summa ingenio ratione comprehendat nulla ratione moveri putet?

From what has been said it is plain to me we have a more certain knowledge of the existence of a God than of anything our senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is anything else without us. When I say we know I mean there is such a knowledge within our reach which we cannot miss if we will but apply our minds to that, as we do to several other inquiries.

7 *Our idea of a most perfect Being not the sole proof of a God* How far the idea of a most perfect being which a man may frame in his mind does or does not prove the existence of a God I will not here examine. For in the different make of men's temper and application of their thoughts some arguments prevail more on one and some on another for the confirmation of the same truth. But yet, I think this I may say that it is an ill way of establishing this truth and silencing theists to lay the whole stress of so important a point as this upon that sole foundation and take some men's having that idea of God in their minds, (for it is evident some men have none and some worse than none and the most very different) for the only proof of a Deity and out of an overfondness of that darling invention cashier or at least endeavour to invalidate all other arguments and forbid us to hearken to those proofs, as being weak or fallacious which our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts that I deem it impossible for a considering man to withstand them. For I judge it as certain and clear a truth as can anywhere be delivered that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world being understood by

Cf. Bk. II ch. xxi. § 1; ch. xxvi. § 1 also
Locke's *F* 1st Letter to Stillingfleet pp. 135-6

Cf. ch. iii. § 6

Cf. Bk. II ch. xxi. § 33-36

to suppose all matter eternal, and yet one small particle is knowledge and power infinitely above all the rest, is without at the least a appearance of reason to frame an hypothesis. Every particle of matter is capable of all the same figures and motions of any other and I challenge any one, in his thoughts, to add anything else to one above another.

6. III. *Third* because system for infinite matter could not exist. If then neither one particular alone can be this eternal thinking being nor all matter as matter i.e. every particle of matter can be it; I only remain, that it is some certain system of matter duly put together that is this thinking eternal Being. This is that which I imagine, is that person which men are aptest to be of God, who would have him a material being as too readily suggested to them by the ordinary conceits they have of themselves and other men, which they take to be material thinking beings. But this imagination, however more material, is no less absurd than the other for to suppose the eternal thinking Being to be nothing else but composition of particles of matter each whereof is inoperative, is to ascribe all the wisdom and knowledge of that eternal Being all to the juxta position of parts, which which nothing can be more absurd. For uniting particles of matter however put together can be nothing thereby added to them, but new relation of position, which it is impossible should give light and knowledge to them.

And lastly because this system of matter is not eternal. For further this corporeal system either has all its parts rest or it is certain motion of the parts whereas thinking consists. If it be perfectly rest, is but one lump, and so can have no powers above the stone.

If be the motion of its parts which is thinking depends all the thoughts there must be the velocity accidental and limited since all the particles that by motion cause thought, being each of them to itself a law, any doubt, cannot regulate its own motions much less be regulated by the thought of the whole since that thought is not the cause of motion, (nor then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it.) but the consequence of it, whereby freedom, power, choice and all rational and wise thinking or acting will be quite taken away so that such thinking being will be no better nor wiser than pure blind matter since to resolve all into the accidental unguided motions of blind matter or into thought depending on unguided motions of blind matter is the same thing not to mention

the narrowness of such thoughts and knowledge that must depend on the motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more absurdities and impossibilities in this hypothesis (how ever full of them it be) than that before mentioned since, let this thinking system be all or part of the matter of the universe it is impossible that any one particle should either know its own, or the motion of any other particle, or the whole know the motion of every particle, and so regulate its own thoughts or motions, or indeed have any thought resulting from such motion.

18. *Matter not co-eternal with its Creator* If the Secretary Others would have Matter to be eternal, notwithstanding that they allow an eternal, co-eternal, immaterial Being. This, though I take not away the being of a God, yet, since I denies one and the first great piece of his workmanship, the creation, I thus consider it a little. Matter must be also eternal Why because you cannot conceive how it can be made out of nothing why do you not also think yourself eternal. You will answer perhaps, Because, about twenty or forty years since, you began to be. But if I ask you, what that year is, which began then to be, you can scarce tell me. The matter whereof you are made began not then to be for if it did, then it is not eternal, but it began to be put together in such a fashion and manner as makes up your body but yet that frame of particles is not you, makes not that thinking being you are (for I have now to do with one who allows an eternal, immaterial, thinking Being but would have unthinking. Matter eternal too) therefore when did that thinking being begin to be. If it did never begin to be then has it always been a thinking thing from eternity to absurdity whereof I need not confute, till I meet with one who is so void of understanding as to own it. If, therefore you can allow a thinking being to be made out of nothing, (as all things that are not eternal must be,) why also can you not allow it possible or a material being to be made out of nothing by an equal power but that you have the experience of the one in few and not of the other? Though, when well considered, creation of a spirit will be found to require no less power than the creation of matter. Possibly if we would emancipate ourselves from all our notions, and raise our thoughts as far as they would reach, to a closer contemplation of things, we may be able to attain some dim and seeming conception how matter might first be made and begin to exist, by the power of that eternal first Being but to give beginning and being to

one thing yet really all matter is not one individual thing neither is there any such thing existing as *one* material being or *one* single body that we know or can conceive And therefore if matter were the *eternal first cogitative being* there would not be one eternal infinite cogitative being but an infinite number of eternal finite cogitative beings independent one of another of limited force and distinct thoughts which could never produce that order harmony and beauty which are to be found in nature Since therefore whatsoever is the first eternal being must necessarily be cogitative and whatsoever is first of all things must necessarily contain in it and actually have at least all the perfections that can ever

follows that the first eternal being cannot be matter

11 Therefore there has been an eternal co-existence
If therefore it be evident that something

Though this discovery of the necessary existence of an eternal Mind does sufficiently lead us into the knowledge of God since it will hence follow that all other knowing beings that have a beginning must depend on him and have no other ways of knowledge or extent of power than what he gives them and therefore if he made those he made also the less excellent pieces of this universe—all inanimate beings whereby his omniscience power and providence will be established and all his other attributes necessarily follow yet to clear up this a little further we will see what doubts can be raised against it

13 Whether the eternal Mind may be also material or no First Perhaps it will be said that though it be as clear as demonstration can make it that there must be an eternal Being and that Being must also be knowing yet it does not follow but that thinking Being may also be material Let it be so it equally still follows that there is a God For if there be an eternal omniscient omnipotent Being it is certain that there is a God whether you imagine that Being to be material or no But herein I suppose lies the danger and deceit of that supposition—there being no way to avoid the demonstration that there is an eternal knowing Being men devoted to matter

would willingly have it granted that this knowing Being is material and then letting slide out of their minds or the discourse the demonstration whereby an eternal knowing Being is proved necessarily to exist would argue all to be matter and so deny a God that is an eternal cogitative Being whereby they are so far from establishing that they destroy their own hypothesis For if there can be in their opinion eternal matter without any eternal cogitative Being they manifestly separate matter and thinking and suppose no necessary connexion of the one with the other and so establish the necessity of an eternal Spirit but not of matter since it has been proved already that an eternal co-existent Being is unavoidably to be granted Now if thinking and matter may be separated the eternal existence of matter will not follow from the eternal existence of a cogitative Being and they

satisfy themselves or others that this eternal thinking Being is material

I I would ask them whether they imagine that all matter every particle of matter thinks? This I suppose they will scarce say since then there could be as many eternal thinking beings as there are particles of matter and so an infinity of gods And yet, if they will not allow matter as matter that is every particle of matter to be as well cogitative as extended they will have as hard a task to make out to their own reasons a cogitative being out of incogitative particles, as an extended being out of unextended parts if I may so speak

15 II Secondly, because one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative If all matter does not think I next ask Whether it be only one atom that does so? This has as many absurdities as the other for his atom of matter must be alone eternal

thinking atom to have produced all the rest of matter they cannot ascribe that pre-eminence to it upon any other account than that of its thinking the only supposed difference But allow it to be by some other way which is above our conception it must still be created on and these men must give up their great maxim, *Ex nihilo fit* If it be said that all the rest of matter is equally eternal as that thinking atom, it will be to say anything at pleasure though ever so absurd. For

is certainly as great as human nature is capable of, concerning the existence of anything, but a man's self alone, and of God.

3. *This notice by our senses, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be called knowledge and proves the existence of things as clearly as the notice we have by our senses of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds: yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge.* If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, I cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far (whatever he may have without his own thoughts,) will never have any controversy with me: since he can never be sure I say anything contrary to his own opinion. As to myself I think God has given me assurance enough of the existence of things without me: since, by their different application, I can produce in myself both pleasure and pain, which is the great concernment of my present state. This is certain: the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us, is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material beings. For we cannot touch anything but by our faculties: nor talk of knowledge itself, but by the help of those faculties which are fitted to apprehend even what we know.

II. *Besides the assurance we have from our senses themselves, that they do not err in the information they give us of the existence of things without us, when they are affected by them, we are further confirmed in this assurance by their concurrent reasons —*

4. *I. Confirmed by concurrent reasons — First, because we cannot have ideas of sensation but by the inlet of the sense: I claim those perceptions are produced in us by the causes affecting our senses: because those that want the organs of any sense, never can have the ideas belonging to that sense produced in their minds. This is too evident to be doubted: and therefore we cannot but be assured that they come in by the organs of that sense, and no other way. The organs themselves, is plain: do not produce them for then the eyes of man in the dark would produce colour, and his nose smell roses in the winter: but we see nobody is in the relish of pineapple, till he goes to the Indies, where it is, and tastes it.*

5. *II. Secondly Because find that we are not*

actual sensation, and another from memory or very distinct present sense. Because sometimes I find that I cannot avoid the having those ideas produced in my mind. For though, when my eyes are shut, or windows fast, I cannot pleasure recall to my mind the ideas of light, or the sun, which former sensations had lodged in my memory: so I cannot pleasure lay by that idea, and take into my eye that of the smell of a rose, or taste of sugar. But, if I turn my eyes anon towards the sun, I cannot avoid the ideas which the light or sun then produces in me. So that there is a manifest difference between the ideas laid up in my memory (over which, if they were there only I should have constantly the same power to dispose of them, and lay them by at pleasure,) and those which force themselves upon me, and I cannot avoid having. And therefore I must needs be some exterior cause, and this brisk acting of some objects without me, whose efficacy I cannot resist: that produces those ideas in my mind, whether I will or no. Besides, there is nobody who doth not perceive the difference in himself between contemplating the sun, as he hath the idea of it in his memory and actually looking upon it, of which two, his perception is so distinct, that few of his ideas are so distinguishable from another. And therefore he hath certain knowledge that they are not both memory or the actions of his mind, and fancies only without him: but that actual seeing hath a cause without.

6. *III. Thirdly because pleasure or pain which accompany actual sensation, accompanies not the turning of ideas over without the external objects.* Add to this, that many of those ideas are produced in us with pain, which afterwards we remember without the least offence. Thus, the pain of heat or cold, when the idea of it is revived in our minds, gives us no disturbance which, when felt, was very troublesome: and is again, when actually repeated which is occasioned by the disorder the

which would either never disturb us, else constantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but it as floating in our minds, and appearances entertaining our fancies, without the real existence of things affecting us from abroad. The same may be said of *phantasy* accompanying several actual sensations. And though mathematical demonstration depends not upon sense, yet the examining them by diagrams gives great credit to the evidence of our sight, and seems to give it a certain approach.

a spirit would be found a more inconceivable effect of omnipotent power. But this being what would perhaps lead us too far from the notions on which the philosophy now in the world is built it would not be pardonable to deviate so far from them or to inquire so far as grammar itself would authorize if the common settled opinion opposes it especially in this place where the received doctrine serves well enough to our present purpose and leaves this past doubt that the creation or beginning of any one substance out of nothing being once admitted the creation of all other but the Creator himself may with the same ease be supposed

19 *Objection* Creation out of nothing But you will say Is it not impossible to admit of the making anything out of nothing since we cannot possibly conceive it? I answer No Because it is not reasonable to deny the power of an infinite being because we cannot comprehend its operations We do not deny other effects upon this ground because we cannot possibly conceive the manner of their production We cannot conceive how anything but impulse of body can move body and yet that is not a reason sufficient to make us deny it possible against the constant experience we have of it in ourselves in all our voluntary motions which are produced in us only by the free action or thought of our own minds and are not nor can be the effects of the impulse or determination of the motion of blind matter in or upon our own bodies for then it could not be in our power or choice to alter it For example my right hand writes whilst my left hand is still What causes rest in one and motion in the other? Nothing but my will — a thought of my mind my thought only changing the right hand rests and the left hand moves This is matter of fact, which cannot be denied explain this and make it intelligible and then the next step will be to understand creation For the giving a new determination to the motion of the animal spirits (which some make use of to explain voluntary motion) clears not the difficulty one jot To alter the determination of motion being in this case no easier nor less than to give motion itself since the new determination given to the animal spirits must be either immediately by thought or by some other body put in their way by thought which is as not in their way before and so must not its motion to thought either of which leads

prehension This is to make our comprehension infinite or God finite when what He can do is limited to what we can conceive of If you do not understand the operations of your own finite mind that thinking thing within you do not deem it strange that you cannot comprehend the operations of that eternal infinite Mind who made and governs all things and whom the heaven of heavens cannot contain

Chap. XI Of our Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things

1 Knowledge of the existence of other finite beings is to be had only by actual sensation The knowledge of our own being we have by intuition The existence of a God reason clearly makes known as has been shown

The knowledge of the existence of a *yet* other thing we can have only by sensation for there being no necessary connexion of real existence with any idea a man hath in his memory nor of any other existence but that of God with the existence of any particular man no particular man can know the existence of any other being but only when by actual operating upon him it

is evident to his being in the world or the

us notice of the existence of other things and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us which causes that idea in us though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it For it takes not from the certainty of our senses and the ideas we receive by them that we know not the manner wherein they are produced & whilst I write this I have by the paper affecting my eyes that idea produced in my mind which whatever object causes, I call *white* by which I know that that quality or accident (i.e. whose appearance before my eyes always causes that idea) doth really exist and hath a being without me And of this, the greatest assurance I can possibly have and to which my faculties can attain is the testimony of my eyes, which are the proper and sole judges of this

1. 2. testimony I have reason to rely on

ities, and to conclude all things impossible to be done whose manner of doing exceeds our com

1 Cf. ch. II. § 14 also Bk. II. ch. viii.
Cf. Bk. II. ch. xxi. § 2

CHAP. XI
since there is no necessary connexion of his existence
a minute since wth his existence n^w by a thou-
sand w^{ys} he may cease t^o be, since I had th^e
testimony of my senses fo^r his existence. And if I
cannot be certain that the man I saw last to-d^y
now in being I can less be certain that h^e is so
ho hath been longer removed from my senses,
and I ha^{ve} not seen since yesterd^y or since the
last year and much less can I be certain of the
existence of men that I never saw. And, there-
fore though t^o be hu^mly probable that milli-
ons of men d^o now exist, yet, whilst I am al^{iv}e, wit-
ting thus, I ha^{ve} not that certainty of it which we
strictly call knowledge tho^{gh} the great likeli-
hood of t^h is me past doubt, and t^o be reason-
able for me t^o do several things upon the co-
fidence that there are men (and men also of my
acquaintance, wth whom I ha^{ve} to d^y) n^{ow} in
the world but this is but probability n^{ot} kn^{ow}l-
ed^e.

ed e. a. Fully t exp t dem ust l 2 crythn.
Whereby t we may bersve b w foolish and
an thing t is for man of a narrow knowl
ed-e who ha ing reaso gi en him t judge of
the different ev dence and probability of things,
and t be swayed accordin ly h w ain, I say
t is to expe t d monstr u n and certainty in
things t capabl of t and refuse assent t cry
rational proposi ns, and et eo trary t cry
plain and cl ar truths, because they cann t be
cr d l, as t surmount every the

1

ure t and I would fain know wna is
be could d pon such gro nds as are capabl
of no do b no bject n.

of no do b no object n.
Past existence of what-thing is known by mem-
ory. As when we sense an actually empty d about any
obj; t w d kn w th i t does exist so by
memory we may be assured that heretof re-thin's
h affected ur senses ha exd. And thus
e ha'e knowledge of th pas existence of sev-
al things, whereof ur senses ha'ing inf rmed
us, our memories will retain the ideas and of this
w are past all doubt, so lo g as w remember
well. I t this knowledge also reaches no further
than ur senses ha'e forme ly assured us. Thus,
seeing w er t this instant, t is an unquestion-
bl truth t me that w ter d th exist and re-
membering hat I saw t yester y t will also
be alw ys true and as lo g as my memory re-
cf. I introduction, §§ 5-7

tains it al says an undoubted proposition to me.
that water d d exist the 10th of July 1688 as it
will also be equally true that a certain number of
d d I wh ch at the same time

the water doth now exist, than that
or colours therein do so, it being no more neces-
sary that water should exist to-day because it
existed yesterday, than that the colours or bub-
bles exist to-day because they existed yesterday,
though it be exceedingly much more probable
because water hath been observed to continue
long in existence, but bubbles, and the colours
in them, quickly cease to be.

12 The existence of other souls perils not know-
able and is a faith. What if as we have of pur-
ity, and how it come by them, I have already
it, how we have those dead in us

are finite spirits really exist, and I can have of such beings in our minds, than by the ideas any one has of fairies or centaurs, he can come to know that things answering those ideas do really exist.

And therefore concerning the existence of finite spirits, as well as several other things, we must content ourselves with the evidence of faith but universal, certain propositions concerning this matter are beyond our reach. For however true it may be, that all the intelligent spirits that God ever created still exist, yet I can never make part of our certain knowledge. These and the like propositions we may assent to, as highly probable, but are not, I fear in this state capable of knowing. We are not then, to put ours upon demonstrating ourselves upon search of universal certainty in all those matters where in we are not capable of any other knowledge, but what our senses present us in this or that particular.

3. Only particular *pr* positi are concerning, *concr* &

See Bk. II, ch. xxiii, § 5, 9-2 8 Bk. IV, ch. 5, § 7

Of. ch. xv § 3 ch. vii § 2 ch. ix § 3.

ing to that of demonstration itself For it would be very strange that a man should allow it for an undeniable truth that two angles of a figure which he measures by lines and angles of a diagram should be bigger one than the other and yet doubt of the existence of those lines and angles which by looking on he makes use of to measure that by

7 IV *Fourthly because our senses assist one another's testimony of the existence of outward things and enable us to predict Our senses in many cases bear witness to the truth of each other's report concerning the existence of sensible things without us He*

certainly could never be put into such exquisite pain by a bare idea or phantom unless that the pain be a fancy too which yet he cannot when the burn is well by raising the idea of it bring upon himself again

Thus I see, whilst I write this I can change the appearance of the paper and by designing the letters tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment by barely drawing my pen over it which will neither appear (let me fancy as much as I will) if my hands stand still or though I move my pen if my eyes be shut nor when those characters are once made on the paper can I choose afterwards but see them as they are that is have the ideas of such letters as I have made Whence it is manifest that they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination when I find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own thoughts do not obey them nor yet cease to be whenever I shall fancy it but continue to affect my senses constantly and regularly according to the figures I made them. To which if we will add that the sight of those shall from another man draw such sounds as I beforehand design they shall stand for there will be little reason left to doubt that those words I write do really exist without me when they cause a long series of regular sounds to affect my ears which could not be the effect of my imagination nor could

be a dream then he doth but dream that he makes the question and so it is not much matter that a waking man should answer him But yet if he pleases he may dream that I make him thus answer That the certainty of things existing in *rerum natura* when we have the testimony of our senses for it is not only as great as our frame can attain to but as our condition needs For our faculties being suited not to the full extent of being nor to a perfect clear comprehensive knowledge of things free from all doubt and scruple but to the preservation of us in whom they are and accommodated to the use of life they serve to our purpose well enough if they all but give us certain notice of those things which are convenient or inconvenient to us For he that sees a

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

ing heat of a glass furnace be barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy by putting his hand into it he may perhaps be awakened into

as certain to us as our pleasure or pain i.e. hap-

sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and avoiding the evil which is caused by them which is the important concernment we have of being made acquainted with them

9 But reaches no further than actual sensation. In fine then when our senses do actually convey into our understandings any idea we cannot but be satisfied that there doth something at that time really exist without us which doth affect our senses and by them give notice of itself to our

cal as to distrust his senses and to affirm that all we see and hear feel and taste think and do during our whole being is but the series and including appearances of a long dream whereof there is no reality and therefore will question the existence of all things or our knowledge of any thing I must desire him to consider that, if all

our senses to be united together do really exist together But this knowledge extends as far as the present testimony of our senses, employed about particular objects that do then affect them, and no further For if I saw such a collection of simple ideas as is wont to be called man existing together one minute since and am now alone, I cannot be certain that the same man exists now

CHAP XII

body is
tu of t
part
maxim
ha'ing
her th
ca l

littl finger but by ur

tainly know th t any parcel of matter w th an
other parcel of matter] used to it is b gger
than either f them al e, will ne er be bl to
know t by th help of thes two relat terms,
h l and part, make of them what maxim you
pl ase

th || hands are eq al. Cann t m
say unless she fetch th certainty f t from this
maxim, that f yo take quals f m quals the
maunder ill be quals maxim which possibly
be nev h ard o tho ght of? I desire any e
t cons der from wh t has been lsewhere said
huch u kn wn first nd clearest by most peopl
th part ular instance, r th g neral rul nd
which t is that g c s lif and burth t th other
These || eral rules are li t the comparing ur
more gen al and abst act deas which ar the
lman ship f the mind mad and ames
g t them f r the as er disp tch in ts rea
soning, and drawing int mprens terms
and sh t rules || arious d mult plied b-
serv tions. But kn wledg began in th mind
and was founded part ulars though after
wards, perhaps, o tce was taken th f t
being natural f th mind (f rward ull to n
larg is kn wledg) most t entu ely t l y p
those g eral t ons d make th proper use
of them, which is t dsburden th memory of
th cumbersome l d f part ulars. F l de
are t may be considered what more certainty
th re is t chuld any th t his body
littl finger and all is b gger than his littl finger
f n h g t his body th n m

4- Don er us to build po pr arious principl s
B t be t n the math mat cs as t will, wh ther
t be cl arer that, taking an ch from a black
line of tw inches, and an inch from a red line
f t o inches, the remaining parts of the two
lines ill be equal r that f yo take quals f om
quals the rem under will be quals wh ch, I say of
th se tw is the clearer and first kn wn lile e
to any on to d terms t n t being material
to my present occas n. That which I h h re
to d ist inquire h ther if it be the read est
w y to kn wledg t begin w th g eral maxims,
and build upon them, t be yet a saf way to take
the principl s wh ch are laid d wn in any other
sci n e as unq est abl truths and so recei e
th m w th ut exami uon and adhere to th m,
w thout ff n them t be d bted f be-
cause n
so far

able If us of ~ ~
f r truth in m rality what may n t be ntro-
d ced and pro ed in n tural philosophy

Let that principle of som of the ld philos-
ophers, That all is Matte and th t there is n th
ing else, be recei d f r certain and ind b table,
and t ill be asy t be seen by the writings f
some that h rev ed t again n ur days,
what consequences t will l d us into Let any
h p l mo tak th w ld or w th th

|| ms g him, w h s l e am
them Could h kn w that his body was
b gger than his littl finger if his langu g were
y t so imperfec th t h had ch rel t
erms as w bl and part I ask, furth when
h has g t these ames, h w is h m re certain
tha his body is wh l d his littl fing r
part, than he was might be cert in bef h
l arn hose erms, that his body was b gger
than his littl finger? Any ne may as reason-
bly d bt d y th t his littl fing is part
of his body as that is less than his body And
l tha can doubt whether t be less, will as cer-
ainly doub wh ther be part So that the
maxim, the whol is b gger than part, can
se er be mad use of t prov th littl finger
less than the body b t when t is useless, by
be g brought t co vince of truth which
h know already For h that does not cer

—
k d flif Aristippus, wh pl ced happiness
in bodily pl asure and in Antisthenes wh mad
vrtu uffic t t f lity And he wh w th
Plat shall place be t tud in the kn wledg of
God will ha huth ight aised t ther n
t mpl u ns than th se wh look ot bey d
this pot f earth and those pershing things
which are t be had n t H th t w th Arche
l us, shall l y t d wn as principle that right
and wro g h est and dish est, are d fin d
nly by laws, and n t by n tu will h th
measures f mo al rectitud and || vity than
those wh take t f granted th tw are under

existences are knowable By which it appears that there are two sorts of propositions — (1) There is one sort of propositions concerning the *existence* of anything answerable to such an idea as having the idea of an elephant phoenix motion or an angel in my mind the first and natural inquiry is Whether such a thing does anywhere exist? And this knowledge is only of particulars No existence of anything without us but only of God can certainly be known further than our senses inform us (2) There is another sort of propositions wherein is expressed the agreement or disagreement of our *abstract ideas* and their dependence on one another Such propositions may be universal and certain So having the idea of God and myself of fear and obedience I cannot but be sure that God is to be feared and obeyed by me and this proposition will be certain concerning man in general if I have made an abstract idea of such a species whereof I am one particular But yet this proposition how certain soever that men ought to fear and obey God proves not to me the *existence of men* in the world but will be true of all such creatures whenever they do exist which certainty of such general propositions depends on the agreement or disagreement to be discovered in those abstract ideas

14 And all general propositions that are known to be true concern abstract ideas In the former case our knowledge is the consequence of the existence of things producing ideas in our minds by our senses in the latter knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what they will) that are in our minds producing there general certain propositions Many of these are called *eternal verities* and all of them indeed are so not from being written all or any of them in the minds of all men or that they were any of them propositions in any one mind till he having got the abstract ideas joined or separated them by affirmation or negation But wheresoever we can suppose such a creature as man is endowed with such faculties and thereby furnished with such ideas as we have we must conclude he must needs when he applies his thoughts to the consideration of his ideas know the truth of certain propositions that will arise from the agreement or disagreement which he will perceive in his own ideas Such propositions are therefore called *eternal truths* not because they are eternal propositions actually formed and antecedent to the understanding that at any time makes them nor because they are imprinted on the mind from any patterns that are anywhere out of the mind and existed before but because being once made about ab-

stract ideas, so as to be true, they will whenever they can be supposed to be made again at any time past or to come by a mind having those ideas always actually be true For names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the same ideas having immutably the same *habitudes one to another* propositions concerning any abstract ideas that are once true must needs be *eternal verities*

Chap XII Of the Improvement of our knowledge

1 Knowledge is not got from maxims It having been the common received opinion amongst men of letters that *maxims* were the foundation of all knowledge and that the sciences were each of them built upon certain *præcognita* from whence the understanding was to take its rise and by which it was to conduct itself in its inquiries into the matters belonging to that science, the beaten road of the Schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more *general propositions* as foundations whereon to build the knowledge that was to be had of that subject. These doctrines thus laid down for foundations of any science were called *principles* as the beginnings from which we must set out and look no further backwards in our inquiries, as we have already observed

2 (The occasion of that opinion.) One thing which might probably give an occasion to this

tain a great certainty of knowledge these sciences came by pre-eminence to be called *Μαθηματικά* and *Μέθοδος* learning or things learned thoroughly learned as having of all others the greatest certainty clearness and evidence in them.

3 But from comparing clear and distinct ideas But if any one will consider he will (I guess) find that the great advancement and certainty of real knowledge which men arrived to in these sciences was not owing to the influence of these principles nor derived from any peculiar ad-

we were employed about and the relation of equality and excess so clear between some of them that they had an intuitive knowledge and by that a way to discover it in others and thus without the help of those maxims. For I ask, Is it not possible for a young lad to know that his whole

obligations antecedent in all human constitutions

5 *To do so is no certain way to truth* If there fore those that pass for principles are not certain (which we must have some way to know that we may be able to distinguish them from those that are doubtful) but are only made so to us by our blind assent we are liable to be misled by them and instead of being guided into truth we shall by principles be only confirmed in mistake and error

6 *But to compare clear complete ideas under steady names* But since the knowledge of the certainty of principles as well as of all other truths depends only upon the perception we have of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas the way to improve our knowledge is not I am sure blindly and with an implicit faith to receive and swallow principles but I think to get and fix in our minds clear distinct and complete ideas as far as they are to be had and annex to them proper and constant names And thus perhaps without any other principles but barely considering those perfect ideas and by comparing them one with another finding their agreement and disagreement and their several relations and habitudes we shall get more true and clear knowledge by the conduct of this one rule than by taking up principles and thereby putting our minds into the disposal of others

7 *The true method of advancing knowledge is by considering our abstract ideas* We must therefore if we will proceed as reason advises adapt our methods of inquiry to the nature of the ideas we examine and the truth we search after General and certain truths are only founded in the habitudes and relations of abstract ideas A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these relations is the only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certainty concerning them into general propositions By what steps we are to proceed in these we to be learned in the schools of the mathematicians who from very plain and easy beginnings by gentle degrees and a continued chain

coveries but whether something like this, in respect of other ideas as well as those of magnitude may not in time be found out I will not determine Thus I think, I may say that if other ideas that are the real as well as nominal essences of their species are pursued in the way familiar to mathematicians they would carry our thoughts further and with greater evidence and clearness than possibly we are apt to imagine

8 *By which morality also may be made clearer* This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture which I suggest (chap. III.) viz that morality is capable of demonstration as well as mathematics For the ideas that ethics are conversant about being all real essences and such as I imagine have a discoverable connexion and agreement one with another so far as we can find their habitudes and relations, so far we shall be possessed of certain real and general truths and I doubt not but if a right method were taken a great part of morality might be made out with that clearness that could leave to a considering man no more reason to doubt than he could have to doubt of the truth of propositions in mathematics which have been demonstrated to him

9 *Our knowledge of substances is to be improved not by contemplation of abstract ideas but only by perceiving* In our search after the knowledge of substances our want of ideas that are suitable to such a way of proceeding obliges us to a quite different method We advance not here as in the other (where our abstract ideas are real as well as nominal essences) by contemplating our ideas and considering their relations and correspondences that helps us very little for the reasons that in another place we have at large set down By which I think it is evident that substances afford matter of very little general knowledge and the bare contemplation of the abstract ideas will carry us but a very little way in the search of truth and certainty What, then are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course the want of ideas of their real essences sends us from our own thoughts to the things themselves as they exist Experience here must teach me what is not and it is by trying alone that I can really know what other qualities co-exist with those of my complex idea viz whether that yellow heavy fusible

and the admirable methods they have invented for the singling out and laying in order those intermediate ideas that demonstratively show the equality or inequality of unapplied quantities is that which has carried them so far and produced such wonderful and unexpected dis-

Cf Bk I ch III § 24.

¹ Cf § 9.

Cf Bk III ch XL §§ 16-18 IV ch II §§ 18-

19

Bk II ch XXII III ch VI

Cf ch XI § 9

that our knowledge cannot exceed our ideas as far as they are either imperfect, confused, or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear knowledge.

Secondly The other is the art of finding out those intermediate ideas, which may show us the agreement or repugnancy of other ideas, which cannot be immediately compared.

5. *Methodus inveniendi* of the That these two (and not the relying maxims, and drawing consequences from some general propositions) are the right methods of improving our knowledge in the ideas of other modes besides those of quantity the consideration of mathematical knowledge will easily inform us. Where first we shall find that he that has not perfect and clear idea of those angles or figures of which he desires to know anything, is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose but man not have a perfect exact idea of a right angle, scalenum, or trapezium, and there is nothing more certain than that he will in vain seek any demonstration about them. Further it is evident that it was not the influence of those maxims which are taken for principles in mathematics that hath led the masters of that science into those wonderful discoveries they have made. Let man of good parts know all the maxims generally made use of in mathematics ever so perfectly and contemplate their extent and consequences as much as his pleasures, he will, by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know that the square of the Hypothenuse in a right angled triangle is equal to the squares of the two other sides. The knowledge that the whole is equal to all its parts, and if you take equals from equals, the remainder will be equal, &c. helped him not, I presume, this demonstration man may I think, pore long enough on those axioms without ever seeing one jot the more of mathematical truths. They have been discovered by the truth his then employed the mind had their objects, their ends before it, far different from those maxims, when it first goes the knowledge of such truths in mathematics, which men, well enough acquainted with those received axioms, but ignorant of this method who first made these demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire. And who knows what methods enlarge our knowledge in other parts of science may hereafter be contented, answering that of algebra in mathematics, which so readily finds out the idea of quantities to measure them by whose equality or proportion we could otherwise very hardly or perhaps, never come to know?

Chap. XIII Some Further Considerations Concerning our Knowledge

1. *Our knowledge partly necessary partly voluntary*
Our knowledge, as in other things, so in this, has so great a conformity with our sight, that it is neither wholly necessary nor wholly voluntary. If our knowledge were altogether necessary all men's knowledge would not only be alike, but every man would know all that is knowable and if it were wholly voluntary some men so little regard or value it that they would have extreme little, or none at all. Men that have senses cannot choose, but receive some ideas by them and if they have memory they cannot but retain some of them, and if they have any distinguishing faculty cannot but perceive the agreement or disagreement of some of them one with another as be that has eyes, if he will open them by day cannot but see some objects and perceive a difference in them. But though a man with his eyes open in the light, cannot but see, yet there be certain objects which he may choose whether he will turn his eyes to there may be in his reach a book containing pictures and discourses, capable to delight or instruct him, which yet he may never have the will to open, never take the pains to look into.

The application of our faculties voluntary but, they being, except yet, as known as things or not as objects
There is also another thing in a man's power and that is, though he turns his eyes sometimes towards an object, yet he may choose whether he will curiously survey it, and with an intent application endeavour to observe accurately all that is visible in it. But yet, what he does

— — — — —
appear painted with flowers, nor the fields covered with verdure, whenever he has mind to it in the cold winter he cannot help seeing it white and hoary if he will look broad. Just thus it is with our understanding all that is voluntary in our knowledge is the employing or withholding any of our faculties from this or that sort of objects, and more or less accurate survey of them but, *they being or passed, our will hath no power to determine the knowledge if the mind one way or another that is done only by the objects themselves, as far as they are clearly discovered.* And therefore, as far as men's senses are conversant about external objects, the mind cannot but receive those ideas which are presented by them, and be informed of the existence of things without and so

duced to the wants and ignorance of the ancient savage Americans whose natural endowments and provisions come no way short of those of the most flourishing and polite nations. So that he who first made known the use of that contemptible mineral may be truly styled the father of arts and author of plenty

12 *In the study of nature we must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles* I would not therefore be thought to disesteem or dissuade the study of nature¹ I readily agree the contemplation of his works gives us occasion to admire revere and glorify their Author and if rightly directed may be of greater benefit to mankind than the monuments of exemplary charity that have at so great charge been raised by the founders of hospitals and almshouses He that first invented printing discovered the use of the compass or made public the virtue and right use of *lin kina* did more for the propagation of knowledge for the supply and increase of useful commodities, and saved more from the grave than those who built colleges workhouses and hospitals All that I would say is that we should not be too forwardly possessed with the opinion or expectation of knowledge where it is not to be had or by ways that will not attain to it that we should not take doubtful systems for complete sciences nor unintelligible notions for scientific demonstrations In the knowledge of bodies we must be content to glean what we can from particular experiments since we cannot from a discovery of their real essences grasp at a time whole sheaves and in bundles comprehend the nature and properties of whole species together Where our enquiry is concerning co-existence or repugnancy to co-exist which by contemplation of our ideas we cannot discover there experience observation and natural history must give us by our senses and by retail an insight into corporeal substances The knowledge of *bodies* we must get by our senses warily employed in taking notice of their qualities and operations on one another and what we hope to know of *separate spirits*² in this world we must I think expect only from revelation He that shall consider how little general maxims precarious principles and hypotheses laid down at pleasure have promoted true knowledge or

helped to satisfy the inquiries of rational men after real improvements how little I say the setting out at that end has for many ages together advanced men's progress, towards the knowledge of natural philosophy will think we have reason to thank those who in this latter age have taken another course and have trod out to us though not an easier way to learned ignorance yet a surer way to profitable knowledge

13 *The true use of hypotheses* Not that we may not to explain any phenomena of nature make use of any probable hypotheses whatsoever hypotheses if they are well made are at least great helps to the memory and often direct us to new discoveries³ But my meaning is that we should not take up any one too hastily (which the mind that would always penetrate into the causes of things and have principles to rest on is very apt to do) till we have very well examined particulars and made several experiments in that thing which we would explain by our hypothesis and see whether it will agree to them all whether our principles will carry us quite through and not be as inconsistent with one phenomenon of nature as they seem to accommodate and explain another And at least that we take care that the name of *principles* deceive us not, nor impose on us by making us receive that for an unquestionable truth which is really at best but a very doubtful conjecture such as are most (I had almost said all) of the hypotheses in natural philosophy⁴

14 *Clear and distinct ideas we settle names and the finding of those intermediate ideas which show their agreement or disagreement* the ways to enlarge our knowledge But whether natural philosophy be capable of certainty or no the ways to enlarge our knowledge as far as we are capable seem to me in short, to be these two —

First The first is to get and settle in our minds determined ideas of those things whereof we have general or specific names at least, so many of them as we would consider and improve our knowledge in or reason about And if they be specific ideas of substances we should endeavour also to make them as complete as we can here by I mean that we should put together as many simple ideas as being constantly observed to co-exist may perfectly determine the species and each of those simple ideas which are the ingredients of our complex ones should be clear and distinct in our minds For it being evident

¹ Cf Bk II ch xxx.

² *lin kina*—quinn.

³ Cf ch xl § 12

⁴ Cf Bk I ch iii. §§ 22–24 and Bk IV ch vi.

⁵ Cf Int oduct n § 7

Cf Ba A um Og num I 19

Cf Bk I ch iii. §§ 23–24 ch. vi.

rd sent which being th most usual w y wh re
th mind has occas to employ this faculty
I hall der these terms, tr at f t, as i last li
abl in urla guag t q ocat
4 Judgment is the pr m g t h s u th
t Thus the mind has n facult es

um d t be so whcn is, as
take t be so bef tce t nly appe rs And if
tso unites separates th m as real ty things
are, is right) dgm t.

Chap. XV Of Probability

Poverty is the precursor of government
 of the people. As democracy is the wing of
 the people, so poverty is the seed of the
 people.

c rse~ ay t po are such as
 h e u d b t d k n l dge of th ir truth y t
 some f i them b o r d r s o n a r u p o n c e t i y th t
 w i d h a t l l a b o t them but asse t

a d i d p r e e s f a s s e t r o m f u l l a s u r c e a u

next is tons t d mm t bl t ast
is not perce ed t be so b t is, appears f
th mo t p t t be so d is ght t
the ma d j dg th propo t be tr u
f be her th th t ary F ex mpl m
th d monstr t f t ma pe ce sth
tain mm t bl xi th m f q ly

f u u
 ta ty) th t p l o c to c o n s d th a r l d
 g d g u n d f p b b l i t y a n d a s i f t h
 3 B t h t i h m h e u p w m t l g t b e
 t u e b f k n o w t h e m b e s P r o b a b l i t y i s l i k l
 c s s t b e t r u d l c r y o z t l t h w d g
 n i f y g c h p r o p o s t n f h u h t h e b e a r
 g u m t o p r o o f t m a k t p a s s r b e r e c e d
 f t r u T l t t m n t h m u n d e s t h i s
 s o t f p r o p o s t c a l l d b l f a r t f
 w h h u t h d m u t g g a n y p p
 o s t f t r u u p o a r g u m p r o o f t h a t
 a r f u d t p e a u d u s t t a s t r u

p o g s s , t h w h i l e u s c o t u e d w i t h a n
 a d w h u h l a r l y h t h g r e m t
 d i s a g r e e m e n t f h o s e t h r a n g l e s q l u y t
 t r i g h t n e d t h u s h a t t k n w l
 e d g h a t i s s o b t t h m a w h
 o o k t h p t b s e r v t h d m t t n
 h e a r g m a h m a t i a n , m a f o r e d t a f f i r m
 t h r e e g l e s f r i g l t b e q u a l t o t w
 r i g h t a , a s s e t o c c e s t f t r u
 w h i c h c a s e t h e f d a t f h i s a s s e n t i s t h
 p r e b i l i t y o f t h e t h g t h p r o o f b e g h a s
 f t m o s t p a r t c a r n t r u t h w t h t h m a n
 w h o s e e s t m o y h r e e c a t n o t b e i n g w t
 f i r m y h g t r a y t b e d e s h s
 k n o w l e d g e e p e c l l y m a t t e r s f t h u k d s o
 h a h a w h c a u s e s h i s a s s e n t t h i s p r o p o

^{sa} t d a, ^{u₃} h e p h a s i s i s b l a n d c e r t c o
 n b e l i t s o t h t w h m a k s m
 b e l e v e s o m e t h g e t u s t o t h t h i n g I
 b e l e v e s o m e t h g t e v d i l y d n b o t t
 d e a t a n d s o t m a w e s t l y s h w g t h g r e
 m i s d i s a g r e e m e n t f t h o s e d a t t h e t a r =
 d e r c o n s d t s o
 4. *The g n d f p b b l i t y a r t f o r m l y*
 u t h u o u p e r n e o r t h i t m p f t h e r
 p e r n e P b b l u y t h e b e g t s p p l y t h d e
 f i f u r k n w l e d g d t g u d u s w e t h t
 f i s a l w a y n t b o u t p o t o
 w h c o f n h a c e r t a i n t y b n i y s o m e u

See ch 1-21.
CL I trod f 2.

far as men's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas they cannot but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them which is so far knowledge and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered they must needs be assured of the truth of those propositions which express that agreement or disagreement they perceive in them and be undoubtedly convinced of those truths For what a man sees, he cannot but see and what he perceives he can not but know that he perceives

3 *Instance in numbers* Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers and hath taken the pains to compare one two and three to six cannot choose but know that they are equal he that hath got the idea of a triangle and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones and can as little doubt of that as of this truth that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be

4 *Instance in natural religion* He also that hath the idea of an intelligent but frail and weak being made by and depending on another who is eternal omnipotent perfectly wise and good will as certainly know that man is to honour fear and obey God as that the sun shines when he sees it For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind and will turn his thoughts that way and consider them he will as certainly find that the infer or finite and dependent is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite as he is certain to find that three four and seven are less than fifteen if he will consider and compute those numbers nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen if he will but open his eyes and turn them that way But yet these truths being ever so certain ever so clear he may be ignorant of either or all of them who will never take the pains to employ his faculties as he should to inform himself about them

Chap XIV Of Judgment

1 *Our knowledge being such that we want something else* The understanding faculties being given to man not barely for speculation but also for the conduct of his life man would be at a great loss

tions of his life perfectly at a stand had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him he that

will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed will have little else to do but to sit still and perish.

2 *What use to be made of this twilight state* There

are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state so in the greatest part of our concernments he has afforded us only the twilight as I may so say of probability suitable I presume to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption we might by every day's experience be made sensible of our short sightedness and liableness to error the sense whereof might be a constant admonition to us to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection It being highly rational to think, even were revelation silent in the case that as men employ those talents God has given them here they shall accordingly receive their rewards at the close of the day when their sun shall set and night shall put an end to their labours

3 *Judgment or assent to probability supplies our want of knowledge* The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had is judgment whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree or which is the same any proposition to be true or false without perceiving a demonstration or evidence in the proofs Them and sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had and sometimes out of laziness unskilfulness or haste even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had Men often stay not carefully to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas which they are desirous or concerned to know but either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations or impatient of delay lightly cast their eyes on or wholly pass by the proofs and so without making out the demonstration to determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas, as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance and take it to be the one or the other as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey This faculty of the mind when it is exercised immediately about things, is called judgment when about truths delivered in words, is most commonly called assent

of dissent which being the most usual way where in the mind has occasion to employ this faculty I shall, under these terms, treat of it, as least liable in our language to equivocation.

4. *Just as the mind is the first thing that is with out perception.* Thus the mind has two faculties con-
 cerning both truth and falsehood —

First, **KNOWLEDGE** hereby it certainly perceives and is undoubtedly satisfied with a true or disagreement of any ideas.

Secondly **JUDGMENT** which is the putting of as together or separating them from another in the mind, when their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived but presumed to be so which is, as the mind imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears. And if it so unites or separates them as reality things are, it is rightly judgment.

Chap. XV Of Probability

1. *Probability is the appearance of agreement for a probable proof.* As demonstrated in the showing the agreement or disagreement of two ideas by the intervention of more proofs, which have a constant, immutable and visible connexion one with another so probability is the giving the appearance of such an agreement or disagreement to by the intervention of proofs, whose connexion is constant and immutable or at least is not perceived to be so but it appears the most part to be so and is rightly and in the mind judged to be true. I propose it to be true false rather than the contrary. For example in the demonstration of the man perceives the certain, immutable connexion there is of equality between the three less triangles and those immediately between which are made use of to show equality in right angles and so by an intermediate knowledge of the green triangle disagreement of the intermediate ideas in each step of the progress, which series is continued with an evidence which clearly shows the agreement or disagreement of those three angles equality in right angles and thus he has attained what he thought it is so. But another man who never took the pains to observe the demonstration, hears a mathematician, man of credit, affirm the three angles of a triangle to be equal two right angles, assents to it, receives it for true in which case the foundation of his assent is the probability of the thing the proof being such as if the most part carries with it the truth whose evidence is the reason of it, nothing more certain than the contrary besides his knowledge especially in matters of this kind so that that which causes his assent to this propo-

sition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, that which makes him take these ideas to agree with out knowing them to do so is the warranted credibility of the speaker in these cases, thus posposed credence in this.

Historically we can find out Our knowledge as has been shown being very narrow and we are not happy enough to find certain truth in everything which we have occasion to consider most of the propositions we think, reason discourse—nay it upon are such as we can of have understood knowledge of the truth yet some of them border so far upon certainty that we make no doubt call both them but assent to them as firmly and as concerning that assent, as resolutely as if they were infallibly demonstrated and that our knowledge of them was perfect and certain. But there be degrees of it, from the very neighbourhood of certainty and demonstration, quoted not improbably and unlikely even though confined to impossibility and also degrees of assent from full assurance and confidence quite down to conjecture and doubt, and distrust I shall come now to handle as I think, for now to the bounds of human knowledge and certainty in the next place to consider the several degrees and grounds for probability and ascertained faith.

3. *But that which makes up the use of probability is the truth of the cry notation of the red gummy chap.* I propose it, if he which receives the argument is proof that it passes, to be received for true. The intermediate truth mind is this sort of proposition is called belief as an opinion, which is the admitting receiving any proposition for true upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to accept as true without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the difference between probability and certainty of knowledge, and knowledge that in all the parts of knowledge there is intuition each man of the idea, which is plain and visible and certain conclusion in belief not so. That which makes me believe, is something extraneous to the thing I believe something not evidently proved on both sides to, and so not manifestly shown in the green triangle disagreement of those ideas that are under consideration.

4. *The ground of probability is the form of the argument or the testimony of the person.* Probability the being to supply the defect of our knowledge and to guide us where that is, is always concerned about propositions whereof we have certainty but only some in

far as men's thoughts converse with their own determined ideas they cannot but in some measure observe the agreement or disagreement that is to be found amongst some of them which is so far knowledge and if they have names for those ideas which they have thus considered they must

ly convinced of those truths For what a man sees he cannot but see and what he perceives he can not but know that he perceives

3 *Instance in numbers* Thus he that has got the ideas of numbers and hath taken the pains to compare one two and three to six cannot choose but know that they are equal he that hath got the idea of a triangle and found the ways to measure its angles and their magnitudes is certain that its three angles are equal to two right ones and can as little doubt of that as of this truth that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be

4 *Instance in natural religion* He also that hath the idea of an intelligent but frail and weak being made by and depending on another who is eternal omnipotent perfectly wise and good will as certainly know that man is to honour fear and obey God as that the sun shines when he sees it For if he hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind and will turn his thoughts that way and consider them he will as certainly find that the inferior finite and dependent is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite as he is certain to find that three four and seven are less than fifteen if he will consider and compute those numbers nor can he be surer in a clear morning that the sun is risen if he will but open his eyes and turn them that way But yet these truths being ever so certain ever so clear he may be ignorant of either or all of them who will never take the pains to employ his faculties as he should to inform himself about them.

Chap. XIV Of Judgment

1 *Of knowledge being short we understand thus* The understanding faculties being given to man not barely for speculation on but also for the conduct of his life man would be at a great loss if he had nothing to direct him but what has the certainty of true knowledge For that being very short and scanty as we have seen he would be often utterly in the dark and in most of the actions of his life perfectly at a stand had he nothing to guide him in the absence of clear and certain knowledge. He that will not eat till he has demonstration that it will nourish him he that

will not stir till he infallibly knows the business he goes about will succeed will have little else to do but to sit still and perish

2 *What use to be made of this twilight state* There fore as God has set some things in broad daylight as he has given us some certain knowledge though limited to a few things in comparison probably as a taste of what intellectual creatures are capable of to excite in us a desire and endeavour after a better state so in the greatest part of our concerns he has afforded us only the twilight as I may so say of probability suitable I presume to that state of mediocrity and probationership he has been pleased to place us in here wherein to check our over-confidence and presumption we might by every day's experience be made sensible of our short sightedness and liability to error the sense wherein might be a constant admonition to us to spend the days of this our pilgrimage with industry and care in the search and following of that way which might lead us to a state of greater perfection. It being highly rational to think even where revelation silent in the case that as men employ those talents God has given them here they shall accordingly receive the rewards at the close of the day when their sun shall set and night shall put an end to their labours

3 *Judgment or assent to probability* applies our understanding to knowledge The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where that cannot be had is judgment whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree or which is the same any proposition to be true or false without perceiving a demonstration whence in the proofs The mind sometimes exercises this judgment out of necessity where demonstrative proofs and certain knowledge are not to be had and sometimes out of laziness unskilfulness or haste even where demonstrative and certain proofs are to be had Men often stay not anxiously to examine the agreement or disagreement of two ideas which they are desirous or concerned to know but either incapable of such attention as is requisite in a long train of gradations or impatient of delay lightly cast their eyes on or wholly pass by the proofs and so without making out the demonstration determine of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas as it were by a view of them as they are at a distance and take it to be the one or the other as seems most likely to them upon such a loose survey This faculty of the mind when it is exercised immediately about things is called judgment when about truths determined in words is most commonly called assent

soon in their memories as truth they have discovered and for the future they remain satisfied in the testimony of their memories that this is the opinion that, by the proofs they have observed, deserves such a degree of their assent as they afford it.

2. *Their assent always be actually in error and then must content ourselves in this circumstance that we have ground for such dissent.* This is all that the greatest part of men are capable of doing, in regulating their opinions and judgments unless a man will exert of them, either to retain distinctly in their memories all the proofs concerning any probable truth, and that too, in the same order and regular deduction of consequence in which they have formerly placed or seen them, which sometimes is enough to fill large volume on one single question or else they must require man, for every opinion that he embraces, every day to examine the proofs both which are impossible. It is unavoidable, there-

can be sure that we have all the particulars before us, that any way concern the question and that there is no evidence behind and yet unseen which may cast the probability on the other side, and outweigh all that is present seems to preponderate with us. Who almost is there that hath the leisure, patience and means to collect together all the proofs concerning most of the points he has, so as safely to conclude that he hath a clear and full view and that there is no more to be alleged for his better information. And yet we are forced to determine ourselves in this respect rather. The conduct of our lives, and the management of our great concerns, will not bear delay for those depend for the most part, on the determination of our judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain and demonstrative knowledge, and herein it is necessary for us to embrace the one side or the other.

3. *The right use of mutual charity and forbearance in necessary dissent.* Since, therefore, it is unavoidable that the greatest part of men, if not all, have several passions without certain and indubitable proof of their truth and carries too great an imputation of ignorance, lightness, or folly for men to quit and renounce their former tenets presently upon the offer of an argument which they cannot immediately answer, and with the insufficiency of it would methods, become all men to maintain peace, and the common offices of humanity and friendship in the diversity of passions since cannot reasonably expect that any one should readily and obsequiously quit his own opinion, and embrace ours, though blind resignation to an authority which their understanding of man disallows is not. For however it may often mistake, it can own no other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another. If he would bring over to your sentiments be one that examines before he assents, you must give him leave to his leisure to go over the account again, and recalling what is said of his mind examine all the particulars, to see in which side the advantages and if he will not think our arguments of weight enough to engage him anew in so much pains, it is but what we often do ourselves in the like case and we should take account if there should prescribe to us what points we should obey. And if he be one who takes his passions upon trust, how can we imagine that he should even those tenets which time and custom have so settled in his mind, that he thinks them self-evident, and of an unquestionable certainty or which he takes to be impressions he has received

of men must be either cry *scopus* or change every moment, and yield themselves up to whoever has most lately studied the question, flatters them against us, which I want of memory they are not able presently answer.

3. *The usual excuse of this for our former judgments is not wholly made.* I cannot but own, that men sit down to their past judgment, and adhering firmly to conclusions formerly made, is often the cause of great bias in error and mistake. But the fault is not that they rely on their memories for what they have before well judged but because they judged before they had well examined. May we not find great number (not to say the greatest part) of men that think they have formed right judgments of several matters and that for no other reason but because they see the light therewith, that imagine themselves have judged right, only because they never questioned or examined their own opinions. Which is indeed to think they judged right because they never judged at all. And yet these of all men, hold their opinions with the greatest stiffness those being generally the most tenacious and firm in their tenets, who have least examined them. What we once know we are certain is so and we may be secure, that there are no latent proofs undiscovered which may overturn our knowledge, or bring it in doubt. But the crisis of probability is not in every case we

ducements to receive them for true The grounds of it are in short these two following —

First The conformity of anything with our own knowledge observation and experience

Secondly The testimony of others vouching their observation and experience In the testimony of others is to be considered 1 The number 2 The integrity 3 The skill of the witnesses. 4 The design of the author where it is a testimony out of a book cited 5 The consistency of the parts, and circumstances of the relation 6 Contrary testimonies

5 *In this all the arguments pro and con ought to be examined before we come to a judgment* Probability wanting that intuitive evidence which infallibly determines the understanding and produces certain knowledge the mind if it will proceed rationally ought to examine all the grounds of probability and see how they make more or less for or against any proposition before it assents to or dissents from it and upon a due balancing the whole reject or receive it with a more or less firm assent proportionably to the preponderancy of the greater grounds of probability on one side or the other For example —

If I myself see a man walk on the ice it is past probability it is knowledge But if another tells me he saw a man in England in the midst of a sharp winter walk upon water hardened with cold this has so great conformity with what is usually observed to happen that I am disposed by the nature of the thing itself to assent to it unless some manifest suspicion attend the relation of that matter of fact But if the same thing be told to one born between the tropics who never saw nor heard of any such thing before there the whole probability relies on testimony and as the relators are more in number and of more credit and have no interest to speak contrary to the truth so that matter of fact is like to find more or less belief Though to a man whose experience has always been quite contrary and who has never heard of anything like it the most untainted credit of a witness will scarce be able to find belief

The king of Siam As it happened to a Dutch ambassador who entertaining the king of Siam with the particularities of Holland which he was inquiring after amongst other things told him that the water in his country would sometimes

6 *Probable arguments capable of great variety* Upon these grounds depends the probability of any proposition and as the conformity of our knowledge as the certainty of observations as the frequency and constancy of experience and the number and credibility of testimonies do more or less agree or disagree with it so is any proposition in itself more or less probable There is another I confess which though by itself it be no true ground of probability yet is often made use of for one by which men most commonly regulate their assent and upon which they pin their faith more than anything else and that is the opinion of others though there cannot be a more dangerous thing to rely on nor more likely to mislead one since there is much more falsehood and error among men than truth and knowledge And if the opinions and persuasions of others whom we know and think well of be a ground of assent men have reason to be Heathens in Japan Mahometans in Turkey Papists in Spain Protestants in England and Lutherans in Sweden But of this wrong ground of assent I shall have occasion to speak more at large in another place *

Chap. XVI Of the Degrees of Assent

— are they also the measure whereby its several degrees are or ought to be regulated only we are to take notice that whatever grounds of probability there may be they yet operate no further on the mind which searches after truth and endeavours to judge right than they appear at least in the first judgment or search that the mind makes I confess, in the opinions men have and firmly stick to in the world their assent is not always from an actual view of the reasons that at first prevailed with them it being in many cases almost impossible and in most very hard even for those who have very admirable memories to retain all the proofs which upon a due examination made them embrace that side of the question It suffices that they have once with care and fairness sifted the matter as far as they could and that they have searched into all the particulars that they could imagine to give any light to the question and with the best of their skill cast up the account upon the whole evidence and thus having once found on which side the probability appeared to them after as full and exact an inquiry as they can make they lay up the conclu-

from God himself or from men sent by him? How can we expect I say that opinions thus settled should be given up to the arguments or authority of a stranger or adversary especially if there be any suspicion of interest or design as there never fails to be where men find themselves ill treated? We should do well to commiserate our mutual ignorance and endeavour to remove it in all the gentle and fair ways of information and not instantly treat others ill as obstinate and perverse because they will not renounce their own and receive our opinions or at least those we would force upon them when it is more than probable that we are no less obstinate in not embracing some of theirs. For where is the man that has incontestable evidence of the truth of all that he holds or of the falsehood of all he condemns or can say that he has examined to the bottom all his own or other men's opinions? The necessity of believing without knowledge may often upon very slight grounds in this fleeting state of action and blindness we are in should make us more busy and careful to inform ourselves than constrain others. At least those who have not thoroughly examined to the bottom all their own tenets must confess they are unfit to prescribe to others and are unreasonable in imposing that as truth on other men's belief which they themselves have not searched into nor weighed the arguments of probability on which they should receive or reject it. Those who have fairly and truly examined and are thereby got past doubt in all the doctrines they profess and govern themselves by would have a juster pretence to require others to follow them but these are so few in number and find so little reason to be magisterial in their opinions that nothing insolent and imperious is to be expected from them and there is reason to think that if men were better instructed themselves they would be less imposing on others.

5 *Probability is either of sensible matter of fact capable of human testimony or such as is beyond the evidence of our senses.* But to return to the grounds of assent and the several degrees of it we are to take notice that the propositions we receive upon inducements of probability are of two sorts either concerning some particular existence or as it is usually termed matter of fact which falling under observation is capable of human testimony or else concerning things which being beyond the discovery of our senses are not capable of any such testimony.

6 *The concurrent opinion of all other men with ours produces a strong approach to knowledge.*
1 Cf. Bk. I ch. iii §§ 22-24 Bk. IV ch. 1.

Concerning the first of these viz *particular matter of fact*

I Where any particular thing consonant to the constant observation of ourselves and others in the like case comes attested by the concurrent reports of all that mention it we receive it as easily and build as firmly upon it as if it were certain knowledge and we reason and act thereupon with as little doubt as if it were perfect demonstration. Thus if all Englishmen who have occasion to mention it should affirm that it froze in England the last winter or that there were swallows seen there in the summer I think a man could almost as little doubt of it as that seven and four are eleven. The first therefore and highest degree of probability is when the general consent of all men in all ages as far as it can be known concurs with a man's constant and never failing experience in like cases to confirm the truth of any particular matter of fact attested by fair witnesses such are all the stated constitutions and properties of bodies and the regular proceedings of causes and effects in the ordinary course of nature.

after the same manner that we with reason conclude to be the effect of steady and regular causes though they come not within the reach of our knowledge. Thus That fire warmed a man made lead fluid and changes the colour or consistency in wood or charcoal that iron sunk in water and swam in quicksilver these and the like propositions about particular facts being agreeable to our constant experience as often as we have to do with these matters and being generally spoke of (when mentioned by others) as things found constantly to be so and therefore not so much

open again in the same manner is very true. These probabilities are so near to certainty that they govern our thoughts as absolutely and influence all our actions as fully as the most evident demonstration and in what concerns us we make little or no difference between them and certain knowledge. Our belief thus grounded rises to assent.

7 *It is unquestionable and of our own ex-*

By your witness —
others that mention it a thing to be for the most part so and that the particular instance of it is attested by many and undoubted witnesses is g

history giving us such an account of men in all ages, and my own experience, as far as I had an opportunity to observe, confirming it, that most men prefer their private advantage to the public. If all historians that write of Tiberius, say that Tiberius did so, it is extremely probable. And in this case, our assent has sufficient foundation to raise itself to a degree which we may call confidence.

8. III. For testimony and the manner of the thing. *As the ground of testimony.* In things that happen indifferently as that a bird should fly, this or that way that it should thunder on man's right or left hand, &c. when any particular matter of fact is touched by the concurrent testimony of unasspected witnesses, there our assent is also heightened. Thus that there is such a city in Italy as Rome that about one thousand seven hundred years ago, there lived in it a man, called Julius Caesar that he was general, and that he was killed in battle against another called Pompey

agree to preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the mind such different entertainments, as we call *help of a juster guess, and a stronger distrust* &c.

9. *Traditional testimonies the farther removed the less their proof becomes.* This is that concerns assent in matters wherein testimony is made use of concerning which, I think, it may not be amiss to take notice of a rule observed in the law of England which is, That though the attested copy of record be good proof yet the copy of a copy ever so well testified, and by ever so credible witnesses, will not be admitted as a proof in judgment. This is so generally approved as reasonable, and suited to the wisdom and caution to be used in our inquiry after material truths, that I never yet heard of any one that blamed it. This practice, if it be allowable in the decisions of right and wrong, carries this observation along with it, *That any testimony the farther it is from the original truth, the less force and proof it has.* The being and existence of the thing itself, is what I call the original truth. A credible man vouching his knowledge of it is good proof but if another equally credible witness from his report, the testimony is weaker and a third that attests the hearsay of an hearsay is yet less considerable. So that in traditional truths, each remove weakens the force of the proof and the more hands the tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and evidence does it receive from them. Thus I thought necessary to be taken notice of because I find amongst some men that quit contrary commonly practiced, who look a pinions to gain force by growing older and what thousand years since would not, to a rational man contemporary with the first voucher have appeared to all probable, is now urged as certain beyond all question, only because several have since, from him, said the same after another. Upon this round proposition, evidently false or doubtful enough in their first beginning come, by an inverted rule of probability to pass for authentic truths and those which found or deserved little credit from the mouths of their first authors, are thought to grow venerable by age, are urged as undeniable.

10. *History is fit for use.* I would not be thought here to lessen the credit and use of history it is all the light we have in many cases, and we have in many cases, and we receive from it a great part of the useful truths we have in common evidence. I think nothing more valuable than the records of antiquity. I wish we had more of them, and more uncorrupted. But

CL. Bacon, *A Discourse of Learning*, Bk. I.

nor man cannot avoid believing it, and can as little doubt of it as he does of the being and actions of his own acquaintance, whereof his himself is witness.

9. *Extraneous testimonies doubt, in spite of any testimony of probability.* Thus far the matter goes easily enough. Probability upon such grounds carries so much evidence with it, that it naturally determines the judgment, and leaves us as little liberty to believe or disbelieve as demonstration.

and these clash with the ordinary course of nature, or with one another there it is, here difference of opinion, and exactness are required, to form right judgment, and in proportion to the assent to the different evidence and probability of the thing which rises and falls according as these two foundations of credibility are common to us. As like air and fortification in some that fortification is not of use to contradict it. These are liable to so great an error of contrary reasons, circumstances, positions, different qualifications, a temper, designs, oversights, &c. of the reporters, that it is impossible to reduce to precise rules the various degrees which remain of their assent. This only may be said in general, That as the arguments and proofs for and against a particular circumstance, and in an open appearance the whole matter is greater or less de-

this truth itself forces me to say That no probability can rise higher than its first original What has no other evidence than the single testimony of one only witness must stand or fall by his only testimony whether good bad or indifferent and though cited afterwards by hundreds of others one after another ■ so far from receiving any strength thereby that it is only the weaker Passion interest inadvertency mistake of his meaning and a thousand odd reasons or capricious men's minds are acted by (impossible to be discovered) may make one man quote another man's words or meaning wrong He that has but ever so little examined the citations of writers cannot doubt how little credit the quotations deserve where the originals are wanting and consequently how much less quotations of quotations can be relied on This is certain that what in one age was affirmed upon slight grounds can never after come to be more valid in future ages by being often repeated But the further still it is from the original the less valid it is and has always less force in the mouth or writing of him that last made use of it than in his from whom he received it

12 *In things which sense cannot discover analogy is the great rule of probability* [Secondly] The probabilities we have hitherto mentioned are only such as concern matter of fact and such things as are capable of observation and testimony There remains that other sort concerning which men entertain opinions with variety of assent though the things be such that falling not under the reach of our senses they are not capable of testimony Such are 1 The existence nature and operations of finite immaterial beings without us as spirits angels devils &c. Or the existence of material beings which either for their smallness in themselves or remoteness from us our senses cannot take notice of—as whether there be any plants animals and intelligent inhabitants in the planets and other mansions of the vast universe 2 Concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature where though we see the sensible effects yet their causes are unknown and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced We see animals are generated nourished and move the loadstone draws iron and the parts of a candle successively melting turn into flame and give us both light and heat These and the like effects we see and know but the causes that operate and the manner they are produced in we can only guess and probably conjecture For these and the like coming not within the scrutiny of human senses cannot be examined by them or be attested by anybody and

therefore can appear more or less probable, only as they more or less agree to truths that are established in our minds and as they hold proportion to other parts of our knowledge and observation *Analogy* in these matters is the only help we have and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of probability Thus observing that the bare rubbing of two bodies violently one upon another produces heat and very often fire itself we have reason to think that what we call heat and fire consists in a violent agitation of the imperceptible minute parts of the burning matter Observing likewise that the different refractions of pellucid bodies produce in our eyes the different appearances of several colours and also that the different ranging and laying the superficial parts of several bodies as of velvet, altered silk &c. does the like we think it probable that the colour and shining of bodies is in them nothing but the different arrangement and refraction of their minute and insensible parts Thus finding in all parts of the creation that fall under human observation that there is a gradual connexion of one with another without any great or discernible gaps between in all that great variety of things we see in the world which are so closely linked together that, in the several ranks of beings it is not easy to discover the bounds between them we have reason to be persuaded that by such gentle steps things ascend upwards in degrees of perfection It is a hard matter to say where sensible and rational begun and where insensible and irrational end and who is there quick sighted enough to determine precisely which is the lowest species of living things and which the first of those which have no life? Things as far as we can observe lessen and augment as the quantity does in a regular cone where though there be a manifest odds betwixt the bigness of the diameter at a remote distance yet the difference between the upper and under where they touch one another is hardly discernible The difference is exceeding great between some men and some animals but if we will

compare the understanding and abilities of some men and some brutes, we shall find so little difference, that it will be hard to say that that of the man is either clearer or larger. Observing I say such gradual and gentle descents downwards as if he were in that are beneath

of perfect nature, ascend gradually upwards in finite perfection of the Creator by gentle steps and differences, that are great distance from the exit. This sort of probability which is the best condition for universal experiments, and the rise of hypothesis, has also its use and influence and arising from analogy leads us into the discovery of truths and useful productions, which would otherwise

them generally refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief, yet there is no case herein

course of nature, therefore, under such circumstances that may be the better to procure belief by how much the more they are beyond ordinary observation. This is the proper case of miracle which, well tested does not only find credit themselves, but give also to the truths, which are such confirmations.

4. *The bar to my judgment is the high estimate.* Besides those who have hitherto men too ed there is sort of proposition that challenge the highest degree of assent, upon bare testimony without the thing proposed generally disagree with common experience and the ordinary course of things. The reason whereof is, because the testimony of chance cannot deceive nor be deceived and that is of God himself. This carries with it an assurance beyond doubt, evidence beyond deception. This is called by peculiar name, *revelation*, and *assent* to it, *faith* which is a solidly determined our minds, and as perfectly excludes all wavering as our knowledge itself and we may as well doubt of our not being as we can wither any revelation from God be true. So that faith is settled and sure principle of assent and assurance, and

Ch. ix. ix. § 2

leaves

to us.

to us, and so on.

pose ourselves to all the extraneous agency of enthusiasm, and all the error of wrong principles of evidence and assurance in what is not discovered by revelation. And therefore in those cases, where assent can be rationally higher than the evidence of its being a revelation, and that this is the meaning of the expression *faith* is to be credited in. If the evidence of its being revelation is that this is its true sense, but only on probable proofs, or assent can reach no higher than a assurance or confidence arising from the more or less apparent probability of the proof. But *faith* and the pre-eminence of light is before their arguments speaks as I shall speak more hereafter.

here I treat of it as it is ordinarily placed in the tradition to reason that in truth the thing else but as *entirely undisturbed* the heart

is.

Chap XVII Of Reason

Various significations of the word as The word as in the English language has different significations sometimes taken for true and clear principles sometimes for clear and fair deduction from those principles and sometimes for the cause and particularly the final cause. But when I consider it I shall have of it here in a signification different from these and that is, as it stands for faculty in man that faculty whereby man is supposed to be distinguished from beasts and wherein it is evident he much surpasses them.

Whereas as *argues* If general knowledge as has been shown consists in perception with agreement disagreement of our ideas, and the knowledge of the existence of all things with us (except only of God whose existence every man may certainly know and demonstrate to himself from his own existence) be had only by senses, where room is therefore for the exercise of any other faculty but *understanding* and *revelation* perceptive. What need there of

Very much both for the enlargement of our knowledge and regulating our assent. For that to both our knowledge and opinion and is necessary and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties, and indeed contains two of them *reason* and *will*. By the first finds out and by the other it so orders the intermediate ideas

Ch. ix.

Ch. ix. § 2

Ch. ix. § 2

Ch. ix. § 2

as to discover what connexion there is in each link of the chain whereby the extremes are held

but the perception of the connexion there is between the ideas in each step of the deduction whereby the mind comes to see either the certain agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, as in demonstration in which it arrives at *knowledge* or their probable connexion on which it gives or withholds its assent as in *probability*. Sense and intuition reach but a very little way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon deductions and intermediate ideas and in those cases where we are fain to substitute assent in stead of knowledge and take propositions for true without being certain they are so we have need to find out examine and compare the grounds of their probability. In both these cases the faculty which finds out the means and rightly applies them to discover certainty in the one and probability in the other is that which we call *reason*. For as reason perceives the necessary and indubitable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another in each step of any demonstration that produces knowledge so it likewise perceives the probable connexion of all the ideas or proofs one to another in every step of a discourse to which it will think assent due. This is the lowest degree of that which can be truly called reason. For where the mind does not perceive this probable connexion where it does not discern whether there be any such connexion or no there men's opinions are not the product of judgment

3 *Reason in its four degrees* So that we may in reason consider these four degrees the first and highest is the discovering and finding out of truths the second the regular and methodical disposition of them and laying them in a clear and fit order to make their connexion and force be plainly and easily perceived the third is the perceiving their connexion and the fourth a making a right conclusion. These several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstration it being one thing to perceive the connexion of each part as the demonstration is made by another another to perceive the dependence of the conclusion on all the parts a third to make out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self and something different from all these to have first found out these intermediate ideas or proofs by which it is made.

4 *Whether syllogism is the great instrument of reason first cause to doubt this* There is one thing more which I shall desire to be considered concerning reason and that is, whether *syllogism* as is generally thought be the proper instrument of it, and the usefulest way of exercising this faculty. The causes I have to doubt are these —

First Because syllogism serves our reason but in one only of the forementioned parts of it and that is to show the connexion of the proofs in any one instance and no more but in this it is of no great use since the mind can perceive such connexion where it really is as easily nay perhaps better without it

Men can reason well who can not make a syllogism. If we will observe the actings of our own minds, we shall find that we reason best and clearest when we only observe the connexion of the proof without reducing our thoughts to any rule of syllogism. And therefore we may take notice that there are many men that reason exceeding clear and rightly who know not how to make a syllogism. He that will look into many parts of Asia and America will find men reason there perhaps as acutely as himself who yet never heard of a syllogism nor can reduce any one argument to

it. It is usually wrapped up in a smooth period and stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and good language show it in its naked deformity. But the weakness or fallacy of such a loose discourse it shows by the artificial form it is put into only to those who have thoroughly studied *modes* and *figures* and have so examined the many ways that three propositions may be put together as to know which of them does certainly conclude right and which not and upon what grounds it is that they do so. All who have so far considered syllogism as to see the reason why in three propositions laid together in one form the conclusion will be certainly right but another not certainly so. I grant are certain of the conclusion they draw from the premises in the allowed *modes* and *figures*. But they have not so far looked into those forms, are not sure by virtue of syllogism that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises they only take it to be so by an implicit faith in their teachers and a confidence in those forms of argumentation but this is still but believing not being certain. Now if of all mankind those who can make syllogisms are extremely few in comparison of those who cannot and if of those few who have been taught logic there is but a very

small number which do a y more than beliceth that syllogisms, in the allowed *mode* and *figure* should conclude right, with the known wing certainly that they do so if syllogisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason and means of knowledge. I will follow that, before Aristotle there was not a man that did not could know any thing by reason and that, since the invention of syllogisms, there is not so few that use and that

tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind which proceeds from a part to an other quicker and clearer with them and the probability which shew easily perceived in things thus in their nature that would be quite lost if this argument were managed learnedly and proposed in *mode* and *figure*. For try often confounds the connexion and I think, every one will perceive in mathematics and demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shrewder and clearest with the syl-

I

1. those few of them that have counted so many among the gross of syllogisms, as to see that, in above three score; that three opposites may be laid together there are but about fourteen which may be sure that the conclusion is right and upon what grounds it is, that, in these few the conclusion is certain, and in the other that God has been more bountiful to mankind than so He has given them a mind that can ease with being instructed in methods of syllogizing the understanding is not taught to reason by these rules that as a faculty to perceive the coherence incoherence of ideas, and can arrange them right with any such perplexing repetitions. I say not this any way to lessen Aristotle, whom I look as one of the greatest men amongst the ancients whose large reason, cuteness, and penetration

I

To infer is a thing but by virtue of propositions laid down as true, to draw another as true. I see so suppose such a connexion of the two ideas of the inferred proposition. Vg Let this be the premises two laid down Men shall be pun-

I

him, I may truly say that they are not th only or the best way of reasoning for the leading of those into truth which are willing to find it, and desire to make the best use they may of their reason for the attainment of knowledge. And himself it is plain, for some of some forms to be concluded, and others not by the forms themselves, but by the rational way of knowledge, e. by the visible agreement of ideas. Tell a country gentleman that the wind is south west, and the weather lowering did it rain and shew easily understand it is not safe for her to go abroad thus clad in which day after fever she clearly sees the probable connexion of all these, viz. south west wind, and clouds, rain, with the taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, with

with the inference of right reason as shown a willingness to have it be taken for such. But in the other case is the syllogism that discovered those ideas, so showed the connexion of them if they must be both found out, and the connexion everywhere perceived before they can rationally be made use of in syllogism unless it can be said that any idea, without considering what connexion it hath with the other whose agreement should be shewn by it will do well enough in a syllogism, and may be taken to ensure for the *medius terminus* to prove any conclusion. But this nobody will say because it is by virtue of the perceived agreement of the intermediate idea with the extremes, that the extremes are concluded together and therefore each intermediate idea must be chosen as in the whole chain hath visible connexion with those two it has been placed between so lesser by the conclusion cannot be inferred do

drawn in for wherever any link of the chain is loose and without connexion there the whole strength of it is lost and it hath no force to infer or draw in anything In the instance above mentioned what is it shows the force of the inference and consequently the reasonableness of it but a view of the connexion of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the conclusion or proposition inferred? *V* Men shall be punished God the punisher Just punishment The punished guilty Could have done otherwise Free dom Self determination by which chain of

right and conclusive modes and figures or no and so are not at all helped by the forms they are put into though by them the natural order wherein the mind could judge of their respective connexion being disturbed renders the illation much more uncertain than without them.] And as for the logicians themselves they see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those it stands between (on which the force of the inference depends) as well before as after the syllogism is made or else they do not see it at all For a syllogism neither shows nor strengthens the connexion of any two ideas immediately put together but only by the connexion seen in them

the ideas of men and self determination appear to be connected in this proposition men can determine themselves is drawn in or inferred from this that they shall be punished in the other world For here the mind seeing the connexion there between the idea of men's punishment in the other world and the idea of God punishing between God punishing and the justice of the punishment between justice of punishment and guilt between guilt and a power to do otherwise between a power to do otherwise and freedom and between freedom and self determination sees the connexion between men and self determination

The connexion must be discovered before it can be put into syllogisms Now I ask whether the connexion of the extremes be not more clearly seen in this simple and natural disposition than in the perplexed repetitions and jumble of five or six syllogisms I must beg pardon for calling it jumble till somebody shall put these ideas into so many syllogisms and then say that they are less jumbled and their connexion more visible when they are transposed and repeated and spun out to a greater length in artificial forms than in that short and natural plain order they are laid down in here wherein everyone may see it and wherein they must be seen before they can be put into a train of syllogisms For the natural order of the connecting ideas must direct the order of the syllogisms and a man must see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those that it connects before he can with reason make use of it in a syllogism And when all those syllogisms are made neither those that are nor those that are not logicians will see the force of the argumentation in the connexion of the extremes one jot the better [For those that are not men of art not knowing the true forms of syllogism nor the reasons of them cannot know whether they are made in

This sentence is backed by Locke in the original.

sides immediately applied to then those two remote ones or as they are called extremes do certainly agree and therefore the immediate connexion of each idea to that which it is applied to on each side on which the force of the reasoning depends is as well seen before as after the syllogism is made or else he that makes the syllogism could never see it at all This as has been already observed is seen only by the eye or the perceptive faculty of the mind taking a view of them laid together in a juxta position which view of any two it has equally whenever they are laid together in any proposition whether that proposition be placed as a major or a minor in a syllogism or no

Use of syllogism Of what use then are syllogisms? I answer their chief and main use is in the Schools where men are allowed without shame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly agree or out of the Schools to those who from thence have learned without shame to deny the connexion of ideas which even to themselves is visible. But to an ingenious searcher after truth it has no other aim but to find it there is no need of any such form to force the allowing of the inference the truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the ideas in a simple and plain order and hence it is that men in the town inquire after truth never use syllogisms to convince themselves or in teaching others to instruct willing learners Because before they can put them into a syllogism they must see the connexion that is between the intermediate idea and the

two other ideas is set between a and applied to, to show their agreement and without which that, they see whether the inference be good or no and so syllogism comes too late to settle it. For to make use again of the former notion I ask

whether the mind considering the idea of justice, placed as an intermediate idea between the punishment of me and the guilt of the punished (and till it does so consider it, the mind cannot make use of it as *medius terminus*) does not as plainly see the force and strength of the inference as when it is formed into a syllogism. To show this very plain and easy example let *murder* be the intermediate idea *medius terminus* that the mind makes use of to show the connexion of *homo* and *murder*. I ask whether the mind does not more readily and plainly see that connexion in the simple and proper position of the connecting idea in the middle thus

Homo—Murder—Homo

than in this perplexed one,

Animal—Homo—Murder—Animal

such is the position these ideas have in syllogism, to show the connexion between *homo* and *murder* by the intervention of *animal*.

Not the only way to detect fallacy. I need syllogism is the right use of necessary use, even the lovers of truth, to show them the fallacies that are often concealed in florid words or in old discourses. But that this is a mistake will appear if consider that the reason why sometimes men who sincerely aim at truth are imposed upon by such loose, and as they are called, rhetorical discourses, is, that their fancies being struck by some lively metaphorical representations, they neglect to observe, or do not easily perceive, that are the words as to which the inference depends. Now to show such men the weakness of such an argumentation there needs more to trip up of the speaker's words, which blend and confounded with those which the unfurnished depends, seems to show connexion where there is none or at least to hinder the discovery of the want of it. This I lay the added as to which the force of the argumentation depends in their disorder to which position the mind taking view of the case, sees what connexion they have and so is able to judge of the inference about any need of syllogism at all.

I grant this mode and figure is commonly made use of in such cases, as if the defects of the incoherence of such loose discourses were wholly owing to the syllogistical form and so I myself formerly thought till, upon stricter examina-

tion I now find that laying the intermediate ideas naked in their due order shows the notion to be much more mental better than syllogism.

to place, but also because syllogism shows the incoherence only to those (who are not one of ten thousand) who perfectly understand mode and figure, and then reason upon which those forms are established. It reasons due a disorderly place of the ideas upon which the inference is made makes every one, whether logician or not, a logician who understands the terms, and hath the faculty to perceive the agreement or disagreement of such

of connexion in the argumentation, and the absurdity of the inference.

And thus I have known a man unskilful in syllogism, but first hearing could perceive the weakness and incoherence of all artificial and plausible discourse whereunto others better skilled in syllogism have been misled and I believe there are few of my readers who do not know such. And indeed if it were not so, the debates of most prince's councils, and all business of assemblies, would be in danger to be mismanaged since those who relied upon and have usually great trouble in them, are not at all versed in the good luck to be perfectly known in the forms of syllogism, or experts in *modus*

kind, especially in matters that concern their crowns and dignities, are so much in love with falsehood and mistake that they would every where have neglected to bring syllogism into the debates of moment or thought ridiculous as so much as to offer them in affairs of consequence a plain and naked truth that men of parts and penetration have were so dilytous to be deceived as to were to cording to the result of their debates, and often pay for their mistakes with their heads or fortunes, and those scholastic forms were of little use to discover truth or fallacy but both to me and the other might be shown, and better shown with them, that those who would not refuse to see what was really shown them.

Another cause to doubt whether syllogism be the only

Cf. Lock, 2, Second ed. of the Reasonableness of Christianity 697 also Lock, Thoughts concerning Education, 693, §§ 188, 89.

drawn in for wherever any link of the chain is loose and without connexion there the whole strength of it is lost and it hath no force to infer or draw in anything. In the instance above mentioned what it shows the force of the inference and consequently the reasonableness of it but a view of the connexion of all the intermediate ideas that draw in the conclusion or proposition inferred? Vg Men shall be punished God the punisher Just punishment The punished guilty Could have done otherwise Free dom Self-determination by which chain of

right and conclusive modes and figures or no and so are not at all helped by the forms they are put into though by them the natural order wherein the mind could judge of their respective connexion being disturbed renders the illation much more uncertain than without them.] And as for the logicians themselves they see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those it stands between (on which the force of the inference depends) as well before as after the syllogism is made or else they do not see it at all. For a syllogism neither shows nor strengthens the connexion of any two ideas immediately put together but only by the connexion seen in them

the ideas of men and self determination appear to be connected i.e. this proposition men can determine themselves is drawn in or inferred from this that they shall be punished in the other world. For here the mind seeing the connexion there is between the idea of men's punishment in the other world and the idea of God punishing between God punishing and the justice of the punishment between justice of punishment and guilt between guilt and a power to do otherwise between a power to do otherwise and freedom and between freedom and self-determination sees the connexion between men and self determination.

The connexion must be discovered before it can be put into syllogisms. Now I ask whether the connexion of the extremes be not more clearly seen in this simple and natural disposition than in the perplexed repetitions and jumble of five or six syllogisms. I must beg pardon for calling it jumble till somebody shall put these ideas into so many syllogisms and then say that they are less jumbled and their connexion more visible when they are transposed and repeated and spun out to a greater length in artificial forms than in that short and natural plain order they are laid down in here wherein every one may see it and wherein they must be seen before they can be put into a train of syllogisms. For the natural order of the connecting ideas must direct the order of the syllogisms and a man must see the connexion of each intermediate idea with those that it connects, before he can with reason make use of it in a syllogism. And when all those syllogisms are made neither those that are nor those that are not logicians will see the force of the argumentation i.e. the connexion of the extremes one jot the better. [For those that are not men of art not knowing the true forms of syllogism nor the reasons of them cannot know whether they are made in

— that no syllogism does or can show. That the mind only doth or can perceive as they stand there in that juxtaposition only by its own view to which

sides immediately applied to then those more remote ones or as they are called extremes do certainly agree and therefore the immediate connexion of each idea to that which it is applied to on each side on which the force of the reasoning depends is as well seen before as after the syllogism is made or else he that makes the syllogism could never see it at all. This as has been already observed is seen only by the eyes or the percep-

— together in any proposition whether that proposition be placed as a major or a minor in a syllogism or no.

Use of syllogism. Of what use then are syllogisms? I answer their chief and main use is in the Schools, wherein men are allowed without shame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly agree or out of the Schools to those who from thence have learned without shame to deny the connexion of ideas which even to themselves is visible. But to an ingenuous searcher after truth who has no other aim but to find it there is no need of any such form to force the allowing of the inference the truth and reasonableness of it is better seen in ranging of the ideas in a simple and plain order and hence it is that men in their own inquiries after truth neither use syllogisms to convince themselves or in teaching others to instruct willing learners. Because before they can put them into a syllogism they must see the connexion that is between the intermediate idea and the

*This sentence is bracketed by Lock in the original.

of Spain employed the hands of his people, and his spirit too so, he had brought his but of that treasure that is so late had in the dark trails of America. And I am not think, that was small employment the force of his reason in branding of syllogisms, and discovering error of that mass of knowledge which lay concealed in the secret recesses of nature and truth. I am not think nature is reason as (as former has done) is like a letter pen a in, and add it the common stock of mankind, rather than an scholar's proceeding by the strict rules of art and logic.

O let us see that will give sound reason. I do not not nevertheless, but were are to be found to assist our reason in this most useful part and this the judicious Hooker encourages me to who in his Eccl. Pol. l. 6, speaks thus. If there may be advised the right helps of true art and learning (which he says, I must publicly confess, was one of the world, carry us the same of learned age, doth neither much know nor generally regard.) there would undoubtedly be almost as much difference in matters of judgment between men therein instructed, and that which men now are as between men that are now and innocents. I do not pretend to have found or discovered here any of those that be profane, this great mass of deep thought mentions, but that is plain, that syllogism and logic now in us, which were as well known in his days, can be none of those he means. It is sufficient for me if by Discourse perhaps sometimes of the way I am sure as for wholly new and unborrowed, I shall have given occasion others to cast about for new discoveries, and seek in their own thoughts for those right helps of art which will scarce be found, I fear by those who serve to condemn themselves the rules and dictates of letters. For best traces lead this sort of cattle, (as an observing Roman calls letters) whose thou has reach only to imitation, and not to the use of it. But I can be bound to say that this age is adorned with some men of that strength of judgment and largeness of comprehension, that if they would employ their thoughts on this subject, could open new and undiscovered in the old ancient stock of knowledge.

It is not as if they were not to be found in the few words among us for now. Having been had occasion to speak of syllogisms in general, and the use of them in reasoning, and the improvement of our knowledge, is fit, before I let this book, to take notice of one mistake in the rules of syllogism.

that no syllogismal reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has at least one general proposition in it. As if it could not reason, and has it knowledge about particulars, whereas, a truth, that that error has considered, the immediate object of all our reasoning and knowledge, is nothing but particulars. Every man's reasoning and knowledge is all about things as existing in his own mind.

Every one of them, particular proposition about things, proposition of the agreement or disagreement of our particular ideas is the basis, and almost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, that the particular ideas about which they are such as more than one particular can correspond with and be represented by. But the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, and consequently our knowledge is equally clear and certain whether either or both, or neither of those ideas, be capable of representing more real beings than one, or no. One thing more I have to say to Her about syllogism, before I leave it. May we not upon just ground inquire whether the form of syllogism now has, is that which in reason is the best? For the extremes of being together, the extremes, i.e. the intermediate ideas, be in contention, to show the agreement or disagreement of the two in question, would not the position of the extremes themselves be more natural, and show the agreement or disagreement of the extremes clearer and better if were placed in the middle between them. Which might be easily done by transposing the propositions, and making the means terms the predicate of the first, and the subject of the second. As thus.

Omnes homines est animal.

Omnes animalia sunt rationabilia.

Ergo omnes homines sunt rationabiles.

Omne corpus est animale et mobile.

Nullum animal est in se ipsum immutabile.

Ergo corpus non est in se ipsum immutabile.

I need no trouble my reader with instances in syllogisms whose conclusions are particular. The same reason holds for the same form in them, as well as in the general.

Our own imperfect Reason, though it open

might fabric, yet it comes far short of the real extent of even corporeal being. And there are many instances wherein it fails us as,

proper instrument of reason in the discovery of truth
Secondly Another reason that makes me doubt whether syllogism be the only proper instrument of reason in the discovery of truth is that of whatever use *mode* and *figure* is pretended to be in the laying open of fallacy (which has been above considered) *those scholastic forms of discourse are not less liable to fallacies than the plainer ways of argumentation* and for this I appeal to common observation which has always found these artificial methods of reasoning more adapted to catch and entangle the mind than to instruct and inform the understanding. And hence it is that men even when they are baffled and silenced in this scholastic way are seldom or never convinced and so brought over to the conquering side they perhaps acknowledge their adversary to be the more skilful disputant but rest nevertheless persuaded of the truth on their side and go away worsted as they are with the same opinion they brought with them which they could not do if this way of argumentation carried light and conviction with it and made men see where the truth lay and therefore syllogism has been thought more proper for the attaining victory in dispute than for the discovery or confirmation of truth in fair inquiries. And if it be certain that fallacies can be couched in syllogism as it cannot be denied it must be something else and not syllogism that must discover them.

I have had experience how ready some men are when all the use which they have been wont to ascribe to anything is not allowed to cry out that I am for laying it wholly aside. But to prevent such unjust and groundless imputations I tell them that I am not for taking away any helps to the understanding in the attainment of knowledge. And if men skilled in and used to syllogisms find them assisting to their reason in the discovery of truth I think they ought to make use of them. All that I aim at is that they should not ascribe more to these forms than belongs to them and think that men have no use or not so full an use of their reasoning faculties without them. Some eyes want spectacles to see things clearly and distinctly but let not those that use them therefore say nobody can see clearly without them those who do so will be thought in favour of art (which perhaps they are beholden to) a little too much to depress and discredit nature. Reason by its own penetration where it is strong and exercised usually sees quicker and clearer without syllogism. If use of those spectacles has so dimmed its sight, that it cannot without them

Cf Bacon on Syllogism *A maxim O ganum* I 11-

see consequences or inconsequences in argumentation I am not so unreasonable as to be against the using them. Every one knows what best fits his own sight but let him not thence conclude all in the dark who use not just the same helps that he finds a need of.

Syllogism helps little in demonstration less in probability. But however it be in knowledge I think I may truly say it is of far less or no use at all probabilities. For the assent there being to be determined by the preponderancy after due weighing of all the proofs with all circumstances on both sides nothing is so unfit to assist the mind in that as syllogism which running away with one assumed probability or one topical argument pursues that till it has led the mind quite out of sight of the thing under consideration and forcing it upon some remote difficulty holds it fast there entangled perhaps and as it were manacled in the chain of syllogisms without allowing it the liberty much less affording it the helps requisite to show on which side all things considered is the greater probability.

Serves not to increase our knowledge but to fence us with the knowledge we suppose we have. But let it help us (as perhaps may be said) in convincing men of their errors and mistakes (and yet I would fain see the man that was forced out of his opinion by dint of syllogism) yet still it fails our reason in that part which if not its highest perfection is yet certainly its hardest task and that which we most need its help in and that is the *figuring out of proofs and making new discoveries*. The rules of syllogism serve not to furnish the mind with those intermediate ideas that may show the connexion of remote ones. This way of reasoning discovers no new proofs but is the art of marshalling and ranging the old ones we have already. The forty seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid is very true but the discovery of it is not owing to any rules of common logic. A man knows first and then he is able to prove syllogistically. So that syllogism comes after knowledge and then a man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out those ideas that show the connexion of distant ones, that our stock of knowledge is increased and that

son all this say he will not do much otherwise than he who having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth should have it beaten up all into swords and put it into his servants hands to fence with and bang one another. Had the king

agreement to the intermediate idea, on both sides, with those which we would compare, is *fully direct*. Were it amounts to *demonstration* where knowledge is produced, which, though it be certain, yet is not so easy nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is hardly any simple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt: the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition too, but not altogether at once, for there must be remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compare it with the other; and where there be many mediums, were the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory just as it is and the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long, and perplexed, and too hard for those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet where the mind clearly retains the intuition of the agreement of any idea with another and that with third, and that with fourth, &c. were the agreement of the first and the fourth a demonstration, and produces certain knowledge which may be called *steadfast* as the other is intuitive.

6. Tapping the resources of democracy and thereby knowing how to use it, but you must upon probable causes. Secondly There are theories, whose agreement or disagreement can no other wise be judged of but by the convention of others which have not certain agreement with the extremes, but an usual or likely one and in these it is that the judgment is properly exercised which is the acquiescing of the mind, that an ideas do agree, by comparing them with such probable mediums. This, tho' go ever amou is to know it, not not to know which is the lowest degree of it, yet sometimes the incommensurable as we the extremes so firm together and the probability is so clear and strong that as it as necessary to know it, demonstration does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the judgment is

to be sure right, and take a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability and then casting them up all right together choose that side which has the overbalance.

17 *Intimate knowledge* is the perception of the certain agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately compared together

Re. and Issue.— is the perception of the *in* agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the interveni^{ng} of one or more other ideas.

agreement is the thinking or taking two ideas in
agreement or disagree, by the intervention of one or
more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagree-
ment with the main does not perceive, but hath
observed to be false and usual.

18. *Consequence of the existence of ideas.* Though in deducing one proposition from another or making inferences *in abstracto*, be a great part of reason, and that which is usually employed about yet the principal act of reasoning is *de facto*, *in concreto* or *de facto* *in concreto*. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together & measure their equality by juxta position. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas, and things agree or disagree, as really they are, but we observe it only by our ideas.

9. *Few words for answers* Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while to reflect on *few words for answers* that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent or to least to awe them as silence their opposition.

1. *Argumentum ad verecundiam.* The first is, to allure the passions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power or some other cause has gained a name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem in the same kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. Thus is pride censured, as carrying it too much pride, when man does not readily yield to the determination of approved worth, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others, and is looked upon as insolence, for a man to set up and there to his own passion against the current stream of antiquity, or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with the authority of Aristotle, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to style it impudence in an adversary who shall stand out

Cl. Berkley Professor Introd. 1 2.

Q c.h. u. || 2-3 m. || 3-20 x m. || o.
Q ch. xv xv xvi.

Q. L. 4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

1997, p. 114, 9.

I *In cases when we have no ideas* It perfectly fails us & here our ideas fail.¹ It neither does nor can extend itself further than they do. And therefore wherever we have no ideas our reasoning stops and we are at an end of our reckoning and if at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas it is only about those sounds and nothing else.

10 II *Because our ideas are often obscure or imperfect* Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss because of the obscurity confusion or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions. Thus not having any perfect idea of the *least extension of matter* nor of *infinity* we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter but having perfect clear and distinct ideas of *number* our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties in numbers nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them. Thus we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds, and of the beginning of motion or thought how the mind produces either of them in us and much imperfectly yet of the operation of God run into

to show conclusions Our reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those ideas which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas and in this some men's faculties far outgo others. Till

tions of ancient mathematicians and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human.

12 IV *Because we often proceed upon wrong principles*

culties wrong without knowing how to free itself and in that case it is vain to implore the help of reason unless it be to discover the falsehood and reject the influence of those wrong principles.⁴ Reason is so far from clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundation brings a man into that if he will pursue it it entangles him the more and engages him deeper in perplexities.

¹ Cf. ch. III. § 1.

Cf. Bk. II. ch. XX. §§ 30-31 also Hume E.

9 Cf. Cicero's *de finibus* U. de finibus d. 2. c. 2. p. 506.

Cf. Bk. II. ch. XXI. §§ 8-55 also Locke's *F.*

Letter to Stillingfleet p. 50.

Cf. Bk. I. ch. II. § 1. IV. ch. VII.

13 V *Because we often employ doubtful terms* As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve error so upon the same ground do dubious words and uncertain signs, often in discourses and arguments when not warily attended to puzzle men's reason and bring them to a nonplus.² But these two latter are our fault and not the fault of reason. But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are everywhere observable.

14. *Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive and not reasoning* Some of the ideas that are in the mind are so there that they can be by themselves immediately compared one with another and in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle as clearly as it does the idea of a circle and thus therefore it has been said I call it *intuitive knowledge* which is certain beyond all doubt and needs no probation nor can have any this being the highest of all human certainty. In this consists the evidence of all those *maxims* which nobody has any doubt about but every man (does not assent to only assent to but) *knows* to be true as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding. In the discovery of and assent to these truths there is no use of the discursive faculty no need of reasoning.

and the spirits of just men made perfect shall be in a future state of thousands of things which no way either wholly escape our apprehensions, or which our short sighted reason having got some faint glimpse of

15

immediate comparing them. And in all these have settled as they are and must by discourse and inference make our discoveries. Now of these there are two sorts which I shall take the liberty to mention here again —

them. In this case when the agreement or disagreement

² Cf. Bk. III.

Cf. ch. II. § 1. III. § 3.

agreement with it termed it a on both sides,
with those which it would compare is plainly
dissimilar and there amounts to demonstration where-
by knowledge is produced which though it be
easy in yet is not so easy nor altogether so
as intuitive knowledge. But use it that there is
hardly simplification when there is a
room for any thing last mistake and that the truth
is seen all perfectly true. In demonstration it
is true, there is intuition too but it is altogether
at once for there must be remembrance of the
intuition of the agreement of the medium or, or a
term medium and a, with it is compared to it
before when it compare it with it and
where there be many mediums, there the danger
of the mistake is the great for each agreement
or disagreement of the ideas as must be believed
and seen each in particular how it is and re-
tained in the memory just as it is and the medium
must be used in no part of it is necessary to
make particular demonstration is mutated or over-
looked. This makes some demonstration is in
d perplexed and too hard for those who have
not strength of parts distinct perception, and a
extraordinary many particular and in their
heads, and even those who are able master
such intricate perceptions, are far from meeting
together them together and there is need of more
than on review before they can arrive at cer-
tainly by the which the mind clearly retains its
intuition of that of the agreement of the medium with
nothing and that with third, distinct with
fourth &c, here the agreement of the first and
fourth is demonstrated monstrously and produces
knowledge which may be called intuition
knowledge as this is used.

6 T apply the narrowness of dem not at re and
that to know ha not g but just mens pon
f of de aom g seco dly There are ther deaz,
whose greenent or disagree n i can no ther
wise bej dged of bu by i cr ation of there
which ha t cer ain green t hith ex
mes, but an unal l kely ne d a these t
is th i th just ment is prop ly exercised hich
is the co cseing of th me d ha any d id
gree by comparing th th uch probabl
word ma. This th gh t ne e m units
h i h i th l est
d

The greater cell y no use.

α 16 II 3 14 11 8-2 x. xl 1 a
 $\alpha\alpha$ chh. 37
 α hh. 1 4 10 1 5 xl 11 8, 9.

to observe right and left a true estimate of the force and weight of each probability and then casting them up all right together choose that side which has the overbalance.

side which has the π electrons.

Remark 1. L_{α} is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas, by the intervention of one or more other ideas.

judgment is the king of all get v d also
agree or disagree by the creation of o e r
more d as, who's cert agreement or d. free
rent sh it is does = 1 perce e but hath
beered: bef guest and usual

8. *Consequens* f. *words and consequens* f. *uses*
Though the deducing one proposition from an
other & taking sentences in words be a great
part of reason a deal of which is usually em-
ployed about yet the principal act of reasoning
is the finding the agreement or disagreement
between two terms by the reason of third As
a man by a yard finds two houses to be of the
same length which could not be brought together
to measure the equality by juxtaposition.
Words have their consequences, as the agree-
ment and disagreement disagree as really
they are but merely logically as.

9 *F* or *not* *forget* *all* Before we quit this subject, I may be *orthodox* *all* *the* *time* to reflect on *few* *or* *few* *argument* *the* *men* in the *r* reasoning *with* *other*, *do* *ordinarily* *make* *use* *of* *to* *pre* *it* *is* *so* *no* *at* *all* *the* *time* *the* *most* *successful* *propos* *at*

I am glad to hear of your success. The first is, to all
leg the p n f men hose parts, I am ng
emuncy poue som thercause hasg ed
nam nd se led th repual n in the com
mo teem th some kind of ul ority Wh n
men are established n ny k nd of gn ry t is
th ugt e bre cl f modesty for oil ers t is
g t y 3y fro n t, nd quest th auth rty
f men wh are a possess n of t. This is pt
be enured in carrying f t too n cl p d
then ax does n re dly eld the d r
m at not pproved with rs, l cl swont to be
rect ed w th respect a d ubmiss n by oil ers
and t is looked pon mol nec for a man t
set up nd dh ret his n p n g nat the
current the m of a tiquy or t p t in the
balance a t that f som learned doctor r
ther use ppro ed w n r Whoe backs his
t t w th ch th r tues, thinks he ught
th rebty carry th cause and ready to style
it mp d a s n h l l tand out
Cl. Berk. I y P r n p l I w d. §

1 I *In cases when we have no ideas* It perfectly fails us where our ideas fail ¹ It neither does nor can extend itself further than they do And therefore wherever we have no ideas our reasoning stops and we are at an end of our reckoning and if at any time we reason about words which do not stand for any ideas it is only about those sounds and nothing else

10 II *Because our ideas are often obscure or imperfect* Our reason is often puzzled and at a loss because of the obscurity confusion or imperfection of the ideas it is employed about and there we are involved in difficulties and contradictions Thus not having any perfect idea of the *least extension of matter* nor of infinity we are at a loss about the divisibility of matter ² but having perfect clear and distinct ideas of number our reason meets with none of those inextricable difficulties numbers nor finds itself involved in any contradictions about them Thus we having but imperfect ideas of the operations of our minds and of the beginning of motion or thought how the mind produces either of them in us and much imperfecter yet of the operation of God run into great difficulties about *free created agents* which reason cannot well extricate itself out of ³

11 III *Because we perceive not intermedietes id as to show conclusively* Our reason is often at a stand because it perceives not those ideas which could serve to show the certain or probable agreement or disagreement of any other two ideas and in this some men's faculties far outgo others Till algebra that great instrument and instance of human sagacity was discovered men with amazement looked on several of the demonstrations of ancient mathematicians and could scarce forbear to think the finding several of those proofs to be something more than human

12 IV *Because we often proceed upon wrong principles*

case it is in vain to implore the help of reason unless it be to discover the falsehood and reject the influence of those wrong principles Reason is so far from clearing the difficulties which the building upon false foundations brings a man into that if he will pursue it it entangles him the more and engages him deeper in perplexities

¹ Cf. ch. § 1

Cf. Bk. II. h. xxiii. §§ 30-31 also Hume *E. gu. y. C. n. g. H. m. U. d. e. r. t. d. e. s. e. c. t. xi. p. 506*

Cf. Bk. II. l. xx. §§ 8-55 also Locke & F. 1

Let. r. t. St. lingfleet p. 50

Cf. Bk. I. chh. l. vi. IV. ch. ii

13 V *Because we often employ doubtful terms* As obscure and imperfect ideas often involve our reason so upon the same ground do dubious words and uncertain signs often in discourses and arguments when not warily attended to puzzle men's reason and bring them to a nonplus ⁴ But these two latter are our fault and not the fault of reason But yet the consequences of them are nevertheless obvious and the perplexities or errors they fill men's minds with are everywhere observable

14 *Our highest degree of knowledge consists in the use of reason* Some of the ideas that are in the mind are so there that they can be by themselves immediately compared one with another and in these the mind is able to perceive that they agree or disagree as clearly as that it has them. Thus the mind perceives that an arch of a circle is less than the whole circle as clearly as it does the idea of a circle and this therefore as has been said I call *intuitive knowledge* ⁵ which is cer

all those *maxims* which nobody has any doubt about but every man (does not as is said only assent to but) *knows* to be true as soon as ever they are proposed to his understanding In the discovery of and assent to these truths there is no use of the discursive faculty *no need of reasons* & but they are known by a superior and higher degree of evidence And such if I may guess at things unknown I am apt to think that angels have now and the spirits of just men made perfect shall have in a future state of thousands of things which now either wholly escape our apprehensions or which our short sighted reason having got some faint glimpse of view in the dark grope after

15 *The next is got by reasoning* But though we have here and there a little of this clear light, some sparks of bright knowledge yet the greatest part of our ideas are such that we cannot discern their agreement or disagreement by an immediate comparison of them And in all these we

together yet may be examined by the intervention of other ideas which can be compared with them. In this case when the agreement or dis-

⁴ Cf. Bk. III.

⁵ Cf. h. ii. § 1. iii. § 3

agreement of the intermediate idea, on both sides, with those which we would compare, is fairly discern'd, were it amounts to demonstration where by known ideas are produced, which, though it be certain, yet is not so easy nor altogether so clear as intuitive knowledge. Because in that there is hardly one simple intuition, wherein there is no room for any the least mistake or doubt, the truth is seen all perfectly at once. In demonstration, it is true, there is intuition too, but not all together at once, for there must be remembrance of the intuition of the agreement of the medium, or intermediate idea, with that we compared it with before, when we compared it with the other and where there be many mediums, where the danger of the mistake is the greater. For each agreement or disagreement of the ideas must be observed and seen in each step of the whole train, and retained in the memory just as it is, and the mind must be sure that no part of what is necessary to make up the demonstration is omitted or overlooked. This makes some demonstrations long, and perplexed, and too hard, or those who have not strength of parts distinctly to perceive, and exactly carry so many particulars orderly in their heads. And even those who are able to master such intricate speculations, are fain sometimes to go over them again, and there is need of more than one review before they can arrive at certainty. But yet were the mind clearly retain'd the intuition it had of the agreement of any idea with another and that which third, and that which fourth, &c., there the agreement of the first and

to observe it, and take a true estimate of the strength of each probability and then

agreed or disagree in the intervention of one or more ideas, whose certain agreement or disagreement with that it does not perceive, but has observed to be first and second.

3. *Concerning the deduction of ideas from words.* Though the deducing one proposition from another or making inferences in words, be a great part of reason, and that which is usually employed about yet the principal act of ratiocination is finding the agreement or disagreement of two ideas which are not by the intervention of words. As a man, by a yard, finds two houses to be of the same length, which could not be brought together to measure their equality by juxta position. Words have their consequences, as the signs of such ideas, and thus agree or disagree, as really they are but we observe only by our words.

9. *First sorts of arguments.* Before we quit this subject, it may be worth our while little to reflect on first sorts of arguments, that men, in their reasonings with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent or at least to awe them as to silence their opposition.

1. *Argument of reputation.* The first is, to allege the opinions of men, whose parts, learning, eminency, power, or some other cause has gained name, and settled their reputation in the common esteem with some kind of authority. When men are established in any kind of dignity, it is thought a breach of modesty for others to derogate any way from it, and question the authority of men who are in possession of it. This is proper to be censured, as carrying with it too much pride, when a man does not readily yield to the determination of approved authors, which is wont to be received with respect and submission by others, and it is looked upon as insolence, for a man to set up and adhere to his own opinion against the current stream of antiquity or to put it in the balance against that of some learned doctor or otherwise approved writer. Whoever backs his tenets with such authorities, thinks he ought thereby to carry the cause, and is ready to strike it impudence in any one who shall stand out

whose agreement or disagreement can no other way be judged of but by the intervention of others. Such is not certain agreement with the extremes, but a small or likely one, and in these it is that the judgment is properly exercised, which is the acquiring of the mind, that an idea do agree by comparison with such probable mediums. This, though it never amounts to knowledge, no not that which is the lowest degree of verisimilitude in the immediate ideas tie the extremes so firm together and the probability is so clear and strong that almost as necessarily follows it, as a scale does demonstration. The great excellency and use of the judgment is

Of ch. 11. § 3. 12. § 8. 13. 14. § 1.

Of ch. 12. § 1. 2. 3.

Of ch. 13. § 4. 14. § 5. 15. § 8. 9.

Of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, § 2.

against them This I think may be called *argumentum ad verecundiam*

20 II *Argumentum ad ignorantiam* Secondly Another way that men ordinarily use to drive others and force them to submit to their judgments and receive their opinion in debate is to require the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof or to assign a better And this I call *argumentum ad ignorantiam*

21 III *Argumentum ad hominem* Thirdly A third way is to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions This is already known under the name of *argumentum ad hominem*

22 IV *Argumentum ad iudicium* The fourth alone advances us in knowledge and judgment The fourth is the using of proofs drawn from any of the foundations of knowledge or probability This I call *argumentum ad iudicium* This alone of all the four brings true instruction with it and advances us in our way to knowledge For 1 It argues not another man's opinion to be right because I out of respect or any other consideration but that of conviction will not contradict him 2 It proves not another man to be in the right way nor that I ought to take the same with him because I know not a better 3 Nor does it follow that another man is in the right way because he has shown me that I am in the wrong I may be modest and therefore not oppose another man's persuasion I may be ignorant and not be able to produce a better I may be in an error and another may show me that I am so This may dispose me perhaps for the reception of truth but helps me not to it that must come from proofs and arguments and light arising from the nature of things themselves and not from my shamefacedness ignorance or error

23 Above contrary *ad accedens* to reason By what has been before said of reason we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of things into those that are according to above and contrary to reason 1 *Accedens* to reason are such propositions whose truth we can discover by examining and tracing those ideas we have from sensation and reflection and by natural deduction find to be true or probable 2 *Abre* reason are such propositions whose truth or probability we cannot by reason derive from those principles 3 *Contrary* to reason are such propositions as are inconsistent with or irreconcilable to our clear and distinct ideas Thus the existence of one God is according to reason the existence of more than one God contrary to reason the resurrection of the dead above reason *Abre* reason also may be taken in a double sense viz.

either as signifying above probability or above certainty and in that large sense also *contrary* to

reason wherein it is opposed to faith which though it be in itself a very improper way of speaking yet common use has so authorized it that it could be folly either to oppose or hope to remedy it

if it be regulated as our duty cannot be afforded to anything but upon good reason and so cannot be opposite to it He that believes with

on truth know not whether the luckiness of the accident will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding Thus at least is certain that he must be accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into whereas he that makes use of the light and faculties God has given him and seeks sincerely to discover truth by those helps and abilities he has may have this

case or matter whatsoever believes or disbelieves according as reason directs him He that doth otherwise transgresses against his own light and misuses those faculties which were given him to no other end but to search and follow the clearer evidence and greater probability But since reason and faith are by some men opposed we will so consider them in the following chapter

Chap XVIII Of Faith and Reason and their Distinct Provinces

1 *Necessity* to know the boundaries It has been above shown 1 That there are of necessity known

ideas 4 That we want probability to direct our assent in matters where we have no other knowledge

1 Cf chh iii § 9-11

ed of our own or testimony of other men to bottom our reason upon.

From these things thus premised I think we may come to lay down the means and boundaries *let us faith and as the want which may possibly have been the cause, if not of great disorders, yet at least of great disputes, and perhaps mistakes in the world. For till it be resolved how far we are to be guided by reason and how far by faith, we shall in our dispute, and endeavour to convince one another in matters of religion.*

2. *Faith and as what as contradistinguished. I find every sect, as far as reason will help them, make use of it gladly and where it fails them, they cry out, It is matter of faith, and beyond reason. And I do not see how they can argue with any one, or ever convince gainsayers but make use of the same plea, as those setting down the boundaries between faith and reason which ought to be the first point established in all questions where faith has anything to do.*

Reason therefore here, as contradistinguished from faith, I take to be the discovery of the certainty of propositions which the mind arrives at by deduction made from such ideas, which it has got by the use of its natural faculties, viz. by sensation or reflection.

Faith, therefore, is the assent to any proposition, not thus made up by deductions of reason, but upon the credit of the proposer as coming from God, in some extraordinary way of communication. This way of discovering truths I therefore call

3. *A new simple demonstration, by the natural relation. First Then I say that no man is persuaded by God, or by any revelation, to believe any new simple ideas which they had not before in sensation or reflection. For whatsoever impressions he himself may have from the immediate hand of God, thus revealed, if it be of the same simple ideas, cannot be conveyed to another either by words or any other signs. Because words, by their immediate perception, cause no other ideas but of their natural sounds and it is by the custom of using them for signs, that they excite and retain in our minds latent ideas but yet not clearly and as were their before. For words, seen or heard recall our thoughts those ideas only which to us they have been wont to be signs of but cannot introduce any perfectly new and formerly unknown simple ideas. The same holds in all other signs which cannot convey to us things of which we have before never had any idea at all.*

Thus whatever things were discovered to St. Paul, when he was transported into the third heaven whatever new ideas his mind there received all the description he can make of others of that place is only this, That there are such things, as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath entered into the heart of man to conceive. And supposing God should discover to any one, supernaturally, pieces of creatures inhabiting far example Jupiter or Saturn (for that it is possible there may be such bodies) which had six senses and imprinted on his mind the ideas conveyed to theirs by that sixth sense he could no more by words, produce in the minds of other

ideas, then, which are the foundation, and sole matter fall upon us and knowledge we must depend wholly on reason. I mean our natural faculties and can by no means receive them, or any of them, from tradition or revelation. I say that natural revelation, distinguishes it from original revelation. By this I mean that first impression which is made immediately by God in the mind of any man, to which cannot set any bounds and by which those impressions are believed over to their words, the ordinary way of conveying our conceptions to another.

4. *Natural revelation may make us know for certain as knowledge itself by us but not with the same certainty that reason doth. So only I say that the same truths may be discovered and demonstrated by revelation, which are naturally may have. So God might, by revelation, discover the truth of any proposition in Euclid as well as men by the natural use of their faculties, come to make themselves clear. In all things of this kind there is little need or use of revelation, God having furnished us with natural and surer means to arrive at the knowledge of them. For whatsoever truth we come to the clear discovery of from the knowledge and contemplation of our own ideas, will always be certain to us than those which are conveyed to us by tradition or revelation. For the knowledge which that thus revelation came at first from God can never be so sure as the knowledge which we have from clear and distinct perception. The great disagreement of our own ideas, which if it were revealed some ages since, that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two right angles, I might ascribe the truth of that proposition upon the credit of the tradition that it was revealed.*

but that would never amount to so great a certainty as the knowledge of it upon the comparing and measuring my own ideas of two right angles and the three angles of a triangle. The like holds in matter of fact knowable by our senses v.g. the history of the deluge is conveyed to us by writings which had their original from revelation and yet nobody I think will say he has as certain and clear a knowledge of the flood as Noah that saw it or that he himself would have had had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater an assurance than that of his senses that it is writ in the book supposed writ by Moses inspired but he has not so great an assurance that Moses wrote that book as if he had seen Moses write it. So that the assurance of its being a revelation is less still than the assurance of his senses.

5 *Even original revelation cannot be admitted as a source of the clear evidence of reason.* In propositions then whose certainty is built upon the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas attained either by immediate intuition as in self-evident propositions or by evident deductions of reason in demonstrations we need not the assistance of revelation as necessary to gain our assent and introduce them into our minds. Because the natural ways of knowledge could settle them there or had done it already which is the greatest assurance we can possibly have of anything unless where God immediately reveals it to us and there too our assurance can be no greater than our knowledge is that it is a revelation from God. But yet nothing I think can under that title shake or overrule plain knowledge or rationally prevail with any man to admit it for true in a direct contradiction to the clear evidence of his own understanding. For since no evidence of our faculties by which we receive such revelations can exceed if equal the certainty of our intuitive knowledge we can never receive for a truth anything that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct knowledge v.g. the ideas of one body and one place do so clearly agree and the mind has so evident a perception of their agreement that we can never assent to a proposition that affirms the same body to be in two distant places at once however it should pretend to the authority of a divine revelation since the evidence first that we deceive not our selves in ascribing it to God secondly that we understand it right can never be so great as the evidence of our own intuitive knowledge where by we discern it impossible for the same body to be in two places at once. And therefore no proposition can be received for divine revelation which

assent due to all such if it be contradictory to our clear intuitive knowledge. Because this would be to subvert the principles and foundations of all knowledge. I edge evidence and assent whatsoever and there would be left no difference between truth and falsehood no measures of credible and incredible in the world if doubtful propositions shall take place before self evident and what we certainly know give way to what we may possibly be mistaken in. In propositions therefore contrary to the clear perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas it will be in vain to urge them as matters of faith. They cannot move our assent under that or any other title whatsoever. For faith can never convince us of anything that contradicts our knowledge. Because though faith be founded on the testimony of God (who cannot lie) revealing any proposition to us yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a divine revelation greater than our own knowledge. Since the holiest strength of the certainty depends upon our knowledge that God revealed it which in this case is here the proposition supposed revealed contradicts our knowledge or reason will always have this objection hanging to it viz. that we cannot tell how to conceive that to come from God the bountiful

our faculties useless wholly destroy the most excellent part of his workmanship our understandings and put a man in a condition wherein he will have less light less conduct than the beast that perisheth. For if the mind of man can never have a clearer (and perhaps not so clear) evidence of anything to be a divine revelation as it has of the principles of its own reason it can never have a ground to quit the clear evidence of its reason to give a place to a proposition whose revelation has not a greater evidence than those principles have.

6 *Traditional revelation is of much less value.* Thus far a man has use of reason and ought to hearken to it even in immediate and original revelation where it is supposed to be made to himself. But to all those who pretend not to immediate revelation but are required to pay obedience, and to receive the truths revealed to others which by the tradition of writings or word of mouth are conveyed down to them reason has a great deal more to do and is that only which can induce us to receive them. For matter of faith being only divine revelation and nothing else faith as we use the word (called commonly *deus faith*) is as to do with no propositions, but those which are sup-

posed to be divinely revealed. So that I do not see how those who make revelations alone the sole object of faith can say that it is matter of faith, and not of reason, to believe that such or such a proposition, to be found in such or such book, of divine inspiration unless it be revealed that that proposition, or all in that book, was communicated by divine inspiration. Without such revelation, the believing, or not believing that proposition, or book, to be of divine authority can never be matter of faith, but matter of reason; and such as I must come to an assent to only by the use of my reason, which can never require or cause me to believe that which is contrary to what is being impossible for reason ever to procure any assent to that which to itself appears unreasonable.

In all this, therefore, where we have clear evidence from our ideas, and those principles of knowledge I have above mentioned, reason is the proper judge and revelation, though it may in consenting, with it, confirm its dictates, yet cannot in such cases validate its decrees, nor can be obliged, where we have the clear and evident sentence of reason, to quit it for the contrary opinion, under pretence that it is matter of faith, which can have no authority against the plain and clear dictates of reason.

7 *That those cases as when revealed the proper matter of faith.* But, *Thirdly* There being many things wherein we have very imperfect notions, or none at all and other things, of whose past, present, or future existence by the natural use of our faculties, we can have no knowledge at all, these, as being beyond the discovery of our natural faculties, and above reason, are, when revealed, the proper matter of faith. Thus, that part of the angels rebelled against God, and thereby lost their first happy state and that the dead shall rise, and live again these and the like, being beyond the discovery of reason, are purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do.

8 *Of necessary cases, for which, as matter of faith, and must carry it against private objections of reason.* But since God, by giving us the light of reason, has not thereby tied up his own hands from affording us, when he thinks fit, the light of revelation in any of those matters wherein our natural faculties are at great probability mistaken as to what God has been pleased give it, must carry it against the private objections of reason. Because the mind not being certain of the truth of that it does not evidently

Cl. Locke *Reply to Second Letter of Sentinelle,* pp. 65-2

know but only yielding to the probability that appears in it, is bound to give up its assent to such a testimony which, it is satisfied, comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive. But yet, it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of the revelation, and of the signs

knowledge that a proposition is true, and of his own principles and evidence of his own knowledge was divinely revealed, or that he understands the words in which wherein it is delivered. It has that the contrary is true, and so

knowing the divine

9. *Revelation is matter of faith, and cannot be proved by reason.* First, What ever proposition is revealed, of whose truth our mind by its natural faculties and notions, can not judge, that is purely matter of faith, and above reason.

Secondly All propositions whereof the mind, by the use of its natural faculties, can come to determine and judge, from naturally acquired

admit a possibility of the contrary to be true, without doing violence to the certain evidence of its own knowledge, and overturn the principles of all reason in such probable propositions,

clear revelation, as another principle of truth and ground of assent, may determine and so it may be matter of faith, and be also above reason. Because reason in that particular matter being able to reach no higher than probability faith gains the determination where reason came short and revelation discovered on which side the truth lay

10. *In matters of reason can find determination.* Thus far the dominion of faith reaches, and that without any violence or hindrance to reason which is not injured or disturbed but assisted and improved by new discoveries of truth, coming from the other

nal fountain of all knowledge Whatever God hath revealed is certainly true no doubt can be made of it This is the proper object of faith but whether it be a divine revelation or no reason must judge which can never permit the mind to reject a greater evidence to embrace what is less evident nor allow it to entertain probability in opposition to knowledge and certainty There can be no evidence that any traditional revelation is of divine original in the words we receive it and in the sense we understand it so clear and so certain as that of the principles of reason and therefore *Nothing that is contrary to and inconsistent with the clear and self evident dictates of reason has a right to be urged or assented to as a matter of faith unless reason hath nothing to do* Whatsoever is divine revelation ought to overrule all our opinions prejudices and interest and hath a right to be received with full assent Such a submission as this of our reason to faith takes not away the land marks of knowledge this shakes not the foundations of reason but leaves us that use of our faculties for which they were given us

11 *If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason no enthusiasm or extravagancy in religion can be easily avoided* If the provinces of faith and reason are not kept distinct by these boundaries there will in matters of religion be no room for reason at all and those extravagant opinions and ceremonies that are to be found in the several religions of the world will not deserve to be blamed For to this crying up of faith in opposition to reason we may I think in good measure ascribe those absurdities that fill almost all the religions which possess and divide mankind For men having been perverted with an opinion that they must not consult reason in the things of religion however apparently contradictory to common sense and the very principles of all the knowledge have let loose their fancies and natural superstition and have been by them led

so far from being acceptable to the great and wise God that he cannot avoid thinking them ridiculous and offensive to a sober good man So that in effect religion which should most distinguish us from beasts and ought most peculiarly to elevate us as rational creatures above brutes is that wherein men often appear most irrational and more senseless than beasts themselves *Cedo quia improbabile est* I believe because it is impossible might in a good man pass for a sally of zeal but would prove a very ill rule for men to choose their opinions or religion by

Chap. XIV. Of Enthusiasm¹

1 *Love of truth necessary* He that would seriously set upon the search of truth ought in the first place to prepare his mind with a love of it. For he that loves it not will not take much pains to get it nor be much concerned when he misses it. There is nobody in the common earth of learning who does not profess himself a lover of truth and there is not a rational creature that would not take it amiss to be thought otherwise of. And yet for all this one may truly say that there are very few lovers of truth for truth's sake even amongst those who persuade themselves that they are so. How a man may know whether he be so in earnest is worth inquiry and I think there is one unerring mark of it viz. The not entertaining any proposition with greater assurance than the proofs it is built upon will warrant. Whoever goes beyond this measure of assent it is plain receives not the truth in the love of it loves not truth for truth's sake but for some other by-end. For the evidence that any proposition is true (except such as are self-evident) lying only in the proofs a man has of it whatsoever degrees of assent he affords it beyond the degrees of that evidence it is plain that all the surplusage of assurance is owing to some other affection and not to the love of truth it being as impossible that the love of truth should carry my assent above the evidence there is to me that it is true as that the love of truth should make me assent to any proposition for the sake of that evidence which it has not that it is true which is in effect to love it as a truth because it is possible or probable that it may not be true. In any truth that gets not possession of our minds by the irresistible light of self-evidence or by the force of demonstration

no tincture from them

1 *for a madness to dictate another's beliefs from whence* The assuming an authority of dictating

Cf. Lock. Letter to M^{rs} Lyn ux Oates April 6, 1695.
 1 Cf. chh § 1. L. § 14.
 Cf. chh §§ 2-13. x. 11. § 15.
 Cf. chh XIV-X. 11.

others, and forwardness to prescribe to their
opinions, is constant concomitant of this bias
and corruption of our judgments. For how al-
most can it be otherwise, but that he should be
ready to impose on another's belief, who has al-
ready imposed on his own. Who can reasonably
expect arguments and conviction from him in
dealing with others, whose understanding is not
accustomed to them in his dealing with himself?
Who does violence to his own faculties, strug-
gles over an own mind, and usurps the prerog-
ative that belongs to truth alone, which is to com-
mand assent by only its own authority, by
and in proportion to that evidence which it car-

3. *Faith* *for* *us* *in* *his* *omnipotence*
Upon this occasion I shall take the liberty to con-
sider *Lord* *ground* *factors* which with some men
has the same authority and is as confidently re-
lied on as either faith or reason. I mean *reason*
em, which, I trust by reason, would set pre-
fession about. Whereby in fact it takes way
both reason and revelation, and substitutes in the
room of them the ungrounded fancies of man's
own brain, and assumes them for a foundation
both of opinion and conduct.

+ F is eternal Reason is eternal & is
 true, whereby the eternal F ther of I^gh and foun-
 tain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind
 that portion of truth which he has laid wth them
 the reach of their natural faculties. Reason is
 eternal enlarged by a new set of discoveries
 communicated by God immediately which reason
 receives the truth of, by the testimony and
 proofs it gives us they come from God. So that
 be that takes wth reason make wth reason for reve-
 lation, puts us the light of both, and does much-
 that is same as if he would persuade man to
 pluck his eyes, be better to receive the remot
 light of an is like star by telescope.

5. *Rite fatalism.* Immediate revelation be-
ing much easier way for men to establish their
opinions and regulate their conduct than the to-
dious and no always successful labour of strict
reasoning, is no wonder that some have been
tempted to pretend to revelation, and to persuade
themselves that they are under the peculiar guid-
ance of heaven in their actions and opinions, es-
pecially in those of them which they cannot ac-
count for by the ordinary methods of knowledge
and principles of reason. Hence we see that, in
all ages, men in whom melancholy has mixed
with devotion, or whose conceits of themselves has
raised them into an opinion of greater famili-
arity with God, and nearer admittance to his
favour than is afforded to others, have often flat-

... the ... of ...

the impulses of the Spirit and cannot be mis-
taken in what they feel. Thus they support them-
selves and are sure reasoning hath nothing to do
with what they see and feel in themselves: what
they have a sensible experience of admits no
doubt, needs no probation. Would he not be ri-
diculous who should require to have it proved
to him that the light shines and that he sees it?
It is its own proof and can have no other. When
the Spirit brings light into our minds it dispels
darkness. We see it as we do that of the sun at
noon and need not the twilight of reason to show
it us. This light from heaven is strong, clear and
pure, carries its own demonstration with it and
we may as naturally take a glow worm to assist
us to discover the sun as to examine the celestial
ray by our dim candle, reason.¹

9 *Enthusiasm how to be discovered.* This is the way
of talking of these men: they are sure because
they are sure and their persuasions are right be-
cause they are strong in them. For when what
they say is stripped of the metaphor of seeing and
feeling this is all it amounts to and yet these
similes so impose on them that they serve them
for certainty in themselves and demonstration
to others.

10 *The supposed internal light examined.* But to
examine a little soberly this internal light and
this feeling on which they build so much. These
men have they say clear light and they see they
have awakened sense and they feel this cannot
they are sure be disputed them. For when a man
says he sees or feels nobody can deny him that
he does so. But here let me ask. This seeing is it
the perception of the truth of the proposition or
of this that it is a revelation from God? This
feeling is it a perception of an inclination or
fancy to do something or of the Spirit of God
moving that inclination? These are two very dif-
ferent perceptions and must be carefully dis-
tinguished if we would not impose upon our-
selves. I may perceive the truth of a proposition
and yet not perceive that it is an immediate re-
velation from God. I may perceive the truth of a
proposition in Euclid without its being or my
perceiving it to be a revelation. nay I may per-
ceive I came not by this knowledge in a natural
way and so may conclude it revealed without
perceiving that it is a revelation of God. Because
there be spirits which without being divinely
commissioned may excite those ideas in me and
lay them in such order before my mind that I
may perceive their connexion. So that the know-
ledge of any proposition coming into my mind I
know not how is not a perception that it is from

Cf. ch. ii. § 1

God. Much less is a strong persuasion that it is
true a perception that it is from God or so
much as true. But however it be called light and
seeing I suppose it is at most but belief and as-
surance and the proposition taken for a revela-
tion is not such as they know to be true but take
to be true. For where a proposition is known to be
true revelation is needless and it is hard to con-
ceive how there can be a revelation in any one of
what he knows already. If therefore it be a propo-
sition which they are persuaded but do not
know to be true whatever they may call it, it is
not seeing but believing. For these are two ways
whereby truth comes into the mind wholly dis-
tinct so that one is not the other. What I see I
know to be so by the evidence of the thing itself
what I believe I take to be so upon the testimony
of another. But this testimony I must know to be
given or else what ground have I of believing?
I must see that it is God that reveals this to me
or else I see nothing. The question then here is
How do I know that God is the revealer of this to
me that this impression is made upon my mind
by his Holy Spirit and that therefore I ought to
obey it? If I know not this how great soever the
assurance is that I am possessed with it is ground
less whatever light I pretend to it is but *enthusiasm*.

m For whether the proposition supposed to be

mistake not these men receive it for true be-

stantly round in this circle. It is a revelation, be-
cause they firmly believe it and they believe it because
it is a revelation.

11 *Enthusiasm fails of evidence that the proposition is from God.* In all that is of divine revelation
there is need of no other proof but that it is an in-
spiration from God for he can neither deceive
nor be deceived. But how shall it be known that

to believe? Here it is that enthusiasm fails of the

¹ Cf. ch. v. § 18.

and not pretend to. For men thus possessed
boast of light whereby they say they are en-
lightened, and brought into the knowledge of
this or that truth. But if they know it to be a
truth, they must know it to be so either by its
own self-evidence, natural reason, or by the
testimony of history.

Without this history, reason, and
truth, of what kind soever, the human mind is inspired
are enlightened, and brought into their minds, and
are established there. If they say they know it to
be true, because it is a revelation from God, the
reason is good; but then it will be demanded
how they know it to be a revelation from God.
If they say by the light it brings with it, which
shines bright in their minds, and they cannot re-
sist, I beseech them to consider whether this be
any more than what we have taken notice of al-
ready, viz. that it is revelation, because they
strongly believe it to be true. For all the light
they speak of is but a strong though unground-
ed persuasion of the truth of their minds, that it is
truth, for rational grounds from proofs that it
is truth, they must acknowledge that it has
for that it is not received as a revelation, but
upon ordinary grounds that their truths are
received and if they believe it to be true because
it is revelation, and have no other reason for it
being revelation, but because they are fully
persuaded, with whatever reason, that it is
true, then they believe it to be revelation only
because they strongly believe it to be revela-
tion which ordinary ground it proceeds
on, either in our tenets or notions. And what
readier way can there be to run ourselves into
the most extravagant errors and miscarriages,
than thus to set ourselves up for supreme di-
vines and to believe any proposition to be
true, any other way than right, only because we be-
lieve it to be so. The strength of our persuasions
is no evidence that all of their own rectitude
crooked things may be as stiff and inflexible as
iron, and men may be perfectly de-
cepible in their truth. How come else
the untractable zeal in indifference and opposi-
tious parties. For if the light, which every man
has in his mind, which in this case is the
truth, the strength of his own persuasions, be
evidence that it is from God contrary to what
he has the same will to be inspirations and God
will be not only the Father of lights, but of propo-
sitions and contradictory lights, leading men con-

trary way and contradictory propositions will
be different truths if an ungrounded strength of
assurance be an evidence that a proposition
is Divine Revelation.

1. *Firmness of persuasion no proof that any person
is inspired by God.* This cannot be otherwise, whilst
firmness of persuasion is made the cause of be-
lieving and confidence of being in the right. St. Paul himself be-
lieved he did well, and that he had a call to it,
when he persecuted the Christians, when he
convinced himself that he thought in the wrong, but it was
not

—
faded in truths, shining in their minds with the
clearest light.

13. *Light in the mind what Light, true light
the mind is, or can be in this world else but the
evidence of the truth of any proposition, and if it
be a self-evident proposition, all the light is*

—
led by this Son of the Morning are as fully satis-
fied of the illumination. are as strongly per-
suaded that they are enlightened by the Spirit
of God as any other who is so they acquiesce and
join in it, are actuated by it and nobody can
be more sure, no more in the right (if their own
belief may be judged) than they.

4. *Revelation must be judged by its own merits.* He,
therefore, that will otiose himself up to all the
extraneous chances of delusion and error must bring
this good light to the trial God when
he makes the prophet does not unmake the man.
He is all his faculties in the natural state, to

of natural reason, Ise makes known to be
a truth which he would have us assent to by his
authority and convinces us that it is from him,
by some marks which reason cannot be mistaken
in. Reason must be our last judge and guide every-

thus I do not mean that we must consult reason and examine whether a proposition revealed from God can be made out by natural principles and if it cannot that then we may reject it but consult it we must and by it examine whether it be a revelation from God or no and if reason finds it to be revealed from God reason then declares for it as much as for any other truth and makes it one of her dictates Every conceit that thoroughly warms our fancies must pass for an inspiration if there be nothing but the strength of our persuasions whereby to judge of our persuasions if reason must not examine their truth by something extrinsical to the persuasions themselves inspirations and delusions truth and falsehood will have the same measure and will not be possible to be distinguished

15 *Belief no pt of of revel tion* If this internal light or any proposition which under that title we take for inspired be conformable to the principles of reason or to the word of God which is attested revelation reason warrants it and we may safely receive it for true and be guided by it in our belief and actions if it receive no testimony nor evidence from either of these rules we cannot take it for a revelation or so much as for true till we have some other mark that it is a revelation besides our believing that it is so Thus we see the holy men of old who had revelations from God had something else besides that internal light of assurance in their own minds to testify to them that it was from God They were not left to the own persuasions alone that those persuasions were from God but had *outward signs* to convince them of the Author of those revelations And when they were to convince others they had a power given them

truth

visible

message

usually burn

without being consumed and heard a voice out of it thus as something besides finding an impulse upon his mind to go to Pharaoh that he might bring his brethren out of Egypt and yet he thought not this enough to authorize him to go with that message till God by another miracle of his rod turned into a serpent had assured him of a power to testify his mission by the same miracle repeated before them whom he was sent to Gideon was sent by an angel to deliver Israel from the Midianites and yet he desired a sign to convince him that this commission was from God These and several the like instances to be found among the prophets of old are enough to show that they thought not an inward seeing or persuasion of their own minds without any other

proof a sufficient evidence that it was from God though the Scripture does not everywhere mention their demanding or having such proofs.

16 *Criteria of a divine revelation* In what I have said I am far from denying that God can or doth sometimes enlighten men's minds in the apprehending of certain truths or excite them to good actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary signs accompanying it But in such cases too we have reason and Scripture unerring rules to know whether it be from God or no Where the truth embraced is consonant

as we assured that we run no risk in entertaining it as such because though perhaps it be not an immediate revelation from God extraordinarily operating on our minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that revelation which he has given us of truth But it is not the strength of our private persuasion within ourselves that can warrant it to be a light or motion from heaven nothing can do that but the written Word of God without us or that standard of

but in our own persuasions which can by itself give it that stamp

Locke means prove it to be an offspring of heaven and of divine original

Chap. XX. Of Wrong Assent or Error

1 *Causes of error or how men come to give assent contrary to probability* Knowledge being to be had only of visible and certain truth error is not a fault of our knowledge but a mistake of our judgment giving assent to that which is not true

But if assent be grounded on probability if the content be probable its in what is

we are going chapters it will be demanded how men come together as not only to probability For there is nothing more common than contrariety of opinions notwithstanding

The reasons he collects though they may be very various yet I suppose may all be reduced to these four

1st Locke's letter to Mr. Molyneux, April 10 1697
2d Cf. Bacon's *De veritate* Bk. I.

I want *proof*
 II. want *fulfillment as them.*
 III. want *all* them
 IV. want *measure of probability*
 For *cause of error* and *proof* For By
 and *proof* I do not mean only the want of
 those proofs which are nowhere extant, and so
 are nowhere to be had but the want even of
 those proofs which are in being or might be pro-
 cured. And thus men want proofs, who have not
 the convenience or opportunity to make experi-
 ments and observations themselves, tending to
 remove the uncertainty nor likewise the

and satisfied in their
 education, whose lives are worn out only in the pro-
 ceedings for life. These men's opportunities of
 knowledge and inquiry are commonly as narrow
 as their fortunes and their understandings are
 but little instructed, when all their whole time
 and pains are laid out to till the croaking of their
 children. It is

ing in the
 than a pauper, who is driven constantly for-
 wards and backwards in narrow lanes and dirty
 roads only to mark time, should be killed in the
 geography of the country. It is not at all more
 possible that he who wants leisure, books, and
 languages, should proportionately increase
 with variety of men, should be in condition to
 collect those testimonies and observations which
 are in being and necessary to make out
 many sayings, if the propositions that, in the
 societies of men are, judged of the greatest men
 or that find grounds of assurance so great
 as the belief of the points he would build them
 is thought necessary. So that great part of man-
 kind are by the natural and unalterable state of
 things in his world and the constitution of his
 man affairs, unavoidably given over to an incurable
 ignorance of those proofs which they build,
 and which are necessary to establish those prin-
 ciples the greatest part of men, having much to
 do, do not mean following or tending to
 do look after those of learned and laborious
 inquiries

3 Object What shall become of those who want
 of proof? I answer. What shall we say then? Are
 the greater part of mankind by the necessity of
 their condition subjected to unavoidable igno-
 rance in those things which are of greatest impor-
 tance to them. (If of those it is obvious to in-

quire) Hence the bulk of mankind no other guide
 but accident and blind chance to conduct them
 to their happiness or misery. For the current
 opinions, and censured guides of every country
 sufficient evidence and security to every man to
 venture his great concerns on may his ever
 lasting happiness or misery. Or can those be the
 certain and infallible oracles and standards of
 truth, which teach one thing in Christendom and
 another in Turkey? O shall a poor countryman
 be eternally happy for having the chance to be
 born in Italy or a day labourer be undoubtably
 lost, because he had the ill luck to be born in
 England. How ready some men may be to say
 some of these things, I will not there examine but
 thus I am sure, that men must allow the rather
 of these to be true, (let them choose which they
 please,) else grant that God has furnished me

with sufficient light to direct them in the way
 the
 plain
 the

living as they have no spare time at all to think of
 his soul and inform himself in matters of religion.
 Were men as intent upon this as they are in
 things of lower concernment, there are so many
 enslave to the necessities of life who might not
 find many vacancies that might be husbanded to
 this advantage of their knowledge.

4. People hindered from progress. Besides those
 whose improvements and informations are strait-
 ened by the narrowness of their fortunes, there
 are others whose largeness of fortune would plen-
 tifully enough supply books, and other requisites
 for clearing of doubts, and discovering of truth
 but they are cooped in close, by the laws of their
 countries, and the strict guards of those whose
 interest it is to keep them ignorant, lest, knowing
 more they should believe the less in them. These
 are as far away further from the liberty and op-
 portunities of fair inquiry than these poor and
 wretched labourers who are full of pride and ha-

disturbing. This is generally the case of all
 those who live in places where care is taken to
 propagate truth without knowledge, where men
 are forced at leisure, to be of the religion of
 the country and must therefore swallow down
 opinions, as silly people do emperors' pills, without
 knowing what they are made of, how they
 will work, and having nothing to do but believe
 that they will do their cure but this is much
 more miserable than they in that they are not

liberty to refuse swallowing what perhaps they had rather let alone or to choose the physician to whose conduct they would trust themselves

5 *Second cause of error want of skill to use proofs*
Secondly Those who want skill to use those evidences they have of probabilities who cannot carry a train of consequences in their heads nor weigh exactly by the preponderancy of reason

are not probable There are some men of one sort but of two syllogisms and no more and others that can but advance one step further These cannot always discern that side on which the strongest proofs lie cannot constantly follow that which in itself is the more probable opinion Now that there is such a difference between men in respect of their understanding

either at the Exchange on the one hand nor at Alms houses or Bedlam on the other Which great difference in men's intellects, whether it rises from any defect in the organs of the body particularly adapted to thinking or in the dullness or untractableness of those faculties for want of use or as some think in the natural differences of men's souls themselves or some or all of these together it matters not here to examine only this is evident that there is a difference of degrees in men's understandings apprehensions and reasonings to so great a latitude that one may without doing injury to mankind affirm that there is a greater distance between some men and others in this respect than between some men and some beasts But how this comes about is a speculation though of great consequence yet not necessary to our present purpose

6 *This third cause of error want of will to use them*
Thirdly There are another sort of people that want proofs not because they are out of their reach but because they will not use them who though they have riches and leisure enough and want neither parts nor other helps, are yet neither the better for them Their hot pursuit of pleasure or constant drudgery in business engages some men's thoughts elsewhere laziness and idleness in general or a particular aversion for books study and meditation keep others from any serious thoughts at all and some out of fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour those opinions which best suit their prejudices, lives and desires, content themselves without examination to take upon trust what they find convenient and in fashion Thus most men even of

those that might do otherwise pass their lives without an acquaintance with much less a rational assent to probabilities they are concerned to know though they lie so much within their view that, to be convinced of them they need but turn their eyes that way We know some men will not read a letter which is supposed to bring ill news and many men forbear to cast up their accounts or so much as think upon their estates, who have reason to fear their affairs are in no very good posture How men whose plentiful fortunes allow them leisure to improve their understandings can satisfy themselves with a lazy ignorance I cannot tell but methinks they have a low opinion of their souls who lay out all their incomes in provisions for the body and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of knowledge who take great care to appear all ways in a neat and splendid outside and would think themselves miserable in coarse clothes or a patched coat and yet contentedly suffer their minds to appear abroad in a piebald livery of coarse patches and borrowed shreds such as it has pleased chance or their country tailor (I mean the common opinion of those they have conversed with) to clothe them in I will not mention on how unreasonable this is for men that ever think of a future state and their concernment in it which no rational man can avoid to do sometimes nor shall I take notice what a shame and confusion it is to the greatest contempters of knowledge to be found ignorant in things they are concerned to know But this at least is worth the consideration of those who call themselves gentlemen That however it is

those that see, or else fall into the ditch and he is certainly the most subjected the most enslaved who is so in his understanding

In the foregoing instances some of the causes have been shown of wrong assent and how it comes to pass that probable doctrines are not always received with an assent proportionable to the reasons which are to be had for their probability but hitherto we have considered only such probabilities whose proofs do exist but do not appear to him who embraces the error

7 *Fourth cause of error false measures of probability*
Fourthly There remains yet the last sort who even where the real probability does appear and are plainly laid before them do not admit of the conclusion nor yield unto manifest rea-

sons, but do either eyes suspend their assent, or give it to the less probable person. And to the danger are those exposed who have taken up any notions for liberty which are

I. Propositions that are not in themselves certain and evident, but doubtful and false taken up for free principles.

II. Received by others.

III. Propositions persons or inclinations.

IV. Authority.

I. I. Do not at first sit as taken for principles.

The true and firmest ground of probability is the conformity which has to our own knowledge especially that part of our knowledge which we have embraced, and continue to look on as probable. These have so great an influence upon our passions, that it is usually by them we judge of truth, and measure probability to that degree, that that is inconsistent with our principles, is so far from passing for probable, that it is almost to be all well possible. The reverence borne to these principles is so great, and their authority so paramount to all other that the testimony not only of other men, but the evidence of our own senses are often rejected, when they offer to touch anything contrary to these established rules. II. As much the doctrine of sense principles, and that principles are not to be proved or questioned, has contributed to this, I will not here examine. This I readily grant, that one truth cannot contradict another but what I take leave also to say that every one ought very carefully to beware what he admits for principle, to examine it strictly and see whether he certainly knows it to be true of itself, by its own evidence, or whether he does only by the assurance believe it to be so upon the authority of others. For he hath strongly bias put in his understanding, which will unavoidably misguide his assent, who hath embraced any free principle, and has boundly given himself up to the authority of any passion as well as evidently true.

3. Learned is children. There is nothing more ordinary than children receive into their minds propositions (especially how matters of religion) from their parents, nurses, and those whom they being insinuated into their way as well as unbiased understandings, and fastened by degrees, are at last (equally whether true or false) riveted there by long custom and education, beyond all possibility of being pulled out again. For men, when they are grown up, reflecting upon their passions, and finding those of this sort to be as ancient in their minds as their very memories, not having observed their early

insinuation, nor by what means they got them, they are apt to reverence them as sacred truths, and not to suffer them to be profaned, touched, or questioned. They look on them as the Luther and Thummam set up in their minds immediately by God himself, to be the great and unerring deciders of truth and falsehood, and the judges to which they are to appeal in all manner of controversies.

10. Of it itself every. This opinion of his principles (let them be what they will) being once established in any one's mind, it is easy to be imagined what reception any proposition shall find, how clearly soever proved, that shall in validate their a thorny or at all thwart these in eternal oracles whereas the grossest absurdities and improbabilities, being but agreeable to such principles, go down glibly and are easily digested. The great obstinacy that is to be found in men firmly believe quite contrary notions, though many times equally absurd, in the various religions of mankind, are as evident a proof as they are an unreasonable consequence of this way of reasoning from received traditional principles. So that men will disbelieve their own eyes, renounce the evidence of their senses, and give their own experience the lie, rather than admit of anything disagreeing with these sacred tenets. Take an intelligent Romanist that, from the first dawning of any notions in his understanding, hath had this principle constantly inculcated, viz. that he must believe as the church (i.e. those of his communion) believes, or that the pope is infallible, and thus he never so much as heard questioned, till forty or fifty years old he met with one of other principles how is he prepared easily to swallow not only against all probability but even the clear evidence of his senses, the doctrine of *transubstantiation*. This principle has such an influence on his mind, that he will believe that it be flesh which he sees to be bread. And what way will you take to convert man of an improbable passion he holds, who, as some philosophers, hath laid down this as a foundation of reasoning, That he must believe his reason (for so men improperly call arguments drawn from their principles) against his senses. Let an enthusiast be principled that he or his teacher is inspired, and acted by an immediate communication of the Divine Spirit, and you immediately bring the evidence of clear reason against his doctrine. Whoever therefore, hath imbedded with principles, as it is, in themselves inconsistent with these principles, to be moved by the most apparent and convincing probabilities, till they are so candid and ungen-

ous to themselves as to be persuaded to examine even those very principles which many never suffer themselves to do

11 II *Received hypotheses* Next to these are men whose understandings are cast into a mould and fashioned just to the size of a received *hypothesis*¹ The difference between these and the former is that they will admit of matter of fact and agree with dissenters in that but differ only in assigning of reasons and explaining the manner of operation These are not at that open defiance with their senses with the former they can endure to hearken to their information a little more patiently but will by no means admit of their reports in the explanation of things nor be prevailed on by probabilities which would convince them that things are not brought about just after the same manner that they have decreed within themselves that they are Would it not be an insufferable thing for a learned professor and that which his scarlet would blush at to have his authority of forty years standing wrought out of hard rock Greek and Latin with no small expense of time and candle and confirmed by general tradition and a reverend beard in an instant overturned by an upstart novelist? Can any one expect that he should be made to confess that what he taught his scholars thirty years ago was all error and mistake and that he sold them hard words and ignorance at a very dear rate What probabilities I say are sufficient to pre-

one translation to be *Repente vous repent* or with the other *Faites pénitence* do penance

bility hang on one side of a covetous man's reasoning and money on the other it is easy to foresee which will outweigh Earthly minds like mud walls resist the strongest batteries and though perhaps sometimes the force of a clear argument may make some impression yet they nevertheless stand firm and keep out the enemy truth that would captivate or disturb them Tell a man passionately in love that he is jilted bring a score of witnesses of the falsehood of his mis-

ardly believed is I suppose that every one hath more than once experimented and though

stantly to close with the more probable side but yet a man hath a power to suspend and restrain his inquiries and not permit a full and satisfactory examination as far as the matter in question

13 *Two means for detecting probabilities* I Suppose fallacy latent in the words employed First That the arguments being (as for the most part they are) brought in words there may be a fallacy latent in them and the consequences being perhaps many in train they may be some of them incoherent There are very few discourses so short clear and consistent to which most men may not with satisfaction enough to themselves raise this doubt and from whose conclusion they may not without reproach of singularity or unreasonableness set themselves free with the old reply *Non per uad bis* it mispersuades though I cannot answer I will not yield

14 *Supposed unknown arguments for the contrary* Secondly Manifest probabilities may be added and the assent withheld upon this suggestion That I know not yet all that may be said on the contrary And therefore though I be beaten it is not necessary I should yield not knowing what forces there are in reserve behind This is a refuge against conclusion so open and so delicate that it is hard to determine when a man is quite out of the verge of it

Cf Bacon's *Logic* I 49.

for and turn himself out stark naked in quest afresh of new notions? All the arguments that can be used will be as little able to prevail as the wind did with the traveller to part with his cloak which he held only the faster To this of wrong hypothesis may be reduced the errors that

they all derive from the infallible truth of the Scripture are an undeniable proof of it All that call themselves Christians allow the text that says *per ardua est* to carry in it the obligation to a very weighty duty But yet how very erroneous all one of their practices be who understand ing nothing but the French take this rule with

¹ Cf Bacon on the *buse hypothesis* in Book I of *Logic*.
Cf *Logic* I 19.

5. It has for its basis naturally determined the
 sent. B t y t there is some d f t and man
 ha in carefully inquired into all the grounds of
 probability and unlikelihood d his utmost to
 inform himself in all particulars fairly and cast
 p th m t tal o both s d s may in most
 cases, com t a k ledge upon the wh le
 mat er o wh h s d th p b bility rests
 m n n r n f matter { reason being

sent. So that I think m y co c i de, mat, m
 propositions, where th gh the p oofs n
 ar f m o t m m t y t ther are s f f i c t
 grounds t suspect that ther is ther fall cy in
 rds, r certain proof as cons d ble t be
 prod ced the co urary d there assent, sus-
 pense duse t are f t m lun ary uons.
 B t here the proofs ar such as mak t highly
 probable, and ther is t sufficient gro d t
 pe t t h t h th r f l l y f w rds
 (such sober and sen us cons der too may dis-
 cover) qually alid proofs, t discov red
 la est th ther d (which also the tur f
 the thing may in some cases, mak pla t a
 considerat man) there I think, man wh has
 bed them can scarce refuse his asse t to the
 ad which th gre ter probability ppears.
 Whether t be probabl ha promiscu us jum
 bl f printing t h uld f t f l l i n t a
 method and rd which sh uld t amp n paper
 a coherent discourse tha bli d f r u t u s
 co urse f t m s t g u d d by u der
 tanding gent, sh uld frequently consu t the
 bodies of any pecies f animals in these and the
 like cases, I think, body th t considers them
 can be j t t tand which ad t take, m
 allw er in his assent. Lastly when ther can
 be no suppositi (th thing is its own nature in
 different and wh lly depending pon th testa-
 mo y f w t cses) that there is as fair testimo y
 ainst, as f the matter of fact tested which
 by inquiry is t be learned m whether there
 was t usand sev hundred y ars g such
 a man m me as Julius Caesar in all uch cases,
 I say I think is in any ratio al man power
 to refuse his asse bu th t t c ssarily f l l w a,
 and closes w th ch probabilities. In ther less
 clear cases, I think t is in man power t sus-
 pend his asse t d perhaps co t h mself
 th the proofs h has, if they f ur th pin
 that suits w th his inclina io or in rest, and so
 top from further search. Bu tha man should
 afford his assent t that ad which th less
 probability ppears t him, seems to me utterly

impracticabl and as impossible as it is to be-
 lieve the same thing probable and improbable
 t th same time.

W h e r t our power t suspend our judgment

two deas appears to us m m s, m
 diately by the assistance f reason I can no
 more refuse t percei e, nor a o d knowing
 t, than I ca a o d seeing those byes which I
 turn my yes to and look n in daylight and
 what upo full examination I find the most prob-
 able, I cannot deny my assent to B t, though m
 cann t hinder our kn wledge, where the gree
 me tis occ perced r our assent, here the
 probability manifestly appears upon du cons d
 erat of all th measures of t y t w can hun

erro infidelity could ot in any case be a
 f ult. Thus, in some cases can prevent o sus-
 pend ur assent but can man rved in modern
 o ancie t h u r y d ubt b ther th re is such a
 pl ce as R me, h ther there as such a man
 as J l u s C e s a r? I de ed th re are mull ons of
 truths that a man is n t, or may ot think him-
 self co d t kn w as wh ther our king
 Richard the Thurd was crooked o no r wheth-
 er Ro er Bacon was mathematician r a mag-
 ician. I these and such lik cases, where the as-
 sent w y or ther is f no importa c t th
 int rest f any n action, n co cernment
 f h u s f l l o w i n g d p e n d i n g t h e r e o n t h r e t i s
 n i t r a n g e t h a t t h m u n d s h u l d g i v e s e l f p r o
 t h c o m m o n p u n i o n o r r e d e r s e l f t o t h e f i r s t
 c o m e r T h e s e a n d t h e l i k p u n i o n s a r e o f s o l i t t l e
 w e i g h t a n d m o m e n t, t h a t, l i k m o t e s i n t h s u n
 t h m t e n d e n c i e s a r e c r y a r e l y t a k e n n u c e f
 T h e y a t t h e r e, a s t w e r e, b y c h a n c e a n d t h e
 m u n d i t s t h m f l i b e t y B u t h t h e
 m u n d j d g e s t h a t t h p r o p o s i t i o n h a s c o c e r n
 m t i o n i h r e t h e a s s e n t n t a s s e n t i n g i s
 t h g h t t d r c o n s e q n o c s f m o m e n t a f t e r
 t, a n d g o o d a n d e v i l i d p e n d c h o o s g r
 r e f u s i n g t h r i g h t d a n d t h m u n d s e t s t h e s e l f
 s e n u s y t i n q u i r e a n d e x a m i n t h p r o b a b i l i t y
 t h e r e I t h i n k t i s n t i n u r c h o c e t o t a k e w h i c h
 i d w p l e a s e, i f m a n i f e s t o d d s p p e a r n t h e r
 T h e g r e a t e r p r o b a b i l i t y I t h i n k, i n t h a t c a s e w i l l
 d t e r m i n t h a s s e n t a n d m a n c a n n o
 a d a s s e n t i n g t a k i n g t t b e t r u w h e r e h
 p e c c e s t h e g r e t e r p r o b a b i l i t y t h a n h c a
 o d k n w i n g t t b e t r u w h e r e h p e r c e i s
 t h e a g r e e m e n t d i s a g r e e m e n t o f a n y t w o d e a s.

If this be so the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of probability¹ as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good

17 IV *Authenticity* The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of and

giving up our assent to the common received opinions either of our friends or party neighbourhood or country. How many men have no other ground for their tenets than the supposed honesty or learning or number of those of the same profession? As if honest or bookish men could not err or truth were to be established by the vote of the multitude yet this with most men serves the turn. The tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity it comes to me with the passport of former ages and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it other men have been and are of the same opinion (for that is all is said) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it. A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions than take them up by such measures. All men are liable to error and most men are in many points by pass on or interest under temptation to it. If we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world and the leaders of parties we should not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its own sake that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained. This at least is certain there is not an opinion so absurd which a man may not receive upon this ground. There is no error to be named which has not had its professors and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in if he thinks that he is in the right way wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow.

18 Not so many men in error as is commonly supposed. But notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions I must do mankind that right as to say *There are not so many men in error as is commonly supposed*. Not that I think they embrace the truth but indeed because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about they have no thought no opinion at all. For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world he would not find concerning those matters they are so zealous for that they have any opinions of their own much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance of probability. They

Cf. Bacon *Novum Organum* I 61 122

are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in and there like the common soldiers of an army show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct without ever examining or so much as knowing the cause they contend for. If a man's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion for what reason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his church and troubles himself to examine the grounds of this or that doctrine? It is enough for him to obey his leaders to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit preferment or protection in that society. Thus men become professors of and combatants for those opinions they were never convinced of nor proselytes to no nor ever had so much as floating in their heads and though one cannot say there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are yet this is certain there are fewer that actually assent to them and mistake them for truths than is imagined.

Chap. XXI Of the Division of the Sciences¹

1 Science may be divided into three sorts. All that can fall within the compass of human understanding being either *First* the nature of things as they are in themselves their relations and their manner of operation or *Secondly* that which man himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of any end especially happiness² or *Thirdly* the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated. I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts —

Physica First The knowledge of things as they are in the world as proper beings their constitution properties and operations whereby I mean not only matter and body but spirits also which have the proper natures constitutions and operations as well as bodies. Thus in a little more enlarged sense of the word I call *Philosophy*. The end of this is bare speculative truth and whatsoever can afford the mind of man any such falls under this branch whether it be God himself angels spirits bodies or any of the relations as number and figure &c.

3 *Practica Secondly* *Πρακτική* The skill of right applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things good and useful. The most considerable under this head is *ethics* which is

¹ Cf. Bk II ch. iii III ch. IV ch. iii. § 26
Cf. Bk II chh. xi, xxvii.

the seeking out those rules and measure of human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to practise them. The end of this is not bare speculation and the knowledge of truth but *rectitudo*, and a good effect variable.

4. *quæritur* Item the third branch may be called *Symbolica* the doctrine of signs the most usual whereof being words, is aptly enough termed *Verbalis* is the business whereof is the use of

signs. As the things the mind conceives are none of them, besides itself present to the understanding it is necessary that something else as signs or representation of the thing to consider should be present to it and these are *deas*. And because the scene of *deas* that makes man's thoughts cannot be laid open to the immediate use of another no laid up any here but in the memory a crysure repository thereof to communicate with his to one another as well as record them for our own use. Signs of our *deas* are also necessary those which men have found most convenient, and therefore generally make use of are *articulati* and. The consideration then, of *deas* and *words* as the great instruments of knowledge, makes a desperate part of their

Cf. Bk. II. ch. x. §§ 4, 5, 8, 9.

contemplation who could take a view of human knowledge in the whole extent of it. And perhaps if they were distinctly weighed and duly considered, they would afford us another sort of logic and critic, than what we have been hitherto acquainted with.²

5. Thus is the first and most general division of the objects of our understanding. This seems to me the first and most general, as well as natural division of the objects of our understanding. For a man can employ his thoughts about nothing but either the contemplation of things themselves, for the discovery of truth, or about the things in his own power which are his own acts as for the attainment of his own ends. In the signs the mind makes use of both in the one and the other and the right ordering of them, for is clearer information. All which three, viz, it is as they are in themselves known, as they depend on us, in order to happiness and the right use of signs in order to knowledge being still different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt. I. ch. ix.

Cf. Bk. I. ch. ix. § 5. So Bacon, *Novum Organum* I. 9.

Cf. Bacon, *Advancement of Learning* Bk. II. the map of the Intellectual World also Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt. I. ch. ix.

If this be so the foundation of error will lie in wrong measures of probability¹ as the foundation of vice in wrong measures of good

17 IV *Authority* The fourth and last wrong measure of probability I shall take notice of and which keeps in ignorance or error more people than all the other together is that which I have mentioned in the foregoing chapter I mean the giving up our assent to the common received opinions either of our fr

same profession² As f

estne turn The tenet has had the attestation of reverend antiquity it comes to me with the passport of former ages and therefore I am secure in the reception I give it other men have been and are of the same opinion (for that is all is said) and therefore it is reasonable for me to embrace it A man may more justifiably throw up cross and pile for his opinions than take them up by such measures All men are liable to error and most men are in many points by passion or interest under temptation to it If we could but see the secret motives that influenced the men of name and learning in the world and the leaders of parties we should not always find that it was the embracing of truth for its own sake that made them espouse the doctrines they owned and maintained Thus at least in certain there is not an opinion so absurd which a man may not receive upon this ground There is no error to be named which has not had its professors and a man shall never want crooked paths to walk in if he thinks that he is in the right way wherever he has the footsteps of others to follow

18 It is so many men in it as is commonly supposed But notwithstanding the great noise is made in the world about errors and opinions I must do mankind that right as to say *There is not so many men as are of such opinions as is commonly supposed* Not that I think they embrace the truth but indeed because concerning those doctrines they keep such a stir about they have no thought no opinion at all For if any one should a little catechise the greatest part of the partisans of most of the sects in the world he would not find concerning those matters they are so zealous for that they have any opinions of their own much less would he have reason to think that they took them upon the examination of arguments and appearance of probability They

Cf. Bacon *De um O gnam*, I 61 122

are resolved to stick to a party that education or interest has engaged them in and there like the common soldiers of an army show their courage and warmth as their leaders direct without ever examining or so much as knowing the cause they contend for If a man's life shows that he has no serious regard for religion for what reason should we think that he beats his head about the opinions of his church

cause and thereby approve himself to those who can give him credit preferment or protection in that society Thus men become professors of and combatants for those opinions they were never convinced of nor proselytes to no nor ever had so much as floating in their heads and though one can

1. turns than is imagined

Chap. XXI Of the Division of the Sciences³

1 Science may be divided into three sorts All that can fall within the compass of human understanding being either F

ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of any end especially happiness or *Thy* the ways and means whereby the knowledge of both the one and the other of these is attained and communicated I think science may be divided properly into these three sorts —

2 *Physics* First The knowledge of things as they are in their own proper beings their constitution properties and operations whereby I mean not only matter and body but spirits also which have their proper natures constitutions and operations as all is bod This in a little more enlarged sense of the word I call *Physics* or *natural philosophy* The end of this is bare speculation and truth and whatsoever can afford it mind of man any such falls under this branch I think it be God himself and his spirits bodies or any of the affections as number and figure &c

3 *Practical Science* Secondly *Πρακτική* These I do right applying our own powers and actions for the attainment of things good and useful The most considerable under this head is *ethics* which is

Cf. Bk II ch viii III ch IV ch iii. § 26
Cf. Bk II chh xxi, xxvii.

GEORGE BERKELEY
THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

GEORGE BERKELEY 1685-1753

BERKELEY the eldest son of an English settler in Ireland, was born March 2 1685, probably at Dysert Castle, near Thomastown in County Kilkenny. At the age of eleven he was enrolled at Trinity College, Dublin, because of his precocity.

After passing the examinations with great distinction. In 1699 he was ordained a deacon in the Anglican church.

The *Common Place Book* he kept during these early years at Trinity College reveal that Berkeley first became interested in philosophy through the influence of Newton, Boyle, and Locke. In 1703 he had formed society to discuss the new philosophy, and his notes indicate that he was so convinced that he had discovered new principles which enabled him to overcome the difficulties he encountered in Locke. His first publication was a review of two mathematical treatises, which appeared in 1707. His own philosophical doctrine was applied for the first time in *A Discourse Towards the New Theory of Vision* (1709) and gained full acceptance a year later in his *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. His concern with moral and social problems became evident at this time in a series of sermons he delivered in the college chapel, the first of which was subsequently published as *A Discourse of the Passions and Affections*.

In 1709 Berkeley published a leaflet in response to the advertisement in the *London Review* of his *Treatise of the Principles of Human Knowledge* and also to make acquaintance with the friends of Lord Shaftesbury and to be instantly appreciated. Swift introduced him to the court and recorded the encounter in

his paper the *Guardian*, and Addison entertained him with wine at the premiere of his *Cato*.

Most of the time between 1714 and 1721 Berkeley spent in travel on the continent. Swift secured him an appointment as chaplain to Lord Peterborough, special ambassador for the coronation of the King of Sicily and he spent the great part of 1714 in France and Italy. His return at the end of that year coincided with the fall from power of his friends, and being unable to obtain an appointment to his liking he accepted a position in the customs at Bristol.

Berkeley's journey to Italy

He spent most of the time in Italy, here, in addition to his tutorial work, he explored antiquities and art treasures and devoted considerable attention to the observation of natural history. On one occasion he climbed Vesuvius.

Berkeley returned to England in 1721 to find the country in the midst of the social crisis caused by the bursting of the South Sea Bubble. He published his view of the affair in the *Discourse Towards the Present State of Great Britain*, in which he proposed extensive reformatory laws, encouragement of the arts, and return to simpler life. Soon afterwards he commenced his project of the encouragement of religious and moral improvement in Bermuda. To his friend Lord Percival to whom he had dedicated the *Theory of Vision* he set his verses prophesying westward the course of Empire takes us, and in a letter declared his determination to spend the rest of my days on the island of Bermuda. In 1723 Esther Vanhomrigh, Swift's Vanessa, sold what may be termed half of her property amounting to four thousand pounds, although

his Bermuda project with great success. In

CONTENTS
THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE,	399
DEDICATION	403
PREFACE,	404
INTRODUCTION	405
THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE	413

1724 he returned to London and published his pamphlet entitled *A Proposal for the Better Supply in of Churches in our Foreign Plantations and for Converting the Savage Americans to Christianity*. In addition to obtaining many private subscriptions for his plan he persuaded Parliament to promise a grant of twenty thousand pounds and obtained a royal charter for his projected college.

In 1728 he married the daughter of the chief justice of Ireland and with three companions departed for America. The group settled first at Newport Rhode Island with the aim of buying lands and stock to supply the college at Bermuda and of encouraging commerce between the island and the mainland. But with Berkeley away from London Parliament showed no inclination to forward the promised grant and in 1731 it became clear that the project was a failure. During the rest of his sojourn in Amer-

For the last eighteen years of his life Berkeley was Bishop of Cloyne in Ireland. The year he became bishop he published his *Analyst* (1734) in which he criticised Newtonian mathematics and suggested certain corrections. Between 1735 and 1737 he published a series of papers entitled *The Querist* which dealt with the welfare of Ireland. The plague years of 1740 and 1741 led him to publish his *Siris* or *a Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Enquiries concerning the*

Berkeley's health which had begun to fail was seriously affected by the death of his eldest son in 1750. He had long wanted to retire to Oxford and now in order to be with his younger son who was studying there he took the extraordinary step of resigning his bishopric. The King refused to accept his resignation and declared that he might live where he chose but he must die a bishop. Berkeley moved to Oxford in 1752. He died there the following year on January 14 and was buried in Christ Church.

house and library to Yale. Although his own plans had failed he continued to follow with lively interest the progress of education in America and on several later occasions donated books to both Yale and Harvard.

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THOMAS EARL OF PEMBROKE &c.
KNIGHT OF THE MOST NOBLE ORDER OF THE GARTER
AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S
MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL

MY LORD

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has not the honour to be known to your lordship should presume to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written something, with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and Religion in the world should make choice of your lordship for his patron, will not be thought strange by any one that is not altogether unacquainted with the present state of the church and learning and consequently ignorant how great an ornament and support you are to both. Yet, nothing could have induced me to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not encouraged by that candour and native goodness which is so bright a part in your lordship's character. I must add my lord, that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased to show towards our Society gave me hopes you would not be unwilling to countenance the studies of one of its members. These considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have it known that I am with the truest and most profound respect, on account of that learning and virtue which the world so justly admires in your lordship.

MY LORD

Your lordship's most humble
and most devoted servant,
GEORGE BERKELEY

INTRODUCTION

1 Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should possess a great calm discernment of mind, great clearness of ideas, and knowledge of the deepest truths and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is we see the illiterate bulk of mankind that walk the high-road of plain common sense and are governed by the dictates of nature for the most part do not heed the things that are

consequences which cannot be manifested or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than that he himself would desire for that knowledge

—
tutes it may have implied in the creation, usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves—that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

4 My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have in truth involved all that doubtful and uncertainty

—
ness: and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is worth well deserving our pains to make strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human knowledge, to sift and examine them as well as to ally such things may be some

—
which have been sustained and might have been denied.

5 How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have engaged before me in the like designs, I am at least with some hopes—upon the consideration that the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer and may perhaps, by close and narrow survey discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

6 In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction

part from sense and reason.

of prior principles to reason, meditate and reflect the nature of things, but thousands of scruples pressing upon our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense derived from all parts discover themselves to our view and endeavoring to correct these by reason, we are in sensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes, difficulties, and intricacies which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, which is worse than in former Secrecism.

2 The cause of this is thought to be the insecurity of things, the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. It is said, the faculties we have are fitted those designed by nature for the support and comfort of life and penetration to the inward sense: and consequently of things. Besides, the mind of man being fitted which treats of things which partake of infinity is no better directed at it than the faculties and conceptions, out of which it is impossible to should extricate itself being of the nature of infinity it be comprehended by that which is finite.

3 But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is hard thing to suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in

PREFACE

WHAT I here make public has after a long and scrupulous inquiry seemed to me evidently true and not useless to be known—particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God or the natural immortality of the soul. Whether it be so or no I am content the reader should impartially examine since I do not think myself any farther concerned for the success of what I have written than as it is agreeable to truth. *But to the end this may not suffer* I make it my request that the reader suspend his judgment till he has once at least read the whole through with that degree of attention and thought which the subject matter shall seem to deserve. For as there are some passages that taken by themselves are very liable (nor could it be remedied) to gross misinterpretation and to be charged with most absurd consequences which nevertheless upon an entire perusal will appear not to follow from them so likewise though the whole should be read over yet if this be done transiently it is very probable my sense may be mistaken but to a thinking reader I flatter myself it will be throughout clear and obvious. As for the characters of novelty and singularity which some of the following notions may seem to bear it is I hope needless to make any apology on that account. He must surely be either very weak or very little acquainted with the sciences who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration for no other reason but because it is newly known and contrary to the prejudices of mankind. Thus much I thought fit to premise in order to prevent if possible the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to condemn an opinion before they rightly comprehend it.

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy being nothing else but the study of wisdom and truth, it may with reason be expected that those who have spent most time and pains in it should enjoy greater calm and serenity of mind, greater clearness and evidence of knowledge and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. Yet so it is we see the whole bulk of mankind thus walk the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in their senses, and are free of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct than if we the light of superior principles to reason, meditate, and reflect the nature of things, but thousand scruples spring in our minds concerning those things which before we seemed fully to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense derived from all parts discover themselves to our view, and, endeavouring to correct these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into a labyrinth of paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as we advance in speculation, till at length, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we were, or which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism.

The cause of this is though it be the obscurity of things, or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings. I say said, the faculties have are few and those designed by nature for the support and comfort of life and not to penetrate into the inward essence and constitution of things. Besides, the mind of man being finite, who treats of things which partake of infinity is not to be wondered at if it runs into absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible should ever extricate itself, it being of the nature of infinity not to be comprehended by what which is finite.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too partial to ourselves in placing the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong use we make of them. It is hard thing suppose that right deductions from true principles should ever end in

consequences which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to the wanted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever appears to us to may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves—that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those Principles are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and uncertainty those absurdities and contradictions, into the several sects of philosophy inasmuch that the wisest men have thought our ignorance incurable, concerning that arise from the natural dullness and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is worth well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning the First Principles of Human knowledge, to sift and examine them in all different places, to see whether there may be some grounds to suspect that those less and difficulties, which lay and embarrass the mind in its search after truth, do not arise from any darkness and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding so much as from false Principles which have been insisted on, and might have been removed.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may seem, when I consider how many great and extraordinary men have gone before me in the like design, yet I am not without some hopes—upon the consideration that the largest errors are not always the clearest, and that he who is short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer and may perhaps, by a close and narrow survey, discern that which had escaped far better eyes.

6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier conceiving what I will say, it is proper to premise somewhat, by way of Introduction,

concerning the nature and abuse of Language But the unravelling this matter leads me in some measure to anticipate my design by taking notice of what seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate and perplexed and to have occasioned innumerable errors and difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge And that is the opinion that the mind hath a power of framing *abstract ideas* or notions of things He

ner thought to be the object of those sciences which go and of a the most abstruse which one shall scarce find any question handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in the mind and that it is well acquainted with them

7 It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things do never really exist each of them apart by itself and separated from all others but are mixed as it were and blended together several in the same object But we are told the mind being able to consider each quality singly or abstracted from those other qualities with which it is united does by that means frame to itself abstract ideas For example there is perceived by sight an object extended coloured and moved this mixed or compound idea the mind resolving into its simple constituent parts and viewing each by itself exclusive of the rest does frame the abstract ideas of extension colour and motion Not that it is possible for colour or motion to exist without extension but only that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour exclusive of extension and of motion exclusive of both colour and extension

Again the mind having observed that in the particular extensions perceived by sense there is something common and alike in all and some other things peculiar as this or that figure or magnitude which distinguish them one from another it considers apart or singles out by itself that which is common making thereof a most abstract idea of extension which is neither line surface nor solid nor has any figure or magnitude but is an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the mind by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense that which distinguishes them one from another and retaining that only which is common to all makes an idea of colour in abstract which is neither red nor blue nor white nor any other determinate

colour And in like manner by considering motion abstractedly not only from the body moved but likewise from the figure it describes and all particular directions and velocities the abstract idea of motion is framed which equally corresponds to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by sense

9 And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities or modes so does it by the same precision or mental separation attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings which include several coexistent qualities. For example the mind having observed that Peter James, and John resemble each other in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves out of the complex or compounded idea it has of Peter James and any other particular man that which is peculiar to each retaining only that is common to all and so makes an abstract idea wherein all the particulars equally partake—abstracting entirely from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences which might determine it to any particular existence. And after this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man or if you please humanity or human nature wherein it is true there is included colour because there is no man but has some colour but then it can be neither white nor black nor any particular colour because there is no one particular colour wherein all men partake.

And thus the mind does frame to itself an abstract idea of stature but then it is not easy to conceive

10 Whether others have this wonderful faculty

of abstracting their deas, they best can tell
or myself, I find indeed I ha e faculty of im-
gining, or representing t myself th d as f
those particular things I ha perceiv'd and of
variously compoundi ¶ and d ding them. I
can imagine man w th vch ds, r the upper
parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can
consider the hand, th eye, the nose each by t
self abstracted or separated from the rest of the
body But then whatever hand o eye I imagine
I must ha e some particular shape and colour
as w th d of man that I frame to myself

be plain, I own myself bl t abstract in one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, w th which, though they are united in some bject, yet t is possible they may really exist w thout them. But

And there are ~~genuine~~ ^{many} ~~people~~ ^{who} acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The generality of me which are simple and illiterate never pretend: ~~at~~ ^{to} ~~act~~ ^{have} notions. It is said they are difficult and not to be attained without pains and study we may therefore reasonably conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the learned.

I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of the doctrine of abstraction, and try if I can discover what it is that includes the men of speculation to embrace an opinion so remote from common sense as that seems to be. There has been late deservedly esteemed philosopher who, no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest difference between the reasoning of mankind and beasts. The having of general ideas, saith he, is that which puts perfect distinction between man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For to evidence we observe no foot steps in them of making use of general signs for universal ideas.

from which we have reason to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting or making general ideas, since they have no use of words or any other signs. And a little after
Therefore, I think, we may suppose that it is not thus that the species of brutes are discriminated from men and it is that proper difference where in they are wholly separated and which at last we descend to so wide a distance. For if they have any ideas at all and are not bare machines (as some would have them) we cannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as evident to me that they do some of them, in certain instances reason as that they have sense but it is only in particular ideas, just as they receive them from their senses. They are the best of them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think) the faculty to enlarge them by any kind of business.

means vain to say that it is
in the distinguishing property of that sort of

mad the signs of general deas. —E: y
Human Understanding IV m. 6 But it seems
that w d be mes g n al by being mad

ple, when it is said the change of motion is proportional to the impressed force, or that what it has extensi is divisible these propositions are to be understood of motion and extension in general and nevertheless it will follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea of motion without body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity or that I must conceive a being independent of extension, which is neither line, surface, nor solid, neither great nor small, black, white, nor red, or of any other determinate colour. It is only implied that

whatever particular motion I consider whether it be swift or slow perpendicular horizontal or oblique or in whatever object the axiom concerning it holds equally true As does the other of every particular extension it matters not whether line surface or solid whether of this or that magnitude or figure

12 By observing how ideas become general we may the better judge how words are made so And here it is to be noted that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas but only that there are any *abstract* general ideas for in the passages we have quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas it is always supposed that they are formed by abstraction after the manner set forth in sections 8 and 9 Now if we will annex a meaning to our words and speak only of what we can conceive I believe we shall acknowledge that an idea which considered in itself is particular but common

unless with regard to its signification general since as it is there used it represents all particular lines whatsoever so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated of all lines or in other words of a line in general And as that particular line becomes general by being made a sign so the name line which taken absolutely is particular by being a sign is made general And as the former owes its generality not to its being the

is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult) for it must be neither oblique nor rectangle neither equilateral equicrural nor scalenon but all and none of these at once? Is of itself it something more?

13 This imperfect state has need of such ideas and makes all the haste to them it can for the convenience of communication and enlargement of knowledge to both which it is naturally very much inclined But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about — If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle as is here described it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it nor would I go about it All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no And this methinks can be no hard task for anyone to perform What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts and there try whether he has or can attain to have an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is neither oblique nor rectangle equilateral equicrural nor scalenon but all and none of these at once?

14 Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry with them and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them. And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and labour of the mind to emancipate our thoughts from particular objects and raise them to those sublime speculations that are conversant about abstract ideas From all which the natural consequence should seem to be that so difficult a thing as the forming abstract ideas was not necessary for common use which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men But we are told if they seem obvious and easy to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so No man would fain know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that difficulty and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps for discourse It cannot be when they are grown up for then it seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking it remains therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions will be found a hard task for that tender age Is it not a hard thing to

13 To give the reader

13 To give the reader an understanding (IV vii 9) which is as follows: These ideas are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so. For when we nicely reflect upon them we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which

imagine that couple of children cannot put together their sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till they have first tackled together the more less obvious sciences and so framed in their minds better general ideas, and annexed them to every common sense they make use of?

15. Nor do I think them *what more needful* for the *earliest* of knowledge than for *every* man. It is, I know, a point in which insisted on, that all knowledge demonstrated are both universal and not such, which I fully agree to; then it does not appear to me that those notions are formed by *abstract* in the manner presumed—*as* *equality* so far as I can comprehend not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of *any* thing but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified or represented by it, by virtue whereof it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature *particular* remind redunant of. Thus, to hold demonstration

sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what so ever hypothesis ever. And that to be an even though the right angle nor the equality nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in mind includes all these particulars, but therein there is not the last mention made of them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles are equal to two right angles, because one of them is right angle, & because the sides comprehending it are of the same length. Which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been oblique, and the sides unequal and still that the demonstration have been held good. And for this reason it is that I conclude that to be true of any bilquangular or scalenon which I had demonstrated of a particular right angled equilateral triangle, and not because I demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle. And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract, general, inconsistent idea of triangle. In like manner we may consider matter so far forth as matter so far forth as animal, without framing the former in need of abstract ideas, either of man or of animal inasmuch as all that is perceived is considered.

17. If we could dilate as well as an useful thing to trace the Schoolmen those great masters of abstraction, through all the manifold inextricable byways his error and dispute which the doctrine of abstract natures and numbers seems to have led them into. What objections and contradictions, and what learned dust have been used but their matters, and what multiplicity and antipathy has been from the need of it that mankind are thus given to this day too clearly known to need being insisted on. And that had been well if that ill use of that doctrine were confined to those only who make the most of it professors of it. When men mind the great pains, industry and parts that have for so many ages been laid to the utility and advancement of the sciences, and that the more remains full of darkness and uncertainty and disputes that are like never to have an end, and even those that are thought to be supported by the most abundant and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men and that, taking

whether of this or that so it matters not, do not equally stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever and is in that sense *universal*. All which seems very plain and not to include any difficulty in it.

18. And of the abstract idea of a triangle which equally agrees to all. For because property may be demonstrated to agree to some particular triangle, it will follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle which in all respects is no the same with it. For example, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles triangular triangle are equal to two right angles, I cannot therefore conclude that as if I were to treat all the triangles which have neither right angle nor equal sides. It seems therefore that it is certain this proposition is universal true we must either make particular demonstration of every particular triangle, which is impossible or else for all demonstration of the abstract idea of triangle, in which all the particulars do and therefore partake of by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer that, though the demonstration which I make the demonstration to be for instance that of an isosceles triangular triangle whose

ing all together a very small portion of them does supply any real benefit to mankind other wise than by being an innocent diversion and amusement—I say the consideration of all this is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of all study But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false principles that have obtained in the world amongst all which there is none methinks hath a more wide and extended sway over the thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract general ideas

18 I come now to consider the source of this prevailing notion and that seems to me to be language And surely nothing of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of an opinion so universally received The truth of this appears as from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest patrons of abstract ideas who acknowledge that they are made in order to naming from which it is a clear consequence that if there had been no such things as speech or universal signs there never had been any thought of abstraction See III vi 39 and elsewhere of the *Essay on Human Understanding* Let us examine the manner wherein words have contributed to the origin of that mistake—First then it is thought that every name has or ought to have one only precise and settled signification which inclines men to think there are certain abstract determinate ideas that constitute the true and only immediate signification of each general name and that it is by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general name comes to signify any particular thing Whereas in truth there is no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed to any general

and will clearly appear to anyone by a little reflection To this it will be objected that every name that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain signification For example a triangle is defined to be a plain surface comprehended by three right lines by which that name is limited to denote one certain idea and no other To which I answer that in the definition it is not said whether the surface be great or small black or white nor whether the sides be long or short equal or unequal nor with what angles they are inclined to each other in all which there may be great variety and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the signification of the word triangle It is one thing for to keep a name constantly to the same definition and another to make it stand everywhere for the same

idea the one is necessary the other useless and impracticable.

19 But to give a farther account how words came to produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that it is a received opinion

ing withal certain that names which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded that they stand for abstract notions That there are many names in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to others determinate particular ideas or in truth anything at all is what nobody will deny

time they are used excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for—in reading and discoursing names being for the most part used as letters are in Algebra in which though a particular quantity be marked by each letter yet to proceed right it is not requisite that in every step each letter suggest to your thought that particular quantity it was appointed to stand for

20 Besides the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the chief and only end of language as is commonly supposed There are other ends as the raising of some passion the exciting to or deterring from an action the putting the mind in some particular disposition—to which the former is in many cases barely subservient and sometimes entirely omitted hence these can be obtained without it as I think does not unfrequently happen in the familiar use of language I entreat the reader to reflect on himself and see if it doth not often happen either in hearing or reading a discourse that the passions of fear love hatred admiration disgust like to rise immediately in his mind

of the characters is oft immediately affected with those passions which at first are not to be produced by the intervention of ideas that are now gotten and may not for example be affected we have being the cause

a dread, though we think not of any particular evil likely to befall us, nor yet frame to ourselves an idea of danger. Abstract. If any one shall ever so little reflect of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will evidently appear to him that general names are often used in the propriety of language without the speaker's designing them for marks of ideas in his mind, which he would have them use the mind of the hearer. Even proper names themselves do not seem always spoken though they do not bring into our view the ideas of those individuals that are supposed to be marked by them. For example, when a schoolman tells me Aristotle hath said, I know not what he means by this disposition

due to the misapprehension of

to restrain their judgment to the authority of that philosopher is impossible any of either of his person, writings, reputation should go before. I must be reminded of the kind of my being given, but which should I insist those things which every day experience will, I doubt not, penitently suggest unto him.

It has been I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstract Ideas. It has considered what has

lastly, we have traced them to their source from

and names may be derived from the word and made the possession of no single person. But the same idea must be owned that most parts of knowledge have been wrangled perplexed and darkened by the abuse of words, and general words of speech wherein they are delivered. Since therefore words are so properly impose the understanding, whatever ideas I consider I shall endeavour to take them bare and naked into my view keeping in mind of my thoughts so far as I am able those names which I use and constant use hath so truly united with them from which I may expect to derive the following advantages.

First, I shall be sure to get clear of all controversies purely bare—the putting up of high weeds in almost all the sciences has been main hinder the growth of true and sound knowledge. Secondly, thus seemeth to be sure

way to extricate myself out of that fine and subtil net of abstract ideas which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of men, and that with this peculiar circumstance that by how much the fine and more various was the wit of any man, by so much the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and fasten hold therein. Thirdly, so long as I confine my thoughts to my own ideas of words, I do not see how I can easily be mistaken. The objects I consider I clearly and adequately know. I cannot be deceived in thinking I have an idea which I have not. It is not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are alike or unlike that are not truly so. To discern the agreements or disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are included in any compound idea and what not, there is no thing more requisite than an attentive percept of what passes in my own understanding.

23 But the attainment of all these advantages doth presuppose an entire deliverance from the deception of words, which I dare hardly promise myself so difficult a thing is to dissolve an union so early begun and confirmed by so long a habit as that betwixt words and ideas. Which difficulty must be necessary much increased by the doctrine of *bonum et malum*. For so long as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, and that not seem strange that they should use words for ideas—being used an impracticable thing to say as de the word, and retain the abstract idea in the mind which is itself was perfectly inconceivable. This seems to me the principal cause why those men who have so

to perform it themselves. Of late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and insignificant disputes which grow out of the abuse of words. And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well, that we attend to the ideas signified, and do without attention to the words which signify them. But how good soever this advice may be they have given there, it is plain

mediate signification of every general name was determined abstract ideas.

4. But, these being known to be mistakes, a man may with greater ease prevent his being imposed by words. If that knowledge he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea an

... = looking for ideas where there are none to be had. It were therefore to be wished that everyone could use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which ...

... into the entrails of the earth in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity—we need only draw the curtain of words to hold the fairest tree of knowledge whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of our hand

25 Unless we take care to clear the First Prin

ciples of knowledge from the embarrass and delusion of words we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose we may draw consequences from consequences and be never the wiser. The farther we go we shall only lose our selves the more irrecoverably and be the deeper entangled in difficulties and mistakes. Whoever therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to discover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of all danger of being deceived by my words and I do not see how he can be led in to an error by considering his own naked undisguised ideas.

A TREATISE CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

1 It is evident to any one who takes survey of the acts of human knowledge that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind or lastly ideas formed by help of memory and imagination—either compound in discerning or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways. By which I have the idea of light and colours, with their several degrees and variations. By touch I perceive hard and soft heat and cold, motion and resistance, and of all these more and less than as quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with odours the palate with tastes and hearing conveys sounds to the mind in all their variety of tone and composition. And as several of these are observed to accompany each other they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, certain colour, taste, smell, figure and consistence having been observed to go together are accounted one distinct thing signified by the name of *apple*.

Like collections of ideas constitute stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things—which as they are pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief and so forth.

II It, besides all this endless variety of ideas or objects of knowledge there is likewise something which knows or perceives them, and exercises divers operations, as willing, imagining, remembering about them. This perceiving subject being as I call *mind, first, soul or myself*. By which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or which is the same thing whereby they are perceived—for the existence of an idea consists in being perceived.

3 The ideas for and the mind, as was

seems no less evident that the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense however blended or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them.—I think an intuition of knowledge may be obtained of this by any one that shall attend to what is meant by the term *intuition* when applied to sensible things. The table I write on I say exists, that is, I see and feel it and if I were out of my study I should say it existed—meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit or being does perceive it. There was an odour

ble. Their existence is perceived out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

4. It is indeed an amazing strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with what great an assurance and acquiescence does this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense. and what do we perceive besides our own

nexed to any name And he that knows names do not always stand for ideas will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas where there are none to be had It were therefore to be wished that everyone would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a clear view of the ideas he would consider separating from them all that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute to blind the judgment and divide the attention In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity—we need only draw the curtain of words to hold the fairest tree of knowledge whose fruit is excellent and within the reach of our hand

25 Unless we take care to clear the First Prin

ciples of knowledge from the embarrass and delusion of words we may make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose we may draw consequences from consequences and be never the wiser The farther we go we shall only lose our

entreat him to make my words the occasion of his own thinking and endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I had in writing them By this means it will be easy for

gused ideas.

existing in the mind alone that depend on and are occasioned by the different size, texture and colour of the minute particles of matter. Thus they take for an undoubted truth, which they may demonstrate beyond all exception. Now if we be certain that those original quantities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities, and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them, it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire any one to reflect and try whether he can, by any abstraction of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body without all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and moving, but I must also give it some colour or other sensible quality which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In short, extension, figure, and motion, abstracted from all other qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible qualities are, there must also be also, to wit, in the mind and nowhere else.

Again, *greatness and smallness, rest and slow* are allowed to exist nowhere without the mind, being entirely relative, and changing as the figure or position of the organs of sense varies. The extension therefore which exists without the mind is neither great nor small, the motion neither rest nor slow; that is, they are nothing at all. But as you let us be extension in general, and motion in general, thus we see how much the tenet of extended movable substances existing without the mind depends on the strange doctrine of abstract laws. And here I cannot but remark how small the vague and indeterminate description of Matter or corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into by their principles, resembles the antiquated and so much ridiculed notion of *substance prima*, to be met with in Aristotle and his followers. Which extension and motion cannot be conceived since therefore it has been shown that extension exists not in an unthinking substance, the same must also be true of sound.

The number is entirely the creature of the mind, even though the other qualities be allowed to exist. You will be ready to whoever considers that the same thing bears a different denomination of number at the mind views it in different respects. Thus, the same extension may be three or three-hundred, according as the mind considers it with reference to a yard, foot, or an inch. Number is so truly relative and dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think how any one would give it an

absolute existence without the mind. We say one book, one page, one line, etc. all these are equally units, though some contain several of the others. And in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind.

13. Lastly I know some will have to be a simple or uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind. That I have any such idea answering the word *why* I do not find; and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it, on the contrary it should be the most familiar to my understanding since it is said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all the ways of sensation and reflection. To say no more it is an *abstract law*.

4. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence in Matter or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for instance, it is said that heat and cold are affections only of the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the corporeal substances which excite them, for that the same body, which appears cold to one hand seems warm to another. Now why may we not as well argue that figure and extension are not patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter because to the same eye at different distances, or eyes of different texture at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind. Again, it is proved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing, because the thing remains unaltered the sweetness is changed into bitter as in case of a fever or otherwise tainted palate. Is it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind, since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter the motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower without any alteration in any external object.

5. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are thought manifestly to prove that colours and taste exist only in the mind, and he shall find they may with equal force be brought to prove the same thing of extension, figure, and motion. Though it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much prove that there is no extension or colour in an outward object, as that we do not know by sense which is the true extension or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing plainly shew it to be impossible that any colour or extension at all, or other sensible quality whatsoever should exist in an un-

ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these or any combination of them should exist unperceived?

5 If we thoroughly examine this tenet it will perhaps be found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of *abstract id*

to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours heat and cold extension and figures—in a word the things we see and feel—what are they but so many sensations notions ideas or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to separate even in thought any of these from perception? For my part I might as easily divide a thing from itself I may indeed divide in my thoughts or conceive apart from each other those things which perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided Thus I imagine the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself So far I will not deny I can abstract—if that may be

our figure motion smell taste etc. &c. the ideas perceived by sense Now for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction for to have an idea is all one as to perceive that therefore wherein colour figure and the like qualities exist must perceive them hence it is clear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of those ideas

8 But say you though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind yet there may be things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the mind in an unthinking substance I answer an idea can be like nothing but an idea a colour or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure If I look but never so little into our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to conceive a likeness except only between our ideas. And I ask whether those supposed originals or external things of which our ideas are the pictures or representations be themselves perceivable or no? If they are then they are ideas and we have gained our point but if you say they are not I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a colour is like something which is invisible hard or soft like something which is intangible and so of the rest

9 Some there are who make a distinction between *prima* and *seconda* qualities By the former they mean extension figure motion rest, solidity or impenetrability and number by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds tastes and so forth The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind or unperceived but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind in an unthinking substance which they call Matter By Matter therefore we are to understand an inert senseless substance in which extends on figure and motion do actually subsist But it is evident from what we have already shown that extension figure and motion are only ideas existing in the mind and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea and that consequently neither they nor the archetypes can exist in an unperceiving mind

6 Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his eyes to see them Such I take this important one to be viz that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world have not any subsistence without a mind that the *being* is to be perceived or known that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me or do not exist in my mind or that of any other created spirit they must either have no existence at all or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit—it being perfectly intelligible and involving all the absurdity of abstracting to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a spirit To be convinced of which the reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the *being* of a sensible thing from its *being perceived*

7 From what has been said it follows there is not any other Substance than Spirit or that which perceives But for the fuller proof of this point let it be considered the sensible qualities are col-

our *cy* no assert that figure motion and the rest of the primary or original qualities do exist without the mind in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that colours, sounds, heat, cold and such like secondary qualities do not—which they tell us are sensations

to make any reasonable person suspect the
 existence of that argument is he may think
 himself to have refuted the existence of bodies with

no real difficulties (not to mention metaphysics)
 which have sprung from the text. It has oc-
 curred to me that the controversy is a dispute

confirming what has been, if I mistake not
 sufficiently demonstrated previously as because I shall
 hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of

22 I am afraid I have given cause to think I
 am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For
 that purpose is to dilate that which may
 be demonstrated with the utmost brevity

thought may exist without the mind. To make
 out this, it is necessary that you conceive them
 as distinct and without thought of his
 manifest personality. When we do our utmost
 to conceive the existence of spiritual bodies, we
 are aware that they are only contemplating our own
 mind

is given by
 although in them they are perceived by reflex
 action
 and

proceeds against the existence of the eternal substance
 24 It is very obvious upon the last inquiry
 into the truth, to know whether it is possible
 for us to understand that is meant by the
 absolute existence of sensible by itself. I think
 that the mind is distinct from those things
 that directly attend it. Else nothing
 tall and direct could be said of this. I know
 each of our faculties is distinct from the
 calmly to determine the rights and if by
 the attention the emptiness repugnancy of
 these perceptions does appear clearly in the
 manner of quiescence in the mind it is so that

Inasmuch that I am content to put the whole
 upon this issue — If you can but conceive it possible
 for extended material substance in
 general, if any one idea, anything like
 idea, to exist otherwise than in mind perceiv-
 ing it, I shall readily grant the cause. And as
 for all that comprises of spiritual bodies, you
 need for I shall grant you as much as though
 you cannot then give me any reason why
 believe it exists, assign any use to it when it is
 supposed to exist. I say the bare possibility of
 your perceptions being truly passed an argu-
 ment that it is so

3. But, say you, surely there is something as
 than for me to imagine trees, for instance in a
 park, books existing in a closet, and body
 by itself perceived in my mind. I answer you may so there
 no difficulty in but what is all this, I be-
 lieve you, more than framing your mind de-
 cern ideas which you call books and trees, and
 the same time imagining I am the idea of any
 one that may perceive them in my mind. But do you
 yourself perceive or think of them all the while
 This therefore is the purpose of this purpose only
 to show you have the power of imagining or forming
 ideas in your mind but it does not show that
 you can conceive a possible thing by itself

to This is what I repeat and culcate and
 earnestly commend to the attentive thoughts
 of the reader

5 All our ideas, sensations, notions, things
 things which we perceive by whatsoever names
 they may be distinguished are necessarily
 — that is nothing of power or generation
 in themselves. So that our ideas are objects of thought
 cannot produce material alterations
 there. They are satisfied with truth of this thing
 though like equis but a bare reserve of
 understood as necessary and necessary part of them
 exist only in the mind, to follow that
 in the things themselves but with respect to those
 which are perceived in the mind, as when the sense

passess in reality in inasmuch that it

being as is distinct from sect 8. Where it
 plainly follows that extension is a figure and mo-
 tion cannot be the cause of sensations. To
 say the effect, that these are the effects of power

thinking subject without the mind or in truth that there should be any such thing as an outward object

16 But let us examine a little the received opinion — It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter and that Matter is the *substratum* that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say you I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer though you have no positive yet if you have any meaning at all you must at least have a relative idea of Matter though you know not what it is yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense—as when I say that pillars support a building in what sense therefore must it be taken?

17 If I inquire into what the most accurate philosophers declare themselves to mean by *material substance* we shall find them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other and as for its supporting accidents thus as I have just now observed cannot be understood in the common sense of those words. It must therefore be taken in some other sense but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words *material substance* I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should I trouble ourselves any farther in discussing this *material substratum* or support of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not this a direct repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?

18 But, though it were possible that solid figured movable substances may exist without the mind corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations ideas or those things that are immediately perceived by sense call them what you will but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind or unperceived like to those which are perceived. Thus the materialists themselves acknowledge. It remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things it must be by reason inferring their existence from what is immediately per-

ceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind from what we perceive since the very passions of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams phrensies and the like, puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have notwithstanding there were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas since it is granted they are produced sometimes and might possibly be produced always in the same order we see them in at present without their concurrence.

19 But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them yet perhaps it may be

and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said for though we give the materialists their external bodies they by the reason confess on are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in

tion. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind yet to hold they do so must

In short if there were external bodies, it

sations or ideas that you are imprinted in the same order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances represented by his ideas, and excusing

question—microscopic as a

to meet any reasonable person suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

3. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the existence of Matter after what has been said, I could instance several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention similitudes) which have sprung from that notion. It has occasioned immensity of controversies and disputes in philosophy and not few of far greater moment in religion. But I shall not enter into the detail of them in this place as well because I think it superfluous as posteriori are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not, sufficiently demonstrated previously as because I shall hereafter find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

2. I am afraid I have been cause to think I am needlessly prolix in handling this subject. For to that purpose it is dilated that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in less or two, to any one that is capable of the last reflection. I shall look into your own thoughts, and so trying whether you can conceive it possible for sound, or figure, motion, or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy trial may perhaps make you see that what you go to find for is a downright contradiction. Inasmuch that I am content to put the whole upon this issue — If you can but conceive possible for an extended movable substance, in general, for any one idea, or an thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in mind perceived. I say, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as

believe it exists, or assign any use to it which is supposed to exist. I say the bare possibility of your notions being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

3. But, say you, surely there is something easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in park, or books existing in closet, and body by to perceive them. I answer you may so, there is no difficulty in it, but what is all this, I believe you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and the same time employing to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them. But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while. This therefore is nothing to the purpose to only shew you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind but it does not shew that you can conceive it possible the objects of your

thoughts exist without the mind. To make

it conceive the existence of these without all the while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind takes notice of itself as included to think it can and does conceive these things unthought of or without the mind, though in the same manner they are properly intended by or exist in itself. But it is no will discover to a young man the truth and end of what is here said, and make it unnecessary to insist on any further proofs against the existence of matter without. 24. It is very obvious, upon the least enquiry into our thoughts, to know whether it is possible for us to understand what is meant by the proposition that we are sensible to ourselves or our ideas. To me it is evident those words mark either direct contradiction or else nothing at all and no concern others of this, I know no reader sadder way than to treat they would calmly attend to their own thoughts and if by this at length emptiness repugnancy of those expressions does appear universally notwithstanding for the sake of it. It is this

our medium —
 tion. This is what I repeat and culminate and earnestly recommend to the attentive thoughts of the reader.

5. All our ideas, sensations, notions, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are really nothing — there is nothing of power or energy added to them. So have an idea or object of thought cannot produce or make any all rational answer. Therefore to be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but bare observation of our ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, I follow that there is nothing in them but what is perceived by whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflexion, will not perceive them as power or activity there is, therefore, no truth that is contained in them. As the student will discover to us that the cry being of an idea implies passiveness and inertness in it, inasmuch that it is impossible for an idea to do anything or truly speaking to be the cause of anything either can it be the resemblance or pattern of any actual being as is evident from sect. 8. Where it plainly follows that extension, figure, and motion cannot be the cause of our sensations. To say therefore, that these are the effects of power

thinking subject without the mind or in truth that there should be any such thing as an outward object

16 But let us examine a little the received opinion — It is said extension is a mode or accident of Matter and that Matter is the *substratum* that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extension. Say you I have no idea of Matter and therefore cannot explain it. I answer though you have no positive yet if you have any meaning at all you must at least have a relative idea of Matter though you know not what it is yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to accidents and what is meant by its supporting them. It is evident support cannot here be taken in its usual or literal sense—as when we say that pillars support a building in what sense therefore must it be taken?

they have no other meaning annexed to those sounds but the idea of Being in general together with the relative notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all other and as for supposing accidents thus as we have just now observed cannot be understood in the common sense of those words it must therefore be taken in some other sense but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider the two parts or branches which make the signification of the words *material substance* I am convinced there is no distinct meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves with

repugnancy and altogether inconceivable?

18 But though it were possible that solid figured movable substances may exist without the mind corresponding to the ideas we have of bodies yet how is it possible for us to know this? Either we must know it by sense or by reason. As for our senses by them we have the knowledge only of our sensations ideas or those things that are immediately perceived by sense call them what you will but they do not inform us that things exist without the mind or unperceived like to those which are perceived. Thus the materialists themselves acknowledge it remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external things it must be by reason inferring their existence from what is immediately per-

ceived by sense. But what reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the mind from what we perceive since the very passions of Matter themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion between them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and what happens in dreams phrensies and the like puts it beyond dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the ideas we have now though there were no bodies existing without resembling them. Hence it is evident the supposition of external bodies is not necessary for the producing our ideas since it is granted they are produced sometimes and might possibly be produced always in the same order we see them in at present without their concurrence.

19 But though we might possibly have all our sensations without them yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than others be and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said for though we give the materialists their external bodies they by their own confession are nearer the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind yet to hold they do so must needs be a very precarious opinion since it is to suppose without any reason at all that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless and serve to no manner of purpose.

bodies, to be affected with the same train of sensations or ideas that you are imprinted in the same order and with the likeness in his mind. I ask whether that intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of corporeal substances represented by his ideas, and exciting them in his mind that you can possibly have for believing the same thing? Of this there can be no question—such one consideration were enough

more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, he has observed that when we perceive by sight a certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound, we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature are called *real* things, and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed *imaginary* or *fictitious*, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are allowed to be more real than in them, that is, to be more strongly ordered and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are *ideas* and certainly no idea, whether faint or true, can exist otherwise than in mind perceived by it.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary to spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down. I do so of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I hope it may be pardoned, since all men do not equally apprehend things of this nature, and I am willing to be understood by every one.

First, then, will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished of the world, and its ead thereof chimerical scheme of *ideas* takes place. All things that exist exist only in the mind that is, they are purely *ideal*. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon, and stars. What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains, trees, stones, nay even of our own bodies. Are all these but so many humors and illusions on the fancy? To which, and what ever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer that by the principles premised we are no deprived of any one thing in nature. What ever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever and is as real as ever. There is *no* *difference*, and the distinction between realities and chimeras remains in full force. This is evident from sect. 9, 30, and 33 where we have shewn what is meant

by *nothing* in opposition to *chimeras* or ideas of our own framing; but then they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are alike.

35. I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which philosophers call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will never miss it. The Atheist indeed will not the colour of an empty name to uphold his impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputation.

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised. In the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said.—There are particular substances, minds, human souls, which will or exist as themselves independent but these are faint, weak, and unsatisfactory in respect of others they perceive by sense—which, being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature speak themselves the effects of a mind more powerful and wise than human spirit. These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former—by which is meant that they are more affecting orderly and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of why it is evident that every egg, table, star, mineral, and in general each part of the mundane system, is as much *nothing* by our principles as by any other. Whether others mean any thing by the term *nothing* is of no concern to what I do, I treat them as I look into their own thoughts and see.

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word *nothing* be taken in the vulgar sense—for combination of sensible qualities, such as extension,

knowledge that we take it away if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

38. But after all, say you, sounds very harsh

ers resulting from the configuration number motion and size of corpuscles must certainly be false

26 We perceive a continual succession of ideas some are anew excited others are changed or totally disappear There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend and which produces and changes them. That this cause can not be any quality or idea or combination of ideas is clear from the preceding section It must therefore be a substance but it has been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit

27 A Spirit is one simple undivided active being—as it perceives ideas it is called the *understanding* and as it produces or otherwise operates about them it is called the *will* Hence there can be no idea formed of a spirit

There is no idea of spirit or that which acts that it cannot be of itself perceived but only by the effects which it produceth If any man shall doubt of the truth of what is here delivered let him but reflect and try if he can frame the idea of any power or active being and whether he has ideas of two principal powers marked by the names *will* and *understanding*, distinct from each other as well as from a third idea of Substance or Being in general with a relative notion of its supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers—which is signified by the name *soul* or *spirit* Thus is what some hold but so far as I can see the words *will* *soul* *spirit* do not stand for different ideas or in truth for any idea at all but for something which is very different from ideas and which being an agent cannot be like unto or represented by any idea whatsoever Though it must be observed at the same time that we have some notions of soul spirit and the operations of the mind such as willing loving hating—inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words

28 I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure and vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit It is no more than willing and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for another Thus making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate the mind active Thus much is certain and

grounded on experience but when we think of unthinking agents or of exciting ideas exclusive of volition we only amuse ourselves with words

29 But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will When in broad daylight I open my eyes it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view and so likewise as the hearing and other senses the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will There is therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

30 The ideas of Sense are more strong lively and distinct than those of the imagination they have likewise a steadiness order and coherence and are not excited at random as those which are the effects of human wills often are but in a regular train or series the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense are called the *laws of nature* and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things

31 This gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life And without this we should be eternally at a loss we could not know how to act anything that might procure us the least pleasure or remove the least pain of sense That food nourishes, sleep refreshes and fire warms us that to sow in the seed time is the way to reap in the harvest and in general that to obtain such or such ends, such or such means are conduced

—
as a grown man no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of life than an infant just born

32 And yet this consistent uniform order which so evidently displays the goodness and wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constitutes the laws of nature is so far from leading our thoughts to Him, that He rather sends them wandering after second causes For when we perceive certain ideas of S

more absurd and unintelligible. Thus, for example, having observed that when we perceive by sight certain round luminous figure we at the same time perceive by touch the idea or sensation called heat, we do from thence conclude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner perceiving the motion and collision of bodies to be attended with sound we are inclined to think the latter the effect of the former.

33. The ideas imprinted in the Senses by the Author of nature are called *athings* and those created in the imagination be *gl* is regular, and constant, are more properly termed *ideas*, or *imaginations*, which they copy and represent. But the our sensations, be they never so regular and distinct, are nevertheless *ideas*, that is, they exist in the mind, as perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense are all *what* has made it in them, that is, it be more *irregular* and coherent than the creatures of the mind but this no argument that they exist *without* the mind. They are also less *dependent* on the spirit, or thinking substance which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of *another* and more powerful spirit, yet still they are *ideas* and certainly no *ideas*, whether *fact* or *cause* exist otherwise than in mind perceiving it.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary to spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles here established. I do so in the following

every one.

First, it will be objected that by the foregoing principles all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world, and instead thereof chimerical schemes of *ideas* takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind that is, they are purely *ideal*. What therefore be comes of the sun, moon and stars. What must we think of houses, mountains, trees, &c. we may even of our own bodies. Are all these but so many chimeras or illusions of the fancy. To all which, and what ever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer that by the principles premised we are no *displeased* of any thing in nature. Whatever we see feel hear or any wise conceive or understand remains as we use it and is as real as ever. There is *no* distinction and distinction between *ideas* of chimeras remains as full force. This is evident from sect. 9, 30, and 33, where we have shown what is meant

by *asking* in opposition to *chimeras* or *ideas* of our own framing but that they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense they are all *ideas*.

35. I do not argue against the existence of a *being* that we can apprehend *other* by sense or reflection. That the things I see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist really exist, I make not the least question. The only thing whose existence we deny is that which *philosophers* call Matter or corporeal substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who I dare say will never miss it. The *Atheists* indeed will not the colour of an empty name to support his impiety and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost a great handle for trifling and disputations.

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take here an abstract of what has been said.—There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls, which will excite *ideas* themselves in *pleasure* but these are faint, and unsatisfactory respect of *others* they perceive by sense—which being impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of nature, speak themselves the effects of mind more powerful and wise than human spirit is. These latter are said to have more reality in them than the former—by which is meant that they are more *irregular* orderly and distinct, and that they are not fictions of the mind perceiving them. And in this sense the sun that I see by day is the real sun and that which I imagine by night is the *disfined* former. In this sense here given of *ality* it is evident that every *entity* tabular mineral in general each part of the *independent* matter, as much as being by our principles as by *any* other. Whether there mean anything by the term *ality* different from what I do I care not to look into their own thoughts and see.

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit that we take away all corporeal substance. To this my answer is, that if the word *substance* be taken in the vulgar sense—of combination of *simple* qualities, such as exist in

known that we take away if we may be said to take away that which ever had *existence* not existing in the imagination.

38. But after all, say I, it sounds very harsh

to say we eat and drink ideas

1

any expression which varies from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridiculous. But this doth not concern the truth of the proposition which in other words is no more than to say we are fed and clothed with those things which we perceive immediately by our senses. The hardness or softness the colour taste warmth figure or suchlike qualities which combined together constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel have been shewn to exist only in the mind that perceives them and this

which
would

an it I

am not for disputing about the propriety but the truth of the expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink and are clad with the immediate objects of sense which cannot exist unperceived or without the mind I shall readily grant it is more proper or conformable to custom that they should be called things rather than ideas.

39 If it be demanded by I make use of the word *idea* and do not rather in compliance with custom call them *things* I answer I do it for two reasons — first because the term is contrary to de

de sec
sensitive

signification than *idea* including spirit or thinking things as well as ideas. Since therefore the objects of sense exist only in the mind and are without thoughtless and inactive I chose to mark them by the word *idea* which implies those properties.

40 But say what we can some one perhaps may be apt to reply he will still believe his senses, and never suffer any arguments how plausible soever to prevail over the certainty of them. Be it so assert the evidence of sense as high as you please we are willing to do the same. That what I see hear and feel doth exist that is to say is perceived by me I no more doubt than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of any thing which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses on the contrary we give them all the stress and assurance imaginable nor are there any principles more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41 Secondly it will be objected that there is a great difference betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire betwixt dreaming or imagining oneself burnt and actually being so if you suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a witness. This and the like may be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which the answer is evident from what hath been already said and I shall only add in this place that if real fire be very different from the idea of fire so also is the real pain that it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain and yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is or can possibly be in an unperceiving thing or without the mind any more than its idea.

42 Thirdly it will be objected that we see things actually without or at distance from us, and which consequently do not exist in the mind it being absurd that those things which are seen at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own thoughts. In answer to this I desire it may be considered that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great distance off and yet for all that those things are acknowledged to have their existence only in the mind.

43 But for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth while to consider how it is that we perceive distance and things placed at a distance by sight. For that we should in truth see external space and bodies actually existing in it some nearer others farther off seems to carry with it some opposition to what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind. The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision which was published not long since wherein it is shewn that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles or any thing that hath a necessary connexion with it but that it is only suggested to our thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or things placed at a distance but by a connexion taught us by experience they come to signify and suggest them to us after the same manner that words of any language suggest the ideas they

41 of the forementioned treatise

44. The ideas of sight and touch make it to spe

are entirely distinct and heterogeneous. The former are marks and prognostics of the latter. That the proper by-objects (ought neither to exist about mind, nor are the images of external things, as shown even in that treatise. Though throughout the same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects—not that to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the truth of them laid down, but because it was be-

1

as well known as a.

their distance and things placed at a distance, do not suggest or mark to us things actually existing at distance, but only diminish what ideas of touch will be imprinted in our minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of such or such actions. It is, I say, evident from what has been said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise and in sect. 147 and else-

here of the Essay concerning Vision, that the ideas are the Language whereby the Governing Spirit whom we depend on informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we execute this that motion in our own bodies. But for a fuller information in this point I refer the Essay itself.

43. Fourthly it will be objected that from the foregoing principles of flow things are every moment annihilated and created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden, the chairs the parlour no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the room is reduced to nothing, and barely opening them it is again created. I answer to all which, I refer the reader to what has been said in sect. 34, &c. and desire he will consider what he means anything by the actual existence of an idea distinct from its being perceived. For my part, after the nicest inquiry I could make, I am not able to discover that anything else is meant by those words and I no more treat that read to sound his own thoughts, and not suffer himself to be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either for his ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived, then I grant the cause; but if he cannot, he will acknowledge it is unreasonable for him to stand upon defence of his knowledge no what, and pretend to charge me as an absurdity the dissenting to those propositions which he himself has no meaning in them.

46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received principles of philosophy are themselves

chargeable with those pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should be reduced to nothing; and yet it is not thus what philosophers commonly acknowledge when they agree on all hands that light and colours, which all men are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are perceived. Again (may) to some perhaps seem incredible that things should be every moment creating; yet this cry not on is commonly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen though they acknowledge the existence of Matter admit that the whole mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinion that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation, which by them is expounded to be a continual creation.

47. Farther it is thought will discover to us that though we allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will unavoidably follow from the principles which are now generally admitted that the particular bodies of what kind soever do not depend on the existence of what they are not perceived. For it is evident from sect. 11 and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers contend for is an incomprehensible something, which hath none of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this more plain, it must be remarked that the infiniteness of Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved and considerable philosophers, who subscribe the principle demonstrated beyond all exception. Hence, it follows there is an infinite number of parts in each parcel of Matter which are not perceived by sense. The reason therefore that any particular body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite number of parts to sense, is, no because it contains no more, since in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because the sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater and its figure varies, those parts which are extremes which were before unperceivable appear grow to bound in every different lines and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And although, after various changes of size and shape, when the sense becomes infinitely acute the body shall seem infinite. During all which there is no alteration in the body but only in the sense. Each body therefore considered in itself is infinitely extended, and con-

to say we eat and drink ideas clothed
 he word
 e to sig
 equal
 certain that
 any expression which varies from the familiar use
 of language will seem harsh and ridiculous But
 this doth not concern the truth of the proposi-
 tion which in other words is no more than to
 say we are fed and clothed with those things
 which we perceive immediately by our senses
 The hardness or softness the colour taste
 warmth figure or suchlike qualities which
 combined together constitute the several sorts of
 victuals and apparel have been shewn to exist
 only in the mind that perceives them and thus
 all that is meant by calling them *ideas* which
 word if it was as ordinarily used as *thin* would
 sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it I
 am not for disputing about the propriety but the
 truth of the expression If

I am perceived or is it not

has

39 If it be demanded why I make use of the
 word *idea* and do not rather in compliance with
 custom call them *things* I answer I do it for two
 reasons — first because the term *thing* in contra-
 distinction to *idea* is generally understood to de-
 denote

ing things as well as ideas Since therefore the ob-
 jects of sense exist only in the mind and are with-
 out thoughtless and inactive I chose to mark them
 by the word *idea* which implies those properties

40 But say what we can some one perhaps
 may be apt to reply he will still believe his senses
 and never suffer any arguments how plausible
 soever to prevail over the certainty of them. Be-
 it so assert the evidence of sense as high as you
 please we are willing to do the same That what
 I see hear and feel doth exist that is to say is
 perceived by me I no more doubt than I do of
 my own being But I do not see how the tes-
 timony of sense can be alleged as a proof for
 the existence of anything which is not perceived
 by sense We are not for having any man turn
 sceptic and disbelieve his senses on the contrary
 we give them all the stress and assurance mag-
 nable nor are there any principles more oppo-
 site to Scepticism than those we have laid down,
 as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41 Secondly it will be objected that there is a
 great difference betwixt real fire for instance
 and the idea of fire betwixt dreaming or imagin-
 ing oneself burnt and actually being so if you
 suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you
 see do but put your hand into it and you will be
 convinced with a witness This and the like may
 be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which
 the answer is evident from what hath been al-
 ready said and I shall only add in this place,
 that if real fire be very different from the idea of
 fire so also is the real pain that it occasions very
 different from the idea of the same pain and yet
 nobody will pretend that real pain either is or
 can possibly be in an unperceiving thing or
 without the mind any more than its idea

42 Thirdly it will be objected that we see
 things actually without or at distance from us,
 and which consequently do not exist in the mind
 it being absurd that those things which are seen
 at the distance of several miles should be as near
 to us as our own thoughts In answer to this I
 desire it may be considered that in a dream we
 do oft perceive things as existing at a great dis-
 tance off and yet for all that those things are
 acknowledged to have their existence only in the
 mind

43 But for the fuller clearing of this point, it
 may be worth while to consider how it is that we
 perceive distance and things placed at a distance
 by sight For that we should in truth see external
 space and bodies actually existing in it some
 nearer others farther off seems to carry with it
 some opposition to what hath been said of their
 existing nowhere without the mind The consid-
 eration of this difficulty it is that gave birth to
 my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision
 which was published not long since wherein it

things as well as ideas Since therefore the ob-
 jects of sense exist only in the mind and are with-
 out thoughtless and inactive I chose to mark them
 by the word *idea* which implies those properties

40 But say what we can some one perhaps
 may be apt to reply he will still believe his senses
 and never suffer any arguments how plausible
 soever to prevail over the certainty of them. Be-
 it so assert the evidence of sense as high as you
 please we are willing to do the same That what
 I see hear and feel doth exist that is to say is
 perceived by me I no more doubt than I do of
 my own being But I do not see how the tes-
 timony of sense can be alleged as a proof for
 the existence of anything which is not perceived
 by sense We are not for having any man turn
 sceptic and disbelieve his senses on the contrary
 we give them all the stress and assurance mag-
 nable nor are there any principles more oppo-
 site to Scepticism than those we have laid down,
 as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41 Secondly it will be objected that there is a
 great difference betwixt real fire for instance
 and the idea of fire betwixt dreaming or imagin-
 ing oneself burnt and actually being so if you
 suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you
 see do but put your hand into it and you will be
 convinced with a witness This and the like may
 be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which
 the answer is evident from what hath been al-
 ready said and I shall only add in this place,
 that if real fire be very different from the idea of
 fire so also is the real pain that it occasions very
 different from the idea of the same pain and yet
 nobody will pretend that real pain either is or
 can possibly be in an unperceiving thing or
 without the mind any more than its idea

42 Thirdly it will be objected that we see
 things actually without or at distance from us,
 and which consequently do not exist in the mind
 it being absurd that those things which are seen
 at the distance of several miles should be as near
 to us as our own thoughts In answer to this I
 desire it may be considered that in a dream we
 do oft perceive things as existing at a great dis-
 tance off and yet for all that those things are
 acknowledged to have their existence only in the
 mind

43 But for the fuller clearing of this point, it
 may be worth while to consider how it is that we
 perceive distance and things placed at a distance
 by sight For that we should in truth see external
 space and bodies actually existing in it some
 nearer others farther off seems to carry with it
 some opposition to what hath been said of their
 existing nowhere without the mind The consid-
 eration of this difficulty it is that gave birth to
 my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision
 which was published not long since wherein it

things as well as ideas Since therefore the ob-
 jects of sense exist only in the mind and are with-
 out thoughtless and inactive I chose to mark them
 by the word *idea* which implies those properties

40 But say what we can some one perhaps
 may be apt to reply he will still believe his senses
 and never suffer any arguments how plausible
 soever to prevail over the certainty of them. Be-
 it so assert the evidence of sense as high as you
 please we are willing to do the same That what
 I see hear and feel doth exist that is to say is
 perceived by me I no more doubt than I do of
 my own being But I do not see how the tes-
 timony of sense can be alleged as a proof for
 the existence of anything which is not perceived
 by sense We are not for having any man turn
 sceptic and disbelieve his senses on the contrary
 we give them all the stress and assurance mag-
 nable nor are there any principles more oppo-
 site to Scepticism than those we have laid down,
 as shall be hereafter clearly shewn.

41 Secondly it will be objected that there is a
 great difference betwixt real fire for instance
 and the idea of fire betwixt dreaming or imagin-
 ing oneself burnt and actually being so if you
 suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you
 see do but put your hand into it and you will be
 convinced with a witness This and the like may
 be urged in opposition to our tenets. To all which
 the answer is evident from what hath been al-
 ready said and I shall only add in this place,
 that if real fire be very different from the idea of
 fire so also is the real pain that it occasions very
 different from the idea of the same pain and yet
 nobody will pretend that real pain either is or
 can possibly be in an unperceiving thing or
 without the mind any more than its idea

42 Thirdly it will be objected that we see
 things actually without or at distance from us,
 and which consequently do not exist in the mind
 it being absurd that those things which are seen
 at the distance of several miles should be as near
 to us as our own thoughts In answer to this I
 desire it may be considered that in a dream we
 do oft perceive things as existing at a great dis-
 tance off and yet for all that those things are
 acknowledged to have their existence only in the
 mind

43 But for the fuller clearing of this point, it
 may be worth while to consider how it is that we
 perceive distance and things placed at a distance
 by sight For that we should in truth see external
 space and bodies actually existing in it some
 nearer others farther off seems to carry with it
 some opposition to what hath been said of their
 existing nowhere without the mind The consid-
 eration of this difficulty it is that gave birth to
 my Essay towards a New Theory of Vision
 which was published not long since wherein it

44 The ideas of sight and touch make two spe

scope and interior and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable.

53. As to the opinion that there are no Causal Causes, this has been the chief of the main tenets by some of the Schoolmen, as it is of late by others among the modern philosophers, who though they all will Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the immediate efficient cause of all things. These men saw that amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any power or utility included in it and that by consequence this was likewise true of whatever body they supposed to exist without the mind, likewise into the immediate objects of sense. But then, that they should suppose an innumerable multitude for it to be goods which they acknowledge are incapable of producing any effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of purpose nor God might have done everything as well without the mind as I say, though should allow it possible must yet be very unaccountable and extravagant supposition.

54. In the right place, the universal concurrent assent of mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in behalf of Matter the existence of external things. Must we suppose the whole world to be mistaken. And if so what cause can be assigned for so widespread and predominant an error. I answer first that, upon narrow inquiry it will not perhaps be found so many as is imagined really believe the existence of Matter to be without the mind. Strictly speaking to believe that which in itself is contradictory, has no meaning in it, is impossible and whether this reasoning expresses are not of this sort, I refer to the impartial examination of the reader. In this sense, indeed, we may be said to believe that Matter exists, that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their sensations, which is all that is them really moment, is really present to them. Some were some senseless unthinking being. But, that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those ideas of matter itself settled upon the opinion, is what I am to be concerned. Thus is it that they tell us when men impose upon themselves by imagining that they believe those propositions which they have not heard, though to be in them they have no meaning in them.

55. But secondly though we should grant a notion to be never so universally and testidly adhered to, yet this is weak argument for its truth to whoever considers what vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere embraced with the utmost consciousness, by the unreflecting (which are the first gradations) part of mankind. There was a time when the antipodes and mountains of the earth were looked upon as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning and if it be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained but a very inconspicuous footing in the world.

56. But it is demanded that we assign cause for this prejudice and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer that men know that they perceived several ideas, whereof they themselves were not the authors—as it being cited from within the mind depends upon the operation of the will—the mind and them make the ideas, or objects of perception had an existence independent of and without the mind. But ever dreaming that contradiction was in order in those words. But, philosophers have plainly seen that the immediate objects of perception do not exist without the mind they some degree corrected the mistake of the vulgar but that

printed by those objects in the mind. And thus not only of the philosophers owes its origin to the same cause with the former namely their being conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations, which they evidently knew were impressed in them without and without the former must have some cause distinct from the minds in which they are impressed.

57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be excited in us by things in their likeness, and rather have recourse to *Spirit* which alone can, may be accounted for first, because they were not war with the repugnancy there is, as well as opposing things like to our ideas existing without us, as contributing to them power to destroy. Secondly because the Spirit in *Spirit* which creates the ideas in our minds, is not marked to be limited to us by any particular finite collection of sensible ideas, as human beings are by their six complex limbs, dimensions. And thirdly because His perceptions are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of nature is interrupted by

sequently void of all shape or figure. From which it follows that though we should grant the existence of Matter to be never so certain yet it is withal as certain the materialists themselves are by their own principles forced to acknowledge that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense nor anything like them exists without the mind. Matter I say and each particle thereof is according to them infinite and shapeless and it is the mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the visible world any one where

on the principles we have premised so as in truth to make any objection at all against our notions. For though we hold indeed the objects of sense to be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived yet we may not hence conclude they have no existence except only while they are perceived by us since there may be some other spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies are said to have no existence without the mind I would not be understood to mean this or that particular mind but all minds whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing principles that bodies are annihilated and created every moment or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of them.

49 Fifthly it may perhaps be objected that if extension and figure exist only in the mind it follows that the mind is extended and figured since extension is a mode or attribute which (to speak within the schools) is predicated of the subject in which it exists. I answer those qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it—that is not by way of mode or attribute but only by way of idea and it no more follows the soul or mind is extended because extension exists in it alone than it does that it is red or blue because those colours are on all hands acknowledged to exist

position a die is hard extended and square they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance distinct from the hardness extension and figure which are predicated of it and in which they exist. Thus I cannot comprehend to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard extended and square is not to attribute of one quality to a subject distinct from and supporting them but only an explication of the meaning of the word die.

of particular philosophy and undermine those mechanical principles which have been applied with so much success to account for the phenomena. In short whatever advances have been made either by ancient or modern philosophers in the study of nature do all proceed on the sup-

of particulars. To explain the phenomena is all one as to shew why upon such and such occasions we are affected with such and such ideas. But if Matter should operate on a Spirit or

of particulars. Besides they who attempt to account for things do it not by corporeal substance but by figure motion and other qualities which are in truth no more than mere ideas and therefore cannot be the cause of anything as hath been already shewn. See sect. 25.

So that it will upon this be demanded

say upon these principles that fire heats or water cools but that a Spirit heats and so forth. Would not this be a ridiculous way of reasoning?

Copernican system do nevertheless say the sun rises the sun sets or comes to the meridian if they affected a contrary style in

of language would receive no manner of objection or disturbance from the admission of our

a manner as is necessary for our utility by false society they may be if taken in a strict and speculative sense. Nay this is unavoidable since propriety being regulated by custom, language is suited to the received opinions which are not always the truest. Hence it is impossible even in

to be cause of production any one effect in a. See sect. 5. Whoever therefore supposes an idea to exist (allowing the supposition possible) and that it is not perceived does it manifestly to no purpose since the only use that is assigned to it, as it exists unperceived, is that it may produce those perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything but Spirit.

6. But, to come together the difficulty it must be observed that though the fabrication of all such parts and organs be not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is necessary to the producing of things in constant regular way according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws that run through the chain of natural effects: these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial machines for the use and ornament of life as to the explaining various phenomena—which explanation consists only in shewing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or which is the same thing, in discovering the manner where in the production of natural effects as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend to counter appearances. There is great and conspicuous use in these regular constant methods of working, observed by the Supreme Agent hath been shown in sect. 5. And it is no less true that particular size, figure, motion, and disposition of parts are not essential though not absolutely to the producing any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce a miracle, cause all the motions in the dial plate of watch, though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in; but yet, if He will act agreeable to the rules of mechanism, by which for wise ends established and maintained in the creation, it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaster whereby he makes the movements and things adjust them, precede the production of the aforesaid motions: as also that any disorder in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is right again.

63. I may indeed on some occasions be necessary to the Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions from the general rules of nature are proper to

they should fail of that effect. Besides, you seem to choose the concluding our reason of His attributes by the works of nature which discover so much harmony and consistency in their make, and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their Author rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being, by anomalous and surprising events.

64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe that what has been objected in sect. 60 amounts in reality to no more than that—ideas are not anyhow and in and in produced, there being a certain order and connexion between them, like to that of cause and effect, there are also several combinations of them made in every regular and artificial manner which seem like so many instruments in the hand of nature that, being had as it were behind the scenes, have a secret power in producing those appearances which are seen on the theatre of the world, being themselves discernible only to the curious eye of the philosopher. But, since one idea cannot be the cause of another to what purpose is that connexion? And, are those instruments, being barely certain as perceptions in the mind, are not subservient to the production of natural effects, it is demanded why they are made or in other words, what reason can be assigned why God should make us, upon close inspection into His works, behold so great variety of idleness so artfully laid together and so much according to rule not being credible that He would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose.

65. To all which my answer is, first, that the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of mark or sign with the thing signified. The first which I see is that the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that I hear is not the effect of this or that motion or collision of the ambient bodies, but the sign thereof. Secondly, the reason why ideas are formed in machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together. And, if the end that we be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by rule and with true consistency. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are

a miracle men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent. But when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any reflexion: their order and concatenation though it be an argument of the greatest wisdom, power and goodness in their creator, is yet so constant and familiar to us that we do not think them the immediate effects of a *Free Spirit* especially since inconsistency and mutability in acting though it be an imperfection is looked on as a mark of freedom.

58. *Tenthly* it will be objected that the notions we advance are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and mathematics. For example the motion of the earth is now universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the clearest and most convincing reasons. But on the foregoing principles there can be no such thing. For motion being only an idea it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not: but the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense. I answer that *tenet if rightly understood* will be found to agree with the principles we have premised for the question whether the earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this to wit whether we have reason to conclude from what has been observed by astronomers that if we were placed in such and such circumstances and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets and appearing in all respects like one of them and thus by the established rules of nature which we have no reason to mistrust is reasonably collected from the phenomena.

59. We may from the experience we have had of the train and succession of ideas in our minds often make I will not say uncertain conjectures but sure and well grounded predictions concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a great train of actions and be enabled to pass a right judgment of what would have appeared to us in case we were placed in circumstances very different from those we are in at present. He in consists the knowledge of nature which may preserve its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said. It will be easy to apply this to whatever object one of the like sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars or any other discoveries in astronomy or nature.

60. In the *eleventh* place it will be demanded to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants and the animal mechanism in the parts of animals might not vegetables grow and shoot forth leaves of blossoms and animals perform all

their motions as well without as with all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together which being ideas have nothing powerful or operative in them nor have any necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will we must think all that is fine and artificial in the works, whether of man or nature may be made in vain. By this doctrine though an artist hath made the spring and wheels and every movement of a watch and adjusted them in such a manner as he knew would produce the motions he designed yet he must think all this done to no purpose and that it is an Intelligence which directs the index, and points to the hour of the day. If so why may not the Intelligence do it without his being at the pains of making the movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes it to pass that whenever there is any fault in the going of a watch there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the movements which being mended by a skilful hand all is right again? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best microscope. In short it will be asked how upon our principles any tolerable account can be given or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies and machines framed with the most exquisite art which in the common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them and serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

61. To all which I answer first that though there were some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature which I could not solve by the foregoing principles yet this objection could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be proved *priori* with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration. Secondly but neither are the received principles free from the like

greater force on those who hold the existence of those machines without of mind for it has been made evident that solid bulky figures move on and the like have no activity or efficacy in them, so

God such are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method—much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of Matter seems too extravagant to receive common assent. Besides, it is in effect no

bly exist other wise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them. It follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter may be that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as that word is taken to denote an *unthinking substance* of qualities or accidents wherein they exist without the mind.

4. But though it be allowed by the materialists themselves that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the mind should naturally and without any reluctance fall off, quite the belief of what was solely grounded thereon: yet the prejudice is rooted so deeply in our thoughts, that we can scarce tell how to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the *being* itself is indelible, at least to retain the name which we apply to it. I know not what abstracted and unfit notions of being may occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can see. For what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either by sense or reflexion, from whence may be traced the idea of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion. And, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our minds.

5. It is very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice, and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless matter by the assistance of which he would as it were screen himself from the Providence of God and remove it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter though heaven reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make out that poor possibility yet the upshot of all is, that there are certain *abstract Ideas* in the mind of God for this, if anything at all that I conceive to be meant by occasions with regard to God. And thus the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

6. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and whether they may be called by the name *Matter* I shall not dispute. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should be any such

7. Hence, I say, it is evident that the being of spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for *inert senseless Matter* nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or leads to the thoughts of it. And I could vainly see any one explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or even make any operative sense or meaning of that supposition. For as it is being no occasion we may say, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that must be, if at all, the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us, and what this amounts to we have just now seen.

8. It is worth while to remember little in the motives which induced men to suppose the existence of *material substances* that so having observed the gradual ceasing, and expiration of those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, was thought that colour, figure, motion, and others of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the mind, and for this reason seemed needful to suppose some unthinking *substance* or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be conceived exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they tripped this *substance* material basis of those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike which they still conceived to exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of material support. But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possi-

to expect from such and such actions and what methods are proper to be taken for the exciting such and such ideas which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said that by discerning a figure texture and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies whether natural or artificial we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon or the nature of the thing

66 Hence it is evident that those things which under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects are altogether inexplicable and run us into great absurdities may be very naturally explained and have a proper and obvious use assigned to them when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information And it is the searching after and endeavouring to understand those signs instituted by the Author of Nature that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle that supreme and wise Spirit in whom we live move and have our being

67 In the *twelfth* place it may perhaps be objected that—though it be clear from what has been said that there can be no such thing as an inert senseless extended solid figured movable substance existing without the mind such as philosophers describe Matter—yet if any man shall leave out of his idea of *matter* the positive ideas of extension figure solidity and motion and say that he means only by that word an inert senseless substance that exists without the mind or unperceived which is the occasion of our ideas or at the presence whereof God is pleased to excite ideas in us it doth not appear but that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist In answer to which I say first that it seems no less

this unknown substance may possibly exist yet where can it be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind is agreed and that it exists not in place is no less certain—since all place or extension exists only in the mind as hath been already proved It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all

68 Let us examine a little the description that is here given us of *matter* It neither acts nor perceives nor is perceived for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert senseless unknown substance which is a definition entirely made up of negatives excepting only the relative not on

of its standing under or supporting But then it must be observed that it supports nothing at all and how nearly this comes to the description of a *nonentity* I desire may be considered. But say you it is the *unknown occasion* at the presence of which ideas are excited in us by the will of God. Now I would fain know how anything can be present to us which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion nor capable of producing any idea in our minds nor is at all extended nor hath any form nor exists in any place The words to be present, when thus applied must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning and which I am not able to comprehend.

69 Again let us examine what is meant by a

thing that is observed to accompany or go before it in the ordinary course of things But when it is applied to Matter as above described it can be taken in neither of those senses for Matter is said to be passive and inert and so cannot be an agent or efficient cause It is also unperceivable as being devoid of all sensible qualities and so cannot be the occasion of our perceptions in the latter sense as when the burning my finger is said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it What therefore can be meant by calling matter an *occasion*? The term is either used in no sense at all or else in some very distant from its received signification

70 You will perhaps say that Matter though it be not perceived by us is nevertheless perceived by God to whom it is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds For say you since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and constant manner it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain constant and regular occasions of their being produced That is to say that there are certain permanent and distinct parcels of Matter corresponding to our ideas, which though they do not excite them in our minds or anywise immediately affect us as being altogether passive and unperceivable to us they are nevertheless to God by whom they are perceived as it were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to imprint on our minds that so things may go on in a constant uniform manner

71 In answer to this I observe that as the notion of Matter is here stated the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from *Sp it* and *id* from perceiving and being perceived but whether there are not certain ideas of I know not what sort, in the mind of

facts related which evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone, mountains and rivers, and trees, and human bodies. To which I answer that no sort of writings have ever sacred or profane, such use those and the like words in the vulgar acceptation, or so as to have meaning in themselves, as in their own truth, called in question by our doctrine. That all those things do really exist, that there are bodies, even corporal substances, when taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our principles and the difference betwixt *ideas* and *things* and *words* has been distinctly explained. See sect. 9, 30, 33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers call *Matter* or the existence of objects without the mind, is anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

3. Again, whether there can be or be not external things, it is agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived by us, whence I plainly follow that in the terms we have laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and signification of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever so far as it is language, remains undisturbed. But all this seems so manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

4. But, I will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of their stress and import by our principles. What must we think of Moses' rod, was it not *any* turned into serpent? was there only change of *ideas* in the minds of the spectators? And, can it be supposed that our Saviour did no more than the marriage feast in Cana was impose the sight, and smell, and taste of the *ideas*, so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The same may be said of all other miracles which, in consequence of the foregoing principles, must be looked upon only as so many cheats, or illusions of fancy. To this I reply that the rod was changed into real serpent, and the water into real wine. That this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of *ideas* and *imagination* has been already so plainly and fully explained, and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily answered from what has gone before that I were to answer to the reader's understanding to repeat the explication of it in place I shall only

ple concerning real miracles has no place at all on ours, but only on the received principles, and consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.

83. Having done with the Objections, which I intended to propose in the clearest light, and given them all the force and weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view of our tenets in their Consequences. Some of these appear at first sight—as that several difficult and hard questions, on which abundance of spec-

—
dissuable, and how it operates on piety—these and like questions being an infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages but depending on the existence of Matter they have no longer any place on our principles. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard to religion as the sciences, which it is any for any one to deduce from what has been premised but that will appear more plainly in the sequel.

So From the principles we have laid down it follows human knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads—that of *ideas* and that of *facts*. Of each of these I shall treat in order.

And first as to *ideas* or unthinking things. Our knowledge of these hath been very much obscured and confounded, and we have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a twofold existence of the objects of sense—the one external or in the world, the other *ideal* and within the mind whereby unthinking things are thought to have natural subsistence of their own distinct from being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very root of *Scepticism* so long a men that what real things subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only so far forth *ideal* as it was conformable to *ideas*. It follows they could not be certain they had any real knowledge at all. For how can it be known that things which are perceived are conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without the mind.

8. Colour, figure, motion, extension, and the like, considered not as so many *sensations* in the mind, are perfectly known, there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if they are looked on as no *essences* or *images*, referred to *things* or *real existences* without the mind, then are we involved all in *scepticism*. We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure, or motion of

thing since it is a plain repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an unperceiving substance

77 But say you though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive yet there may perhaps be some inert unperceiving substance or *substratum* of some other qualities as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind because we have not a sense adapted to them But if we had a new sense we should possibly no more doubt of their existence than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and colours I answer first if what you mean by the word *Matter* be only the unknown support of unknown qualities it is no matter whether there is such a thing or no since it no way concerns us and I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what we know not *what* and we know not *why*

78 But secondly if we had a new sense it could only furnish us with new ideas or sensations and then we should have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving substance that has been already offered with relation to figure motion colour and the like Qualities as hath been shewn are nothing else but *sensations* or *ideas* which exist only in a *mind* perceiving them and this is true not only of the ideas we are acquainted with at present but likewise of all possible ideas whatsoever

79 But you will insist what if I have no reason to believe the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it or explain anything by it or even conceive what is meant by that word? yet still Matter exists

a substance
go about to unfold the meaning or adhere to any particular explanation of those words may be attended with great difficulties I answer when words are used without a meaning you may put them together as you please without danger of running into a contradiction You may say for example that twice two is equal to seven so long as you declare you do not take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation but for marks of you know not what And by the same reason you may say there is an inert thoughtless substance which is the occasion of accidents which is the occasion of
neither substance nor accident

inert thoughtless indivisible immovable, extended existing in no place For say you what ever may be urged against substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative notion of Matter hath no place at all so long as this negative definition of Matter is adhered to I answer you may if so it shall seem good use the word Matter in the same sense as other men use nothing and so make those terms convertible in your style For after all this is what appears to me to be the result of that definition the parts hereof when I consider with attention either collectively or separate from each other I do not find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my mind different from what is excited by the term *nothing*

81 You will reply perhaps that in the fore said definition is included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing—the positive abstract idea of *quiddity* *entity* or *existence* I own indeed that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea which I say they the most abstract and general notion of all that is to me the most incomprehensible of all others That there are a great variety of spirits of different orders and capacities whose faculties both in number and extent are far exceeding those the Author of my being has bestowed on me I see no reason to deny And for me to pretend to determine by my own few stunted narrow inlets of perception what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme Spirit may imprint upon them were certainly the utmost folly and presumption—since there may be for aught I at I know innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations different from one another and from all that I have

possibly exist yet for any one to perceive any of Entity or Existence abstracted from spirit and idea from perceived and being perceived is I suspect a downright repugnancy and trifling with words—It remains that we consider the objects which may possibly be made on the part of Religion

82 Some there are who think that though the arguments for the real existence of bodies which are drawn from Reason be allowed not to amount to demonstration yet the Holy Scriptures are so clear in the point as will sufficiently convince every good Christian that bodies do really exist and are something more than mere ideas there being in Holy Writ innumerable

that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended, unperceiving substance which they call *Matter* to which they attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever even the eternal mind of the Creator wherein they suppose only ideas of the corporeal substances created by him if indeed they allow them to be at all created.

92. For as we have shewn the doctrine of *Matter* is the doctrine of substance it has been the main

consequence of the

most celebrated among the ancient philosophers, even of those who maintained the being of God, has thought it to be useful and eternal wisdom. How great first of material necessity has been to Atheists all ages were needless to relate. All this is monstrous system has so visible and necessary dependence on that when this corner-stone is once removed the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the ground, insomuch that it is little worth while to bestow a particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect of Atheists.

93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in with those systems which of our

thoughts I try likewise in all its various forms depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon and stars, and every other object of the senses are only so many sensations in their minds, which ideas exist once but barely being perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship their own ideas but rather address their homage to that ETERNAL VISIBLE MIND which produces and sustains all things.

95. The same absurd principle, by mingling itself with the articles of our faith, has occasioned no small difficulties to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection how many scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others. But did not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition that a body is denominated the *same* in the regard not to the form or that which is perceived by sense but the material substance, which remains the same under several forms. Take away this notion of substance about the identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by *body* what every plain ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and felt which is only a combination of sensible qualities & ideas, and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.

96. Matter being expelled out of nature drags with it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible number of disputes and perplexing questions, which have been thorns in

knowledge, peace, and religion have reason to wish they were.

97. Beside the external existence of the objects of perception, another great source of errors and difficulties in regard to knowledge is the doctrine of *lost ideas* such as that have been set forth in the *Introduction*. The plainest things in the world though we are immediately acquainted with and perfectly known when they are considered as an abstract way appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place

duration, taken in particular objects, are what every body knows but has passed through their hands in metaphysics they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men of ordinary sense. But your servant meets you each time in each place and he shall never say that he deliberates the meaning of those words concerning that particular time and place, the motion by which he is going thither he finds not the least difficulty in it if time be

beaten to those who deny Providence, in respect of Superior Mind over the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events either to blind chance fatal necessity arising from the impulse of the body, or to a very natural And in their hand, when

rejoice to see them deprived of their grand support, and driven from the only fortress without which your Epicureans, Hebbusists, and the like, have no even the shadow of pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the world.

94. The existence of Matter or bodies unperceived, has not only been the main support of Atheists and Fustists, but the same principle

anything really and absolutely or in itself it is impossible for us to know but only the proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same our ideas vary and which of them or even whether any of them at all represent the true quality really existing in the thing it is out of our reach to determine. So that, for aught we know all we see hear and feel may be only phantom and vain chimaera and not at all agree with the real things existing in *rerum natura*. All this scepticism follows from our supposing a difference between *things* and *ideas* and that the former have a subsistence without the mind or unperceived. It were easy to dilate on this subject and show how the arguments urged by sceptics in all ages depend on the supposition of external objects

with evidence the nature of any real unthinking being but even that it exists. Hence it is that we see philosophers distrust their senses and doubt of the existence of heaven and earth of every thing they see or feel even of their own bodies. And after all their labour and struggle of thought they are forced to own we cannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative knowledge of the existence of sensible things. But all this doubtfulness which so bewilders and confounds the mind and makes philosophy ridiculous in the eyes of the world vanishes if we annex a meaning to our words and not amuse ourselves with the terms absolute external exist and such like signifying we know not what. I can as well doubt of my own being as of the being of those things which I actually perceive by sense it being a manifest contradiction that any sensible object should be immediately perceived by sight or touch and at the same time have no existence in nature since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived.

89 Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge which may be proof against the assaults of Scepticism than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing reality existence* for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things or pretend to any knowledge thereof so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words. *Thing* or *Being* is the most general name of all it comprehends under it is of kinds entirely distinct and heterogeneous and which have nothing common but the name viz. *spirits* and *ideas*. The former are active indivisible substances the latter are inert

flecting dependent beings, which subsist not by themselves but are supported by or exist in minds or spiritual substances. We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflection and that of other spirits by reason. We may be said to have some knowledge or notion of our own minds of spirits and active beings, which in a strict sense we have not ideas. In like manner we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas—which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that *ideas*, *spirits* and *relations* are all in their respective kinds the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse and that the term *idea* would be improperly extended to signify everything we know or have any notion of.

90 Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things or do really exist this we do not deny but we deny they can subsist without the minds which perceive them or that they are resemblances of any archetypes existing without the mind since the very being of a sensation or idea consists in being perceived and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again the things perceived by sense may be termed *external* with regard to their origin—in that they are not generated from within by the mind itself but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which perceives them. Sensible objects may like us be said to be without the mind in another sense, namely when they exist in some other mind thus when I shut my eyes the things I see may

--- 91 things. It is acknowledged on the received principles that extension motion and in a word all sensible qualities have need of a support as not being able to subsist by themselves. But the objects perceived by sense are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities and consequently cannot subsist by themselves. Thus far it is agreed on all hand. So that in denying the things perceived by sense an existence independent of a substance of support wherein they may exist we detract nothing from the received opinion.

sense have no existence distinct from being perceived and can therefore exist in any other substance than those unextended indivisible substances or *sprits* which act and think and perceive them. The easophilosophers vulgarly hold

much the study of nature is bounded by this doctrine.

3. The great mechanical principle now in vogue is attraction. That the earth falls to the earth, or the sea swells towards the moon, may to some very plausibly be explained thereby. But how

much also is accounted for by attraction but, in the other instances, I do not perceive that anything is effected besides the effect itself for as to the manner of the action whereby it is produced, or the cause which produces it, these are not so much as aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take review of the several phenomena, and compare them together we may observe some likeness and conformity between them. For example, in the falling of stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in cohesion, crystallization, &c. there is something like namely an union or mutual approach of bodies. So that any one of these or the like phenomena may no seem strange or surprising to man who has nicely observed and compared them. For instance, the fact that only is thought to which is uncommon, or thin by itself, and out of the ordinary course of our observation. That bodies should tend towards the centre of the earth is not thought strange because it is what we perceive every moment of our lives. But, that they should have like gravitation towards the centre of the moon may seem odd and unaccountable to most men because it is discordant with the ideas. But philosopher whose thoughts take in larger compass of nature having observed certain similitude of appearances, as well in the heavens as the earth, that argue innumerable bodies to have mutual tendency towards each other which he denotes by the general name attraction, whatever can be reduced to this he thinks justly accounted for. Thus he explains the tides by the attraction of the terraqueous globe towards the moon, which to him does not appear odd or anomalous, but only particular example of general rule or law of nature.

105. If therefore we consider the difference there is between natural philosophers and other men, in regard to their knowledge of the phe-

nomena, we shall find it consists not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces them—for that can be no other than the will of God—but in a greater largeness of comprehension whereby analogous harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general rules, see sect. 6. which rules, grounded on the analogy and uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are most agreeable and sought after by the mind for that they extend our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable us to make very probable conjectures touching things that may have happened at very great distances of time and place as well as to predict things to come which sort of endeavour towards eminence is much affected by the mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such things, for we are apt to lay too great stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of truth, humour that eagerness of the mind whereby it is carried to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example in the business of gravitation. mutual attraction, because it appears in many instances, some are traitors for pronouncing universal and that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other and so far as that gravitation from being natural to bodies that in some instances quite contrary principle seems to shew itself as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case but it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit, who causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at fixed distance and to some He gives quite contrary tendency to fly asunder just as He sees convenient.

After what has been premised, I think we may lay down the following conclusions. First it is plain philosophers amuse themselves in vain, when they inquire for any natural efficient cause, distinct from mind or spirit. Secondly consider in the workman's creation is the workmanship of a wise and good Artist it should seem become philosophers to employ their thoughts (contrary to what some hold) about the final causes of things and I confess I see no reason why pointing out the arts and methods which nature has adapted, and for which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived, should not be thought in good way of account for them.

taken exclusive of all those particular actions and ideas that diversify the day merely for the continuation of existence or duration in abstract then it will perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it

98 For my own part whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of *time* abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind which flows uniformly and is participated by all beings I am lost and embroiled in inextricable difficulties I have no notion of it at all only I hear others say it is infinitely divisible and speak of it in such a manner as leads me to entertain odd thoughts of my existence since that doctrine lays one under an absolute necessity of thinking either that he passes away innumerable ages without a thought or else that he is annihilated every moment of his life both which seem equally absurd Time therefore being nothing abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each other in that same spirit or mind Hence it is a plain consequence that the soul always thinks and in truth whoever shall go about to divide in his thoughts or abstract the *existence* of a spirit from its *cogitation* will I believe find it no easy task.

99 So likewise when we attempt to abstract extension and motion from all other qualities and consider them by themselves we presently lose sight of them and run into great extravagances All which depend on a twofold abstraction first it is supposed that extension for example may be abstracted from all other sensible qualities and secondly that the entity of extension may be abstracted from its being perceived But whoever shall reflect and take care to understand what he says will if I mistake not acknowledge that all sensible qualities are alike *sensations* and alike *real* that where the extension is there is the colour too *in* his mind and that the archetypes can exist only in some other *mind* and that the objects of sense are nothing but those sensations combined blended or (if one may so speak) concerted together none of all which can be supposed to exist unperceived

100 What it is for a man to be happy or an object good every one may think he knows But to frame an abstract idea of happiness prescinded from all particular pleasure or of goodness from everything that is good this is what few can

words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular persons and actions seems to have rendered morality very difficult and the study thereof of small use to mankind And in effect the doctrine of *abstraction* has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most useful parts of knowledge

101 The two great provinces of speculative science conversant about ideas received from sense are Natural Philosophy and Mathematics with regard to each of these I shall make some observations And first I shall say something of Natural Philosophy On this subject it is that the sceptics triumph All that stock of arguments they produce to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low are drawn principally from this head namely that we are under an invincible blindness as to the *true* and *real* nature of things Thus they exaggerate and love to enlarge on what are miserably bantered say they by our senses and amused only with the outside and show of things The real essence the internal qualities and constitution of every the meanest object is hid from our view something there is in every drop of water every grain of sand which it is beyond the power of human understanding to fathom or comprehend But it is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is groundless and that we are influenced by false principles to that degree as to mistrust our senses and think we know nothing of those things which we perfectly comprehend

102 One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves ignorant of the nature of things is the current opinion that everything includes within itself the cause of its properties or that there is in each object an *inward essence* which is the source whence its discernible qualities flow and on they depend Some have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes to wit the figure motion weight and such like qualities of insensible particles whereas in truth there is no other agent or efficient cause than *spirit* it being evident that motion as well as all other *ideas* is perfectly inert See sect 25 Hence to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds by figure motion magnitude and the like must needs be labour in vain And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at all satisfactory Which may be said in general of those sciences where no one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another I need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out and how

1. But, not standing what has been said, I must confess it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than *relative* so that to conceive motion there must be at least one other body, whereof the distance or position is related to each other *mutually*. Hence, if there was one only body in being, it could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea of motion doth necessarily include relation.

113. But, tho' it is in every motion the necessity to conceive more bodies than one, yet I may conceive one only is moved, namely that on which the force causing the change in the distance or situation of the bodies, is impressed. For how ever some may change relation to one another, so as to term that body *fixed* of which changes in distance from some other body, whether the force or action causing that change were impressed on it or no, yet as relative motion is that which is perceived by sense, and regarded to the ordinary affairs of life, it would seem that every man of common sense know what it is as well as the best philosopher. Now I ask an one whether in his sense of motion as he walks along the streets, the stones pass over may be said to move because they change distance with his feet. To me it appears that though motion inclides relation of one thing to another yet it is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated from it. As man may think of something which does not think so body may be moved to or from another body which is not therefore used in motion.

4. As the pace happens to be variously defined, the motion which is related to it varies. A man in a ship may be said to be quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect of the sea, and westward in respect of the shore. In the common affairs of life men ever go beyond the earth that is the pace of any body and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted *quiescent* to be so. But philosophers, who have great notions of thought, and juster notions of the system of things discover even the earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their notions they seem to conceive the corporeal world as *moving*, and the *unmoved* unmoved *space* or shell thereof to be the pace whereby they estimate true motions. If we sound out our conceptions, I believe we may find all the above motions can frame an idea of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. For as hath been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all external relation, is incomprehensible and to this kind of rel

is motion all the above mentioned proper ties, causes, and effects ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found agreeable. As to what is said of the centrifugal force, that I does not at all belong to circular relation motion, I do not see how this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it. See *Principles of Natural Philosophy* by Mr. Newton, in *Book II*. For the water in the vessel at that time wherein it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I think, no motion at all as is plain from the foregoing section.

115. For to denominate a body *fixed* (is requisite, first, that the change is distance or situation with regard to some other body and secondly that the force occasioning that change be applied to it. If either of these be wanting I do not think that, agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible for us to think body which we see changing its distance from some other to be moved, though it have no force applied to it (in which sense there may be apparent motion) but then it is because the force causing the change of distance is imagined by us to be applied impressed on that body thought to move which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking things to be in motion which is not, and that is all.

6. From what has been said it follows that the philosophic consideration of motion does not imply the being of an *absolute Space* distinct from that which is perceived by sense and related bodies which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear upon the same principles that demonstrate the like of all other objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly we shall find we cannot even frame an idea of *pure Space* exclusive of all body. Thus I must confess seems impossible, as being a most abstract idea. When I conceive a motion in some part of my body if it be free or without resistance, I say there is *space* but if I find resistance, then I say there is *body* and in proportion as the resistance to motion is lesser or greater I say the space is more or less *free*. So that when I speak of pure or empty space it is no to be supposed that the word "space" stands for an idea distinct from or conceivably without body and motion—tho' indeed we are apt to think every noun substance stands for a distinct idea that may be separated from all others, which has occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the world to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still remains *pure Space* whereby nothing else is meant but only that I conceive it possible for

and altogether worthy a philosopher Thirdly from what has been premised no reason can be drawn why the history of nature should not still be studied and observations and experiments made which that they are of use to mankind and enable us to draw any general conclusions is not the result of any immutable habitudes or relations between things themselves but only of God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the world See sect 30 and 31 Fourthly by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view we may discover the general laws of nature and from them deduce the other phenomena I do not say *demonstrate* for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of nature always operates uniformly and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles which we can not evidently know

108 Those men who frame general rules from the phenomena and afterwards derive the phenomena from those rules seem to consider signs rather than causes A man may well understand natural signs without knowing their analogy or being able to say by what rule a thing is so or so And as it is very possible to write improperly through too strict an observance of general grammar rules so in arguing from general laws of nature it is not impossible we may extend the analogy too far and by that means run into mistakes

109 As in reading other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and apply it to use rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the language so in perusing the volume of nature it seems beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phenomenon to general rules or shewing how it follows from them We should propose to ourselves nobler views namely to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty order extent and variety of natural things hence by proper inferences to enlarge

servient to the ends they were designed for God's glory and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow creatures

110 The best key for the aforesaid analogy or natural Science will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated Treatise of *Metaphysics* In the entrance of which justly admired treatise Time Space and Motion are distinguished into *absolute* and *relative* true and *relative* mathematical and *vulgar* which distinction as it is at large ex-

plained by the author does suppose these quantities to have an existence without the mind and that they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things to which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at all

111 As for *Time* as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted sense for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things, I have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been already said on that subject Sect. 97 and 98 For the rest this celebrated author holds there is an *absolute Space* which being unperceivable to sense remains in itself similar and immovable and relative space is the measure thereof which being movable and defined by its situation in respect of sensible bodies is vulgarly taken for immovable space *Place* he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any body and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is the place *Absolute Motion* is said to be the translation of a body from absolute place to absolute place as relative motion is from one relative place to another And because the parts of absolute space do not fall under our senses instead of them we are obliged to use their sensible measures and so define both place and motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immovable But it is said in philosophical matters we must abstract from our senses since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to be quiescent are truly so and the same thing which is moved relatively may be really at rest as likewise one and the same body may be in relative rest and motion or even moved with contrary relative motions at the same time according as its place is variously defined All which

respect of the whole partake of the motions of the whole Secondly the place being moved that which is placed therein is also moved so that a body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the motion of its place Thirdly true motion is never generated or changed otherwise than by force impressed on the body itself Fourthly true motion is always changed by force impressed on the body moved Fifthly in circular motion barely relative there is no centrifugal force which nevertheless in that which is true or absolute is proportional to the quantity of motion

and to what scope they directed it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for ease of memory and help of computation, made use of counters, or a string of single strokes, points, or the like, each of which was made to signify an unit, a score, or a hundred of whatever kind they had occasion to reckon. Afterwards they found out the more convenient ways of making one character stand in place of several strokes or points. And lastly the notation of the Arabians or Indians came into use, wherein, by the repetition of few characters or figures, and varying the signification of each figure according to the place it obtains, all numbers may be most easily expressed which seems to have been done in imitation of language so that an exact analogy is observed between the notation by figures and names, the nine simple figures answering the nine first numeral names and places in the former corresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to those considerations of the simple and local value of figures, were contrived methods of finding from the given figures or marks of the parts, what figures and how placed are proper to denote the whole, or the *ars arithmetica*. And having found the sought figures, the same rule or analogy being observed how to write, it is easy to read them into words and so the number becomes perfectly known. For then the number of any particular things is said to be known, when I know the name of figures (with their due arrangement) and accordingly to the standing analogy be given to me. For these things being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know the signs of any part of the particular things signified by them and, thus computing the signs (because of the connexion established between them and the distinct multitude of things hereof is taken for an unit) we may be able easily to sum, multiply, divide, and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number.

2. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things, but the signs, which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake, but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and dispose rightly of them. Now agreeably to what we have before observed of words in general (see sect. 9. Intro.) happens here likewise that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by numeral names or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of particular things to our minds. I will not at present enter into more particular dissertation on this subject, but only observe that it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for abstract truths and theo-

rems concerning numbers, are in reality conversant about no object distinct from particular numeral things, except only names and characters, which originally came to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely verbal.

3. From numbers we proceed to speak of *Form* or *Wh* is considered as relative, the object

where supposed and thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the principles and demonstration as in Geometry that mathematicians never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And, as this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing, geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so much reluctance in mind not yet debauched by learning, so it is the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtlety which renders the study of Mathematics so difficult and tedious. Hence if we can make it appear that no finite extension contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows that we shall at once clear the science of Geometry from a great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and which shall make the attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it hitherto has been.

24. Every particular finite extension which may possibly be the object of our thought is an *idea* existing only in the mind, and consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore, I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extension that I consider it is certain they are not contained in it but, it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line, surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to myself in my mind. Wherefore I conclude they are not contained in it. No thing can be plainer to me than that the extensions I have in view are no other than my own ideas and it is no less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an infinite num-

the limbs of my body to be moved on all sides without the least resistance but if that too were annihilated then there could be no motion and consequently no Space Some perhaps may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them with the idea of pure space but it is plain from what we have elsewhere shewn that the ideas of space and distance are not obtained by that sense See the Essay concerning Vision

117 What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned concerning the nature of *pure Space* But the chief advantage arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma to which several who have employed their thoughts on that subject imagine themselves reduced to wit of thinking either that Real Space is God or else that there is some thing beside God which is eternal uncreated infinite indivisible immutable Both which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions It is certain that not a few divines as well as philosophers of great note have from the difficulty they found in conceiving either limits or annihilation of space concluded it must be divine And some of late have set themselves particularly to shew the incommunicable attributes of God agree to it Which doctrine how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature yet I do not see how we can get clear of it so long as we adhere to the received opinions

118 Hitherto of Natural Philosophy we come now to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of speculative knowledge to wit, Mathematics These how celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty of demonstration which is hardly anywhere else to be found cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes if in their principles there lurks some secret error which is common to the professors of those sciences with the rest of mankind Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from a great height of evidence yet their first principles are limited by the consideration of quantity and they do not ascend into any inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence all the particular sciences each part whereof Mathematics not excepted does consequently participate of the errors involved in them That the principles laid down by mathematicians are true and their way of deduction from those principles clear and incontestible we do not deny but we hold there may be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned

though tacitly supposed throughout the whole progress of that science and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors are diffused through all the branches thereof To be plain, we suspect the mathematicians are as well as other men concerned in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract general ideas and the existence of objects without the mind

119 Arithmetic has been thought to have for its object abstract ideas of *Number* of which to understand the properties and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative knowledge The opinion of the pure and intellectual nature of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness and elevation of thought It hath set a price on the most trifling numerical speculations which in practice are of no use but serve only for amusement and hath therefore so far infected the minds of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved in numbers and attempted the explication of natural things by them But if we inquire into our own thoughts and consider what has been premised we may perhaps entertain a low

— subservient to practice and promote the benefit of life

120 Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect 13 from which and what has been said in the Introduction it plainly follows there

— denoted by the numeral names and figures The theories therefore in Arithmetic if they are abstracted from the names and figures as like use from all use and practice as well as from the particular things numbered can be supposed to

— ling it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speculation

121 However since there may be some who deluded by the specious show of discovering abstracted verities waste their time in arithmetical theorems and problems which have not any use it will not be amiss if we more fully consider and expose the vanity of that pretence and thus will plainly appear by taking a view of Arithmetic in its infancy and observing what it was that originally put men on the study of that science

not to be admitted against propositions relating to infinity as though it were not impossible even for an infinite mind to conceive contradictions, or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have necessary connexion with truth or with reason. But, whoever considers the weakness of this pretence will think it was contrived on purpose to humour the laziness of the mind which had rather acquiesce in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with a severe examination of those principles it has ever embraced for true.

31. Of late the speculations about infinities are run so high, and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age. Some there are of great note who, not content with showing that some lines may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do yet farther maintain that each of those infinitesimals is itself subdivided into an infinity of other parts or infinitesimals of a second order and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there are infinitesimals of infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c., without ever coming to an end so that according to them as each does not barely contain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an infinity of an infinity of infinities of parts. Others there be who hold all orders of infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at all thinking it is a good reason absurd to imagine there is any positive quantity or part of extension which, though multiplied infinitely can never equal the smallest given extension. And yet on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, cube or other power of a positive real root, would itself be nothing at all which they and infinitesimals of the first order deny any all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

32. Have we not therefore reason to conclude they are both in the wrong, and that there is in effect no such thing as parts infinitely small, or as infinite number of parts contained in any finite quantity? But you will say that if this doctrine obtains it will sow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and those great men who have raised this science to so astonishing a height, have been all the while building a castle in the air. To this it may be replied that what

business of another place. For the rest, though it should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to mankind. On the contrary I think it were highly to be wished that men of great abilities and obstinate application would draw off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of life, or have a more direct influence on the manners.

33. It is to be said that several theorems undoubtedly true are discovered by methods in which infinitesimals are made use of, which could never have been if their existence included a contradiction in it. I answer that upon a thorough examination it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines, or even quantities less than the smallest real quantity. It will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.

34. By what we have premised, it is plain that very numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those false Principles which were impugned in the foregoing parts of this treatise and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the same time appear to be most fruitful Principles, from whence do flow innumerable consequences highly and antaginous to true philosophy as well as to religion. Particularly *Matter* or the *absolute existence of corporeal objects* hath been shewn to be that wherein the most avowed and pernicious enemies of all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever placed their chief strength and confidence. And surely if by distinguishing the real existence of unthinking things from their being perceived, and allowing them a substance of their own out of the minds of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the contrary a great many inexplicable difficulties arise if the supposition of Matter is barely precarious, as not being grounded on so much as one single reason if its consequences cannot endure the light of examination and free inquiry but screen themselves under the dark and general pretence of "infinities being incomprehensible" if withal the removal of this *Matter* be not attended with the least evil consequence if it be not even missed in the world, but everything as well, nay much easier conceived without it, if, lastly both Sceptics and Atheists are for ever silenced upon supposing only spirits and ideas, and this scheme of things is perfectly agreeable both to Reason and Re-

ber of other ideas that ■ that they are not infinitely divisible If by finite extension be meant something distinct from a finite idea I declare I do not know what that is and so cannot affirm or deny anything of it But if the terms extension parts &c are taken in any sense conceivable that ■ for ideas then to say a finite quantity or extension consists of parts infinite in number is so manifest a contradiction that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so and it is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees as a converted Gentile to the belief of transubstantiation Ancient and rooted prejudices do often pass into principles and those propositions which once obtain the force and credit of a *principle* are not only themselves but likewise whatever is deducible from them thought privileged from all examination And there ■ no absurdity so gross which by this means the mind of man may not be prepared to allow

125 He whose understanding is possessed with the doctrine of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be thought of the ideas of sense) extension in *abstract* ■ infinitely divisible And one who thinks the objects of sense exist without the mind will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit that a line but an

geometricians as of other men and have a like influence on their reasonings and it were no difficult thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of to support the infinite divisibility of extensions are bottomed on them At present we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine

126 It hath been observed in another place that the theorems and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal ideas (sect 15 Introd) where it is explained in what sense this ought to be understood to wit the particular lines and figures included in the diagram are supposed to stand for unnumerable others of different sizes or in other words the geometer considers them abstracting from their magnitude—which does not imply that he forms an abstract idea but only that he cares not what the particular magnitude is whether great or small but looks on that as a thing different to the demonstration Hence it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts

since it ■ regarded not in itself but as it is universal and it is universal only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines greater than itself in which may be distinguished ten thousand parts or more though there may not be above an inch in it After this manner the

considered in its own nature

127 Because there is no number of parts so great but it ■ possible there may be a line containing more the inch line is said to contain parts more than any assignable number which is true not of the inch taken absolutely but only for the things signified by it But men not retaining that distinction in their thoughts slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper contains in itself parts unnumerable There is no such thing as the ten thousandth part of an inch but there is of a mile or diameter of the earth which may be signified by that inch When therefore I delineate a triangle on paper and take one side not above an inch for example in length to be the radius,

all and consequently may be neglected without an error or inconvenience yet these described lines being only marks standing for greater quantities whereof it may be the ten thousandth part is very considerable it follows that to prevent notable errors in practice the radius must be taken of 10 000 parts or more

128 From what has been said the reason ■ plain why to the end any theorem become universal in its use it ■ necessary to speak of the lines described on paper as though they contained parts which really they do not In doing of which if we examine the matter thoroughly we shall perhaps discover that we cannot conceive an inch itself as consisting of or being divisible into a thousand parts but only some other line which is far greater than an inch and represented by it and that when we say a line is infinitely divisible we must mean a line which is infinitely great What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause why ■ suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extension has been thought necessary in geometry

129 The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed from this false principle might, one would think have been esteemed so many demonstrations against it But by I know not what logic, it is held that proofs *a posteriori*

understand the meaning of the word
 id to affirm or deny anything

spirits that blindness or hardness by me perceived as
 those described by another
 41 It must be supposed that they who
 assert the natural immortality of the soul are
 persons that are wholly incapable of an
 illumination even by the infinite power of the Creator
 for he first gives being but only that is not
 liable to be broken or dissolved by the ordinary
 laws of nature or motion. They indeed who
 hold the soul firm to be only this

enclosed. And thus no has been gradually em-
 braced and cherished by the worst part of man-
 kind as the most effectual antidote against all
 impressions of virtue and religion. But it has

that man by the use of his faculties
 possibly affect an impossible and
 substance which being itself is indissoluble
 by itself free from that is to say the soul
 of man naturally immortal.

4 After what has been said, it is, I pro-
 pose, plain that our souls are to be known
 in the same manner as senseless, insensible objects,
 or by way of ideas. Spirits and ideas are things so
 wholly different, that what we say they exist,
 they are known in like these words must
 not be thought to signify anything common to
 both natures. There is nothing at all common
 in them and to expect that by way of multiplica-
 tion enlargement of our faculties we may be
 enabled to know precisely as we do a triangle,
 seems as absurd as if we held his pet se-
 soned. This is inculcated because I maintain
 may be of moment towards clearing several im-
 portant questions, and preventing some every

dangerous errors concerning the nature of the
 soul. We may not, I think, strictly be said to
 have an idea of an object being or of an act
 although it may be said to have an idea of
 them. I have some knowledge of my
 mind and it acts about ideas, inasmuch as I
 know and understand that it is meant by these
 words. What I know that I have some notion
 of I will not say that the terms *idea* and *act*
 may not be used concretely if the word *idea*
 has a so broad yet too distant to clearness and
 propriety that it distinguishes things very differ-
 ent by difference of names. It is also to be remarked
 that we cannot
 but use the same things. But if in this manner way
 the word is extended to spirits, and rel-
 ations, and acts, this is, after all an affair of cer-
 bal concern.

43 It will not be amiss to add that the doc-
 trine of *ideas* as has had no small bare
 reputation those sciences intricate and obscure
 which are particularly concerned about spiritual
 things. We have magnified the knowledge of me-
 taphysics and the powers of the mind and consider them pre-
 sented as well
 from the mind itself as from the re-
 spect by itself. He a great name
 be of dark and ambiguous terms, presumed to
 stand for abstract notions, have been introduced
 into metaphysics and immortality and from these
 have grown infinite distinctions and disputes
 among the learned.

44 But in this business we are to have con-
 tributed towards clearing many controversies
 and mistakes with regard to the nature of
 operations of the mind than by being used to
 speak of things in terms borrowed from
 sensible objects. For example the will is not
 the motion of the soul thus refuses belief that
 the mind firm as ball in motion impelled
 and determined by the objects of sense as neces-
 sarily as that is by the stroke of a ball. Hence
 arise endless scruples and errors of danger-
 consequence in metaphysics. All which I do but
 not may be cleared and truth appear plain
 and firm and distinct, could but philosophy be
 prevailed to retire into the sciences ad-
 vancedly considered their own meaning.

45 From what has been said it is plain that
 we cannot know the existence of things
 otherwise than by their perceptions, the deas
 by them excited in us. I perceive several mo-
 tions, changes, and combinations of ideas, the
 information that there are certain particular goods

ligion methinks we may expect it should be admitted and firmly embraced though it were proposed only as an *hypothesis* and the existence of Matter had been allowed possible which yet I think we have evidently demonstrated that it is not

134 True it is that in consequence of the foregoing principles several disputes and speculations which are esteemed no mean parts of learning are rejected as useless But how great a prejudice soever against our notions this may give to those who have already been deeply engaged and make large advances in studies of that nature yet by others we hope it will not be thought any just ground of dislike to the principles and tenets herein laid down that they abridge the labour of study and make human sciences far more clear compendious and attainable than they were before

135 Having despatched what we intended to say concerning the knowledge of IDEAS the method we proposed leads us in the next place to treat of SPIRITS—with regard to which perhaps human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant of the nature of spirits is our not having an *idea* of it But surely it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding that it does not perceive the idea of spirit if it is manifestly impossible there should be any such idea And this if I mistake not has been demonstrated in section 27 to which I shall here add that a spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist but that this *substance* which supports or perceives ideas should itself be an idea or like an idea is evidently absurd

136 It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some have imagined) proper to know substances without which if we had we might know our own soul as we do a triangle To this I answer that in case we had a new sense bestowed upon us we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas of sense But I believe nobody will say that what he means by the terms *soul* and *substance* is only some particular sort of idea or sensation We may therefore infer that all things duly considered it is not more reasonable to think our faculties defective in that they do not furnish us with an idea of spirit or active thinking substance than it would be if we should blame them for not being able to comprehend a *round square*

137 From the opinion that spirits are to be known after the manner of an idea or sensation

have risen many absurd and heterodox tenets and much scepticism about the nature of the soul It is even probable that this opinion may have produced a doubt in some whether there had any soul at all distinct from their body since upon inquiry they could not find they had an idea of it That an *idea* which is inactive and the existence whereof consists in being perceived should be the image or likeness of a agent subsisting by itself seems to need no other

essary that an idea or image be in all respects like the original

138 I answer if it does not in those mentioned it is impossible it should represent it any other thing Do but leave out the power

degree of those powers should be represented in an idea it is evident there can be no idea of spirit

139 But it will be objected that if there is an idea signified by the terms *soul* *spirit* and *substance* they are wholly insignificant or have no meaning in them I answer those words do not mean or signify a real thing which is neither an idea nor like an idea but that which perceives ideas and wills and reasons about them. What I am myself that which I denote by the term *substance* is the same with what is meant by *soul* or *spirit* or *substance* If it be said that this is only quarrelling at a word and that since the immediately

may not partake in the same appellation I answer all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being perceived where as a soul or spirit is an active being whose existence consists not in being perceived but in perceiving ideas and thinking It is therefore

id a See sect 27

140 In a large sense indeed we may be said to have an idea or rather a notion of spirit that

person of God? I answer if by Nature is meant only the whole series of effects or sensations impressed on our senses, according to certain fixed and universal laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce any thing at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning, annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is an empty name, introduced by those teachers who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. "The Lord H. causeth the vapours to ascend. He maketh lightning with His name. He bringeth forth the wind out of His treasures. Jerem. 4. 13. H. turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark with night. Amos 5. 8. H. maketh the earth, and maketh it soft with snows. H. maketh the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness, so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn. See Psalm 65. But notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at great distance off, and substitute some blind unthinking deus in His stead, though (if we may believe Saint Paul) He be not far from every one of us.

I will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have of their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, tumors, tumors, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, comets, meteors, &c. &c. are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is an immediately actuated and superintended by Spirit of divine wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in good measure given from sect. 6. it being plain that the ordered methods of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and a more steady and consistent manner which attests both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, without its ordered and various parts,

phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. Verily (saith the prophet) thou art a God that hidest thyself. Isaiah. 45. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose. It were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

32. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would here we do well to examine whether our tampering the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with imposture and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the perpetually fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than perhaps does nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

3. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pertinent to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the case of some one particular pain

like myself which accompany them and concur in their production Hence the knowledge I have of other spirits is not immediate as is the knowledge of my ideas but depending on the intervention of ideas by me referred to agents or spirits distinct from myself as effects or concomitant signs

146 But though there be some things which convince us human agents are concerned in producing them yet it is evident to every one that those things which are called the Works of Nature that is the far greater part of the ideas or sensations perceived by us are not produced by or dependent on the wills of men There is therefore some other Spirit that causes them since it is repugnant that they should subsist by themselves See sect 29 But if we attentively consider the constant regularity order and concatenation of natural things the surprising magnificence beauty and perfection of the larger and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of creation together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole but above all the never-enough admired laws of pain and pleasure and the instincts or natural inclinations appetites and passions of animals I say if we consider all these things and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes One Eternal Infinitely Wise Good and Perfect we shall be convinced

147 Hence it is evident that God is known as certainly and immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever distinct from ourselves We may even assert that the same

reasons and considerable than those ascribed to human agents There is not any one mark that denotes a man or effect produced by him which does not more strongly convince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of Nature For it is evident that in effect

the will of the Creator He alone it is who upholding all things by the word of His power maintains that intricate course

unthinking herd that they cannot see God Could we but see Him say they as we see a man we should believe that He is and believing obey His commands But alas we need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things with a more full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow creatures Not that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate view or see corporeal things not by themselves but by see not

148 I explain my meaning — A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense as not being an idea when therefore we see the colour size figure and motions of a man we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our minds and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections serve to mark out unto us the existence of

149 I explain of ideas as directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and motion like to ourselves accompanying and represented by it And after the same manner we see God all the difference is that whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind whithersoever we direct our view we do at all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity everything we see hear feel or any way perceive by sense being a sign or effect of the power of God as is our perception of those very motions which are produced by men

150 It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one that is capable of the least reflection than the existence of God or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us as we have an absolute and entire dependence on him to stand in him to be moved and have our being That the discovery of this great truth which lies so near and obvious to the mind should be attained to by the reason of so very few is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men although they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the Divinity yet so little affected by them that they seem as if they were blinded with excess of light

150 But you will say Hath Nature no share in the production of natural things and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole

operation of God. I answer it by *Nature* is meant only the visible series of effects & sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that *Nature*, taken in this sense cannot produce anything real. But, if by *Nature* is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and thus perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. *Nature*, in this acceptance is a vain chimaera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But, it is more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to *Nature*. "The Lord He causeth the vapours to ascend: He maketh lightning with the rain, He bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures. Jerem. 13. He turneth the shadow of death into the morning and maketh the day

nomena strike on our senses, the hand which creates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. Verily" (saith the prophet) thou art God that hidest thyself. Isaiah, 45: 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy who will not be at the least expense of thought yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear from what he has elsewhere observed that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature that without its all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose & were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31 Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

52 We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with the impotent and suffering mortals. I mean indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal

yearth His goodness so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over with corn. See Psalm 65. But, notwithstanding that this is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what reason from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at great distance off and substitute some blood unthinking deputy in His stead though (if we may believe Saint Paul) He be not far from every one of us."

It will, I do not but, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is good measure plain from sect. 62 it being while that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after every manner which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Which is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst it motions and various phe-

Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or a fiat of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted recklessness or prodigality in the gentle who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His power.

53 As for the mixture of pain & uneasiness which is in the world pursuant to the general law of nature, and the notions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in that we are in the present, is indispensably necessary to our well being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take for instance, the idea of some particular pain

DAVID HUME
AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN
UNDERSTANDING

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

DAVID HUME 1,11-17,6

Hume was born at Edinburgh on April 6, 1711, the younger son in a good but not wealthy family.

His father "who passed for a man of parts, and Ben Hume was still a child, and he was brought up by his mother in the family estate of Ninewells, near Berwick. About 1723 he entered the University of Edinburgh, and, according to his own testimony, "passed through the ordinary course of education with success. His letters show that when he returned to Ninewells about three years later he had acquired "fair knowledge of Latin, slight acquaintance with Greek, and literary taste inclining to books of reasoning and philosophy, and to poetry and the pastimes. His studious disposition led his family to believe that law was the proper profession for him, but he found an insurmountable aversion everything but the pursuits of philosophy and general learning, and while he followed law, upon Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Varron were the books which I was secretly devouring.

A too ardent passion for his studies threatened his health, and in 1734 determined to try complete change of scene and occupation. Hume entered a business house in Bristol. He was so to be paid the same salary as usual, and he set out for France, resolved "to take very rapid business steps, my distribution of leisure to business compared my improvement, and to reward every object as it deserved, except the improvement of my talents as a lawyer. He resided at Paris, resided at Rome, and was named La Flessa, where Descartes had once studied. During his stay in France he wrote the *Treatise of Human Nature*, and he returned to London to spend a year of relaxation. He appeared in the House of Commons in 1740. Contrary to his expectations, his first essay "Of the Liberty of the Press" which was published in 1741, drew attention as even to obtain a second edition, the second.

Up to the date of his first publication, Hume had devoted himself to study, mainly in history and economics. In 1742 he received the chair of history at the University of Edinburgh, and in 1743 he was elected a member of the Royal Society.

which enjoyed such success that a second edition was brought out the following year. At that time he also issued a second volume of essays. He continued to look about for a position that would secure him independence, and in 1744 tried hard to obtain the chair of moral philosophy at Edinburgh. Failing in this attempt, he accepted the post of tutor to the Marquis of Annandale, who had been declared a lunatic by the court. Upon his dismissal a year later Hume accepted the office of secretary to General St. Clair, a distant relative, who was engaged in an expedition which was at first meant against Canada, but ended in an incursion on the coast of France. After the failure of this venture he accompanied the general on a military embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin, on which he "wore the uniform of an officer and was introduced at these courts as an aide-camp to the general." He remarks that these two years (1746-48) almost the only interruption which his studies have received during the course of his life, enabled him to return to Scotland, master of near two thousand pounds.

During his absence from England in 1748 his *Plato and Epistola* was published. Afterwards entitled *the Essay concerning Human Understanding*, it was a re-casting of the first part of the *Treatise* by which he hoped to gain a larger audience. But the first reception of the work was little more favorable than that accorded to the *Treatise*. In 1751 he re-cast the third book of the *Treatise* and published it as *the Essay concerning the Principles of Morals*. This same year he was again unsuccessful in his attempt to obtain a professorship at Edinburgh, this time as the successor to his friend, Adam Smith, in the chair of logic. The following year, despite accusations of heresy, he received the post of librarian at the Advocates' Library, which though small in salary provided excellent facilities for literary work.

During his years as librarian Hume attained his greatest success as a man of letters. He composed his essays and in 1757 brought out the *Four Dissertations*, one of which was devoted to the *History of the Literature of the British Empire*. The *History of the Literature of the British Empire* were also completed, but

CONTENTS

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	447
I. OF THE DIFFERENT SPECIES OF PHILOSOPHY	451
II. OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS	455
III. OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS	45
IV. SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE EXTENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING	458
SCEPTICAL SOLUTION OF THESE DOUBTS	63
V. OF PROBABILITY	69
VI. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION	4
VII. OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY	43
VIII. OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS	87
IX. OF MIRACLES	403
XI. OF A PARTICULAR PRODIGE AND OF A FUTURE STATE	497
XII. OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHI LOSOPHY	503

on the advice of friends publication was postponed until after his death. Most of his efforts however were devoted to the writing of history to which he may have turned his attention because of the success of his political and economic essays. Adam Smith had recommended that he begin with Henry VII but he chose to start with the period of James I, an epoch when I thought the misrepresentations of faction began chiefly to take place. Although Hume was disappointed by the reception of the first volume which appeared in 1753 his *History of England* was well received and within a few years it brought the author a larger revenue than had ever before been obtained in his country from literature. The work was completed by 1761 although Hume continued to revise it throughout most of the remainder of his life excising from it all the villainous seditious Whig strokes and plaguy prejudices of Whiggism that he could detect.

Although not only independent but opulent and determined never more to set foot out of his native country Hume in 1763 accepted an invitation to go to Paris as acting secretary of the embassy. For three years he enjoyed Parisian society. Meeting with men and women of all ranks and stations he noted the more I resided from their excessive civilities the more I was loaded with them. He returned home convinced there is a real satisfaction in

living at Paris. Rousseau accompanied him persuaded by Hume to seek shelter in England. The association was of short duration it ended in a violent and sensational quarrel for which Rousseau seems to have been largely to blame. Hume after serving as undersecretary at the Foreign Office for a year (1767, 68) retired to Edinburgh where he built himself a new house and settled down with the prospect of enjoying long my ease and of seeing the increase of my reputation.

In the spring of 1775 Hume was stricken with a troublesome though not painful illness. Preparing himself for a speedy dissolution he wrote a short autobiography in which he drew his own character. I am he wrote or rather was (for that is the style I must now use in speaking of myself which emboldens me the more to speak my sentiments) I was I say a man of mild dispositions of command of temper and of an open social and cheerful humour capable of attachment but little susceptible of enmity and of great moderation in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame my ruling passion never soured my temper notwithstanding my frequent disappointments.

A visit to Bath in 1776 seemed at first to relieve his sickness but on the return journey more alarming symptoms developed his strength rapidly sank and little more than a month later he died in Edinburgh on August 25 1776.

CONTENTS

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE	447
I OF THE DIFFERENCES OF PHILOSOPHY	451
II OF THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS	455
III OF THE ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS	457
IV SCEPTICAL DOUBTS CONCERNING THE TRUTHS OF THE UNDERSTANDING	468
V SCEPTICAL SOLUTIONS OF THESE DOUBTS	463
VI OF PROBABILITY	469
VII OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY COEXISTENCE	470
VIII OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY	478
IX OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS	487
X OF MIRACLES	488
XI OF A PARTICULAR PROPOSITION CONCERNING THE FUTURE STATE	497
XII OF THE ACADEMICAL OR SCEPTICAL PHILOSOPHY	503

ADVERTISEMENT

Most of the principles and *in this*
called
the Au

t *more* *fore he left College and which he*
wrote and published not long after But not finding it suc
cessful he was sensible of his error in going to the press too
early and he cast the whole anew in the following pieces
where some negligences in his former reasoning and more in
the expression are he hopes corrected It several writers
who have honoured the Author's Philosophy with answers
have taken care to direct all their batteries against that
juvenile work which the Author never acknowledged and
have affected to triumph in any advantages which they
imagined they had obtained over it I practice very con
trary to all rules of candour and fair dealing and a strong
instance of those polemical artifices which a bigotted zeal
thinks itself authorized to employ Henceforth the Author
desires that the following Pieces may alone be regarded as
containing his philosophical sentiments and principles

AN ENQUIRY

CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

Sect. 1 Of the different Species of Philosophy

1 Moral philosophy or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners each of which has its peculiar merit, and may contribute to the entertainment, instruction, and reformation of mankind. The one considers man chiefly as born for a *virtue* and as influenced in his measures by taste and sentiment pursuing one object, and ordering another according to the *idea* which these objects seem to possess, and according to the light in which they present themselves. As *virtue*, of all objects, is allowed to be the most valuable, this species of philosophy paints her in the most amiable colours, borrowing all helps from poetry and eloquence, and treating their subject in an easy, and obvious manner and such as is best fitted to please the imagination, and engage the affections. They select the most striking observations and instances from common life place opposite characters in proper contrast and alluring us into the paths of *virtue* by the view of glory and happiness, direct our steps in these paths by the soundest precepts and most illustrious examples. They make us feel the difference between vice and *virtue* they excite and regulate our sentiments and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours.

2 The other species of philosophy considers man in the light of *reason* rather than an actual being and endeavours to raise his understanding more than cultivate his manners. They regard human nature as subject of peculiar

instances to general principles, they still push on their enquiries to principles more general, and rest not satisfied till they arrive at those original principles, by which, in every science, all human curiosity must be bounded. Though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to common readers, they aim at the approbation of the learned and the wise and think themselves sufficiently compensated for the labour of their whole lives, if they can discover some hidden truths, which may contribute to the instruction of posterity.

3 It is certain that the easy and obvious philosophy will always, with the generality of mankind, have the preference above the accurate and abstruse and by many will be recommended not only as more agreeable, but more useful than the other. It enters more into common life moulds the heart and affects the mind and, by introducing those principles which cultivate men, reforms their conduct, and brings them nearer to that model of perfection which it describes. On the contrary the abstruse philosophy being useful only in a turn of mind which cannot enter into business and action, vanishes when the philosopher leaves the shade, and comes into open day, no can its principles easily retain any influence over our conduct and behaviour. The feelings of our heart, the agitation of our passions, the vehemence of our affections, dissipate all its conclusions, and reduce the profound philosopher to a mere plebeian.

4 This also must be confessed, that the most durable, as well as justest fame has been acquired by the easy philosophy and that the strict reasoners seem hitherto have enjoyed only a momentary reputation from the caprice or ignorance,

tion, or behaviour. They think a reproach to all literature, that philosophy should try to be fixed, beyond controversy, the foundation of more

ance of their own age but have not been able to support their renown with more equitable posterity. It is easy for a profound philosopher to commit a mistake in his subtle reasonings and one mistake is the necessary parent of another while he pushes on his consequences and is not deterred from embracing any conclusion by its unusual appearance or its contradiction to popular opinion. But a philosopher who purposes only to represent the common sense of mankind in more beautiful and more engaging colours if by accident he falls into error goes no farther but renewing his appeal to common sense and the natural sentiment.

on perhaps will be read with pleasure when Locke shall be entirely forgotten.

The mere philosopher is a character which is commonly but little acceptable in the world as being supposed to contrive.

in principles and notions equally remote from their comprehension. On the other hand the mere ignorant is still more despised nor is anything.

The noble entertainments. The most perfect character is supposed to lie between those extremes retaining an equal ability and taste for books company and business preserving in conversation that discernment and delicacy which arise from polite letters and in business that probity and accuracy which are the natural result of a just philosophy. In order to diffuse and cultivate so accomplished a character nothing can be more useful than compositions of the easy style and manner which draw not too much from life require no deep application or retreat to be comprehended and send back the student among mankind full of noble sentiments and precepts applicable to every exigence of human life. By means of such compositions virtue becomes amiable science agreeable company instructive and entertaining.

Man is a reasonable being and as such receives from science his proper food and nourishment. But so narrow are the bounds of human understanding that little satisfaction can be

hoped for in this particular either from the extent of security or his acquisitions. Man is a sociable, no less than a reasonable being. But neither can he always enjoy company agreeable and amusing or preserve the proper relish for them. Man is also an active being and from that disposition as well as from the various necessities of human life must submit to business and occupation. But the mind requires some relaxation and cannot always support its bent to care and industry. It seems then that nature has pointed out a mixed kind of life as most suitable to the human race and secretly admonished them to allow none of these biases to draw too much so as to incapacitate them for other occupations and entertainments. Indulge your passion for science says she but let your science be human and such as may have a direct reference to action and society. Abstruse thought and profound researches I prohibit and will severely punish by the pen- sive melancholy.

Why do still a man

5 Were the generality of mankind contented to prefer the easy philosophy to the abstract and profound without throwing any blame or contempt on the latter it would

is often carried farther even to the absolute rejecting of all profound reasonings or what is commonly called metaphysics. I shall now proceed to consider what can reasonably be pleaded in their behalf.

We may begin with observing that one considerable advantage which results from the accurate and abstract philosophy is its subservency to the easy and humane which without the former can never attain a sufficient degree of exactness in its sentiments precepts or reasonings. All polite letters are nothing but pictures of human life in

artist must be better qualified to succeed in this undertaking who besides a delicate taste and a quick apprehension possesses an accurate knowledge of the internal fabric, the operations of the understanding the workings of the passions and the various species of sentiment which discriminate vice and virtue. He

passion never the inward search or enquiry may appear to become, in some measure, requisite to those, who would describe with success the motions and outward appearances of life and manners. The anatomist presents to the eye the most hideous and disgusting objects but his science is useful to the painter in delineating even *Nea* or an *Helen*. While the latter employs all the richest colours of his art, and gives his figures the most graceful and engaging airs he must still carry his attention to the inward structure of the human body, the position of the muscles, the fabric of the bones, and the use and figure of every part or organ. Accuracy is, in every case, adjoined to beauty and just reasoning to delicate argument. In vain would we exalt the one by depreciating the other.

Besides, we may observe in every art or profession, even those which most concern life or action, that a spirit of accuracy however acquired, carries all of them nearer their perfection, and renders them more subservient to the interests of society. And this philosopher may be remote from business, the genius of philosophy is carefully cultivated by several, must gradually diffuse itself through the whole society, and bestow similar correctness every art and calling. The politician will acquire greater foresight and subtlety in the subdividing and balancing of power the lawyer more method and finer principles in his reasonings and the general more regularity in his discipline and more caution in his plans and perceptions. The stability of modern governments above the ancient, and the accuracy of modern philosophy has improved, and probably will still improve by similar gradations.

6. Were there no distant to be reaped from these studies, beyond the gratification of an insatiable curiosity ought not this to be deplored as being necessary to those few sad and harmless pleasures, which are bestowed on the human race. The sweet reward most inoffensive path of life leads through the recesses of science and learning and whose can either remove

But this obscurity in the profound and abstract philosophy is objected to, not only as painful and languid but as the inevitable source of uncertainty and error. Here indeed lies the justest and most plausible objection against a considerable part of metaphysics, that they are not properly distinguished from the fruitless of

visions, which being unable to determine on fair ground, raise these intangling brambles to cover and protect their weakness. Chased from the open country these robbers fly into the forest, and labour in vain to break in upon every unguarded avenue of the mind and do terrible mischief to the religious arts and prejudices. The stoutest antagonist, if he remits his watch a moment, is oppressed. And many through cowardice and filly penitence test the energies, and willingly receive them with reverence and submission as their legal sovereigns.

7. But is this a sufficient reason, why philosophers should desert from such researches, and leave supervision till in possession of other retreat. It is not proper to draw an opposite conclusion, and pervert the necessity of carrying the war in to the most secret recesses of the enemy. In vain do we hope, that men, from frequent disappointment, will at last abandon such airy sciences, and discover the proper province of human reason. For besides, that many persons find too sensible an interest in perpetually recalling such topics besides this, I say the motive of blind despair can never reasonably have place in the sciences since however unsuccessful former attempts may have proved, there is still room to hope that the industrious good fortune or improved sagacity of succeeding generations may reach discoveries unknown to former ages. Each diligent enquirer must still pursue the arduous prize and find himself stimulated, rather than discouraged, by the failures of his predecessors while he hopes that the glory of achieving so hard a conquest is reserved for himself. The only method of freeing the human mind from these obscure questions, is to enquire seriously into the nature of human understanding and show from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit this judgment in order to be true to ourselves ever after. And must cultivate metaphysics with some care in order to destroy the false and dilute. Indolence which, in some persons, affords a safeguard against this deceitful philosophy as, with others, a verbal

As some bodies, which have been endowed with various and florid beauties, require some exercise and reap pleasure from what, to the general of mankind, may seem burdensome and laborious. Obscure, indeed, is painful to the mind as well as to the eye but to bring light from obscurity is what every labourer must needs be delightful and joyful.

those actions that excite our approbation or disapprobation, to search for some common principle, on which this variety of sentiments might depend. And though they have sometimes carried the matter too far by their passion for some one general principle, it must, however be confessed, that they are excusable in expecting to find some general principle, into which all the virtues and vices are justly to be resolved. The law has been the object of critics, logicians, and even politicians. Nor have their attempts been wholly unsuccessful, though perhaps longer time, greater accuracy and more ardent application may bring these sciences still nearer their perfection. I throw apart once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more rash, precipitate, and dogmatical, than even the boldest and most presumptuous philosophy that has ever attempted to impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind.

What though these reasonings concerning human nature seem abstract, and of difficult comprehension. This affords no presumption of their falsehood. On the contrary it seems impossible, that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy. And whatever pains these researches may cost us, we may think ourselves sufficiently rewarded, not only in point of profit but of pleasure, if, by that means, we can make any addition to our stock of knowledge, in subjects of such unpassable importance.

But as, after all, the abstractedness of these speculations is no recommendation, but rather disadvantage to them, and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by care and art, and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail, we have, in the following enquiry attempted to throw some light upon subjects, from which uncertainty has

been novel. And still more happy, if reasoning in this easy manner we can undermine the foundations of an abstruse philosophy which seems to have hitherto served only as a shelter to superstition, and cover barbarity and error!

SECT. II. *Of the Origin of Ideas*

Every one will readily allow that there is considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when man feels the pain of extreme heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.

These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the senses but they never can naturally reach the force and acuity of the original sentiment. The utmost we say of them, even when they operate with greatest vigour is, that they represent their object in so lively a manner that we could almost say we feel or see it. But, except the mind be disordered by disease or madness, they never can arrive at such a pitch of acuity as to render these perceptions altogether indistinguishable. All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the description be taken for a real landscape. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation.

We may here see a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind. A man in a fit of anger is situated in a very different manner from one who only thinks of that emotion. If you tell me, that any person is in love I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation but never can mistake this conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion. When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is faithful mirror and copies its objects truly but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed. It requires no nice discernment or metaphysical head to mark the distinction between them.

2. Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and acuity. The less forcible and more lively are commonly denominated *Thoughts* or *Ideas*. The other species want name in our language, and in most others I suppose, because it was not requisite for any but philosophical purposes, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore use a little freedom, and call them *Impressions* employing that word in sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term *impression*, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

3. Nothing, at first view may seem more unbounded than the thought of man, which not only escapes all human power and authority but is not even restrained within the limits of nature and reality. To form monsters, and join incongruous shapes and appearances, costs the imagi-

ination no more trouble than to conceive the most natural and familiar objects And while the body is confined to one planet along which it creeps with pain and difficulty the thought can in an instant transport us into the most distant regions of the universe or even beyond the universe into the unbounded chaos where nature is supposed to lie in total confusion What never was seen or heard of may yet be conceived nor is any thing beyond the power of thought except what implies an absolute contradiction

But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty we shall find upon a nearer examination that it is really confined within very narrow limits and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding transposing augmenting or diminishing the materials afforded us by the senses and experience When we think of a golden mountain we only join two consistent ideas gold and mountain with which we were formerly acquainted A virtuous horse we can conceive because from our own feeling we can conceive virtue and thus we may unite to the figure and shape of a horse which is an animal familiar to us In short all the materials of thinking are derived either from our outward or inward sentiment the mixture of the two

14 To prove this the two following arguments will I hope be sufficient First when we analyze our thoughts or ideas however compounded or sublime we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment Even those ideas which at first sight seem to be of a different kind are in reality derived from the same source

15 To prove this the two following arguments will I hope be sufficient First when we analyze our thoughts or ideas however compounded or sublime we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment Even those ideas which at first sight seem to be of a different kind are in reality derived from the same source

15 Secondly If it happen from a defect of the organ that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas A blind man can form no notion of colours a deaf man of sounds Restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient by opening this new inlet for his sensations you also on

16 Secondly If it happen from a defect of the organ that a man is not susceptible of any species of sensation we always find that he is as little susceptible of the correspondent ideas A blind man can form no notion of colours a deaf man of sounds Restore either of them that sense in which he is deficient by opening this new inlet for his sensations you also on

17 The senses of which we can have no conception because the ideas of them have never been introduced to us in the only manner by which an idea can have access to the mind to wit by the actual feeling and sensation

18 There is however one contradictory phenomenon which may prove that it is not absolutely impossible for ideas to arise independent of their correspondent impressions I believe it will readily be allowed that the several distinct ideas of colour which enter by the eye or those of sound which are conveyed by the ear are really different from each other though at the same time resembling No if this be true of different colours it must be no less so of the different shades of the same colour and each shade produces a distinct idea independent of the rest For if this should be denied it is possible by the continual gradation of shades to run a colour sensibly into what is most remote from it and if you will not allow any of the intermediate shades to exist

19 To prove this the two following arguments will I hope be sufficient First when we analyze our thoughts or ideas however compounded or sublime we always find that they resolve themselves into such simple ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment Even those ideas which at first sight seem to be of a different kind are in reality derived from the same source

rather now I ask, whether it be possible for a man his own imagination, to supply this defect and raise up himself the idea of that regular mode, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses. I believe there are what I take to be of opinion that he can; and thus is several proof that the simple ideas are not to be taken in every instance derived from the corresponding impressions, though this instance is not so clear that it is scarcely worth our observation, and does no more than that for a more we should see our several manner.

Here, therefore, is a proposition, which does not seem to be self-evident and in itself, but, proper use were made of it, might render every dispute equally an ellipsis, and banish all kind of error, which has so long taken possession of the philosophical reasoners, and drawn disgrace upon them. All ideas, especially abstract ones, are naturally faint and obscure the mind has but a slender hold of them they are apt to be confounded with other resembling ideas and hence are often employed as terms, though without distinct meaning, we are apt to imagine it has the criminal id annexed to it. On the contrary all impressions, that is, all sensations, either outward or inward, are strong and vivid the limits between them are more exactly determined, nor is it easy to fall in any error or mistake in regard to them. When we can obtain, without any suspicion, that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as but too frequently we need but enquire, for what use it is that suffices to determine it) and if it be impossible to assign any this will serve to confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas into so clear light we may reasonably hope to remove all dispute which may arise, concerning their nature and reality.

I am probable that no more was meant by those who coined many ideas, than that all ideas were copies of our impressions though must be considered, that the terms, which have been employed, were not chosen with such caution, nor so exactly determined, as to prevent all mistakes about their doctrine. For that is meant by many. If ideas be quantities natural, then all the perceptions and ideas of the mind must be allowed to be natural or natural, in the latter sense we take the latter word, whether in proportion to what is uncommon, artificial, or miraculous. If by ideas be meant, conceptions of our birth, the dispute seems to be frivolous nor is worth while to enquire what time thinking begins, whether before or after our birth. Again, the word *idea*, seems to be commonly taken in very loose sense, by Locke and others as standing for all of our perceptions, our sensations and passions, as well as thoughts, &c. Now in this sense I should desire to know what can be

Sect III Of the Association of Ideas

18. It is evident that there is a principle of connexion between the distinct ideas in his ideas of the mind, and that, in their appearance to the memory or imagination, they introduce each other with a certain degree of method and regularity. In our more serious thinking or discourse this is so observable, that any particular thought, which breaks in upon the regular tract or chain of ideas, is immediately remarked and rejected. And even in our wildest and most wandering reveries, as in our very dreams, we shall find, if we reflect, that the imagination ran not altogether at adventures, but that there was still a connexion upheld among the different ideas, which succeeded each other. Were the loosest and freest conceptions to be transcribed, there would indeed be observed some thing.

Which is expected in all is transcribed. Where this is wanting, the person who broke the thread of discourse might still inform you, that there had secretly revolved in his mind a succession of thoughts, which had gradually led him from the subject of conversation. Among different languages, even where we cannot suspect the least connexion or communication, it is found, that the words, express of ideas, in most compounded, do yet nearly correspond to each other. A certain proof that the simple ideas, comprehended in the compound ones, were bound together by some universal principle, which had an equal influence on all mankind.

9. Though it be too trivial to escape observation, that different ideas are connected together, I did not find that any philosopher has attempted to enumerate or class all the principles of association subject, to which that seems worthy of curiosity. To me, there appear to be only three principles of connexion among ideas, namely *Repetition*, *Contiguity* in time or place, and *Cause or Effect*.

meant by asserting that self-love, or resentment of injuries, or the passion between the sexes is not

the schoolmen, who, making use of undefined terms, draw out their disputes to tedious length, without ever touching the point in question. A like ambiguity and circumlocution seem to run through the philosopher's reasonings on this as well as most other subjects.

That these principles serve to connect ideas

ing the others ² and if we think of a sound we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it ³ But that this enumeration is complete and that there are no other principles of association except these may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader or even to a man's own satisfaction All we can do in such cases is to run over several instances and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible The more instances we examine and the more care we employ the more assurance shall we acquire that the enumeration which we form from the whole is complete and entire

Sect. IV. *Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding*

PART I

20 All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds to wit *Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact* Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry Algebra and Arithmetic and in short every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain *That the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of the two sides* is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty* expresses a relation between these numbers Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is or ever existent in the universe Though there

possible because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation *that it will rise* We should in vain therefore attempt to demonstrate its falsehood Were it demonstratively false it would imply a contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind

It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory This part of philosophy its observability has been little cultivated either by the ancients or moderns and therefore our doubts and errors in the prosecution of so important an enquiry may be the more excusable while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction They may even prove useful by exciting curiosity and destroying that implicit faith and security which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry The discovery of defects in the

common notions is an intricate and more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public

22 All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect* By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses If you were to ask a man why he believes any matter of fact which is absent for instance that his friend is in the country or in France he would give you a reason and this reason would be some other fact as a letter received from him or the promise made him or the promise made him there reason is the foundation of all our knowledge

And here it is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it Were there nothing to bind them together the inference could be entirely precarious The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person Why? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric and closely connected with it If we analyze all the other reasonings of this nature we shall find that they are founded on

21 Matters of fact which are the second objects of human reason are not ascertained in the same manner nor is our evidence of their truth however great of a like nature with the foregoing The contrary of every matter of fact is still

Remembrance
Contingency
Cause and effect

For instance Contingency is also a
hypothesis
consequence
blame
strong
tension
implies in

PART I

the relation of cause and effect and that this relation is either near or remote direct or collateral. Heat and light are collateral effects of fire, and the effect may justly be inferred from the other.

3. If I would satisfy ourselves, therefore concerning the nature of that evidence which assures us of matters of fact, we must enquire how arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect.

I shall venture to affirm, as general proposition, which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is, in any instance, raised by reasonings *priori* but arises entirely from experience, where we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let an object be presented to a man, if ever so strong natural reason and abilities if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes.

proper nourishment of a man, not for a lion or a unicorn?

But the same truth may not appear at first sight to have the same evidence with regard to events, which have become familiar to us from our first appearance in the world which bear a close analogy to the whole course of nature and which are supposed to depend on the simple qualities of objects, though any secret structure of parts. We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason, without experience. We fancy that were we brought into a sudden into this world we could at first have inferred that a billiard ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse and that it would need not to have waited for the event in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that where it is too great, it not only covers up natural ignorance, but even conceals itself and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree.

5. But it convinces us that all the laws of nature and all the operations of bodies without exception, are known only by experience, the fol-

causes which produced it, the effects which

know it us since we must be conscious of the irresistibility which we then lay under of foretelling what would arise from them. Present two smooth pieces of marble to a man who has no tincture of natural philosophy he will never discover that they will chere together in such manner as to require great force to separate them in direct line, while they make so small resistance to lateral pressure. Such events, as bear little analogy to the common course of nature, are also readily confessed to be known only by experience no does any man imagine that the explosion of gunpowder or the traction of loads could ever be discovered by argument *priori* in like manner when an effect is supposed to depend upon an intricate machinery or secret structure of parts, we make no difficulty in attributing all our knowledge of it to experience. We will assert that he can give the ultimate reason, why walk or bread is

in entio must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard ball is quite distinct event from motion in the first. Is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other? A top or piece of metal raised into the air and left without any support, immediately falls but to consider the matter *priori* is there anything we discover in this situation which can beg the idea of downward rather than an upward or any other motion, in the thing itself?

And as the first imagination in entio of a particular effect, in all natural operations, is arbitrary where we consult not experience so must we also esteem the supposed connection

between the cause and effect, which binds them together and renders it impossible that any other effect could result from the particular of that cause. When I see, for instance, billiard

That these principles serve to connect ideas will not I believe be much doubted. A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original ¹ the mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others ² and if we think of a sound we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it ³ But that this enumeration is complete and that there are no other principles of association except these may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the reader or even to a man's own satisfaction. All we can do in such cases is to run over several instances and examine carefully the principle which binds the different thoughts to each other never stopping till we render the principle as general as possible ⁴ The more instances we examine and the more care we employ the more assurance shall we acquire that the enumeration which we form from the whole is complete and entire

Sect IV *Sceptical Doubts concerning the Operations of the Understanding*

PART I

20 All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds to wit *Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact*. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry Algebra and Arithmetick and in short every affirmation which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. *That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the square of the two sides* is a proposition which expresses a relation between these figures. *That three times five is equal to the half of thirty* expresses a relation between these numbers. Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.

21 *Matters of fact* which are the second objects of human reason are not ascertained in the same manner nor is our evidence of their truth however great of a like nature with the foregoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still

possible because it can never imply a contradiction and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness as if ever so conformable to reality. *That the sun will not rise to-morrow* is no less intelligible a proposition and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation *that it will rise*. We should in vain therefore attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false it would imply a contradiction and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.

It may therefore be a subject worthy of curiosity to enquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory. This part of philosophy it is observable has been little cultivated either by the ancients or moderns and therefore our doubts and errors in the prosecution of so important an enquiry may be the more excusable while we march through such difficult paths without any guide or direction. They may even prove useful by exciting curiosity and destroying that implicit faith and security which is the bane of all reasoning and free enquiry. The discovery of defects in the common philosophy if any such there be will not I presume be a discouragement but rather an incitement as is usual to attempt something more full and satisfactory than has yet been proposed to the public.

22 All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of *Cause and Effect*. By means of that relation alone we can go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses. If you were to ask a man why he believes any matter of fact which is absent for instance that

or the knowledge of his former resolutions and promises. A man finding a watch or any other machine in a desert island would conclude that there had once been men in that island. All our reasonings concerning fact are of the same nature. And he is constantly supposed that there is a connexion between the present fact and that which is inferred from it. Were there nothing to bind them together the inference would be entirely precarious. The hearing of an articulate voice and rational discourse in the dark assures us of the presence of some person. Why? because these are the effects of the human make and fabric and closely connected with it. If we anatomize all the other cases of this nature we shall find that they are founded on

Resemblance

Contiguity

Cause and effect

For instance Contrast of Contiguity is also
connexion among Ideas but it may properly be
considered as a mixture of Contiguity and Resemblance. When two objects contrast with one another destroys the other that is the cause of an idea of it on and the idea of the antecedent on an object implies the idea of its former existence

tion, such may be of more difficult solution and expectation. Philosophers, that give themselves airs of superior wisdom and sufficiency have a hard task when they encounter persons of inquisitive dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure at last to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions and even to discover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of men of our very ignorance.

I shall content myself in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give a negative answer to the question here proposed. I say then, that, even after we have experienced the perceptions of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. Thus an error must needs be both explained and defended.

2. It must certainly be allowed that nature has kept us at great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of few superficial qualities of objects which she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the influence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour and weight, and consistence of bread, but neither sense nor reason can ever inform us of the secret qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of the human body. Sight feeling and taste are all of the actual motion of bodies but as it is that wonderful force power which would carry a moving body forever in continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communicating their force to this we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we vainly presume, when we see like sensible qualities, that they have like secret powers, and perceive that effects, imitate those which we have experienced will follow from them. If a body of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly seen, be presented to us, we make no scruple repeating the experiment, and if ever with certainty like nourishment and support, which is his process of the mind or thought of which I would willingly know the foundation is allowed all hands that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and these secret powers and con-

sequently that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction by anything which it knows of their nature. As to past Experience it can be all owed to give a direct and certain information of those precise objects only and that precise period of time, which it is under its cognizance but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for aught we know may be only in appearance similar this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread which I formerly eat nourished me that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time endowed with such secret powers but does it follow that other bread must also nourish me another's me and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers. The consequence seems not wise necessary. At last, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind that there is a certain step taken a process of thought, and an inference which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same, I have found that such a body has always been attended with such an effect and I foresee that other objects which are in appearance similar will be attended with similar effects. I shall all we if you please, that the conclusion proposed may justly be inferred from the other I know in fact that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by chains of reasoning I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connexion between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium which may enable the mind to draw such an inference if indeed it be drawn by reasoning and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension and is incumbent on those that produce it to assert that it really exists, and is the original fall or conclusion on some certain matter of fact.

3. This negative argument must certainly a process of mine, become altogether common, if many philosophers shall turn their enquiries this way and not be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step which supports the deduction. I give this conclusion. But as the question is yet new every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration as to conclude, because an argument respects his enquiry that therefore it does not really exist. For this reason I may be required to venture upon a more difficult task and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.

The word, Power is here used in a loose and popular sense. The more accurate expression would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.

ball moving in a straight line towards another even suppose motion in the second ball should by accident be suggested to me as the result of their contact or impulse may I not conceive that a hundred different events might as well follow from that cause? May not both these balls remain at absolute rest? May not the first ball return in a straight line or leap off from the second in any line or direction? All these suppositions are consistent and conceivable. Why then should we give the preference to one which is no more consistent or conceivable than the rest? All our reasonings *a priori* will never be able to show us any foundation for this preference.

In a word then every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not therefore be discovered in the cause and the first invention or conception of it *a priori* must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary since there are always many other effects which to reason must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain therefore should we pretend to determine any single event or infer any cause or effect without the assistance of observation and experience.

26 Hence we may discover the reason why no philosopher who is rational and modest has ever pretended to assign the ultimate cause of any natural operation or to show distinctly the action of that power which produces any single effect in the universe. It is confessed that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles productive of natural phenomena to a greater simplicity and to resolve the many particular effects into a few general causes by means of reasonings from analogy, experience and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes we should in vain attempt their discovery nor shall we ever be able to satisfy ourselves by any particular

purpose these are probably the ultimate causes and principles which we shall ever discover in nature and we may esteem ourselves sufficiently happy if by accurate enquiry and reasoning we can trace within them

our ignorance a little longer as perhaps the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of it. Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all

philosophy and meets us at every turn in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.

7 Nor is geometry when taken into the assistance of natural philosophy ever able to remedy this defect or lead us into the knowledge of ultimate causes by all that accuracy of reasoning for which it is so justly celebrated. Every part of mixed mathematics proceeds upon the supposition that certain facts are established by nature in her operations and abstract reasonings are employed either to assist experience in the discovery of these laws or to determine their influence in particular instances where it depends upon any precise degree of distance and quantity. Thus it is a law of motion discovered by experience that the

that a small force may remove the greatest obstacle or raise the greatest weight if by any contrivance or machinery we can increase the velocity of the

ions of all the parts and figures which can enter into any species of machine but still the discovery of the law itself is owing merely to experience and all the abstract reasonings in the world could never lead us one step towards the knowledge of it. When we reason *a priori* and consider merely any object or cause as it appears to the mind and

comparable and inviolable connexion between them. A man must be very sagacious who could discover by reasoning that crystal is the effect of heat and ice of cold without being previously acquainted with the operation of these qualities.

PART II

28 But we have not yet attained any tolerable satisfaction with regard to the question first proposed. Each solution still gives rise to a new question as difficult as the foregoing and leads us on to farther enquiries. When it is asked What is the nature of the agent or cause which produces the operation or seems to be that they are founded on the relation of cause and effect. When again it is asked What is the foundation of all necessary connexion necessary to the relation it may be replied in one word Experience. But if we still carry on our sifting humour and ask What is the foundation of the connexion of the premises? this implies a new ques-

which may be of more difficult solution and question. Philosophers, that give themselves up to superior wisdom and sufficiency have a hard task when they encounter persons of inferior dispositions, who push them from every corner to which they retreat, and who are sure to insist to bring them to some dangerous dilemma. The best expedient to prevent this confusion, is to be modest in our pretensions and even to uncover the difficulty ourselves before it is objected to us. By this means, we may make a kind of merit of our very ignorance.

I shall content myself, in this section, with an easy task, and shall pretend only to give necessary answer to the question here proposed. I shall then, thus, even after we have experience of the operations of cause and effect, our conclusions from that experience are not founded on reasoning, or any process of the understanding. The answer we must endeavour both to explain and to defend.

29. It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of few superficial qualities of objects, while she conceals from us those powers and principles on which the essence of those objects entirely depends. Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread, but neither sense nor reason can ever tell us of those qualities which fit it for the nourishment and support of a human body, and of which we conceive an idea of the actual motion of bodies, but as to that wonderful force or power which would carry on a moving body for ever in continued change of place, and which bodies never lose but by communication, is to others of us we cannot form the most distant conception. But notwithstanding this ignorance of natural powers and principles, we are so presumptuous, that we see these secret qualities, that they have secret powers, and expect that effects similar to those which have experienced, will follow from them. If a loaf of like colour and consistence with that bread, which we have formerly eat, be presented to us, we make no scruple of repeating the experiment, and foresee, with certainty, the nourishment and support. Now this is a process of the mind or thought, of which I would willingly know the foundation. I am assured on all hands that there is no known connection between the visible qualities and the secret powers and consequences.

subsequently that the mind is not led to form such a conclusion concerning their constant and regular conjunction, by anything which it knows of their nature. As to past Experience, it can be allowed to give direct and certain information of those precise objects only, and that precise period of time, which fell under its cognizance; but why this experience should be extended to future times, and to other objects, which for all that we know may be only in appearance similar, this is the main question on which I would insist. The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers, but does it follow that other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities must always be attended with like secret powers. The consequence seems nowise necessary. At least, it must be acknowledged that there is here a consequence drawn by the mind that there is a certain step taken, a process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained. These two propositions are far from being the same. *I have found such and such an object here attended with such an effect, and I for ever last meet objects, which are of a resembling nature, and I conclude such similar facts I shall know, if you please, that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other. I know in fact, that it always is inferred. But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning, I desire you to produce that reasoning. The connection between these propositions is not intuitive. There is required a medium, which may enable the mind to draw such an inference, if indeed it be drawn by reasoning, and argument. What that medium is, I must confess, passes my comprehension, and is incumbent on those, to produce it, who assert that it really exists, and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matter of fact.*

30. This negative argument must certainly in process of time become altogether convincing, if many penetrating, and able philosophers should turn their enquiries this way, and no one be ever able to discover any connecting proposition or intermediate step, which supports the understanding in this conclusion. But as this question is yet new, every reader may not trust so far to his own penetration, as to conclude, because an argument escapes his enquiry that therefore it does not really exist. For this reason it may be requisite to venture upon a more difficult task, and enumerating all the branches of human knowledge, endeavour to show that none of them can afford such an argument.

The word, Power, here used in loose and popular sense. The more accurate explication of would give additional evidence to this argument. See Sect. 7.

All reasonings may be divided into two kinds namely demonstrative reasoning or that concerning relations of ideas and moral reasoning or that concerning matter of fact and existence. That there are no demonstrative arguments in the case seems evident since it implies no contradiction that the course of nature may change and that an object seemingly like those which we have experienced may be attended with different or contrary effects. May I not clearly and distinctly conceive that a body falling from the clouds and which in all other respects resembles snow has yet the taste of salt or feeling of fire? Is there any more intelligible proposition than to affirm that all the trees will flourish in December and January and decay in May and June? Now whatever is intelligible and can be distinctly conceived implies no contradiction and can never be proved false by any demonstrative argument or abstract reasoning *a priori*.

If we be therefore engaged by arguments to put trust in past experience and make it the standard of our future judgement these arguments must be probable only or such as regard matter of fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned. But that there is no argument of this kind must appear if our explication of that species of reasoning be admitted as solid and satisfactory. We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded on the relation of cause and effect that our knowledge of that relation is derived entirely from experience and that all our experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour therefore the proof of this last supposition by probable arguments or arguments regarding existence must be evidently going in a circle and taking that for granted which is the very point in question.

31 In reality all arguments from experience are founded on the similarity which we discover among natural objects and by which we are induced to expect effects similar to those which we have found to follow from such objects. And though none but a fool or madman will ever pretend to dispute the authority of experience or to reject that great guide of human life it may surely be allowed a philosopher to have so much curiosity at least as to examine the principles of human nature which gives this mighty

power. Now it seems evident that if this conclusion were formed by reason it would be as perfect at first and upon one instance as after ever so long a course of experience. But the case is far otherwise. Nothing so like as eggs yet no one, on account of this appearing similarity expects the same taste and relish in all of them. It is only after a long course of uniform experiments in any kind that we attain a firm reliance and security with regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning which from one instance draws a conclusion so different from that which it infers from a hundred instances that are nowise different from that single one? This question I propose as much for the sake of information as with an intention of raising difficulties. I cannot find I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I keep my mind still open to instruction if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on me.

32 Should it be said that from a number of uniform experiments we infer a connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers thus I must confess seems the same difficulty couched in different terms. The question still recurs on what process of argument this inference is founded? Where is the medium the interposing ideas which join propositions so very wide of each other? It is confessed that the colour consistence and other sensible qualities of bread appear not of themselves to have any connexion with the secret powers of nourishment and support. For other use we could infer these secret powers from the first appearance of these sensible qualities without the aid of experience contrary to the sentiment of all philosophers and contrary to plain matter of fact. Here then is our natural state of ignorance with regard to the powers and influence of all objects. How is this remedied by experience? It only shows us a number of uniform effects resulting from certain objects and teaches us that those particular objects at that particular time were endowed with such powers and forces. When a new object endowed with similar sensible qualities is produced we expect similar powers and forces and look for a like effect. From a body of like colour and consistence we expect like nourishment and support. But this surely is a step or process explained.

33 Such are the instances. And when he says Similitude quodlibet semper se habet ad idem effectum he is not guilty of a tautology nor are these propositions in any respect the same. You

which appear similar we expect the same. This is the sum of all our experimental conclusions.

that the one proposition is an inference from the other. But you must confess that the inference is not intuitive, neither is it demonstrative. Of what nature is it, then. To say it is experiential, is begging the question. For all inferences from experience suppose, as their foundation, that the future will resemble the past, and that similar powers will be conjoined with similar sensible qualities. If there be any suspicion that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove the resemblance of the past to the future.

Since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular, that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not that, for the future, it will continue the same. Can you pretend to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently all their effects and influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects. Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects. What logic, what process of argument secures you against this supposition. My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent, I am equally satisfied in the point, that as philosopher, he has some share of curiosity. I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundations of this inference. No reading, no enquiry has yet been able to remove my difficulty. Can I do better than propose the difficulty to the public, even though, perhaps, I have small hopes of obtaining solution. We shall at least, by this means, be sensible of our ignorance, if we do not augment our knowledge.

33. I must confess that man is guilty of unpardonable arrogance who concludes, because an argument has escaped his own investigation, that therefore it does not really exist. I must also confess that, though all the learned, for several ages, should have employed themselves in fruitless search upon any subject, it may still, perhaps, be rash to conclude positively that the subject must, therefore, pass all human comprehension. Even though we examine all the sources of our knowledge, and conclude them unfit for such a subject, there may still remain suspicion, that the enumeration is not complete, or the examination not accurate. But with regard to the pres-

ent subject there are some considerations which seem to remove all this accusation of arrogance or suspicion of mistake.

It is certain that the most ignorant and stupid peasants—nay infants, nay even brut beasts—improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle, but will expect a similar effect from a cause which is similar in its sensible qualities.

that argument nor have you any pretence to re-

obvious to the capacity of a mere infant. If you hesitate, therefore, a moment, or if, after reflection, you produce any intricate or profound argument, you, in a manner give up the question and confess that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes which are, to appearance, similar. This is the proposition which I intended to enforce in the present section. If I be right, I pretend not to have made any mighty discovery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge myself to be indeed a very backward scholar, since I cannot now discover an argument which, it seems, was perfectly familiar to me long before I was out of my cradle.

Sect. V. *Sceptical Solution of these Doubts*

PART I

34. The passion for philosophy like that for religion, seems liable to this inconvenience, that, though it aims at the correction of our manners, and extirpation of our vices, it may only serve by imprudent management to foster predominant inclinations, and push the mind with more determined resolution towards that side which already draws on in it, by the bias and propensity of the natural temper. It is certain that, had we assented to the unanimous firmness of the philosophers' sage, and endeavoured to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may at last, render our philosophy like that of Epicurus, and thereby still more refined by enervation of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment. While we study with attention the vanity of human life,

and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours we are, perhaps all the while flattering our natural indolence which hating the bustle of the world and drudgery of business seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full and uncontrolled indulgence. There is however one species of philosophy which seems little liable to this inconvenience and that because it strikes in with no disorderly passion of the human mind nor can mingle itself with any natural affection or propensity and that is the Academic or Sceptical philosophy. The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement of danger in hasty determinations of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice. Nothing therefore can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence of the mind its rash arrogance its lofty pretensions and its superstitious credulity. Every passion is mortified if it except the love of truth and that passion never is nor can be carried to too high a degree. It is surprising therefore that this philosophy which in almost every instance must be harmless and innocent should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy. But perhaps the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment. By flattering no irregular passion it gains few partizans. By opposing so many vices and follies it raises to itself abundance of enemies who stigmatize it as libertine profane and irreligious.

Nor need we fear that this philosophy while it endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life should ever under mine the reasonings of common life and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action as well as speculation. Nature will always maintain her rights and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever. Though we should conclude for instance as in the foregoing section that in all reasonings from experience there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding there is no danger that these reasonings on which almost all knowledge depends will ever be affected by such a discovery. If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same. What that principle is may well be worth the pains of enquiry.

35 Suppose a person though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection to be brought on a sudden into this world he would indeed immediately observe a continual succession of objects and one event following another but he would not be able to discover any thing farther. He would not at first by any reasoning be able to reach the idea of cause and effect since the particular powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses nor is it reasonable to conclude merely because one event in one instance precedes another that therefore the one is the cause the other the effect. Their conjunction may be arbitrary and casual. There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other. And in a word such a person without more experience could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses.

Suppose again that he has acquired more experience and has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other. Yet he has not by all his experience acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other nor is it by any process of reasoning he is engaged to draw this inference. But still he finds himself determined to draw it. And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking. There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion.

36 This principle is Custom or Habit. For wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew the same act or operation without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding we always say that this propensity is the effect of Custom. By employing that word we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity. We only point out a principle of human nature which is universally acknowledged and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther or pretend to give the cause of this cause but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle which we can assign of all our conclusions from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction that we can go so far without repining at the narrowness

or rather because they will arrive at no far-
ther than certain we here advance a very im-
probable proposition at least, if not a true one
and assert that a true conclusion con-
sists of two objects—heat and cause for instance
and as such—we are determined to con-
sider to expect the one from the negation
of the other. This rashness seems even the only
one which explains the difficulty we meet with
in a thousand instances, an inference which
we are able to draw from one instance that
is, we respect, different from them. Reason is
indeed of a such nature. The conclusions
which draw from considering one circle are
the same which would form upon surveying all
or circles in the universe. But no man, has
seen any one body move, or being impeded by
another could infer that every other body will
move and be impeded. All inferences from ex-
perience, therefore, are effects of custom, not of
reasoning.

Nothing more useful than for writers, even,
on metaphysics, or points of philosophy, to distinguish
between reason and experience and to show that
these species of argumentation are entirely distinct
and not each other. The former are taken for the
most part of our intellectual faculties, which, by
considering a priori the nature of things, and
amongst the rest, that must follow from their
operation, establish particular principles of science
and philosophy. The latter are supposed to be de-
rived entirely from sense and observation, by
which we learn what has actually resulted from
the operation of particular objects, and are thence
able to infer what may, for the future, result from
them. Thus, for instance, the limitations and re-

striction, then, is the great square of human life.
It is that principle alone which renders our
experience useful to us, and enables us to expect of
the future a similar train of events with those
which have appeared in the past. Without the
influence of custom we should be entirely in-
sensible of every matter of fact beyond what is im-
mediately present to the memory and senses. We
should never know how to act, nor means to that
or to employ our natural powers in the promo-
tion of any end. There would be end at once
of all action, as well as of the chief part of specu-
lation.

3 But here it may be proper to remark that
though our conclusions from experience carry us
beyond our memory and senses, and assure us of
matters of fact which have passed in the least con-

tinued with unbroken theory or from experi-
ence and history which inform us of the enormous
space, that ambition, in every age and country
has been fixed to make of so imprudent con-
duct.

The same distinction between reason and experi-
ence maintained in all our deliberations con-
cerning the conduct of life while the experienced
statesman, general, physician, or merchant is
trusted and followed, and the unpractised novice
with however natural talents endowed, neglected
and despised. Though be allowed, that reason
may form very plausible conjectures with regard to
the consequences of such particular conduct in
such particular circumstances it is still so posed
imperfect, without the assistance of experience
which alone can give stability and certainty to
the maxims derived from study and reflection.

But notwithstanding this distinction be thus
universally received, both in the action and pecu-
liarities of life, I shall not scruple to pronounce that
as, at bottom, erroneous, at least, superficial.
If we examine those arguments, which, in any of
the sciences above mentioned, are supposed to be

Inference and conclusion.

There is no man so young and unexperienced, as
not have formed from observation, the general
and just maxims concerning human nature
and the conduct of life but must be confessed,
that when the course put there in practice
he will be sensible of the error and will
further perceive both amongst these maxims, and
which him their proper use and application. In
every situation or incident, there are many parti-
culars and accidental circumstances, which
the man of great talent is, first, to re-
mark, though on them the justice of his conclu-
sions, and consequently the prudence of his con-
duct, surely depend. Not mentioning, that, a
young beginner, though he discovers some and ma-
xims occur not all, on the proper occasions, nor
can be immediately applied with due accuracy
and distinction. The truth is, an unexperienced
reasoner could be no reasoner at all, were he how-
ever unexperienced and when we say, that
character to any one we mean, not only in com-
parison to sense and pose him possessed of
experience in smaller and more imperfect degree

and turn all our thoughts towards the empty and transitory nature of riches and honours we are perhaps all the while flattering our natural indolence which hating the bustle of the world and drudgery of business seeks a pretence of reason to give itself a full and un-

any natural affection or propensity and that is the Academic or Sceptical philosophy The academics always talk of doubt and suspense of judgement of danger in hasty determinations of confining to very narrow bounds the enquiries of the understanding and of renouncing all speculations which lie not within the limits of common life and practice Nothing therefore can be more contrary than such a philosophy to the supine indolence

But the love of truth and that passion never is nor can be carried to too high a degree It is surprising therefore that this philosophy which in almost every instance must be harmless and innocent should be the subject of so much groundless reproach and obloquy But perhaps the very circumstance which renders it so innocent is what chiefly exposes it to the public hatred and resentment By flattery

Some enemies who stigmatize it as libertine, profane and irreligious

Nor need we fear that this philosophy which endeavours to limit our enquiries to common life should ever undermine the reasonings of common sense and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action as well as speculation Nature will always maintain her rights and prevail in the end over any abstract reasoning whatsoever Though we should conclude for instance as in the foregoing section that in all reasonings from experience there is a step taken by the mind which is not supported by any argument or process of the understanding there is no danger that these reasonings on which almost all knowledge depends will ever be affected by such a discovery If the mind be not engaged by argument to make this step it must be induced by some other principle of equal weight and authority and that principle will preserve its influence as long as human nature remains the same What that principle is may well be worth the pains of enquiry

35 Suppose a person though endowed with the strongest faculties of reason and reflection to be brought on a sudden

He would not be able to discover any thing farther He could not at first by any reasoning be able to reach the idea of cause and effect since the particular powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses nor is it reasonable to conclude, merely because one event in one instance precedes another that therefore the one is the cause the other the effect The conjunction may be arbitrary and casual There may be no reason to infer the existence of one from the appearance of the other And in a word such a person without more experience could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately present to his memory and senses

Suppose again that he has acquired more experience and has lived so long in the world as to have observed familiar objects or events to be constantly conjoined together what is the consequence of this experience? He immediately infers the existence of one object from the appearance of the other Yet he has not by all his experience acquired any idea or knowledge of the secret power by which the one object produces the other nor is it by any process of reasoning he is engaged to draw this inference But still he finds himself determined to draw it And though he should be convinced that his understanding has no part in the operation he would nevertheless continue in the same course of thinking There is some other principle which determines him to form such a conclusion

36 This principle is Custom or Habit For wherever the repetition of a particular act or operation produces a propensity to repeat the same act or operation without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding we call this propensity by the effect of Custom By employing that word we pretend not to have given the ultimate reason of such a propensity We only point out a principle of human nature which is universally acknowledged and which is well known by its effects. Perhaps we can push our enquiries no farther or pretend to give the cause of this cause but must rest contented with it as the ultimate principle which we can assign of all our conclusions from experience. It is sufficient satisfaction that we can go so far without stopping at the narrowness

the true nature of belief. For as there is no difference between the conception of an object which we believe so firmly that we cannot call it a fiction, and the conception of an object which is rejected, were it not for the sentiment which distinguishes the one from the other. If I see a balliard-ball moving towards me on a smooth table I can easily prevent it from stopping on contact. This conception is not in contradiction but still feels very different from that conception by which I represent the impulse and the communication of motion from one ball to another. I therefore to attempt expression of this sentiment, should, perhaps, find it very difficult, as an impossible task in the same manner as we would find it our to describe the feeling of ad or passion of anger to a creature who never had any experience of these sentiments. Belief is not a true and proper name of this feeling, and no one ever loses to know the meaning of that term, because every man is every moment conscious of the sentiment represented by it. It may not, however, be improper to attempt a description of this sentiment, in hopes we may by that means, arrive at some analogies, which may afford more perfect explication of it. I say then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively for cible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination alone is ever able to attain. This variety of terms, which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended to express the act of the mind, which renders realities, or what is taken for such, more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them superior influence the passions and imagination. Provided we agree about the feeling, is needless to dispute about the terms. I command over all is

that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgement from the fictions of the imagination. It gives them more weight and influence makes them appear of greater importance enforces them in the mind and renders them the governing principle of our actions. I bear it present, for instance a person's face, with whom I am acquainted and the sound comes as from the next room. This impression of my senses is immediately conveyed to the person, together with all the surrounding objects. I paint them out to myself as existing at present, with the same qualities and relations, of which I formerly knew them possessed. These ideas take faster hold of my mind than ideas of an enchanted castle. They are very different to the feeling and have much greater influence of every kind, either to give pleasure or pain, joy or sorrow.

Let us, then, take in the whole compass of this doctrine, and allow that the sentiment of belief is not this, but a conception more intimate and ready than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination, and that this manner of conception arises from a customary conjunction of the object with something present to the memory or senses. I believe that it will not be difficult, upon these suppositions, to find other operations of the mind analogous to it, and to trace up these phenomena to principles still more general.

We have already observed that nature has established connections among particular ideas, and that no sooner an idea occurs to our thoughts than it introduces its correlatives and carries our attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible movement. These principles of connexion or association we have reduced to three, namely Resemblance Cause and Contiguity and Consistency which are the only bonds that unite our thoughts together and direct that regular train of reflection or discourse, which, in a greater or less degree, takes place among all mankind. Whether arises a question, on which the solution of the present difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all these relations, that, when one of the objects is presented to the senses or memory the mind is not only carried to the conception of the correlative, but reaches a distinct and proper conception of it than what otherwise it would have been able to attain. This seems to be the case with that belief which arises from the relation of cause and effect. And if the case be the same with the other relations or principles of associations, this may be established as a general law which takes place in all the perceptions of the mind.

We may therefore, observe, as the first experi-

den, that belief consists not in the perception of the nature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in this respect the mind is conscious, and is impossible perfectly to explain this feeling or manner of conception. It may make use of words which express something near it. But is true and proper name, as we observed before is belief, which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert,

tant places and most remote ages yet some fact must always be present to the senses or memory from which we may first proceed in drawing these conclusions. A man who should find in a desert country the remains of pompous buildings would conclude that the country had in ancient times been cultivated by civilized inhabitants but did nothing of this nature occur to him he could never form such an inference. We learn the events of former ages from history but then we must peruse the volumes in which this instruction is contained and thence carry up our inferences from one testimony to another till we arrive at the eyewitnesses and spectators of these distant events. In a word if we proceed not upon some fact present to the memory or senses our reasonings would be merely hypothetical and

here at last after our most restless and curious enquiries. But still our curiosity will be pardonable perhaps commendable if it carry us on to still farther researches and make us examine more accurately the nature of this belief and of the customary conjunction whence it is derived. By this means we may meet with some explanations and analogies that will give satisfaction at least to such as love the abstract sciences and can be entertained with speculations which however accurate may still retain a degree of doubt and uncertainty. As to readers of a different taste the remaining part of this section is not calculated for them and the following enquiries may well be understood though it be neglected.

PART II

particular matter of fact which you relate you must tell me some reason and this reason will be some other fact connected with it. But as you cannot proceed after this manner in infinitum you must at last terminate in some fact which is present to your memory or senses or must allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.

38 What then is the conclusion of the whole matter? A simple one though it must be confessed pretty remote from the common theories of philosophy. All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some object present to the memory or senses and a customary conjunction between that and some other object. Or in other words having found in many instances that any two kinds of objects—flame and heat snow and cold—have always been conjoined together if flame or snow be pre-

39 Nothing is more free than the imagination of man and though it cannot exceed that original stock of ideas furnished by the internal and external senses it has unlimited power of mixing compounding separating and dividing these ideas in all the varieties of fiction and vision. It can feign a train of events with all the appearance of reality ascribe to them a particular time

belongs to any history or fact which is attended with the greatest certainty. Wherein therefore consists the difference between such a fiction and belief? It lies not merely in any peculiar idea which is annexed to such a conception as commands our assent and which is wanting to every known fiction. For as the mind has authority over all its ideas it could voluntarily annex this particular idea to any fiction and consequently be able to believe whatever it pleases contrary to what we find by daily experience. We can in our conception join the head of a man to the body of a horse but it is not in our power to believe that such an animal has ever really existed.

upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul when we are so situated as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love when we receive benefits or hatred when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

At this point it would be very allowable for us to stop our philosophical researches. In most questions we can never make a single step further and in all questions we must terminate

It follows therefore that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling which is annexed to the latter not to the former and which depends not on the will nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by nature like all other sentiments and must arise from the particular situation in which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. Whenever any object is presented to the memory or senses it is immediately by the force of custom carries the imagination to conceive that object which is usually conjoined to it and this conception is attended with a feeling or sentiment different from the loose reveries of the fancy. In this

reaches beyond the memory or senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and activity of conception here explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive that it will burn, not extrinsically, but intrinsically. This transition of thought is from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its origin altogether from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an object present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more so, and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That idea arises immediately. The thought moves instantly to the end, and conversely that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. With a sword in my hand, the idea of a wound

here amply subject to employ their wonder and admiration.

45 I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory that as this perception of the mind, by which we infer like effects from like causes, and the error is so essential to the substance of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is slow in its perceptions appears not, in any degree, during the first years of infancy and it best is, in every age and period of human life extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure to necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency which may be infallible in its perceptions, may discover itself the first appearance of life and thought and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding.

As it is has taught us the use of our limbs,

so it is that we should be able to correspond to the course of that which she has established among eternal objects though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

SECT VI Of Probabilities

46 There is no such thing as Chance in the world. Our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding and begins like species of belief or opinion.

There is certainly probability which arises from superiority of chances in any side according as this superiority increases, and surpasses the opposite chances, the probability receives a proportionable increase, and begets till a high degree of belief or assent that side, in which we discover the superiority. If sides were marked with figure or number of pots or of sides, and with another figure or number of pots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable that the former would turn up than the latter though, if it had thousand sides marked in the same manner and only one different, the probability would be

Mr Lock decides all arguments in demonstrative and probable. I thus now we must say that it is only probable all men must die or that the sun will rise to-morrow. But conform our language more common use we might say arguments in demonstration are our proof and probability. By proofs meaning such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or opposition.

and experience and is satisfactory find some analogies, by which it may be explained. The transition from present object does in all cases gain strength and solidity: the related idea. Here, then, is kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed be wholly unknown to us, yet our thoughts and conceptions have a real, we find, go in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle by which this correspondence has been effected so necessary to the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct in every circumstance and occurrence of human life. Had not the presence of an object instantly excited the idea of those objects, commonly conjoined with it, all our knowledge must have been limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses and we should never have been able to adjust in our minds, or multiply our natural powers, the thoughts of good or of a warning of evil. Those, who do light in the discovery and contemplation of final causes have

ment to our present purpose that upon the appearance of the picture of an absent friend our idea of him is evidently enlivened by the *resemblance* and that every passion which that idea occasions whether of joy or sorrow acquires new force and vigour In producing this effect there concur both a relation and a present impression Where the picture bears him no resemblance at least was not intended for him it never so much as conveys our thought to him And where it is absent as well as the person though the mind may pass from the thought of the one to that of the other it feels its idea to be rather weakened than enlivened by that transition We take a pleasure in viewing the picture of a friend when it is set before us but when it is removed rather choose to consider him directly than by reflection in an image which is equally distant and obscure

The ceremonies of the Roman Catholic religion may be considered as instances of the same nature The devotees of that superstition usually plead in excuse for the mummeries with which they are upbraided that they feel the good effect of those external motions and postures and actions in enlivening their devotion and quickening their fervour which otherwise would decay if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects We shadow out the objects of our faith say they in sensible types and images and render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these types than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and contemplation Sensible objects have always a greater influence on the fancy than any other and this influence they readily convey to those ideas to which they are related and which they resemble I shall only infer from these practices and this reasoning that the effect of resemblance in enlivening the ideas is very common and as in every case a resemblance and a present impression must concur we are abundantly supplied with experiments to prove the reality of the foregoing principle

42 We may add force to these experiments by others of a different kind in considering the effects of *contiguity* as well as of *resemblance* It is certain that distance diminishes the force of every idea and that upon our approach to any object though it does not discover itself to our senses it operates upon the mind with an influence which imitates an immediate impression The thinking on any object readily transports the mind to what is contiguous but it is only the actual presence of an object that transports it with a superior vivacity When I am a few miles from

home whatever relates to it touches me more nearly than when I am two hundred leagues distant though even at that distance the reflecting on anything in the neighbourhood of my friends or family naturally produces an idea of them But as in this latter case both the objects of the mind are ideas notwithstanding there is an easy transition between them that transition alone is not able to give a superior vivacity to any of the ideas for want of some immediate impression¹

43 No one can doubt but causation has the same influence as the other two relations of resemblance and contiguity Superstitious people are fond of the reliques of saints and holy men for the same reason that they seek after types or images in order to enliven their devotion and give them a more intimate and strong conception of those exemplary lives which they desire to imitate Now it is evident that one of the best reliques which a devotee could procure would be the handywork of a saint and if his cloaths and furniture are ever to be considered in this light it is because they were once at his disposal and were moved and affected by him in which respect they are to be considered as imperfect effects and as connected with him by a shorter chain of consequences than any of those by which we learn the reality of his existence

Suppose that the son of a friend who had been long dead or absent were presented to us it is evident that this object would instantly revive its correlative idea and recal to our thoughts all past intimacies and familiarities in more lively colours than they would otherwise have appeared to us This is another phenomenon which seems to prove the principle above mentioned

44 We may observe that in these phenomena the belief of the correlative object is always presupposed without which the relation could have no effect The influence of the picture sup-

¹ *Id est ne nobis id quod datum est in errore quoddam cum illa idemus quibus memordignis*

*in obliuione Scriptorem Laetum
no trum de primis um gloriaria tua vis admo-
tione loci non sine causa his memorie de-
ducta disciplina*

poses, that before our friend has once examined. Continuity to him can never excite our ideas of being unless we believe that it really exists. As I said it, that this belief while it reaches beyond the memory or senses, is of a similar nature, and arises from similar causes, with the transition of thought and activity of conception were explained. When I throw a piece of dry wood into a fire, my mind is immediately carried to conceive, that the flames, not extinguishes the same. This transition of thought from the cause to the effect proceeds not from reason. It derives its original together from custom and experience. And as it first begins from an object present to the senses, it renders the idea or conception of flame more strong and lively than any loose, floating reverie of the imagination. That new arises immediately. The thought moves instantly towards it, and connects it all that force of conception, which is derived from the impression present to the senses. When a sword is leveled at my breast, does not the idea of wound and pain strike me more strongly than when a glass of wine is presented to me, even though by accident this idea should occur after the appearance of the latter object. But what is there in this true manner to cause such strong conception, except only present object and customary transition to the idea of another object, which we have been accustomed to connect with the former? This is the whole operation of the mind, in all our conclusions concerning matter of fact and existence and it is manifest to find some analogies, by which may be explained. The transition from present object does in all cases go strength and solidity to the related idea.

Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas and thoughts powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone in the same train with the other works of nature. Custom is that principle by which this correspondence has been effected so necessary the subsistence of our species, and the regulation of our conduct in every circumstance and occurrence of human

here ample subject to employ their wonder and admiration.

45. I shall add, for a further confirmation of the foregoing theory that, as this operation of the mind by which we infer like effects from like causes, and it is so essential to the subsistence of all human creatures, it is not probable that it could be trusted to the fallacious deductions of our reason, which is still weak in its operations appears not, in any degree during the first years of infancy and the best in every age and period of human life extremely liable to error and mistake. It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom of nature to secure so necessary an act of the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency which may be infallible in its operations, may discover itself the first appearance of life and thought, and may be independent of all the laboured deductions of the understanding. As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought correspond to course to that which she has established in external objects though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.

SECT VI OF PROBABILITY

6. THERE can be no such thing as Chance in the world our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding and begets like species of belief and opinion.

There is certainly probability which arises from superiority of chances any and accord as this superiority increases, and surpasses the proportion chances, the probability receives proportionable increase and begets still a higher degree of belief or assent to that side in which we discover the superiority. If a die were marked with the figure or number of pots of its sides, and with no other figure or number of pots on the two remaining sides, it would be more probable that the former would turn up than the latter though, if had thousand sides marked in the same manner and only one different, the probability would be

limited to the narrow sphere of our memory and senses and should never have been able to adjust men's desires, multiply their natural powers, that the proportion of good or avoiding of evil. Those, who delight in the discovery and contemplation of final causes have

Mr Lock divides all arguments in demonstration and probable I thus now we must say that it is not probable all men must die or that the sun will rise to-morrow But inform our language more to common use we are apt to divide arguments in demonstrations from probability By proofs meeting such arguments from experience as leave no room for doubt or possibility

much higher and our belief or expectation of the event more steady and secure. This process of the thought or reasoning may seem trivial and obvious but to those who consider it more narrowly it may perhaps afford matter for curious speculation.

It seems evident that when the mind looks forward to discover the event which may result from the throw of such a die it considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable and thus in the very nature of chance to render all the particular events comprehended in it entirely equal. But finding a greater number of sides concur in the one event than in the other the mind is carried more frequently to that event and meets it oftener in revolving the various possibilities or chances on which the ultimate result depends. This concurrence of several views in one particular event begets immediately by an inexplicable contrivance of nature the sentiment of belief and gives that event the advantage over its antagonist which is supported by a smaller number of views and recurs less frequently to the mind. If we allow that belief is nothing but a firmer and stronger conception of an object than what attends the mere fictions of the imagination this operation

renders its influence on the passions and affections more sensible and in a word begets that reliance or security which constitutes the nature of belief and opinion.

47 The case is the same with the probability of causes as with that of chance. There are some causes which are entirely uniform and constant in producing a particular effect and no instance has ever yet been found of any failure or irregularity in their operation. Fire has always burned and water suffocated every human creature. The production of motion by impulse and gravity is an universal law which has hitherto admitted of no exception. But there are other causes which have been found more irregular and uncertain nor has rhubarb always proved a purge or opium a soporific to every one who

mined by custom to transfer the past to the future in all our inferences where the past has been entirely regular and uniform we expect the event with the greatest assurance and leave

all these various effects must occur to the mind in transferring the past to the future and enter into our consideration when we determine the probability of the event. Though we give the preference to that which has been found most usual and believe that this effect will exist we must not overlook the other effects but must assign to each of them a particular weight and authority in proportion as we have found it to be more or less frequent. It is more probable in almost every country of Europe that there will be frost sometime in January than that the weather will continue open throughout that

Here then it seems evident that when we transfer the past to the future in order to determine the effect which will result from any cause we transfer all the different events in the same proportion as they have appeared in the past and conceive one to have existed a hundred times for instance another ten times and another once. As a great number of views do here concur in one event they fortify and confirm it to the imagination beget that sentiment which we call *belief* and give its object the preference above the contrary event which is not supported by an equal number of experiments and recurs not so frequently to the thought in transferring the past to the future. Let any one try to account for this operation of the mind upon any of the received systems of philosophy and he will be sensible of the difficulty. For my part I shall think it sufficient if the present hints excite the curiosity of philosophers and make them sensible how defective all common theories are in treating of such curious and such sublime subjects.

Sect VII Of the Idea of necessary Connexion

PART I

48 THE great advantage of the mathematical sciences above the moral consists in this that the ideas of the former being sensible are always clear and determinate the smallest distinction between them is immediately perceptible and the same terms are still expressive of the same ideas without ambiguity or variation. An oval

never mistaken for circle or hyperbola for an ellipse. The isosceles and scalenum are distinguished by boundaries more exact than vice and virt right and wrong. If y terms be defined in geometry thus readily of self substantiates, on all occasions, the definition for the term defined. Or even when no definition is employed, the object itself may be presented to the senses, and by that means be intelligible and clearly apprehended. But the finer sentiments of the mind, the perceptions of the distinct things, the various qualities of the passions, the feelings, the passions themselves, easily escape us, when hurried by fleet reason, not powerful to recall the original object, as often as we have occasion to complete it. Ambiguity by this means, gradually introduced into our reasonings. Similar objects are readily taken to be the same. And the conclusion becomes at last the side of the premises.

One may say how ever affirm, that, if we consider these sciences in proper light the advantages and disadvantages are nearly compensated each other and reduce both of them to a state of equality. If the mind, with greater facility retains the ideas of geometry clear and determinate, it must carry much lighter a more intricate chain of reasoning and compare ideas much sicker of each other in order to reach the abstracted truths of that science. And if moral ideas are plentiful, with extreme care to fall into obscurity and confusion, the inferences are all much shorter in these disquisitions and the intermediate steps, which lead to the conclusion, much fewer than in the sciences which treat of quantity and mobility. I say the scarcely proposition in Euclid so simple as that to consist of more parts, than are to be found in any moral reasoning, which runs to the clear and concise. Where we trace the principles of the human mind through few steps we may be very ill satisfied with our progress, notwithstanding how soon it returns a bar to all our enquiries concerning causes, directed as us to an acknowledged first or general. The chief obstacle, therefore, to our improvement in the moral or metaphysical sciences is the obscurity of the ideas, and ambiguity of the terms. The principal difficulty of mathematics is the length of inferences, which compass the right reason of the forming of any conclusion. And perhaps, our progress in natural philosophy is chiefly retarded by the want of proper perceptions and phenomena, which are often discovered by chance and cannot always be followed the requisite way by the most diligent and

among these sciences, the difficult cases, which obstruct the progress of the former require peculiar care and capacity to be surmounted.

49 There are no ideas, which occur in natural philosophy, more obscure than certain than those of power, for energy, or necessity, of which it is every moment necessary for us to entertain all our disquisitions. We shall therefore direct

in this section, to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby remove some part of that obscurity which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.

It seems a proposition which will not admit of much dispute that all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions, or in other words that it is impossible for us to think of anything which we have not actually felt either by our terms or other senses. I have understood to plain and prove this proposition.

I have pressed my hopes, that, by proper application of it, men may reach greater clearness and precision philosophical reasoning, than what they have hitherto been able to attain. Complex ideas may perhaps, be well known by definition, which is the greatest abridgement of those parts or simple ideas, that compose them. But when we have pushed our definitions to the most simple ideas, and find till some ambiguity added to the uncertainty what resource are we then possessed of? By what method can we throw light upon these ideas, directed to their proper use and determine to our intellectual view? Produce the impressions original sentiments, from which the ideas are copied. These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit of no ambiguity. They are not only perceived a full light by themselves, but may throw light on their correspondences, which are hidden in obscurity. And by this means we may, perhaps, obtain a new microscope or peepers of perceptions, by which, in the material sciences the most minute and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our perceptions and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas, that can be thought of by our query.

5 Truly fully considered therefore with the idea of power is necessary to excite in us examination is impression and red to find the impression with greater certainty let us search for all the sources, from which it may possibly be derived.

Section II.

When we look about us towards external objects and consider the operation of causes we are never able in a single instance to discover any power or necessary connexion any quality which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does actually in fact follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second. This is the whole that appears to the *outward senses*. The mind feels no sentiment or *inward impression* from this succession of objects. Consequently there is not in any single particular instance of cause and effect anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connexion.

From the first appearance of an object we never can conjecture what effect will result from it. But were the power or energy of any cause discoverable by the mind we could foresee the effect even without experience and might at first pronounce with certainty concerning it by mere dint of thought and

we give us ground to imagine that it could produce any thing or be followed by any other object which we could denominate its effect. Solidity extends on motion these qualities are all complete in themselves and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession but the power of force which actuates the whole machine is entirely concealed from us and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. We know that in fact heat is a constant attendant of flame but what is the connexion between them we have no room so much as to conjecture or imagine. It is impossible therefore that the idea of power can be derived from contemplation of its operation or any power itself.

51 Since therefore external objects as they appear to the senses give us no idea of power or necessary connexion by the operation in particular instances let us see whether this idea be

as Hume said that we are every moment conscious of internal power while we feel that by the simple command of our will we can move the organs of our body.

52 This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy and are certain that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This idea then is an idea of reflection since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own mind and on the command which is exercised by will both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul.

52 We shall proceed to examine this pretension and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence we may observe is a fact which like all other natural events can be known only by experience and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause which connects it with the effect and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means by which this is effected the energy by which the will performs so extraordinary an operation of this we are so far from being immediately conscious that it must forever escape our most diligent enquiry.

For if it is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter? Were we empowered by a secret wish to remove mountains or control the planets in their orbit this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary nor more beyond our comprehension. But if by consciousness we perceived any power or energy in the will we must know this power we must know its connexion with the effect we must know the secret union of soul and body and the nature of both these substances by which the one is able to operate on so many instances upon the other.

53 Andly We are not able to move all the organs of the body with a like authority though we cannot assign any reason besides experience for so remarkable a difference between one and the other. Why has the will an influence over the tongue and fingers not over the heart or

as Hume says reasoning cannot give us an original simple idea as this philosopher himself confesses. This therefore cannot be the origin of that idea.

of experience, why the authority or will over the organs of the body is circumscribed by such particular limits. Being in that case acquainted with the power of the will by which it operates, we should also know why its influence reaches precisely to such boundaries, and no farther.

A man, suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, or who had newly lost those members, cannot endow them, (first) move them, and employ them in their usual offices. Here he is as much conscious of power as command. He feels, as a man in perfect health is conscious of power to actuate any member which remains in its natural state and condition. But consciousness never deceives. Consequently neither in the one case nor in the other are we ever conscious of any power. We are the influence of our will from experience also. And experience only teaches us, how on even constantly follow an order about instructing us the secret connection, which binds them together and renders them inseparable.

Thus we learn from anatomy that the immediate object of power in voluntary motion, is not the member itself which is moved, but certain muscles, and nerves, and animal spirits, and, perhaps, something still more minute and more unknown, through which the motion is conveyed propagated, ere it reach the member. These motions are the immediate object of volition. Can there be more certain proof that the power by which this whole operation is performed, so far from being directly and fully known by an inward sentiment or consciousness, is to the last degree mysterious and unexplored. Here the mind wills certain effects immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally different from the one intended is produced. This event produces another equally unknown. Till last, through long succession the desired event is produced. But if the original power is felt, it must be known. We do not know, if effect also must be known since all power relates to its effect. And since if the effect be not known, the power cannot be known nor felt. How indeed can we be conscious of power to move our limbs, when we have such power but not that it has certain animal spirits, which, though they produce the motion of our limbs, yet operate in such manner as is wholly beyond our comprehension.

We may therefore, conclude from the whole,

I hope without any temerity though with assurance that our idea of power is not copied from a sentiment or consciousness of power within ourselves, when we give rise to a voluntary motion or apply our limbs to their proper use and office. That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience like other natural events. But the power or energy by which this is effected like that of other natural events, is unknown and conceivably.

53 Shall we then assert, that we are conscious of a power or energy in our own mind, when, by an actual command of our will we cause a new idea, fix the mind to the contemplation of it, turn it on all sides, and at last dismiss it for some other idea, when we think that we have surveyed it with sufficient accuracy. I believe the same arguments will prove that even this command of the will gives us no real idea of force or energy.

First: It must be allowed, that, when we know a power we know that every circumstance in the cause by which it is enabled to produce the effect. For these are supposed to be synonymous. We must, therefore know both the cause and effect and the relation between them. But do we pretend to be acquainted with the nature of the human soul and the nature of an idea, or

that it may seem, at first sight, beyond the reach of any being less than infinite. At least it must be owned that the power is not felt, nor known no even conceivable by the mind. We only feel the event, namely the existence of an idea, consequent to the command of the will. But

men. Secondly This sentiment of an idea of our overcome resistance has no known connexion with an event. What follows it, we know by experience but could not know a priori. It must, however be confessed that the animal mind which we experience though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power enters very much into that vulgar inaccurate idea, which is formed of it.

the manner in which this operation is performed the power by which it is produced is entirely beyond our comprehension

Secondly The command of the mind over it self is limited as well as its command over the body and these limits are not known by reason or any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect but only by experience and observation as in all other natural events and in the operation of external objects Our authority over our sentiments and passions is much weaker than that over our ideas and even the latter authority is circumscribed within very narrow boundaries Will any one pretend to assign the ultimate reason of these boundaries or show why the power is deficient in one case not in another

Thirdly This self command is very different at different times A man in health possesses more of it than one languishing with sickness We are more master of our thoughts in the morning than in the evening Fasting than after a full meal Can we give any reason for these variations except experience? Where then is the power of which we pretend to be conscious? Is there not here either in a spiritual or material substance or both some secret mechanism or structure of parts upon which the effect depends and which being entirely unknown to us renders the power or energy of the will equally unknown and incomprehensible?

Volution is surely an act of the mind with which we are sufficiently acquainted Reflect upon it Consider it on all sides Do you find anything in it like this creative power by which it raises from nothing a new idea and with a kind of Fiat imitates the omnipotence of its Maker if I may be allowed so to speak who called forth into existence all the various scenes of nature? So far from being conscious of this energy in the will it requires as certain experience as that of which we are possessed to convince us that such extraordinary effects do ever result from a simple act of volition

54 The generality of mankind never find any difficulty in accounting for the more common and familiar operations of nature—such as the descent of heavy bodies the growth of plants the generation of animals or the nourishment of bodies by food But suppose that in all these cases they perceive the very force or energy of the cause by which it is connected with its effect and is for ever infallible in its operation They acquire by long habit such a turn of mind that upon the appearance of the cause they immediately expect with assurance its usual

attendant and hardly conceive it possible that any other event could result from it It is only on the discovery of extraordinary phenomena such as earthquakes pestilence and prodigies of any kind that they find themselves at a loss to assign a proper cause and to explain the manner in which the effect is produced by it It is usual for men in such difficulties to have recourse to some invisible intelligent principle as the immediate cause of that event which surprises them and which they think cannot be accounted for from the common powers of nature But philosophers who carry their scrutiny a little farther immediately perceive that even in the most familiar events the energy of the cause is as unintelligible as in the most unusual and that we only learn by experience the frequent conjunction of objects without being ever able to comprehend anything like Connection between them

55 Here then many philosophers think themselves obliged by reason to have recourse on all occasions to the same principle which the vulgar never appeal to but in cases that appear miraculous and supernatural They acknowledge

appears in nature They pretend that those objects which are commonly denominated causes are in reality nothing but occasions and that the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature but a volition of the Supreme Being who wills that such particular objects should for ever be conjoined with each other Instead of saying that one billiard ball moves another by a force which it has derived from the author of nature it is the Deity himself they say who by a particular volition moves the second ball being determined to this operation by the impulse of the first ball in consequence of those general laws which he has laid down to himself in the government of the universe But philosophers advancing still in their enquiries discover that as we are totally ignorant of the power on which depends the mutual operation of bodies we are no less ignorant of that power on which depends the operation of mind on body or of body on mind nor are we able either from our senses or consciousness to assign the ultimate principle in one case more than in the other The same ignorance therefore reduces them to the same conclusion They assert that the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body and that they

ὁ θεὸς ὁ μηχανιστὴς (deus et machina)

L. 11

not the organs of sense, which, being created by external objects, produce sensations in the mind but that it is a particular volu of our omnipotent Maker which excites such a sensation, in consequence of such a motion in the organ. In like manner it is that any energy in the will that produces local motion in our members. It is God himself, who is pleased to second our will, in itself impotent, and to command that motion which we erroneously attribute to our power and efficacy. Nor do philosophers stop at this conclusion. They sometimes extend the same inference to the mind itself in its internal operations. Our mental conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker. When we voluntarily turn our thoughts to any object, and awake is imagination in the fancy it is not the will which creates that idea. It is the universal Creator who discovers it to the mind, and renders it present to us.

56 Thus, according to these philosophers, every thing is full of God. Not content with this

enough the Deity still more sensible and immortal. They consider not that, by this theory the grandeur, instead of magnifying the grandeur of those attributes, which they affect so much to celebrate. It argues surely more power in the

nary and so remote from common life and experience. We are got to a dry land where we have reached the last steps of our theory and then we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument or to think that our usual analogies and probabilities have any authority. Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses. And however we may flatter ourselves that we are guided, in every step which we take, by a kind of circumstantial evidence and perception, we may be assured that it is fancied perception has no authority when we thus apply it to subjects that lie entirely out of the sphere of experience. But in this we shall have occasion to touch after wards.

Sec. 11. I cannot perceive any force in the argument in which this theory is founded. We are ignorant, it is true of the manner in which bodies operate on each other. Their force and energy is surely incomprehensible. But are we not equally ignorant of the manner of force by which a mind even the supreme mind operates either on itself or on body. Where, I beseech you do we acquire any idea of it. We have no sentiment or consciousness of this power in ourselves. We have no idea of the Supreme Being but what we learn from reflection on our own

Supreme Being as much as in the grossest matter. We surely comprehend as little the operations of the soul as of the ether. It is more difficult to conceive that motion may arise from impulse than that it may arise from intuition. All we know is our profound ignorance in both cases.

Sec. 12.

I need not examine the length of this *invention* which is so much talked of in the new philosophy and which is ascribed to Descartes. We find by experience that body rests in motion continues forever in its present state all power from it by some

will, not an absolute assurance, that it has earned us quit beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary

some thus flourish and dived to establish the theory proposed by Otho Corary the great philosopher. He directed us to an eternal truth. He explained his universal truth so though he was so cautious and modest as to call it a hypothesis, he was being deceived with more persuasion. I must confess that there is something in the foundation of opinions like extraordinary Descartes insinuated that doctrine of

PART II

58 But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument which is already drawn out to too great a length We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could

1
a yining but one event following another without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates or any connexion between it and its supposed effect The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body—where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition or the energy by which the mind produces this effect The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible

—, — events seem entirely loose and separate One event follows another but we never can observe any tie between them They seem so joined but never connected And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment the necessary conclusion is to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all and that these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life

59 But there still remains one method of availing this conclusion and one source which we have not yet examined When any natural object or event is presented it is impossible for us by any sagacity or penetration to discover or even conjecture without experience what event will result from it or to carry our thoughts beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses Even after one instance or experiment here we have observed a particular event to follow upon another we are not entitled to form a general rule or foretell what will happen in like cases it being justly

the universal necessity of the D. ty. th. t
existing on the M. I. b. nche and oth. r. Ca. t. ans
made the foundation of fl. th. h. It

esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment however accurate or certain But when one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence We then call the one object Cause the other Effect We suppose that there is some connexion between them some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity

It appears then that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant can that idea these instances positions But instances different from every single instance which is supposed to be exactly similar except only that after a repetition of similar instances the mind is carried by habit upon the

or the imagination from one object to its usual attendant is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion Nothing farther is in the case Contemplate the subject on all sides you will never find any other origin of that idea This is the sole difference between one instance from which we can never receive the idea of connexion and a number of similar instances by which it is suggested The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse as by the shock of two billiard balls he could not pronounce that the one event was connected but only that it was joined with the other After he has observed several instances of this nature he then pronounces them to be connected What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other When we say therefore that one object is connected with another we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought and give rise to this inference by which they become proofs of each other's existence A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary but which seems founded on sufficient evidence Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gen

eral durance of the understanding or sceptical opinion to certain every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. \ conclusions can be more great to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.

60. And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprise and ignorance and weakness of the understanding than this? For surely if there be any relation among objects which it imports it must know perfectly, it is that of cause and effect. O! thus are fitted all our reasonings concerning matter, effect, existence. By means of it alone we obtain any assurance concerning objects which are removed from the present testimony of our memory and senses. The only immediate utility of all sciences, is to teach us, how to control and regulate future events by their causes. Our thoughts and reason are thus fitted to reason in matter.

these thoughts but beyond these, we have no idea of it.

61. To recapitulate therefore the reasonings of this section. Every idea is copied from some preceding impression or sentiment and where we cannot find any impression we may be certain that there is no idea. In all single instances of the perception of bodies or minds, there is nothing that produces any impression nor consequently can suggest any idea of power or necessary connection. But when many uniform instances appear of the same object is always followed by the same event we then begin to entertain the notion of cause and connection. We then find a new sentiment or impression to wit a customary connexion with thought or imagination between the object and its usual attendant and this sentiment is the original of that idea which we seek for. For as this idea arises from number of similar instances, and not from one must arise from that cause.

3

may define cause to be an object followed by another and here all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to it and O! in these words her first fact by itself had obtained, the second never had existed. The appearance of cause alone, the mind by customary transition, the idea of the effect. Of this also we have experience. We may therefore imitate this experience for another definition of cause, and call an object followed by another and whose presence always follows the thought that other. But though both these definitions be drawn from

had any idea of power as the mind does not they measure in itself? If I drop whether the force of body in motion be as velocity or the square of velocity this dispute, I say need not be decided by comparing its effects in equal or unequal times but by direct mensuration and

tion of things to another. These words, as commonly used have very loose meanings and tend to confusion. No animal capable of external bodies in motion without the sentiment of firmness or desire. Every animal has sentiment or feeling from the stroke or blow of an external object that is in motion. These sensations, which are merely animal and from which we can a priori derive inference we are permitted to transfer to inanimate

circumstance in the cause which gives connection with its effect. We have said of this connection nothing yet. What is it? What is its desire known when we do our conception of it. We say for instance, that the being of this thing is the cause of this particular so and so. But what we mean by that affirmation. We either mean that its combination is followed by this and that all similar combinations have been followed by similar results. O! that the result is followed by this and that for the appearance of one he immediately perceives the sense and forms immediately an idea of the other. We may consider the relation of cause and effect in either of

causation, we consider only the constant perception

eternal sensation, which they occasion.

PART II

58 But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument which is already drawn out to too great a length. We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived. It appears that in single instances of the operation of bodies we never can by our utmost scrutiny discover anything but one event following another without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the

operations of mind on body—where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible.

Events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem *connected* but never *connected*. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment the necessary conclusion seems to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all and that these words are absolutely without any meaning when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.

59 But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion and one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or event is presented it is impossible for us by any sagacity or penetration to discover or even conjecture without experience what event will result from it or to carry our thoughts beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment we have observed a particular event to follow upon another we are not entitled to form a general rule or foretell what will happen in like cases it being justly

thought universal and necessary of them.

But I suppose all I say is that it has a real though undetermined power. By which I mean has it become so prevalent among modern metaphysicians?

esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of event has always in all instances been conjoined with another we make no longer any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other and of employing that reasoning which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object *Cause* the other *Effect*. We suppose that there is some connexion between them some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.

It appears then that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance which is supposed to be exactly similar except only that after a repetition of similar instances the mind is carried by habit upon the appearance of one event to expect its usual attendant and to believe that it will exist. This connexion therefore which exists in the mind this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance from which we can never receive the idea of connexion and a number of similar instances by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse as by the shock of two billiard balls he could not pronounce that the one event *determined* the other but only that it *was* *connected* with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature he then pronounces them to be *determined*. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of *determination*? Nothing but that the notion of these events to be *determined* in his imagination and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say therefore that one object is connected with another we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought and give rise to this inference by which they become proofs of each other's existence. A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any gen

PART I
 no two events bore any resemblance to each other but every object was entirely new & tho't any similitude to whatever had been seen before, we should never in that case have attained the least idea of necessity or of connection among these objects. We might say upon a civil supposition, that one object or event has followed another not that one was produced by the other. The relation of cause and effect must be utterly unknown to mankind. Inference and reasoning

knowledge of any real existence could possibly have access to the mind. Our ideas of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity observed in the operations of nature.

After Beyond the constant just of similar objects, and the consequent inference from one to the other we have no notion of any necessary connection.

If it appear therefore, that all mankind have ever allowed, without any doubt or hesitation, that these two circumstances take place in the voluntary actions of men and in the operations of mind it must follow that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of necessity and that they have hitherto disputed, merely for the understanding each other.

65. As to the first circumstance the constant and regular connection of similar events, we may possibly satisfy ourselves by the following considerations. It is universally acknowledged that there is great uniformity among the actions of men, in all nations and ages and that human nature remains till the same in its principles and operations. The same motives always produce the same actions. The same events follow from the same causes. Ambition, avarice, self love, anty friendship generous public spirit these passions, mixed in various degrees,

the latter Mankind are so much the same in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature by which

men in all various circumstances and situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become acquainted with the regular principles of human action and behaviour. These records of wars, intrigues, factions, and revolutions, are so many collections of experiments, by which the politician moral philosopher fixes the principles of his science in the same manner the physician or natural philosopher becomes acquainted with the nature of plants, minerals, and their external objects, by the experiments

which he forms concerning them. Nor are the earth, water and the elements, examined by Aristotle and Hippocrates, more like to those which I present to our observation than the men described by Polybius and Tacitus are to those who now govern the world.

Should a traveller returning from a far country bring us an account of men, wholly different from any with whom we were ever acquainted, who were entirely destitute of avarice, ambition or revenge who knew no pleasure but friendship generosity and public spirit we should immediately from these circumstances, detect the falsehood, and prove him liar with the same certainty as if he had falsified his narrative with stories of centaurs and dragons, miracles and prodigies. And if we would explode any foppery in history we cannot make use of more corroborative argument than to prove that the actions ascribed to any person are directly contrary to the course of nature, and that no man motives, in such circumstances, could ever induce him to such conduct. The credulity of Quintus Curtius is as much to be suspected, which describes the supernatural courage of Alexander by which he was hurried singly to attack multitudes, as when he describes his supernatural force and activity by which he was able to resist them. So readily and universally do we acknowledge uniformity in human motives and actions as well as in the operations of body.

Hence likewise the necessity of that experience acquired by long life and variety of business and company in order to instruct us in the principles of human nature, and regulate our future conduct, as well as speculation. By means of this guide, we mount up to the knowledge of men's inclinations and motives, from their actions, ex-

kind. Would you know the sentiments, inclinations, and course of life of the Greeks and Romans

observations which you have made with regard

fer from every individual instance. But this customary connexion or transition of the imagination is the only circumstance in which they differ. In every other particular they are alike. The first instance which we saw of motion communicated by the shock of two billiard balls (to return to this obvious illustration) is exactly similar to any instance that may at present occur to us except only that we could not at first infer one event from the other which we are enabled to do at present after so long a course of uniform experience. I know not whether the reader will readily apprehend this reasoning. I am afraid that should I multiply words about

over their antagonists. It is true if men attempt the discussion of questions which lie entirely beyond the reach of human capacity such as those concerning the origin of worlds or the economy of the intellectual system or region of spirits they may long beat the air in their fruitless contests

could preserve the dispute so long undecided but some ambiguous expressions which keep the antagonists still at a distance and hinder them from grappling with each other

63 This has been the case in the long disputed question concerning liberty and necessity and to so remarkable a degree that if I be not much mistaken we shall find that all mankind both learned and ignorant have always been of the same opinion with regard to this subject and that a few intelligible definitions could immediately have put an end to the whole controversy. I own that this dispute has been so much canvassed on all hands and has led philosophers in to such a labyrinth of obscure sophistry that it is no wonder if a sensible reader indulge his ease so far as to turn a deaf ear to the proposal of such a question from which he can expect neither instruction or entertainment. But the state of the argument here proposed may perhaps serve to renew his attention as it has more novelty promises at least some decision of the controversy and will not much disturb his ease by any intricate or obscure reasoning.

I hope therefore to make it appear that all men have ever agreed in the doctrine both of necessity and of liberty according to any reasonable sense which can be put on these terms and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words. We shall begin with examining the doctrine of necessity.

64 It is universally allowed that matter in all

to reach and reserve the flowers of rhetoric for subjects which are more adapted to them

Sect VIII Of Liberty and Necessity

PART I

62 It might reasonably be expected in questions which have been canvassed and disputed with great eagerness since the first origin of science and philosophy that the meaning of all the terms at least should have been agreed upon among the disputants and our enquiries in the course of two thousand years been able to pass from words to the true and real subject of the controversy. For how easy may it seem to give exact definitions of the terms employed in reasoning and make these definitions not the mere sound of words the object of future scrutiny and examination? But if we consider the matter more narrowly we shall be apt to draw a quite opposite conclusion. From the circumstance alone

and that the same words are used in the terms employed in the controversy. For as the faculties of the mind are supposed to be naturally alike in every individual otherwise nothing could be more fruitless than to reason or dispute together it were impossible if men affix the same ideas to their terms that they could so long form different opinions of the same subject especially when they communicate their views and each party turn themselves on all sides in search of arguments which may give them the victory

effect in such particular circumstances could possibly have resulted from it. The degree and direction of every motion is by the laws of nature connected with such exactness that a living

than what is a just and precise idea of necessity. We must consider whence that idea arises when

manifest in their wouled powers when irreg-
 ular events follow from any particular cause
 as such persons and phisician are not surprised
 at the matter nor are ever tempted to deny in
 general, the necessity and uniformity of those
 principles by which the animal economy is con-
 ducted. They know that the human body is a
 mighty complicated machine. That many secret
 powers lurk in it, which are altogether beyond
 our comprehension. That to us it must often
 appear very uncertain in its operations. And
 that therefore the irregular events, which out-
 wardly discover themselves, can be no proof
 that the laws of nature are not observed with
 the greatest regularity in its internal operations
 and government.

68. The philosopher if he be consistent must
 apply the same reasoning to the customs and
 notions of its agent nations. The most irregu-
 lar and unexpected resolutions of men may fre-
 quently be accounted for by those who know
 every particular circumstance of their charac-
 ter and situation. A person of an obliging disposi-
 tion gives a peevish answer. But he has the
 toothache, or has no dinner. A stupid fellow
 discovers an uncommon alacrity in his carriage.
 But he has met with sudden piece of good for-
 tune. Or even when an action is sometimes
 happens, cannot be particularly accounted for
 either by the person himself or by others we
 know in general, that the characters of men
 are to certain degree inconstant and irregu-
 lar. This is, in manner the constant character
 of human nature though it be applicable, in
 more particular manner to some persons who

superfluous to prove that this experienced uni-
 formity in human actions is a source whence we
 draw *facts* concerning them. But in order to
 throw the argument into a greater variety of
 lights we shall also insist, though briefly on this
 latter topic.

The mutual dependence of men is so great in
 all societies that scarce any human action is
 entirely complete in itself or is performed with-
 out some reference to the actions of others, which
 are requisite to make it answer fully the inten-
 tion of the agent. The poorest artizan who la-
 bours alone, expects at least the protection of
 the magistrat to ensure him the enjoyment of
 the fruits of his labour. He also expects that,
 when he carries his goods to market and offers
 them at reasonable price he shall find pur-
 chasers, and shall be paid by the money he re-
 quires, to engage others to supply him with
 those commodities which are requisite for his
 subsistence. In proportion as men extend their
 dealings, and render their intercourse with others
 more complicated, they always comprehend, in their schemes of life, greater anxiety
 of voluntary actions, which they expect from
 the proper motives, to co-operate with their
 own. In all these conclusions they take their
 measures from past experience, in the same
 manner as in their reasonings concerning ex-
 ternal objects and firmly believe that men, as
 well as all the elements, are to continue, in their
 operations, the same that they have ever found
 them. A manufacturer reckons upon the labour
 of his servants for the execution of any work as
 much as upon the tools which he employs, and
 would be equally surprised were his expecta-
 tions disappointed. In short, this experiential
 inference and reasoning concerning the nature
 of others enters so much into human life that no
 man whilst awake, is ever moment without
 employing it. Have we not reason therefore to
 affirm that all mankind have always agreed in

steady principles enough to be made use of
 able by human sagacity and enquiry

69. Thus appears, not only that the con-
 junction between motives and voluntary actions
 is as regular and uniform as that between the
 cause and effect in any part of nature but also
 that this regular conjunction has been univer-
 sally acknowledged among mankind, and has
 ever been the subject of dispute, either in phi-
 losophy or common life. Now as it is from past
 experience that we draw all inferences concern-
 ing the future, and as we conclude that objects
 will always be conjoined together which we find
 to have always been conjoined it may seem

For not to mention that almost every
 notion of their life supposes that opinion, there are
 even few of the speculative parts of learning to
 which it is not essential. What would become
 of history had we not dependence on the tra-
 dition of the historian according to the experience
 which we have had of mankind. How could
 politics be science, if law and forms of govern-
 ment had not uniform influence upon society?
 Where would be the foundation of morals if par-

pressions and even gestures and again descend to the interpretation of their actions from our knowledge of their motives and inclinations. The general observations treasured up by a course of experience give us the clue of human nature and teach us to unravel all its intricacies. Pretexts and appearances no longer deceive us. Public declarations pass for the specious colouring of a cause. And though virtue and honour be allowed their proper weight and authority that perfect disinterestedness so often pretended to is never expected in multitudes and parties seldom in their leaders and scarcely even in individuals of any rank or station. But were there no uniformity in human actions and were every experiment which we could form of this kind irregular and anomalous it were impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind and no experience however accurately digested by reflection would ever serve to any purpose. Why is the aged husband man more skilful in his calling than the young beginner but because there is a certain uniformity in the operation of the sun rain and earth towards the production of vegetables and experience teaches the old practitioner the rules by which this operation is governed and d i s i

—
Circumstances will always act precisely in the same manner without making any allowance for the diversity of characters prejudices and opinions. Such a uniformity in every particular is found in no part of nature. On the contrary from observing the variety of conduct in different men we are enabled to form a greater variety of maxims which still suppose a degree of uniformity and regularity.

Are the manners of men different in different ages and countries? We learn thence the great force of custom and education which mould the human mind from its infancy and form it into a fixed and established character. Is the behaviour and conduct of the one sex very unlike that of the other? Is it thence we become acquainted with the different characters which nature has impressed upon the sexes and which she preserves with constancy and regularity? Are the actions of the same person much diversified in the different periods of his life from infancy to old age? This affords room for many general observations concerning the gradual change of our sentiments and inclinations and the different maxims which prevail in the different ages of human creatures. Even the charac-

ters which are peculiar to each individual have a uniformity in their influence otherwise our acquaintance with the persons and our observation of their conduct could never teach us their dispositions or serve to direct our behaviour with regard to them.

67 I grant it possible to find some actions, which seem to have no regular connexion with any known motives and are exceptions to all the measures of conduct which have ever been established for the government of men. But if we would willingly know what judgement should be formed of such irregular and extraordinary actions we may consider the sentiments commonly entertained with regard to those irregular events which appear in the course of nature and the operations of external objects. All causes are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity. An artificer who handles only dead matter may be disappointed of his aim as well as the politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.

The vulgar who take things according to their first appearance attribute the uncertainty of events to such an uncertainty in the causes as makes the latter often fail of their usual influence though they meet with no impediment in their operation. But philosophers observing that almost in every part of nature there is contained a vast variety of springs and principles which are hid by reason of their minuteness or remoteness find that it is at least possible the contrariety of events may not proceed from any contingency in the cause but from the secret operation of contrary causes. This possibility is converted into certainty by farther observation when they remark that upon an exact scrutiny a contrariety of effects always betrays a contrariety of causes and proceeds from their mutual opposition. A peasant can give no better

influence on the heels but fails of its usual effect perhaps by reason of a grain of dust which puts a stop to the whole movement. From the observation of several parallel instances philosophers form a maxim that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes.

Thus for instance in the human body when the usual symptoms of health or sickness disappoint our expectation when medicines op-

era not w^h their wonted powers when ureg-
ular events flow from any particular cause
The philosopher and physician are not surprised
at the irregular nor are ever tempted to idly in-
fer, from the necessity and uniformity of those
principles by which the animal economy is con-
ducted. They know that a human body is
no more a machine. That many secret
powers lurk in it, which are all over-ruled beyond
our comprehension. That it is thus must often
appear very uncertain in its operations. And
that therefore the irregular events, which out-
wardly discover themselves, can be no proof
that the laws of nature are not observed w^h
the greatest regularity in all internal per-
formances and government.

68. The philosopher if he be consistent must
apply the same reasoning to the actions and
motions of intelligent agents. The most irregu-
lar and unexpected resolutions of men may fre-
quently be accounted for by those who know
every particular circumstance of their character
and situation. A person of an obliging disposi-
tion gives a peremptory answer. But he has the

—, —, —

either by the person himself or by others w^h
know in general, that the characters of men
are, to a certain degree, inconstant and irregu-
lar. Thus, in a manner, the constant character

superstitious to prove that this experienced uni-
formity in human actions is a source whence we
draw *ferre* concerning them. But in order to
throw the argument into a greater variety of
lights we shall also insist, though briefly on this
latter topic.

The mutual dependence of men is so great in
all societies that scarce any human action is
entirely complete in itself or is performed w^h
out some reference to the actions of others, which
are requisite to make it answer fully the inten-
tion of the agent. The poorest artificer who la-
bours alone expects at least the protection of
the magistrate to ensure him the enjoyment of
the fruits of his labour. He also expects that,
when he carries his goods to market and offers
them at a reasonable price he shall find pur-
chasers, and shall be able by the money he re-
quires, to engage others to supply him w^h
those commodities which are requisite for his
subsistence. In proportion as men extend their
dealings, and render their intercourse w^h oth-
ers more complicated, they always compre-
hend, in their schemes of life a greater variety
of voluntary actions, which they expect from
the proper motives, to co-operate w^h their
own. In all these conclusions they take their
measures from past experience, in the same
manner as in their reasonings concerning ex-
ternal objects and firmly believe that men, as
well as all the elements, are to continue, in their
operations, the same that they have ever found
them. A master reposes upon the labour
of his servants for the execution of any work as
much as upon the tools which he employs, and
would be equally surprised were his expecta-
tions disappointed. In short, thus experience
and inference and reasoning, concerning the actions
of others enters so much into human life that no
man whilst he is ever moment w^hout
employing it. Have we not reason therefore to
affirm that all mankind have always agreed in
the doctrine of necessity according to the fore-
going definition and explication of it.

No wise philosophers ever entertained
different opinions from the people in this particu-
lar. For not to mention that almost every
action of their life supposes that passion, there are
even few of the speculative parts of learning to
which it is not essential. What would become
of history had we not a dependence on the tra-
dition of the historian according to the experience
which we have had of mankind. If we could
possess but science, if laws and forms of govern-
ment had not uniform influence upon society?
Where would be the foundation of morals, if par-

operate in uniform laws, —

These seem irregularities in the same manner
as the winds, rain, clouds, and their variations
of the weather are supposed to be governed by
steady principles though no easily discover-
able by human sagacity and inquiry.

69. Thus appears, not only that the con-
junction between motives and voluntary actions
is as regular and uniform as that between the
cause and effect in any part of nature but also
that this regular conjunction has been univer-
sally acknowledged among mankind, and has
never been the subject of dispute, either in phi-
losophy or common life. Now as it is from past
experience that we draw all inferences concern-
ing the future and as we conclude that objects
will always be conjoined together which we find
to have always been conjoined it may seem

ticular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our *criticism* upon any poet or polite author if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible therefore to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and this inference from motive to voluntary actions from characters to conduct

And indeed when we consider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together and form only one chain of argument we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature and derived from the same principles

ed and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same prisoner when conducted to the scaffold foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas. The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape the action of the executioner the separation of the head and body bleeding convulsive motions and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions but the mind feels no difference between them in passing from one link to another. Nor is less certain of the future event than if it were connected with the objects present to the memory or senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physical necessity*. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind: whether the united objects be motives volition and actions or figure and motion. We may change the name of things but their nature and their operation

Were I a poor man I should be surprised to see a rich man in a ship to come into my house where I am surrounded with my servants. I rest assured that he is not to stay here before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself which is new and solidly built and founded. — But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy. — So may a sudden earthquake

arise and shake and tumble my house about my ears. I shall therefore change the suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed. And this event I think I can foretell with the same assurance as that if he throw himself out at the window and meet with no obstruction he will not remain a moment

in the air. No suspicion of an un-

at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather as that he will find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations

71 I have frequently considered what could possibly be the reason why all mankind though they have ever without hesitation acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole

profess the contrary opinion. The matter is accounted for after the following manner

So far as we are able to observe that particular objects are constantly so joined together and that the mind is carried by a customary transition from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds and feel no such connexion of the motive and the action they are thence apt to suppose that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent influence of the mind from one to another and finding that these two circumstances are universally

allowed to have place in voluntary actions we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may contradict the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find upon reflection, that they dissent from it in words only not in their real sentiment. Necessity according to the sense in which it is here taken has never yet been rejected or can ever I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may only perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter some farther connexion between the cause and effect and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear on examination and it is incumbent on these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or describing that necessity and pointing it out to us in the operations of material causes.

It would seem, indeed that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss more simple questions, namely the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity except that of a constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality the whole of that necessity which we concern in matter and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind, the dispute must at least, must be owned to be then not merely verbal. But as to gas we will shortly suppose, that we have some farther idea of

that these have a regular conjunction with motives and circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity which we have already allowed in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and behaviour.

§ 73 If it to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science will not require many words to prove that all mankind have ever agreed in the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity and that the whole dispute in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions we cannot surely

— — —
 tel is that all we know of them is the constant
 conjunction and inference from one to the other

— — —
 that I present, I can consider not that the
 fantastical desire of showing liberty is here the
 motive of our actions. And seems certain, that
 however we may imagine we feel liberty within
 ourselves, poets or can commonly infer our
 titles from our motives and character and even
 where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he

ticular characters had no certain or determinate power to produce particular sentiments and if these sentiments had no constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our *criticism* upon any poet or polite author if we could not pronounce the conduct and sentiments of his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters and in such circumstances? It seems almost impossible therefore to engage either in science or action of any kind without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and this inference from motive to voluntary actions from characters to conduct.

And indeed when we consider how aptly *natural* and *moral* evidence link together and form only one chain of argument we shall make no scruple to allow that they are of the same nature and derived from the same principles

as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded and in all attempts for his freedom chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one than upon the inflexible nature of the other. The same prisoner when conducted to the scaffold foresees his death as certainly from the constancy and fidelity of his guards as from the operation of the axe or wheel. His mind runs along a certain train of ideas. The refusal of the soldiers to consent to his escape the action of the executioner the separation of the head and body bleeding convulsive motions and death. Here is a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions but the mind feels no differ-

ent to the memory or senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleased to call a *physical* necessity. The same experienced union has the same effect on the mind whether the united objects be motives volition and actions or figure and motion. We may change the name of things but their nature and their operation on the understanding never change.

Were a man whom I know to be honest and opulent and with whom I live in intimate friendship to come into my house where I am surrounded with my servants I rest assured that he is not to stab me before he leaves it in order to rob me of my silver standish and I no more suspect this event than the falling of the house itself which is new and solidly built and founded — But he may have been seized with a sudden and unknown frenzy — So may a sudden earthquake

arise and shake and tumble my house about my ears I shall therefore change the suppositions. I shall say that I know with certainty that he is not to put his hand into the fire and hold it there till it be consumed. And this event I think I can foretell with the same assurance as that if he throw himself out at the window and meet with no obstruction he will not remain a moment suspended in the air. No suspicion of an unknown frenzy can give the least possibility to the former event which is so contrary to all the known principles of human nature. A man who at noon leaves his purse full of gold on the pavement at Charing Cross may as well expect that it will fly away like a feather as that he will find it untouched an hour after. Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature attended with more or less degrees of certainty proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations.

71 I have frequently considered what could possibly be the reason why all mankind though they have ever without hesitation acknowledged the doctrine of necessity in their whole practice and reasoning have yet discovered such a reluctance to acknowledge it in words and have rather shown a propensity in all ages to profess the contrary opinion. The matter I think may be accounted for after the following manner. If we examine the operations of body and the production of effects from their causes we shall find that all our faculties can never carry us farther in our knowledge of this relation than barely to observe that particular objects are constantly conjoined together and that the mind is carried by a customary notion from the appearance of one to the belief of the other. But though this conclusion concerning human ignorance be the result of the strictest scrutiny of this subject men still entertain a strong propensity to believe that they penetrate farther into the powers of nature and perceive something like a necessary connexion between the cause and the effect. When again they turn their reflections towards the operations of their own minds and feel no such connexion of the motive and the action they are thence apt to suppose that there is a difference between the effects which result from material force and those which arise from thought and intelligence. But being once convinced that we know nothing farther of causation of any kind than merely the constant conjunction of objects and the consequent inference of the mind from one to another and finding that these two circumstances are universally

allowed to have place in voluntary actions, we may be more easily led to own the same necessity common to all causes. And though this reasoning may contravert the systems of many philosophers, in ascribing necessity to the determinations of the will, we shall find, upon reflection, that they dissent from it in words only, not in their real sentiment. Necessity according to the sense in which it is here taken, has never yet been rejected, nor can ever I think, be rejected by any philosopher. It may only perhaps, be pretended that the mind can perceive, in the operations of matter some farther connexion between the cause and effect and connexion that has not place in voluntary actions of intelligent beings. Now whether it be so or not, can only appear upon examination and it is incumbent these philosophers to make good their assertion, by defining or describing that necessity and pointing it out to us in the operations of material causes.

2. It would seem, indeed, that men begin at the wrong end of this question concerning liberty and necessity when they enter upon it by examining the faculties of the soul, the influence of the understanding and the operations of the will. Let them first discuss a more simple question, namely the operations of body and of brute unintelligent matter and try whether they can there form any idea of causation and necessity except that of constant conjunction of objects, and subsequent inference of the mind from one to another. If these circumstances form, in reality the whole of that necessity which we conceive in matter and if these circumstances be also universally acknowledged to take place in the operations of the mind the dispute is at an end. It at last, must be without doubt thenceforth merely verbal. But as I guess will hardly suppose, that with some farther degree of necessity and usage in the perceptions of external objects it hath come to the point that we can

perceive that these have a regular conjunction with motions and circumstances and characters, and as we always draw inferences from one to the other we must be obliged to acknowledge in words that necessity which we have already allowed, in every deliberation of our lives, and in every step of our conduct and behaviour.

3. But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the question of liberty and necessity the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science it will not require many words to prove that all mankind have ever greed with the doctrine of liberty as well as in that of necessity and that the whole dispute in this respect also, has been hitherto merely verbal. For what is meant by liberty when applied to voluntary actions. We can not surely

see that all acknowledge this constant conjunction and inference to be necessary. We may perhaps find that it is with difficulty we are induced to fix each arrow limits to human understanding. But we can afterwards find no difficulty when we come to apply this doctrine to the actions of the will. For as it is vi-

tion. Now with the very common & usual notion of the foregoing doctrine.

mean that actions have so little connexion with motives inclinations and

liberty when opposed to necessity not to constraint is the same thing with chance which is universally allowed to have no existence

PART II

By which we can conclude the existence of the other. For these are plain and acknowledged matters of fact. By liberty then we can only mean a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will that is if we choose to remain at rest we may if we choose to move we also may. Now this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to belong to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here then is no subject of dispute.

74 Whatever definition we may give of liberty we should be careful to observe two requisite circumstances first that it be consistent with plain matter of fact secondly that it be consistent with itself. If we observe these circumstances and render our definition intelligible I am persuaded that all mankind will be found of one opinion with regard to it.

It is universally allowed that nothing exists without a cause of its existence and that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has any where a being in nature. But it is pretended that some causes are necessary.

The definition a necessary connexion with its effect and let him show distinctly the origin of the idea expressed by the definition and I shall readily give up the whole controversy. But if the foregoing explication of the matter be received this must be absolutely impracticable. Had not objects a regular conjunction with each other we should never have entertained any notion of cause and effect and this regular conjunction produces that inference of the understanding which is the only connexion that we can have any comprehension of. Whoever attempts a definition of cause exclusive of these circumstances will be obliged either to employ unintelligible terms or such as are synonymous to the term which he endeavours to define and if the definition above mentioned be admitted

which is proper to
cause is as
if a cause be
is liable to be
ant by the se
at a cause is
what will

we know of the matter and this is indeed all the very essence of necessity nor have we any other idea of it.

75 There is no method of reasoning more common and yet none more blameable than in philosophical disputes to endeavour the refutation of any hypothesis by a pretence of its dangerous consequences to religion and morality. When any opinion leads to absurdities it is certainly false but it is not certain that an opinion is false because it is of dangerous consequence. Such topics therefore ought entirely to be forborne as serving nothing to the discovery of truth but only to make the person of an antagonist odious. Thus I observe in general without pretending to draw any advantage from it I frankly submit to an examination of this kind and shall venture to affirm that the doctrines both of necessity and of liberty as above explained are not only consistent with morality but are absolutely essential to its support.

Necessity may be defined two ways conformably to the two definitions of cause of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the constant conjunction of like objects or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another. Now necessity in both these senses, (which indeed are at bottom the same) has universally though tacitly in the schools in the pulpit and in common life been allowed to be long to the will of man and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can draw inferences concerning human actions and that those inferences are founded on the experienced union of like actions with like motives inclinations and circumstances. The only particular in which any one can differ is that either perhaps he will refuse to give the name of necessity to this property of human actions. But as long as the meaning is understood I hope the word can do no harm. Or that he will maintain it possible to discover something farther in the operations of matter. But this it must be acknowledged can be of no consequence to morality or religion whatever it may be to natural philosophy or metaphysics. We may here be mistaken in asserting that there is no idea of any other necessity or connexion in the actions of body. But surely we ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind but what everyone does and must readily allow of. We change no circumstance in the received or orthodox system with regard to the will but only in that with regard to material objects and

cases. \ thus th refore ca be mo no-
cent, at least, than this doctrine.

Alia s be gfo ded n rewards a d
punishme is, tis pposed as a f ndamental
principle, that these motu es ha e a regular and
uniform infl ence the m d and both pro-
duce the good and p event the e al a tions. We
ma gn t this infl ence what amew please
but as it is usually co j ued w th th t n, it
must be esteemed a *cause* and be looked pon
as an instance of that coeasity which w ould
here establish.

The only proper bject fh tredo geance
perso or cratur d wed w th tho ght
and consciousness and wh a y criminal in-
jurious cuions excite th t pass t is nly by
their relatio t the perso co exu w th
hum. Actions are, by their very nature t mpo-
rary and perishing and where they proceed t
from some cause in th char ter and disposition
of the perso ho perf rmed th m, th y can
twer redound t his ho our if good infamy
if evil. Th t is n th msel may be blame-
b, they may be co trary t lth rul of
morality and religi B th perso is t
rverable for them and as they proceeded from
nothing in him that is dur bl and constant, and
lea nothing of that nature behind th m, t is
impossible he can, po th is account, become
the object of pun hme to geance. A cord
g to the principle, therf e, which denies n-
cessity nd conseq tly causes, man is as pure
and untainted, af er ha ung committ d th most
horrid crime, as t the first mome t f his birth,
nor his character anywise co cern d in his
tions, since they are t derv d from t, and the
k dness f th e c be used as
proof of the depr ty f the ther

Men are not blamed f ch t ns as th y
perform gnorantly and casu lly whatever may
be th nseq ce Why b t b cau th
principles of these actu ns ar nly m mentary
a d t m n t th m l M e l s
blamed f such tions as th y perf rm hastily
and unpremedit ly than f ch as p oceed
from deliberation. F what reaso b t because
hasty temper tho gh constant cause prin-
ciple in the mind, per tes nly by intervals, and
infects not th whol chara ter Again repe t
ance pes f every crime if attended w th re-
formation of lif and man ers H w is th t be
accounted for b t by asserting th t ions n-
der a perso criminal merely as th y ar proofs
of criminal principles th mind and when, by
an alteratio of these principles, th y cease to be
just proofs, th y lik wise asc t be criminal.

B t except upon the doctri e f n cessity they
never were just proofs, a d consequently never
w re criminal.

77 It will be eq ally asy to prove, d from
the same arg m e that liberty cordi g to
that d f t abo cm t ed i wh h all
me gr e is also esse tial to mo al ty d th t
no h man act ns, where t is w ting are s-
cept ble of any moral q al t es, or can be the ob-
j is e th of pprobat r dislike. Fo as c
tions are objects of our mo al sentime t, so far
o ly as they are nd cat ons f the int rnal char-
ct p ssions, d aff t o s t is imposs bl
that they can g e rise th r to pr use o blame
wher they p oceed t f m these p ples
b t ar de d alt g th from exte l o-
le ce

8 I pretend ott ha e biated or moved
all obj t ns to this theory w th regard t n-
cessity d liberty I can f resce ther by ctions,
d m ed from top cs wh h ha e not h e been
treated of It may be sa d f inst ce, that if
ol tary ct ns be s bjected to the sam la s
of excess ty w th th operat ns f matter th re
is co tin d cha n of necessary causes pre-
rd ed and pre-d termi d reaching from the
g al cause f l t ev ry gl l t o f
ry human et No c t g ncy y
wher th un erse o d fference l t e

m t esult H man ct o th f e th
can ha o mo al turp t d at all, as proceed
g from so good cause af th y h y tur-
p t de th y mu t l C t the
sam guilt whil h is ck w ledged t be th ur
ultimat cause and th F as man wh
f d m w bl f l th nse
q ces wh th th t au h mpl y d bel g
h t so wher co t ed hat f c
essary causes is fixed that Be g either fin t
infinit wh prod es th first islik wise th
th fall th rest, d must both bear the bl me
d q r th p use h h bl g t th m
Our clear and al bl d as f mo al ty
t blish this rule, po q est bl easons
wh n w samun th conseq ces f y h
m t n nd th as m t l l ha e
greater f ce h ppl d to th l t ns and
nt ntions f Be g infinit ly wise and power
f l l g n an m pot m y be pl ded f
so lum ed re ure as an b t th se impe

fections have no place in our Creator. He fore saw he ordained he intended all those actions of men which we so rashly pronounce criminal. And we must therefore conclude either that they are not criminal or that the Deity not man is accountable for them. But as either of these positions is absurd and impious it follows that the doctrine from which they are deduced cannot possibly be true as being liable to all the same objections. An absurd consequence if necessary proves the original doctrine to be absurd in the same manner as criminal actions render criminal the original cause if the connexion between them be necessary and evitable.

This objection consists of two parts which we shall examine separately. First that if human actions can be traced up by a necessary chain to the Deity they can never be criminal on account of the infinite perfection of that Being from whom they are derived and who can intend nothing but what is altogether good.

Secondly and must acknowledge him to be the ultimate author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures.

79 The answer to the first

We are to conclude that the whole considered as one system is in every period of its existence ordered with perfect benevolence and that the utmost possible happiness will in the end result to all created beings without any mixture of positive or absolute ill or misery. Every physical ill says they makes an essential part of this benevolent system and could not possibly be removed even by the Deity himself considered as a wise agent without giving entrance to greater ill or excluding greater good which will result from it. From this theory some philosophers and the ancient Stoics among the rest derived a topic of consolation under all afflictions which they taught their pupils that those ills under which they laboured were in reality goods to the universe and that to an enlarged view which could comprehend the whole system of nature every event became an object of joy and exultation. But though this topic be pious and sublime it was soon found in practice weak and ineffectual. You could surely more irritate than appease a man by representing the rackings which he has produced the pains which he has undergone and led them through the proper canals to the senses and

nerves where they now excite such acute torments. These enlarged views may for a moment please the imagination of a speculative man who is placed in ease and security but neither can they dwell with constancy on his mind even though undisturbed by the emotions of pain or passion much less can they maintain their ground when attacked by such powerful antagonists. The affections take a narrower and more natural survey of their object and by an economy more suitable to the infirmity of human minds regard alone the beings around us and are actuated by such events as appear good or ill to the private system.

80 The case is the same with moral as with physical ill. It cannot reasonably be supposed that those remote considerations which are found of so little efficacy

The appearance of certain characters dispositions and actions it immediately feels the sentiment of approbation or blame nor are there any emotions more essential to its frame and constitution. The characters which engage our approbation are chiefly such as contribute to the peace and security of human society and the characters which excite blame are chiefly such as tend to public detriment and disturbance. Whence it may reasonably be presumed that the moral sentiments

A different opinion or conjecture that everything is right with regard to the whole and that the qualities which disturb society are in the main as beneficial and are as suitable to the primary intention of nature as those which more directly promote its happiness and welfare? Are such remote and uncertain speculations able to counterbalance the sentiments which arise from the natural and immediate view of the objects? A man who is robbed of a considerable sum of money

and
ens
in
with
these sentiments are not to be controuled or altered by any philosophical theory or speculation whatsoever

8. The mind's objection admits not of so easy and satisfactory an answer nor is it possible to explain distinctly how the Deity can be the immediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These necessities, such more natural and unassisted reason very unfit to handle, and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in insurmountable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and inconsistency of human creatures with the presence or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy. Happy if she be thence sensible of her temerity when she pries into these sublime mysteries and leaving a scene so full of obscurities and perplexities, return, with suitable modesty to her true and proper province the examination of common life where she will find difficulties enough to employ her enquiries, without launching into so boundless an ocean of doubt, uncertainty and contradiction!

SECT. IV. Of the Reason of Animals

82. ALL our reasonings concerning matter of fact are founded in a species of Analogy which leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar the analogy is perfect, and the inference, drawn from it, is regarded as certain and conclusive nor does an man ever entertain doubt where he sees a piece of iron, that it will have weight and cohesion of parts as in all other instances, such have never fallen under his observation. But where the objects have not so exact a similarity the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance. The anatomical theories, formed upon the use of animals, are by this species of reasoning, extended to all animals and it is certain, that while the circulation of the blood, for instance, is clearly proved to have place in one creature as for example fish, it forms a strong presumption so that the same principle has place in all. These analogical observations may be carried farther even to this science, of which we are now treating and any theory by which the operations of the understanding or the reason and connection of the passions man, will acquire additional force if we find, that the same theory is requisite to explain the same phenomena in all other

animals. We shall make trial of this, in regard to the hypothesis, by which we have in the foregoing discourse endeavored to account for all experimental reasonings and it is hoped, that this new point of view will serve to confirm all our former observations.

83. First It seems evident, that animals as well as men learn many things from experience and infer that the same events will always follow from the same causes. By this principle they become acquainted with the more obvious properties of external objects, and gradually from their birth, treasure up a knowledge of the nature of fire water earth stones, heights, depths, &c. and of the effects which result from their operation. The ignorance and inexperience of the young are here plainly distinguishable from the cunning and sagacity of the old who have learned by long observation to avoid what hurt them, and to pursue what gives ease or pleasure. A horse, that has been accustomed to the field becomes acquainted with the proper height which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old greyhound will trust the more figuring part of the chase to the younger and will place himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this occasion, founded on any thing but his observation and experience.

This is still more evident from the effects of discipline and education on animals, who, by the proper application of rewards and punishments, may be taught any course of action and most contrary to their natural instincts and propensities. I know experience which renders a dog apprehensive of pain, when you menace him, or lift up the whip to beat him. I know even experience which makes him answer to his name, and infer from such an arbitrary sound that you mean him rather than any of his fellows, and understand his name when you pronounce in certain manner and with a certain tone and accent.

In all these cases, we may observe, that the animal infers some effect beyond what immediately strikes his senses and that this inference is also founded on past experience while the creature expects from the present object the same consequences, which it has always found in its observation to result from similar objects.

84. Secondly It is impossible, that this inference of the animal can be founded on any process of argument reasoning by which he decides, that like event must follow like objects, and that the course of nature will always be reg-

ular in its operations For if there be in reality any arguments of this nature they surely lie too abstruse for the observation of such imperfect understandings since it may well employ the utmost care and attention of a philosophic genius to discover and observe them Animals therefore are not guided in these inferences by reasoning Neither are child

are the
actions
rs them
are in

a i the same with the vulgar and are governed by the same maxims Nature must have provided some other principle of more ready and more general use and application nor can an operation of such immense consequence in life as that of inferring effects from causes be trusted to the uncertain process of reasoning and argumentation Were this doubtful with regard to men it seems to admit of no question with regard to the brute creation and the conclusion being once firmly established in the one we have a strong presumption from all the rules of analogy that it ought to be universally admitted without any exception or reserve It is custom alone which engages animals from every object that strikes their senses to infer its usual attendant and carries their imagination from the appearance of the one to conceive the other in that particular manner which we denominate *belief* No other explication can be given of this operation in all the higher as well as lower classes of sensitive beings which fall under our notice and observation¹

Since all easings once in g fcs or causes is deduced meely from custom it may be asked how the passions that men so much pass an mals in easning and on man so much su pass anothe Has not the same custom the same influence on all

We shall here end a o b cfly to explain the geat diff en e in h m

idings After
ctw n m n
ded
d ha e be n

I for n r w gard en one xp im nt as th fo nd n f ason g and xp ct a malar cent w th some deg e of t nty v h th ex p r m nt has been made u tly d f c f om ll fo gnc cumst n s It is th fo e ns d d as a matt e of great impo tan to obser eth on sequ ncs of things and as on man m y w y mu h urpass n th r n attent on nd m mo y and obse t n this all m k a y g t d f fer n e n th r reasoning

2 Whether a complicated causes to produce any effect one mind may be much larger

85 But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation there are also many parts of it which they derive from the original hand of nature which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions and in which they improve little or nothing by the longest practice and experience These we denominate *Instincts*, and are so apt to admire as something very extraordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding But our wonder will perhaps cease or diminish when we consider th

elf
nd
is

is a species of instinct or mechanical power that acts in us unknown to ourselves and in its chief operations is not directed by any such relations or comparisons of ideas as are the proper objects of our intellectual faculties Though the instinct be different yet still it is an instinct which teaches a man to avoid the fire as much as that which teaches a bird with such exactness the art of incubation and the whole economy and order of its nursery

Sect X Of Miracles

PART I

86 There is in Dr Tillotson's writings an argument against the rational sense which is as concise

than another and better ble to comprehend the whole system of objects and to infer justly their consequences

ing is m ual f om hast a narrowness of mind w l h s not on l d s than to om m t mistak s in this part ul

7 When we reason from analogy the man who has the great person is the greater prompter of suggesting n l g will be the better as n

8 Byass's from p j d ed at n p s o party & bang m re upo v m nd th n not r

9 After we have acquired confidence in the testimony of books and in the large number of the philosophy men in the world the great the the se f th

It would be easy to discuss many other instances that make a difference in the understanding of men

and great, and too great as any argument can possibly be supposed against doctrine, so little of serious reflection. It is acknowledged on all hands, that the learned prelate that the birth either of the scripture or of christianity, is founded merely in the testimony of the apostles, who were eye witnesses to those miracles of our Saviour by which he proved his divine mission. Our evidence, then, for the truth of the Christian religion is less than the evidence for the truth of our senses: because, even in the first authors of our religion, it was no greater and is evidently must diminish in passing from them to their disciples: nor can any one rest such confidence in their testimony as in the immediacy of his senses. But a weaker evidence can never destroy stronger and therefore, were the doctrine of the real presence ever so clearly revealed in scripture, it were directly contrary to the rules of just reasoning, to give our assent to it in common sense, though both the scripture and tradition, on which it is supposed to be built, carry it clearly in with them as sense. As they are considered merely as external evidence, and are not brought home to every breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit.

Nothing is so convenient as a decisive argument of this kind, which must at least remove the most atrocious bigotry and superstition, and free us from their impudent solicitations. I flatter myself that I have discovered an argument of a like nature, which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and consequently will be useful as long as the world endures. For I begin to presume with the counts of miracles and prodigies be found in all history sacred and profane.

Though experience be our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact, it must be acknowledged, that this guide is not altogether infallible, but in some cases is perplexed us into error. One, who in our climate should expect better weather in any week of June than in one of December, could reason justly and conformably to experience, but it is certain, that he may happen, in the event, to find himself mistaken. However we may believe, that, in such case, we would have no cause to complain of experience, because it commonly informs us beforehand of the uncertainty by that contrariety of events, which we may learn from diligent history. As effects follow not without their supposed causes. Some events are found, in all countries and all ages, to have been

constantly conjoined together. Others are found to have been more variable and sometimes to disappoint our expectations: so that, in our rea-

soning,

A wise man, therefore, proportion his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience he expects the event with the last degree of assurance and regards his past experience as full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds with more caution. He weighs the opposite experiments. He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments to that side he inclines, with doubt and hesitation and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability then, supposes an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to overbalance the other and to produce

degree of evidence, proportioned to the superiority. A hundred instances of experiments in one side fifty in another afford a doubtful expectation of any event though a hundred uniform experiments, with only one that is contrary, reasonably begot a pretty strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite experiments, where they are opposite and deduce the smaller number from the greater in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.

To apply these principles to a particular instance we may observe that there is no species of reasoning more common than useful, necessary, but many of them that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye witnesses and spectators. Thus species of reasoning perhaps, we may deny, it be founded in the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute the word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion to either and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction. It is evident that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony whose connexion with any event seems, in itself as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to

a certain degree had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity were they not sensible to shame when detected in a falsehood Were not these I say discovered by experience to be qualities inherent in human nature we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony A man delirious or noted for falsehood and villany has no manner of authority with us

And as the evidence derived from witnesses and human testimony is founded on past experience so it varies with the experience and is regarded either as a *proof* or a *probability* according as the conjunction between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to be constant or variable There are a number of circumstances to be taken into consideration in all judgements of this kind and the ultimate standard by which we determine all disputes that may arise concerning them is always derived from experience and observation Where this experience is not entirely uniform on any side it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgements and with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other kind of evidence We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others We bal-

ance still with a diminution of assurance in proportion to the force of its antagonist

89 This contrariety of evidence in the present case may be derived from several different causes from the opposition of contrary testimony from the character or number of the witnesses from the manner of their delivering their testimony or from the union of all these circumstances We entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact when the witnesses contradict each other when they are but few or of a doubtful character when they have an interest in what they affirm when they deliver their testimony with hesitation or on the contrary with too violent asseverations There are many other particulars of the same kind which may diminish or destroy the force of any argument derived from human testimony

Suppose for instance that the fact which the testimony endeavours to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the marvellous in that case the evidence resulting from the testimony admits of a diminution greater or less in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual The reason why we place any credit in witnesses and historians is not derived from any connexion which

we perceive *a priori* between testimony and reality but because we are accustomed to find a conformity between them But when the fact at tested is such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation here is a contest of two opposite experiences of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains The very same principle of experience which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses gives us also in this case another degree of assurance against the fact, which they endeavour to establish from which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief and authority

I should not believe such a story were it told me by Cato was a proverbial saying in Rome even during the lifetime of that philosophical patriot¹ The incredibility of a fact it was allowed might invalidate so great an authority

The Indian prince who refused to believe the first relations concerning the effects of frost reasoned justly and it naturally required very strong testimony to engage his assent to facts that arose from a state of nature with which he was unacquainted and which bore so little analogy to those events of which he had had constant and uniform experience Though they were not contrary to his experience they were not conformable to it²

90 But in order to encrease the probability against the testimony of witnesses let us suppose, that the fact which they affirm instead of being

¹ Plutarch *Life of Cato*

No Indian testimony could have prevailed with him to do so in these climates Thus is

what of the testimony ought to be diminished if it is that you never saw water in Muscovy during the winter and therefore that you are not easily deceived that what would then be the consequence

commonly conduct ourselves in our reasonings is that the objects of which we have no experience resemble those of which we have that what we have found to be most usual is always most probable and that where there is an opposition of arguments we ought to give the preference to such as are founded on the greatest number of past observations But though in proceeding by this rule we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary degree yet in advancing farther the mind observes not always the same rule but when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous it rather the more readily admits of such a fact upon account of that very circumstance which ought to destroy all its authority The passion of *surprise* and *wonder* arising from miracles being an agreeable emotion gives a sensible tendency to wards the belief of those events from which it is derived And this goes so far that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately nor can believe those miraculous events of which they are informed yet love to hear of them

With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of travellers received their descriptions of sea and land monsters their relations of wonderful adventures strange men and uncouth manners? But if the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder there is an end of common sense and human testimony in these circumstances loses all weight

we raise and yet persevere in it with the best intentions in the world for the sake of promoting so holy a cause or even here this delusion has not place vanity excited by so strong a temptation operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any other circumstances and self interest with equal force His auditors may not have and commonly have not sufficient judgement to canvass his evidence what judgement they have they renounce by principle in these sublime and mysterious subjects or if they were ever so willing to employ reason passion and a heated imagination disturb the regularity of its operations Their credulity increases his impudence and his impudence overpowers the credulity

leaves address actions captivates the willing hearers and subdues their

understanding Happily this pitch it seldom attains But what a Tully or a Demosthenes could scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian audience every Capuchin every itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind and in a higher degree by touching such gross and vulgar passions

The many instances of forged miracles and prophecies and supernatural events which in all ages have either been detected by contrary evidence or which detect themselves by their absurdity prove sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the marvelous and ought reasonably

to spread so quickly especially in country places and provincial towns as those concerning marriages inasmuch that two young persons of equal condition never see each other twice but the whole neighbourhood immediately join them together The pleasure of telling a piece of news so interesting of propagating it and of being the first reporters of it spreads the intelligence And this is so well known that no man of sense gives attention to these reports till he find them confirmed by some greater evidence Do not the same passions and others still stronger incline the generality of mankind to believe and report with the greatest vehemence and assurance all religious miracles?

94 *The dly* It forms a strong presumption against all supernatural and miraculous relations that they are observed chiefly in about among ignorant and barbarous nations or if a civilized people has ever given admission to any of them that people will be found to have received them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors who transmitted them with that inviolable sanction and authority which always attend received opinions When we peruse the first histories of all nations we are apt to imagine ourselves transported into some new world where the whole frame of nature is disjointed and every element performs its operations in a different manner from what it does at present Battles revolutions pestilence famine and death are never the effect of those natural causes which we experience Irod gives omens oracles judgments quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with them But as the former grow thinner every page in proportion as we add a century nearer the enlightened ages we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or super

usual in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of mankind toward the marvelous, and that, though this inclination may at times receive check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated from human nature.

Every judicious reader is apt to suppose the personal ill these wonderful historians, and the frauds and errors they are in our day are not very strange, I hope, that men should be in all ages. I must surely have seen instances enough of that frailty. You have yourself read many such marvellous relations, varied, and being treated with scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the vulgar. Be assured, that those renowned miracles, which are spread and flourished to such enormous heights, arose from like beginnings, but being sown in more proper soil, shot up to such prodigious almost equal to those which they relate.

It is the policy in that false prophet, Alexander, though now forgotten, was once so anxious to lay the first scene of his impostures in Phrygia, where, as Lucian tells us, the people are extremely credulous and stupid and ready to swallow with the grossest delusion. People at a distance, who are weak enough to think the marvellous at all worth enquiry, have no opportunity of receiving better information. The scenes come magnified to them by hundred circumstances. Fools are industrious in propagating the imposture, while the wise and learned are contented, in general, to decide is bawling, and working themselves of the particular facts, by which time he distinctly refuted. And thus the impostor, whose imposture was enabled to proceed, from his ignorant Phrygianians, the credulous of others, even among the Grecian philosophers, and men of the most eminent rank and distinction in Rome, may could encourage the assertion of that sage emperor Marcus Aurelius so far as to make him trust the success of military expedition his delusive prophecies.

The advantages are so great, of starting an imposture among an ignorant people, that even though the delusion should be too gross to impose on the generosity of them (which, though I doubt not, it has in much better chance for succeeding in remote countries, than if the first scene had been laid in a city renowned for arts and knowledge. The most ignorant and barbarous of these barbarians carry the report abroad. None of their countrymen have large correspondence, or sufficient credit and authority to contradict and beat down the delusion.

Man inclinable to the marvellous has full opportunity to display itself, and thus it is which is universally exploded in the place where it was first started. I shall pass for certain a thousand miles distant. I had Alexander fixed his residence at Athens, the philosophers of that renowned mart of learning had immediately spread, throughout the whole Roman empire, the sense of the matter which, being supported by so great authority and displayed by all the force of eloquence and eloquence, had it opened the eyes of mankind. It is true, Lucian, passing by chance through Phrygia, had an opportunity of performing this good office, but, though much to be wished, it does not always happen, that every Alexander meets with a Lucian, ready to expose and detect his impostures.

95. I must add as fourth reason, which diminishes the authority of prodigies, that there is no testimony for any even those which are not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of witnesses so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, I thus consider that, in matters of religion, what ever is different is contrary, and that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of China should, all of them, be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle, therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of them bound in miracles) as is direct scope is to establish the particular system which it is intended to have the same force, though more indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying, it also itself. It likewise destroys the credit of those miracles, on which that system was established, so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be regarded as contrary to each other. Of this prodigies, whether weak or strong as present cases, either. According to this method of reasoning, when we believe an miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we have for our warrant the testimony of few barbarous Arabians. And on the other hand, we are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Tacitus, Cicero, and, in short, of all the authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who have related any miracle in their particular religion. I say we are to regard their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over subtil and refined, but is not in reality different from

the reasoning of a judge who supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a crime against any one is destroyed by the testimony of two others who affirm him to have been two hundred leagues distant at the same instant when the crime is said to have been committed

96 One of the best attested miracles in all profane history is that which Tacitus reports of Ves-
pasian who cured a blind man

rubbing of holy oil upon the stump and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact whom the cardinal found by their zealous devotion to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relation is also contemporary to the supposed miracle

counterfeit and the witnesses very numerous and all of them in a manner spectators of the fact to which they are all

against himself who relates the story seems not to give any credit to it and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered justly that it was not requisite in order to reject a fact of this nature to be able accurately to disprove the testimony and to trace its falsehood through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew that as this is commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place so was it extremely difficult even where one was immediately present by reason of the bigotry ignorance cunning and roguery of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded like a just reasoner that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it and that a miracle supported by any human testimony was more properly a subject of derision than of argument.

There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person than those which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris the famous Jansenist with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The

miracles were immediately proved upon the spot before judges of unquestioned integrity attested by witnesses of credit and disjunction in a learned age and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world. Nor is this all a relation of them as published and dispersed every where nor were the facts though a learned body supported by the civil magistrate and determined enemies to those opinions in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought ever able distinctly to refuse or detect them. Where shall we find such a number

was enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine historian where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity solidity age and probity of so great an emperor who through the whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian a contemporary writer noted for candour and veracity and without

under the contrary imputation of atheism and profaneness. The persons from whose authority he related the miracle of established character for judgement and veracity as we may well presume eye witnesses of the fact and confirming their testimony after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire and could no longer give any

no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.

There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de Retz which may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician fled into Spain to avoid the persecution of his enemies he passed through Sagossa the capital of Aragon where he was shown in the cathedral a man who had served seven years as a doorkeeper and as all known to every body in town that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had been seen for so long a time wanting a leg but recovered that limb by the

Hutcheson's History of the Causes (Vespasian)

the reasoning of a judge who supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a crime against any one is destroyed by the testimony of two others who affirm him to have been two

rubbing of holy oil upon the stump and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church and the whole company in town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact whom the cardinal found by their zealous devotion to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here the relation is also contemporary to the supposed prodigy of an incredulous and libertine character as well as of great genius the miracle of so singular a nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit and the witnesses very numerous and all of them in a manner spectators of the

fane history is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian who cured a blind man in Alexandria by means of his spittle and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in that fine historian where every circumstance seems to add weight to the testimony and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and eloquence if any one were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity solidity age and probity of so great an emperor who through the whole course of his life conversed in a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers and never affected those extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian a contemporary writer noted for candour and veracity and withal the greatest and most penetrating genius perhaps of all antiquity and so free from any tendency to credulity that he even lies under the contrary imputation of atheism and profaneness. The persons from

and confirming their testimony after the Flavian family was despoiled of the empire and could no longer give any reward as the price of a lie *Utrumque qui interfuerit nunc quoque memorant postquam nullum mendacio pretium*. To which if we add the public nature of the facts as related it will appear that no evidence can well be supposed stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.

enemies he passed through Saragossa the capital of Aragon where he was seen in the cathedral a man who had served seven years as a doorkeeper and was well known to every body in town that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had been seen for so long a time wanting a leg but recovered that limb by the

Histories of St. Sebastian in nearly the same account. Letters of the Cardinals (Vespasian)

is that the cardinal himself who relates the story seems not to give any credit to it and consequently cannot be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered justly that it was not requisite in order to reject a fact of this nature to be able accurately to disprove the testimony and to trace its falsehood through all the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew that as this is commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and place so was it extremely difficult even where one is immediately present by reason of the bigotry ignorance cunning and roguery of a great part of mankind. He therefore concluded like a just reasoner that such an evidence carried falsehood upon the very face of it and that a miracle supported by any human testimony was more properly a subject of derision than of argument.

There surely never was a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person than those which were lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbé Paris the famous Jansenist with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The curing of the sick going hearing to the deaf and sight to the blind were every where talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But what is more extraordinary many of the miracles were immediately proved

to be of the nature of unquestoned in

and all a relation of the miracles was dispersed every where nor were the facts though a learned body supported by the civil magistrature and determined enemies to those opinions, in whose favour the miracles were said to have been wrought ever able distinctly to refute or detect them. Where shall we find such a number

canonizes its origin. Upon reading this book, find it full of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of that of the world and of human nature entirely different from the present. Of our fall from that state. Of the race of man, extended to near thousand years. Of the destruction of the world by deluge. Of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favourites of heaven and what people the countrymen of the author. Of their deliverance from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable. I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart and after a serious consideration declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates which is, however necessary to make it be received, according to the measures of probability above established.

10. What we have said of miracles may be applied, with the same analogy, to prophecies and indeed, all prophecies are real miracles, and as such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the capacity of human nature: for all future events, it would

— — — — —
 Was the Christian Religion not only, as I first attended to miracles, but even this I could not be believed by any reasonable person. The only reason is insufficient to convince

— — — — —
 inclination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.

Sect. VI Of particular Providence and of Justice to State

— — — — —
 I can by no means approve of it as they seem to be curious, and bear some relation to the chain of reasoning carried throughout this enquiry. I shall here copy them from my memory as accurately as I can, in order to submit them to the judgement of the reader.

Our conversation began with my discoursing the singular good fortune of philosophy which as it requires entire liberty from all other privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation, received a first birth in an age and country of freedom

and toleration, and was never cramped even in its most extravagant principles, by any creeds, concessions, or penal statutes. For except the birth of Pericles, and the death of Socrates

— — — — —
 advanced age, in peace and tranquillity. — — — — —
 currents were even admitted to receive the sacred talchar, and to officiate at the altar in the most sacred rites of the established religion. And the public coursement of pensions and salaries was afforded equally by the wisest of all the Roman emperors, to the professors of every sect of philosophy. How requisite such kind of treatment was to philosophy in her early youth, will easily be conceived, if we reflect, that even at present, when she may be supposed more hardy and robust she bears with much difficulty the inclemency of the seasons, and those harsh winds of calumny and persecution which blow upon her.

Lucian, says my friend as the singular good fortune of philosophy what seems to result from the natural course of things, and to be undisturbed in every age and nation. This pernicious bigotry of which you complain as so fatal to philosophy is really her offspring. When after allying with superstition separates herself entirely from the interest of his parent and becomes her mortal enemy and persecutor. Speculative digressions of religion the present occasions of confusion dispute, could not possibly be conceived diminished in the early ages of the world when mankind being wholly illiterate formed ideas of religion more suitable to their weak apprehensions and composed their sacred texts of such tales chiefly as were the subjects of traditional belief more than of argument or dispute. After the first alarm, therefore, was given which arose from the new paradoxes and principles of the philosophers these teachers

— — — — —
 3 It seems then say I that you have politics entirely out of the question, and never speaks

Lucian vi. § 3. *ibid* (The B. quest, or the Lo-pists)
 Lucian, viii. 66 (The Eunuch)
 Lucian and Dio

records of history Thus suppose all authors in all languages agree that from the first of January 1600 there was a total darkness over the whole earth for eight days suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is still strong and lively among the people that all travellers who return from foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition without the least variation or contradiction it is evident that our present philosophers instead of doubting the fact ought to receive it as certain and ought to search for the causes whence it might be derived The decay corruption and dissolution of nature is an event rendered probable by so many analogies that any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency towards that catastrophe comes within the reach of human testimony if that testimony be very extensive and uniform

But suppose that all the historians who treat of England should agree that on the first of January 1600 Queen Elizabeth died that both before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court as is usual with persons of her rank that her successor was acknowledged and proclaimed by the parliament and that after being interred a month she again appeared resumed the throne and governed England for three years I must confess that I should be surprised at the concurrence of so many odd circumstances but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous an event I should not doubt of her pretended death and of those other public circumstances that followed it I should only assert it to have been pretended and that it neither was nor possibly could be real You would in vain object to me the difficulty and almost impossibility of deceiving the world in an affair of such consequence the wisdom and solid judgement of that renowned queen with the little or no advantage which she could reap from so poor an artifice

I would say that I should rather believe the most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence than admit of so singular a violation of the laws of nature

But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of that kind that this very circumstance could be a full proof of a cheat and sufficient to convince all men of sense not only to make them reject the fact but even reject it without farther examination Though the Being to whom the miracle is ascribed be in this case Almighty it does not

upon that account become a much more probable since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being other than from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past observation and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of nature by miracles in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable As the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact this must diminish very much the authority of the former testimony and make us form a general resolution never to lend any attention to it with whatever specious pretence it may be covered

Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning We ought says he to make a collection or particular history of all monsters and prodigious births or productions and in a word of everything new rare and extraordinary in nature But this must be done with the most severe scrutiny lest we depart from truth Above all every relation must be considered as suspicious which depends in any degree upon religion as the prodiges of Livy And no less so everything that is to be found in the writers of natural magic or alchemy or such authors, who seem all of them to have an unconquerable appetite for falsehood and fable

I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered

I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here delivered as it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is by no means fitted to endure To make this more evident let us examine those miracles related in scripture and not to lose ourselves in too wide a field let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch which we shall examine according to the principles of these pretended Christians not as the word or testimony of God himself but as the product of a mere human writer and historian Here then we are first to consider a book presented to us by a barbarous and ignorant people written in an age when they were still more barbarous and in all probability long after the facts which it relates corroborated by no concurring testimony and resembling those fabulous accounts, which every

uses as ill-ive t a just proportion to the effect. But if ascribe to t farther qualities, or affirm t capab. of prod cin, other effects, we can only impute the licence of conjecture, and arbitrariness, to suppose the existence of qualities and energies, without reason or authority.

The same rule holds, whether the cause as-

You find certain phenomena in nature. You seek a cause or author. You imagine that you have found him. You afterwards become so enamoured of this offspring of your brain, that you magnify it impossible but he must produce something greater and more perfect than the present scene of things, which is so full of ill and disorder. You forget that this superlative intelligence and benevolence are entirely imaginary or at least, without any foundation in reason, and that you have no ground to ascribe to him any qualities, but what you see he has actually exerted and displayed in his productions. Let your gods, therefore O philosophers, be suited to the present appearances of nature, and presume not to alter these appearances by arbitrary suppositions, in order to suit them to the attributes which you so fondly ascribe to your deities.

105. *These deities are not supported by*

with reverence. But when philosophers, who pretend to neglect authority and to cultivate reason, hold the same discourse, I pay them not, I own, the same obsequious submission and pious deference. I ask who carried them into the celestial regions, who admitted them to the councils of the gods, who opened to them the book of fate, that they thus rashly affirm, that their deities have executed or will execute, any purpose beyond what has actually appeared. If they tell me, that they have mounted on the steps or by the gradual ascent of reason, and by drawing inferences from effects to causes, I still insist, that they have aided the ascent of reason by the wings of imagination; otherwise they could not thus change the manner of inference, and argue from causes to effects presuming that a more perfect production than the present world would be more suitable to such perfect beings as the gods, and forgetting that they have no reason to ascribe to these celestial beings any perfection or any tribute but what can be found in the present world.

Hence all the fruitless industry to account for the appearances of nature, and save the honour of the gods, while we must acknowledge the reality of the evil and disorder with which the world so much abounds. The obstinate and intractable qualities of matter were at first, or the observance of general laws, or some such reason, is the sole cause, which controlled the power and benevolence of Jupiter, and obliged him to create mankind and every sensible creature so

as any quantities, beyond what are precisely requisite to produce the effect. Nor can we, by any uses of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is known to us. No one merely from the sight of one of Zeus's pictures, could know that he was also a statuary or architect, and was an artist no less successful in stone and marble than in colours. The talents and taste, displayed in the particular work before us, these we may safely conclude the workman to be possessed of. The cause must be proportioned to the effect, and if we exactly and precisely proportion it, we shall never find in it any qualities, that point farther or afford an inference concerning any other design or performance. Such quantities must be somewhat beyond what is merely requisite for producing the effect, which we examine.

106. Allowing, therefore, the gods to be the authors of the existence or order of the universe, I follow, that they possess that precise degree of power, intelligence, and benevolence, which appears in their workmanship; but nothing farther can ever be proved, except we call in the assistance of exaggeration and flattery, to supply the defects of argument and reason. So far as we trace of an attributes, I present, appear so far may we conclude these attributes exist. The supposition of farther attributes is merely a hypothesis much more than a supposition, that, in distant regions of space or periods of time, there has been, or will be, more magnificent displays of these attributes, and a more extensive administration more suitable to such imaginary virtues. We can never be allowed to mount up from the universe, the effect, to enter the cause; and then descend downwards, to infer any conclusion from that cause, as if the present effects alone were not entirely worthy of the glorious attributes, which we ascribe to that deity. The knowledge of the cause being denied solely from the effect, they must be exactly adjusted to each other, and the one can never refer to anything further or be the foundation of any new inference and conclusion.

pose that a wise magistrate can justly be jealous of certain tenets of philosophy such as those of Epicurus which denying a divine existence and consequently a providence and a future state seem to loosen in a great measure the ties of morality and may be supposed for that reason pernicious to the peace of civil society

I know replied he that in fact these persecutions never in any age proceeded from calm reason or from experience of the pernicious consequences of philosophy but arose entirely from passion and prejudice But what if I should advance farther and assert that if Epicurus had been accused before the people by any of the

of his adversaries who endeavoured with such zeal to expose him to the public hatred and jealousy?

I wish said I you would try your eloquence upon so extraordinary a topic and make a speech for Epicurus which might satisfy not the mob of Athens if you will allow that ancient and polite city to have contained any mob but the more philosophical part of his audience such as might be supposed capable of comprehending his arguments

The matter would not be difficult upon such conditions replied he And if you please I shall suppose myself Epicurus for a moment and make you stand for the Athenian people and shall deliver you such an harangue as will fill all the urn with white beans and leave not a black one to gratify the malice of my adversaries

Very well Pray proceed upon these suppositions

104 I come hither O ye Athenians to justify in your assembly what I maintained in my school and I find myself impeached by furious antagonists instead of reasoning with calm and dispassionate enquirers Your deliberations which of right should be directed to questions of public good and the interest of the commonwealth are diverted to the dissquisitions of speculative philosophy and these magnificent but perhaps fruitless enquiries take place of your more familiar but more useful occupations But so far as I am concerned I will prevent this abuse We shall not here dispute concerning the origin and government of worlds We shall only enquire how far such questions concern the public interest And if I can persuade you that they are entirely indifferent to the peace of society and security of government I hope that you will presently send us back to our schools there to

examine at leisure the question the most sublime but at the same time the most speculative of all philosophy

The religious philosophers not satisfied with the tradition of your forefathers and doctrine of your priests (in which I willingly acquiesce) indulge a rash curiosity in trying how far they can establish religion upon the principles of reason and they thereby excite instead of satisfying the doubts which naturally arise from a diligent and scrupulous enquiry They paint in the most magnificent colours the order beauty and wise arrangement of the universe and then ask if such a glorious display of intelligence could proceed from the fortuitous concurrence of atoms or if chance could produce what the greatest genius can never sufficiently admire I shall not examine the justness of this argument I shall allow it to be as solid as my antagonists and accusers can desire It is sufficient if I can prove from this very reasoning that the question is entirely speculative and that when in my philosophical disquisitions I deny a providence and a future state I undermine not the foundations of society but advance principles which they themselves upon their own topics, if they argue consistently must allow to be solid and satisfactory

105 You then who are my accusers have acknowledged that the chief or sole argument for a divine existence (which I never questioned) is derived from the order of nature where there appear such marks of intelligence and design that you think it extravagant to assign for its cause either chance or the blind and unguided force of matter You allow that this is an argument drawn from effects to causes From the order of the work you infer that there must have been project and forethought in the workman If you cannot make out this point you allow that your conclusion fails and you pretend not to establish the conclusion in a greater latitude than the phenomena of nature will justify These are your concessions I desire you to mark the consequences

When we infer any particular cause from an effect we must proportion it to the one to the other and can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities but what are exactly sufficient to produce the effect A body of ten ounces raised in any scale may serve as a proof that the counterbalancing weight exceeds ten ounces but can never afford a reason that it exceeds a hundred If it is cause assigned for any effect be not sufficient to produce it we must either reject that cause or add to it such qual

any principles of action in him, but so far as we know them to have been exerted and satisfied.

— *Let my work of justice justify me.* If you answer in the affirmative, I conclude, that, since justice here exerts itself, it is justified. If you reply in the negative, I conclude that you have then no reason to ascribe justice, in our sense of it, to the gods. If you hold a medium between affirmation and negation, by saying, that the justice of the gods, at present, exerts itself in part, but not in its full extent, I answer that you have no reason to give it any particular extent, but only so far as you see it, at present, exert itself.

1. Thus I bring the dispute, O Athenians, to short issue with my antagonists. The course of nature lies open to my contemplation as well as to theirs. The experienced train of events is the great standard, by which we all regulate our conduct. Nothing we can be repeated to in the forum, or in the senate. Nothing else ought ever to be heard of in the school, or in the closet. To run would our limited understanding break through these boundaries, which are too narrow for our fond imagination. While we arrive from the course of nature, and enter a particular intellectual cause, which first bestowed, and still preserves order in the universe, we embrace a principle, which is both uncertain and useless. It is uncertain because the subject lies entirely beyond the reach of human experience. It is useless because our knowledge of this cause being derived entirely from the course of nature, we can never, according to the rules of just reasoning, return back from the cause with any new inference, or making additions to the common and experienced course of nature, establish any new principles of conduct and behaviour.

2. I observe (and I find, he had finished his harangue) that you neglect not the artifice of the deities of old, and as you were pleased to make me stand for the people, you asseverate yourself into my faith by enumerating those principles, to which, you know, I have always expressed particular attachment. But allowing you to make experience (as indeed I think you ought) the only standard of our judgement concerning facts, and all other questions of fact, I doubt not but, from the very same experience to which you appeal, it may be possible to reverse our reasoning, which you are pleased to turn into the train of Epicurus. If you saw for instance, a sumptuous building surrounded with heaps of brick and stone and mortar, and all the instruments of masonry could you tell us of from the effect, that it was the work of design and contri-

ance? And could you not return again, from this inferred cause, to infer new additions to the effect, and conclude, that the building would soon be finished, and receive all the further improvements, which art could bestow upon it. If you saw upon the sea-shore the print of one human foot, you would conclude, that a man had passed that way, and that he had also left the traces of the other foot, though effected by the rolling of the sands or inundation of the waters. Why then do you refuse to admit the same method of reasoning with regard to the order of nature. Consider the world and the present time only as an imperfect building, from which you can infer a superior intelligence and argument from that superior intelligence, which can less than nothing imperfect. Why may you not infer a more finished scheme or plan, which will receive a completion in some distant point of space or time. Are not these methods of reasoning exactly similar? And under what pretence can you embrace the one, while you reject the other?

3. The immediate difference of the subjects, replied he, is sufficient foundation for this difference in my conclusions. In works of human art and contrivance, it is allowable to advance from the effect to the cause, and returning back from the cause, to form new inferences concerning the effect, and examine the alterations, which it has probably undergone, or may still undergo. But what is the foundation of this method of reasoning (Plato) that man is born whom we know by experience, whose motives and designs we are acquainted with, and whose projects and inclinations we have a certain conception and coherence, according to the laws which nature has established for the government of such a creature. When, therefore we find, that any work has proceeded from the skill and industry of man, as we are otherwise acquainted with the nature of the animal, we can draw a hundred inferences concerning what may be expected from him, and these inferences will all be founded in experience and observation. But did we know man only from the same work or production which we examine, were impossible for us to argue in this manner because our knowledge of all the qualities, which we ascribe him, being in this case derived from the production, it is impossible that we could pass to an thing farther or be the foundation of an new inference. The print of a foot in the sand can only prove, when considered alone, that there was some figure adapted to it, by which was produced but the print of a human foot proves likewise, from our other experience, that there was probably

imperfect and so unhappy. These attributes then are it seems beforehand taken for granted in their greatest latitude. And upon that supposition I own that such conjectures may perhaps be admitted as plausible solutions of the ill phenomena. But still I ask. Why take these attributes for granted, or why ascribe to the cause any qualities but what actually appear in the effect? Why torture your brain to justify the course of nature upon suppositions which for aught you know may be entirely imaginary, and of which there are to be found no traces in the course of nature?

The religious hypothesis therefore must be considered only as a particular method of accounting for the visible phenomena of the universe, but no just reasoner will ever presume to infer from it any single fact, and alter or add to the phenomena in any single particular. If you think that the appearances of things prove such causes, it is allowable for you to draw an inference concerning the existence of these causes. In such complicated and sublime subjects every one should be indulged in the liberty of conjecture and argument. But here you ought to rest. If you come backward, and arguing from your inferred causes, conclude that any other fact has existed, or will exist in the course of nature, which may serve as a fuller display of particular attributes, I must admonish you that you have departed from the method of reasoning attached to the present subject, and have certainly added something to the attributes of the cause, beyond what appears in the effect; otherwise you could never, with tolerable sense or propriety, add anything to the effect in order to render it more worthy of the cause.

108 Where then is the oddness of that doctrine which I teach in my school, or rather which I examine in my gardens? Or what do you find in this whole question, wherein the security of good morals, or the peace and order of society is in the least concerned?

I deny a providence, you say, and supreme governor of the world, who guides the course of events, and punishes the vicious with infamy and disappointment, and rewards the virtuous with honour and success in all their undertakings. But surely I deny not the course itself of events, which lies open to every one's inquiry and examination. I acknowledge that in the present order of things, virtue is attended with more peace of mind than vice, and merit is

human life and moderation the only source of tranquillity and happiness. I never balance between the virtuous and the vicious course of life, but am sensible that to a well-disposed mind every advantage is on the side of the former. And what can you say more, allowing all your suppositions and reasonings? You tell me indeed that this disposition of things proceeds from intelligence and design. But whatever it proceeds from, the disposition itself on which depends our happiness or misery, and consequently our conduct and deportment in life, is still the same. It is still open for me, as well as you, to regulate my behaviour by my experience of past events. And if you affirm that while a divine providence is allowed, and a supreme distributive justice in the universe, I ought to expect some more particular reward of the good, and punishment of the bad, beyond the ordinary course of events, I here find the same fallacy which I have before endeavoured to detect. You persist in imagining that if we grant that divine existence, for which you so earnestly contend, you may safely infer consequences from it, and add something to the experienced order of nature, by arguing from the attributes which you ascribe to your gods. You seem not to remember that all your reasonings on this subject can only be that

supposition, since it is impossible for you to know anything of the cause, but that you have antecedently not inferred, but discovered to the full, in the effect.

109 But what must a philosopher think of those vain reasoners who instead of regarding the present scene of things as the sole object of their contemplation, so far reverse the whole course of nature, as to render this life merely a passage to something farther, a porch which leads to a greater and vastly different building, a prologue which serves only to introduce the piece, and give it more grace and propriety? Whence do you think can such philosophers derive their idea of the gods? From their own conceit and imagination surely. For if they derived it from the present phenomena, it could never point to anything farther, but must be exactly adjusted to them. That the divinity may possibly be endow'd with attributes, which we have never seen exerted, may be governed by principles of action which we cannot discover to be satisfied, all this will freely be allowed. But still this is mere possibility and hypothesis. We never can have reason to ascribe any attributes or

114. There is still no circumstance replied
I which you seem to have overlooked. Though
I should allow your premises I must deny your
conclusion. You conclude, that religious doc-

beyond what appear in the ordinary course
nature. Whether this reasoning of theirs be just
or not no matter its influence on their life

reasonably follow in inferences of this nature
both the effect and cause must bear a similarity
and resemblance to other effects and causes
which we know of which we have found in
many instances to be combined with the choicest
I believe that your reflection to pursue the
consequences of this principle. I shall just ob-
serve, that as the arguments of Epicurus al-
ways oppose the necessity of a Deity
lar and unparalleled to be the proof of a Deity
cause less singular and unparalleled your
reasons upon the opposition seem at
least, to merit no attention. There is, I
some difficulty how we can ever return from
the cause to the effect and reasoning from our
idea of the former infer any assertion on the
latter. I may add to this.

Sect. XII Of the academical or
sceptical Philosophy

PART I

of the labors of society in no respect, more easy
and secure.

After all, I may perhaps, agree to your general
conclusion in favor of liberty though upon
different premises from those, which you en-
deavour to found it. I think, that the talent
to tolerate every principle of philosophy nor is
there an instance, that any government has us-
fered in political interests by hindering
There is enthusiasm among philosophers
their doctrines are not every allusion to the peo-
ple and no restraint can be put upon their rea-
sonings, but that must be of dangerous conse-
quence to the sciences, and even to the state, by
opening the way of persecution and oppression
in politics, where the generality of mankind are
more deeply interested and concerned.

5. But there occurs to me (continued I) with
regard to your main topic, a difficulty, which I
shall just propose you without insisting
lest lead into reasonings of too nice and deli-
cate nature. I word, I am chagrined whether
it be possible for a cause to be known only by its

116 There is not greater number of philosophi-
cal reasons, displayed upon any subject, than
those which prove the existence of Deity and
refute the fallacies of *atheism* and yet the most
religious philosophers still dispute whether *God*
can be so believed as to be a perfect being
without Himself shall reconcile these contradic-
tions. This labyrinth is a hard road
to clear the old ideas of deities and giants, en-
tertained through last doctines with regard to the
existence of these monsters.

The *Scripture* is an authority in religious
naturally provokes the indignation of all di-
vers and general philosophers though it is re-
sisted by some men more than any such absurd
unconcerned the matter will had no op-
portunity to be examined in any subject of
fact or speculation. This begins a
universal question. What is meant by scepticism. And
how far it is possible to push these philosophical
principles to doubt and uncertainty.

There is species of scepticism, antecedent to all
study and philosophy which is much inculcated
by Des Cartes and others, as so ere given

against error and precipitate judgment.
It recommends universal doubt not only of
all former opinions and principles, but also
of every faculties of whose utility say they
we must assure ourselves, by chain of reason-
ing deduced from some original principle which
cannot possibly be fallacious and useful. But
this is the very thing which is
which has preoccupied above others, that ar-
rived not down to us if there were,

cause or object, that has ever fallen under our
observation. It is only when two persons of bi-
jects are found to be consistently combined that
can enter the one from the other and where
an effect present, which was entirely singular

cause. If experience and observation and anal-
ogy be, indeed, the only guides which we can

another foot which also left its impression though effaced by time or other accidents. Here we mount from the effect to the cause and descending again from the cause infer alterations in the effect but this is not a continuation of the same simple chain of reasoning. We comprehend in this case a hundred other experiences and observations concerning the usual figure and members of that species of animal without which this method of argument must be considered as fallacious and sophistical.

113 The case is not the same with our reasonings from the works of nature. The Deity is known to us only by his productions and is a single being in the universe not comprehended under any species or genus from whose experienced attributes or qualities we can by analogy infer any attribute or quality in him. As the universe shews wisdom and goodness we infer wisdom and goodness. As it shews a particular degree of these perfections we infer a particular degree of them precisely adapted to the effect which we examine. But farther attributes or farther degrees of the same attributes we can never be authorised to infer or suppose by any rules of just reasoning. Now without some such licence of supposition it is impossible for us to argue from the cause or infer any alteration in the effect beyond what has immediately fallen under our observation. Greater good produced by this Being must still prove a greater degree of goodness a more impartial distribution of rewards and punishments must proceed from a greater regard to justice and equity. Every supposed addition to the works of nature makes an addition to the attributes of the Author of nature and consequently being entirely unsupported by any reason or argument can never be admitted but as mere conjecture and hypothesis.¹

The great source of our mistake in this subject and of the unbounded licence of conjecture which we indulge is that we tacitly consider ourselves as in the place of the Supreme Being and conclude that he will on every occasion

In general I think it is established as a maxim that the ends which are naturally the part of the effects must be impossible to infer any effect from the use of the qualities which are requisite to produce it.

observe the same conduct which we ourselves in his situation would have embraced as reasonable and eligible. But besides that the ordinary course of nature may convince us that almost everything is regulated by principles and maxims very different from ours besides this I say it must evidently appear contrary to all rules of analogy to reason from the intentions and projects of men to those of a Being so different and so much superior. In human nature there is a certain experienced con-

tinuity from experience to infer another and draw a long chain of conclusions concerning his past or future conduct. But this method of reasoning can never have place with regard to a Being so remote and incomprehensible who bears much less analogy to any other being in the universe than the sun to a waxen taper and who discovers himself only by some faint traces or outlines beyond which we have no authority to ascribe to him any attribute or perfection. What we imagine to be a superior perfection may really be a defect. Or were it ever so much a perfection the ascribing of it to the Supreme Being where it appears not to have been really exerted to the full in his works savours more of flattery and panegyric than of just reasoning and sound philosophy. All the philosophy therefore in the world and all the religion which is nothing but a species of philosophy will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course of experience or give us measures of conduct and behaviour different from those which are furnished by reflections on common life. No new fact can ever be inferred from the religious hypothesis no event foreseen or foretold no reward or punishment expected or dreaded beyond what is already known by practice and habit.

the philosophical disputes concerning metaphysics and religion

it is not most difficult to engage in this but in cases where it is

See can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible aspect of nature for that led us to a genuine discovery, which is acknowledged false and even erroneous. And it justifies this pretended philosophical system, by chain of clear and convincing argument, or even an appearance of argument, exceeds the power of all human capacity.

But an argument can't be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects, surely distinct from them, though resembling them (if that be possible) and cannot arise either from the memory of the mind itself, or from the suggestion of some internal and unknown principle, or from some other cause still more unknown to us. It is acknowledged, that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise not from an external, as in dreams, madness, and other diseases. And nothing can be more desperate than to maintain in which body should so perpetuate upon mind as ever to convert an image of itself substance, supposed of so different, and even contrary nature.

It questions of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them. How small this question be determined? By experience surely as all other questions of like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach an experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.

It has recourse to the eternity of the Supreme Being, in order to prove the eternity of our senses, is surely making every unexpected circuit. If his eternity were not adjoined in this manner, our senses would be entirely infallible because it is not possible that he can ever deceive. Not to mention, that if the external world be once called in question, we shall be lost to find arguments, by which we may prove the existence of that Being or any of his attributes.

This is the topic, therefore, in which the profounder and more philosophical scepticisms will always triumph, when they endeavor to introduce an eternal doubt in all objects of human knowledge, and inquiry. Do you follow the passions and propensities of nature may they be in assistance to the exercise of sense. But I ask you, believe that the every perception or sensible image is the external object. Do you declare this principle in order to embrace more rational opinion, that the perceptions are only representations of something external. You

here depart from your natural propensities and more obvious sentiments and yet are not able to satisfy your reason which can never find any convincing argument from experience to prove, that the perceptions are connected with any external objects.

2. There is another sceptical topic of a like nature derived from the most profound philosophy which might merit our attention, were it requested to dig so deep, in order to discover arguments and reasonings, which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by modern enquirers, that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard soft, hot, cold, white black, &c. are merely secondary and exist not in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model which they represent. If this be allowed, with regard to secondary qualities, it must also follow with regard to the supposed primary qualities of extension and solidity nor can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former. The idea of extension is naturally required from the senses of sight and feeling.

And if all the qualities supposed by the senses, be in the mind not in the object the same conclusion must reach the idea of extension which is wholly dependent on the sensible and as of the ideas of secondary qualities. Nothing can save us from this conclusion, but the assertion that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by the intellect, an opinion, which, if we examine it occur tell we shall find it be unintelligible, and even absurd. An extension, that is neither imaginable nor sensible, cannot possibly be conceived and a tangible or visible extension, which is neither hard nor soft black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. Let any man try conceive a triangle in general, which is neither large nor small nor has any particular length or proportion of sides and he will soon perceive the absurdity of all the scholastic notions with regard to abstraction and general ideas.

This argument is drawn from Dr Berkeley and indeed most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, but are not accepted. It professes, however in his title page (and undoubtedly with great truth) that he composed his book against the scepticisms as well as against the atheisms and free thinkers. But that all his arguments, though otherwise wise in indeed, are in reality merely sceptical appears from this, that they amount to no exact and precise conclusion. Their only effect is cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.

could we advance a step beyond it but by the use of those very faculties of which we are supposed to be already diffident. The Cartesian doubt therefore were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) would be entirely incurable and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject.

It must however be confessed that this species of scepticism when more moderate may be understood in a very reasonable sense and is a necessary preparative to the study of philosophy by preserving a proper impartiality in our judgments and weaning our mind from all those prejudices which we may have imbibed from education or rash opinion. To begin with clear and self-evident principles to advance by timorous and sure steps to review frequently our conclusions and examine accurately all their consequences though by these means we shall make both a slow and a short progress in our systems are the only methods by which we can ever hope to reach truth and attain a proper stability and certainty in our determinations.

117 There is another

of their mental faculties or their unfitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of speculation about which they are commonly employed. Even our very senses are brought into dispute by a certain species of philosophers and the maxims of common life are subjected to the same doubt as the most profound principles or conclusions of metaphysics and theology. As these paradoxical tenets (if they may be called tenets) are to be met with in some philosophers and the refutation of them in several they naturally excite our curiosity and make us enquire into the arguments on which they may be founded.

I need not insist upon the trivial topics against the existence of our organs on numberless occasions the appearance of an oar in water the various aspects of objects according to their different distances the double images which arise from the pressing one eye with many other appearances are only corrected their evidence by reason and by considerations derived from the nature of the medium the distance of the object and the dispos-

tion of the organ in order to render them within their sphere the proper criteria of truth and falsehood. There are other more profound arguments against the senses which admit not of so easy a solution.

118 It seems evident that men are carried by a natural instinct or prepossession to repose faith in their senses and that without any reasoning or even almost before the use of reason there exists a natural belief in the existence of objects independent of our perception.

certain any suspicion that the one are nothing but representations of the other. This very table which we see and which we feel hard to be believed to exist independent of our perception and to be something external to our mind which perceives it. Our presence bestows not being on it our absence does not

But this universal and primary opinion of all

men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception and that the senses are only the inlets through which these images are conveyed without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object. The table which we see seems to diminish as we remove farther from it but the real table which exists independent of us suffers no alteration.

Therefore it is to the reason that the existences which we consider when

1 dependent

119 So far then as we are necessitated by reasoning to contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature and to embrace a new system with regard to the evidence of our senses. But here philosophy finds herself extremely embarrassed when she would justify this new system and obviate the cavils and objections of the sceptic.

conclusions of geometry or the science of quantity

6. The sceptical object is not *murdered* nor, or the reasons for concerning matter of fact, are either *far* or *right* *philosophical*. The popular objections are derived from the natural weakness of human understanding, the contradictory passions, which have been entertained in different ages and nations the varieties of our judgement in sickness and health, youth and old age, prosperity and adversity, the perpetual contradiction of the particular man's passions and sentiments with many other topics of that kind. It needless to insist farther on this head. These objections are but weak. For as, in common life reason every moment concerning it and experience, and cannot possibly sustain, without continually improving this species of argument, any popular objections, derived from thence must be insufficient to destroy that doctrine. The great benefit of Pyrrh is, the excess of principles of scepticism is action, and employment, and the occupations of common life. These principles multiply the triumphs in the schools, where it is, indeed, difficult, if not impossible, to resist them. But as soon as they leave the shade, and by the presence of the real objects, which actuate our passions and sentiments, are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, the human like smoke and less the most determined sceptic in the same condition as the mortals.

7. The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more probability. It seems to me not impossible to do this better

found researches. Here he seems to have ample matter of triumph. He is justly assiduous, that allows of no easy matter of fact which is in itself more of sense than many is.

requently connected together that we have no argument to convince us, that objects, which have our perception been frequently enjoyed will likewise in other instances, be enjoyed in the same manner and that nothing leads us to this inference but custom, a certain instinct of our nature which is indeed difficult to resist but which, like other instincts, may be fallacious and deceitful. While the sceptic insists upon these topics, he is without force, rather indeed, his weakness and weakness is made manifest, the intention to destroy all assurance and order

in the

8. For here is the chief and most confused objection to scepticism, that no durable good can ever result from that which remains in itself force and power. We need only ask such a sceptic, *What has he means this? And what he proposes by all this curious search?* He is immediately told what to answer. A Coper

beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything that all human life must perish, ere his principles universally and indubitably prevail. All discourse, all that would immediately cease and men remain in that thargy till necessities of nature unsatisfied prevent them from misery. It is true, so far as the human mind is concerned, it is to be dreaded. Nature is always too strong for principle. And though Pyrrhonian may throw himself into the most violent and extraordinary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings the first and most universal event in his life is flight. All his doubts and scruples, and all the human same every point of time and peculiar view with the philosophers of every other sect with those who are concerned in his life in

cropped the human presence, with the presence of science further. It certainly concerns all lovers of science not to expose themselves to the ridicule and contempt of the ignorant by their conclusions and it seems the easiest solution of these difficulties.

123 Thus the first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this that such an opinion if rested on natural instinct is contrary to reason and if referred to reason is contrary to natural instinct and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it to convince an impartial enquirer The second objection goes farther and represents this opinion as contrary to reason at least if it be a principle of reason that all sensible qualities are in the mind not in the object Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary you in a manner annihilate it and leave only a certain unknown inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions a notion so imperfect that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it

PART II

124 It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the sceptics to destroy reason by argument and ratiocination yet is this the grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes They endeavour to find objections both to our abstract reasonings and to those which regard matter of fact and existence

The chief objection against all abstract reasonings is derived from the ideas of space and time ideas which in common life and to a careless view are very clear and intelligible but when they pass through the scrutiny of the profound sciences (and they are the chief object of these sciences) afford principles which seem full of absurdity and contradiction No priestly dogmas invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of extension with its consequences as they are pompously displayed by all geometers and metaphysicians with a kind of triumph and exultation A real quantity infinitely

is not to support because it lacks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason But what renders the matter more extraordinary is that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning the clearest and

What material points are not deduced less need there by the imagination These images then which are present to the fancy or senses are absolutely indivisible and consequently must be allowed to be the

most natural nor is it possible for us to allow the premises without admitting the consequences. Nothing can be more convincing and satisfactory than all the conclusions concerning the properties of circles and triangles and yet when these are once received how can we deny that the angle of contact between a circle and its tangent is infinitely less than any rectilinear angle that as you may increase the diameter of the circle in infinitum this angle of contact becomes still less even in infinitum and that the angle of contact between other curves and their tangents may be infinitely less than those between any circle and its tangent and so on in infinitum The demonstration of these principles seems as unexceptionable as that which proves the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right ones though the latter opinion be natural and easy and the former big with contradiction and absurdity Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense which without the assistance of any sceptic gives her a diffidence

is fled and confounded that she scarcely can pronounce with certainty and assurance concerning any one object

125 The absurdity of these bold determinations of the abstract sciences seems to become if possible still more palpable with regard to time than extension An infinite number of real parts of time passing in succession and exhausted one after another appears so evident a contradiction that no man one should think whose judgement is not corrupted instead of being improved by these sciences could ever be able to admit of it

Yet still reason must remain restless and unquiet even with regard to that scepticism to which she is drawn by these seeming absurdities and contradictions How any clear distinct idea can contain circumstances, contradictory to itself or to any other clear distinct idea is absolutely incomprehensible and perhaps, as absurd as any proposition which can be formed So that nothing can be more sceptical or more full of doubt and hesitation than this scepticism itself which arises from some of the paradoxes

material cause
effect is
to also
composed
an infinite number of those infinitely small parts
extension on which are still proposed infinitely divided
11

CHAPTER III

hardly mere appearances. But as all other ideas are clearly distinct and differ from each other, can ever advance farther by our utmost scrutiny than to observe this diversity; and, by a serious reflection, pronounce not this not to be a truth. O if there be any difficulty in these decisions, it proceeds entirely from the undetermined meaning of words, which is corrected by juster definitions. That if *quæstio fidei* cannot be known, it is the terms be ever so exactly defined, with the truest reasoning and inquiry. But to convince us of this proposition, that *as far as they can be, as just as it is necessary to define the terms, and explain the subject* is a relation of propriety. This proposition is, indeed, nothing but more imperfect demonstration. It is the same case with all those pretended philosophical axioms, which may be found in every other branch of learning, except the sciences of quantity and number, and these may as easily be proved the only proper objects of knowledge and demonstration.

3. All other inquiries of men regard only matters of fact and existence, and these are evidently incapable of demonstration. Whatever may and be the negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The non-existence of any being without exception, is as clear and distinct as a demonstration. The proposition, which affirms not to be, however false, is no less conceivable and intelligible, than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition, which is not true, there confused and unintelligible. That the cube root of 64 is equal to the half of 10, is false proposition, and can never be distinctly conceived. But that Cæsar or the angel Gabriel, any being never existed, may be false proposition, but still is perfectly conceivable and implies no contradiction.

The existence therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect, and these arguments are fundamentally perfect. If reason produces anything may appear to produce anything. The falling of pebbles may for what we know extend

through the sun, or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect, and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. Such is the foundation of moral reasoning, which forms the greatest part of human knowledge, and is the source

Moral
uticular
regard
tory

The sciences, which treat of geometry, astronomy, politics, natural philosophy, physics, chemistry &c. where the qualities, causes and effects of a whole species of objects are required into.

Divinity or Theology, as it proves the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular partly concerning general facts. It has foundation in reason, so far as it is supported by experience. But is best and most solid foundation is faith and divine revelation.

Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment. Beauty is either moral or natural, is felt more properly than perceived. Or if the reason concerning it, and not our taste, is standard we regard ourselves, it with general tastes of mankind, or some such fact, which may be the object of reasoning and inquiry.

When we are persuaded of these principles, what have we must make. If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance let us ask, *Does it state any truth as it really is, or only a quarrel of words? Does it state any permanent law or necessary matter of fact and existence? No. Command it then that flames of fire can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.*

1

Why cause the sun to move — —
two can assign.

any philosophical res

130 Another

pricism
d and
rthou

amusement and can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind who must act and reason and believe though they are not able by their most diligent enquiry to satisfy themselves concerning the foundation of these operations or to remove the objections which may be raised against them

PART III

129 There is indeed a more mitigated scepticism or *academical* philosophy which may be both durable and useful and which may in part be the result of this Pyrrhonism or *excessive* scepticism when its undistinguished doubts are in some measure corrected by common sense and reflection The greater part of mankind are naturally apt to be affirmative and dogmatical in their opinions and while they see objects only on one side and have no idea of any counterpoising argument they throw themselves precipitately into the principles to which they are inclined nor have they

as suspends the reaction They are therefore impatient

by the violence of their affirmations and obstinacy of their belief But could such dogmatical reasoners become sensible of the strange infirmities of human understanding even in its most perfect state and when most accurate and cautious in its determinations such a reflection would naturally inspire them with more modesty and reserve and diminish their fond opinion of themselves and their prejudice against antagonists The illiterate may reflect on the disposition of the learned who amidst all the advantages of

augustines and obstinacy a small tincture of Pyrrhonism might abate the pride by showing them that the few advantages which they may have attained over the fellows are but inconsiderable if compared with the universal perplexity and confusion which is inherent in human nature In general there is a degree of doubt and caution and modesty which in all kinds of scrutiny and decision ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner

and scruples is the limitation of our enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding The imagination of man is naturally sublime delighted with whatever is remote and extraordinary and running without control into the most distant parts of space and time in order to avoid the objects which custom has rendered too familiar to it A correct

as fall under daily practice and expence leaving the more sublime topics to the embellishment of poets and orators or to the arts of priests and politicians To bring us to so salutary a determination nothing can be more serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt and of the impossibility that anything but the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it Those who have a propensity to philosophy will still continue their researches because they reflect that besides the immediate pleasure attending such an occupation philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life methodized and corrected But they will never be tempted to go beyond common life so long as they consider the imperfection of those faculties which they employ the nearer they reach and their inaccurate operations While we cannot give a satisfactory reason

a quiet limitation which we may form with regard to the origin of souls and the situation of nature from and to eternity?

This narrow limitation indeed of our enquiries is in every respect so reasonable that it suffices to make the slight extension of the natural powers of the human mind and to compare them with their objects in order to recommend it to us We shall then find what are the proper subjects of science and enquiry

the more sophistry and illusion As the component parts frequently adumbrate entirely similar their relations become intricate and involved and nothing can be more useful as well as useful than to trace by a variety of mediums the equality or inequality through

